The Tyrrhenian Way of War: war, social power, and the state in Central Italy (c. 900 – 343 BC)
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Abstract

This thesis examines warfare, social power, and the state in central Italy for the period between 900 and 343 BC. The goal of this research is to better understand how warfare fit into the dialogue of social power in Etruria and Rome. This is achieved through the fulfilment of a number of aims. The first is to understand the patterns of warfare present in central Italy, as these can help us better understand the social aspects of conflict in the region. The project assumes that the practise of warfare is important for understanding its role in this dialogue, and thus an analysis of arms, armour, and tactics is also necessary. The second aim is to understand how warfare and politics affected one another. The condottieri paradigm is challenged and the strength of central Italian states asserted. The third aim is to explain the interaction between warfare and economic power, and the interaction between these two aspects of social power. The fourth aim is similar, and analyzes the connections that are visible between warfare and religion.

Through these aims, this project creates a clearer picture of warfare in Etruria and Rome from the Iron Age to the Archaic Period. It argues that the exchange and dialogue of social power was not alienated from the state, and that independent warfare would have been of less value than it was probably worth. To this end, the Servian Constitution is re-examined and the idea of an early Roman hoplite phalanx, and single class army, is rejected. The original contribution of this work is in reasserting the position of the state in Tyrrhenian warfare and rejecting the idea that private interest was more powerful.

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1 All dates BC unless otherwise noted.
Preface

Classical texts cited are based on the Teubner editions, unless otherwise noted. Translations are all my own, except where cited. Classical author abbreviations follow the Oxford Classical Dictionary, 4th edition, except the following:

*Homeric Hymns* = *HH*

Note also:

Acknowledgements

I came to love the Romans not through studying classics and ancient history at school, or even by intention, but rather through a renewed passion in my second year of university for history, specifically that of Renaissance Italy. After discovering that a career in the hard sciences was not to my liking, I decided to exercise an old passion, developed through an unnatural attachment to the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, particularly his two extant plays and the novella, *La favola di Belfagor Arcidiavolo*. After having begun my studies anew as an historian, I was guided away from the world of Florence to what I am now convinced I was meant to study, Ancient Rome. This was because of the influence and guidance of Dr. Benedict and Christy Lowe, who were the only connection to the ancient world at Western Oregon University.

By the advice of Dr. Lowe I came to Cardiff to further my study and passion through a master’s degree. The completion of this degree, and my hopeful continuation to further academic life, is due in large part to Drs. Louis Rawlings and Kate Gilliver, without whose passionate guidance I doubt that I would have pursued a PhD. The completion of this thesis, and my progress in scholarly research, owes itself, one hundred percent, to the supervision and insights of Drs. Louis Rawlings and Guy Bradley, my doctoral supervisors. I owe almost as much to every other member of the faculty at Cardiff University’s School of History and Archaeology, in particular, Prof. James Whitley.

The friendship that I have found in my fellow post-graduate students at Cardiff and abroad has kept me going even when I thought I could not. Foremost amongst these friends has been Robert Brown, whose passion for Byzantine history eclipses even my own for the Romans. Cezary Kuciewicz, Roel Konijnendijk, and Matthew Lloyd have been instrumental in helping me better understand the world of Hellenic warfare. Dr. Valeriu Predoi has helped to ground me with continual discussions of the world of physics. Above and beyond all of the assistance that my friends have provided, the only reason that this thesis has come into existence is the assistance, in all aspects of life, of my parents, Curtiss and Patricia, whose love, even whilst living thousands of miles away, kept me going.

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2 Text and numeration are those of the version of the text edited by A. Stäuble (2004), Franco Cesati Editore, Florence.
1. Introduction

The topic of warfare in classical antiquity is an increasingly popular avenue of research, primarily in historical studies. This popularity is certainly on the rise, and the recent launching of a new series from Cambridge University Press, 'Armies of the Ancient World,' reflects the academic interest in the topic.\(^3\) Within this ever expanding body of research, early Italy has received relatively little attention. The seminal works on the subject are now over thirty years old, and represent a dated approach to the topic.\(^4\) Since the publication of these two monographs considerable research has been done on the societies of central Italy and the societies of the wider Mediterranean which influenced the development of Etruria and Latium. Significant in this discussion is the progression of research on Greek warfare and its development throughout the archaic period, whose impact has only been lightly felt in research on Italy. The current work aims to begin the process of filling this gap and bringing the study of central Italian warfare into the modern world of scholarship.

In order to accomplish this aim, a number of methodologies will be adopted and adapted to better understand the evidence available. The period under investigation requires a number of different types of evidence to be analyzed cooperatively to reach a thorough understanding. The earliest temporal periods treated by this thesis are known to us only through the archaeological record. Later periods, especially the closer the study comes to its end date of 343 BC,\(^5\) are known through both archaeological and historical evidence. Even when there is historical evidence available to the researcher, it is a period which is hotly contested, and the reliability of the historical narrative is questionable. Because of all of these issues, a thorough

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\(^3\) The first volume in the series has recently been published, Fischer-Bovet (2014).


\(^5\) All subsequent dates are BC unless otherwise stated.
and delicately constructed methodology must be adopted and explained. The following chapter outlines the general approach of the later analysis and then discusses the individual methodologies relating to each type of evidence being used in the study. The concluding discussion of this chapter explains how the different methodologies will be used together to gain a complete understanding of warfare's relationship to society and state in Tyrrhenian Italy through the employment and adaptation of the IEMP model of social power put forward by M. Mann.

1.1 Thematic Introduction

Warfare is a topic which is approached by many scholars in different ways. Traditional methods of approaching warfare in past societies can be broken into two relatively broad groups: tactical and grand strategic. The first type of study concerns itself with the 'battlefield reality' of pre-contemporary war. Studies of this kind focus on identifying troop types, usages on the battlefield, and often, if not always, the arms and armour of the belligerents involved. Classic studies on early Roman warfare exemplify this approach, and the study of tactics ends up as the focus of the work.\(^6\) Often, the society behind the method of warfare is forgotten or discussed as it suits discussions of tactics. The progress of tactical studies of this kind about the Greek world has yielded interesting results which have impacted on both the understanding of the practise of warfare and the societal implications of that warfare.\(^7\) The impact of these studies has been felt in a reduced way in research on early Italy.\(^8\)

The importance of tactical studies, though, on pre-literate societies is dubious. The interpretation of a spear-head, however thorough, is limited in its

\(^6\) Nilsson (1929).


\(^8\) Rosenstein (2010) and Smith (2006), 288.
usefulness. The same can be said of all types of arms and armour. Iconographic representations can be used to help fill the gap, as has been exemplified by some scholars in the interpretation of Greek warfare, but we lack depictions which are easily identified as battle scenes in Etruscan and early Roman art. Thus, earlier interpretations of Etruscan and early Roman tactics have been based on each particular author’s understanding of contemporary (ancient) Greek tactics, known vicariously, to readers both ancient and modern, through later, Classical, literature.

In recent years, it has become fashionable in the history of ancient warfare to approach the subject from the ‘Face of Battle’ approach, based on the work of the same name by John Keegan. This approach emphasizes the experience of soldiers in combat, which is quite heavily predicated on a wealth of literary evidence. Gregory Daly has used this methodology to write the first original take on the Battle of Cannae in recent scholarship. The period analyzed by this thesis, however, is not a good candidate for this approach as we do not have reliable and detailed historical accounts of battles. It is only in the concluding chapters of this thesis that the tactical implications of Etruscan and early Roman evidence is fully discussed and this aspect of warfare purposefully takes a back seat to the otherwise cultural approach adopted throughout the rest of this study.

The second traditional approach to the historical study of warfare is the 'grand strategic' method, which analyses warfare through the eyes of strategic outcomes. In the study of the ancient world, this type of analysis was championed by

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9 Some efforts seem fruitful, if not wholly convincing, i.e. Small (2000).
10 van Wees (2000).
11 Keegan (1976).
12 Ibid., 13-77.
13 Daly (2002). A shorter study, that is still effective in its aim, has been published by Phil Sabin (2000).
the extremely controversial work of Luttwak.\textsuperscript{14} A study of this scope would be impossible for the time period under investigation. Like the ‘Face of Battle’ approach, it requires a thorough documentation in the guise of narrative history, as well as documentary sources such as plentiful epigraphy and ‘non-official’ historical evidence. Although one could attempt to discuss a specific military-political strategy in late archaic and early classical central Italy (c. 509-343) it would be very dangerous, and the results of one of these studies have been highly criticized.\textsuperscript{15}

Neither of these methodologies is appropriate for this study. Evidence is lacking for both of these approaches to come to a fruitful conclusion. In order for this study to yield new, and important, results, a more progressive methodology is adopted. This methodology can be called a cultural approach to warfare. Rather than regarding warfare as a separate entity from culture more generally, this thesis approaches warfare as another element of culture. It exists alongside all other elements of a society: art, myth, politics, religion, trade, and so forth. While I do not disagree with the idea that 'war was central to ancient societies,'\textsuperscript{16} I do not believe that a fruitful study of warfare can be removed from the other elements of those societies. While this study cannot claim to be completely divorced from the more traditional approaches to warfare, its central methodological underpinning hopes to take 'into consideration the role of culturally unique dispositions, proximate causation, and agency in the analysis of social process,' primarily warfare.\textsuperscript{17} To further discuss this methodology I must first define war/warfare in the context of this study and then illustrate its perceived position within society.

\textsuperscript{14} Luttwak (1979).
\textsuperscript{15} Alföldi (1965).
\textsuperscript{16} Fagan and Trundle (2010), 1.
\textsuperscript{17} Nielsen and Walker (2009b), 4.
What defines warfare and differentiates it from other forms of violent interaction is a blurred space in the academic mind. Brian Ferguson provides a succinct definition, that war is 'organized, purposeful group action, directed against another group... involving the actual or potential application of lethal force.'\(^\text{18}\) He has gone on to clarify his believe that war is more than the action, that it is a condition which can exist between two societies, and that it can have correlates in 'every dimension of culture.'\(^\text{19}\) The idea that war must be an acknowledged condition is one that is difficult, if not impossible, to see in the archaeological record. Destruction on two sides of a 'border' may be a sign of this mutually acknowledged state, but it could have a number of other explanations. For the purposes of our analysis, ‘war’ will be seen in a broader sense. War, here defined, is the act of aggression which may or may not lead to violence but often leads to a transfer of material or geographic resources between the aggressor and the target. But the prospect that there are correlates of war in other dimensions of culture is useful to keep in mind.

The evidence analyzed in this thesis regards the period c. 900 - 343. These two dates represent the 'traditional' dating of the beginning of the Iron Age (Villanovan) and the beginning of the First Samnite War. These chronological bounds have been set for a number of reasons, the most important of which is the continuity seen in the archaeological record during this time. At the beginning of these bounds, the great cities of central Italy began to take shape. This is the transitional period between bronze and iron being the predominant materials used in tools and weapons, and it is shortly after this period that urbanization begins to take hold in central Italy.\(^\text{20}\) The continuity of these sites, and in many ways the material

\(^{18}\) Ferguson (1984), 5.

\(^{19}\) Idem. (1990), 26.

culture which went along with them, lasts throughout the historical period. But there is a logical reason for the ending date of 343.

This study concludes with the first ‘long distance’ war in the history of the Roman Republic, and the beginnings of its empire. In the period leading up to 343 we can start to talk about an end to the Tyrrhenian way of war. The first major shock came in 396 when the Romans destroyed the power base, if not the power, of their rival city in the Tiber Valley, Veii. This is a momentous occasion even for central Italy, as it is the first documented instance of two primary centres coming into conflict with the result that one is destroyed. The second major event is the Gallic sack of Rome, traditionally dated to 390, which revealed some of the weaknesses of Tyrrhenian warfare and, again, threatened a primary centre. The third, and final, even which forms the conclusion to the period under study is the beginning of the First Samnite War (343). The outbreak of this war, and the traditional account of Roman involvement, shows that the Roman state had evolved to the point that it could insert itself into the affairs of peoples outside of a short marching distance from the city, and probably signalled the arrival of the Roman army as it was known throughout the Middle Republic.

It may seem odd to some that a work covering both the Etruscans and the Latins would be a favourable option. Monographs tend to carry titles such as ‘A Critical History of Early Rome’ or ‘The Etruscans,’ rather than a single volume dedicated to a detailed history of both.21 Some works purport to present a broader history with their titles, such as ‘The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000-264 BC),’ but they tend to focus on Rome,

21 Forsythe (2005) and Barker and Rasmussen (1998), respectively.
for reasons of evidence and academic training. Looking deeper into continental scholarship, however, leads us to two fundamental monographs on the subject of Tyrrenian warfare, those of Saulnier and Stary. Both of these works look at the warfare of both the Etruscans and the Romans. Besides just following earlier studies, there are deeper reasons to study the warfare of these peoples together, the evidence.

The literary tradition holds that the Etruscans and Romans were particularly indebted to one another, even if they were known to later authors as two separate ‘ethnic’ groups. Etrusco-Roman dependence supposedly ran so deep that ancient authors held that there was a dynasty of Etruscan kings which ruled in early Rome (Livy 1.33-44), and that the early Roman army was modelled after an ‘Etruscan phalanx’ (Diod. Sic. 23.2.1). Even if this ancient belief does not hold up to modern scrutiny, there is something to be said of the similarity of conditions in Etruria and Latium. The archaeological evidence shows that rather than being two distinct ‘ethnic’ groups (Etruscans and Latins), there was much cultural overlap.

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22 Cornell (1995). Many of the longer monographs on the period in English tend to be written by classicists (philologists in the past) rather than archaeologists, thus Rome is an easier subject to approach based on their training. This has caused some problems of interpretation, see the brief but profound statement in Spivey and Stoddart (1990), 127.

23 Saulnier (1980) and Stary (1981). Add to this numerous other titles on other subjects, principal to our study Lubchansky (2005).

24 Along with the Etruscans and Romans, Stary includes the ager Faliscus, Umbria, Picenum, and the Abruzzo, thus rounding out his ‘Mittelitalien’.

25 Speaking of ethnic groups, and ethnic identity in antiquity as a whole, is, in my opinion, anachronistic. On the division of the ‘ethnic groups’ of ancient Italy in the literary evidence, see Bourdin (2012), 25-44, 69-77, 195-214, 216-224.

26 Cf. Cornell (1995), 151-72; Poucet (2000). See especially Cornell (1995), 170; 432 n. 72, for the ineditum Vaticanum. Note, however, that Livy (8.8) has the ‘Roman phalanx’ being based on that of the Macedonians, showing some of the confusion of the literary tradition.

27 Ampolo (2009). See, however, the comments of Bourdin (2012), 62-66.
character of central Italian settlements.\textsuperscript{28} Linguistically, though, we can divide the two groups on non-anachronistic grounds.\textsuperscript{29} Inscriptions show that the Etruscans spoke a language which was different from that of the Romans, and this was noted in antiquity (Dion. Hal. \textit{Ant. Rom.} 1.30.2). These differences in language, however, should not be exploited by attaching retrojected ethnographic terms to regions and thus restricting academic studies by these boundaries.\textsuperscript{30}

Beyond theoretical arguments there is a very practical reason to consider the Tyrrhenian region as a whole in a study of warfare. The period in question was not one of conquest or overseas campaigning; it was one of regional conflict and aggression within a semi-closed system: Etruscans and Latins fighting one another for a myriad of reasons.\textsuperscript{31} Therefore the details of warfare being waged by Etruscans and Latins were influenced by one another. And it is through a combined approach that we must proceed with our study.

\section*{1.2 Archaeological Methodologies}

Archaeology in central Italy has been influenced, like the archaeology of ancient warfare in general, by the researches of ancient historians and classical philologists.\textsuperscript{32} Occasionally, as in the case of Andrea Carandini, the analytical connection between archaeological and textual material is too close for practical

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{28} Bourdin (2012), 532-551, has assembled a vast body of evidence on this topic. Two principal types of evidence have helped us to understand the phenomenon. The epigraphic evidence from Etruria, for instance, has shown that family groups could move from one settlement to another and integrate into that society. The historical sources, which favour Rome, give evidence of, especially, elite mobility into the city.
\item \textsuperscript{29} \textit{Ibid.}, 46-59.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Bradley (2000), 113-14 presents a concise argument. For a further argument against assigning strict cultural identity and regionalism to archaeological evidence see the essays in Shennan (1989).
\item \textsuperscript{31} This is not to claim that there were no other groups present in the Tyrrhenian arena during this period, but they did not have as much of an impact in Central Italy as the indigenous populations themselves.
\item \textsuperscript{32} See, recently, Carandini (2012) and Cifani (2012).
\end{itemize}
comfort. Many academics acknowledge that too close of a partnership between these two fields causes circular and poorly reasoned arguments. Critical approaches to the history of Early Rome are often prefaced by a discussion of this problematic connection. The approach taken in this work reflects these concerns and addresses archaeological data and literary evidence as complimentary, but not co-dependent. Sophisticated approaches to warfare through archaeology have become more prevalent in the academic literature in recent years. Much of this interest has come from pre-historians of the New World or the East. A number of these studies address the issue of the origin of warfare in human societies and how this knowledge can help us understand warfare in later periods. This research has been aided by a growing interest in warfare and conflict from anthropologists. The scholars involved in this research have progressively abandoned the techniques of processual archaeology in favour of a more culturally subjective analysis. This post-processual methodology has spawned interesting archaeological approaches to warfare that have looked at topics such as religion, ideology, political complexity, and others. Regarding the ancient Mediterranean, these new approaches have seen less use in examining warfare. Existing archaeological studies of Greece and pre-Roman/Roman Italy that address conflict and warfare have been occupied with somewhat older, more ‘traditional’, questions: tactics, strategy, conquest. This trend

33 For instance, Carandini’s (2009) close association of the foundation myths of Rome with his analysis of the archaeological data.
38 Walker (2009).
39 Cobb and Giles (2009).
40 LeBlanc (2006); Wiessner (2009).
is most probably the direct result of the close connections between classical archaeology and classical philology and ancient history.

The hierarchy of disciplines within classical studies has prevented, to some extent, the diversification of warfare studies in classical archaeology. Historically minded archaeologists have often looked to connect their work with that of ancient historians. The most obvious example of this connection is the study of the ‘hoplite age’ in Greece. The discovery and analysis of pieces of hoplite kit, such as the large round aspis, or the Corinthian helmet, are often predicated on the study of ancient texts. Although this trend seems to be changing, it has influenced the direction of archaeological studies of warfare in the Mediterranean. The present study attempts to evaluate the archaeological evidence of warfare in central Italy independently from the historical evidence, as far as that is possible. Due to the nature of the evidence, however, a continuous archaeological discussion spanning the entire period under investigation is impossible.

The type of evidence available in central Italy, as well, dictates what types of analyses may be undertaken. In the earliest phases of the Iron Age, we possess a considerable corpus of martial artefacts. Much of this data comes from funerary contexts, which forces us to understand these items through the ritual of which they were a part. As funerary practices change, the nature of, and volume of, arms and armour found in mortuary contexts changes. Over time the volume decreases, until it is completely phased out of the burial practices of central Italy. Standing alongside this type of evidence, especially in later periods of this study, is a body of art depicting martial activity. Whilst much art of this nature was produced domestically,

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41 Snodgrass (1965 and 1986); Jarva (1995). On the connections, or lack thereof, between the historical and archaeological disciplines in classical studies, see the essays in Sauer (2004).
42 See, for instance, Brouwers (2010), especially chapters 1-6.
43 Stary (1981) is still the best catalogue of the data.
the impact of Egyptian, Phoenician, and Hellenic motifs and styles must be negotiated to come to an understanding of what the art is saying. In the resulting analysis, we see that martial art in Etruria and Rome was influenced by, but not produced for the same purpose of, the imports which came so readily from the East. In this regard, structuralist and traditional methodologies of artistic interpretation are both important and applied in this work.

1.3 Historical Methodologies

Knowledge, then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas. John Locke

The scholarly debate on the history of early central Italy is mired because of the nature of the evidence. No texts survive, or indeed were probably to have ever existed, from the earliest periods of Etruscan and Roman history. Greek authors whether poets, historians, or philosophers occasionally mention events relating to central Italy in their works from periods considerably earlier than the birth of indigenous Roman historical writing. For instance, Hesiod ‘knew’ of Agrius and Latinos, kings over the ‘famous Tyrrhenians’ in what would be known as Italy (Theog. 1011-1016). In the context of the ongoing conflicts between the Western Greeks and the Carthaginians, with whom groups of Etruscans were allied, we know that poets such as Pindar used their talents to bring further glory to leaders such as Hieron of Syracuse, thus bringing elements of Etruscan history (in this case) into the Greek literary tradition (Pyth. 1.71-76). Circulation of poetry such as this would

46 Locke’s (1993), 291, conception of knowledge is very relevant to the historiographical approach to Early Rome, what some scholars consider knowledge others consider repugnant credulity, whilst what some others consider knowledge still further scholars consider disagreeable hypercriticism.
have brought Italian peoples, under the general moniker ‘Tyrrhenians’, to the attention of Hellenes throughout the Mediterranean.\footnote{On the politics of this type of poetry, and its circulation, see Hornblower (2009). Poems, such as the one cited by Pindar, would have played a part in bringing Italians to the attention of Greeks throughout the diaspora; Antonaccio (2006), 276-283, has pointed to the connections between this poetry and the dedication of arms in Pan-Hellenic sanctuaries.} The historian Promathion wrote a history of Italy which included a discussion of the foundation of Rome (Plut. \textit{Rom.} 2 = \textit{FGrH} 817 F 1).\footnote{Wiseman (1995), 57-58, suggests an early fifth-century date for Promathion, in the time of the conflicts between the Greeks and the Persians.} Hellanicus of Lesbos also discussed Rome’s foundation (\textit{FGrH} 4 F 84) and may have known some Latin.\footnote{Wiseman (2007), 68-69.} By the fourth century, the philosopher Heracleides of Pontus and Aristotle could speak of the Gallic sack of Rome, which Heracleides referred to as a Greek city (Plut. \textit{Cam.} 22).\footnote{Because Heracleides was a Pythagorean, Wiseman (1995), 58, has suggested that his view of Rome may derive from the Pythagorean circles of Croton and Tarentum of the sixth century. Plutarch claims that Aristotle received an accurate (\textit{ἀκριβῆς}) report of the sack. This version held that the hero of Rome was someone named Lucius, which indicates a different version of the story than that in Livy (see below). It is possible, though, that Aristotle’s received version prioritized the religious saviour of the city, Lucius Albinius, who does appear in Livy (5.40).} Dionysius of Halicarnassus cites Hieronymus of Cardia and Timaeus of Tauromenium as the first two historians to have dealt with early Roman history (\textit{Ant. Rom.} 1.6.1). Momigliano famously argued that Timaeus was the Greek historian who ‘discovered’ Rome.\footnote{Momigliano (1959).}

Much of the Greek interest in Italy was devoted to the Etruscans, or ‘Tyrrhenians’. The Etruscans traded with the early migrants from Greece who settled at Pithecusae and Cumae in the Bay of Naples, and continued this economic contact throughout much of the archaic period.\footnote{Ridgway (1988b), 653-61, (1992).} But this contact came at a price, or so we are led to believe, as the Greeks remembered the Etruscans, often, as pirates (cf. \textit{IH} 7 1-11; Strabo 6.2.2). A number of specific battles were remembered, the Battle of Alalia between Phocaean colonists and a combined fleet of Etruscans and Carthaginians (Hdt. 1.166-67) and the Battle of Cumae (Pind. \textit{Pyth.} 1.71-76).

Unnamed cities of Etruria are mentioned in connection with the Athenian assault on
Sicily during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 6.88). Etruscans are even mentioned by Aristotle, in a passage which shows the confused understanding of the Greeks regarding the Etruscans (Pol. 3.9.6 = 1280a). Although the instances of Etruscans in Hellenic historiography are important, they often betray themselves as topoi and must be interpreted delicately. Unfortunately, none of the larger historical narratives which either focused on Italy or included extensive discussions of early Italy have survived.

The first Roman writers to address the history of Rome, and by extension central Italy, worked in the second century BC, but none of their works survive complete. The first Roman to write a history of his own city was Fabius Pictor. Livy refers to him as the most ancient author regarding Roman history (1.44, 55, 2.40 = FRHist T 11). Dionysius says that Fabius Pictor and Lucius Cincius were the first two Romans to relate the early deeds of their city (Ant. Rom. 1.6.2 = FRHist T 12). From Cicero (Div. 1.43 = FRHist T 10) and Dionysius (Ant. Rom. 1.6.2 = FRHist T 12) we know that Fabius wrote his history in Greek. Although Dionysius describes the treatment of early Rome by these authors as brief, what we know of the work points to admirable levels of detail being written about. Beginning with these early historians, Greek ideals and styles of historical writing helped to influence the creation of the narratives of Roman history.

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53 Wiseman (1979), 9-16, gives a succinct analytical summary. See Ogilvie and Drummond (1989), 5-9, for brief biographical descriptions of the early Roman historians. The chronological distance between Archaic Rome and the first Roman historians should not be considered a severe danger in itself. From a global perspective, we know of pre-literate societies which preserved systematic, technical, details and information over a vast span of time, see Zuidema (1982).

54 On Cincius, see FRHist, 1.179-183.

55 The commentators on Fabius Pictor in FRHist, 1.163-166, have pointed to evidence which suggests Fabius’ may also have circulated as a Latin text. Whether or not it was written by the historian in question is impossible to determine but the commentators’ working hypothesis that the same historian wrote both the Greek and the Latin texts seems plausible. Chassignet (1996), lxi-lxii, proposed that the Latin version of Fabius Pictor was a translation of the Greek text, created by the historian himself. FRHist, 1.169-173.

Besides the narratives of Livy and Dionysius, of the annalistic tradition, a handful of brief statements on archaic Rome, in particular, are preserved in antiquarian sources. The antiquarians did not write historical narratives but rather the analysis of certain topics of interest in an historical manner. This type of work has been described as ‘encyclopaedic.’ From our knowledge, the most productive of these ancient scholars was Marcus Terentius Varro, who is supposed to have written between 490 and 620 works throughout his life. Two of the most important antiquarian sources to which we have relatively good access are Festus and Aulus Gellius. Sextus Pompeius Festus compiled a Latin dictionary in the second century AD, of which the portions from M to T have been preserved in one manuscript and the rest in an abbreviated epitome by ‘Paul the Deacon.’ Aulus Gellius wrote a miscellany in the second half of the first century AD, most of which survives. Though claiming that we should not call Gellius an antiquarian ‘scholar’, Stevenson has compared the topical essays found in the *Noctes Atticae* (Gellius’ surviving work) as ‘comparable (in spirit at least) to many of those in early editions of, for example, *The Classical Weekly* or *Quarterly*.’ Although these sources provide alternative versions of some stories, or references to otherwise unknown traditions, events, and rituals, they were still not absence of bias.

Unfortunately, very little of the antiquarian tradition survives, and that which does survive in reference to Early Rome is preserved as quotations and fragments.

Within the Ciceronian corpus, we find a number of his own antiquarian deductions

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58 On the possible research methods of antiquarian writers, see Stevenson (2004), 134-141.  
60 Cornell (1995), 19. Varro’s actual outputs were probably many fewer than this, perhaps around forty works? See FRHist 1.415-423.  
61 FRHist 1.67.  
62 Book eight is lost to us except for chapter headings. On the composition of the work, see Holford-Strevens (2003), 27-47.  
63 Stevenson (2004), 123.  
64 As observed by Bispham (2007), 30-32.
about Archaic Rome that are quite important as they represent the understanding of one of the most learned men of the Late Republic, however there are not many of them.\footnote{Rawson (1972).} The information preserved in these fragments, however, is often considered to be important for our understanding of Early Rome because it is devoid of the problems of the narrative tradition in construction and judgment.\footnote{Cornell (1995), 18-26, Forsythe (2005), 64-65.}

We are left with secondary material which dates, primarily, from the first century BC onward. The usefulness of these authors has often been questioned and academics are split on how much, if any, of the information preserved in these texts is historically valuable.\footnote{Miles (1995), 8-74, has argued that Livy’s history, while certainly having moralizing elements, was also written within a developed historical method.} In the ultra-sceptical camp, it is believed that the narratives of Livy and Dionysius, especially, are not to be trusted for historical fact; some sceptics go so far as likening these texts to ‘science-fiction.’\footnote{Rathje (2004).} On the other hand, there are scholars who believe that we can draw on the preserved narratives quite readily.\footnote{Carandini (1997), 13-37, believes that the continuity of oral tradition would have preserved Early Roman history somewhat well throughout the Republican period. Carandini’s up-to-date views can be found in English now as Carandini (2014). His view is in the extreme as, for example, he reads Romulus as an historical person. The reviews of Wiseman (2000; 2001) are important to read alongside Carandini.} Tim Cornell goes so far as claiming that ‘the most important evidence for the early history of Rome comes from [these] literary sources.’\footnote{Cornell (1995), 1.} There is no consensus among scholars as to how to approach the narratives of Early Rome and central Italy, except that caution must be used in our analyses.\footnote{Forsythe (2005), 59-77. We may look at the trends of Homeric scholarship as a cautionary tale of adhering to any one orthodoxy on the ‘usefulness’ of our narratives. While the influential article of Anthony Snodgrass (1974) had for some time championed the view that we should not see a ‘unified Homeric society’ the arguments against this point of view have continued and the subject of ‘Homeric Greece’ has become a minefield in which scholars are forced into tightly packed orthodoxies on the
The earliest stories of Rome, presented as history by ancient authors, are certainly elaborated legends and myths. Poucet has laboriously demonstrated the problematic nature of this material. By the time that Roman history was being written down, the influence of Greek mythology and the Hellenic obsession with city origins had taken hold of Roman thought and heavily influenced their foundation myths. The problems of the historicity of the foundation stories can be extended to the legends of the early kings of the Regal Period. While the names of the kings are plausible, the deeds associated with each, and the chronology of the period, are problematic.

Especially troubling are the diametrically opposed kings, Numa Pompilius and Tullus Hostilius. The first is credited with the creation of many of Rome’s religious practices (Livy 1.18-21; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.63-73; Plut. Numa 7-20). Numa’s successor, Tullus Hostilius, was his opposite and was known for his conquests and warfare (Livy 1.22; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.2). The history of the later kings, those of the so-called Tarquin dynasty, is considered by some to be more historical in nature than those before. The narratives at this point read more believably and contain less overtly mythological elements. Some elements of the stories surrounding the Tarquins, though, may have been created because of political...

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subject. See Raaflaub (1998) for a relatively up to date discussion and bibliography. I would hope that the scholarly views on the narratives of Early Rome do not appear or become this tightly contested and the view that I express here is one of, hopefully, moderation.

72 Cornell (1995), 57-73; Wiseman (1995), 1-17. Cornell rightly argues that the foundation legends of Rome were formed or forming by the end of the sixth century, but this does not mean that we should rely on them as historical evidence.

73 Poucet (1985). See, though, the positivist analysis of Grandazzi (1997). While I am sympathetic to some of his ideas, his intimate reading of the archaeology into the narrative tradition is problematic.


76 Forsythe (2005), 97.

77 Cornell (1995), 119, describes these successors as ‘little more than contrasting stereotypes.’

78 Especially by Cornell (1995), 127-30, who believes that it is with the accession of Tarquinius Priscus that we can begin speaking of Roman history. Forsythe (2005), 99-108, is perhaps even more erudite in his claim that this period of regal history is, if nothing else, full of ‘more complex problems.’
or economic motives. This has been suggested for the Corinthian genealogy associated with the dynasty, which may have been a Cumaean creation.\textsuperscript{79} What seems probable is that the historical tradition of the kings was patched together throughout the centuries from a number of different sources, and contains a complex web of myths and facts.\textsuperscript{80}

The history of the Early Republic has been preserved in a more believable form than that of the Regal Period.\textsuperscript{81} The mythological overtones are considerably lighter, even if the presence of religious and divine occurrences is still prominent.\textsuperscript{82} It is possible that the narrative of the early Republic reads more believably than that of the Regal Period because the surviving narratives are structured in a more familiar way, recalling events for years based on the magistrates in power during those years.\textsuperscript{83} It is commonly believed that the narratives for this period are based on a smattering of ‘facts’ preserved until history was being written in Rome.\textsuperscript{84} Principal among these sources are the annals of the Pontiffs, \textit{Annales Maximi} (Cic. \textit{De Or.} 2.52-53; Serv. \textit{ad Aen.} 1.373). Scholars have debated the reality, usefulness and accuracy of these records, what form they took, and how exactly they were organized.\textsuperscript{85} It has often been questioned how far back into the Republic the \textit{Annales} existed, and why there is a discrepancy between the historians of the annalistic

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\textsuperscript{79} Zevi (1995) has suggested that the story of Demaratus’s migration from Corinth and Tarquinius Priscus’ to Rome was recorded by Aristodemus who had been made Tarquinius Superbus’ heir (cf. Livy 2.34). By emphasizing Tarquin’s non-Roman heritage, it is argued, Aristodemus created a stronger case for his right to their property. This idea has recently been challenged, however, along with the existence of a ‘Cumaean chronicle’, see Gallia (2007), 59.


\textsuperscript{81} Inclusion of religious events and prodigies are not unique to the first pentad of Livy, see Davies (2005), 21-26.

\textsuperscript{82} Forsythe (2005), 60-64.

tradition and the antiquarian notice that at the beginning of the Republic there was one, not two, supreme magistrates of the Roman people. In addition to the *Annales Maximi*, other documentary evidence probably survived from the earliest periods of Rome which could be and were used by later historians to help form their narratives.

Inscribed documents are occasionally cited by ancient authors. The most famous and discussed of these is the first treaty between Rome and Carthage, at least the first known, which was preserved by Polybius (3.22). Polybius tells us that this treaty dated to the consulship of Lucius Iunius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, traditionally the first consuls, and elaborates this telling us this was twenty-eight years before Xerxes crossed into Greece (480 BC). The language of the treaty was in

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**Notes:**

86 Smith (2011c).

87 Documentary sources which diverged from the traditional story could be used to challenged the ‘orthodox’ narrative, as Licinius Macer has been said to have done, Levene (2007), 279. Ogilvie (1958), 46, suggested that damage to original documentary sources (such as those which would date to the earliest period of the Republic) could have caused parts of the historical tradition to have become confused. An example of this confusion is in the consular names given for 444, see Frier (1975).

88 The historicity of this treaty has been questioned and rehabilitated by various scholars. Cary (1919), 71 n. 5, found it ‘more probable’ that the first treaty dated to 348, in contradiction to Nissen (1876). The authenticity of this treaty has often been questioned because of the consuls named as signatories, L. Iunius Brutus and M. Horatius. The first year of the republic supposedly saw five consuls, resulting from a series of resignations and deaths, Broughton (1951), 1-3. As Walbank (1957), 339, has pointed out, the general assumption that the consuls of this year are fabrications of the historical tradition is not a strong basis for denying the treaty’s late sixth-century date. The names of Brutus and Horatius could have been added to the treaty at a later time. What is more problematic about Polybius’ version is the supposed preservation of the treaties in the so-called treasury of the aediles, which was supposedly located on the Capitoline Hill next to the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus (Polyb. 3.26). This is the only mention of this treasury. It seems possible to me, however, that Polybius meant the temple of Fides on the Capitol. The foundation of this temple was attributed to Numa (Livy 1.21; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.75; Plut. *Numa* 16), see Platner (1929), 209. Mommsen (1858), 198-206, believed that this temple, which occasionally hosted meetings of the Senate (Val. Max. 3.17; App. B. Civ. 1.16), held the treaties Rome made with other peoples. The recovery of a number of bi-lingual inscriptions, arguably from this temple, dating to the second century support this identification, Coarelli (2007),35-36. There have been other attempts to identify the treasury of the aediles, all pointing to other buildings, such as the *Atrium Publicum* or the *aedes tensarum*, Palmer (1997), 16-22. All of the suggestions discussed by Palmer keep the aediles in the picture, which I suggest is unnecessary, although all of the possible alternatives are speculative. It seems more probable that Polybius would have been confused by the name of the building than to have fabricated entire treaties. I am inclined to follow the conclusions of Scullard (1989), 520-26, that the first treaty is historical and fits into the historical setting of the late 6th and early 5th centuries. Cornell (1995), 211, bluntly states that the first treaty is ‘accepted by all serious scholars,’ noting that even in Alfödi’s (1965) controversial treatment of the period he accepts the authenticity of the treaty; cf. Scardigli (1999). The most recent treatment of the treaties, Serrati (2006), has reaffirmed the 509 treaty’s authenticity.
an archaic form of Latin, which was difficult for even the learned men of the time to understand. Importantly, Polybius goes on to tell us that this treaty was still preserved in the ‘treasury of the aediles’, on the Capitol, but most Romans and Carthaginians did not know of its existence (3.26). Cicero knew of another archaic treaty preserved in his time, the treaty of the so-called Foedus Cassianum with the Latins, which could be seen in the Forum (Balb. 53).\(^8\) It is possible, if not probable, that further treaties were preserved from the archaic period and used, not cited, by the sources of our sources.\(^9\) Further archaic documents are known to have survived, such as religious documents (cf. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.26, 10.32).\(^1\) Hypothetical documentary sources have been suggested by some modern scholars, as well.\(^2\)

Other types of evidence were used by Roman historians to help form their narratives. Funeral eulogies are often seen as being an important, if not self-serving, source for Roman history. According to Polybius, in his day it was customary to recount the accomplishments of the deceased man’s ancestors all the way back to the most ancient (Polyb. 6.53-54).\(^3\) Cicero and Livy were both negative in their views of the usefulness of these orations, as they often were designed to give greater glory to the family than was deserved (Cic. Brut. 62; Livy 8.40). This does not mean that these extraordinary stories would have been copied whole heartedly into the Roman

\(^8\) This treaty is remembered in the narrative tradition, see Livy 2.33 and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.95.
\(^9\) Preservation of documents from c. 449 is more probable than from the earliest periods, thanks to a new practice instituted under the consulship of Lucius Valerius and Marcus Horatius of deposition senatorial decrees in the temple of Ceres via the plebian aediles (Livy 3.55).
\(^1\) See in general, Cornell (1991).
\(^2\) Ogilvie (1965), 589, believed that the evidence of the ’classis’ being present at the battle of Fidenae (Livy 4.34) could have come from a misinterpretation of an archaic monument still visible in the days of the earlier annalists. Although this is an appealing idea, it is tenuous and cannot be proven.
\(^3\) These orations were probably based on stories which were kept alive in the families of the elite families, helpfully tied to artifacts which they also preserved, such as the imagines of their ancestors. This type of evidence was essential in keeping the memory of spectacular deeds alive, but the elaboration of these stories is a problem from a modern historian’s objective method of historical inquiry; Beck and Walter (2001), 29-31.
historical tradition. The description of the work of an historian by Sallust is important in this regard:

The writing of history is, in my opinion, a peculiarly difficult task. You must work hard to find words worthy of your subject. And if you censure misdeeds, most people will accuse you of envy and malice. When you write of the outstanding merit and glory of good men, people are quite ready to accept what they think they could easily do themselves; but anything beyond that is dismissed as an improbable fiction (Sall. Cat. 3.2).

While it was indeed the job of the historian of the ancient world to write an entertaining piece of literature, their audience would not necessarily believe extraordinary deeds. Whether or not audiences were able to ‘police’ the stories being told or written down, there must have been some recognition of events which did not fit into the popular view of Roman history. This would not necessarily have prevented their inclusion in the surviving narratives. When this invention did occur, it may have been the replacing of one historical figure with a member of the family who created the false history. This, however, does not mean that we should reject familial stories, such as that of the gens Fabia at the Cremera, as being false, although it is prudent to question the names involved.94

Unfortunately for modern scholars, even less has survived of the historical past of the Etruscans. We know that there were native historians amongst them, although we do not know of when these authors were writing.95 Varro knew of Etruscan histories (Tuscae historiae) written in the eighth ‘saeculum,’ whose date we

95 Pallottino (1975), 153-55, doubted to what extent literary culture and creativity took hold in Etruria and was quite pessimistic about its existence. The basic evidence has not changed since Pallottino was writing, but the modern opinion has swung towards accepting that there was probably a developed literary culture of some kind in Etruria, see the summary in Camporeale (2011), 209-11, with bibliography.
do not know for sure (Censorinus DN 17.6). And the emperor Claudius knew of Etruscan histories (ILS 212.1.8-27). He went on in his later days to write twenty books of Etruscan history, none of which survive unfortunately (Suet. Claud. 42).

Writers of Etruscan history, in the ancient world, would have had very similar sources to those of Roman historians. It is generally assumed that family histories, biographical histories, religious histories, and possibly even civic histories all existed. What is painfully obvious, however, is that very little of this material was used by Roman authors in the creation of their narratives. The confusion of the tradition of Servius Tullius/Macstarna in the Roman tradition is strong evidence of this.

Beyond a critique of the possible sources of our sources, Livy and Dionysius are often criticized for their preservation of the evidence which they had at hand. Livy, in particular, has been attacked for his narrative. The first pentad, the portion of Livy especially under study in the present work, is often approached for its literary characteristics rather than its historical interests. Much criticism has fallen on Livy from his heroic characterization of many of the heroes of Early Rome. Dionysius has been rehabilitated, to some degree, in recent years with his frequent use of cited sources as a primary factor in this. However much modern scholars

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96 To be read with Cornell’s (1995), 134, reading of Tuscos auctores.
97 Cornell (2011 [1976]).
98 Cf. Ogilvie and Drummond (1989), 16-17, and Momigliano (1989), 89.
101 In a comparison of the different versions of the Horatii and Curiatii episode presented by Livy and Dionysius, Oakley (2010) has highlighted the difference in literary skill between the two authors. The careful crafting of narratives, such as Oakley has suggested for this episode, would invariably lead readers to nuanced differences in the understanding of the historical events. This is a troubling example of how style could possibly change ‘fact’.
104 Gabba (1991), 60-90, analyzed his historical methods with optimistic tones, although he does clarify that he was not attempting to rehabilitate Dionysius as an historian of the ‘first rank.’ Schultze’s (2000) recent comments on Dionysius go further than Gabba and earlier commentators,
wish to criticize the surviving narratives, we cannot dismiss the fact that they represent the closest things in our possession to the original sources and must be used in any reconstruction of early central Italy.

Although we have seen that caution must be exercised regarding the historicity of the literary evidence relating to central Italy during the period under investigation, use of the historical narratives and miscellaneous literary sources is essential to the study of warfare during the period under question. Archaeological evidence for and of warfare is scanty for the fifth century in Roman contexts, although it is more plentiful for Etruria. A balanced and moderate approach to the textual evidence is adopted in this work. Certain topics can only be discussed through the use of these much maligned texts, such as political organization and leadership in war. On these points the texts appear to be extremely valuable. But, statements by the ancient authors, especially those of Livy and Dionysius, are not used as evidence without question. Stories of an overtly mythological or aetiological nature are questioned for their usefulness on a case-by-case basis.

Further, this is not a historiographical study; it is an historical study in the classical sense and aims to develop a better understanding of the history of warfare during this period as it is presented to us, but the complex and problematic narratives are never used unquestioningly. With that said, I follow the august words of Jacques Heurgon in my approach to early Roman, and by extension Etruscan, history: to approach it with a ‘mood of restrained confidence, of cautious acceptance,’ and to examine ‘events which are not necessarily true, nor yet necessarily false.’

calling Dionysius ‘highly conscientious’ and ‘thoughtful and reliable and much more fair-minded in his judgement of his fellow-historians than most.’

105 Heurgon (1973), 250.
1.4 Mann, IEMP, and Structure

The place of warfare, or the potential of violence, is an important theme throughout sociological research. Coercive force is famously the basis for Max Weber’s understanding of ‘the state’ and of social organization in general. The monopolization of ‘legitimate’ force is the underpinning of circumscribed domination. In this sense, warfare is an intrinsic part of the state as a sovereign and supreme entity. The sweeping assumptions made by some scholars regarding the usefulness of sociological and anthropological universalisms have occasionally been applied to the study of Mediterranean warfare. Quite often, these universalisms are more directed at the analysis of the Greek polis and trying to force it into a categorical setting in which it will likely never fit. The present work does assume that warfare was an important element in the formation of states and civil structures in Tyrrhenian Italy, but does not follow strict universal applications of theory.

Underpinning this approach is the philosophy of Max Weber. His development, and the subsequent academic discussion of, the concepts of Verstehen social science methodology contributes to my own technique. The general concept of Verstehen is that the analyst of social phenomena, in this case warfare in central Italy, attempts to understand the material under analysis from the point of view of the individual actors involved in the creation of said phenomena. A form of this analysis has become fashionable in archaeological analysis under the guise of ‘agency’. Through this line of thinking, warfare must be seen not only from a collectivized position, in which war is an action of collected actors (i.e. ‘the state’),

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106 I am not a sociologist.
107 Weber (1946), 82-83.
109 Infra chapter 4.
111 Cf. Dobres and Robb (2000b) and Hodder (2000).
but also as an action committed by a group of actors each with individual motivations. This type of approach has been refined by a number of social scientists and sociologists and has seen a revival under the moniker neo-Weberianism. Through these approaches we should understand societies as being ‘constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power.’

An important reappraisal of the role of warfare in society, or a suggestion of its place, has been made by one of the neo-Weberians, the sociologist Michael Mann. In his magnum opus, *The Sources of Social Power*, which is spread across four volumes, he argues that military and political (state) power are two separate entities. It is in the separation of military and political power that Mann’s understanding of society is different from most, and important for the current study. This version of the structure of social power is often abbreviated as ‘IEMP’ which stands for Ideological, Economic, Military, and Political, the four most important types of social power. These are the most regularly present throughout human societies. This type of approach helps to develop our understanding and explanation of certain phenomena of early central Italy, such as the so-called *condottieri*. In the best discussion of this topic to date, the author was forced to discuss the warlords of central Italy as being in direct opposition to the state. As will be shown in chapter 3 of this thesis, this is not necessarily the case.

We should begin our questioning of the historical phenomena under study by looking at how individual ‘humans pursuing goals’ affected the history of warfare in

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112 Mann (2012), 1. This description has a history in Weberian theory and perhaps a more intricate, if not less comprehensible, version of this description is offered by Mann as ‘a society is a network of social interaction at the boundaries of which is a certain level of interaction cleavage between it and its environment,’ *ibid.*, 13 (with discussion).
113 In relation to war, this is clearly stated in Mann (1996).
115 Collins (2006); Poggi (2006) critiques this separation.
116 Rawlings (1999). A recent PhD, Armstrong (2009), proposed an even stricter division between state and private actors.
central Italy.\textsuperscript{117} From this starting point, we can question the goals of the actors in our historical drama and then analyze their actions through the complex web of social power. This type of analysis moves away from neatly defined images of society, such as that of E. Lenski.\textsuperscript{118} In this traditional type of power diagram (Fig. 2), we see entrenched classes which are separated based on the source of their social power. Merchants and artisans are empowered through economic processes, the governing class and the ruler through political (vis. military as well) power, and the priests through ideological power.\textsuperscript{119} If we deconstruct the power structure of central Italy as it is visible archaeologically and historically, however, we see that this type of rigid structure does not fit. We are also forced to abandon such universalisms as Dumézil’s ‘\textit{idéologie tripartite}.’

We should not separate warfare from political (sc. collective) society entirely, though. As Spencer has observed, violence is typically a social activity and that it is both constructed and interpreted by cultural processes.\textsuperscript{120} John Keegan has forcibly claimed that war ‘is always an expression of culture.’\textsuperscript{121} Warfare’s interaction with culture is complex and is multifaceted. War leads to contact with and occasionally absorption of extra-local cultural elements: trends, technology, and social organization. Its role in the development and evolution of other networks of power, especially political, is influenced by these external contacts as well as internal changes.\textsuperscript{122} The complex relationship between military power/warfare and the other networks which constitute societies can be visualized easily thanks to Claus Bossen (Fig. 1).

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{117}] Mann (2012), 30.
\item[\textsuperscript{118}] Cited in Runciman (2000), 69-70.
\item[\textsuperscript{119}] Ibid., 64-92.
\item[\textsuperscript{120}] Spencer (1996).
\item[\textsuperscript{121}] Keegan (1993), 12.
\item[\textsuperscript{122}] Bossen (2006).
\end{itemize}
Ultimately, though, it is from Mann’s IEMP model that the structure of this work has been devised. Following on from this introduction is an examination of the arms, armour, and tactics with which the peoples of central Italy waged war. After this comes a general survey of the patterns of warfare in central Italy, taking into account the archaeological and historical evidence. This knowledge is used as a building block to discuss the cultural forces and social-power interactions of warfare throughout the period in question. This chapter is followed by an analysis of ‘warfare and the state’ which endeavours to address the ‘problem’ of both civic and ‘private’ armies of the period. The fifth chapter examines the interplay between the economy and economic power and that of warfare, looking especially at the ability of military power to create or enhance economic power. Following on from this chapter we address the deep seated connections in Tyrrhenian Italy of warfare and religion.

The aims of this project are to show that warfare was deeply connected to other aspects of society in central Italy, the state in particular. This is done by analysing certain characteristics of this society, politics, economics, and religion, and their connections to warfare. To the extent that it is possible, the actions of ‘individuals’ are discussed within this framework with the assumption that their actions are being taken in pursuit of certain goals and objectives. By this, the author does not mean that individual historical figures guide the study, but that evidence is read from the point of view that it reflects individual choices and actions. This project also aims to address a number of traditional issues in central Italian warfare which relate both to the execution of warfare as well as the relationship between war and other sources of social power, principally the issues of ‘hoplites’ and condottieri. In some areas of this study, I must concede that the findings are as much reasoned
and scholarly probabilities as they are definitive conclusions, and it is with a healthy scepticism that I proceed; *je pense donc je ne sais rien*. 
2 Arms, Armour, and Tactics: changes over time

Be they clubs and arrows or swords and helmets, arms and armour play an important role in the practise of warfare throughout history. Technological developments relating to warfare have influenced the development of societies around the world. Cases have been argued that changes in arms and armour dramatically changed the history of the Late Bronze Age, bringing on the collapse of the Near East and eventually a new social order.\(^{123}\) The major social change supposedly brought on by the introduction of hoplite arms and tactics in Greece will be discussed fully below (chapter 4) and introduced in this chapter, but we should note that the arms themselves are often pointed to as the defining feature. Culture also plays an important role on the battlefield and influences tactical procedures. The hoplite and his phalanx in their most rigid sense have been argued to have been as much a product of Hellenic cultural developments as the arms and tactics were influential in the tactics and their reflections in cultural developments.\(^{124}\) In the age of the musket, culture determined tactical deployment to an even more ludicrous extreme which produced rank and file volley tactics. In stark contrast to this were the tactic employed by partisans, rangers, and natives who used the exact same arms as their enemies yet fought with guerrilla style tactics. This chapter examines arms and armour and their use on the battlefield through a thorough examination of the evidence, emphasizing archaeology and iconography for the earliest periods and a combined approach to the historical period.

In this study, arms are not merely implements of warfare; they are also an element of culture and cultural expression dependent on the mores of their users. A

\(^{123}\) Drews (1993).
\(^{124}\) Cf. Ober (1996b; 1996c).
number of approaches to this topic have examined central Italy in the Iron Age.\textsuperscript{125} The scholarly discussion on arms and armour in central Italy during the Archaic Periods, however, has generally omitted this approach to weaponry in favour of traditional approaches which emphasize the tactical use of said artefacts.\textsuperscript{126} Much of this discussion, until recently, has been tactically deterministic. But the use and display of arms and armour outside of warfare is an extremely important element in the construction of social power in central Italy from the Bronze Age onward, and is reflective of Bossen’s theoretical description of warfare’s permeating nature in societies.\textsuperscript{127} This chapter, then, will examine how arms, armour, and tactics changed over time, and how this was connected to larger cultural changes.

\section*{2.1 Arms and Armour}

Arms and armour played an important role in the Late Bronze Age in Italy (c. 1200-900). Although they are not often found in burials, many hoards of bronze items contained weapons, especially spear heads and swords.\textsuperscript{128} During this period, exchange of bronze and bronze weapons occurred throughout the Italian Peninsula, as recent metallurgical analyses have shown.\textsuperscript{129} This trade does not seem to have had a considerable impact on central Italy, as much of the evidence is spread down the Adriatic coast.\textsuperscript{130} External influences on the arms of central Italy may date to this period, however, as represented by a number of swords found in Etruria which are of types more common to the Atlantic coast of modern France and the southern coast of modern Spain (Fig. 3).\textsuperscript{131} Influence from outside of central Italy is a recurring point in the discussion of this section and it is important to keep in mind that this influence

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{125}{Cf. Iaia (1999; 2009-2012; 2013).}
\footnote{127}{Bossen (2006).}
\footnote{128}{Iaia (2009-2012), 73-74.}
\footnote{129}{Jung \textit{et al.} (2011).}
\footnote{130}{Ibid., Fig. 23.1.}
\footnote{131}{Broodbank (2013), 491-493, Fig. 9.34.}
\end{footnotes}
is not necessarily new to the Iron Age and should be considered as a continuation of an already globalising European Bronze Age.\textsuperscript{132} This section examines the development and change in arms and armour in central Italy from the Early Iron Age to the close to our period, approximately 343. It is laid out in a chronological order to show that the trends in arms and armour changed throughout time, but that there was overlap, and also elements which did not change as much as others.

At the beginning of the Iron Age we have little evidence for arms and armour.\textsuperscript{133} The evidence that we do posses comes from a relatively small number of burials.\textsuperscript{134} Over time, the number of arms deposited in tombs increases.\textsuperscript{135} In this early period the most common form of defensive protection that we find in the archaeology is the helmet. Two types of helmets predominate the evidence between the beginning of the tenth century and the end of the ninth century. The most recognizable of these helmets are the crested ‘Villanovan’ helmets found throughout Etruria, the Ager Faliscus, Picene territory, and Campania.\textsuperscript{136} This type of helmet had a life of about 150 years, perhaps longer, in central Italy. The design of the helmets continued to change throughout that period. Examples have been found in both bronze and impasto copies.\textsuperscript{137} These helmets are spectacular for their large crests (Fig. 18). The illustration provided is of the helmet from Tomb 871 at Veii with a ludicrously large crest measuring 64 cm from the base to the top of the

\textsuperscript{132} The case is being continually developed for a well connected Bronze Age in which Northern Europe and the Mediterranean were well connected through exchange, trade, or some other kind of contact. See in general, Harding (2000), 164-196, and the papers collected in Alberti and Sabatini (2013).
\textsuperscript{133} The standard catalogue of arms and armour from central Italy is that of Stary (1981). It forms the basis of the present author’s understanding in this chapter.
\textsuperscript{134} Iaia (1999) provides an up-to-date catalogue and analysis of funerary practices, including deposition of arms, for Tarquinia and Vulci.
\textsuperscript{135} Idem. (2009-2012), 74-79.
The nature of these crests has been described as decorative and evidence of conspicuous consumption and/or ritual rather than of actual warfare. The example from Veii may be strong evidence of this, as the size of the crest would make it somewhat impractical to wear into battle. Additionally, we do not possess any iconographic depictions of this kind of helmet being worn into battle, although this absence could also be attributed to artistic conventions of the time which did not show scenes of battle in paintings or engravings.

The diameter of the crested helmets averaged between 25 and 35 cm. The size of the crest varied considerably, but a range of 15 cm to 63 cm is representative; the measurement is typically taken from the base of the helmet to the tip of the crest. The crest, and the helmets themselves, are made of sheet bronze which has been hammered and then fastened together. They were heavily decorated with pearlettes and geometric designs, although the level of decoration is not consistent. The style of decoration is similar to styles north of the Alps in the contemporary Hallstatt culture, which we also see in other types of helmets from this period and on other types of vessels, discussed in detail below. The purpose of this decoration is not entirely clear. If the helmets were meant to be worn in life, whether on the battlefield or ceremonially, the decorative elements would have increased the visual prestige of the helmet and would be a readily visible element distinguishing the

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139 Spivey and Stoddart (1991), 129-131.
140 An askos from tomb 525 of the Benacci cemetery of Bologna has been cited by some scholars, such as Saulnier (1980), 19, as showing the use of a crested helmet on an actual figure. This piece is problematic for a number of reasons. Bologna is marked by the absence of helmets in Villanovan burials, including the crested helmet, which forces the question as to where this figure was made. External influence has been suggested, with Greece, Cyprus, and eastern Europe being the forerunners (Boardman [1988], 215-216). Brendel (1995), 90, does not suggested external influence, noting that a style of small statue developed in this region in the early seventh century, and that this askos fits in with this trend.
141 Saulnier (1980), 18.
142 Martinelli (2004), 18, illustrates the construction with a cutaway view.
143 The crested Villanovan helmet, however, is not found in Hallstatt contexts, except for one example found at Hallstatt itself, Stary (1979), 185.
wearer from a wearer of a less decorated helmet. If these helmets were expressly
made for use in ritual and/or the grave, the decorative elements may be taken as a
sign of social differentiation between those individuals using or being buried with
less decorated helmets and those with the heavily decorated helmets. It is also quite
possible that the designs and intricacies were simply a matter of preference or
fashion.

Within the general category of crested helmets existed one other
differentiating element besides decorative elements. The most widespread style of
crested helmets used a skullcap shape with a spike at the top (Fig. 19).\textsuperscript{144} This style
of construction is found in examples from central Italy, north western Italy,
Campania, Basilicata, and Picenum.\textsuperscript{145} The other style of construction of these
helmets consisted of a skullcap shape with no spike (Fig. 19).\textsuperscript{146} These helmets are
more limited in their distribution, being primarily concentrated in areas near the
Tiber.\textsuperscript{147} It is unclear whether or not these two types of construction would give any
type of structural advantage to the helmets. Those with a spike used at the top of the
helmet may add more structural stability to the crest, although without experimental
reconstructions it is impossible to gauge how important this would have been in
combat or in ritual use.

The second style of helmet common during the Early Iron Age is the cap
helmet. This type of helmet, again, can be divided into two different general designs.
The first style is that with a knob on top (Figs. 20-21).\textsuperscript{148} This style of the cap helmet
is most commonly found in central Italy, with some examples coming from the

\textsuperscript{144} Hencken’s (1971), 78, ‘pointed cap’ type of crested helmet.
\textsuperscript{145} Stary (1981), Karte 1.
\textsuperscript{146} Hencken’s (1971), 97, ‘round cap’ type of crested helmet.
\textsuperscript{147} Stary (1981), Karte 1.
Adriatic coast east-northeast of Etruria and Latium.\textsuperscript{149} The principle concentration of these helmets is in the Early Iron Age cemeteries of Tarquinia.\textsuperscript{150} This type of helmet is not unique to Italy. Examples which have been linked to the Italian specimens have been found in the Carpathians and seem to have been an element of the Bronze Age Urnfield culture.\textsuperscript{151} It appears that they were markers of social rank and were restricted to a rather small number of individuals. In Tarquinia these helmets played a particular role in the evolution of identity in burials and were also an indicator of social status or rank.\textsuperscript{152}

The bell helmets without knobs are less common than those with knobs.\textsuperscript{153} In Etruscan contexts they appear to only have been produced in Tarquinia. Two examples have been found here (Fig. 20).\textsuperscript{154} These were found in the eighth century necropoleis of the settlement. The style of these helmets does not appear to be connected to the same areas outside of Italy as the knobbed cap helmets do. Those without knobs, however, are similar in style to a number of examples found in the far upstream of the Po River and in the foothills of the Italian Alps.\textsuperscript{155} The decoration on these helmets is similar to that of the other helmet types from the region. This could be an indication that these helmets were produced by and for residents in central Italy, although their rarity in the region and relative commonality in the foothills of the Alps may indicate that they were imported wares.

The practical differences between these two general types of helmets (crested and bell) are negligible. Their usefulness as pieces of armour must have been

\textsuperscript{149} Stary (1981), Karte 2.
\textsuperscript{150} Iaia (1999).
\textsuperscript{151} Clausing (2001), with earlier bibliography. Stary (1979), 185, postulated a Mycenaean origin based on a fifteenth-century helmet of similar design, see Snodgrass (1999), 26. The helmet from Knossos included cheek pieces.
\textsuperscript{152} Iaia (2009-2012).
\textsuperscript{154} Hencken (1971), 124.
\textsuperscript{155} Stary (1981), Karte 2.
somewhat similar. Both helmet types cover the top of the head, sitting above the eye line. They do not provide protection to the back of the neck or any parts of the face. This type of protection is helpful against blows coming from above, such as a downward slash from a sword or a lofty thrust of a spear. They would have also provided adequate protection against missiles of all types. Perhaps the biggest difference between the two helmets on the battlefield was the extra height which they provided the wearer.\textsuperscript{156} In later times, and other contexts within the Mediterranean, crested helmets of a different fashion functioned similarly.\textsuperscript{157} Greek art, and a number of physical examples, evidence the use of crests in that sphere of warfare.\textsuperscript{158} The use of crests on helmets may be explained by its increasing the perceived height of the user, thus creating a more intimidating figure to the enemy.

The importance of these helmets off of the battlefield, in both social and funerary contexts, may have been quite different. The ornate nature and expense related to the production of the crested helmets must be related to the status or wealth of the wearer, whether dead or alive.\textsuperscript{159} In Tarquinia, crested helmets covered the four biconical urns which are often cited as the earliest funerary evidence for the development of political status which was divorced from kin related status.\textsuperscript{160} These four burials stand out from their peers as not being within established familial burial patterns. Bell helmets with knobs were probably used for similar purposes in the funerary ritual. This has been discussed quite thoroughly especially in recent literature.\textsuperscript{161} That helmets were an indicator of social position is supported by the use

\begin{footnotes}{156}The real difference in added height may have been negligible, as the cap helmets with knobs are thought to have had feather or other crests affixed to the knob, Stary (1981), 23-24.
\begin{footnotes}{158}Snodgrass (1999), 42-43, on early crested helmets. Crested helmets were included in Alcaeus’ description of arms being displayed in a hall (frg. 357 = 140 Campbell).
\begin{footnotes}{159}Iaia (2009-2012, 2013).
\begin{footnotes}{160}Pacciarelli (2010), 26.
\begin{footnotes}{161}Iaia (2009-2012), 72-79.
of both bronze and *impasto* imitations in burials. At this point in the archaeology it is impossible to know whether political and military power or office overlapped, although it is probable that they did. Scholars tend to connect the two, which is a well established connection and practise in archaeological literature from a world perspective. It is difficult to prove this for central Italy, however, and a discussion of the Tarquinian evidence is important.

It is from this settlement that we see the first differentiation between familial and non-familial burial practices.\textsuperscript{162} Warrior identity, though, was common to all burial types.\textsuperscript{163} The burial type most commonly associated with family strength, the hut-urn burial, is also noted for its wealth in vessels, ceremonial tools, and arms and armour.\textsuperscript{164} In Tarquinia, hut-urn burials occur in central positions within familial burial groups.\textsuperscript{165} This positioning, and the wealth of these burials, has been interpreted as signalling that the interred was a paterfamilias figure, or the head of an Etruscan *gens*. It cannot be said with certainty that helmet burials were of a lesser, superior, or equal social standing as hut-urn burials with arms.

The geometric designs which adorn many of the Villanovan helmets provide an important piece of evidence regarding their manufacture. As we have seen above, the typologies of some of these helmets are linked to examples from central Europe, especially the Urnfield culture. The geometric designs, as well, are common between central Italy and Europe north of the Alps.\textsuperscript{166} Along with these patterns, the concurrent use of hut/house urns in Northern Germany, Scandinavia, and Pomerania

\textsuperscript{162} Paciarelli (2010).
\textsuperscript{163} Riva (2010), 74-95.
\textsuperscript{164} Bartoloni et al. (1987).
\textsuperscript{165} Riva (2010), 82-83.
\textsuperscript{166} Déchelette (1928), 229-237, and Saulnier (1980), 19, both compared the designs on Etruscan helmets to Hallstatt designs. On geometric design in Etruria, in general, see Brendel (1995), 35-41.
have been linked to the existence of elite networks connecting much of Europe. Metal smiths from north of the Alps are often cited as being present in central Italy during this period, crafting many of the bronze objects, including the helmets, for their elite patrons. The culmination of this contact and cultural exchange can be seen in the funerary remains of tomb AAI from Quattro Fontanili, Veii. Taken together, the contents of this tomb closely represent the idealized Urnfield warrior (Fig. 22): small shield with bronze facing, short sword, spear, ornate helmet with geometric designs, and a ritual amphora (Fig. 23). The amphora from this tomb is particularly important, as it is among the Veio-Gevelinghausen-Seddin group, which are stylistically similar, in construction and decoration. The construction of warrior identity, especially through the use of helmets, was influenced from outside of central Italy, but was shaped and solidified using uniquely Villanovan models, such as the crested helmet.

During the Early Iron Age we also find evidence for two other pieces of defensive arms in central Italy. The first types of armour, shields are not abundantly attested during this period. Oval shields are represented iconographically and in miniature at Veii and Bisenzio-Capodimonte. They are characterized by a number of ‘spindles’ radiating from what appears to be a central strong point (Fig. 24).

Bronze round shields are also attested beginning in the eighth century, although

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167 Sabatini (2007), 155-166, in her discussion of house urns in Northern Germany and Scandinavia makes a strong case for the interrelation of much of Europe and Italy in the period of the Early Iron Age in Central Italy, approximately 900-700 in the absolute chronology.
171 Jockenhövel (1974), and Kristiansen (1993). This particular type of amphora helps to link Central Italy to a considerable swathe of Europe, including Poland, where at Przelawice one of these amphorae has been discovered. Links to parts of Poland further north than this are established through the use of house urns and Pomeranian face urns, which have been linked to so-called canopic urns from Etruria, see Kneisel (2012), 31 Fig. 12.
172 Bartoloni and De Santis (1995).
fragmentary and rare.\textsuperscript{174} The remains of a shield found in the Tomb of the Warrior at Tarquinia, dating to the eighth century, had traces of a leather backing.\textsuperscript{175} It is possible, if not probable, that these shields are evidence of a progressive development, which began with a type of round shield made of stretched leather over a wooden frame, which eventually came to be sturdier shields with a bronze facing.\textsuperscript{176} Bronze facing would have given extra strength and value in combat for the bearer. This would also give the user a more formidable appearance in battle, and the metal facing on shields may have helped to establish the status of its bearer on the field.

The final type of armour found throughout the Early Iron Age is chest armour. The normal form of this was the pectoral, found throughout central Italy.\textsuperscript{177} Pectorals of a style most commonly associated with Etruria, square with geometric designs, have also been found in Picenum (Fig. 25).\textsuperscript{178} These are more common in Southern Etruria and Latium, and do not occur in Etruscan contexts in the north.\textsuperscript{179} Four examples have been found in Rome.\textsuperscript{180} The protection gained by wearing these devices was not extensive. It is possible, along with many other pieces of kit from this period that the value of these items was in display or identity. Rarely, breastplates are attested during the Early Iron Age, with the notable example being the cuirass of the seventh century from Narce.\textsuperscript{181} Some commentators have noted that this was constructed out of thin bronze sheet, and would have been less

\textsuperscript{175} Hencken (1968), 34.
\textsuperscript{176} The spindles may indicate that the face of these shields was not a rigid material, such as wood, but rather one that required additional support, like leather. This type of shield is described by Polybius as having been wielded by the early Roman cavalry (6.25). Polybius’ description of early Roman cavalry, however, is not to be relied upon, as discussed below.
\textsuperscript{177} Saulnier (1980), 31.
\textsuperscript{178} Stary (1981), 24-25, 247. The example found in Picenum was from Fermo.
\textsuperscript{179} In Etruria, these pectorals were found in Narce, Bisenzio, Veii, and Tarquinia.
\textsuperscript{180} These were all found on the Esquiline: tomb 86, Müller-Karpe (1962), pl. 15A4, tombs 87 and 98, Gjerstad (1956), and tomb 14, Acanfora (1976), pl. 19D. Cf. Martinelli (2004), 67-69.
\textsuperscript{181} Stary (1981), 24-25.
protective than a similar piece made of thick leather.\textsuperscript{182} No Early Iron Age leather armour survives intact from central Italy, and it is only a hypothesis that it would have existed. This hypothesis also ignores the opportunity for display on the battlefield, provided by bronze armour.\textsuperscript{183}

Offensive arms during the Early Iron Age (c. 900-750) are represented by swords and by spears. Swords are the most resource intensive of these two groups.\textsuperscript{184} They require a substantial amount of labour and resources to construct and could not have been common to all members of society.\textsuperscript{185} Antenna swords are found in a number of Etruscan contexts. These are mostly in Southern Etruria, with a number of finds in Northern Etruria.\textsuperscript{186} There are also a number of finds of this type of sword on the fringes of the Po Plain. An example of this type of sword has also been found in Rome.\textsuperscript{187} In Italian contexts antenna swords are more often found in Picene contexts than in Etruria.\textsuperscript{188} A type of antenna sword, with associated production in Tarquinia, is commonly found in northern Italy.\textsuperscript{189} A number of examples also exist from Apennine contexts, as well. These swords are characterized by their hilt which has a pommel consisting of two so-called antennae which wrap in on themselves (Fig. 26). Antenna swords were long swords which could imply that they were meant for slashing attacks, although their use as a stabbing weapon is not to be dismissed. These types of swords are not unique to Italy and are closely associated with the

\textsuperscript{182} Spivey and Stoddart (1990), 129.
\textsuperscript{183} The intimidating feature of dazzling armour is noted by Dionysius (\textit{Ant. Rom.} 9.5.4) when the Roman army arrayed in front of Veii c. 480.
\textsuperscript{185} In Bronze Age Europe, swords were not as common as spears. The former were also apt to be highly decorated, probably a status symbol, Harding (1999), 162, Idem. (2000), 281.
\textsuperscript{187} Stary (1981), 142.
\textsuperscript{188} Cf. Stary (1981), 248-249, Karte 17.
\textsuperscript{189} Harding (2000), 238, is confident that these were produced in Etruria and got to northern Italy through a trading network.
cultures of the Alps and of the Hallstatt culture throughout Bronze Age Europe.\footnote{Antenna swords were a common Bronze Age phenomenon in Europe, overlapping with the Early Iron Age in Central Italy, cf. Bianco Peroni (1970), and Kristiansen (1993). These were one of the defining elements of the Urnfield culture (esp. Urnfield V/Hallstatt B), Gimbutas (1965), 156. Cf. Stary (1979), 185.}

This is further evidence that the arms and armour of central Italy during the Early Iron Age was influenced by cultures north of the Alps.

The second type of sword found in central Italian contexts is the so-called mushroom hilted short sword (\textit{Griffzungenschwerter mit pilzförmigem Knauf}).\footnote{Bianco Peroni (1970), 194-273; Stary (1981), 32-36, 178.}

These swords are shorter than antenna swords and have a considerably different shape (Fig. 27). Whilst the antenna swords have a relatively even shape all the way down, tapering to a point at the end, and a relatively narrow character, the mushroom hilted swords have a very wide profile at the base and taper almost in a wedge shape towards the tip. These swords are closer in style to the swords commonly associated with later Roman armies of the Republic.\footnote{Cf. Bishop and Coulston (2006), 54-57.}

These swords were probably used as stabbing weapons; although, like the antenna swords we should not pigeon hole these weapons into one method of wounding. The development of this type of sword may have been the result of heavier armour coming into usage in Italy, and it has been argued that they would be more effective as a piercing weapon than antenna swords.\footnote{Stary (1981), 32-36, with considerable discussion and bibliography. This may also explain why another short, stabbing, style sword is found in a number of instances in Central Italy, Ibid., 37.}

Unlike antenna swords, the mushroom hilted swords are not found north of the Alps. They are considerably more common in central Italy than other sword types, with examples also existing from south of the Bay of Naples as well as the farthest points of Southern Italy. These are possibly of a Mediterranean type or influenced by other Mediterranean types, although there is some precedence in Bronze Age Italy for swords with similarly shaped blades.\footnote{Stary (1979), 186, Idem. (1981), 32-33.}
During the Early Iron Age the axe seems to have been a popular weapon.\textsuperscript{195} Single faced axes are common in Etruria (Fig. 28). Simple, undecorated, examples are found throughout a very extensive area, from the farthest reaches of Northern Etruria and the Po Plain south to the Bay of Naples.\textsuperscript{196} In Etruria proper this is one of the most commonly found weapons in Etruscan burials.\textsuperscript{197} Decorated axe heads are found in the cemeteries of a number of large settlements. These may be indicators of social rank and position and may be more related to political office or symbolism than to warfare. If these decorated examples are related to political status they may be the precursors to the fasces of the historical period. Axes and palstaves may have originally been influenced by contacts with Europe north of the Alps, where Bronze Age use of the axe was widespread.\textsuperscript{198}

With the coming of the late eighth/early seventh centuries the arms and armour found throughout central Italy changed. Helmet design drastically changed in this period, shifting from the crested ‘Villanovan’ helmets and cap helmets to those shaped like a semicircular dome (Fig. 29). Archaeologically recovered examples of this type of helmet are limited in central Italy.\textsuperscript{199} The design has been found in the environs of Veii, Rome and Vetulonia.\textsuperscript{200} They are attested in the Apennines. This type of helmet is found widely on the Adriatic coast of Picenum. It is a similar style

\textsuperscript{195} It was possibly a popular weapon in the Final Bronze Age, as well, Martinelli (2004), 135-137.
\textsuperscript{196} Stary (1981), Karte 28.
\textsuperscript{197} Saulnier (1980), 33. See also Martinelli (2004), 135-145.
\textsuperscript{198} Stary (1979), 185, Idem. (1981), 38-40. On the use of the axe in Bronze Age warfare see Harding (1999) and idem (2000), 275, who points out that the battle axe eventually came to be a symbol of power in the European Bronze Age, rather than an effective weapon.
\textsuperscript{199} Stary (1981), Karte 3. Saulnier (1980), 65, believes that the shipboard warriors shown on the Aristonothos krater are meant to be depicted wearing this type of helmet. While this could be the case, the helmets depicted on this krater appear to cover more of the back of the head and neck than the examples of hemispheric helmets known archaeologically. If the helmet were worn at an angle, giving preference to the back of the head, then it is possible it is depicted.
\textsuperscript{200} Stary (1981), 60-61, 153.
to the double ridged helmet found at Populonia, which is itself a style more common in the Eastern regions of modern Slovenia.\textsuperscript{201}

It is during the early seventh century that chest protection also changes, with the appearance of the disc shaped heart protector (kardiophylax) (Fig. 30).\textsuperscript{202} This round disk protector covered the centre of the chest and was typically supported by a harness of sorts which held it in place.\textsuperscript{203} Some scholars see these as a continuing development of the pectorals of the earlier Iron Age, but point out connections to Assyrian models.\textsuperscript{204} Examples of these have been found across a wide range of sites in Etruria. The style of these heart plates is not unique to Etruria, and occurs more often in Picenum and regions just south.\textsuperscript{205} Examples of this type of armour have also been found on Corsica. The defensive value of these types of armour is negligible. Using the so-called Capestrano Warrior (Fig. 31) as an example of how much surface area these would protect shows us that only a small area of the chest would benefit.\textsuperscript{206} It could be that these items were more an element of prestige and identity than they were of practical military kit. Whether or not more practical options were available and made of organic materials, such as leather, which did not survive in the archaeological record is impossible to tell.\textsuperscript{207}

The Near East has also been pointed to as the source of a number of other developments in central Italian arms and armour from the eighth to middle of the seventh century.\textsuperscript{208} Round bronze shields, which had a central boss, are found

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{201} This type of helmet is typically associated with the Hallstatt C2 to D2 periods, Stary (1981), 65-66.
\item \textsuperscript{202} These are only attested from the seventh century.
\item \textsuperscript{203} Stary (1981), 67-69.
\item \textsuperscript{204} Ibid., 69, with earlier bibliography.
\item \textsuperscript{205} Ibid., 434-436.
\item \textsuperscript{206} Martinelli (2004), 69, provides a reconstruction of how these would have been supported on the chest, using the Capestrano Warrior and an example. The heart protector is attached to four straps, two on top, which hang over the shoulders, and then two on the bottom which attach to a belt.
\item \textsuperscript{207} See Figs. 32-33 for examples of what these warriors may have looked like fully equipped.
\item \textsuperscript{208} Contacts with the Near East are well attested outside of the sphere of warfare, as well, and are thoroughly discussed elsewhere: cf. Turfa (1986), 66-69, Naso (2000) and Riva (2006).
\end{itemize}
throughout Etruria, and can be equated to Near Eastern precedents. The bronze facing of these shields is thin and was not the core defensive element of the device. These bronze façades were affixed to either wood or wicker rounds, which would have provided much of the defensive protection of the shield. Daggers, similar to those visible in evidence from the reigns of Sargon II and Sennacherib, were in use in Etruria during this period. Spears also saw continued use in this period. This combination of arms and armour led Stary to equate the central Italian warriors or soldiers of this period to the image of contemporary Assyrian soldiers (Fig. 34). This depiction shows an Assyrian soldier during the reign of Ashurbanipal (r. 668-627) who is wearing a kardiophylax, of the type now common in central Italy, carrying a spear and a dagger, and armed with a wicker shield.

The last major adoption in central during this period regarding warfare was the chariot. This piece of technology is linked, again, to Near Eastern imports. The existence of war chariots throughout the Near East and early Greece provides evidence that these types of vehicles could and were used successfully in warfare. Iconography from a slightly later period (especially from the sixth century) shows

209 Stary (1979), 189. It is possible that these shields were actually a development of Etruscan antecedents, this was the conclusion of Hencken and Camporeale, cited in the discussion of Saulnier (1980), 65, who agrees with their conclusions. The shields are certainly decorated with geometric designs which are well attested in Central Italy. We know, though, that there was a considerable Orientalizing culture in Etruria at this point, and the similarity of depictions with Near Eastern models is too close to rule out an eastern Mediterranean origin, Stary (1981), 30-31.


211 Stary (1979), 190.


213 On the development of the chariot in Etruria, see Crouwel (2012). He rightly points out that some of the early evidence for chariots in Etruria, specifically iconography on imported wares, should be treated with caution when arguing for the use of these vehicles.

214 Stary (1979), 190. Emiliozzi (2001) confidently identifies elements of Etruscan wheeled vehicles with Assyrian types and has pointed out that only on Cyprus and in Italy is the practice of burying a chariot within tombs practiced, throughout the Mediterranean.

215 Saulnier (1980), 66-68.
chariots being used by armed riders. Chariots are found in the burials of both 
males and females throughout central Italy. The existence of chariots in female 
burials indicates that they were not necessarily, and probably not, used in actual 
warfare. The most probable use of chariots in central Italian warfare was to ferry a 
warrior to and from the battlefield. The most common use of wheeled vehicles, 
though, was in processions or simply as a status symbol.

Adoption of the Greek style ‘hoplite’ panoply began around the middle of the 
seventh century in central Italy. It has long been pointed out that types of arms and 
armour found in the archaeology and iconography of Etruria, especially, began to 
shift at this point. One of the most important changes during this period was the 
adoption of the Corinthian helmet (Fig. 35). This type of helmet represents a leap 
in protectiveness from its central Italian antecedents. Unlike the helmets of the 
Early Iron Age, the Corinthian helmet provided considerable protection to the back 
of the head as well as the cheeks and face. This type of helmet is traditionally 
thought of as a strong factor in the development of tightly packed combat. It was 
quickly adapted for warfare in central Italy, however, with the development of the

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216 For instance, the decorated ostrich egg from Vulci (Fig. 45) which shows a line of armed men, 
with a rider in front, and an armed figure mounting a chariot in the rear or the temple friezes from 
Poggio Buco and Tuscania which depict similar scenes.
217 Riva (2010), 88.
218 Emiliozzi (2013).
219 Snodgrass (1965).
220 Stary (1981), 62-64. This type of helmet was widely depicted in figurative art in central Italy. Actual examples provide evidence that Corinthian helmets were probably in actual use, see Stary (1981), 427-430, for bibliographic information on fifty surviving examples. An example of a highly decorated Corinthian helmet was found in Vulci in 1835, de Luynes (1836), and is now held in the Bibliothèque nationale de France (Bronze.2013 = Luynes 598, inv. 116).
221 Snodgrass (1999), 51-52, describes the Corinthian helmet in some detail and praises it as a technologically ‘advanced product.’ A spectacular example of a Corinthian helmet, presumably used by an Etruscan during the Battle of Cumae (474) was found at Olympia in 1959, see Daux (1960). This was part of the trophy set up by Hieron to celebrate his victory in this battle against the Etruscans. The two other helmets associated with this trophy were Negau type helmets. See below.
222 Hanson (1989), 71-75; Schwartz (2009) provides a thorough discussion of the impact of ‘heavy’ arms on tactical considerations, but is to be read with caution. See the brief middling comments by Viggiano and van Wees (2013), 60-61.
Etrusco-Corinthian or Etrusco-Illyrian helmet (Figs. 36). These helmets had considerably larger openings for the eyes and ears, with cheek guards that more closely followed a man’s beard line rather than the entire face. In time the Negau helmet also became popular throughout central Italy, which gave the wearer completely unimpaired vision and hearing.

All three styles of helmets were in use from the end of the eighth century until the end of the period under study, although the evidence for precise styles falls off as time progressed. The adoption of the Corinthian helmet and the Negau type helmet show a continuing trend in central Italian armour, a willingness, or a need, to adopt designs from outside. The origin of the Corinthian helmet was with the Greeks, perhaps in phalanx warfare. The Negau helmet is a widespread helmet design found throughout Italy, the Alpine regions, and into Slovenia. The exact origins of this type of helmet are not entirely clear, and it could have been designed first in central Italy, the Alps, or Slovenia. The development of the Etrusco-Corinthian/Illyrian helmet, and subsequent development of the Negau type, shows that although there was an impetus to import new helmet designs, there was also a need to adapt imported designs to local requirements.

223 Stary (1979), 191, noted that local varieties of the Corinthian helmet were visible through to the fourth century. The terms Etrusco-Corinthian and Etrusco-Illyrian are not in common usage, however I believe that this type of terminology can help in describing the local variants of these helmets. On the adoption of Illyrian helmets in Central Italy, see Stary (1981), 64-65.


225 This is due to the ever increasing scarcity of arms and armour in burial contexts as time progressed.


227 The typological name of the helmet is derived from the 1811 excavation of twenty-six examples in Ženjak, near Negau, whence their name has come.

228 Stary (1979), 196, believes that the Negau type helmet was originally fashioned from the top of Greek or Etruscan helmet style, made without the faceguard of the Corinthian family of helmets.
Two spectacular examples of the Negau helmet were those dedicated by the Syracusan tyrant, Hieron I, after a victory over the Etruscans at Cumae in 474.\textsuperscript{229} The trophy also included a Corinthian helmet (see above). Each of these helmets was engraved ‘Ηιάρον ὁ Δεινομενεος/ καὶ τοὶ Συρακόσιοι/ τοι Δὶ Τυρ<ρ>αν’ ἀπό Κύμας’ ‘Hiaron [the son] of Deinomenes and the Syracusans to Zeus [dedicated these arms captured from] the Tyrrhenians at Kyme.\textsuperscript{230} This battle was also commemorated by Pindar (Pyth. 1.71-76).\textsuperscript{231} Presumably all three helmets were captured arms which had been used by Etruscan sailors or ‘marines’ during the battle (cf. Diod. Sic. 11.51). If this is a correct assumption, then it shows contemporaneous use of both the Negau and Corinthian type helmets.

Large round shields, along the lines of the Greek \textit{aspis}, called a \textit{clipeus} by the Romans (Livy 1.43), are also found from the middle of the eighth century onwards.\textsuperscript{232} Although round shields were in use before this period, the development of larger, bronze faced, shields only began at this point. These were probably made with a core of wood and only faced with bronze, like their Greek counterparts.\textsuperscript{233} As is often pointed out in the development of Greek arms and armour, the development of the double grip (\textit{porpax/antilabe}) on these shields allowed for greater mobility and use.\textsuperscript{234} Some scholars go so far as to claim large shields like these were usable only because of this double grip system.\textsuperscript{235} Evidence of the double grip, though, is not always present. A number of surviving bronze shields/facings have remnants of

\textsuperscript{229} The first originally published by Bröndsted (1820), but discovered, according to the original publication, in 1817. The second was found much more recently, Linagouras (1979). Both are discussed and illustrated in Frielinghaus (2011), 70-71, 448, being equivalent to her numbers L1 and L2.

\textsuperscript{230} Inscription and translation retrieved from Whitley (2011), 185, with further bibliography.

\textsuperscript{231} Pindar mentions both Phoenicians (Carthaginians) and Etruscans.

\textsuperscript{232} Stary (1981), 74-76. I use the terminology \textit{‘aspis’} in lieu of \textit{‘hoplon’}, following Lazenby and Whitehead (1996).

\textsuperscript{233} Snodgrass (1999), 53.

\textsuperscript{234} van Wees (2004), 48.

\textsuperscript{235} Hanson (1989), 65-66.
these two grips. Artistic depictions of the porpax and antilabe are present in native art, although the import of Greek artistic styles makes the interpretation of these images complicated (Fig. 39). It is probable, though, that the depiction was reflective of the shields in use in central Italy during this period.

Chest protection was left to two principal types. The first of these was the bronze cuirass. Surviving examples in central Italy are not common, although this is also true of Greece, where the bronze cuirass is often associated with the full hoplite panoply. As we have seen above, some modern commentators have pointed out that the Italian examples are made of relatively thinly hammered bronze sheet and would have been less protective than chest protection made of other materials, such as organics. This conclusion presumes the existence of organic body armour, usually described as leather, something that does not survive in the archaeological record. Although this is a widely held belief in the modern scholarship, it cannot and should not be taken as fact. There is no evidence for the use of leather armour in central Italy, which could be due to circumstances of survival of organic materials in the archaeological record, but any conclusion drawn on this point must be speculative, rather than authoritative as this conclusion is often stated. Scholars who believe that the protection afforded by bronze body armour was inferior, thus precluding them from actual combat use, overlook the importance of display in combat, just as we have seen with the tall crested Villanovan helmets above. Glittering metallic

237 The provided example does not show both grips, but the grip shown is so close to the rim of the shield that it is probable that there was a second grip which is not shown.
238 van Wees (2004), 48, points out that the bronze cuirass was not a commonly owned or worn piece, noting that in the Ten Thousand of Xenophon only a handful of the hoplites had them.
239 The use of leather as armour in Greece was at one time thought prominent (i.e. Jarva [1995], 36), but it is probable that only some of the depictions of so-called Type IV armour was leather, see Aldrete et al. (2013), 57-64.
240 Recent experiments using bronze plate of 0.8 mm and 1.8 mm and gauging their defensive capabilities against arrows concluded that 0.8 mm bronze armour would not protect its wearer from even a 25-lb. pull bow at 7.5 m, Aldrete et al. (2013), 125-128. This is evidence that thinner bronze
armour provided a fearsome image for the enemy, with the prime example from Italian antiquity being the Samnties described by Livy (9.40). The second type of chest protection found in central Italy in the Archaic Period was the linothorax, linen armour. Depictions of this type of armour are widespread in art during this period. It is represented in statuary (Fig. 40) of warriors and depictions which show the Etruscan Mars, Laran. Pseudo-historical figures such as the Vibenna brothers are shown wearing this type of armour when ambushing and kidnapping the prophet Cacu. In figurative art, individual warriors are depicted wearing linothorakes (Fig. 41), as well as are men in armed groups. Armed riders are also depicted wearing this type of armour. This type of armour is well attested throughout the Mediterranean. Twice it is mentioned in the Homeric poems (II. 2.529, 830; cf. Strabo 13.1.10 and Pliny NH 19.6). A linen corselet was good enough for a king of Veii to wear in the latter half of the fifth century (Livy 4.20). Their use in the central Mediterranean in general is attested for the early fifth century by the dedication at Olympia of three linothorakes by Gelon after the battle of Himera (Paus. 6.19.7). Recent reconstructions of ancient linen armour have shown that it was incredibly strong. It could have stopped arrows from penetrating from a distance as close as four meters. The level of protection granted by linen was more significant than that of thinner bronze plate, and possibly leather, if armour was actually made of leather. Linen armour was lighter than its metallic counterparts, and would have been well adapted to use in open warfare. Linothorakes could also occupy the

plate was not an effective armour for protection, but its value for display is still important. It is worth noting that the remains of bronze corsets and shield facings from Olympia show that they could be pierced by enemy weapons, but this does not seem to have stopped the Greeks from using this type of armour, see Snodgrass (1999), 56. 241 Cf. Dionysius (Ant. Rom. 9.5.6).
important place of display in combat through the weaving of metal scales or other artistic elements into or onto the armour. By themselves, fresh linen corselets may have provided an element of this as well, as Alcaeus includes thorakes of new linen among the other spectacular arms of the period (Frg. 2.19).

The importance of this type of armour should not be underestimated. Besides the actual combat advantages that have been noted above, there was another practical advantage to linen armour: it could be made in the home with a readily available material. Weaving was an important element of the household economy throughout the Mediterranean, and was possibly a defining element of central Italian women’s activities. The image of the Roman wife diligently sitting at home doing her weaving is embedded in the probably anachronistic story of the rape and suicide of Lucretia (Livy 1.57). What this means, though, is that Etruscan and Roman soldiers could have their armour made at home, rather than hiring out to a smith.

Changes in offensive arms begin to appear in the seventh century. At this point we see a new type of sword emerge in the Ager Faliscus, Picenum and in Umbria; the so-called double edged bat swords (Zweischnidige Hiebschwerter) were long swords with a simpler style of hilt than the antenna swords. The blade tapered from the hilt to a narrow point and then tapered wider and finally tapering again to the point. This created a slightly leaf shaped blade, although completely unrelated to the leaf shaped bladed short swords of the Aegean. Examples of this type of sword are also found in Southern Italy. The Faliscan, Picene, and Umbrian

245 Flax, used to produce linen, may have been cultivated in Italy from the Neolithic onward, although the evidence is scanty, due in part to faulty archaeological methodology in earlier excavations, see Gleba (2008), 65-67. Aldrete et al. (2013) have pointed out, though, that this type of armour could have been made from all kinds of scrap cloth, depending on the availability of resources to those making the armour.
246 Gleba (2008), 173-178. The distaff, an implement used during the spinning of fibers, has been found in ornate versions in Etruria, and in limited numbers elsewhere in Italy, and is reflective of the status of women and the importance of textile creation, see Gleba (2011).
swords were probably used as slashing weapons as their size and blade shape would have given them an advantage when used in this manner.\textsuperscript{248} This type of sword was not adopted in Etruria or Latium.

Offensive arms of the Archaic Period differed from the Early Iron Age. Swords were fashioned after the curved blade designs of the Greeks, or possibly a design from south-central Europe, including a knuckled hilt (Figs. 42).\textsuperscript{249} Short swords with straight blades were also in use, similar in design to the Early Iron Age, and similar as well to designs used in later Roman periods (Figs. 43).\textsuperscript{250} The first of these would have been effective as a slashing or ‘chopping’ weapon, although a distinct point was present. Straight bladed short swords would have been designed as a stabbing weapon, similar to their use in later Roman legionary combat. A type of dagger with a hilt similar to the antenna swords also existed in Latium and the ager Faliscus which are typologically associated with examples from the Hallstatt culture.\textsuperscript{251} Spears were an important and well attested element of the arms of this period. Spearheads are found throughout central Italy in the Archaic Period (except for Rome) and range in size from large leaf blades to smaller, perhaps javelin, points.\textsuperscript{252} Larger spearheads may indicate a larger spear in general, and would have been used as a stabbing weapon, giving its wielder a good amount of reach. Smaller

\textsuperscript{248} This type of sword was probably a native development and may be reflective of the type of warfare being waged around the central Apennines at this point, as this seems to be the nexus upon which the axis of discovery sits.

\textsuperscript{249} Stary (1981), 83-84, 190-191. Examples of the machaira type sword are also found in Central Italy, but better attested on the Adriatic coast, Ibid., 84-85, Karte 22. The development of the curved blade sword may have come from the eastern Mediterranean or from Spain, with earlier examples being produced in both areas. Stary (1979), 196, does concede that they could also have been a development native to Central Italy, especially Latium.

\textsuperscript{250} Stary (1981), 81-83.

\textsuperscript{251} Stary (1981), Karte 24.

\textsuperscript{252} Stary (1981), 90, notes spearhead lengths between 17 and 78 cm, the average however falling between 22 and 35 cm.
spears could have been used as missiles, an action attested in the later narrative history of the period.\textsuperscript{253}

Axes are attested in the Archaic Period, in slightly different styles than seen in the Early Iron Age.\textsuperscript{254} As opposed to the palstaves of the Early Iron Age, the axes of the Archaic Period were often double headed.\textsuperscript{255} Use of axes is shown in depictions of both infantry and cavalry. Modern commentators have a mixed history of interpreting these weapons.\textsuperscript{256} Most have dismissed their use in combat, with prominent members of the field like Mario Torelli describing them as archaising elements of Archaic art.\textsuperscript{257} This traditional consternation is based in the supposed incompatibility of the double headed axe in orthodox hoplite warfare.\textsuperscript{258} A helmet from Etruria, though, provides evidence of damage sustained from the blow of an axe.\textsuperscript{259} As we see below, the traditional view of hoplite warfare has been questioned in recent scholarship, and in this work, and there is no reason to restrict what we consider viable combat weapons to a limited interpretation of this kind. Moving away from a hoplite based understanding of combat in central Italy means that the axe should be viewed not as an archaising element but as a common weapon, if not culturally unique, in the context of the central Mediterranean.

The bow and arrow are not well attested in central Italy.\textsuperscript{260} Remains of arrowheads exist, but are not exceedingly common. A number of depictions in native art show archers operating within a mixed combat, including ‘heavy infantry’ and cavalry. We also see two figures armed with round shields, spears, and bows and

\textsuperscript{254} Stary (1981), 86-89.
\textsuperscript{255} Ibid., 89-90.
\textsuperscript{256} Saulnier (1980), 63, rapidly dismissed their use and relegated axes, especially those with two heads of this period, as being symbols of power (she uses \textit{imperio}) rather than combat weapons.
\textsuperscript{257} Torelli (2011b), 191-193.
\textsuperscript{258} The supposed difficulty of swinging a battle axe in phalanx combat is common enough in the literature on Greek warfare, cf. Anderson (1991), 25.
\textsuperscript{259} Weiss (1978), 197-198.
\textsuperscript{260} Stary (1981), 91.
arrows on a set of horse face-guards (Fig. 44). These depictions are not common, though. Archers are also depicted onboard ships in Etruscan art (Fig. 16). They are not the only armed members of the crew, and are counted amongst non-missile infantry. Arrowheads were amongst the recovered items from the Giglio wreck.

This survey of the changes of arms and armour in central Italy reveals a number of important concepts. The first is that the cultures of central Italy were receptive of foreign designs in arms and armour from a very early time. Actively acquiring new types of arms helped to expand the contact networks connected to central Italy and helped influence non-military elements of culture, with the northern influences on geometric art being very prominent. Through these networks, the social power of Etruscan elites was enhanced, allowing them to acquire prestige objects from abroad, with arms and armour providing an easy opportunity to display these connections within their communities.

2.2 Tactics

The use of warriors, soldiers, weapons, and technology on the battlefield collectively make up the concept of tactics. Execution of certain types of tactics, such as the Greeks’ use of the phalanx in pitched battle or the Roman manipular organization, is often pointed to as being a decisive factor in either victory or defeat. Scholars have traditionally promulgated the idea that tactics followed technology. For example as defensive armour became heavier and mobility, visibility, and audibility became more restricted, it is often argued that the Greeks were forced to adopt the phalanx tactics of the traditional literature. Within this view, the arms and

261 George (2013), 740, believes that elites fought as archers, often, in Etruscan armies. This assertion is perhaps a bit overstated.
262 Peña (2011), 185-186, Figure 9.2.
263 Echeverría Rey (2010) critiques the nature of these arguments, see especially 43-51.
armour of the Greeks directed how they fought their wars. While technology does play an important role in guiding the development of tactics, cultural considerations are as or more important than their technological counterparts. Using the Greek example again, along with heavier arms and armour, cultural mores of the period are traditionally thought to have guided the practise of warfare, if not as strictly adhered to as the practices described by Mardonius (Hdt. 7.9). Perhaps the most extreme example of tactics being shaped by cultural trends was the practise of rank and file musket volleys of the Enlightenment (c. eighteenth century AD). While musket armed forces in Europe were fighting in controlled lines exchanging civilized volleys, the native peoples of North America used the same types of arms to wage a type of guerrilla warfare on their enemies, eventually being adopted by the American colonials. This section looks at how technology and culture may have guided the development of tactics in central Italy.

In the Early Iron Age we have no literary or artistic evidence to help us understand the tactical situation. We can only try to reconstruct battle during this period based on our general knowledge of society at this time and our knowledge of the arms and armour in use. The types of helmets in use during this period sat high on the head and did not impede either vision or hearing. It is possible that this indicates an open style of combat in which situational awareness is more important than maximum protection. Spears, especially long spears, have been proposed as the primary weapon amongst the panoply described above, and that battle usually

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264 Hanson (1989) and Schwartz (2009) epitomize this view.
265 The idea of agonial Greek warfare has been challenged in recent scholarship and may have been a nostalgic invention of later authors, see Krentz (2002) and van Wees (2004), 115-130.
266 Parker (2007).
267 Jones (2000), 5-49.
268 Stary (1981), 54-56.
took the form of a scrimmage between individual combatants duelling with spears, or if that had broken swords and axes.\textsuperscript{269}

The advantage of the crested bronze helmets, in particular, may have come to bear in combat such as this. As their purpose was to enhance the perceived height of the wearer, thus creating a more formidable persona on the battlefield, in individual duels, combatants with less impressive headwear would have been at a psychological disadvantage. We have also seen above that both crested and bell helmets may have been used to create an identity associated with arms in burial; if this identity transferred into the world of the living, the value of these helmets on the battlefield may have been in establishing the identity of seasoned warriors or of men from a warrior ‘class,’ or perhaps just particularly wealthy or otherwise powerful individuals. If there were combatants present on the field who were of a perceived lesser class, then the tactical application of this kit was in a rudimentary type of psychological warfare.

Examples of this type of effect being cause by arms are present in poetic evidence, although not from strictly ‘historical’ sources.\textsuperscript{270} In the Homeric epics, elaborate arms and armour helped to differentiate different warriors. Their arms and armour helped to establish and communicate their legend and their prowess in warfare.\textsuperscript{271} The Greek army’s bronze armour lit the sky, for how polished and gleaming it was (\textit{Il.} 19.359-363).\textsuperscript{272} This effect is echoed in Virgil’s description of Aeneas’ ‘star-bright shield and celestial armour: a vision of fire,’ (\textit{Aen.} 12.165-

\textsuperscript{269} Saulnier (1980), 41, who also laments our lack of evidence.
\textsuperscript{270} Although interesting, the examples cited here must be read as metaphorical rather than concrete evidence.
\textsuperscript{271} For example, the silver studded sword of Priam (\textit{Il.} 2.45-47) or the shield of Achilles (\textit{Il.} 18.478-608).
\textsuperscript{272} van Wees (1994), 131-137.
There is some indication that this was a genuine element of early Greek society and that the ‘biography’ of artefacts could be transmitted through time. If similar cultural practices were at work in central Italy it is possible that the ornately decorated bronze helmets that we know from funerary contexts would have helped to circulate these stories throughout the region, thus adding a legendary element to the perceived combat prowess of those individuals, their compatriots, and those warriors who wore similar items.

The effects of this psychological battle cannot be fully understood in any recreation of Early Iron Age battle and tactics. The perceived standing, whether in physicality or class, of an opponent would have affected the combat potential of individual combatants, especially if someone of a lower standing was fighting a renowned warrior. This would give an advantage to wealthy or elite combatants in single combat. This could also give an advantage to warriors or soldiers who were associated with fighters who possessed this type of battlefield gravitas. Although it is quite impossible to prove, it is possible that tactical ‘units’ on the battlefield mirrored the social organization of Etruscan settlements during this period. If this is true, groups of fighters would have been drawn together around prominent members of elite families. This is reflected by the clustering of burials around centralized, wealthy, burials throughout the period. These groups are typically associated with kin groups. In Tarquinia, the leaders of these kin groups were buried within hut urns for a period in the Early Iron Age. This type of burial can be contrasted, though, in the late eighth century with a number of burials found outside of the kin

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273 Tr. Ahl.
274 Whitley (2002) points out that these items may or may not convey actual military prowess, but be more indicative of an ideology.
275 Riva (2010), 84-95.
277 Bartolini et al. (1987).
structure, which have consistently been interpreted as representing the existence of an early state structure beyond the family group.

Hut urns/family leaders were surrounded by burials with arms, possibly representing armed retainers or family members. If these were indeed warriors or soldiers, it seems plausible that they would have fought together as a unit. As we see towards the end of the Early Iron Age, though, this familial society is contrasted with extra familial, perhaps ‘state’ burials.\textsuperscript{278} Based on this social change, armies of Early Iron Age Tarquinia, and perhaps Etruria in general, may have been drawn up by state leaders, but at the most basic levels were still based on familial links. Tactically, these armies may have fought in a single battle line, but the possibility of micromanagement by family groups may have allowed for smaller, more manoeuvrable, tactical units.

Throughout the Orientalizing period, we have little reason to propose much of a different tactical organization than described above. The introduction of the chariot, however, has been pointed to as signalling a change in tactics.\textsuperscript{279} Other scholars do not see this introduction as a drastic change.\textsuperscript{280} Depictions of the chariot in the iconographic tradition beginning in the late seventh century often show an armed figure ascending into a chariot at the back end of a line of other armed men (Fig. 45). This appears to be a position of command or prestige, and the chariot, far from being an instrument of tactical superiority, was a means of conveyance.\textsuperscript{281} This is the usual practice found in the Iliad.\textsuperscript{282} Fitting in with the above emphasis on

\textsuperscript{278} Iaia (1999), 120.
\textsuperscript{279} Stary (1979), 190, 205 n. 104, citing evidence in Virgil that early Central Italy saw a form of chariot warfare. The use of Virgil as a source to discuss chariot warfare is problematic because of the possible impact of Homeric chariot warfare on the construction of the epic.
\textsuperscript{280} Saulnier (1980), 68-69.
\textsuperscript{281} Ibid., 69.
\textsuperscript{282} van Wees (2004), 58. See, though, Greenhalgh (1973) who believed that massed chariot combat was a reality in early Greek warfare.
display in combat, some chariot riders in Homer choose not to dismount, but to stay on their chariot to display their glory (Il. 12.110-115). This was one of the reasons that the chariot was adopted in central Italy.

During this period we also see an increasing amount of evidence that horses were regularly ridden.\(^{283}\) The use of horses in warfare may date to an earlier period in Italian history, though, as domesticated horses are attested at least as far back as the Terramare culture.\(^{284}\) Italians, the inhabitants of central Italy in particular, had a penchant for horsemanship, and by the Archaic period it is obviously an important element of the regional culture.\(^{285}\) In their earliest usage, horses may have been used in a similar way to chariots, being a means of conveyance to and from the battlefield.\(^{286}\) It is probable that they were used in raiding, though, which is well attested behaviour in early equine cultures.\(^{287}\)

If it is difficult for us to say much about the tactics of warfare in the Early Iron Age, it is slightly less so as we move towards the historical period. Organized groups of armed men begin to appear in at least the seventh century. The Tragliatella oinochoe is a prime example of this (Fig. 11).\(^{288}\) This vessel has had a long and difficult history of interpretation.\(^{289}\) Besides showing a line of figures carrying shields and three spears or javelins each, the other images show a labyrinth, two

\(^{284}\) Azzaroli (1972; 1985). Anthony (2007), 222-224, argues that ‘riding cannot be cleanly separated from warfare,’ by which idea we have to consider that mounted war, or at least mounted raiding, occurred quite far back into the Bronze Age in Central Italy.
\(^{285}\) Lubtchansky (2005). Camporeale (2004-2005) has shown that a culture developed around horses or possibly horse breeding, especially around Narce and the ager Faliscus.
\(^{286}\) Saulnier (1980), 69. This is a concept which is also familiar in the discussion of Greek warfare, with early riders being cited as mounted infantry, cf. van Wees (2004), 58. Other commentators believed that cavalry in the traditional sense existed from an early period in Greece, notably Worley (1994), 7-15, 32-35. Worley does argue, though, that we should see Mycenean cavalry, in particular, as ‘dragoons,’ a rather anachronistic term and way of looking at the situation.
\(^{287}\) Note, for instance, the impact that the introduction of the horse had on Native American populations, Anthony (2007), 222.
\(^{288}\) Giglioli (1929).
\(^{289}\) Cf. Martinez-Pinna (1995). Small (1986) believed that this was a funeral scene. Bonfante (2011b) has recently described this piece as showing ‘organized military forces... led by officers on horseback,’ 252. This description, however, is extremely problematic.
riders on horseback (along with a captive?), a lone figure, and then an erotic scene.\textsuperscript{290} The image of the labyrinth bears an inscription which reads ‘TRUIA’, which has been suggested to mean ‘Troy’.\textsuperscript{291} While it may show a line of soldiers, it has been persuasively argued that what is depicted by the line of figures bearing arms is an armed dance.\textsuperscript{292} Less problematic depictions begin with another series of oinochoes which are quite similar and currently held in the Royal Ontario Museum of Archaeology, in Toronto (Figs. 12-13).\textsuperscript{293} Native depictions of organized groups of warriors or soldiers eventually become relatively common, and their representation on Etrusco-Corinthian ware becomes more detailed (Fig. 46).\textsuperscript{294}

The importance of these depictions is not immediately clear. To some commentators, they imply that there existed some sort of military organization in the communities which produced these images.\textsuperscript{295} To others, these images are not directly linked to actual warfare, but to ritual or to dance.\textsuperscript{296} It is very appealing to try to claim that organized lines of men apparently armed for war is evidence for tightly organized lines of battle, or at least of organized units. The increasingly ‘heavy’ nature of arms and armour during this period may indicate closer knit tactics as well, which is particularly reflected in the use of the Greek style Corinthian helmet. This helmet was extremely restrictive and was most effectively used in a tightly organized line of battle.\textsuperscript{297} As we have seen above, though, this helmet was not used for a long period of time in its most basic form, and was improved upon to

\textsuperscript{290} Stary (1981), Taf. 9.
\textsuperscript{291} Decke (1881). It has also been suggested that this vase may show the process, or perhaps the myth, related to the ‘Lusus Troiae’ (cf. Dion. Hal. \textit{Ant. Rom.} 2.64) and the armed dance, or perhaps all of the images taken together, represent some sort of initiation or rebirth ceremony, Versnel (1993), 325-327, with earlier bibliography.
\textsuperscript{292} Camporeale (1987). Spivey and Stoddart also see it as an armed dance (1990), 137-38.
\textsuperscript{293} Robinson and Harcum (1930), 31-32.
\textsuperscript{294} Boitani (1974), 213.
\textsuperscript{295} Stary (1981), 129-130. Note, though, that this much of this discussion is tied directly to ‘hoplite combat,’ discussed below.
\textsuperscript{296} Spivey and Stoddart (1990), 137-139.
\textsuperscript{297} See, though, brief comments by Viggiano and van Wees (2013), 60-61.
fit a looser form of combat. The existence of tightly packed battle arrays could be true, and may have been reflected in the Early Iron Age through familial links, although we cannot prove any definite opinion to be true. They are, in both the least and the most, evidence that something brought men bearing arms together into groups: ritual, dance, or perhaps actual warfare.\textsuperscript{298}

During this period (c. 650), as we have seen above, Greek style arms and armour begin to make their way into the material record of central Italy. Scholars have often taken this evidence, alongside depictions of ‘ranks’ of identically (or similarly) armed men to be indicative of the practise of hoplite warfare in central Italy for this period.\textsuperscript{299} A number of theories exist as to how hoplite arms and tactics would have made their way into central Italy, with many scholars believing that their transmission from the Greeks of Southern Italy is the most probable.\textsuperscript{300} This seems to be a clear example of the concept of peer polity interaction, in which the advanced military technology and tactics of the newly arrived Greeks forced the Etruscans and then the Romans to adopt said methods.\textsuperscript{301} This conclusion is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, the type of combat which would have been encountered by Etruscan and Greek traders would have presumably been aboard ships, which certainly did not include phalanx combat. Secondly, when we do hear of combat between Etruscan and Greek armies, it is the cavalry that is emphasized in the narrative.\textsuperscript{302}

\textsuperscript{298} Camporeale (1987) has shown that armed dance was common throughout Etruria. We should not distance this too far from the actual practice of warfare, however, as the same or similar arms and armour would probably have been involved.

\textsuperscript{299} Stary (1981), 132-135, 169-171, with earlier literature.

\textsuperscript{300} Stary (1979), 193, links conflict with the Greeks of Southern Italy to the adoption of the hoplite panoply and phalanx, including contact with traders. See also the comments of Snodgrass (1986b), citing hoplite army victories over Etruscans.

\textsuperscript{301} Renfrew (1986).

\textsuperscript{302} For instance, when an Etruscan led army attacked Cumae in 524/523 the infantry combat is relegated to a background noise, while the cavalry engagement takes centre stage in the narrative (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7.4). When the Syracusans defeated Carthage for the first time, at the Battle of
The situation in general is made complicated by two other points: current discussions on Greek tactics of relatively similar periods, and the evidence of battle in the literary evidence. Because of these two issues, the possibility of hoplite warfare in central Italy must be addressed.

The idea of Etruscan and Roman hoplite phalanxes, in a tactical sense, is long rooted in the modern historical tradition. The most thorough early discussion in English can be found in McCartney’s landmark, if not flawed, article. McCartney believed that both Etruscans and Romans fought in a Greek style phalanx from sometime in the archaic period. This position was echoed in the coming decades, notably by Nilsson, for whom the introduction of this particular tactical formation had resonating socio-political consequences. For all these early scholars on the subject, the most convincing, and unquestionably ‘reliable’ according to Nilsson, piece of evidence for central Italian phalanxes was not to be found in the archaeological evidence, but rather in the Ineditum Vaticanum. This problematic text gives evidence for the adaptation of bronze shields (χαλχάσπιδες) by the Romans during their wars with the Etruscans. The text also tells us, though, that at the time of this adoption, the Romans also began to fight in phalanxes.

The Ineditum Vaticanum is not the only literary evidence marshalled in support of central Italian hoplite phalanxes. In the case of Rome, it has been proposed by a number of authors, and followed by many others, that the introduction of Himera, the cavalry play the major part (Diod. Sic. 11.21; cf. Hdt. 7.167); this story is highly mythologized, having the Greek cavalry take the Punic camp through a stratagem, but it is possible that there is a core of historical truth that the cavalry played a decisive role in the Greek victory. The strength in cavalry of the Western Greek armies is also reflected in the disastrous Athenian campaign of 415-413.

303 Nilsson (1929) contains early bibliography.
304 McCartney (1917).
305 Nilsson (1929).
306 von Arnim (1892).
of the Servian Constitution signalled the introduction of the hoplite phalanx.\footnote{Cornell (1995), 184, believes that ‘it has long been recognized that the Servian reforms presuppose the adoption of hoplite tactics at Rome.’ This was also a vehemently accepted fact in both the German, Stary (1981), and French, cf. Jannot (1985; 1986), schools.} This requires that the Servian Constitution be viewed as an egalitarian measure and that under this reform there was only one military class, known collectively to the Romans as classis. As we have seen in chapter three, however, the form of the Servian Constitution handed down to us by Livy, Dionysius, and Cicero cannot be discarded this quickly; thus, we should not readily accept the existence of a Roman hoplite phalanx based on the re-reading of this reform. It is obvious that direct knowledge of the tactics of this period were confused by the period in which our evidence was written, this is exemplified by a passage of Livy in which he claims that the Romans changed from a Macedonian style phalanx to the manipular army, changing from \textit{clipeii} to \textit{scuti} when pay was introduced (8.8). The proposal that the Roman army fought along the lines of a Macedonian army is certainly false and is reflective of the Late Republican and Augustan periods’ interest in the Hellenistic East and a conflation or misunderstanding of the extent to which ‘phalanx’ was a Classical concept. It is interesting that Livy is the only source which mentions this, which betrays it as his own confusion rather than that of his sources.

Modern arguments have typically supplemented this snippet of literary evidence with the body of archaeological and artistic evidence which indicates that Greek arms and armour were in use in central Italy.\footnote{I.e. Stary (1981).} This evidence used to be extrapolated through the line of thinking that if the Etruscans and Romans had adopted the hoplite panoply, they must have also adopted the hoplite’s phalanx; this is because of the physical limitations put on a soldier by the hoplite kit. Stary, following the consensus of scholars on Greek armies (especially from the German
school), believed that ‘the panoply, especially the armour, the large hoplite shield with a diameter of 1 to 1.20m, and the Corinthian helmet which covered the whole head, was of no advantage but a positive obstacle for the single combat man-to-man... the panoply was advantageous only in close formation, that is to say in the phalanx, and therefore depended on the phalanx-tactics.’ Various scholars have iterated similar, if not almost exact, arguments in favour of this idea. Authorities on Greek warfare were the source of this conclusion.

V. D. Hanson was very specific in his description of the ‘burden of hoplite arms and armour,’ as he called it. He believed that hoplites could only fight within the confines of a phalanx because of this burden. From Hanson’s seminal publication, which brought the study of Greek warfare up-to-date for the common twentieth-century reader, though, opinion on this point has differed and two general schools of thought have developed. The first, the ‘traditional,’ school accepts that the hoplite was so weighed down by his arms and armour that he could not but fight in relatively static square formations. The second, the ‘new,’ school argues that Greek battles and the hoplites which fought therein were more fluid and varied. Besides supposed ‘practical’ considerations on the size and weight of Greek arms and armour, there are a number of pieces of literary evidence which lend themselves to each side of this debate.

Much of the support for the idea that hoplites could only fight within the phalanx comes from Thucydides and Xenophon. Thucydides provides two good examples of hoplites being defeated by light armed troops (3.97-98; 4.32-36). In Xenophon’s *Hellenica*, two instances of hoplite forces being defeated by attacking

309 Stary (1979), 193.
311 Hanson (1989), 55-88.
their ‘unprotected side’ are given: the first an army of Argive hoplites are defeated by Spartans, and in the second a group of Spartan hoplites are defeated by a group of missile troops (4.2.22; 4.5.13). The ‘naked’ side of these forces which were attacked has been assumed by translators and historians to mean the ‘right’ side of the hoplites, as this is the supposed side where the protection of the great hoplite aspis fell short.\(^{312}\) Recently, Schwartz has argued very strongly in favour of this view of hoplites and their phalanx, restating the supposed physical limitations and elaborating on the literary evidence which he views as proving the weaknesses of hoplites in terms of their mobility.\(^{313}\)

Arguments against this theory, though, are becoming more abundant. From a period after the adoption of the hoplite kit, van Wees has argued that many ‘hoplite’ battles were probably fluid, involving missiles and hand to hand combat, rather than just the latter.\(^{314}\) He argues that the use of a ‘sideways on’ stance would allow a hoplite to shield himself completely with an aspis, not requiring a fellow to his right.\(^{315}\) Importantly, these arguments are founded on evidence for the Archaic age, precisely the period when the phalanx was supposedly adopted in Etruria and Rome. This would mean that even in battles between armies of hoplites, there would not necessarily be a need to fight in a tight formation, unless other factors, perhaps cavalry, were involved. This reconstruction would see battles somewhere in between the individual nature of Homeric duels and the rigidly set piece affairs described by earlier modern commentators. Further arguments by Rawlings provide historical examples of hoplites and their ‘burdensome kit’ fighting, and fighting well, outside

\(^{312}\) Ibid., 27-28.
\(^{313}\) Schwartz (2009; 2013).
\(^{314}\) van Wees (2000).
of a phalanx.\textsuperscript{316} He also draws an important parallel to the kit of Assyrian infantry of a relatively contemporary period, who are depicted as being able to perform a number of tasks which required a high level of mobility.\textsuperscript{317}

Although a number of academics have refuted the claims and ideas put forward by the ‘new’ school, especially those of van Wees, these refutations lack much substance. Their arguments are based often in the camp of ‘physical limitations of the hoplite shield’ and provide little new analysis, simply restating earlier arguments. There has not been, to my knowledge, a direct refutation of the evidence provided by Rawlings for combat success outside of the phalanx and the literary sources that he has cited. If the contemporary Greeks were not restricted to the phalanx then why should we view the warfare of central Italy through this lens?

Bruno d’Agostino suggested, some years ago, that the Etruscan social system would have been unable to adapt to the egalitarianism which the hoplite phalanx supposedly brought with it.\textsuperscript{318} For Rome, Nathan Rosenstein has rightly pointed out that a phalanx along the Greek lines could not have developed in the Archaic period, at least influenced by an Hellenic antecedent, if that antecedent had yet to be developed.\textsuperscript{319} Other scholars have voiced their doubts about Etruscan and Roman phalanxes, but it is only the two aforementioned pieces which discuss it in any detail.\textsuperscript{320} Alternatively, Saulnier puts forward a theory that the ‘Servian Army,’ at least, fought in two different lines of battle: one, the phalanx of the wealthy, the other, a line of differently armed ‘light’ troops.\textsuperscript{321} Accepting that we can no longer securely use Greek parallels to describe central Italian warfare during the Archaic

\textsuperscript{316} Rawlings (2000), especially 234-237.
\textsuperscript{317} Ibid., 247-248.
\textsuperscript{318} d’Agostino, B. (1990). D’Agostino, though, still believed in a Roman hoplite phalanx based on a Servian model.
\textsuperscript{319} Rosenstein (2010).
\textsuperscript{320} Cf. Momigliano (1963), 119, and Harris (1990), 508.
period, we must go back to the original evidence, iconographic and literary, to create a new model.

Most modern authors consider the early battle narratives as being historically worthless. While this may be true, they represent our only knowledge of the legends and stories which survived into the historical period. Though suspect to hyper-critical historians, there is value in examining these stories even if it is impossible to build a conclusive picture from them. It is clear from the narrative of the Regal Period that cavalry was remembered as being very important. Besides the mysterious figures of the *celeres*, bodies of riders were continually in need by the Roman kings. Both Tullius Hostilius (Livy 1.30) and Tarquinius Priscus (Livy 1.36) were remembered as having expanded the cavalry. Hostilius drew his new cavalrymen from the newly integrated people of Alba Longa, while Tarquinius attempted to add more centuries to the existing tribes of Roman cavalry. The latter of these stories has a deeply religious tone and may reflect a real religious conundrum faced by the king, or a false aetiology developed by later Romans in order to explain an oddity in the tribal system surrounding the cavalry.\textsuperscript{322} The first story, however, is unnecessary for the Livian narrative and there is little explanation as to why this particular fact was fabricated, unless it was to simply add depth to the narrative. We see in the narratives of both Livy and Dionysius, as well, that the cavalry was often highlighted as the centrepiece of combat and of victory.

The importance of the cavalry continued into the Republican period. The first battle fought by the newly founded Republic and its recently evicted king is decided in the main by an early cavalry charge which killed the consul Brutus and the son of

\textsuperscript{322} Ogilvie (1965), 150-151, believes that the narrative around Attus Navius is completely fabricated, and that the episode is built up around the historical oddity of the *primores* and *postiores* of the tribal cavalry. Ampolo (1999), 67, accepts the cavalry reform, and possibly even the opposition to it, but acknowledges the fantastic nature of the story surrounding it.
Tarquinius Superbus, Arruns (Livy 2.6-7). At the Battle of Lake Regillus, not long after the founding of the Republic, the important scenes in the narrative are again about cavalry manoeuvres, particularly around the consul Marcus Valerius (Livy 2.20). This battle also sees the cavalry dismount and fight alongside the infantry to bolster their courage and secure a Roman victory. The legend of Castor and Pollux associated with this battle may be indicative of the real importance of the cavalry to victory.\textsuperscript{323} Caeso Fabius in a later battle against the Veientines needed to use only his cavalry to rout the enemy (Livy 2.43). In a later war against the Sabines we hear of the cavalry being urged on to better the infantry and again was forced to fight on foot to help bolster the infantry (Livy 3.61-62). This occurs again in 423 (4.38-39). A battle against the Volsci in 446 saw the cavalry in the middle of the battle line (mounted) and was apparently the decisive element in the Roman victory (Livy 3.70). The cavalry again appear in the middle of the battle line in 437 (Livy 4.18). A number of artistic depictions show mêlées in which cavalry and infantry are fighting.\textsuperscript{324} Other iconographic evidence shows that the cavalry of central Italy were equipped to fight hand to hand, perhaps as a type of shock cavalry (Figs. 9-10). These depictions are evidence that cavalry could have fought along the lines described in the literary evidence. The value of these stories may be limited, but they show a departure from the regular pattern of Roman battle during the Late Republic and may date to at least the earliest Roman historians.

Raiding was an important element of central Italian warfare, as we will see below in chapter three. It is probable that some of this raiding was carried on by warriors or soldiers on foot. The arms and armour of the period would not have

\textsuperscript{323} Richardson (2013) argues that this legend is a later addition to the story, but there is no strong evidence for this, and the early attestation of the temple to Castor in Rome suggests that this was an early tradition ascribed to the battle, cf. Cornell (1995), 108-109, 263.

\textsuperscript{324} Stary (1981), Tafel 25.
precluded this, even if a rather full version of the hoplite panoply was adopted.\textsuperscript{325} Cavalry, however, would have been the most successful and useful raiders. Mounted warriors and soldiers allow for quick insertion and extraction from hostile territory and allow a raiding army to carry off more plunder than they would be able to on foot. These assumptions can be corroborated through examples from other cultures.\textsuperscript{326} Cavalry raids may be depicted in iconography from the period under question. A number of so-called oikos temples were decorated with scenes depicting armed riders at the charge, armed in a realistic fashion for the period (Figs. 9-10).\textsuperscript{327} These could be meant to represent the role of the cavalry in warfare in general, not just in raiding, but the absence of infantry from these scenes may be evidence that they do represent raids. We hear from the literary sources, as well, that cavalry could be used alone to drive off raiding armies (cf. Livy 3.22). Earlier commentators have had considerable difficulty in reconciling the preponderance of evidence which points to the importance of cavalry in central Italy with the strict version of hoplite warfare associated with the period and region.\textsuperscript{328} As we have seen above, if we discard the notion of strictly organized hoplite phalanxes it is not impossible, nor difficult, to speak about cavalry as being a very prominent combat arm both in pitched battle and in raids.

Infantry tactics are not easily elucidated from the evidence. We receive little description of how these men fought on the battlefield in the narrative. In a number of instances we hear of ‘wings’ of armies being commanded by individual

\textsuperscript{325} Rawlings (2000).  
\textsuperscript{326} Anthony (2007), 222.  
\textsuperscript{327} Winter (2009), 311-332.  
\textsuperscript{328} Stary (1981), 124-125, 157-158, and Jannot (1986), saw them as mounted hoplites or auxiliaries. Saulnier (1980), 112-114, argues that cavalry was disappearing overtime, with the adoption of the hoplite phalanx, trying to make the case that the lack of a cavalry deputy in consular armies indicates the slide from prominence of the cavalry, but this is just absurd and does not make sense without a complicated manipulation of religious evidence from the later Republic. That consuls are nearly always mounted in the narratives of the fifth century should highlight the importance of this type of service.
commanders, who were themselves usually mounted, which may point to an army broken up into different units.\footnote{Examples of parts of armies being led by individual commanders: Livy 2.6-7, 19-20, 47, 3.22, 4.38, etc…} This type of organization was common in Greek warfare, even in periods where the classical idea of the hoplite phalanx could well have been used; this was often the case in armies composed of citizens from multiple \textit{poleis}.$^{330}$ It is probable that smaller groups existed within these larger tactical units, again, not different necessarily than in a traditional hoplite phalanx. Many scholars have recognized that Etruscan elites played an important role in the recruitment of armies through their clients and other dependents, best evidenced by the description of the Etruscan army at Veii provided by Dionysius ($\textit{Ant. Rom.}$ 9.5.4). There is evidence that the gens Fabia fought together as a unit as well (Livy 2.46).\footnote{van Wees (2004), 97-101, and Rawlings (2007), 84-85.} Diodorus’ description of the so-called Fabian Expedition reads as though the Fabii fought together as a unit, which was the cause of their mass casualties (Diod. Sic. 11.53.6). Although this type of micro-organization could have existed, and was something shared with the armies of the Early Iron Age, there is no reason to presume that there was not an overarching mechanism of control exercised through the means of the state. Magistrates could marshal armies, whether raised by individual elite groups ($\textit{gentes}$?) or through pseudo-constitutional mechanisms (see chapter 3) and this would have been the source of massed battles.

Individual units were integrated into a larger line of battle. This is what is suggested by the narratives. As individual armies clashed these smaller units may have operated on their own, tactically. There is some evidence that the units of bodyguards kept by consuls on campaign operated separately from the general organization of the army, and we may be able to see a snippet of how the rest of the

\footnote{See the discussion of familial armies above, 3.2.1.}
smaller familial units operated.\textsuperscript{332} This is, however, hypothetical. The success of Roman cavalry of breaking up armies, especially from attacks straight to the middle of an opposing battle line, may suggest that the cohesion of different smaller units may not have been great. This would also suggest a more open form of battle than the traditional phalanx battle organization allows. That cavalry units could dismount and make their way to the front of a battle line, in an effective way to bolster the ranks, also indicates a loose organization in which individuals could work their way forward.\textsuperscript{333} The arms and armour of the period, as represented in archaeology and iconography, also suggested a more open form of combat. Rather than adopting and continuing to use the restrictive Corinthian helmet, a style of helmet developed in central Italy which allowed for considerably improved vision and hearing over Greek designs. This helmet was then overtaken by the Negau type helmet, which provided unimpaired vision. This loose organization is in contrast to the traditional ‘push’ of the hoplite battle, which scholars of the traditional school usually maintain was based on the physical force of a densely packed block of men.

It is also worth exploring the proposal of Saulnier, that the Roman armies of the Servian Constitution fought in a two line battle formation, with a densely packed phalanx of elites armed as traditional hoplites and retainers or dependents armed with ‘lighter’ skirmishing equipment.\textsuperscript{334} This is based on a somewhat credulous reading of the Servian reforms, as advocated below. A reconstruction of this type also pre-empts the later development of the tripartite battle line of the Middle Republic.\textsuperscript{335} There is some evidence, though, as we will see again below, that armies

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{332} Livy 2.20, 33, 47.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{333} Jannot (1986) believes that cavalry often fought dismounted, cf. 119.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{334} Saulnier (1980), 108-109.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{335} Keppie (1984), 19-23.}
\end{footnotes}
with mixed gear did exist in Archaic Italy.\textsuperscript{336} This evidence comes from a number of \textit{situlae} from Bologna (Figs. 7-8) which depict armies with some soldiers armed with oblong ‘\textit{scuti}’, smaller oblong shields, and then a single figure at the rear with a \textit{clipeus}. Some recent commentators have cited these as explicit evidence for the existence of an army along the lines of the Servian Constitution.\textsuperscript{337} While this is possible, we cannot discount that these represent armies which included mercenaries from different cultures using their traditional arms and armour.\textsuperscript{338}

It is problematic that these images come from situlae, a type of vessel which was produced primarily in the Veneto and the area of modern Slovenia.\textsuperscript{339} This is a considerable distance from the region under discussion and may have no relation to south Etruria and Rome. It is striking, however, how similar the armed groups shown on these vessels are to the description of an army based on the Servian Constitution. It is possible that these images are reflective only of an army structure in the Veneto. It is also possible, however, that these situlae were created for Etruscan patrons, illustrating an aspect of their way of life, war.\textsuperscript{340} But, if these images are accepted as evidence for armies along the lines of the Servian Constitution then it is worth reconsidering the proposal of Saulnier. These images do not show a core phalanx of \textit{clipeus} wielding elites, but rather seem to show an army of differently armed soldiers carrying oblong shields with a leader at the end of the march armed in the traditional ‘hoplite’ fashion. Tactically, this may imply an army of retainers which did much of the fighting, while an ornately armed commander urged them on from the rear. This is not entirely detached from the narrative sources, and could line up with the stories

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\textsuperscript{336} Chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{338} Cherici (2008a).
\textsuperscript{339} Frey (1969).
\textsuperscript{340} Capuis (2004), 135-136, for instance, suggests that the Benvenuti \textit{situla} was made to show the adoption of Etruscan customs.
of the cavalry having to bolster faltering lines of infantry, the commander and his bodyguards, being the cavalry, only coming when it is absolutely necessary.\textsuperscript{341}

### 2.3 Conclusions

As we have seen above, the arms and armour of central Italy changed over time. A number of themes emerge, however. Central Italian cultures embraced arms and armour designs from abroad, ranging from the cap helmets of the Early Iron Age to the Corinthian helmets of the Archaic Period. Adoption of these foreign arms and armours helped to influence the cultural development of the region, impacting artistic developments in the Early Iron Age geometric designs and guiding the creation of Hellenizing art in the Archaic. Although there may have been practical reasons for the adoption of certain elements discussed above, especially the linothorax, there is also evidence that a fashion process was at work, which utilized foreign elements to emphasize the social position of people already associated with war making, as different styles of warfare do not necessarily seem to have been adopted. By adopting the image of the foreign warrior, then, central Italian elites at once distanced themselves from ‘commoners’ and asserted their role in the practise of warfare.

Imported styles of arms and armour also helped central Italian elites interact with the wider world. The identities that they created using these imported styles may have allowed them to be recognized as part of a warrior class even among foreigners.\textsuperscript{342} While the actual execution of war allowed for the accumulation of economic and religious social power quite readily, as we see below, the material aspects related to warfare (arms and armour) allowed for the construction and

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\textsuperscript{341} The phenomenon of single combat is well known from the Republican period immediately after that under study, but Oakley (1985) could account for seven instances of it between the Regal Period and 349. The full extend of this type of behaviour in battle is unknown during our period, but we should acknowledge that single combat may have been a regular feature of battles.

\textsuperscript{342} Cf. Riva (2005).
acquisition of political power through creating a very specific image, whether this operated on the level of certain classes or on the level the individual. The Servian Constitution is an important example of this. The first class armed themselves with *clipeii*, large round shields, which would easily allow an onlooker to identify them as being of a certain standing. This contrast is easily seen on the Situla Arnoaldi, where what appears to be a commander, carrying a *clipeus*, stands to the rear of a much larger group of soldiers carrying *scuti*. Creating this division may have been one of the motivations of the Servian classes; following this line of thought it could imply that when we hear of the Romans abandoning the *clipeus* and adopting the *scuti* that it was both a social and a military revolution. This may also be indicated by the fact that a number of sources place the introduction of the *stipendium* at the transition between these two shield and tactical types. Keeping in mind the above discussion, the analysis will now move onto analyzing the patterns of warfare in central Italy and the connections between military power and the three other major sources of social power.
3. Warfare in Tyrrhenian Italy

Patterns of warfare are influenced by many of the same social forces which act on the day-to-day aspects of warfare, such as the recruitment of armies or the tactics employed on the battlefield. In the case of warfare patterns, or types of warfare being waged, it is in the goals of those in command or leadership positions which usually have the greatest influence. In smaller social units, such as those below the traditionally defined ‘chieftdom’ sized society, warfare is often characterized by raiding and counter raiding for various economic, religious, and cultural reasons. With increasing social complexity it is generally assumed that more complex patterns of warfare emerge. Chiefdoms, for example, are often categorized as participating in small scale conquest on a regional level. Complex chiefdoms and early/archaic states have traditionally been seen as the origin points of ‘traditional’ warfare: battle and conquer. The data from central Italy show a more complex pattern than these evolutionary categories allow for.

It is readily deduced that conflict was present and probably escalating during the period of transition from Bronze to Iron Age. Throughout the years 2200 to 730, defensibility of settlement locations becomes increasingly important. This has been explored using agent-based modelling by Federico Cecconi and his team, and when compared to excavated data it appears to be similar. The authors of that study

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344 Earle (1991b); Otterbein (2004), 117.
345 Earle (1997), 106-10, gives a review of earlier scholarship on this point. Otterbein (2004), 177-82, has elaborated on this point and has put forward an addendum to the traditional definition of the ‘early state’ established by Claessen and Skalnik (1978b) which would include ‘an efficient military organization’ as a criterion of an ‘early state.’ See, however, Claessen (2006). An up-to-date overview of the ‘early state’ concept, with bibliography, can be found in Skalnik (2009); cf. Grinin (2003). Simon Stoddart (2010) has rightly cautioned against the application of ‘crisp typologies’ whilst examining Central Italian state formation.
346 Their theoretical simulation was based, in part, on the innovative and important simulation of Anasazi settlement in the Long House Valley, Arizona (Dean et al. [1999]). An early projection of what this type of analysis can do in archaeology was put forward by J. Doran (1999) around the same time as Dean et al.’s study. The methodology has been further developed by teams working in various
concluded that in the phase of settlement immediately preceding the urbanization of central Italy, defensibility, and thus warfare, was increasingly present. The fortification of sites in central Italy continued throughout the period under study in this work, becoming more elaborate over time. Southern Etruria and Latium see the most rapid and numerous constructions of fortifications in the archaic period and later. Rome, the largest city of the region throughout much of the archaic and classical periods, perhaps came late onto the scene of fortified cities, probably building its first monumental and all-encompassing wall in the sixth century. These data all point to a region in which conflict was prevalent enough to invest communal resources in the construction of walls.

But what kind of warfare were these settlements being protected against? Was it traditional warfare, as seen from a Western point of view, involving pitched battles and conquest, or was it more uncivilized, as some would have it, consisting of raiding and small encounters? This is what historians of the early modern and modern world describe as ‘la petite guerre.’ But if ‘small war’ was a major social and economic force within central Italy should we still describe it in such a diminutive fashion? This chapter examines the patterns of warfare as we can see them in the archaeological and historical records. While the historical evidence may be seen to be treated in a ‘credulous’ fashion, care has been taken to explain controversial choices of evidence where they come up.

areas of archaeology, such as the Titicaca Basin (Griffin and Stanish [2007]), with an accessible description of the methods and theory to be found in Kohler et al. (2005).

Cecconi et al. (2004).

Fontaine (2008), 204, provides a helpful map of the situation as we currently know it. I side with the opinions of Gabriele Cifani (1998; in progress) on the dating of the earliest walls of Rome.

Cf. Cifani (in progress), 5-6, for a discussion of the resources and economic impact of walls.

Carman (1999).

3.1 Traditional Warfare/ Early Conquest

Traditionally, Western scholars have emphasized that pitched battles and conquest of territory constitutes the proper form of war. The sacking of cities as part of a pattern of warfare can be seen as far back as the Homeric tradition. This position can be seen in some traditions of scholarship regarding central Italian warfare. The German tradition is especially guilty of this, often using Greek parallels to discuss Roman and Etruscan evidence; such as Homer and the hoplite narrative. Other schools of scholarship practise this same procedure. Although Greek evidence is cited throughout this study, it is not a starting point for analysis, as it has been in the past. This is not to say, however, that we lack evidence for pitched battles and conquest during this period. We have some evidence from archaeology for this type of warfare and considerable evidence from the historical sources.

3.1.1 Sieges and Conquest

This section looks at the evidence for ‘siege warfare’ in central Italy. It should be noted that the author uses this term to mean a number of different things. The first is a siege along traditional lines, circumvallation, assaulting walls, and the like. The second type of warfare that is considered under this heading, though, are attacks, or the threat of attacks, on settlements, whether or not they involved the

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354 Individuals could become renowned for leading wars of this kind, notably Achilles, who was remembered as having sacked 23 cities and was known by one epitaph as πτολίπορθος (Hom. II. 9.328-29), see Haft (1990).
357 The following analysis is based on a reading of the problematic literary sources concerning Early Rome. As outlined in the introduction, this study utilizes these sources readily. Although some scholars would argue that there is little value in this, the author does not agree. The stories preserved in the histories have been warped and changed throughout time, but that does not mean that they are completely false or fabricated. This work is one of historical examination at its core, not philological or historiographical. With that objective clear, it must be conceded that a non-historiographical approach to early Rome is problematic to a modern critical historian. As noted in the introduction, the historicity of individual events and notes are examined on a case-by-case basis throughout the thesis.
more complex practices of siege warfare known from the eastern Mediterranean or later history.

The comings and goings of small centres in the Early Iron Age are not well enough known to conclude whether those which were abandoned were destroyed in conflict or whether their populations moved for other reasons. With the development of the large centres which would eventually become the Etruscan cities we begin to see evidence of some larger settlements being destroyed or abandoned, most probably in conflicts over power or economics. Marsiliana d’Albegna was abandoned or destroyed sometime in the sixth century, possibly because of pressure from the expanding primary centre of Vulci. Acquarossa was destroyed or abandoned between the end of the sixth century or beginning of the fifth century. Like Marsiliana d’Albegna, Acquarossa probably met its fate in the face of an expanding city. Murlo may be added to the list of larger settlements destroyed during the archaic period, although the interpretation of its destruction is disputed. Some scholars have argued that the monumental complex at Murlo, and the site as a whole, was destroyed as a ritual act, whilst others maintain that its demise came because of its position in a politically volatile site. Besides these sites, there is no visible destruction of primary or other large centres in Etruria until the Roman conquest of Veii in 396.

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359 Barker and Rasmussen (1998), 174-78, give an overview of the information.
360 The research tradition on this site can now be found in Zifferero (2009). See the comments by Haynes (2000), 165-66.
364 The settlement summary provided by Spivey and Stoddart (1991), 45-61, is still relevant. Camporeale’s handbook (2011), 221-396, provides an up to date bibliography for all settlement evidence in Etruria.
In the narratives, though, we do hear of some sieges of large centres throughout the period.\textsuperscript{365} Within the narrative of the Rape of the Sabine women, we hear that the Sabine army, led by Titus Tatius, captured the Capitol, traditionally with the help of Tarpeia, daughter of Spurius Tarpeius (Livy 1.11; Dion. Hal. \textit{Ant. Rom.} 2.38-41). Usually portrayed a traitor, trading the Capitoline Hill for her own vanity (or infatuation), some traditions of Tarpeia portrayed her as a failed hero, attempting to disarm the Sabines.\textsuperscript{366} While the legend of Tarpeia and the aetiological explanation for the name of the Tarpeian Rock are certainly mythological, that a Sabine army captured the Roman citadel during the eighth century could be a genuine historical memory; if it did happen, though, there is no hard evidence. An army of Etruscan \textit{condottieri}, either led by Caelius Vibenna or Mas(c)starna could have captured the Caelian Hill by force sometime in the sixth century.\textsuperscript{367} Lars Porsenna was the next to lay siege to a major city, which was Rome, but never captured the city according to the traditional accounts (Livy 2.9-14; Dion. Hal. \textit{Ant. Rom.} 5.21-35).\textsuperscript{368} Arruns Porsenna, the son of Lars, besieged Aricia after his father’s army made peace with Rome (Dion. Hal. \textit{Ant. Rom.} 7.5). We may also see Rome being besieged by an army from Veii in the aftermath of the dubious episode of the

\textsuperscript{365} On siege narratives in Livy, see Roth (2006).
\textsuperscript{366} Dionysius (\textit{Ant. Rom.} 2.40) says that Piso (F 7 \textit{FRHist}) portrays Tarpeia as trying to disarm the Sabines. The tradition is confused and probably mythological in most of its aspects, see O’Neill (1995), Wiseman (2004), 145-47, Cairns (2011).
\textsuperscript{367} The emperor Claudius knew an Etruscan version of the story of the brothers Vibenna in which Mastarna, who was to become Servius Tullius, led the army of the deceased Caelius to Rome and occupied the hill which was to become the Caelian (\textit{ILS} 212.I.22-7). Varro (\textit{Ling.} 5.46) and Dionysius (\textit{Ant. Rom.} 2.36) both preserve a tradition in which Caelius himself came to Rome as an ally of Romulus.
\textsuperscript{368} Andreas Alföldi (1965) famously claimed that these sieges of Rome, contrary to the traditional narrative, resulted in the capture and subjugation of the city. His account has been almost roundly rejected in modern scholarship, with the most famous reviews and refutations of his ideas coming from Arnaldo Momigliano (1965), although even Momigliano ceded that it was a possibility that Porsenna captured the city (1969), 487-99. The full list of evidence against Alföldi’s position is too large to enumerate here, but I would like to add one point to the traditional critique. If Fabius Pictor, and the Roman tradition in general, was open to the creation of a more honourable history why would the Gallic Sack not have been mitigated to a level like the siege of Porsenna?
Fabii at the Cremera (Livy 2.51; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 9.24-26). 369 Besides these instances, we do not hear of primary centres being besieged before the fall of Veii. 370 Smaller centres, however, regularly fell prey to the armies of both the primary centres of the region, as well as the expeditionary armies of the hill tribes which began in the fifth century. The first act of foreign policy undertaken by Tarquinius Priscus was to sack the town of Apiolae (Livy 1.35; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.49). 371 Tarquin’s next siege may have been of the town of Collatia (Livy 1.37-38; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.50). 372 The king’s attention was then turned to a number of Latin cities, Corniculum, Old Ficulea, Cameria, Crustumerium, Ameriola, Medullia, and Nomentum (Livy 1.38). Livy tells us that he ‘ad singula oppida circumferendo arma omne nomen Latinum domuit.’ 373 Dionysius has Tarquin taking Corniculum by storm but a number the other cities capitulating to terms of friendship, giving as a reason that the Latins had no national army assembled at the time (Ant. Rom. 3.50-51). 374

369 We do not hear of the army of Veii actually investing the walls of Rome, rather they continually ravaged the land from a fortified position on the Janiculum forcing the Romans to engage them in the field for want of supplies within the city. The Romans may have done the same not long after (Livy 2.53).

370 Dionysius (Ant. Rom. 9.68) knew a tradition that the Aequi and Volsci besieged Rome, with the Roman driving them off during a defence between the Esquiline and Colline gates. Livy (3.6–7) tells us that it did not occur to the Aequi and Volsci to do this, however, and the inclusion of ἑλεπόλεις (siege towers) makes the Dionysian version of the story dubious. On ἑλεπόλεις see Didodorus (20.48) and Plutarch (Demetr. 21).

371 Dionysius’ version of the story describes the war in very Roman terms as a just war, as the Latins had originally made war on Rome. This tradition is not preserved in Livy and may indicate the presence of multiple historical traditions regarding this event (or non-event). Dionysius then describes the capture of Crustumerium, not narrated in Livy. The circumstances within the narration make it seem a fantastical event, possibly a creation of the early annalists, although if this is the case there could have been a kernel of truth to the event. Crustumerium had supposedly been made a Roman colony under Romulus (Livy 1.11) and fit into a pattern of expansion under the early kings which did not always include the sieges of the centres which would come under Roman power. In the same passage of Livy, we hear of Antemnae falling to the same fate, their army defeated in the field; the Romans sent colonies to the relevant towns and they then became part of Roman territory. On this policy of expansion, see Cornell (1989), 243-57. Although skepticism has been expressed by a number of scholars, the expansion of Roman power under the kings has been reaffirmed recently as summarized by Francesca Fulminante (2014), 112-15, who provides a helpful and informative map of the expansion under certain kings, 114. Ultimately, this expansion must be believed in through faith in the literary sources, which is not universal. That the early expansion was through siege warfare, however, is unclear.

372 The account of Dionysius explicitly tells of a siege in which the Romans attacked the walls of the town. Livy’s version sounds as though the town was surrendered after a defeat in the field.

373 ‘War was brought to each town individually, thus [Tarquin] conquered the Latin nation.’
Even if the version of the story preserved by Dionysius is to be preferred, it is apparent that Corniculum did fall by a siege and subsequent storming. The threat of a siege and sack led cities later in the reign of Tarquin to acquiesce more quickly to the Romans (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.66).

By the expulsion of the kings in 509, Rome had conquered and controlled a considerable portion of Latium. The first treaty between the Roman Republic and Carthage, dated by Polybius to 509/8, gives us a list of towns which were under the direct control of Rome: Ardea, Antium, Lavinium, Circeii, Tarracina, and more (3.22). We cannot say for sure how Rome came to exercise control over these towns, as they are not those present in the conquest narratives of the kings. It is possible, however, that they were taken by force in sieges. Whatever the foundations left by the kings, the Republic continued to grow, and within this growth practised siege warfare. The earliest Roman siege we hear of during the Republic was that of Fidenae by Publius Valerius Publicola and Titus Lucretius (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.43). The sources are confused on the next siege in the Republic’s march to domination, listing it variously as Suessa Pometia (Livy 2.17) and Cameria (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.49). Both Livy and Dionysius list the same consuls for the year, Opiter Verginius Tricostus and Spurius Cassius Vecellinus and the details of the

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374 Dionysius notes that the towns which surrendered without a fight, Ficulea and Cameria, did so because they saw the fate of towns that did not; their populations were enslaved and their cities razed. Eventually the towns all capitulated without a siege, having lost a conventional war against Tarquin (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.54).

375 I accept a late sixth century date for the treaty and believe that it fits the circumstances of the time. For discussion, see above.

376 The towns listed are all coastal towns, or within striking distance from the coast. The omission of inland towns probably reflects the intent of the treaty, which was to regulate Punic raiding in Latium. The absence of these towns from the conquest narratives should not necessarily cause too much confusion. There is no reason to believe that smaller settlements could not come under the power of a larger neighbour through peaceful means, and this absence should not speak against the reliability of the sources. The omissions, though, may indicate a gap in knowledge of the annalists.

377 Livy does not list this event, only saying that the consuls of the year waged a successful war against the Sabines (2.16).
Sieges are very similar.\textsuperscript{378} In both sources the Romans used siege engines to bring the city into submission. Whilst it is very unlikely that sophisticated siege engines were used to bring either of these cities into submission, it is possible that a genuine memory of an important siege during this year may have helped to create this anachronistic narrative.\textsuperscript{379}

Two or three years after the siege of either Pometia or Cameria, possibly both, Rome besieged Fidenae, and we are told that Crustumeria is also captured in this year, although we are not told how.\textsuperscript{380} In the consular year of Publius Veturius Geminus and Publius Aebutius Elva, besides a Roman siege of Fidenae, Sextus Tarquinius, one of the sons of Tarquinius Superbus, besieged the Roman town of Signia, but he was not successful in his attempt to take the town by force (Dion. Hal. \textit{Ant. Rom.} 5.58).\textsuperscript{381} Dionysius knew of another siege of Fidenae the consular year of Titus Larcius Flavus and Quintus Cloelius Siculus (Dion. Hal. \textit{Ant. Rom.} 5.59-60).\textsuperscript{382} The narrative during the period of the Battle of Lake Regillus is confused, but we hear of the Latin army taking Corbio by storm (Dion. Hal. \textit{Ant. Rom.} 6.3) and in an almost certainly anachronistic speech, put in the mouth of Titus Larcius by Dionysius, he reminds the Romans of the many instances in which they captured cities by storm (Dion. Hal. \textit{Ant. Rom.} 6.19).\textsuperscript{383} A number of years later the Romans

\textsuperscript{378} The \textit{cognomina} of the consuls are provided by Dionysius but not Livy.

\textsuperscript{379} On the anachronism of siege engines during this/these siege/s, see below 6.3.

\textsuperscript{380} Dionysius has the siege of Fidenae take place the year before Livy does. Dionysius (5.52) lists it as occurring during the consulsiphip of Servius Sulpicius Camerinus and Manius Tullius Longus while Livy (2.19) recorded that this year was uneventful and the siege of Fidenae took place during the consulsiphip of Titus Aebutius and Gaius Vetusius. Dionysius (5.58) does record a siege of Fidenae during this latter consular year.

\textsuperscript{381} The sources are, again, confused on the events of this year. Livy does not record the siege of Signia by Sextus Tarquinius, rather he records that four years later colonists were sent to re-found the colony, originally having been established by Tarquinius Superbus (Livy 1.56).

\textsuperscript{382} Livy simply says that for three years, starting in this year, there was neither peace nor war, '\textit{nec pax nec bellum}.'

\textsuperscript{383} Speeches were an important element of Greek historiography and employed readily by Dionysius. Dionysius, in fact, criticized Thucydides for his neglectful and improper use of speeches throughout his narrative (Dion. Hal. \textit{Thuc.} 14-18). See Gabba (1991), 68-73. The trope that the Romans were
reduce the Volscian settlement of Velitrae by siege (Livy 2.30; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.42).

Although Rome was rife with social strife during the first secession of the plebs during this period, following the return of concord to the city Rome continued her success in sieges. In the year immediately following the first secession, Postumus Cominius captured the Volscian towns of Longula and Polusca, both settlements belonging to the Volsci (Livy 2.33; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.91). The Romans then besieged Corioli, described by Dionysius as the μητρόπολις (mother-city/capital) of the Volsci (Livy 2.33; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.92). The Volsci strike back against the Romans after the supposed defection of Gnaeus Marcius Coriolanus, the Roman hero of Corioli. They proceed to take twelve towns of the Latins and the Romans. In 468 the Romans again captured a large Volscian settlement through a siege, supposedly lasting a number of days, when they took the town of Antium (Livy 2.65). In 459 an army of the Aequi took the citadel of Tusculum, supposedly in a night attack, although the reality of the event may have been a siege (Livy 3.23). From this point, the number of sieges we hear of strikingly declines.

accustomed to besieging cities is used again in a speech by Agrippa Menenius during the first secession of the plebs (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.50; cf. 6.51, 55, 57, 74, 75).

On the so-called conflict of the orders, see generally Raaflaub (2005b).

On the settlement patterns of the Volsci, see Cristofani (1992).

Although the story regarding Gnaeus Marcius Coriolanus is almost certainly highly mythologized, Cornell (2003), the siege and sack of Corioli is not itself un-historical.

Circeii, Satricum, Longula, Polusca, Corioli, Mugilla, Lavinium, Corbio, Vetelia, Tolerium, Labici, and Pedum (Livy 2.39). Livy does not tell us how these towns were captured. According to Dionysius, Circeii surrendered to the Volsci, having seen how large their army was (Ant. Rom. 8.14). When the Volsci move on to Labici, Dionysius does tell us that they took the city through a siege and repeated attacks on the walls (Ant. Rom. 8.19). He later describes a series of sieges of Latin cities, and then surrenders without fights, but they do not match up with those named by Livy (Ant. Rom. 8.20-21).

Dionysius (Ant. Rom. 9.58) says that the city surrendered because of a discord between the Aequi reinforcements and the soldiers of Antium and the Volsci. He does note a successful Roman siege of Antium a number of years later (Ant. Rom. 10.21).
The most significant and spectacular siege that we hear of next is that of Fidenae in 435. The dictator, Quintus Servilius Priscus (or Structus), invested the city and then took it through a stratagem of digging a tunnel to the citadel (Livy 4.22). This same town was besieged again in 426 when it abandoned its alliance with Rome in favour of Veii (Livy 4.31-32). Labici was then captured by the Romans, encircling the town and capturing it through the use of ladders (Livy 4.47). Livy explicitly mentions a siege in connection with the capture of the Aequian town of Bolae in 415, which was retaken by the Aequi in the following year, and then taken by the Romans later in the same year (Livy 4.49). In 412 Lucius Furius Medullinus captured the Volscian town of Ferentinum, possibly in a siege although we are not explicitly told (Livy 4.51). The Aequi captured Carventum in 410, with the Romans driving them out shortly after (Livy 4.53). The citadel, at least, of this town was then retaken by the Aequi in 409, and the Romans failed to retake it in a prolonged siege lasting into 408 (Livy 4.55). The Volscian town of Verrugo, however, was captured by the Romans.

The greatest siege of this period was that of Veii, which traditionally began in 405, which is handled in a separate section below (Livy 4.60). But during the period of the ten year siege a number of other centres were captured. In the year after the war was declared against Veii, the Romans besieged and destroyed the Volscian town of Artena (Livy 4.61). Anxur, a town of the Volsci, was besieged in 401, and was retaken the following year (Livy 5.12-13). In 397 the Volsci again besieged Anxur, while the Aequi besieged the Roman colony at Labici (Livy 5.16). Camillus

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389 This stratagem is repeated by Camillus at Veii in 396, and is discussed further below, 6.3.
390 Although, the emphasis in the narrative on the plunder taken from this battle may betray a different historical truth, possibly that this was a raid rather than a siege.
besieged Falerii 394 (Livy 5.26).\(^{391}\) In the same year another Roman army captured the town of Verrugo, again (Livy 5.28). The Roman colony of Vitellia\(^{392}\) was taken by storm by the Aequi in the following year (Livy 5.29).

The next sieges that we hear of were at the hands of the Gauls, who had recently come into Italy.\(^{393}\) We are told that they overran many of the Etruscan settlements in the north (Livy 5.33, 35; Plut. Cam. 16; Polyb. 2.17; Scyl. 2.18).\(^{394}\) This territory may not have been conquered in the traditional sense, through military force, but rather through a process of relatively peaceful immigration.\(^{395}\) The first town that we hear of being besieged by the Gauls was Clusium (Livy 5.35-6; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 13.11; Plut. Cam. 17). The literary evidence is consistent in believing that the Gallic ‘invasion’ of central Italy was because of their search for land. However this element of the narrative came about, it seems unlikely that the Romans, or the Clusians, would have had any idea about the motivation of the Gauls. Tim Cornell has pointed out that the tradition that they were searching for land on which to settle is contradicted by the narrative actions which fit better with a large war party led by their chief, Brennus.\(^{396}\) The motivation for investing Clusium, and later Rome, was probably plunder, rather than land.\(^{397}\)

The year after the Gallic Sack of Rome, the armies of Rome, led by Camillus, resumed their regular schedule of siege warfare. The town of Bolae was taken in a swift assault (Livy 6.2) while an Etruscan army, of unknown origin, besieged the Roman ally Sutrium (Livy 6.3; Plut. Cam. 33). Sutrium was retaken by Camillus not

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\(^{391}\) In this instance, even though we know that this was a siege, thanks in part to the possibly mythological tale of a treacherous Faliscan teacher, Livy’s narrative sounds as though the original intention of Camillus’ incursion was as a plundering raid.

\(^{392}\) It is probable that this colony is the same as Vetelia, which had been seized in the war against Coriolanus (Livy 2.39).

\(^{393}\) See below, 2.4.


\(^{395}\) Sassatelli (2013).


\(^{397}\) See below, 2.4.
long after it had been taken by the Etruscans. Throughout the early decades of the fourth century this pattern continues. An Etruscan army took Sutrium and Nepet by siege (Livy 6.9), only to have those two towns almost immediately retaken by a Roman army (Livy 6.10). A Volscian army, along with forces from Praeneste, captured Satricum after an assault in 381 (Livy 6.22). In one of the most prolific campaigning years that we hear of, the Romans took nine towns by storm (Livy 6.29; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.5). This is the general pattern as presented by the narrative sources.

The threat of siege and capture of small centres left an impact on the landscape of central Italy. We have seen above that between the Bronze and the Iron ages, settlement sites trended towards defensible positions atop hills, which is a process that continued into the Etruscan period. The further fortification of some of these positions is indicative of a hastening pattern or threat of warfare which directly threatened the settlements, rather than just the hinterland. It is unclear when the process of fortification began. In one frontier zone, that between Caere and Tarquinia, in the mineral rich Tolfa Hills, the fortification of small centres as a matter of territorial strategy may have been begun in the sixth century. The chronology of fortification of the large centres is also unclear. Roselle is

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398 Sutrium was supposedly recaptured within the same day that it was captured (Plut. Cam. 35). Evidence of this campaign of Camillus’ was visible in the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitol until it was destroyed by fire in 83 (Livy 6.4).
399 Barker and Rasmussen (1998), 158-72. For example, Perkins (1999), 18-64, on the development of the Albegna Valley.
400 For example, the class of site which Hilary Becker (2002-2003) describes as a ‘castellum’ is not well attested before the Hellenistic period, though see Becker (2008), Bonghi Jovino (2010), 33-43, reviews the chronological arguments regarding the walls of Rome and provides an interesting approach to dating walls in the region.
traditionally cited as the first large Etruscan centre to be fortified with walls. The dating of most of the circuits, though, has been debated. The fortifications of Veii and Vulci may date to the eighth century, as argued on new evidence. Recently, the earliest walls of Tarquinia have been reaffirmed as sixth-century in origin. Those of Caere may date from the same period. It is apparent, as well, that the concentration of fortified centres was denser in Southern Etruria than in the north.

The fortification of sites in Lazio occurred in a similar time frame to that of sites in Etruria. In parts of Latium, fortifications can be dated back to the eighth century. These defenses consisted of earthen ramparts and defensive ditches, with walls appearing in the sixth century. Gabii built its fortifications between the late seventh and early sixth centuries. Crustumerium, a settlement caught between Rome and Veii, was naturally defended on all sides but one, where, during its urbanizing phase, a protective trench or moat was dug. In the Pontine region fortification is first detected at the end of the sixth century, and further fortification

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403 Spivey and Stoddart (1990), 136.
405 Boitani et al. (2008).
408 Cerasuolo (2012), 123.
409 Fontaine (2008), 203-9. This could indicate a lower frequency of warfare in the north, although this is not a guarantee. There are many different types of defensive measures a settlement can rely on, though famously Aristotle condemned the attitude that cities did not need walls for defense as archaic (Pol. 7.11.8 = 1330b); see Cherici (2008b). The defensive needs of North-Central Etruria seems to have increased in the fourth century, this was due, in part, to the looming threat of Roman expansion, Maggiani (2008), cf. Harris (1979) 175-90.
410 Cifani (2002b).
412 Mogetta and Becker (2014).
413 Attema et al. (2014), 177-78.
of strong sites may have been an element of Roman protection strategies.\textsuperscript{414} The fortification of indigenous settlements, though, is from about the same period.\textsuperscript{415}

It is evident that protection of settlements throughout the period under question was important. Fortification of large centres from the eighth century, if that dating is correct, implies that the emerging primary centres, which became the large city-states of central Italy, were threatened by the pattern of warfare at work during that time.\textsuperscript{416} As smaller centres were fortified we may be able to read an increased threat to these towns. It is also possible that the fortification of these settlements played into the defensive strategies of the primary centres, such as Tarquinia and Rome. The narrative tradition provides ample evidence as to why these fortifications were necessary, with small centres in the environs of Rome falling often, occasionally more than once in a given year. While we lack a definitive narrative tradition for other parts of central Italy, the pattern of fortifications throughout allows us to extrapolate the tradition regarding Rome and her hinterland to the rest of the region, or at least in the southern region. The more sparsely fortified northern region could indicate an environment in which warfare was less prevalent, or perhaps a pattern of warfare which did not emphasize the siege and sacking of settlements.

3.1.2 Pitched Battles

Pitched battles are often thought of as the primary execution of warfare. This is, of course, a very Western and modern outlook. Pitched battle often brings to mind the concept of Greek warfare held by the Persian Mardonius: ‘when they declare war on one another they seek out the best, most level piece of land, and that’s where they

\textsuperscript{414} Attema (1991).
\textsuperscript{415} Attema \textit{et al.} (1998), de Haas (2008), 19-31. On the development of these centres, in general, see Attema (2005), 122-27.
\textsuperscript{416} Walls were not only for fortification. They could be an element of civic pride and display or used as a means of delineating the population of a settlement from those outside of it.
go and fight’ (Hdt. 7.9). These were envisioned to be set piece, pre-arranged, battles, and definitive of Greek warfare. In reality they play a role no more or less important than sieges, and in the case of central Italy, raids. With this being said, pitched battles are attested throughout the period under question in the historical evidence, although they are almost impossible to detect archaeologically. What little evidence can be gleaned from the material remains is through iconography, although that itself is quite limited.

Historians of Greek warfare have often looked to iconography to trace the development of the hoplite battle, pitched battle par excellence. A small Protocorinthian vase known as the Chigi olpe, found near the site of Veii in 1881, typifies this form of identification. We should not take the presence of this Greek artefact in Etruria as evidence for hoplites or pitched battle in central Italy. It is echoed in domestic Etruscan production by the Tragliatella oinochoe, which some scholars have argued shows an Etruscan phalanx, but is more likely an armed dance. Depictions of groups of armed figures become more common over time in central Italy. Even if we are to take these examples as evidence for pitched battle in central Italy, we have to admit that the evidence is not overwhelming. As we see below, it is no longer tenable to accept the equation of ‘hoplite’ arms in iconography or actual examples thereof as testament of ‘hoplite,’ thus pitched battle, warfare.

The historical record preserves many examples of pitched battles being fought in central Italy. Under the kings we hear of a number of pitched battles which

417 Tr. Waterfield.
420 Small (1986); Camporeale (1987). It should be pointed out that the figures appear to be holding three javelins each, rather than a single long spear, as one might expect in ‘hoplite image.’ Though, with van Wees’ (2000) reconstruction of early ‘hoplite’ battle being open and fluid, including the use of thrown weapons, the Tragliatella oinochoe may fit within the new hoplite ‘heterodox.’
422 See below, 6.3.
fit importantly into the narrative, such as that fought by Tullus Hostilius against a combined army of Veii and Fidenae (Livy 1.27; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 3.24-26). This same king supposedly won an important victory over the Sabines at the Malitosa forest, our sources telling us that the increased size of the cavalry, after the incorporation of the Alban nobles into the Roman state, was the deciding factor (Livy 1.30; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 3.33). Tarquinius Priscus supposedly expanded the cavalry during his rule, presumably expecting an increased advantage in pitched battle (Livy 1.36). The most influential battle which included one of the Roman kings was that of the Silvian wood.

The recently evicted Tarquinius Superbus solicited Veii and Tarquinii for an army with which to take back his kingdom. They submitted to his requests and allowed Tarquin to lead a combined force against the Romans. The Romans, under the consulship of Lucius Iunius Brutus and Publius Valerius, met this army in full force. We are told, however, that the decisive element of the battle was a cavalry clash, in which Brutus and the son of Tarquinius, Arruns, killed one another. The details of this battle may be quite fictitious, but there are two elements which are important and stand out, the cavalry was thought of as decisive and the consul and Arruns engaged in a single combat (Livy 2.6-7; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 5.14-17).

The emphasis on cavalry’s importance is reiterated in a number of battles throughout the early Republican period. In the Battle of Lake Regillus, we hear that the cavalry dismounted in order to help stay the breaking Roman infantry, but earlier in the narration of the battle we hear of multiple cavalry duels, which may indicate that the memory of this event revolved around the cavalry and that the emphasis on
the infantry line was a later invention (Livy 2.20; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.3-13).\(^{423}\)

The Roman cavalry proved decisive in the victory over a Sabine army in 494 when
their initial charge sent the enemy ranks into disarray (Livy 2.31).

Our literary sources give us a plethora of further pitched battles throughout
the period under question. The narratives of these battles are rather unusual, when
we get full narratives rather than simply notices. The most spectacular Roman loss
came in 390 at the Allia when the army was routed and all but destroyed by the
Gallic horde which would go on to sack Rome. This battle has lived on in infamy in
the Roman calendar.\(^{424}\) The occurrence of pitched battles, as well as of sieges, are
predicated on the existence of large organized armies in central Italy, probably those
of states, or other types of polities.

### 3.2 Raiding

For the majority of the period in question, the pattern of warfare included the
almost annual, if not annual, raiding of neighbouring peoples into one another’s
lands for booty. It is a pattern which can only be traced through the early histories of
Rome, as we possess no narratives of Etruscan history. It seems probable, however,
that the pattern of warfare described in this section for Rome and her environs fits
into the overall pattern of warfare in Tyrrhenian Italy. It is for this reason that I have
borrowed a concept from earlier authors in attempting to describe a ‘way of war’ for
a certain people or region.

The earliest possible description of a war that we hear of in Rome was the
result of the so-called Rape of the Sabine Women (Livy 1.9; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.*

\(^{423}\) Dionysius’ account (*Ant. Rom.* 6.11-12) emphasizes even more than Livy’s the centrality of the
cavalry. The supposed presence of the Dioscuri and subsequent dedication of the temple in Rome
may also be indicative of the importance of the Cavalry at Lake Regillus, see Massa-Pairault (1995),
36-47. Some authors are doubtful of the antiquity of the Dioscurii tradition, see Richardson (2013).

\(^{424}\) Degrassi (1963), 208.
This episode, possibly a war itself, elaborately embellished in the historical tradition, saw the abduction of a number of virgins from the neighbouring Sabine peoples by Roman youths. The response to this was for the men of Caenina to mount a counter raid into Roman territory (Livy 1.10; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.33-4). On this occasion, Romulus is said to have captured another kind of plunder as a result of catching the raiders from Caenina, the *spolia opima*. As the Romans launch a counter raid into Caeninan territory, their citadel is captured by a group of Sabines which leads to a number of the most famous, if not fictitious, events of regal Rome, such as the circumstances around the naming of the Lacus Curtius and the merger of Sabine and Roman through Titus Tatius and Romulus (Livy 1.12-13). It is possible that raiding for females occurred again between the Romans and Sabines, when in 501 a group of Sabine youths abducted a group of Roman prostitutes while

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426 Although our sources agree that the Sabine women were abducted during a festival for Neptune being held in Rome it is possible that the event being remembered by this elaborate story was actually a raid or a war. The abduction of women is viewed as an extremely common cause of war in ‘primitive’ societies and thus may be reflected here. Rather than the women having been taken by a stratagem, it seems more probable that they were taken in a raid on neighboring Sabine lands. For abduction of women in warfare, see: Keely (1996), 86; Otterbein (2004), 196; 204-207; Gat (2006), 137-38, 415-19. Although it is worth noting that a cooperative element is present in the story (the eventual migration of the Sabines to Rome) which could also have an historical core, which may stand in opposition to the idea that the source of this story was a more simple raid; see the comments of Fuentes (2004) for a discussion on the possibilities of cooperation in the development of human societies. T. P. Wiseman believes that the story of the Sabine women has an early third-century origin, when the Romans enfranchised the city of Cures (2004), 142-43. While his conclusion that the story as preserved in our sources may be an effort to ‘read back into the origins of Rome the new common status of Romans, Latins and Sabines,’ it is possible that this effort was built on an existing foundation. In short, it is possible that the memory of an early raid for women was retold in the third century to serve a political purpose. Connections between Rome and Sabine settlements is likely from the eighth century, but the Sabine stories in the Roman historians cannot be confirmed, see Ampolo (1996).
427 Both Livy and Dionysius record that the peoples of Caenina, Crustumerium, and Antemnae had made moves to go to war, but Caenina was the first to do so, and did so alone. Whether or not these towns had actually had their women plundered, is debatable, and it seems more probable that we can view this occurrence in one of two ways, either the Romans had raided Caenina, the town which actually went to war in retribution and it was only this town which was raided, or the Romans had plundered a larger swathe of Sabine lands, taking from it more generally a group of virgins, and the towns remembered in these passages all had been affronted. The earlier possibility seems more likely. We could also ignore the individual settlement names and perhaps the specific Sabine ‘ethnicity’ as well and just speak of this as an early Roman raid for women of the neighbouring peoples.
428 This element, the memory of the *spolia opima*, may lend historical credence to the story and reinforce its antiquity, although any element of regal history is dubious.
attending games in Rome (Livy 2.18). This episode, like those discussed previously, was probably remembered in a romanticized way rather than a simple raid, which is possibly the actual source of the story.

In the following centuries covered by the first book of Livy, and the first five of Dionysius, the practise of raiding is very prominent. That a genuine tradition concerning raiding existed in the sources available to the first-century historians may be evidenced by a Livian statement about the years following the Rape of the Sabine Women. When the fever of war had spread from Fidenae to Veii, ‘they overran Roman territory as if conducting a raid rather than standard warfare,’ (1.15). The evidence of the following centuries of warfare shows that rather than this episode of Etruscan raiding deviating from the normal (or just?) practise of war, it was precisely the standard model of war until the beginning of the fourth century.

The numbers of times we hear of raids occurring are too many to number here. It could be argued that this was a topos employed by later historians in their narratives of early Rome, that raiding was ‘what they did back then.’ There is evidence, however, that raiding was part of an earlier tradition which was used as evidence in the literary narratives. Livy expresses a continued confusion as to why the armies that he reads about in his sources were not committing to real war. During the first bought of conflict between Veii and the Roman Republic, Livy notes that

429 tr. Luce. Perhaps we are meant to read ‘they overran the Roman border pillaging and plundering more than in the manner of just war.’ The reading hinges on the translation of ‘iusiti’ within the comparative ‘magis quam iusti more belli.’ The Romans were preoccupied with the idea of ‘just war’, exemplified by requesting redress for grievances against Rome, rerum repetitio. See Eckstein (2006), 216-229.

430 Dionysius does not mention this deviance from supposed normality (cf. Ant. Rom. 2.53-54) which could indicate that it is a matter of Livian judgment, rather than something that he found in his sources. If this is true, the early annalists would not have considered this type of warfare to be abnormal, meaning that it was either common practice during the construction of the early tradition, or that instances of raiding are genuine historical memories from the fifth century. I am inclined to believe that this is evidence for the reliability of the early tradition and Livy’s effort to understand these texts and to make his version of Roman history more understandable for Romans of his time. It is important, though, that he notes this difference, instead of just changing the narrative, which is also reflective of Livy being faithful to his sources. The Roman preoccupation with just war (see note above), though, may be reason to assume that Livy’s contradiction was found in his sources.
the Veientine raids were more of an affront to Roman feelings than something which would do actual harm (2.48). This confusion appears again when the Aequi and Volsci, whilst raiding Roman lands, did not see fit to invest the walls of Rome (Livy 3.7). In this instance, the gods are given credit for saving Rome. Similarly, Livy’s Sabines ask why the Romans were flittering about raiding and ravaging their lands, in the manner of bandits, rather than committing to an actual battle (3.61). During a year of pestilence in Rome, there were no plundering raids executed beyond the borders of Roman territory and there was no thought of ‘war’ by senators or plebs (4.21). Here we see the division between raiding, praedationes, and wars, bella, clearly presented. They were certainly two different actions, but Livy’s confusion may indicate that his sources did not always differentiate the two. This confusion suggests a legitimate tradition of raiding from the archaic period.

The nature of this raiding may not have different entirely from later epochs of Roman warfare. Pitched battles are remembered during this period, but are often preceded or followed by ravaging of enemy lands. A similar situation occurred after Lucius Lucretius and Gaius Aemilius defeated the army of Volscini in a pitched battle and proceeded to plunder the territory (Livy 5.32). Plundering armies were occasionally caught by their victims’ armies and forced into a pitched battle. This was the case when Quintus Fabius ambushed a plundering army of the Aequi. We are led to believe that part of the reason for the defeat of these Aequi was that they were loaded down with booty (Livy 3.3). Even when an army was committed to a siege, raiding and plundering was to be carried out. In an historically questionable example, we hear that this occurs when Lars Porsenna besieges Rome and occupies the Janiculum (Livy 2.9-14; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.22-34). Later in the fifth century,

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431 For instance, Livy 2.16, in which Roman armies successfully fight a pitched battle against the Sabines and follow it up by plundering their lands.
we hear of the Aequi besieging a Roman camp but continuing their raids for plunder on Roman lands (Livy 3.5). We should be mindful that the occurrence of pitched battles may not have been much rarer than raiding, as we hear that in 406 the men of military age complained that not a year had gone by without a battle (Livy 4.58).

Possibly the most infamous instance of Roman raiding was the expedition of the Fabii. Both Livy (2.49) and Dionysius (Ant. Rom. 9.15) give a very patriotic reasoning for the entire clan of the Fabii to march to war against Veii, that the state did not have the resources to fight on so many fronts at once, so they would relieve some of the burden. They go on to raid and plunder the lands of Veii, though, rather than attempting to fight a decisive battle (Livy 2.49-50; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 9.15). Dionysius’ account is the most poignant, claiming that the army of the Fabian consul of that year, an actual levy of the Roman people, left all of the plunder from their raids with the garrison of the Fabii at their hilltop fortress (Ant. Rom. 2.15.4-5). In chapter 4, however, it is argued that this was an elaborate version of an event whose historical reality was much different than that presented in Livy and Dionysius.

We see below that an early term denoting the population of Rome in arms was populus. It is quite possible that this term was derived from the verb populo/populare, meaning to lay waste, ravage, or pillage. Coincidentally, this is the most common verb used by Livy when narrating early Roman raiding. If we are right in associating these two terms, the early Roman army would have been directly associated with raiding and ravaging. We may have visual representation of this type of a raiding force in a number of terracotta plaques recovered in central Italy. The so-

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432 A similar tone is to be found in Ovid’s notice of the Fabii, in which he praises them ‘una domus vires et onus susceperat urbis,’ (Fasti 2.197). On the historiography and historical character of this expedition, see Richard (1990b).
433 3.1.2.
called Veii-Rome-Velletri system included scenes of armed riders at the charge, with arms aloft (swords and axes) (Figs. 9-10).\footnote{Winter (2009), 311-32.} A similar set of designs adorned the face of a so-called oikos temple in Tuscania (Fig. 47).\footnote{Ibid. see Roof 4-6.} It is possible that these images are meant to represent units of cavalry in a larger army, but it is equally possible that they represent mounted raiders. The elite context of the structures upon which these images were set encourages this interpretation.\footnote{See below, 3.2.1.}

Raiding is not only an activity carried out by armies on neighbouring settlements. Raids can also come from the sea, and in the case of central Italy these may have been regular.\footnote{I differentiate between sea borne raiding and piracy, see below 4.3.} We do not have direct evidence of Etruscan or Roman sea raiders but we know that their lands were the subject of sea borne raids. Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse, raided the Caeretan port of Pyrgi in 384 and removed from there 500 talents worth of plunder (Diod. Sic. 15.14.3-4; Strabo 5.2.8). Some scholars believe that this raid may have been accompanied by a coordinated attack from Celtic mercenaries on land.\footnote{This theory is based on a number of passages in the ancient sources which tie the Gallic horde which sacked Rome in 390 to mercenary service with Dionysius I. Justin (20.5) says that the Gauls were enlisted as mercenaries in the wars against the Italian Greeks which then implies that on their return from Southern Italy they fought a battle against an army from Caere at the orders of the Sicilian tyrant (Diod. Sic. 15.14.3; Strabo 5.2.3). Cornell (1995), 316, calls this theory ‘most attractive’ but it cannot be proven. If this theory were to be proven true it would be indicative of the internationalizing nature of warfare in the fourth century in Central Italy.} In 349, Livy records that the sea and land around the Latin coast was infested by Greek raiders who were plundering the land, spectacularly fighting a battle against a force of marauding Gauls (Livy 7.25). The coast of Latium, and possibly Etruria, also fell prey to the Carthaginians. In the first treaty between Rome and Carthage reported by Polybius we hear that the Carthaginians are forbidden from doing harm to a number of communities in Latium.
which fell under the power of Rome. The Punics are not supposed to attack other
Latin communities, but if they do those communities are to be handed over to the
Romans; likewise the Carthaginians are not to build fortresses in Latium (Polyb.
3.22). Many scholars emphasize this treaty as being a phenomenon of economics,
but that is not the entire story. This treaty provides evidence that the Carthaginians
had been raiding communities in Latium, certainly from the sea, and that they had
been hauling the plunder off with them. Why else would these clauses be included in
this treaty?

This treaty has a long scholarly history. For Scullard this treaty was
primarily an economic one, especially from the Carthaginian side. Heurgon does
not explicitly call the treaty primarily economic in nature, but does emphasize the
economic aspect in his analysis, almost ignoring the comments on Latium. Cornell
emphasizes how this treaty was helpful as a legitimizing agent for the newly founded
Roman Republic. Forsythe sees the conditions of the treaty dealing with Latium as
a political statement of the Romans’, possibly even one of the Romans of Polybius’
own day. Serrati describes the first two treaties preserved by Polybius as ‘almost
wholly economic’ with ‘few military clauses.’ He goes on to postulate that the
treaty would have been important for Rome, as a fledgling Republic, to be
recognized by such a powerful neighbour. Hoyos believes that the Romans were
the lesser power in the treaty, pointing out that they were not prohibited from raiding
Punic territories, probably because the Romans lacked a fleet. Richard Miles

440 Ardea, Antium, Lavinium, Circeii, Tarracina.
441 The historicity of this treaty is discussed in chapter 1.
442 Scullard (1989), 522.
443 Heurgon (1973), 253.
446 Serrati (2006), 113.
447 Ibid., 115.
448 Hoyos (2010), 44-45.
acknowledges that the treaty had wide ranging details, but still categorizes it within the Punic desire to ‘secure commercial advantage’ in the region.\textsuperscript{449}

In analyzing this treaty, we must first ask if it was primarily economic, what the advantage to Rome in signing it was. The treaty limited their ability to trade in Carthaginian territory and limited the extent of the Western Mediterranean in which their merchants could ply the seas. Serrati proposed that the treaty may have had something to do with the Roman need to import grain during periods of famine, the first being noted in 508 (Livy 2.9).\textsuperscript{450} The problem with this suggestion is that we do not hear of specific origins for the Sicilian grain in this episode. During later famines, when we do hear of the sources of Sicilian grain, they are not from the Carthaginians but from the Sicilian tyrants (cf. Livy 2.34, 4.12-16; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.26, 7.20, 7.37, 12.1-4). It seems that the Romans were eager to sign this treaty more because it would limit Punic raiding from their coast than any of the economic benefits that it would entail. This is even more evident in the second treaty, usually dated to 348, in which the Carthaginians are allowed to raid towns in Latium, keep the plunder and slaves, so long as the turn over control of the town itself to the Romans (Polyb. 3.24). This fits the pattern of coastal raiding in which the Greeks were participating, and I believe that this behaviour was ongoing in central Italy from a relatively early period.

Raiding, then, was an important element in the practise of warfare in central Italy. This has been recognized by previous authors, but is not regularly reviewed in detail.\textsuperscript{451} This type of warfare had a direct impact, and a different impact from ‘traditional’ warfare, on the society of central Italy. This impact was felt in many

\textsuperscript{449} Miles (2010), 94-95.
\textsuperscript{450} Serrati (2006), 118.
\textsuperscript{451} For instance, Cornell (1995), 308, describes warfare in fifth-century Central Italy as ‘an indistinct pattern of annual razzias.’ Strangely much of the literature specifically examining warfare during this period does not address the issue of raiding. This is especially true of the French school.
ways, politically, economically, and religiously, all of which are explored in the following chapters.

3.3 The Conquest of Veii

Conflicts between Rome and Veii must have been regular. Two primary centres but 15 kilometres apart would have been a tenuous situation. Elites from each city probably came to blows in raiding parties and in small conflicts often, although there is little evidence. Of the conflicts that we do hear of between the two they are often broken down into three separate ‘wars’ and all fall within the fifth century. The first of these Veientine Wars was fought between 483 and 474. It was precipitated by Veientine desires for more than just countryside plundering, or at least that is what Livy would have us believe (2.43). It was during this war that the Fabian clan suffered its famous defeat at the Cremera (Livy 2.50; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 9.15, 18-22). On the whole, the Romans came off poorly in this conflict, suffering more defeats than they inflicted on the armies of Veii. The sources attribute this, at least in part, to civil discord in Rome. It was only with the destruction of their Sabine allies outside of the walls of Veii that a peace was finally pursued (Livy 2.53-54).

The Second Veientine War (437-435) saw the focus of conflict shift from Veii and Rome themselves to the town of Fidenae. This important post at the river gateway to Veii had been the site of battle before, and in the 500s was taken and part of its land probably formed the donation made to the gens Claudia. This second war

452 Gabriele Cifani has recently made a short study of the frontier between Rome and Veii before the conquest, given as part of a conference paper at Cambridge in 2013, which has not yet come to publication. The frontiers between these two centres were marked by a series of fortresses, as we saw above existed between the territories of other large centres like Tarquinia and Caere. The unpublished version of this paper can be found at the author’s website following this link: https://www.academia.edu/8352232/War_and_Peace_Boundaries_and_Frontiers_Approaching_the_geopolitical_landscapes_of_archaic_Tyrrhenian_Italy.

453 The sources do not name three ‘Veientine wars,’ the separation into three separate conflicts is a modern construct.
was precipitated by the murder of four ambassadors from Rome at the hands of Lars Tolumnius, the king of Veii. Rome fared considerably better during this conflict than during the first. As Livy says, though, it was not a bloodless victory (4.17). Losses of Roman soldiers were so high that they appointed a dictator, Mamercus Aemilius, to lead the state as one man. The most notable exploit by a single Roman was the single combat and killing of Lars Tolumnius by Aulus Cornelius Cossus, for which he was allowed to dedicate spolia opima in the temple of Jupiter Feretrius (Livy 4.19-20). The close of the war came only after a plague devastated Rome, spurring on the appointment of another dictator, Quintus Servilius (Priscus or Structus). Servilius successfully led a Roman army against the armies of Veii and captured Fidenae by digging a tunnel into its citadel (Livy 4.21-23).

The third, and probably final, conflict with Veii began, according to Livy, because of the repulse of an embassy sent by Rome asking for reparations for the previous war (Livy 4.58). Typically, scholars have dismissed many of the details preserved in the historical tradition as being part of a highly developed mythical tradition about the long siege which ended in the destruction of Veii. The most common critical evaluation of the narrative surrounding the siege of Veii was that the Roman historical tradition equated it with the ten year siege of Troy, the end of which is narrated in the Iliad. Not all scholars have so quickly dismissed the length of the war, notably Scullard who cites the introduction of pay for the legions

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454 This delegation included the fetiales.
455 Ogilvie (1965), 629-30; Cornell (1995), 312.
456 Forsythe (2005), 246. There is reason to believe that at least some of the narrative, and possibly the length of the siege, was created as a parallel with that of Troy. Livy directly compares the two events in a speech put into the mouth of Appius Claudius Crassus, even noting the length of each (5.4). The duration of the siege, however, is a constant thorn in the sides of the patricians, as the plebs were continually complaining about it (cf. Livy 5.10). Ogilvie (1965), 628, believes it inevitable that the epic tasks of Veii and Troy would have been equated in the minds of heroizing Romans. Whatever ‘flavour’ was added to the historical narrative of the fall of Veii by Roman historians has not altered the story in a drastic way. As it stands, many of the details of the siege are of no consequence to the present study.
as a reason to believe in a ten year siege. If the war is contextualized in the circumstances of Tyrrenian war the idea of a lengthy siege or war makes more sense.

As we have seen above, one of the practices of Tyrrenian warfare of which we are well informed throughout the narratives is that some raiding armies would establish a base of operations. The most celebrated instances of this were the incursion of Corioli into Roman territory (Livy 2.39) and in the traditional narrative of the expedition of the Fabii to the Cremera (Livy 2.49-50), the latter is historically dubious. This was not a phenomenon restricted to warfare in central Italy. When the Spartans fortified Decelea in 413, they completely deprived Athens of its hinterland, giving the Peloponnesian allies a major advantage (Thuc. 6.91-92, 7.19-20, 27-30). What we see happening at Veii is probably similar. According to Livy, eight military tribunes were elected to the high office in the first year of the war, and constructed fortifications in the territory of Veii (5.1-2). While we are led to believe that these fortifications were built directly against the walls of the great Etruscan city, this seems unlikely (Livy 5.7). What is probable, however, is that there was a disaster at at least one of the camps which prompted a large number of Romans to volunteer service in prosecuting the war. This may have been what prompted the election of eight military tribunes, which Livy notes was more than

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457 Scullard (1980), 100. The institution of pay for the army, however, may not date to the siege of Veii.
458 Livy notes at 5.19 that the soldiers who had been in the camps for nine years had gotten used to making small raids against the Veientines.
459 Plutarch (Camillus 2) does not mention that the camps were built right against the walls, although his account is considerably abbreviated from the Livian narrative. Dionysius (Ant. Rom. 12.10) is even more vague, simply saying that the Romans were besieging Veii, although the narrative is fragmentary at this point.
460 The narration of this passage (Livy 5.7), however, fits more with the discourse of civil unrest between plebians and patricians than with the practicalities of war. The idea of a disaster prompting mass volunteerism in the Roman population is purely speculative, based on the idea that if an entire camp, or the majority of a camp, was killed the Romans still at home would be motivated to exact revenge on Veii.
ever before (5.1.2). It is evident that there was not a single Roman army investing Veii, but a coalition of armies led by individual consular tribunes.\textsuperscript{461} Animosity and competition between the tribunes caused Lucius Verginius to not come to the aid of Manius Sergius.\textsuperscript{462} Over the next ten years the situation stays the same. Roman ‘siege’ camps are occasionally attacked and Roman defeats encourage social problems at home.\textsuperscript{463} It is possible that the establishment of semi-permanent raiding camps in the territory of Veii is what led to the creation of the ten year siege narrative, although the differences between the siege of the city and the establishment of raiding camps in Veientine territory are negligible.

When Marcus Furius Camillus was elected dictator in 396 an important change came to the war against Veii. Rather than having a number of camps dispersed throughout Veintine territory, he consolidates the army into a single force (although we are told there were still multiple camps) (Livy 5.19).\textsuperscript{464} The army which Camillus raised may also have been unique among those levied to attack Veii over the previous nine years.\textsuperscript{465} We are told that no one in the city tried to avoid military service, and it is possible that mercenaries came into the army from the Latins and Hernici (Livy 5.19).\textsuperscript{466} The city was eventually taken by Camillus,

\textsuperscript{461} For instance, we are told that the Capenates and Faliscans attacked the camp commanded by Manius Sergius and that help from the main camp was the only chance to save Sergius’ camp (Livy 5.8).

\textsuperscript{462} On military tribunes with consular power and the possible reasons for creation of this office, see below 3.1.1.

\textsuperscript{463} Cf. Livy 5.8, 5.12, 5.13, 5.16, 5.18.

\textsuperscript{464} It is unclear from the Livian version of events if Camillus was elected as dictator for the sole purpose of defeating Veii. It was apparent to either Livy or his sources that this was the case, but before proceeding to Veii with his recently levied army, Camillus first engaged an army of Faliscans and Capenates near Nepet.

\textsuperscript{465} If we are correct in assuming that the early years of the ‘siege’ of Veii was actually a prolonged series of systematic raids, this may have been the first large and general levy to attack the city.

\textsuperscript{466} \textit{peregrina etiam iuventus, Latini Hernicique, operam suam pollicentes ad id bellum veneret}. Livy does not explicitly tell us that these Latin and Hernician youths came to the Roman camp because of pay, but there is also no mention that they came to fulfill treaty obligations or the like. It is possible that they were promised (\textit{polliceor}) because of a treaty, but the use of the active present participle (\textit{pollicens}), rather than the perfect active participle (\textit{pollicitus}), implies to the current author that the
through a tunnel dug from his camp under the citadel, specifically the temple of Juno, in the city. With his soldiers inside, the city fell after a bloody fight, and the spoils were taken back to Rome.

The fate of the plunder from the sack of Veii became the most divisive social issue of the following years. Although certainly an exaggeration, the plunder from Veii was expected to be greater than that from all of Rome’s previous wars put together (Livy 5.20). This exemplifies one of the problems of a large city falling to a conquering army. The excessive wealth which could be seized from a defeated city was clearly a concern in some situations, and has been argued to have led Sparta to not destroy Athens in 404/403. The version of events with which we are left makes the plebeians out to resent that one tenth of the plunder was to be dedicated to Apollo based on a vow made by Camillus at the beginning of his dictatorship. It is interesting that we do not hear of patrician complaints regarding this tithe.

Archaeologically, the fall of Veii is much more difficult to interpret. The original interpretation of the survey data from the British School at Rome’s study was that there was no noticeable disruption dating to the traditional period of the Roman siege. There is no destruction layer which can be identified with a fire or razing by the Romans. With the reinterpretation of the Veii survey, this conclusion has not changed considerably. Although Veii goes through a long period of decline, the early fourth century does not show evidence of a steep drop off in population or productivity. We cannot ignore, however, that the political sovereignty of Veii

promise was made upon these youths’ joining of the army and that it was not because of an existing arrangement.

467 Livy 5.23-ff.
468 Powell (2006). It is coincidental that Dionysius compared the size, and perhaps wealth, of Veii to Athens (Ant. Rom. 2.54).
469 Livy 5.23, 5.25; Plutarch, Camillus, 7.
471 See, in general, the collected studies in Cascino et al. (2012).
disappears from the historical record after the Roman siege. While the city itself was not destroyed, its power was.\footnote{Smith (2012).}

That the city was not physically destroyed is hinted at in the literary sources. During the Gallic siege of Rome, an Etruscan army, from an unnamed settlement, pillaged Roman lands and considered an attack on Veii (Livy 5.45). While there was a Roman garrison there, perhaps being the target, it would make more sense if this Etruscan army contemplated attacking Veii based on its lingering wealth, which likely had not been completely stripped away by the Roman attack. The presence of a Roman garrison, as well, is evidence of a population which needed to be kept under guard. In brief, the capture of Veii did not result in a catastrophic fire, or the razing of the city, or the slaughter of the population. The city and its territory were annexed by Rome, only the sovereignty of Veii was destroyed. This is an important moment for the history of central Italy and for our interpretation of the pattern of warfare. The vacuum of power created by the destruction of Veientine political sovereignty was very great, and is probably to blame for some of the later incursions of military forces from further afield.\footnote{The consequences for the fall of a primary centre to another in the development of regional politics has been extensively analyzed for the Oaxaca Valley, Mexico: Redmond and Spencer (2006; 2012), Spencer (1990), Spencer and Redmond (2003). It is probable that the fall of Veii forced the Roman state to consolidate its organization, especially in regard to warfare. The successful sack of Veii could be indicative that some of these changes may have occurred in the late fifth century, and led to the events of 396. Changes relating to the consolidation of the Roman state are discussed at length in 3.1 below. From a comparative view point, as well, we can understand that it is not exceptional that Roman expansion began with earnest after the fall of Veii, and the Republic gained so much ground after this period, having stayed relatively localized in its expansion from the eighth century onward. Cf. Hui (2005), 97-101; Maisels (2010), 165-66, 219-20.} The absorption of the lands of Veii into Roman hands increased the latter’s political power immeasurably.

### 3.4 The Gallic Sack, The Etruscans, The Samnites

The seizure of Veii signals a change in the pattern of warfare in central Italy. Besides the siege being the first time that a primary centre fell to another power,
after this point we hear of incursions into central Italy from further afield, such as the Gauls, and soon after the expedition of forces from central Italy, notably Rome, fighting wars considerably further afield. This is the end of warfare as a regional practice. This is best reflected in the Roman change of tactics in 340, while fighting the Samnites (Livy 8.8; Diod. Sic. 23.2.1).

In the years following the Roman conquest of Veii, bands of Gauls begin to be encountered throughout central Italy. Groups of their people had for some time been making incursions into Etruscan lands in the north of the Italian peninsula. Eventually, the Gallic horde made its way to the city of Clusium, at which juncture embassies were sent to Rome, who in turn sent an embassy to Clusium to observe the Gauls (Livy 5.33; Plutarch, Camillus, 17). The three envoys sent were the sons of Marcus Fabius Ambustus. While the historiographical circumstances surrounding the inclusion of members of the gens Fabia in this story are disputed, the true character of their mission is not likely to have followed the version presented by the literary sources. We are invariably told that the Clusines sought help from Rome, and Livy specifies that help was requested from the senate (Livy 5.35). Diodorus’...
source claimed that the Roman ambassadors were sent into Etruscan lands to spy on the Gallic army (14.113). By the time the story had reached Plutarch, the help being requested from the Romans is clearly ridiculous; the Clusines supposedly asked that the Romans send ambassadors, πρέσβεις, and letters, γράμματα, to the Gauls (Camillus, 17). According to the tradition, these ambassadors joined the battle line of the Clusians and brought the hatred of the Gauls on Rome.\footnote{For the importance of the tradition in Roman historiography and self-image, see Kraus (1994).}

The first problem that we must realize in this story is that the Clusines are not remembered as having sent for help from their fellow Etruscans. If there was ever a period in which the meeting of the twelve peoples (now eleven with the fall of Veii) at the Fanum Volturinum would have acted as a political or military body it was now. There is absolutely no indication that this was the case. We have no reason to assume that the appeal to Rome is historical, but what of the inclusion of the three Fabii in this story? It could be a creation of later historical writers.\footnote{Richardson (2012).} Their presence, however, may have been historical, if we disregard the claim that they had been sent as ambassadors. If, as the historical tradition records, the Gauls had been ravaging northern Etruscan lands and the Po Valley, it is not impossible to think that some of the elites in the Etruscan cities would have organized an army to confront these barbarians. As we see below, the organization of this army would have been quite complex.\footnote{See below, chapter 3.} One element of such an army could have been mercenaries. These members of the gens Fabia, then, could have been mercenaries.\footnote{This would be one of the only instances of Romans acting as mercenaries in the army of another polity. Mercenary service is discussed at length in 3.2.2 below.} This would explain the presence of the Fabii Ambusti in the Clusian line of battle, and military action independent of the state was not uncharacteristic of the Fabii. Although the
presence of these Fabii is blamed for the Gallic attack on Rome in the ancient literature, this is not probable.\footnote{Mathieu Engerbeaud (2014) has recently suggested that the continuing and escalating conflict between Rome and the surrounding tribes may have weakened the Roman state, allowing for the Gallic disasters. There may be some truth to this idea. As Engerbeaud points out, however, there is no concrete evidence in our sources for this.}

When the Gauls advanced into Roman territory, the state sent an army to meet them in battle. The army was led by six military tribunes (Livy 5.36).\footnote{These were the three Fabii who had fought at Clusium, and Q. Sulpicius Longus, Q. Servilius, and P. Cornelius Maluginensis.} As in most other occurrences where a Roman army was led by many consular tribunes, they were defeated. Unlike in other instances where feuding tribunes caused a Roman defeat, Livy does not blame disputes in command but cowardice from both sides: command and soldiery (5.38). After this defeat, the infamous Battle of the Allia, the Gauls sack the city itself.\footnote{I follow the analytical tradition of how we should read the Gallic sack which can be found in Cornell (1995), 313-18, and Forsythe (2005), 252-59. Much of the narrative tradition has to be rejected as later invention. Even the accomplishments of Camillus must be questioned, although his presence in or leadership of the army which eventually repulsed the Gauls cannot be completely ruled out.} This echoes the warnings of the fall of Veii, that primary centres in central Italy are vulnerable to attack. The continued presence of the Gauls in central Italy, as well, is one of the major changes in Tyrrellian warfare. They remain in the region, acting as a roving band of brigands (Livy 6.42, 7.9-10, 7.15, 7.25; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 14.8-10; Plut. Cam. 40-41). Some elements of the Gallic horde may have also been engaged as mercenaries by any number of regional powers (Just. Epit. 20.5).\footnote{Cf. Cornell (1995), 316; Forsythe (2005), 256-59. Gallic mercenary service during this period is most closely associated with Dionysius I of Syracuse, who even sent a contingent of them to help the Spartans during the Peloponnesian War (Xen. Hel. 7.1.20), see the discussion of Bridgman (2003). For the tradition of Celtic mercenaries, see Cherici (2013).}

At the same time that the Gauls were forcing Tyrrellian warfare to change, the changing landscape of power created by the Roman destruction of Veii caused further alterations to the pattern of warfare. While in the past raiding was generally limited to neighbouring polities/peoples, the removal of Veii allowed for raids to be
conducted by enemies further afield, namely between Tarquinia and Rome (Livy 6.9, 7.17-22). The distances involved with these campaigns altered the relationship between the state and the army, and dictated a new level of reciprocation between soldier and state. The one was required by the other to be away from domestic life for a longer period of time, much as we saw during the siege of Veii.

The First Samnite War is a distinctive change in the practise of Roman warfare. Livy summarizes these differences as being ‘the force of the enemies, the remoteness of the regions, and the extent of the periods involved’ (Livy 7.29). We may also add to this list the meddlesome nature of Rome’s involvement with these peoples. For the first time, Rome meddles in the affairs of the peoples outside of her hinterland, entering the war on the side of the Sidicini and Campanians who were being pressured by the Samnites (Livy 7.29-31). This extended excursion to the south caused enough dissention in the Roman state and hinterland that the soldiers and the Latins revolted. These conflicts foreshadow the coming theme in Roman expansion, war abroad with occasional trouble at home. Some elements of traditional Tyrrhenian warfare continue, such as raiding, but the changes in patterns of warfare discussed in this brief section precipitated changes in the way that the Tyrrhenian states, Rome in particular, waged war.

3.5 Conclusions

The pattern of warfare in central Italy was complex. It appears to have been common from the Final Bronze Age through to the end of the period under study.

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488 Cornell (2004) has pointed out the dangers of regarding this period as the period of the Samnite Wars, and that we should not overestimate the importance of the conflicts between Romans and Samnites. The preoccupation of the literary narrative, however, cannot be ignored and I still maintain that the so-called First Samnite War, or the events described under that title, does mark a change in Roman war-making.
489 Forsythe (2005), 281-88.
491 Cf. Harris (1979); David (1996).
Raiding was a common practice, and was possibly the earliest form of violent conflict to be found in the region. Overtime this behaviour became more complex and included piracy, as we see below in chapter 6. Evidence for pitched battles begins to appear, if we read supposedly organized images of armed men as being evidence for large, organized, armies, which fought in battles. When we come to the early historical period, pitched battles seem to be common. The Roman memory, reflected in the narrative histories, is full of instances of pitched battles. Although these stories may not be strongly grounded in historicity, there is no reason to completely dismiss them from our analysis.

From the Final Bronze Age onward, we have seen that the defence of settlements was extremely important. This began with the movement of the settled population from valley floors to defensible sites, often on heights or hills. With the synoecism and growth of the large settlements, which would eventually become the great city-states of the region, defence became more complex. Defence in the form of ditches and walls began sometime in the eighth century, and quickly spread throughout the region. This may be a reflection of peer polity interaction, with constructed defensive systems encouraging success in settlements which were thusly defended. Although these defensive systems had a cultural value, their primary purpose was defence. Settlements were clearly the targets of warfare, whether that was raiding or sieges.

The first primary centre to fall to an enemy, and have its power destroyed, was Veii. After the Romans conquered their Etruscan neighbour the pattern of warfare beings to change. We hear very little about Roman raiding after this point, with all of their attention going to fight against the continually intrusive hill tribes. By destroying the political sovereignty of Veii, the Romans were allowed to
concentrate their efforts further afield, mostly in Latium, leading to the eventual wars against the Samnites. The turning point which allowed all of this, though, was the fall of Veii.
4. Warfare and the State

Discussions of warfare, especially in prehistory, often go hand in hand with discussions of states and state formation.\(^{493}\) The centrality of warfare to Carneiro’s now foundational theory on state formation is well known.\(^{494}\) Warfare as a primary cause of state formation, however, has not gone unchallenged.\(^{495}\) The role of warfare in shaping Mediterranean states, however, has been somewhat constitutively reaffirmed, especially in the Greek world.\(^{496}\) Hoplite warfare’s role in the formation of early Italian states had been quite fashionable until recently. Both d’Agostino and Rosenstein have shown in two very different ways that we must not remain chained to the concept of the hoplite in our understanding of Etruscan city-states and archaic Rome (respectively).\(^{497}\) It is essential, however, to re-examine the connection between states and warfare in Tyrrhenian Italy through a critical approach rather than dismissing the connection as ‘unknowable.’

We must first answer the question of ‘what is a state?’ before moving on to seeing how the states of Tyrrhenian Italy practised warfare. This question is made difficult by the many interpretations of what constitutes a state throughout the academic community. To many nineteenth-century scholars on early Italy it was ‘the strict conception of the unity and omnipotence of the state in all matter pertaining to it, which was the central principle of the Italian constitutions, placed in the hands of the single president nominated for life, a formidable power, which was felt perhaps

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\(^{495}\) Webster (1975); Classen (2006). For a recent synthesis, however, see Gat (2006), 231-322, who argues that warfare, at least in many instances, played an important role in the formation of states.
\(^{496}\) Snodgrass (1965); Viggiano (2013).
\(^{497}\) d’Agostino (1990); Rosenstein (2010). The problems raised by Rosenstein, in particular, should be applied to all of Tyrrhenian Italy; his use of van Wees’ (2000; 2004) arguments are lucid and helpful. It is only fair to point out that Rosenstein was not the first to bring van Wees’ innovative approach to Greek warfare into Tyrrhenian considerations; the first that I know of was Smith (2006), 288.
by the enemies of the land, but was not less heavily felt by its citizens.498 This totalitarian idea of the state has not completely disappeared from studies on the ancient Mediterranean, but is not necessarily current in all disciplines.

While some classical scholars have introduced more complex discussions of the state into the field, no major re-evaluation of Tyrrenian warfare has been written since these ideas have been introduced.499 Part of the problem with bringing modern discussions of the state into play when examining archaic Italy is that even some scholars who specialize in social relations consider the concept of the state to be a ‘messy’ one.500 Others have not been so negative. Wright provides a succinct definition from an anthropological perspective, that the state ‘can be recognized as a cultural development with a centralized decision-making process,’ that contains a multiplicity of specializations.501 While this is a somewhat rudimentary definition of the state, I hope to avoid being bogged down by the theoretical issues surrounding ‘early state,’ ‘archaic state,’ and ‘developed state,’ differences.502

For the purposes of this study ‘the state’ will be defined along similar lines to what Hansen refers to as the sociological, anthropological, archaeological, and historical (i.e. as used by historians) definition of the state, which is traceable back to Weberian ideals.503 The state is ‘a centralized legitimate government in possession of the sole right to enforce a given legal order within a territory over a population.’504

Seeing warfare as a type of ‘legal order’ in this case, practicable only by the state

498 Mommsen (1881), 1.253.
499 In general, see the well-written introduction to the subject by Hansen (2000b), 12-14. The introduction to the concept of ‘the state’ in Smith (2011b), 217-21, is also helpful. For the Greek world the dialogue with non-classical archaeologists seems to have begun before any reconsideration of the Italian evidence, although the impact of external theorists may not have been great; cf. Whitley (1991), 39-45.
500 Mann (1984), 187.
501 Wright (1977), 383.
503 Hansen (2000b), 28 (n. 27).
504 Ibid., 13.
(legitimately), has been one of the major areas of discussion in central Italian warfare studies.\textsuperscript{505} The state, in the contexts of this study, is seen as a mechanism which possessed legitimate power and exercised this power through some form of legal tradition.\textsuperscript{506} It has been pointed out by many anthropological archaeologists that the warfare waged by states is different than that waged by complex chiefdoms or chiefdoms.\textsuperscript{507} Conquest is often seen as the typical type of war waged by states, while raiding is typically the ‘less severe’ sibling associated with chiefdoms.\textsuperscript{508} The primary objectives of this chapter are to outline the evidence that Tyrrenian Italy was a ‘city-state culture,’ thus consisting of a landscape of states, and then to examine how these states actually behaved in patterns of warfare.

Within the general approach that states possessed legitimate power within a circumscribed territory, this study makes one modification. States are viewed as collectives of individuals, all of whom had their own pursuits and goals. Social power did not exist within the institutions of the state itself, but with the people who held these positions. This is not to say that the state was a diffuse, or federate, entity in central Italy.\textsuperscript{509} Rather, the states should be seen as the active dialogue between social actors using social power to effect desired outcomes.

Social stratification, as revealed by the archaeology of burial, is a strong indicator of the level of social progression a society has attained. Social stratification

\textsuperscript{505} See, in particular, Rawlings (1999), 112-15.
\textsuperscript{506} Hadfield and Weingast (2013) have shown, though, that the state is not necessary for the enforcement of laws, and that a variety of collective-type societies throughout history were able to enforce laws.
\textsuperscript{508} Not all states are as adept at conquest as others. Runciman (1990) has analyzed the reasons why Greek \textit{poleis} were not more successful in the long-term of Mediterranean history. Describing them as ‘citizen-states’ rather than city-states, their weakness was in their limited potential for economic growth and their reliance, in the end, on mercenaries, rather than enfranchised allies (or the like), to defend themselves and fight their wars. He contrasts this with Rome, who was able to expand successfully because of their inclusion of allies and conquered peoples within the state and military systems.
\textsuperscript{509} Mann (2012), 167-174, has observed that many of the great early empires existed as federate aristocracies, with a despotic head of state who was constantly having to legitimate its power.
and the emergence of a privileged class are core components in this theory.\textsuperscript{510} The burial pattern in Etruria shows little social differentiation in the period of the Final Bronze Age.\textsuperscript{511} Transitioning into the Iron Age, burial patterns indicate a differentiation of status, especially along the lines of gender and age, within the familial group.\textsuperscript{512} There is corroborating evidence from certain centres, such as Veii, that social differentiation based on wealth existed at the level of the settlement as well.\textsuperscript{513} A similar phenomenon occurred in Latium in the earliest periods of the Iron Age.\textsuperscript{514} This differentiation is a sign that the processes of state formation were underway in the transitional period into the Iron Age.

The emergence of the state in central Italy has been quite widely accepted in some lines of scholarship, especially regarding the period from the eighth century forward.\textsuperscript{515} These explanations for the emergence of both urban and state culture has almost always been tied to a diffusionist approach to contacts with the eastern Mediterranean. It was contact with Phoenicians and Greeks that supposedly spurred on the development of both of these concepts in Tyrrhenian Italy.\textsuperscript{516} Archaeological work over the past three decades, however, has shown that urbanization, at least, was a process began before extensive contact with the eastern Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{517} Warfare, or conflict, could have played an important role in this change of settlement pattern.\textsuperscript{518} Along with increasing signs of a process of urbanization, in the period

\textsuperscript{510} Service (1975), 266-89, and Wright (1977).
\textsuperscript{511} Spivey and Stoddart (1991), 140-43.
\textsuperscript{512} Riva (2010), 30-31.
\textsuperscript{513} Riva (2010), 27.
\textsuperscript{514} Bietti Sestieri (1992), 199-220, notes that, differently from Etruscan communities, Latial ones do not seem to have been divided as strictly between familial units.
\textsuperscript{515} Cf. Guidi (1998; 2006; 2010).
\textsuperscript{516} Drews (1981); Champion \textit{et al}. (1984), 259; Sherratt (1993), 39.
\textsuperscript{517} For the so-called proto-urban development from Final Bronze Age 3 to Early Iron Age 1 see: Guidi (2006), 56-9, and Riva (2010), 11-38. See also Steingräber (2001) and Bartoloni (2008).
\textsuperscript{518} Warrior or martial imagery and identity was the most visible and spectacular marker of status in burials of this period, cf. Iaia (1999; 2009-2012) and Riva (2010), 74-95.
from the Final Bronze Age into the Early Iron Age there is significant evidence that the defensibility of settlement sites became more and more important.\textsuperscript{519}

Recently it has been pointed out that urbanization, whether it is the ‘proto-urbanization’ that we see in Etruria during this period, or elsewhere in the Mediterranean, is a complicated topic to discuss hand in hand with the state. Although cities used to be considered a marker of the state proper, there has been a recent methodological backlash against this.\textsuperscript{520} It is an important step forward that scholars have begun to divorce urbanism and state formation, but it leaves us at a problematic point in the analysis of warfare, in particular, if we accept to be ‘in the dark’ in terms of state formation.\textsuperscript{521} This is especially true if we push state formation into the realm of the seventh and sixth centuries in Etruria and Rome, as some scholars do.\textsuperscript{522} For this period there is quite convincing evidence that infrastructure development was underway in a highly organized fashion, indicating the presence of a developed state.\textsuperscript{523} It is during this time that the first paving of the forum occurred in Rome, as well as the construction of possibly the first public building, the Regia.\textsuperscript{524}

Throughout the region, as we have seen above in chapter three, we begin to detect the construction of fortifications in central Italy. Roselle may have had the

\textsuperscript{519} Cecconi et al. (2004) and supra chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{520} From an evolutionary point of view the existence of a political community with an urban center points to the existence of states, although this point of view has been challenged and the neo-evolutionary paradigms are problematic at the moment, cf. Roscoe (1993). That complex societies do not always move towards centralization is becoming more and more evident, see Angelbeck and Grier (2012), albeit their study is heavily influenced by theoretical anarchism. Cf. Osborne (2005), 2-3, and Riva (2010), 21-22. I am mildly skeptical that urbanism and the state can be completely separated because as van der Vliet (1990), 256, points out, ‘a mass of people does not act spontaneously and effectively without a form of leadership and without a form of internal political organization.’ If urbanizing populations were (comparatively) large, they must have had some sort of control structure.\textsuperscript{521} Some authors are considerably more optimistic that we do see states develop somewhat early on. See, especially, Cifani (2003) and Guidi (2006; 2010).
\textsuperscript{522} Cifani (2002) and now Riva (2010), 180.
\textsuperscript{523} See especially Cifani (2002).
\textsuperscript{524} Cornell (1995), 93-94.
earliest fortifications in the region, possibly dating to the seventh century,\textsuperscript{525} although the picture is much more complex with the advent of recent research. Veii and Vulci were both fortified with walls in the eighth century, at least a century earlier than the usual dating of the walls at Roselle.\textsuperscript{526} The sixth century seems to have seen a great expansion in the number of fortified settlements, with Tarquinia and Caere adding walls during this century; smaller centres between these two cities were also fortified during this century.\textsuperscript{527} Walls and other defensive projects were undertaken throughout Latium from the eighth century.\textsuperscript{528} The construction of walls, and other large fortification projects, such as defensive ditches, all require a great amount of labour. The manpower which constructed these fortifications probably came from the fortified settlements themselves, as there is no reason to suspect an external labour force.\textsuperscript{529} The ability of a settlement’s inhabitants to organize this much labour is an indicator of the existence of some sort of state or state-like mechanism of control.\textsuperscript{530} If these defensive structures were primarily built to protect against conquering armies, this may be a sign of states and their type of warfare.

The question of the existence state is further complicated by the epigraphic evidence. We now know two important terms in Etruscan which are applicable to the current situation, \textit{ras-} and \textit{spur-}. The first of these was thought to mean ‘Etruscan’ until recently.\textsuperscript{531} Recently, however, \textit{ras-} has been argued, and I am convinced of it, to be more closely equated to Latin \textit{publicus}.\textsuperscript{532} It seems to indicate the body of people rather than the physical city. The second Etruscan term relevant to the current

\textsuperscript{525} Spivey and Stoddart (1990), 136; Barker and Rasmussen (1998), 273-274.
\textsuperscript{526} Boitani et al. (2008); Moretti Sgubini (2006, 2008).
\textsuperscript{527} Baratti et al. (2008), 203-209; Cerasuolo (2012), 123; Perego (2012).
\textsuperscript{528} Cornell (2000), 217-219.
\textsuperscript{529} This labour may not have been ‘free labour’, as slavery was practiced in Etruria from a relatively early time, although we do not know how large of a body slaves would have formed. See Frankfort (1959), Nash Briggs (2002-2003), and Benelli (2013).
\textsuperscript{530} The traditional ‘tribal’ type of organization should be read as ‘state like.’
\textsuperscript{532} Bourdin (2012), 226-29.
discussion is _spur_-. Bourdin has recently discussed the complexity of this term and its probable equivalence to ‘cité-État’ or a similar idea.\(^{533}\) Though the argumentation and exact definition of these terms may not be accepted by all, it is clear that they denote recognition of a certain community that does not appear to be kin related, thus a political community, or possibly a ‘state’ community.

Although the existence of proto-urban or urban centres does not necessarily signal the development of a state, the use of these terms in the epigraphic record supports the idea that there were state entities during this period. Although _ras_- (_rasna_ ) is attested quite late (the earliest being from the middle of the fourth century \([ET\ Vs\ 1.179]\)), _spur_- is attested already in the second quarter of the seventh century in Narce \((ET\ Fa\ 3.1,\ Fa\ 6.1)\).\(^{534}\) It is probable that the idea of a political community existed before this first attestation and that this evidence provides grounds for a belief in state like communities at least in the seventh century. The existence of state structures in the seventh century is further strengthened by the attestation of _zilaθ_ (a magistrate) in an inscription from Rubiera, dated to the end of the century \((ET\ Pa\ 1.2)\).\(^{535}\) This evidence, albeit scant, from two separate sites strongly points towards states, or at least developed political communities by the end of the seventh century.

Epigraphic evidence also gives us evidence for the existence of identities based around both ethnicities and city/state origination. Attestations of gentilicial names based on an ethnic origin are common throughout Etruria. One of the earliest iconographic pieces of evidence for warfare (seventh century) contains the ethnic gentilicial _Feluske_ \((ET\ Vn\ 1.1)\).\(^{536}\) Attestations of civic associations are common in Etruscan inscriptions all the way into the fourth century, as evidenced by another

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\(^{533}\) Ibid., 229-40.

\(^{534}\) On the closeness between the Faliscans and Etruscans, see Cifani (2012), 156-159.


\(^{536}\) This being the stele of Auvile Feluske. Poccetti (1997). See, though, Colonna (2013).
important piece of evidence, the depiction of *Cneve Tarχunies Rumaχ* in the François tomb in Vulci.\(^{537}\) The importance of these identities, however, may not lie in community or state solidarity but as individualistic markers of identity.\(^{538}\) It is fairly clear that most, if not all, of the proto-urban and urban centres in Tyrrenhian Italy were multi-ethnic ‘open’ societies from an early date.\(^{539}\) As Ruth Whitehouse has pointed out, the absence of explicitly *state* related inscriptions from the early periods of Tyrrenhian literacy is problematic, although it does not necessarily preclude the existence of states.\(^{540}\)

Thus the situation is complex. Conclusive signs pointing to the existence of strong, Weberian, states are not common in the Early Iron Age. This may indicate that the region was in a period in which proto-states or short lived temporary states existed. The emergence of monumental defensive structures in the eighth and seventh centuries are evidence of warfare which threatened entire settlements, a type of warfare that can be called state like, one of conquest and expansion. During this period, as well, developing social stratification and the elaboration of socio-political positions indicate the emergence of some type of states.\(^{541}\) By the seventh century it is probable that the large settlements of central Italy were governed by states.

### 4.1 Traditional Accounts

In the early historical period we find sophisticated state mechanisms at work. This is true at least of Rome. Due to the nature of the evidence, though, it is impossible to know just how developed the communities of Etruria had become. This section examines the evidence for how the figures who occupied these political roles exercised military power and conducted warfare. This section also discusses the

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\(^{537}\) Buranelli (1987) and Morandi Tarabella (2004).


\(^{539}\) Ampolo (1976-77; 1981), Bradley (1997; 2000; forthcoming), and Bourdin (2012), 519-589.

\(^{540}\) Whitehouse (2007).

\(^{541}\) Cf. Pacciarelli (2010).
ways in which the state and its magistrates were able to field armies and the mechanisms of recruitment. Due to the nature of the evidence, this is a heavily Romanocentric discussion.

4.1.1 Magistrates and War

Magistrates in the ancient world often had functions in both the political and military spheres of power (i.e. Roman consuls, Athenian strategoi). These were the officials, whether elected, hereditary, or tyrannical, who raised armies and led them into the field. This section looks at the magistrates for whom we have evidence in central Italy and examines their functions regarding warfare. It aims to show that magistrates were an important part of elite sociality, especially in Rome, and that the use of political power helped to expand the use of military power by this group. This analysis begins with an analysis of warrior tombs and whether or not they are representations of the earliest form of military governance.

One of the most difficult to interpret tomb types in Tyrrhenian Italy is the ‘warrior tomb.’542 The phenomenon of burying weapons alongside the dead is well represented throughout the period in question. In the Early Iron Age, a low percentage of tombs contained actual weapons.543 This proportion increased over time, and the inclusion of ceramic representations of helmets, the most telling symbol of the ‘warrior’ from this period, became more common.544 That the burial and identification of the deceased as a warrior had become ritualized even in this early period is confirmed by the use of these imitations from the same necropolis.545

542 Describing these burials as ‘warrior tombs’ is dangerous, which is why the term has been placed inside inverted commas. The author does not intend to claim that every individual buried with arms and armour in Etruria were warriors in life, this is certainly not the case.
543 Iaia (1999), 33, calculates that 11.2% of the tombs from EIA I at Tarquinia contained actual examples of weapons.
544 Approximately 77% (37 of 48) of burials at Tarquinia and 60% (56 of 94) of burials at Veii contained a helmet; the calculations are by Saulnier (1980), 18.
Offensive arms were also present in these tombs. Clearly, being identified with arms and armour in burial was important for prominent Villanovan males.

Commonly discovered alongside this Etruscan weapon burial rite, was the image of the hut. Occasionally the urn was shaped like a contemporary dwelling, or the dwelling was represented in *impasto* in another way. This is normally interpreted as a symbol of the deceased’s position as head of house or family. Some examples have led scholars to make a direct link between this household leadership and martial leadership or prowess. If this were true, the exercise of military power may have been limited to familial networks.

Through time, the ritual of the weapon burial becomes more elaborate in central Italy. Grave goods rapidly become more abundant, as well as the perceived wealth of tombs. More elements are added to the warrior identity, including ritual tools such as knives for sacrificing, as well as spits for roasting sacrificed meat. These items were not limited to just male burials. Along with these items, the chariot began to be included in a number of tombs, both male and female. The inclusion of the chariot has made some scholars postulate that a Homeric form of warfare was prevalent in central Italy during this period. The inclusion in relatively high percentages in female graves (approximately 28% of chariots have been found in female graves) precludes this. Rather, the inclusion of chariots is

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547 Bartolini *et al.* (1987). The interpretation of the hut as a temple or proto-temple is also possible.
549 Riva (2010), 84-96.
550 Bartolini (1993), 274, and perhaps a similar culture would be reflected?
551 Riva (2010), 97, provides the percentage. The absolute numbers of chariot burials are 23 from Vetulonia, 10 from Tarquinia, 25 from Veii, three from Caere, two from Populonia, and 14 from Marsiliana, *ibid.*, 96 n. 175.
most probably a sign of an overarching elite identity which was not bounded by biological sex. How should we interpret the creation of this identity?  

The use of arms and armour to create an identity in burials is not unique to the central Italian world within the ancient Mediterranean. The Late Bronze Age and Early Iron Age in the Aegean saw a number of these types of burials, and their existence has influenced the discussion of these societies quite heavily. In both realms, iconographic representation of, perhaps, ‘warriors’ creates ambiguity as to the importance of arms and weapons. In Geometric Greece, for instance, armed figures are frequently depicted in non-martial settings and weapons appear to be a social marker rather than a direct connection to combat. There is a similar iconographic pattern in central Italy. This pattern can be exemplified by a number of artefacts, such as scenes which may depict armed dances or hunting scenes (Figs. 4-5). If arms were relevant to these activities, can we restrict arms found in funerary settings to the realm of actual warfare? Because of this evidence we cannot definitively describe those buried with weapons to be ‘warriors’.

Riva has recognized the importance of new, very public, displays of wealth and identity as being important to the political elaboration of the urban centres in the eighth century. It is problematic, however, how much she emphasizes the military nature of these burials throughout her monograph. While the funerary evidence from the Iron Age and Orientalizing periods shows that this identity may have built primarily on a direct correlation between the display of arms and military success or leadership, evidence from the Archaic period shows that this may not have been the

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552 Warrior identity was also expressed quite readily, in later periods, through stelae. See the collection in Stary (1981), Tafeln 27-31.
553 Whitley (2002).
case. This is best shown in the frieze from the archaic building at Poggio Civitate (Murlo).  

Of particular interest is the plaque depicting a number of seated figures (Fig. 6). This frieze most probably depicts scenes of activities associated with elites, similar to other terracotta frieze schemes throughout central Italy. The importance of the individuals seated seems clear, but the symbols of their importance are what take our interest. Two figures have an identity which seems to be defined by arms, incidentally they are the only two readily identifiable male figures on the plaque. The third figure from the left is holding an axe in his hand, which is the only element which appears to indicate his identity or status. The most interesting, however, is the furthest figure on the right. He is seated and holding what could be a lituus. This may identify the figure as a priest-king, but it does not constitute his entire identity. Behind this figure stands an attendant holding both a spear and a sword, in a demonstrative pose. If we are to read this figure as the local leader, then, his identity is multifarious, including both martial and religious items. Whether or not he was proficient in either seems to be irrelevant.

The tombs containing arms must also not be removed from the context of the necropoleis. Throughout the period in question, and culminating in the so-called princely burials, the tombs of elite Tyrrhenians were becoming more and more monumental. Tombs went from simple depositions to stone built dwellings of the

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556 Sinos (1994).
557 Cf. Winter (2009). The other plaques at Murlo show a number of other aristocratic scenes, such as banqueting (symposion) and horse racing.
558 Although the axe could symbolize a sacrificial tool, its presence in many martial scenes disallows us from discounting its martial properties altogether.
559 The lituus was a divinely associated curved and knotless staff with divine associations attributed to Etruscan priests, although it was not exclusively associated with the Etruscans (Cic. Div. 2.80; Livy 1.18; Ver. Aen. 7.187). Servius notes its royal connotations and its symbolic role in settling disputes (ad Aen. 7.187). See Thulin (1968), 3.113-14, Pfiffig (1975), 48, and Torelli (1986), 220.
The very public presence of these monumental tombs, alongside the very elaborate burial ritual itself, emphasized the position of the elites, and thus of the warrior tombs. But honour and position are not simply expressions, they are the results of a dialogue between members of a society and must represent some sort of complex organization within that society when the dialogue is as complex as the weapon burial rite. The monumentalization of tombs, and the elaborate burial ritual itself, should be seen as the efforts of a weakly, or insecurely, based political power attempting to strengthen its position. Thus, while the ‘warrior tombs’ may not contain the remains of actual warriors, and should not be interpreted solely along the lines of their martial content, they do represent communities which may have negotiated social power much like states, if they were not actual states.

The social organization of Rome shows a dialogue between social power and warfare, especially in the forms of social units and institutional formalization. State armies are further evidenced by an examination of civic leaders and military leadership. This is especially important as we have no real institutional framework to examine in the Etruscan city-states, thus we must build our understanding of state-like warfare from the narrative tradition as well as the epigraphic corpus.

In the historical period, the earliest civic leaders attested in Tyrrhenian Italy are kings. The narrative tradition is full of kings. At Rome, the seven traditional reges are all remembered as leading armies in war. Existence of kings at Rome is almost certain, supported not only in the narrative tradition, but also by the

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560 Izzet (2007), 87-121.
561 Tuck (2012).
564 As a caveat, if an extensive osteological study could exist, similar to Robb’s (1997) study of Campania, we would have a much clearer picture of the actual martial status of these individuals. Based on the evidence still available to modern researchers, this seems unlikely to happen.
565 Instances in Livy: 1.10, 11, 14, 15, 22, 23, 24, 27, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 42, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57.
Etruscan kings are no less common. Mezentius is remembered as a legendary king of Caere in the Aeneid (7.647, 8.482, 10.786-907). Lars Porsenna was rex of Clusium at the end of the sixth century and waged a successful campaign against Rome (Livy 2.9). In the middle of the fifth century Veii was ruled by a king remembered as Lars Tolumnius (4.17). Veii was against ruled by a king at the time of its fall to Rome at the end of the fifth century (Livy 5.1). All of these leaders appear as the leaders of the armies of their respective states.

What Etruscan kings were known as in their own language is less clear than their Roman counterparts. The Romans had a tradition by which the title of Etruscan kings was lucumones (Serv. ad Aen. 2.278). This, however, could be a rather weak etymology based on the Etruscan praenomen Lucumo, incidentally the attested first name of the first Tarquin in Rome (Livy 1.34). It is possible that zilatθ, which later referred to a republican magistracy in Etruscan city-states, could have originally meant king. The Pyrgi Tablets, bi-lingual inscriptions in Punic-Phoenician and Etruscan have the terms MLK (melek) and zilatθ (TLE 874, 875) describing the same figure. Although later attestations equate zilatθ and praetor, MLK quite certainly means 'king.'567 The use of this Phoenician term may indicate that Thefarie Velianas was a tyrannical figure, rather than a legitimate magistrate.568

The place of the king in society was more complex than their seemingly supreme leadership of their states’ armies. The Brontoscopic Calendar preserves a complex picture of kingship in the eighth or seventh centuries.569 Kings could either be beneficent (27 December) or cruel (16 January), and their positions were not

568 On Thefarie Velianas, see now Colonna (2007).
569 Turfa (2006; 2012).
necessarily secure (19 October, 30 December, 21 January). The picture presented in this document shows a dynamic society, led by a king, but in which leading men were also important.\textsuperscript{570} According to a tradition preserved in the Roman literature, those under the power of the kings were expected to pay homage, possibly every nine days, although the historicity of this is not secure (Macrobi. \textit{Sat.} 1.15). If this was an historical fact, though, it shows that kings held considerable sway, being able to coerce their subjects to perform such a regular and obtrusive task.

The transition to republican forms of government in Tyrrhenian Italy brought in new leaders of both states and their armies. In Rome this took the form of the two consuls (Livy 1.60 Dion. Hal. \textit{Ant. Rom.} 5.1).\textsuperscript{571} They were elected by the \textit{comitia centuriata}, those eligible to be asked to serve. Shortly after the introduction of the republican magistracy of the consulate, the Romans chose their first dictator (c. 499).\textsuperscript{572} Around 445 the political situation in Rome had changed and the annual consuls were replaced by a board of between four and six \textit{tribuni militum consulari potestate} (consular tribunes) (Livy 4.6; Dion. Hal. \textit{Ant. Rom.} 11.56).\textsuperscript{573} What is interesting, however, is that the nature of warfare does not seem to change throughout these changes in supreme office. All three types of leaders could lead armies on regular campaigns,\textsuperscript{574} besiege settlements, and lead what appear to be raiding parties.

The last of these offices, the consular tribunes, are an interesting case. The powers given to these officials were very similar to that of consuls.\textsuperscript{575} These magistrates were elected in lieu of consuls, irregularly, between 444 and 367. The

\textsuperscript{570} Infra 3.2.1.
\textsuperscript{571} Smith (2011c) \textit{contra} Urso (2011).
\textsuperscript{572} Drummond (1978).
\textsuperscript{573} Drummond (1980). For a list of years which saw consular tribunes at the head of the Roman government and army see Cornell (1995), 336.
\textsuperscript{574} I.e. for consuls Livy 2.6, for dictators Livy 2.19, and for consular tribunes 4.31.
\textsuperscript{575} Palmer (1970), 222.
exceptional nature of this magistracy is that the number of men elected into it varied between three and nine. This political change came at the end of a period of other major transformations of Roman civic life: the creation of the Twelve Tables and the creation of the quaestorship. How exactly the consular tribunes fit in with this reorganization of the socio-political norms is not entirely clear.

The reasoning behind the consular tribunate given in the literary sources is political; this magistracy was a compromise between patricians and plebeians, the latter of whom had been clamouring for access to the consulship (Livy 4.16; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 11.53-61). Livy also records a tradition, however, that the consular tribunate was created to meet the growing military needs of Rome (4.7). Both of these explanations are problematic. Livy only records three instances of plebeians being elected to the office, meaning that if the political explanation is to be accepted it clearly did not fulfil its goal (5.12, 13, 6.30). The military explanation ignores the fact that the consular tribunes were elected before the needs of Rome were known for the year; as well, in years with consular tribunes, warfare is not often noted. Boddington has argued that there is no correlation between the intensity of warfare during a given year and the number of consular tribunes elected. Neither of the ancient explanations are satisfactory.

Recently, Armstrong has argued that the consular tribunate, as well as the censorship, were created around the middle of the fifth century in response to increased plebeian participation in the state and in the army. This conclusion is

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576 Cornell (1995), 336 Table 8.
578 Ridley (1986), 450 and Cornell (1995), 336-337, have both argued that there were plebeian consular tribunes elected during other years. Even if these arguments are to be believed, the creation of this office did not propel the plebeians to the top of the Roman political structure.
579 Staveley (1953), Adcock (1957), and Boddington (1959).
580 Boddington (1959), 358-359.
based on his underlying assumption that Rome before this period was not organized around a strong state system, and that the army was based around the gentes. As we see below, this is problematic. It is possible that the creation of the consular tribunate was a means of allowing more members of the elite (both patrician and plebeian) the opportunity to command an army, especially in small campaigns. Perhaps this was in the form of raiding. The narrative tradition does not record raiding type behaviour associated with the consular tribunes, but it is possible that small raiding type campaigns did not always make it into the historical record. As we see below, campaigns, even if the commander was unable to celebrate a triumph, could result in considerable gains in social power, economic and religious, and by allowing a larger swathe of the elite to campaign in any given years would have been a means of offsetting the growing influence and social power of the plebeians.

Roman magistrates were legally allowed to lead armies only if they were imbued the imperium. This is one of the most ‘fundamental’ components of Roman war-making. This was the ‘right of command’ which was voted to magistrates by the comitia curiata, and it is this ‘right’ which distinguished the military role of certain magistrates from the civil roles of others (Cic. Leg. agr. 2.30). This body would have represented the entire citizen community, not just the army. Sumner

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582 Smith (2006), 317-318, points out that it is difficult to imagine how Rome would have functioned in the 6th and 5th centuries if there was such a large divide between patrician interests and those of the rest of Rome.

583 Raiding is, however, well attested in general. See above, chapter 2.

584 It is noted that the consular tribunes could not celebrate triumphs, which is usually ascribed to the difference in auspicia which was bestowed upon them. It could be that the campaigns for which they were elected, though, were not large enough to receive such communal praise or that they did not fulfill other criteria for a triumph. On the auspicia of the consular tribunate, see Smith (2006), 272. Drogula (2007), 419.

585 Mitchell (1990), 150; Cornell (1995), 115. Whether or not Roman reges were imbued with this power, or required to be imbued with it to lead armies, is unknown. Cicero (Rep. 2.25; cf. Livy 1.17) says that Numa was brought from Cures to become rex in Rome, although he had already been chosen by the people, he had a law passed in the curia regarding his imperium.
suggested that commanders were first chosen by the *comitia centuriata* and then confirmed by the entire population in the *comitia curiata* (Cic. *Leg. agr.* 2.26). While this is an attractive suggestion, the most important element of it is the recognition that military commanders were chosen by a vote of the entire community, not just the army. Thus, these were not necessarily strong men of the army being given *imperium* by their comrades in arms, but they were recognized communal leaders. This double election may have helped to reinforce the Roman ideal that states should by ‘its best men’ who excelled in manliness and intelligence (Cic. *Rep.* 1.51).

*Imperium* came in different ‘types’ or ‘levels’, with that of the consul being the highest of the regular magistrates in the republican period. According to Messala, an augur quoted by Aulus Gellius, different types of magistrates had different *imperium* (*NA* 13.15). Another example of this is the inferiority of the master of horse’s *imperium* compared to that of the dictator, from whom the master of horse received his *imperium*. The other principal magistrate elected during the period under study, the consular tribune, presents a problem. Though they led armies, we are unsure of the precise mode of their election. We never hear of their confirmation by a *lex curiata*, granting them *imperium*, but Livy does say that they

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587 Sumner (1970), 75.
588 Mitchell (1990), 149, suggested that Roman kings, serving as commanders of ‘confederate’ armies may have been imbued with a type of *imperium* by the communities who contributed to that allied force. There is, though, no evidence for this.
589 A number of scholars, such as Bleicken (1981), 33-44, have proposed that this was a solely military power. Most recently, Drogula (2007) has forcefully argued that the power granted to a magistrate by their *imperium* was not exercised within the sacred boundary of the city and was solely a military authority. Beck (2011) has recently pointed out that this is not a perfect answer to the question of what exactly *imperium* constituted, and emphasizes that the nature of this power was constantly changing throughout Roman history.
590 In this context, Cicero is comparing the radical democracy of Athens, in which leaders were appointed by allotment, compared to that of Rome, where the best men were supposedly elected.
591 He notes that though praetors were colleagues of consuls, they did not have equal *imperium*.
were given both the insignia and the imperium of the consuls (Livy 4.7).\textsuperscript{594} Not all scholars are convinced, with Sealey bluntly stating that ‘it is clear, for example, that consular tribunes did not hold imperium.’\textsuperscript{595} Whether or not they were given power through a curiate law, they still commanded armies in the field.

The passing of a lex curiata granting imperium to a magistrate allowed them to take the auspicia militiae.\textsuperscript{596} By this, it is meant that the magistrate was authorized to use a special augury to show that they were divinely favoured to take command. The public auspices were traditionally in the realm of the patricians (Gell. NA 13.15; Cic. Leg. 3.3.9, ad Brut. 13.4.4, Dom. 38).\textsuperscript{597} This helped to keep military commands in the hands of the elites. When a pleb is finally allowed to wage war under their auspicia, it ends in disaster (Livy 7.6). In a world without gods, or at least fewer, a modern view of this procedure can be viewed as the intersection between political and religious social power being monopolized by a single social group. It is probably, however, that the Romans themselves took this topic seriously (i.e. Livy 4.2). By giving a military leader imperium and allowing them to take the auspices, the entire Roman population was agreeing that an individual was acceptable as a military leader. The need to have these two political/divine elements points to the existence of a strong state structure regulating warfare in Rome

The situation in Etruria is less well documented.\textsuperscript{598} Whether or not certain city-states were headed by kings, a collegiate pair of men styled as zilaθ mexl rasnal, or led by a singular eponymous magistrate (Serv.\textit{ad Aen.} 2.669), we cannot speak

\textsuperscript{594} [tribunes militum] imperio et insignibus consularibus usos.
\textsuperscript{595} Sealey (1959), 529.
\textsuperscript{596} Smith (2006), 221-222.
\textsuperscript{597} Linderski (1990); Mitchell (1990), 20-22; Smith (2006), 263-268.
\textsuperscript{598} Etruscan magistrates are somewhat well known, but their functions are not, see Lambrechts (1959), Heurgon (1967), and Maggiani (2000).
about many specific military expeditions that were not levelled against Rome.599 We know nothing about the leadership of the Etruscan fleet which participated in the Battle of Alalia in the latter sixth century (Hdt. 1.166). We could surmise that it was possibly a fleet from Caere, which we know was somewhat well connected to Carthage by c. 500 (TLE 874 and 875). If this were the case, said fleet may have been led by a tyrannous figure such as Thefarie Velianas as the supreme magistrate in charge. It is problematic to assume this, though, as we know that Carthage had diverse economic and political interests in Tyrrenian Italy, evidenced, for instance, by the first treaty with Rome dated c. 509 (Polyb. 3.22). It is possible that members of the Spurinna family held a number of magistracies in Tarquinia sometime during the 5th or 4th centuries which included military leadership, specifically against Caere as well as an expedition to Sicily.600 If the so-called elogia of Tarquinia are evidence for the 5th or 4th centuries, then it shows that magistrates were able to take armies at least as far afield as Sicily.601

The most secure conclusion that we can draw is that political and military leadership seems to overlap in the periods for which we have literary or epigraphic evidence. We have also seen above that in earlier periods the identity of elites was built around a combination of different ideals, including considerable martial symbolism, which may indicate their positions as military leaders.

4.1.2 Recruitment of Armies

The first armies for which we have details on their recruitment are known from regal Rome. This recruitment seems to have been based on the divisions of the population. The earliest socio-political division that we hear of in Rome is the

599 Torelli (2000b), 201.
600 Torelli (1975).
601 On the historicity and identification of the figures mentioned in these inscriptions, though, see Cornell (1978) who is not as optimistic as Torelli is with definite identifications of the figures. Cf. Heurgon (1951).
division of the people into three tribes (*tribus*) (Varro *LL* 5.55). These three tribes were known to the Romans as Ramnenses, Titienses, and Luceres (Livy 1.13). Although the sources attribute a number of explanations for the names of these tribes, such as Livy’s ethnic etymologies of Ramnenses and Titienses (*ibid.*), the true origin of these names is certainly lost to us. Their importance diminished, or disappeared, with the coming of the Servian Constitution in the middle of the sixth century, but their names were preserved in the centuries of the cavalry (cf. Livy 1.36). It was from these earliest tribes that the Romans believed their earliest armies were recruited (Varro *LL* 5.89).

Varro’s account holds that the earliest Roman armies consisted of 3,000 infantry, 1,000 from each of the Romulean tribes, and attributes an etymology of *miles* to this recruitment. Criticisms of this etymology are well known. This number is compatible with the social division that Livy attributes to Romulus regarding those who were not knights. Livy holds that Romulus divided the people into thirty *curiae*. Momigliano authoritatively claimed that ‘the Curiae were the pivotal element of archaic Rome.’ It remains to be seen how to fully interpret the *curiae*, but what does seem certain is that the entire population (*quirites*) of Rome, at one point, belonged to *curiae*. A piece of evidence which may support this idea is that the feast day of the *Quirinalia* (17 February) was celebrated by the mass gathering of all the *curiae* (Ovid *Fasti* 2.531-32).

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602 Our sources give different names for these tribes, but their exact name is not important for the current discussion (Cic. *Rep.* 2.20; Serv. *ad Aen.* 5.560; Festus 468L; Plut. *Rom.* 20).
604 Livy (1.13) recorded a tradition that only the cavalry of the early army was recruited from these tribes. Cf. Cicero *Rep.* 2.20. The consecration of six Vestals based on this organization is also rooted in an antiquarian reference (Festus 475L) rather than the narratives of Livy and Dionysius.
607 Momigliano (1963), 109.
The most acceptable modern reconstruction of this situation, then, is that the earliest Roman armies were recruited from thirty curiae who, together, made up the earliest known Roman armies. An exception to this rule existed in the little understood and poorly attested celeres, the 300 supposed swift bodyguards of Romulus (Livy 1.15). This body continued to exist throughout the regal period, attested even to the last king (Livy 1.59). What the celeres actually were is unclear. This is in large part because the ancient tradition itself is somewhat confused. The most obvious objection to accepting the celeres at face value, as they appear in Livy, comes from Pliny (HN 33.9). Here, Pliny records the evolution of the name given to the equites: it began as ‘Celeres’ under Romulus and the other kings, changing to ‘Flexuntes,’ and, before the members of the ordo equester were known thus, they were known as ‘Trossuli.’

This is the strongest evidence to marshal against the otherwise abundant annalistic tradition (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.13, 29, 64, 4.71; Plut. Rom. 26, Numa 7; Diod. Sic. 8.6). That the celeres were an authentic element in early Rome, and thus a part of early Roman armies, can be found in the Salian ritual associated with 19 March. The tribune of the celeres mentioned in this ritual is an office which Livy associated with Brutus (1.59). The confused tradition, however, implies that it was the name of the celeres and their tribune that was remembered in the late Republic, rather than the function of either.

Ogilvie verbosely expresses doubt about the authenticity of the celeres as a separate body from the early Roman cavalry. He links the earliest interest in reviving knowledge of this body to the period of the Gracchi and the rising importance of the

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610 Dionysius (2.13.4) equates the celeres to the hippes of the Spartans because both fought either mounted or on foot, as circumstances provided. This should not be problematic, as he notes that this is his opinion and not the opinion of his sources.
equites as a political body. Ogilvie (1965), 83. He cites the interest of M. Junius Congus Gracchanus (fl. 100) to this issue. Ogilvie (1965), 84. At least in the account of Valerius Antias (fr. 2) they were a bodyguard. Although, Ogilvie (1965), 228, attributes this particular idea to 'later constitutionalists.' Another positive figure in early Rome, Servius Tullius, is said to have made use of the royal bodyguard (Livy 1.48). Here the bodyguard is playing a role in helping the otherwise betrayed king. This bodyguard does not seem to be mounted, but the importance of this may be trivial. It could correlate to the prohibition on the dictator mounting a horse. Dionysius does record that they were a chosen body of cavalry, but his entire account of the battle is muddled with fanciful events (Ant. Rom. 6.11). The thesis is not unique to Ogilvie. Cf. Heurgon (1973), 120, Momigliano (1989), 104. Alföldi (1965), 44. Momigliano (1966), responded to with Alföldi (1968), in turn rebutted in Momigliano (1969).
the early cavalry and the *celeres* as the same institution. For this version to be accepted we must reconcile our acceptance of a confused antiquarian tradition, represented by Pliny, as opposed to a seemingly coherent and culturally accepted (from a Roman perspective) version, represented by Livy. Ultimately, in the latter half of the sixth century the entire structure of the Roman government and the recruitment process of the army was changed with the introduction of the Servian Constitution, and the military function of the *celeres*, as a body of cavalry recruited directly from the *curiae*, ceased.

Among the many difficult historical issues of the monarchy, the reforms, or ‘constitution,’ of Servius Tullius is one of the most debated.620 Interest in this topic is so intense, in my view, because it represents the interconnection of almost all aspects of social organization in one historical event. The centuriate reform of Servius Tullius reorganized the Roman people into a new public assembly (*comitia centuriata*), by some accounts brought in a new form of warfare, and is clearly an attempt at social control. How much and in what ways this reform affected these three characteristics of Roman society is still unclear. No modern synthesis has provided an acceptable analysis of the reform.621 The importance of understanding the centuriate reform for wider research on warfare in archaic Tyrrhenian Italy is emphasized by its regular appearance in the existing literature on the topic.622 In order to better understand this reform it will be analyzed within both its socio-political context in the literary tradition as well as the archaeological context of warfare in the sixth century.

620 Fraccaro (1931; 1934) has made an extremely strong case that the basis of the Republic army lay in the Regal period, and that the structure of the Servian reforms makes sense within this time. This study accepts a sixth-century dating for the Servian army.

621 The best is in Cornell (1995), 173-97. An alternative, but less well developed, discussion can be found in Forsythe (2005), 109-15.

Before we begin an analysis of the role of the Servian Constitution it is important to digress on its historicity for a moment, as the general outline of the reform is almost always called into question. Specifically we need to look at the historicity of its division into five classes. The two modern syntheses of Early Roman history, in English, both dismiss the idea that the five classes given in both Livy and Dionysius represent an historical reality (Livy 1.43; Dion. Hal. 4.16-18). They both see the original form of the centuriate organization being organized along the lines of *classis* vs. *infra classem*, the hoplite army vs. those below the level of hoplite. This is not an argument unique to their discussion. The source of this idea comes primarily from three sources, now almost clichés: Aulus Gellius, Festus and Livy.

According to Gellius, the five classes (of the Servian Constitution) were further divided between *classis* and *infra classem*, and that only the men of the first Servian class were classified in the first group (NA 6.13). Festus echoes this sentiment almost identically, although he sets his information in the second century BC (100L). A third piece of evidence, even more circumstantial than the first two, comes from Livy. When narrating a battle fought at Fidenae in Varronian 425, Livy mentions a problem within his earlier sources which claimed that there had been a naval engagement here (4.34). These passages, along with a early concept of hoplite warfare in Greece, have led to the dismissal of an historical five-class subdivision of the population under Servius Tullius.

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624 Momigliano (1963), 119-120 (with bibliography).
625 It is also in Gellius that we find a definition for *classis* which means the army. The *flamen Dialis* was said to not be able to observe the *classis* arrayed outside the pomerium (NA 10.15). As well, we see *classis* meaning ‘army’ in Gellius’ discussion of the Spartan use of pipes in battle (NA 1.11). The problem with this second instance, however, is that the word is found in the plural (*classes*) rather than the singular, as we would expect given the previous examples of its use in Roman contexts.
On its own, this is not a conclusive body of evidence, to my mind, to dismiss
the five classes as originating under Servius Tullius, or at least in the sixth century. It
seems to be overlooked by most that the first Gellius passage (NA 6.13) maintains
that within the five classes it was only the first class called classis, and not
necessarily that the entire legio was once called classis. The other Servian classes are
still present as the infra classem, meaning that this group was not an undifferentiated
mass! But we also must not remove this passage from its context, which is 169 BC
and Cato the Elder arguing in favour of the lex Voconia (Cic. Balb. 8, Sen. 5). Thus
we are left seeing that in the middle of the second century the first class is
synonymous with classis, but realistically we are forced to stop there. Slightly more
convincing could be Gellius’ statement that the flamen Dialis could not see the
'classis’ outside the pomerium (NA 10.15). This would be quite secure evidence if
we had a date for the institution of this regulation against the flamen, but we have no
idea when this came into effect.\textsuperscript{627} If we are to see classis as representing the entirety
of the Early Roman army of the centuriate organization we would expect that as
more classes were added to the census rolls that the army would, at some point, be
called classes instead, representing an army consisting of all of the ‘new’ classes
combined. The only extant example of this is given in Gellius (NA 1.11) when
discussing the army of the Spartans. This passage may need to be read as ‘when the
army was drawn up.’ If we read the plural classes literally, our translation would be

\textsuperscript{627} I side here with Rüpke’s (2012) warning that we should not expect religious institutions to be
unchanging throughout their history and, in my opinion, it is dangerous to read this particular
institution all the way back into the regal period as we have no mention of it in the narrative histories,
even though, for instance, Livy would presumably have good reason to mention it at 1.20 when telling
of Numa’s creation of the priesthood. Rather, Livy simply cites Numa as making this particular
flamen stay resident in Rome. It is curious that Plutarch, although listing a number of prohibitions of
the flamen Dialis does not mention this particular one (QR 40, 44, 50, 109). Plutarch was, however,
following a different tradition from Livy, as he assigns the creation of the flamen Dialis to Romulus
rather than to Numa (cf. Numa 7).
‘when the classes were drawn up’ and it would make less sense within the text. Thus we cannot say securely, based on the evidence from Gellius, that *classis* in the singular was vernacular for army proper, only that it represented the first class of the Roman army at some point in the city’s history.

The passage in which Livy supposedly uses *classis* to represent the army is a very difficult passage to interpret. Based on the less than clear understanding of the word in Gellius, this passage could either mean that the first class of the Roman army was the only one to take the field on this occasion, or perhaps it was exceptional that it had taken the field, (per *NA* 6.13) or that the army made up of every available soldier was present (per *NA* 10.15). The first meaning from Gellius can be dismissed as we know that the cavalry was present, and the passage at 6.13 is too vague for us to safely include the cavalry in its reference. Certainly, the second example from Gellius fits the situation, as it would imply that the entire army was present, which the narrative seems to support (cf. Livy 4.32-34). Even Ogilvie, who seemingly supported the idea that the *classis* represented the entire Servian army in one class, concedes that ‘*classis* and *classici* could equally well stand collectively for the five classes, while *infra classem* would be all those who did not have the minimum property qualification.’

A more critical look at Livy is revealing in this light. The passage at 4.34 has had a considerable impact on the attitude of modern scholars to the Servian classes. In some ways it is seen as confirmation of the information provided by Gellius. This

628 I also believe that it would be impossible to read the passage as ‘when Spartan armies’ in the absolute plural, as following on from ‘*cum procinctae igitur classes erant*’ Gellius brings the number back to the singular with ‘*et instructa acies*.’ The perfect passive participle of *instructa* forces us to read this entire passage in the figurative plural.

629 The evidence of Festus fits in with the same argument and thus does not need to be discussed independently.

630 A. Momigliano (1963) in fact believed that ‘the knights remained of course above the centuries of the *classis*,’ (120).

631 Ogilvie (1965), 589.
is not what this aside of Livy’s provides. Recent commentators, such as Forsythe, have claimed that this passage represents an ‘annalistic misunderstanding of the word [classis].’\textsuperscript{632} The problem with this idea is how it has come down to us and how it was most probably introduced into the annalistic tradition. Commentators have continually left out an essential element of the sentence, quoque.\textsuperscript{633} Livy is not telling us simply that ‘certain historians record that there was a naval battle’ at Fidenae in 425, but that certain historians have also recorded that the fleet was present.\textsuperscript{634}

It seems quite certain that the classi here is not the fleet, regardless of how we interpret it. If, in fact, this passage is representative of a misunderstanding of an inscription, as postulated by Forsythe, there is another probable solution to the problem of Livy’s text.\textsuperscript{635} Whatever the source used by the earlier annalists was, the text must have read something like ‘legio classisque adfuerunt’\textsuperscript{636} if Livy is accurately representing his source. The ambiguity does not rest with the presence of the army, only the presence of the classis. If we accept a reading of Livy as reflective of the structure of his sources then we are forced to see the classis not as the single, undifferentiated, Servian army but as something that stands separate from it. It is

\textsuperscript{632} Forsythe (2005), 113.

\textsuperscript{633} The sentence reading: classi quoque ad Fidenas pugnatum cum Veientibus quidam in annales rettulere (1898 Teubner text).

\textsuperscript{634} Quoque having to be read together with classi. The quoted translation is that of Luce (1998) in the Oxford World’s Classics series.

\textsuperscript{635} Forsythe (2005), 113. Although the nature of this postulated inscription should be considered tenuous, see Sailor (2006).

\textsuperscript{636} Livy often uses legio to mean ‘army’ in the first pentad: 1.11, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 37; 2.6, 22, 25, 26, 30, 32, 33, 39, 40, 46, 48, 49; 3.3, 10, 16, 18, 19, 22, 27, 28, 29, 41, 62; 4.17, 18, 19, 22, 32, 39, 40, 47, 51, 61; 5.8, 35, 38. The most common word used to refer to the army in the first pentad, however, is exercitus: book 1 twenty-three times, book 2 thirty-three times, book 3 thirty-seven times, book 4 thirty-two times, and book 5 twenty-five times. Exercitus is also a fairly old term, being traceable back to Ennius (ap. Macr. Sat. 6.4.6) and Plautus (Amph. Prologue 102). It seems very unlikely to me that classis ever meant ‘the army’ yet did not make its way into the vocabulary of the annalists. With that said, early Latin was certainly different to that of the latter centuries BC. Polybius’ difficulty in reading the first of the Romano-Punic treaties (3.22) illustrates the differences between the Latin of the late sixth century and the mid to late second century. We would be on more secure footing if we had access to the texts of the early annalists, but even then the point would be impossible to prove conclusively.
problematic that we do not possess Dionysius at this point, who could offer a
comparative understanding.

These discrepancies do not give us enough ground to dismiss the five classes
of the Servian constitution. It must be asked why the annalists would create these
anachronistic classes in their description of Servius Tullius and then assign them a
haphazard assortment of weaponry if all of their evidence pointed to a single class
which made up the army. It seems far more probable that the early annalists
preserved some sort of memory which originated in the sixth century. There is some
ground to claim that a document known as the descriptio classium existed which
could have been the source for the five classes, but perhaps not for the arms assigned
to each, as they differ between our two surviving sources, Livy and Dionysius.\(^{637}\) If
this document recorded the state of the army under Servius Tullius as consisting of
five classes, but did not list their arms, then it would make sense for mid-Republican
annalists to try to fill in this gap.\(^{638}\) If this document, however, only contained a
single Servian class it makes no sense for the annalists to have created the five
classes out of nowhere.

There is also evidence within the descriptions of the classes themselves
which may indicate a genuine historical value for the five separate classes. It is well
known that the accounts of Livy and Dionysius are almost identical, in terms of what
each class was to be armed with, but they do differ slightly.\(^{639}\) This has been
recognized as being indicative of our two sources having followed different

\(^{637}\) See Festus (290 L) for evidence of the descriptio classium.

\(^{638}\) Digesta (2) records a Sextus Papirius, supposedly a contemporary of Tarquinius Superbus, as
having written a book containing the leges regiae. The actual origin of these laws seems dubious but
they were preserved at a later time by Sextus Pomponius in his Enchiridion. The existence of this
work, however, means that we should not dismiss out of hand the descriptio classium or its possible
antiquity.

\(^{639}\) Cf. Gjerstad (1973), 153.
traditions when composing their respective works.\textsuperscript{640} There is evidence from
Bologna that armies of mixed arms existed in a quasi-contemporaneous period.\textsuperscript{641}
The Arnoaldi Situla shows a group of armed figures, perhaps an army, with mixed
arms: on figure on foot carrying a round shield and wearing a crested helmet, six
figures on foot carrying oblong shields and wearing (possibly) Negau type helmets,
one figure carrying an oblong shield and wearing a crested helmet, a horseman with
round shield, a horseman without visible defensive arms, and a figure carrying an
oblong shield and appearing to blow into a horn (Fig. 7).\textsuperscript{642} The Certosa Situla
contains similar imagery, four figures carrying round shields with crested helmets,
four figures carrying square shields with rounded corners, five figures carrying
oblong shields, two horsemen, and four figures with basket shaped headwear
possibly carrying axes (Fig. 8).\textsuperscript{643} These depictions seem to show a strikingly similar
set of arms to those found in the classes of the Servian Constitution.\textsuperscript{644}

Besides the distance from Rome at which these were found, there are a
number of problems with taking these as evidence for the classes of the Servian army
without some comment. Firstly, although oblong shields are evidenced at Veii and
Bisenzio in the eighth century, there is no archaeological evidence in Rome or
Latium during the sixth century for this type of shield, this evidence only comes
from regions further north.\textsuperscript{645} We can overcome this obstacle, however, by realizing
that the representational evidence that we have from this period in central Italy were
commissioned by elites, much of which was meant to promulgate their image. If this

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{640} Cornell (1995), 180.
\textsuperscript{641} Cherici (2008) for full discussion. He dates these pieces between the 6\textsuperscript{th} and 5\textsuperscript{th} centuries.
\textsuperscript{642} On the Arnoaldi situla, see Cherici (2008), 195-198.
\textsuperscript{643} On the Certosa situla, see Ducati (1923). On the cultures which produced\textit{situlae}, see Bonfante
(1985).
\textsuperscript{644} Cherici (2010), 203. Idem. (2008), 213-223, raises the possibility that these are depictions of a pre-
Roman example of the manipular system.
\textsuperscript{645} Stary (1979), 200, and\textit{infra} 6.1.
\end{flushleft}
is accepted, it can be reasoned that the production of art displaying the arms and armour of the second class and below would not have been a priority. Secondly, it is also possible that the armies depicted on these *situlae*, if that is what they are, may show a multi ‘ethnic’ character, the figures with the round shields being Etruscans and those with oblong shields being from the Hallstatt cultures to the north of the Po Plain. The similarities between the *situlae*, especially that of the Arnoaldi *situla*, and the recorded arms of the Servian constitution cannot be ignored. It would be unwise to claim that these images confirm the authenticity of the historical record, but they do give the literary evidence considerable support.

There has also been a linguistic argument against *classis* being an archaic term meaning the army. *Classis* must be reconciled with the well attested term *legio*. The later is clearly the remembered name of the army raised from the Servian Constitution as is well attested throughout the narrative history of the Republic. That the original Servian army was known as *legio* is quite certain, as well, if we accept a connection between the legion and *leges*, laws enacted by the *comitia centuriata*, or *populus*. These laws stand in opposition to those enacted by the *plebs*, outside of the army levy, which were known as *plebiscita*. This connection is tenuous, however, as there is an Indo-European precedent for *lex/legis*, and the point may be moot.

The argument against an archaic Roman hoplite phalanx is also an important counter point to the single class theory. Circumstantial support for the single class theory has often been to cite the nature of hoplite phalanx warfare, in which two ‘egalitarian’ groups of citizen-soldiers faced off in an almost agonal martial

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646 Stary (1981), 299-303. Cf. Cherici (2008), 203-210. Though dating to a later period, the army reconstructed from the Hjortspring bog finds was one of mixed arms, with commanders wielding narrow shields, represented by a smaller number of examples, and the regular soldiers wielding broader shields, the ratio between these two was 52/53 to 11/12, see Randsborg (1999), 192-197.

647 Forsythe (2005), 181-82.

648 The precedent being Sanscrit *lag-, lig-* (to fasten). Cf. Lewis and Short entry for *lex*.

649 Rosenstein (2010).
There was little to no differentiation in these armies that relied on extremely tight formations and steadfastness to hold the line. The new interpretation of Greek warfare, which is considerably more plausible and evidence-heavy, postulates that the emergence of the classical Greek phalanx occurred only sometime in the fifth century. This new dating precludes its introduction in sixth-century Rome. This renders much of the discussion of the nature of the Servian army moot.

The problems raised against the Servian Constitution are not limited to discussions of the infantry. The cavalry centuries have also caused considerable misunderstandings in modern interpretations. Servius Tullius is said to have maintained the original six equestrian centuries that originated with Romulus and were expanded by Tarquinius Priscus, and then added twelve additional centuries to their number (Livy 1.43; cf. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.18). While the number of centuries is securely settled at a total of eighteen, the order in which these centuries voted is not consistent in the evidence. The annalistic tradition, as maintained by Livy (1.43) and Dionysius (4.20), records that the cavalry centuries voted first (Livy) or concurrently with the first class of the infantry (Dionysius). This is contradicted by a small body of non-narrative evidence (Cicero Phil. 2.82; Rep. 2.22; Festus 452L). Rawlings has emphasized the mistaken precedence given to this body of evidence by earlier commentators.

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651 For the orthodox views on hoplite warfare see Hanson (1989).
652 It is possible that the 'hoplite phalanx' originated in central Italy, although there is not a strong body of evidence to suggest this.
653 van Wees (2000b; 2004). Although, there could be an argument made, however poor, for an eastward moving trend towards the hoplite phalanx, but the evidence from 'the middle' (i.e. Sicily) is too lacking to support a claim such as this.
655 Rawlings (1999), 120 n. 46.
Argumentation to support the hypothesis that the cavalry centuries voted after the first class is problematic. Momigliano based part of his theory on his perception that cavalry would have played little to no role in the hoplite warfare of the time, emphasizing their lack of stirrups and inability to perform shock tactics. There is no evidence for this inability in any ancient society, and it is a modern anachronism. Cornell’s rationalization of this otherwise counterintuitive aspect of the comitia centuriata is bound up in accepting his belief that the Servian Constitution was meant as a check on the power of the aristocracy. This reconstruction, however, is based almost wholly on an earlier understanding of hoplite warfare and a presumption that the cavalry, being made up of the wealthiest members of Roman society, voted last.

The importance of cavalry for archaic Rome could be confirmed (or at least supported) by a series of terracotta revetment plaques found which date close to the reign of Servius Tullius (Fig. 9-10). The motif of armed riders is quite common in the so-called Veii-Rome-Velletri decorative system. It would be overly optimistic to try to equate these images directly to the Servian equites, but their presence at a number of prominent sites throughout Rome, and their very public display, must have some significance. These images typically appear alongside other friezes which depict images which are often associated with aristocratic activity and seem to

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656 Momigliano (1986), 175.
657 The success of Hellenistic cavalry as ‘shock cavalry’ should be noted as a simple body of evidence against this unsubstantiated assumption. Cf. Echeverría Rey (2010).
660 These images appear on plaques from around Rome: Capitoline, probably a temple, Albertoni (1990), 70-71; Forum, Cimino (1990), 54; Palatine, perhaps a temple, Winter (2009), 320. Other elements of the decorative system have been found at the site of the Regia, although it is unclear whether or not the scene of armed riders was present.
fit into a visual dialogue as such. Their presence as a decorative element on small temples could represent the aristocratic origin of the original temple dedication.⁶⁶¹

Some of the scholarly doubt towards the prominence of the archaic Roman cavalry could be based in a famous, yet absurd, passage in Polybius. The historian states that, before adopting Greek kit, Roman horsemen fought almost naked, with an ineffective hide shield, and carried lances which broke apart before coming to grips with the enemy (6.25).⁶⁶² Accepting this attitude easily enables one to believe that the cavalry must have taken a backseat to the infantry under the Servian Constitution.⁶⁶³ Besides the pragmatic problems presented by Polybius’ statement, his concept of early Roman cavalry does not match up with the iconographic evidence of archaic armament.⁶⁶⁴

Lastly, the difference in conceptions of the Servian Constitution could also be down to the different goals of the preserved authors. There are three different historical traditions which can be seen to affect our knowledge of this topic. Cicero represents a tradition of institutional history which has a clear and distinct goal, which is to prove that the Roman constitution was the best in the Mediterranean world (Rep. 1.34, 70).⁶⁶⁵ Livy and Dionysius together represent the other two historical traditions. The first is a tradition of institutional history which seemingly aims to understand the workings of archaic Rome. The second is the narrative tradition which preserves at least some narrative knowledge of the workings of early Rome. These three traditions all give different pictures of what the Servian Constitution actually accomplished.

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⁶⁶¹ Cf. Becker (2009) and infra 5.3.
⁶⁶³ See McCall (2002), 13-25, for a critical survey of the military success of the Roman cavalry. McCall concludes that they were a considerably more effective body than is traditionally thought. Jannot (1986).
⁶⁶⁴ Cf. Asmis (2005). I am nowhere near as confident in the erudition of Cicero as Rawson (1972) was.
Under the moralizing institutional history created by Cicero, the Roman Constitution can be seen to be superior to others even of the ‘mixed’ variety. The voting of the *equites* after the first class could have been an element of this moralizing agenda. This would show that in Rome, unlike other states, voting was primarily the concern of a middling group of well to do citizens. The institutional history preserved by the annalists is not of much more help except to give evidence of the importance of the *equites* under the original organization. The narrative history, however, provides a line of analysis that has not been mustered in the discussion of the Servian Constitution.

Although the narrative histories do preserve a version of the Servian Constitution, the reconstruction of Roman warfare based on their actual narratives does not fit well at first sight with a military view of the Constitution. Roman warfare throughout the fifth century, and probably in the sixth century as well, often consisted of raids and counter raids against hill tribes such as the Aequi and Volsci, as well as against Veii. The importance of cavalry in raids is obvious. More than that, the entire Roman levy does not seem to be being raised to go on these raiding expeditions.

In the years immediately following the fall of the monarchy we get a glimpse of how the Servian Constitution and the Roman army were probably functioning. Cavalry, not the infantry levy, is the most notable contributor to the first battle to repulse the return of Tarquinius Superbus, the Battle of ‘Silva Arsia’ (Livy 2.6). The two consuls, Publius Valerius and Lucius Iunius Brutus, each led a different component of the army, Valerius the infantry and Brutus the cavalry. The most notable event of the battle was of Brutus and Arruns Tarquinius killing one another

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666 Cornell (1995), 308-09
667 There is an analogous problem with the different roles of the *magister populi* (dictator) and the *magister equitum* in this incident.
in the cavalry engagement. Eventually the infantries join the fight, but clearly the important illustration in the narrative is that of the cavalry engagement.

The next great battle in the fifth century poses a further problem. In either 499 (Livy 2.19) or 496 (Livy 2.21; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.1-16) the first dictator is appointed, Aulus Postumius, and Titus Aebutius is appointed as the master of the horse. What is problematic from a constitutional point is that Livy specifies that they marched against the Latins ‘with a great force of infantry and cavalry’ (Livy 2.19). Further examples of the need to specify the quality of numbers raised are relatively common. The narrative histories show that the constitution was not remembered as playing a memorable role in the wars of the fifth century.

This evidence is very diverse and indicates that there was not a standard sized army in the archaic period. The Roman army which fought at Lake Regillus is described by Livy as ‘a great force’ (2.19). This seems to imply that this army was irregularly large. Proportionally great preparations for war were made in 434 in the face of an Etruscan threat (Livy 4.23). We also hear of Roman armies which included volunteers (Livy 3.69, 4.60, 5.16). An additional abnormality in recruitment in 418, when the decision was made to only levy troops from ten tribes, rather than the entire population (Livy 4.46). Although not widely attested, there is evidence which points to the Roman army being enrolled irregularly throughout the fifth century. The last example provided, as well, may be evidence that the Servian recruitment system was, perhaps amongst other things, a coercive tool. Thus, despite having two institutional traditions which describe the Servian Constitution as being the basic recruiting structure of the Roman army of the archaic period, the narrative histories do not support a simple recruitment structure. This is problematic for

668 magnis copiis peditum equitumque profecti.
669 bellumque tanto maiore quam proxime conatu apparatum est.
historians who argue for a standardized Roman army based on the number of centuries in the *comitia centuriata*.\(^{670}\) The reform is almost always seen as a primarily military reform which introduced this kind of standardization.\(^{671}\)

Based on the above discussion I propose a new reading of the Servian Constitution and the centuriate organization, at least as it existed in archaic Rome. Rather than being a military reform along the lines of the ‘hoplite reform’ of the Hellenic world, the Servian Constitution represents a negotiation of power between the elites, who probably voted first, followed by the well to do, who typically voted along the lines of the elites (Livy 1.43). It also established who in the city-state’s hegemony was obliged to go to war when called into service.\(^{672}\) This was a measure of coercion to force those who were outside of the wealthiest social group to go to war.

Recruitment of Etruscan armies may have been raised in a similar fashion to those of Early Rome, though we have no evidence for this type of state mechanism. Civic armies certainly existed, but from the evidence available it appears that these were often augmented by auxiliaries from the region or by units raised by individual families. This was the case for the army of Veii in 480 (Livy 2.44; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom. 9.5.4*).\(^{673}\) If recruitment along the lines of kin or client relationships was common throughout Etruria, the development of coercive state mechanisms may not have been necessary, but the existence of Etruscan magistrates suggests that this was not the case.

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\(^{671}\) Ogilvie (1976), 64; Momigliano (1989), 103; Magdelin (1990), 442; Cornell (1995), 183; Miglierati (2003), 56; Smith (2006), 176. The bibliography is too extensive to cite every example.


\(^{673}\) See George (2013).
4.2 Condottieri

Besides states waging war during the period under investigation, extra-state figures are seen as playing a prominent role in conflict making. These figures are often referred to as _condottieri_, a term more commonly found in Renaissance history. The use of this term in the history of central Italy can be traced back to the early twentieth century. Deiss has summed up the nature of these men, as the term applies to the Renaissance: ‘they fought, intrigued, betrayed, killed – to get what they wanted.’ This general sketch fits well with the activities of those historical individuals. This basic description makes them a very tempting comparison to the aristocrats, elites, or whomever else we see acting outside of the state system of Tyrrhenian Italy. We should take care, though, to remember that the idea of waging a ‘private war’ is not unique to an Italian context. There is considerable evidence for private wars having been waged in the Hellenic world from the age of Homer through to the Classical period. But how prominent and how important was this warfare? Was there a strict dichotomy between state and private war, as some have suggested?

One of the characteristics of the armies of Renaissance _condottieri_ was the preponderance of mercenaries within their ranks. This may have also been the case in Tyrrhenian Italy. There is evidence that mercenaries circulated throughout the region, and may have participated in both the wars of Etruria and Latium and as far afield as Sicily. The actions of mercenaries are by definition outside of the traditional

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674 Cf. Rawlings (1999), 116 n. 4.
675 Deiss (1966), 13.
677 A number of examples from the Homeric corpus present themselves. Two of the best examples are the first two examples of the ‘Cretan Lie’ (Od. 13.256-286, 14.191-359). If we give any credence to the reality of a Homeric world, then Odysseus gives us two fairly strong examples of a Cretan _condottiero_. Further examples can be found in more historical times (e.g. Hdt. 6.42; Thuc. 1.5-6; Plato _Laws_ 12.955b-c). These instances are all discussed in Rawlings (2007), 11-14; cf. van Wees (2004), 95-97.
678 Armstrong (2009).
image of the state as dominating the use of force; these men go to war for personal gain, whether that was wealth, glory, or subsistence. This section examines the behaviour of condottieri and mercenaries, breaking them into two general categories. The first looks at how non-state armies centred on kin groups operated. The second examines the phenomenon of non-kin and non-state based armies or war-bands. The important differentiation is that kin based groups have a pre-existing bond, while armies of mercenaries and strangers do not.

4.2.1 Gentilicial/Kin Groups

The rise of large settlements over the period of the Early Iron Age, as we have seen above, may be an indicator of the rise of proto-states or states. In the archaeological remains, however, there may be evidence of a resistance to centralized power. Developments in Tarquinia are important for our understanding of how families and states may have been opposed during this period. At the end of the Early Iron Age, four burials stand out from the usual trend of burials clustered in family groups, sitting alone. These are relatively wealthy burials in terms of their grave goods which included bronze crested helmets and other arms. Opposed to these four burials is a general burial pattern which centres on the family group. At the centre of a number of these familial groups are a number of extremely wealthy burials. The most spectacular of these included an impasto hut urn. Burials with kind of urn have been argued to represent the figure of the pater familias, the head of the family unit. Patterns within these familial groups, as well, may indicate that

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680 Pacciarelli (2010).
682 This pattern may have also been reflected in settlements, Barker and Rasmussen (1998), 79.
683 Bartoloni et al. (1987).
military power, or at least the practice of burial with arms, was restricted to certain families within the community.\textsuperscript{684}

The widespread use of the hut urn in Etruria and Latium may be evidence of strong familial bonds and groups which could exercise military power during the period in which states appear to be forming.\textsuperscript{685} If this is true, warfare may have been organized along both state and non-state lines in the Early Iron Age throughout the region. This supposition, however, is predicated on those persons buried with arms actually practised warfare, and that the bonds within these familial groups were strong enough to coerce its members into performing martial deeds. The continued importance of familial burial groups into the Orientalizing and Archaic Periods show that kin ties were still important into the period in which the central Italian city-states were very developed. This may be further evidence that the kin groups were extremely powerful in the earlier period; the assumption would be that their power slowly declined as the power of the state increased. Political power could be consolidated within certain families for multiple generations, although the evidence does not allow for much elaboration.\textsuperscript{686} This concentration of political power may have translated into monopolization of military power through the mechanisms of the state, although there is no direct evidence for this happening before the historical period.

The famously problematic scene depicted on the Tragliatella \textit{oinochoe} has often been used as further evidence of gentilicial armies (Fig 11).\textsuperscript{687} The most

\textsuperscript{684} Iaia (2009-2012), 79.
\textsuperscript{685} The obvious counterpoint to seeing the hut urn in this way is Bisenzio, where they were used in burials also of children, and the bioconical urn, typical of much of the rest of Etruria, is absent in favour of a wider use of hut urns. As well, Bietti Sestieri (1992), 236-238, has observed that burial (sc. familial) groups in Latial communities were not separated within individual communities, which is an indication of internal cohesion for those settlements.
\textsuperscript{686} Cf. Colonna (2006b; 2007).
\textsuperscript{687} On the problems of the Tragliatella \textit{oinochoe}, see above, chapter 2.
controversial scene depicted on this vessel shows seven armed figures, with large round shields emblazoned with boars, and holding three spears. The other scenes on this vase, however, point to this being part of either a ritual or an elaborate myth about which we know very little. Two further oinochoe show similar scenes, armed figures with shields similarly emblazoned (Figs. 12-13). This evidence may very well point to the existence of forces centred around the gens, as has been forcefully argued by Jannot. The repetition of shield emblems is pointed to as the key piece of evidence for this. The problem with this assertion regarding the Tragliatella oinochoe is that the boar was a civic symbol of Tarquinia. Tragliatella lies within what is generally considered the territory of Caere, which may make us question an association to Tarquinia, but there is no reason to presume that it was always within the sphere of control of this city. In general, though, there is no reason to rule out that these shield devices could have had civic symbolism rather than familial.

Another body of controversial evidence relating to the existence of gentilicial armies was excavated at Vetulonia, in 1905. One hundred and twenty five Negau type helmets were found during this excavation near the Mura dell’Arce, dating to the fifth century. On the lower edge of approximately fifty of these helmets is inscribed the word haspnas. This has been identified as a family of elites from the area. The inscribed name has led some scholars to conclude that this provides definitive proof of gentilicial armies in Etruria. This inscription, however, could

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690 Pernier (1905).
691 Maggiani (1990), 48-49. These helmets may have been deposited as spoils of war, as suggested by Naso (2007), 145.
692 Ibid., compares the discovery to the expedition of the Fabii, discussed below. Cowen (2013), 739, believes that these helmets would have been owned by the clan and then distributed to their soldiers when needed.
mean many different things.\footnote{There was a tradition in Italy, from the archaic period to that of the Empire, of owners inscribing their names on helmets. See Coarelli (1976).} It could be the name of the smith who made the helmets. Alternatively, the helmets could be the ritual deposition of captured helmets, with those inscribed with \textit{haspnas} having been those killed or taken prisoner by members of this one family. The definitive association of these helmets, as well as the above discussed evidence, with private, family based, warfare has rested heavily on two pieces of literary evidence.

The first piece of literary evidence is Dionysius’ description of an Etruscan army drawn up at Veii, around 480. The observations of the Romans are supposedly preserved, telling us that influential men (\textit{δυνατοί}) from around Etruria had brought their dependents (\textit{πενέσται}) to join with the army from Veii (\textit{Ant. Rom. 9.5.4}).\footnote{Dionysius’ use of \textit{πενέστας} forces the reader to consider the possible connection to those of the same titled in Thessaly, cf. Jannot (1985), 139-140.} Although this scene does establish the possibility of leading Etruscan figures recruiting armed groups of men, ultimately it was in the service of a civic army, and there is no evidence that the armed groups raised for this confrontation were used to wage a private campaign.\footnote{This could be evidence of a stage of state formation in which warfare was helping to solidify connections between elites and their retainers, or serfs, in Etruria, Rawlings (1999), 109-110.}

The most significant historical source for gentilicial warfare, however, is the fifth-century expedition of the \textit{gens Fabia} against Veii.\footnote{Heurgon (1973), 181, is so confident that this is evidence of \textit{gens} based warfare that he wrote ‘its genuineness, behind the epic embellishments, can hardly be disputed: it provides, as a piece of sociology, a clear example of \textit{gens}-warfare, in which a single, whole clan, independently of the state, took on the responsibility for a war.’ This level of confidence in the historicity of the Fabian private war is still common; see Smith (2006), 290-295.} This episode is frequently used to support arguments in favour of seeing gentilicial armies in early Rome.\footnote{\textit{i.e. Rawlings (1999), 112; Armstrong (2013b), 14.} The Roman state was occupied by conflicts against raiding tribes from the east in 479, when war was provoked by Veii. The \textit{gens Fabia} volunteered to wage a ‘private’ war against Veii, with whom hostilities seem to have been about to ignite.
Livy claims that the Fabii went to war ‘velut familiar bellum private sumptu’ (Livy 2.49). According to the tradition handed down by Livy and Dionysius, the clan marched out en masse against the Veientines, with 306 patrician members of the clan being engaged (Livy 2.49; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 9.15-22). Besides family members, Livy tells us that the cognati and sodales of the clan also marched with the Fabii. The prolonged hostilities against Veii culminated in the utter destruction of the clan at the battle of the River Cremera, in 476/477 (Livy 2.50). That this was actually an example of a family waging private warfare, though, is a complicated conclusion and is questioned below.

The account of this war in Diodorus Siculus does not follow the same narrative as Livy and Dionysius, and this divergence must be reconciled. According to Diodorus, this conflict between Rome and Veii was a war in the traditional sense, and that it was exceptional for the fact that 300 members of a single family, the Fabii, were killed in the fighting (11.53.6). The reception of this version of events is mixed in the modern scholarship, with some commentators such as Momigliano suggesting that it was created as a ‘normalization’ of archaic events, which would have been more faithfully recorded in Diodorus’ sources. Tim Cornell has connected the conflict with the Fabian lands which bordered the ager Veientanus and believes that the story’s ‘basic historicity should not be questioned.’ Oldfather, in a note to his Loeb translation of Diodorus, believed that Diodorus provides a ‘sensible’ account of the event and ‘that this was a battle between the Romans and the Etruscans for the control of the right bank of the Tiber… [which] the Fabian gens

698 Brief discussion in Rich (2007), 16.
699 Momigliano (1975), 328.
dressed up.' Although this is simply a passing statement made by a translator, it is a point which deserves further, more rigorous, examination.

Of our three narrative sources of the events at the Cremera, Diodorus provides the most brief account. Livy’s version spans three chapters in book two (2.48-50), and Dionysius’ account was written over eight chapters (9.15-22). Diodorus’ account amounts to two sentences. But those two sentences contain a very important notice, ‘according to some historians there were also three hundred of the Fabii,’ amongst those killed. We know from Dionysius that there were a number of versions of the story known to him, as well, but they all include the Fabii (Ant. Rom. 9.19, 20). Although he does not explicitly say he followed multiple sources, Livy’s narrative has been accused of this. It is obvious, then, that by the Late Republic there were a number of different versions of the Battle of the Cremera within the historical tradition. Two of these were preserved by Dionysius, one of which was probably the basis for Livy’s narrative, but we must remember that there were also authors which did not even include the Fabii in the story, as cited by Diodorus.

Diodorus’ chronology of early Rome is significantly different from that of Livy and Dionysius. This difference has generally been considered an important

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701 Oldfather (1946), n. 4 at 11.53.6. Mitchell (1990), 50, is very critical of the modern tradition of associating this event with gentilial warfare, claiming that ‘the story contains little historically reliable detail.’

702 ἤν φασὶ τὶνες τῶν συγγραφέων καὶ τοὺς Φαβίους τοὺς τριακοσίους. The emphasis in the translation is my own.

703 Dionysius claimed preference for the second of the stories, which resembles Livy’s narrative, in that the Fabii were drawn out of their fortress to rustle some livestock. His first story, which involved the Fabii leaving their fortress to perform a ceremony at Rome is considered, by Dionysius, to be less believable.

704 Ogilvie (1965), 359-361, noted inconsistencies in Livy’s narrative, especially in chronology and logic, which have led some to believe Livy followed at least two different sources in writing his narrative.

705 Richard (1990b) discusses the inconsistencies within the stories from both historical and philological angles.
cache of otherwise unpreserved traditions. It is important to note that Diodorus did not record every event of early Rome, only those which seemed important, notably the Decemvirate and the Gallic Sack. The Battle of the Cremera, then, was important enough to receive mention by Diodorus, even if he did not provide a complete narrative. This shows that his sources made the event out to be of historical value, with or without the participation of the Fabii. If every version of the story had been simply an annihilation of the gens by the army of Veii, would it really have ranked as important enough for Diodorus to include in his compilation?

Arguments in favour of this expedition having been a proper military affair of the Fabii claim that because the lands of this gens bordered the Veientine land which was being attacked it would have been a prerogative of the Fabii to undertake this endeavour. This does lend credence to the war having been carried out primarily by the gens and its retainers, but a number of inconsistencies further complicate the matter. Dionysius tells us that the Fabii took along with them 4,000 of their clients (πελάται) and friends (ἑταῖροι) (9.15.3), while Livy tells us that their family (cognati) and friends (sodales) followed after them but does not give a number (2.49). We do not hear of these others taking part in the fighting in either account, both using very general language to describe the combat. Dionysius’ second narrative of the events which led to the Fabian massacre could be construed as including the clients and friends, as he speaks of a Fabian army, but there is no specific mention of them (Ant.

706 Cornell (1995), 3, 403 n. 5, with earlier bibliography. Some modern commentators attribute these differences to Diodorus’ own carelessness and general indifference to the details of the annalistic tradition’ (Forsythe [2005], 68-69). This latter view is based in a tradition of disregarding Diodorus as an important source for the Greek world, as well, and assuming that the differences to be found in his narrative were down to him being a mediocre historian, at best. This view is not universal and not accepted by the author of this thesis, see in general Sacks (1990) and Green’s (2006) introduction.

707 Saulnier (1980), 145-147, believed that the Cremera campaign was an official campaign into which the Fabii injected themselves.

708 Taylor (1960), 40-41. This argument, though, is circular, relying partially on the historicity of the Cremera episode, arguing that the nearness of the Fabii spurred them to action.
Rom. 9.20-21). Livy completely omits them, saying that 306 perished, these being the Fabii (2.50).

We also have to contend with the Livian narrative naming Caeso Fabius, the leader of the expedition, as consul (2.48). When the army marched out of Rome, in this version of the story, they would have technically been under the auspices of an active consul (2.49). Rawlings believes that this was a normalizing addition to the historical tradition. Dionysius, though, also names Caeso Fabius as the consul when the clan first marches out of the city (Ant. Rom. 9.15.3). Caeso Fabius did not lead his clan as consul, only a normal Roman army. Having returned to Rome with his army in the year that the Fabii marched out on their own, Caeso resigned his position of consul, but he joined his clansmen later and led with proconsular power (Ant. Rom. 9.16.3). The appointment of Caeso as a supposed ‘proconsul’ is an absurd claim, and is typically regarded as a normalizing element of the tradition, as the Livian narrative above. The supposed normalizing element in both narratives, either making Caeso consul (Livy) or proconsul (Dionysius), is problematic from an historical point of view, and the effort of Livy (or his source) is in vain, because although the clan sets out under his auspices, the actual combat comes a year later, after Lucius Aemilius and Gaius Servilius were elected consuls (Livy 2.50). In Dionysius Caeso marched out before he left office, but not with the clan, with the Roman army (9.15.3).

Noting these complications, it is easy to understand Richard’s exhausted conclusion that the version of events handed down to us is probably not the true version of events. The circumstances of the year prior to the departure of the Fabii

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709 Rawlings (1999), 112.
710 Richard (1990b), 177. Palmer (1970), 235, points out that the office of ‘proconsul’ does not appear until 326, and the appearance here is to be discarded.
711 Richard (1990b), 199.
may give an important clue to the historical circumstances surrounding this event. In
480, an army was raised in Rome to march against Veii, perhaps as a reprisal for a
plundering raid the year before (Livy 2.43-44). This army was commanded by
both consuls, Marcus Fabius and Gnaeus Manlius. They are said to have defeated
Veii in a battle which Dionysius describes as greater than any others fought by Rome
before it (Ant. Rom. 9.13.1). Manlius the consul was killed, but the Fabian consul
survived, although Quintus Fabius, consul three years earlier, was killed (Livy
2.46). This battle was described as if was a resounding success for the Fabii as it
supposedly won them the favour of the plebs and the senate (Livy 2.47-48).

It is possible that after this victory the Fabii were able to establish themselves
in a fortified position on Veii’s side of the Tiber, which is reflected in the first action
taken in the narratives of their private war. The gens is strongly associated with
this victory over Veii and Livy makes it seem quite clear that the family benefited
greatly from it. The benefit which Livy highlights is popularity with the people, but
there is no reason to think that the Fabian consul, the only surviving consul, did not
use his victory to secure gains for his family. It is possible, if not probable, that the
Fabii used this opportunity to exert control over the lands recently forced from Veii’s
hands, perhaps it was an opportunity to expand their original lands which shared a
border with the new acquisition. If this is the case, though, it is unlikely that the clan
marched out against Veii in a familial show of patriotism, but rather was entrenched

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712 Dionysius (9.1) gives a different version of events, which involved the Veientes summoning the
Etruscan League to a meeting in order to organize an army against Rome. This is unlikely. Even if
there was an Etruscan ‘league’ which met every year at the Fanum Voltumnae (i.e. Liv 4.23, 25, 61,
5.1, 6.2) there is no evidence that it ever constituted a federal entity or a council which could raise
troops. See the comments of Aigner-Foresti (2005), 94-100, and Becker (2013), 364-365.
713 Livy gives the battle less praise (2.47).
714 This precludes confusion by Diodorus of this battle with the one equated to the loss of many Fabii.
715 Livy (2.49) says that they fortified a praesidium. Cassola (1988) compares this type of behaviour
to coniuratio, the type of private warfare which the Fabii were supposedly waging (Serv. ad Aen.
6.845).
716 Livy (2.47) says ‘inde populares iam esse Fabii nec hoc alla nisi salubri rei publicae arte.’
for almost three years in newly conquered lands before they were later forced off by
the Veientes.\textsuperscript{717}

If this line of thinking is accepted, then the account of Diodorus can be lined up with the accounts of Livy and Dionysius. In the two narrative accounts, after the Fabii were destroyed at the Cremera an army from Rome comes to battle with the army from Veii, and is defeated (Livy 2.51; Dion. Hal.\textit{ Ant. Rom.} 9.23-24). This is the defeat which is mentioned in Diodorus (11.53.6). To make the version given by Diodorus compatible with the Livian and Dionysian accounts, though, the Fabii would have to have been destroyed during the battle, rather than in a separate engagement, or series of engagements, before the arrival of the Roman army. This version of events may help to make sense of one last element of the story, that the Fabii were wiped out down to a single, young, male (Livy 2.50). Dionysius finds this detail to be ludicrously fictional and a fabrication of later authors, pointing out that there had to have been young male members of the family who had not been part of the slaughter (Dion. Hal.\textit{ Ant. Rom.} 9.22).\textsuperscript{718} Presumably there would have been male members of the family not old enough to participate in warfare. Because the Fabii disappear from the consular lists until 467, some modern commentators have accepted the historicity of a single male survivor of this intense slaughter.\textsuperscript{719}

The evidence of the Fabii disappearing from the magistrate lists is telling, but of what? The election of Quintus Fabius Vibulanus consul in 467 only allows for a gap of twelve years since the last Fabian consul, and eleven or ten years since the supposed slaughter of the family. Quintus is noted as being the lone survivor of the

\textsuperscript{717} If this was the case, the first version of their destruction given by Dionysius (9.19) may make more sense, although it is still an unlikely course of events, as conceded by Dionysius himself.

\textsuperscript{718} Although Livy is confident in this detail, Dionysius notes that only some writers preserve this tradition. Livy (3.1) notes that the consul of this year, Quintus Fabius, was the lone survivor of the Cremera.

\textsuperscript{719} Cornell (1995), 311.
disaster (Livy 3.1), but Dionysius’ description is very interesting, he calls Quintus ‘the son of one of the three brothers who had commanded the garrison that was sent out to the Cremera and had perished there together with their clients’ (Ant. Rom. 9.59.1). If we are to accept Livy’s version, we must question how young Quintus could have been at the Cremera if he is elected consul only about a decade after the supposed destruction of the rest of the family. Dionysius’ version provides another issue, though; we have seen above that he rejected the idea that a single youth survived the slaughter and now shows that he is following a different tradition than Livy, which is probably the romantic tradition recording only one survivor. In this version it is not the entire family which was destroyed, but only three brothers and their retainers. This version of events works well with the above suggestion, that the supposed Fabian expedition was actually a movement to newly conquered lands by a number of members of the family.

If the entire gens was not destroyed, as has just been suggested, a new explanation for their absence from the consular lists is needed. There is no reason that we have to preclude the unpopularity of members of the gens during this decade, as it seems fairly certain that the popular consuls of the years leading up to the Cremera were killed in the conflict with Veii. It is also possible, however, that the gens was blamed for the disaster that befell the Roman army. The narrative indicates that the Roman army was sent against Veii after the Fabii were destroyed, and even though a Fabius was not in command of this army, the fact that it was levied and marching to deal with a problem caused by the clan may have caused a backlash amongst the Roman people (Livy 2.51).

So what then does this leave of the Fabian expedition? None of this argumentation is meant to claim that the Fabii were not engaged in raiding against
Veii. This they were doing, being based in a fortified position in newly conquered territories. Two parts of the story, however, are proposed to be later additions to the story. The first part that was a later elaboration is that the Fabii marched against Veii in a zeal of patriotism and in defence of Rome; as has been suggested in this section, they were simply occupying land won in the previous year’s campaigning. The second part of the story that is probably a later creation is the absolute destruction of the clan. The Fabii do disappear from the consular *fasti*, but this was not because they were wiped out, it was because they were blamed for the greatest Roman disaster to date.

We have seen in this section, then, that the evidence traditionally mustered to argue that there were private armed bands regularly roaming around Etruria and Latium is problematic. Much of the archaeological evidence is difficult to interpret, and the association of much of it with ‘condottiero’ or gentilicial warfare rests on a linked interpretation with a body of problematic literary evidence. As has been argued here, much of the evidence for gentilicial armies must be either questioned, or altogether rejected.

### 4.2.2 Strangers/Mercenaries

In addition to the problematic evidence of familial groups, and others, whom we may label *condottieri*, we find evidence of individuals who went to war for personal gain, without their family group, or went to war on behalf of polities that were not their home; these men were mercenaries.\(^{720}\) Mercenaries are well known from the ancient world. They occupied a prominent place in the warfare of the eastern Mediterranean empires and later city-states.\(^{721}\) Mercenaries from pre-Roman Italy were known to fight for Greek cities in Sicily and for the Carthaginians on a

\(^{720}\) Cf. Di Fazio (2013).

\(^{721}\) Trundle (2004); Luraghi (2006); Hale (2013).
number of occasions.\textsuperscript{722} Although Etruscan mercenaries are mentioned by Thucydides in relation to Sicilian affairs, the level of participation of Etruscans and Romans is unclear.\textsuperscript{723} Recently, it has been argued that there is no evidence to reliably see central Italian mercenaries before the fourth century.\textsuperscript{724} While mercenaries from Etruria and Rome may not have played much of, or any, role in the wider Mediterranean before the fourth century, textual evidence suggests that mercenaries did exist on a local level.

During the reign of Tullus Hostilius, the Sabines recruited mercenaries and volunteers from the local area, especially Veii, for a way against Rome (Livy 1.30).\textsuperscript{725} As we have seen in the historical methodology above, evidence from the regal period is extremely tenuous. Our sources probably did not have access to a genuine memory of this levy. This example shows, however, that the Roman historians accepted the idea of mercenaries existing that early in central Italian history.\textsuperscript{726} In later times, an Etruscan army marching against Rome attracted a number of Sabines, by their own accord, because of the liberal pay being offered by the Etruscans (Dion. Hal. \textit{Ant. Rom.} 3.59.1-2).\textsuperscript{727} When Tarquinius Superbus was assembling an army with which to march on Rome, he was sent help by Tarquinia and Veii, some soldiers were sent by their friends (\textit{φίλοι}), while others served for pay (\textit{μισθοφόροι}) (Dion. Hal. \textit{Ant. Rom.} 5.14.1). The army of Lars Porsenna which marched on Rome contained a large contingent of foreigners and mercenaries.

\textsuperscript{722} Tagliamonte (1994).
\textsuperscript{723} Tagliamonte (2002).
\textsuperscript{724} Piel (2010).
\textsuperscript{725} \textit{Etruria erat vicina, proximi Etruscorum Veientes. inde ob residuas bellorum iras maxime sollicitatis ad definctionem animis voluntarios traxere, et apud vagos quosdam ex inopi plebe etiam merces valuit. publico auxilio nullo adiuti sunt, valuitque apud Veientes—nam de ceteris minus mirum est—pacta cum Romulo indutiariam fides.}
\textsuperscript{726} It may be that no thought was given to the existence, or not, of mercenaries during this period, and this story was possibly entirely made up by our sources. Chronologically, however, it is the earliest association we have of mercenaries with central Italy, even if it is a fake notice.
\textsuperscript{727} \textit{αλλ᾽ ἥθελοντα τινας ἐπικαύθησαν αὐτοῖς ὀλίγοι μισθοῖς μεγάλοις ἰππόχθενες.}
We should not discount off hand that there were men willing to go to war for some sort of remuneration in central Italy during the archaic period.

There are more speculative instances which may be construed as the inclusion of mercenaries in armies. In 464, when preparing to raid the lands of the Hernici, the Aequi sought an armed force from the Volscian town of Ecetra (Livy 3.4). Although the Aequi and the Volsci are said to have raided lands together, this is an exceptional instance where we are told a contingent from a specific town is on the move. In the same year, when the consul Spurius Furius is trapped within his camp by this army of the Aequi, a relieving force which included *subitarios milites* from allied peoples, including the town of Antium, comes to the rescue (Livy 3.5).

Although these very well could be soldiers provided under treaty agreements with Rome, the fact that 1,000 men from Antium only showed up after the battle could be indicative of a less formal arrangement, perhaps one for pay. When the *plebs* of Ardea seceded from the nobles, they gathered a group of artisans to fight against the nobles ‘*ad spem praedae*’ (Livy 4.9). If not actually mercenaries, these men came to violence for the same reasons that mercenaries do. In 410 when the Aequi were again marshalling an army, some Volsci joined their warband as ‘*voluntariis mercede*’ (Livy 4.53).

Some scholars have argued that there is archaeological evidence for professional soldiers, or warchiefs, present in the record. The evidence of these men is in their contextually isolated burials. Examples of these follow: the ‘Tomb of the Warrior’ (Vulci), Tomb 180 at Certosa (Bologna), and the Tomb of the Warrior

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728 Adam (2001). Dionysius also records that a body of Etruscan mercenaries during the reign of Romulus (2.37.2).

729 Martinelli (2004), 271-277, argues that mercenary service in Central Italy may be visible as far back as the Early Iron Age, although at least some of his discussion can be explained through trade and exchange of artefacts rather than mercenary service.
at Lanuvium (Lazio). All three of these examples have been labelled as tombs of foreigners and characterized by burial with arms and armour.\textsuperscript{730} In Vulci, the late sixth-century ‘Tomb of the Warrior’ stands out not necessarily for its inclusion of war-related items, but because of its containing the full kit of a warrior: spear, large round shield, and greaves.\textsuperscript{731} In the Certosa necropolis in Bologna, foreign mercenary or soldier tombs have been identified and postulated to have been Umbrians, based on the ‘national’ character of the arms found therein.\textsuperscript{732} It must be conceded that the contents of the tomb also betray an Etruscan nature and the inclusion of a ‘full hoplite panoply’ must make us question how useful the ‘national’ identification of the deceased is. In the case of the Lanuvium burial, its isolation and contents led the most thorough commentator to believe that it was almost certainly the burial of a \textit{socius} or a mercenary.\textsuperscript{733}

A quick conclusion cannot be drawn on the men buried in these graves. It is apparent that they were meant to be associated with warfare, whether it was a practical relation or a ritual one is not entirely obvious. The inclusion of what some have seen as more ‘realistic’ martial implements should make us consider these burials to be of individuals who did indeed go to war during their lives. But even if we believe this conclusion, the interpretation that these men were mercenaries is problematic. The burials do stand out from the others in their respective centres, and in the case of the Lanuvium burial stand out topographically from the rest of the burials. The spread of gentilicial names related to polities throughout the region is

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\item[\textsuperscript{730}] Adam (2001), 880-882.
\item[\textsuperscript{731}] Ferraguti (1937).
\item[\textsuperscript{732}] Adam and Rouveret (1990), 344.
\item[\textsuperscript{733}] Zevi (1993), 440.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
corroborating evidence that these burials may indeed represent strangers or newcomers to the community.\footnote{Colonna (2013).}

These burials and names, though, may not necessarily represent mercenaries. Migration of entire clans following a leader is attested in central Italy. The most well-known such figure is Attus Clausus (Livy 2.16). These figures could also be much less romanticized than even a migrant strong man. The irregular burials that we have been discussing could be those of exiles from nearby communities, who came to the polities in which they were buried through necessity. An excellent example of this type of figure is provided by Coriolanus.\footnote{Livy, 2.35; Plutarch, \textit{Coriolanus}.} After having encouraged enough anger against his person at Rome, through his hostilities towards the \textit{plebs}, he went into exile among the Volsci. Presumably if he had died in peace in the Volscian lands, and was respected by the people, Coriolanus would have been afforded a comparatively nice funeral and burial, and if he had had any input it is possible that to the modern archaeologist it would appear as a ‘foreigner’ burial. This is, of course, speculative, but it should serve as an example that a straightforward interpretation of these burials is not possible.

It must be pointed out that this period of central Italian history was before monetization. Mercenaries active in this world could not have been paid by coin, as, for example, were those in the service of Carthaginian during the wars against Syracuse.\footnote{Carthage seems to have begun minting coins for the purpose of paying their mercenaries, as is evidenced by the legend found on their earliest coinage. This read either \textit{Qrthdst} (Carthage) or \textit{Qrthdst/mhnt} (Carthage/the camp). Because of this latter legend, it is typically argued that these coins were minted specifically to pay their army, Miles (2010), 124-125, with bibliography.} But the lack of a monetary economy does not preclude soldiers for hire. Alternative methods of remuneration are possible. The Persian Empire, for example,
used to pay for services in livestock, grain, and wine. It could be that central
Italian states would have compensated mercenaries with similar goods. The
possibility of plunder and booty cannot be ruled out as reason enough to serve as a
mercenary. As we see in chapter five, below, plunder was a regular part of war in
central Italy, and a share of this could have been used as remuneration. Trundle
has shown, for the Greek world, that there many different ways to pay
mercenaries. If Runciman’s analysis of the Roman state is applicable to our
period, it is possible that inclusion in the citizen body, or at least the community, of
Rome may have been used as payment for service. Although there was no coin
circulating in central Italy, there were other ways of ‘paying’ mercenaries.

Besides mercenaries, another type of figure may have joined around
prominent men to wage war. Sodales, as the Romans called them, were friends or
companions, with the word term carrying a martial connotation. Livy calls the
followers of the Fabii, who perhaps followed the clan to their fortress on the
Cremera, sodales (2.49). He also uses the term to describe the remaining friends of
the Tarquins in Rome, after the expulsion of the rex (2.3), as well as the followers of
Caeso Fabius (3.14) and Caeso Quinctius (3.14). Besides other ties, these
companions may have had a religious connotation, although the evidence is not
extensive.

The most remarkable evidence that figures of the archaic period had sodales
around themselves was found in Satricum. The so-called lapis Satricanus preserves a

\[737\] Hallock (1985).
\[738\] In brief, this plunder would probably have included cattle, slaves, and movable wealth. See below.
\[739\] Trundle (2004), 80-103.
\[740\] Runciman (1990) on the permeability of the Roman state compared to that of the Greek poleis.
\[741\] Armstrong (2013a), 65.
\[742\] Torelli (1999b), 17.
dedication made by the *sodales* of one *popliosio valesiosio*. This dedication may provide evidence for early Roman colonization, or perhaps a campaign in which Satricum was captured or sacked by Publius Valerius and his *sodales*. Warrior brotherhoods of this kind may have been common in archaic central Italy, and the example of the *lapis Satricanus* may be evidence that they operated outside of any type of state structure.

Groups such as *sodales* may have accompanied a number of figures who we know waged war as strangers on behalf of adopted communities. Coriolanus is said to have gathered a band of followers around him for warlike gain, eventually going on to wage war on Rome on behalf of the Volsci who welcomed him into their community (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 7.21). The term used to denote his war-band, ἐταυπία, is equated to *sodales* (Digest 47.22.4). Like Coriolanus, the son of Tarquinius Superbus left Rome and took up residence in a neighbouring settlement, Gabii, and waged war on Rome (Livy 1.53-54). Although this is a tactic used by the Roman rex in order to bring Gabii under his control, it is a further example that strangers, these so-called *condottieri*, were able to wage war on behalf of adoptive communities. The most well known figures of this kind, though, were the brothers Vibenna.

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745 Adam (2001), 885.
746 Problematically, Plutarch (*Cor.* 13.3) does not describe this scene from the Coriolanus legend, but rather describes him waging a private war against the Volsci with a group of πελάτας, who should not be immediately equated with *sodales*. These persons were closer to true clients, dependents, rather than to a group of friends under arms, see Jannot (1985), 138-141. A complete understanding of what exactly made someone a *sodalis* is problematic. The Oxford Latin Dictionary gives two general definitions, one is a member of a fraternity or religious group and the other is ‘an intimate companion, comrade, mate, crony’ *OLD* (1968), 1780. That there was a difference in status between a figure such as *popliosio valesiosio* and his *sodales* is to be assumed, but it is difficult to imagine a direct equation with πελάτας, as Jannot has demonstrated.
The *Lyon Tablet*, or at least part of it preserves evidence for the most famous archaic *condottiero*. The *Tablet* is a bronze plaque inscribed with a speech made by the emperor Claudius in AD 48. Claudius was trying to persuade the Senate to allow men from Gaul into its ranks. In order to do this he attempted to bring up historical analogues to the current situation. In the course of this speech he betrayed an element of the Etruscan mytho-history surrounding the figure of Servius Tullius.

If we follow Etruscan sources, he [Servius Tullius] was once the most faithful companion (*sodalis*) of Caelius Vivenna and took part in all his adventures. Subsequently, driven out by a change of fortune, he left Etruria with all the remnants of Caelius’ army and occupied the Caelian hill, naming it thus after his former leader. Servius changed his name (for in Etruscan his name was Mastarna), and was called by the name I have used, and he obtained the throne to the greatest advantage of the state.\(^{747}\)

The existence of Caelius Vivenna (Caeles Vibenna) is known from outside of this speech.\(^{748}\) The most important part of this story for the current discussion is that Rome was captured by the army of a *condottiero*, subsequently followed by the usurpation of the throne by Servius Tullius.\(^{749}\) Elements of the story of Vibenna may be preserved on a wall painting from the François Tomb, from Vulci.

Among the heroic paintings of the François Tomb is one series which has been called ‘the one Etruscan painting that has any truly historical content.’\(^{750}\) It could depict a conflict between two groups, the first, apparently victorious group,

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\(^{748}\) Varro *LL* 5.46; Festus 486 L; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.36. For the Vibenna brothers in general see Cornell (1995, 134-135, 425-426 n. 45, n.46, n. 48). See also Rawlings (1999, 105-106). That knowledge of these figures was quite common and preserved in Etruscan historical records see Barker and Rasmussen (1998, 112-116) for further bibliography. See also Alföldi (1965, 213-231) with extreme caution.

\(^{749}\) On Servius Tullius/Macstarna, see Cornell (1995), 130-141, Migliorati (2003), 49-60.

consists of Caile Vipinas, Avle Vipinas (Caelus and Aulus Vibenna), Ma(c)starna, Larth Ulthes, Rasce, and Marce Camitlnas. The second group includes Laris Papathnas Velznach, Pesna Arcmsnas Sveamach, Venthical [...], and Gneve Tarchunies Rumach. The interpretation of this painting has been consistent since the middle of the twentieth century. Larth Ulthes has come to the rescue of his otherwise naked companions, who appear to be being freed from bondage. Among those being slaughtered by the recently escaped men are the only figures given a locative title. Laris Papathnas is from Volsinii, Pesna Arcmsnas from Sovana, Venthical’s home has not been identified, and Gneve (Gnaeus) is a Tarquin of Rome. Aside from this painting, none of these figures are known from the historical record.

It may be that the group doing the killing represents some sort of independent warband, but what about the group being killed? That the defeated all have ‘national’ identities affixed to them muddles the view that this is an example of a single war-band led by Gneve (the only bearded figure among the defeated). The paintings do not form one continuous scene within the tomb, and are spatially separated from one another. It is possible that rather than being meant to be read as a single scene, these paints represent a series of mythical events involving different heroes from Vulci defeating a series of enemies.

It is evident that strangers were welcome into the practise of warfare in alien communities. Mercenaries probably operated in central Italy throughout the period under investigation. Alongside these soldiers for hire existed a group of condottieri.

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751 The ‘c’ is present in the tomb painting.
752 Description in Cornell (1995), 135-138 and rather clear black and white plates in Alföldi (1965), Plates VIII-XII.
753 Though see references in Alföldi (1965), 221-222.
754 For Rumach as almost certainly denoting Rome see Alföldi (1965), 222 n.3.
755 It is possible that none of the figures doing the killing have a city attribution because it was well enough known that they all came from Vulci.
such as Coriolanus, who brought with them groups of armed companions into new communities. The ability of these figures to wage war independent of official state systems is unclear. The son of Tarquinius Priscus was waging a legal war through his newly acquired position in Gabii, and Coriolanus was waging a war on behalf of his adopted home amongst the Volsci. The supposed capture of Rome by Caelius Vibenna, though, is the only strong evidence we possess which shows a condottiero actually undertaking a major military campaign. Ultimately, though, most of the traditionally cited examples of condottieri are more reflective of an open social system in which horizontal mobility was common.  

4.3 Conclusions

A considerable amount has been argued in this chapter. The first half has tried to argue in favour of seeing states in central Italy from around the eighth century onward. The implications in terms of this for warfare are not entirely clear-cut; under the assumptions of anthropological and sociological theories this would have led to a centralized and organized practise of warfare. That this kind of threat existed is shown in the fortification of frontier zones and in the large scale campaigning at the end of the sixth century by Lars Porsenna. In the latter half of the sixth century we have seen that a complex and strongly coercive military system was established in Rome, which obligated members of the community to serve in her armies.

Powerful figures were not absent from this picture of warfare. Caelius Vibenna provides the most convincing evidence for the existence of roaming warlords in central Italy. Many of the examples cited by other scholars, though, such as Appius Claudius or Coriolanus, are not examples of condottieri, but of persons

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who have become a member of a community that was not their original home. When these figures move to a new polity, they are shown to wage war within the official confines of those centres. The supposed expedition of the Fabian gens has been shown to not be the smoking gun evidence of central Italian condottieri as some believe it to be. This type of warfare may have been more common in the Early Iron Age and down to the Regal Period, but at that point the sources are unanimous that the Romans instituted the fetial priesthood. If we accept a regal dating for the fetiales, as is argued below, then it was only in the earliest periods of central Italian urban settlement that private warfare could have been common. It is in this period, I believe, that the end of widespread private warfare ended, and from the sixth century onward states were the only major agents of war.

757 See below, chapter 6.
5. Warfare and the Economy

Warfare and economics can be closely related. In some schools of anthropological thought, economic causes were the leading causes of primitive warfare. This idea is based on the assumption that growing population need to expand their resource pool. In a synthesis of studies, Keely has showed that 46.4% of Western North American Indian raids/wars were for economic purposes. He has also demonstrated that 86% of non-state societies went to war for economic reasons, while 90% of state societies did the same. In the Middle Republic, Roman society was spurred towards war by economic motivation. This is not to say that economic causes are the only causes of warfare, but that they are almost an omnipresent cause of war in the human experience. The exploitation of military power by the social elite could serve as a means to an end, but at the same time economic power could be used to help them achieve military power. This chapter looks at the economy of central Italy and then moves on to analyzing the effects of raiding and the history of piracy in the period under investigation. The aim of this chapter is to discuss and understand the interplay between military power and economic power, quite specifically the acquisition of economic power through the exercise of military power.

5.1 The Economy of Central Italy

The ancient Mediterranean economy was very complex. From an early period in the Iron Age international trade resumed after a break from the Mycenaean period. Italy again became part of the wider Mediterranean world and economy

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759 Keely (1996), 115-117, 199.
760 Ibid., 200.
762 Camporeale (2004a); Broodbank (2013), 445-505.
when the Phoenicians and Greeks began to look west for trade. The most visible early evidence of this is the Greek settlement of Pithecusae. It is often cited that a desire for metals drove this westward move. This gradually increasing foreign trade may have helped to spur on the development of socio-political classes, or at least the visible division of social groups in the archaeological record. The major impact of this trade was to bring central Italy, especially the Etruscans, into a large network of traders and pirates, states and tribes, which would continue to impact the history of Italy indefinitely. It was through this contact with the Phoenicians and the Greeks that certain elements of arms and armour made their way into central Italy from the eighth century onward. It is probable that this trade spurred on the development of piracy in the central Mediterranean.

Although central Italy participated in this wider network of trade, on a local level the economy was based on agriculture. A number of different cereals were grown throughout the region. Husbandry was widespread, as far as we can tell. The slaughter of animals became ritualized at some point, and precise butcher marks may be physical evidence of this. That the harvest of stock was important for ritual is confirmed in other ways. We know that animal sacrifice was used in certain elements of worship in both Etruria and in Rome, and amongst raised animals were

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763 Aubet (1993), 194-211.
765 Treister (1996); Osborne (2009), 106-110.
766 Torelli (1986); Naso (2000); Riva (2010). Contrast modern views, such as those of Riva (2006) and van Dommelen (2006) with those of the previous generation, such as Drews (1981).
767 Malkin (2011).
768 Cherici (2007) and below, chapter 6.
769 Below, 4.3. Trade with the eastern Mediterranean was also, probably, responsible for the development of piracy in the Adriatic, which is outside of the scope of this study. See Sassatelli (2004b).
pigs and cows. This agriculture was easily exploited in warfare, with raids being made to carry off cattle and even during large campaigns it is probable that crops were also ravaged.

Networks of trade within central Italy also existed. These networks were built up around a number of different trades. One of the most visible was the trade in architectural decorations. These decorations were made in a number of centres and then distributed through a network of trade. One location that we know produced this kind of work was Murlo. Many of these decorative plaques displayed military scenes. The so-called Rome-Vei-Veletri system is very intriguing (Fig. 9-10). These pieces have been shown to come from a common mould, although the centre of production is not known. This system displays militaristic themes, especially that of the mounted warrior in an attacking stance. It is important that we recognize that the popularity and widespread implementation of these scenes reflects a regional recognition of this type of warfare. These particular plaques decorated important structures in the towns in which they have been found, in Rome perhaps even the Regia. Choice of decoration for a building such as this would not have been haphazard but deliberate; there is meaning to be found in these images, and from their content that meaning is very probably militaristic.

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774 See below, 4.2.
775 Cf. Winter (2009); Maggiani (2010).
776 Tuck (2014), 126, with earlier bibliography. Murlo also manufactured metal objects, and possibly processed types of ore as well. This is the best example of how Etruscan elites dominated economic power.
778 Winter (2009), 311-322. Some modern authors have proposed that this imagery is archaizing as it mixes contemporary (i.e. ‘hoplite’) imagery with that from the preceding Villanovan period, although this is not an extremely convincing argument. Although even Torelli (2006) admits to a widespread acknowledgement of the symbolism of the imagery.
779 Roth-Murray (2007) traces the network of exchange and ideology represented by these frieze plaques. Lulof (2014) believes that there was a workshop in Rome which produced many of these plaques for the region; she also points to a period of rapid and extensive construction of temples in Rome during this period.
It was not just the buyers and the viewers of these scenes who were engaged in the meaning of the images. The producers of these products must have also recognized and understood what the cultural value of these depictions was. If this is to be accepted it implies that there was an understanding of the imagery of warfare, and perhaps practise, throughout the network of trade. The role of these artisans and craftsmen in transmitting a particular image of warfare should not be underestimated. Although they were probably not from the highest classes, their position in society was important. There has been considerable research done on the topic of craftsmen in central Italy recently which have shown how internally connected the region was.  

A certain Corinthian has had a considerable impact on the discussion of production in central Italy, Demaratus. Demaratus is said to have fled to Tarquinia after civil strife drove him from his home (Livy 1.34). He came with a number of artisans and set up a workshop. He gained enough influenced to have sired and offspring who would eventually become a Roman king. The importance of a figure like this in the realm of warfare should not be underestimated. Demaratus fled to Rome during the period in which the old orthodoxy believed hoplite warfare was in its prime in Greece. The newer perspective, though, places his migration at a time of development. Regardless of whether or not hoplite warfare was in full stride yet or not, the immigration of an important figure, and his integration into the community, could have led to his influencing Tarquinia’s way of making war. As

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780 A number of recent studies have shown the importance of artisans, craftsmen, and merchants in Central Italy: Smith (1998); Ciampoltrini and Firmati (2002-2003); Camporeale (2013). See in general *Etruscan Studies* v. 17 n. 2. Craftsmen may have even been featured on a number of incised gems, Ambrosini (2014), notably blackssmiths and a helmet-maker. These gems could be indications of the prestige or the wealth of those involved in these crafts.

781 Imported craftsmen have been explored by a number of authors, briefly: Drews (1981); Ridgway and Ridgway (1994); Edlund-Berry (2002-2003); Winter (2002-2003); Camporeale (2013).


783 Cf. Hanson (1989); Kagan and Viggiano (2013b); Konijnendijk (2015), 14-27.

784 van Wees (2000) and (2004), 166-197.
Demaratus supposedly founded a workshop, this would have allowed him to produce products which depicted warfare as he knew it from his homeland which would then be distributed throughout Etruria and probably Latium, as well. The impact of visual culture on warfare may not have been overwhelming, but it could have helped to spread trends in arms and armour. The story surrounding Demaratus’ ‘setting up shop’ is dubious, though, and much of it is probably a later creation.

Transmission of this visual culture also occurred through the trade in statuary. Bronze workshops appear to have existed as centres of production in central Italy. One of the most well attested and widespread pieces of production were statues of warriors and depictions of Laran/Mars. One of the workshops identified by scholars is that of the so-called Todi workshop. Etruscan appreciation for statuary is reflected in the story that when the Romans took Volsinii in 265 they found and removed two thousand bronzes from the city (Pliny NH 34.33). The desire for cult statuary extended to looking outside of central Italy, with the possibility that the cult statue of Diana in Rome may have been produced in Massilia, or in the least it was influenced by a statue of Artemis made in that city (Strabo 4.1.5). Rome is also supposed to have imported the sculptor Vulca, from Veii, to construct the statue of Jupiter Optimus Maximus and the adorning sculpture of his temple (Pliny NH 35.157; cf. Plut. Pub. 13). Through these trade connections, central Italy would have seen imports of statuary, and then its circulation, which represented pan-Mediterranean deities outfitted in the Greek style of arms and armour. These representations must have had some sort of impact on the

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785 Foxhall (2005) discusses the process of trends spreading in the Mediterranean during the period of urbanization.
788 Richardson (1971); Maule (1991) and (1993).
789 That this story is preserved by the people who conquered the city makes it questionable.
choice of arms in central Italy as elites and commoners alike worked to emulate their gods. The militaristic nature of at least some of this sculpture may have also served a political function in justifying the warfare of the elite.\textsuperscript{791}

We have seen that the economy of central Italy was diverse in the period under study. There were ways in which economic forces, particularly trade, may have impacted warfare. This economy was vulnerable, as all agrarian economies are, to the ravages of war. In the following two sections we look at how raiding by land armies and piracy affected the economy of central Italy.

\textbf{5.2 The Profits and Consequences of Raiding}

Raiding is both an act of war and an economic action. Taking movable wealth, whatever the medium, had two purposes: to harm the victim and to benefit the doer. This was not done without risk, as we have discussed above, but the consequences for the victim could be quite devastating. In some cultures raids did not necessarily target tangible wealth, but rather a cultural wealth.\textsuperscript{792} Raids for honour or reprisal were common among the North American Indians.\textsuperscript{793} We hear of a number of instances in the ancient sources, as well, where raids were executed in central Italy as reprisals for earlier injuries. This is common behaviour in the ethnographic record. What we hear of more often than not, however, is raiding for the purpose of seizing movable wealth. This wealth could be in the form of livestock, captives, or valuable objects. Our sources often mention, as well, the agricultural

\textsuperscript{791} Similarly, Pisistratus used sculpture to link himself to Heracles and Athena, Cornell (1995), 148, with bibliography.

\textsuperscript{792} For instance, raiding for scalps was common practice amongst the Plains Indians of North America, Grinnell (1910).

\textsuperscript{793} Hoebel (1967) discusses the complex views towards raids and reciprocative violence amongst the Comanche.
devastation that raids and campaigning would have, which directly impacted the economy of the targeted city or settlement.\(^{794}\)

Livestock was a prime target for raiding armies. Cows, pigs, goats, and sheep together were an important aspect of the central Italian economy. We have iconographic depictions as far back as the Orientalizing period which show captive animals being led by armed figures (Fig. 14).\(^{795}\) Although it is impossible to show definitively that these images are meant to represent a successful raiding party, this is probably the situation. Raiding for cattle is present in our literary sources in a number of occasions (Livy 2.51, 64, 3.66, 6.31). If any of the narrative around Lars Porsenna’s siege of Rome can be believed, we have an excellent example of how valuable cattle were to marauding armies. The Romans used cattle in this instance as a way to bait the Etruscan army into a trap, which, according to Livy was successful, and helped to lead to an end of the siege (Livy 2.11).\(^{796}\) Besides the value of these beasts as a food source and potentially as breeding stock, they had a religious value as well.\(^{797}\) We know that animal sacrifice was practised throughout the region. The ability to abscond with an important part of your enemy’s cattle, which may have been intended for ritual purposes, must have led to a ‘cultural victory’ over them.\(^{798}\) This could have helped to further social problems in the affected country’s population. In the case of cattle used in ritual slaughter, capturing these animals would also lead to increased prestige at home.

\(^{794}\) On this point, see Hanson (1998), 131-173, who discusses the effectiveness of agricultural destruction in Greek warfare. His conclusions, based both in classical evidence and modern experience, are that agricultural devastation was not an often successful operation.
\(^{795}\) Jannot (1985), 132.
\(^{796}\) The Romans used this tactic in later situations, as well (Livy 2.50).
\(^{797}\) See below, chapter 5.
\(^{798}\) By ‘cultural victory’ the author means a military victory which had a negative impact on another aspect of their enemies’ culture, whether that was religious or related to another non-economic aspect of that settlement or civilization.
Crops would be destroyed and fields laid waste. The impact of warfare on certain types of crops, such as vines and olives, may not have been as devastating as might be assumed.\textsuperscript{799} We should not underestimate the problems that raiding could bring on a settlement.\textsuperscript{800} When an army of Veii defeated the Roman army and occupied the Janiculum, it raided Roman territory to the point that there was a scarcity of food in the city (Livy 2.51). On at least one occasion we hear that the agricultural fields were the target of a particular incursion (Livy 6.4).\textsuperscript{801} Food shortages were not unheard of in central Italy and could lead to internal problems within cities. This may have been one of the plebian grievances in the fifth century.\textsuperscript{802} In times of peace corn could be brought in from Etruria (i.e. Livy 4.12-13) or further afield, such as Sicily (Livy 2.34). It is safe to assume, though, that in times of war this supply may have been harder to receive.

Land based raiding also led to the capture of movable wealth, generally of an unknown variety. We usually hear of the raiding army being laden with plunder or carrying off booty (i.e. Livy 2.42, 3.3, 10, 4.34, 51, 59, 5.20, 27, 28, 32, 6.12-13). It is impossible to tell exactly what type of booty was being taken away. Perhaps statuary that had a religious meaning, as happened when the Romans sacked Veii in 396 (Livy 5.22).\textsuperscript{803} It may be possible to assume that at least some of the movable wealth was in the form of precious metals, or metal in general, in this pre-monetary

\textsuperscript{799} Hanson (1998).
\textsuperscript{800} Unfortunately we do not often hear of the results of this agricultural raiding. For instance, when the Romans raided Volsci territory in 494 we simply hear of them ravaging the lands (Livy 2.30).
\textsuperscript{801} Although we are told that the crops were the specific target of this campaign, we can surmise that agricultural raiding may have been the case in a number of other instances where we hear that the enemy’s land has been ravaged: Livy 2.16, 30, 39, 51, 3.5, 6, 23, 25, 4.1.
\textsuperscript{802} Cornell (1995), 265-268.
\textsuperscript{803} We have seen above that when Rome took Volsinii they removed from there two thousand statues (Pliny NH 34.33). If this practice was common, although we have little evidence to make that claim, then it may have been a putative measure, especially in raids that were reprisals. These examples are of sieges, but raids against undefended settlements or sanctuaries would have been able to produce this type of booty without a siege. This was the case when Dionysius I sacked the temple at Pyrgi. Stealing away gods was a tactic used in the ancient Near East to punish or assert power over a conquered people, see Young (1988).
The Etruscans, in particular, were known for producing high quality gold jewellery which would have been taken if it was available. That personal items were taken is attested by Livy (3.10). Possibly the most valuable, and the only non-agricultural booty mentioned in the sources, things to be taken away from a raid were slaves. We hear of captives being taken during a number of raids, which we should presume were made into slaves (Livy 4.29, 34, 6.31). It is possible that depictions of blond slaves in Etruscan tomb paintings represent slaves taken in this manner from Gallic peoples. The taking of slaves by Roman pirates is also probable and is alluded to in the second treaty with Carthage (Polyb. 3.24). The economic impact of these slaves is impossible to tell.

Although it is impossible to tell the economic impact of raiding and warfare in general, it does seem to have caused some problems. When booty was not distributed to the soldiers they would cause a stir (Livy 2.42, 4.34). It is understandable why the people would want a share in some of the hoards captured, as they could be large enough to feed the treasuries of the city (Livy 2.42, 3.10, 5.27). In the wake of the sack of Veii this problem became very acute, with the populus of Rome becoming discontent with their erstwhile hero, Camillus (5.32). The dictator was simply trying to make the soldiers fulfil the tithe which the gods had a right to (Livy 5.20, 25). The Roman people may have been wise to be

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804 On the pre-monetary economy see Crawford (1976).
806 Nash Briggs (2002-2003) with bibliography. Etruscan slaves were probably used in both domestic and industrial settings, Barker and Rasmussen (1998), 101-102, 206. These slaves did always remain in bondage, some gained their freedom; in later times we have evidence of the diversity of Etruscan slaves who had been manumitted, with Greeks, Etruscans, Latins, and others represented, Capdeville (2002-2003).
807 Slavery in early Rome is indicated by a passage in the Twelve Tables (12.2) and their historicity is probable. Cornell (1995), 280, notes that most slaves of this period were ‘either captives or home-bred.’
808 It is unlikely that there was legislation against generals keeping large sums of money after campaigns, see the discussions of Schatzman (1972) and Rosenstein (2011).
suspicious of a general who kept too much of the plunder from raiding and sacking cities, as this type of thinking may have led to the Spartans sparing Athens in 404/403.\textsuperscript{809} The amount of wealth that could be extracted from a settlement during a raid, whatever type of wealth that may have been, could add up to huge amounts. Dionysius I of Syracuse is supposed to have looted 1,500 talents from the small port town of Pyrgi in a piratical raid (Diod. Sic. 15.14.4).

5.3 Piracy in the Tyrrhenian and Beyond

Piracy is a common topic in the dialogue on archaic Tyrrhenian Italy. Etruscan piracy, in particular, is often discussed. Any discussion of piracy during this period, though, is fraught with a number of problems, as always these problems are the usefulness and availability of sources. We also have to define what we are speaking about when we approach piracy, as it is a topic that has received a considerable amount of scholarly attention over the past two decades. Piracy, like land based raiding, is characterized as the seizure of property or capital by force, in which we generally assume that this is violent force, or at least the threat of violence.\textsuperscript{810}

At its most basic level, piracy is an economic activity that is affected by patterns of trade and forces of markets, even in the ancient world. These economic actors, though, are variably described in different cultural settings; in more modern contexts, the pirate is a figure which can either be a felonious parasite or a libertarian hero.\textsuperscript{811} This problematic reception of the concept of the pirate is evident in the ancient world, as it is often noted that one man’s pirate is another man’s trader.\textsuperscript{812} A

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{809} Powell (2006).
\textsuperscript{810} Anderson (2001).
\textsuperscript{811} Pennell’s (2001b) introduction gives a succinct and helpful overview of the cultural reception of pirates and piracy.
\textsuperscript{812} de Souza (1999), 1-42. I do not distinguish piracy from warfare as de Souza does, quite acutely in his brief survey (1995), 179, and I believe that, especially in the ancient world, there should be no
recent, and helpful definition, has been put forward by two anthropologists based on a survey of the history of piracy in the early period of modern history: ‘a form of morally ambiguous property seizure committed by an organized group which can include thievery, hijacking, smuggling, counterfeiting, or kidnapping.’ Smuggling and counterfeiting were probably not activities undertaken by pirates in the central Mediterranean, but the rest of this description fits the activities that we see in our sources.

Associations of peoples of the central Mediterranean with piracy may go considerably further back in history than the Iron Age. Some scholars believe that some of the so-called Sea Peoples which harassed Egypt and the Levant from the thirteenth century originated from Western parts of the Mediterranean, particularly Sardinia and Sicily. It is also possible that some of these seaborne raiders were Etruscan, possibly those identified in Egyptian reliefs as Trš (Teresh). Although it is impossible to conclusively connect these early instances of raiding to the central Mediterranean, from the period in which we do begin to read historical notices we do hear of piracy being prominent in this region.

The Etruscans are traditionally thought of as practicing piracy quite readily. We are told that some of the earliest Greek settlers in the central Mediterranean were discouraged from the attempt by the tenacious Etruscan pirates

\[\text{disambiguation between the two. They are the same activity occasionally practiced by different levels of participation. De Souza is also weary of identifying piracy before the Hellenistic period, although I am unsure that this is as difficult as some might believe.} \]
\[\text{Dawdy and Bonni (2012), 695-696. Although I do not differentiate in this discussion between the practice of piracy on the seas and seaborne raiding of land targets, the Greeks may have, Cherici (2006), 324.} \]
\[\text{Broodbank (2013), 460-472. These connections are not definite and require more evidence than we currently possess to prove conclusively.} \]
\[\text{Wainright (1959). We must be careful about this identification, however, and as pointed out by Tykot (1994), there is no definitive proof of the connection between this group of the Sea Peoples and the Etruscans. In fact, as he argues, the etymological connections may exist but are probably tied to later Phoenician vocabulary rather than an earlier Egyptian vocabulary.} \]
In the fifth century, Anaxilaos of Rhegion built fortifications in order to check the activities of Etruscan pirates (Strabo 6.1.5). One of the most often cited examples of Etruscan piracy and its impact is the *Homerica Hymn* to Dionysus and the later traditions of this myth. In this story, the god Dionysus is abducted by Etruscan pirates, eventually freeing himself through his divine powers. Versions of the story are found in Euripides (*Cyc. 10-22*), Apollodorus (*Bibl. 3.5.3*), Ovid (*Met. 3.564-691*), Hyginus (*Poet. astr. 2.17; Fab. 134*), and Nonnus (*Dion. 31.86-91, 44.231-252, 45.105-168*). Some scholars have read this myth as being set in the central Mediterranean, but this has recently been questioned.

Evidence from Greek sources betray a possible non-Italian origin for the Tyrrhenians who abducted Dionysus. We consistently hear about Tyrrhenians who inhabited the Aegean. From Herodotus we hear that the Pelasgians, who are the same people as the Tyrrhenians, used to inhabit Attica and founded a number of towns in the Eastern Mediterranean (1.57). Thucydides records that there were Pelasgians/Tyrrhenians living on the Akte peninsula and that these peoples had once inhabited Lemnos and Athens (4.109). Dionysius of Halicarnassus repeats a tradition from Hellanicus that the Tyrrhenians were once called Pelasgians but only took their name after emigrating to Italy (1.28.3–4). These peoples had been driven out of Greece by the coming of the Hellenes. It may also be these Aegean Tyrrhenians...

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817 Ridgway (1988), 635, does not think that this notice has much historical strength. Strabo cites Ephorus, a fourth-century historian, which may indicate that this tradition does not have considerable antiquity and may have been part of the narrative of Etruscan piracy which was more developed by that time (see Paleothodoros [2012]). Without an extant text of Ephorus, however, it is impossible to argue strongly on either side.

818 References to the myth are present in other works, see Paleothodoros (2012), 477 n. 11.

819 Gras (1976).

820 Paleothodoros (2012).

821 The problems of Pelasgians, Tyrrhenians, and Etruscans are typically dealt with in questions of the origins of the Etruscans. An autochthonic origin of the Etruscans, however, does not necessarily rule out that there were populations in the Aegean which spoke a Raetic (or Etruscan) dialect or related language. The famous stele discovered on Lemnos is strong evidence that this population did exist. On the origin of the Etruscans, see Pallottino (1975), 64-81, Briquel (1984), (1991), (1993). Briquel...
that we hear of as raiding Samos (Athen. 15.12). Raiding attributed to the Pelasgians, as opposed to Tyrrenians proper, is also attested in the Aegean.\textsuperscript{822} The dichotomy between the Tyrrenians and Pelasgians, and the apparent confusion on the part of the Greeks as to who these peoples actually were, has led to a strong argument against seeing these notices of piracy as relating to the Etruscans of Italy.\textsuperscript{823} Whether or not it was the piratical behaviour of the Aegean Tyrrenians/Pelasgians or the Italian Etruscans taking part in the Aegean adventures, we cannot prove.

There are a number of other indications that the indigenous inhabitants of Italy did practise piracy, as well, although some of these fall later than the scope of this study. Sometime in the early sixth century, Etruscans are said to have been practicing piracy, which helped to bring certain Greek colonists together (Diod. Sic. 5.9.4).\textsuperscript{824} In the first half of the fifth century, the Syracusans sent a fleet led by Phayllus to suppress Etruscan piracy, eventually sacking Elba (Diod. Sic. 11.88.4). This force apparently did not succeed, the leader was exiled, and the Syracusans sent another fleet, eventually attacking the Etruscans who were settled on Corsica (Diod. Sic. 11.88.5). We hear that when Dionysius I of Syracuse pillaged the Caeretan port of Pyrgi it was in order to put down piracy (Diod. Sic. 15.14.3).\textsuperscript{825} That so many of these notices come from Diodorus may be indicative of the strength of the topos of Etruscan piracy in the Western Greek historians. This topos may have spread to the east, perhaps influencing the position of the Tyrrenoi in the Homeric Hymns.

\textsuperscript{822} Cf. Bruni (2013), 760.
\textsuperscript{823} Paleothodoros (2012) has assembled considerable evidence on this point.
\textsuperscript{824} Later in the fifth century an Etruscan army, along with Umbrians and Daunians, attacked Cumae (Dion. Hal. 
\textit{Ant. Rom.} 7.3). Colonna (1993) has suggested that this marked the beginning of Etruscan dominance in the Adriatic. If this is correct it would have allowed Etruscan ships to practice piracy.
\textsuperscript{825} It is only in the version of the story preserved by Diodorus that we hear of suppression of piracy as the reason for the raid on Pyrgi. Strabo (5.2.7), pseudo-Aristotle (\textit{Oec.} 1349b), Polyainus (5.2.21), and Aelian (\textit{VH} 1.20) all omit mention of Caeretan piracy. Caven (1990), 190-191, points out that although suppression of piracy was given as a reason for this raid, overall Dionysius’ piratical activities were in line with his other strategies.
through the myth of Scylla as we hear in the rationalization of the myth by
Palaephatus (*De incr. 20*).

We also hear of a number of later instances of Tyrrhenian piracy. In 339, an
Etruscan pirate by the name of Postumius sailed into the harbour at Syracuse and
offered his services to Timoleon who had recently ‘liberated’ the city (Diod. Sic.
16.82.3). Postumius is not a common Etruscan name, and it is problematic to
directly accept that this man was a pirate from Etruria. If Postumius did in fact
lead an Etruscan pirate fleet, it may be that he originated from the Latin town of
Antium. According to Strabo (5.3.5) the inhabitants of this city used to take part in
piracy alongside the Etruscans. He says that Antium was already a subject of Rome
when this was going on. Because of Rome’s supposedly close ties to Caere in the
early years of the Republic this could indicate that the allied piratical fleet was based
there, perhaps in Pyrgi. It is possible, as well, that the association of piracy with
Antium as a possession of Rome may imply that the Romans themselves practised
piracy, although there is no hard evidence for this outside of the treaties with
Carthage.

That the Etruscans of the central Mediterranean did practise piracy may also
be reasoned by examining the historical situation as we know it. Piracy in the seas
around Italy was not limited in practise to Etruscans. Greeks were particularly guilty
of this. Some of the earliest Hellenic migrants to the region, Phocaeans, settled on

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826 There is no mention of this event in Plutarch’s biography of Timoleon.
828 This is supported by two instances of piracy noted for Antium in Dionysius (*Ant. Rom. 7.37.3,
(5.2.3) records that Caere, the primary centre who controlled Pyrgi, was renowned among the Greeks
because they did not practice piracy. Strabo (5.2.8) does associate Pyrgi as the port city of Caere,
which may rule out the possibility that Pyrgi/Caere had any involvement in this activity.
830 Discussed below.
Corsica and began to operate as pirates (Hdt. 1.166). When the Ionian Greeks were driven from the coast of Anatolia, their leader, Dionysius, a Phocaean, ended up establishing himself as a pirate in Sicily, preying on Etruscan and Carthaginian ships (Hdt. 6.17). Chalcidian pirates from Opician Cumae were remembered as founding Zankle on the straights between Italy and Sicily (Thuc. 6.4). Perhaps the most famous Greek pirates in the central Mediterranean were the inhabitants of Lipari (Diod. Sic. 5.9; Paus. 10.11). Something of a piratical rivalry may have developed between a group of Etruscans and the Liparians, who had dedicated a portion of their population to naval defense (Strabo 6.2.10). The most famous episode of Liparian piracy occurred at the beginning of the fourth century when they seized a Roman ship sailing for Delphi; eventually the Liparians released the Romans and escorted them to the sanctuary (Livy 5.28; Diod. Sic. 14.93.3; Plut.

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831 Cf. Justin 18.7.11, 43.5.2; Strabo 6.1.1; Paus. 10.8, 18.7; Gras (1972).
832 L. Scott (2005), 112. It is interesting to note that Justin’s epitome of Trogus (43.3) records that during the reign of one of the Tarquins a group of Phocaean sailed up the Tiber and entered into an alliance with the Romans, then sailed on to settle the city of Marseilles. Coincidentally we hear about a naval battle between these Phocaean and the Carthaginians near the founding date of this town (Thuc. 1.13). We cannot say for certain that this particular group of Phocaean was practicing piracy, but sailing up the Tiber is reminiscent of the Viking raids in Northern Europe which utilized navigable river systems to conduct their piratical behaviour. If they were behaving in such a way it would make sense that the Carthaginians were interested in destroying their ships. Justin does say that the Phocaean made a living through fishing and trading, but most of all through the practice of piracy but the lack of statement on this point by the earlier historians is problematic, especially as they readily mention the piratical nature of other Phocaean groups which settled in the Central Mediterranean. It seems that Strabo (4.1) and Trogus (via Justin) were following different traditions on the foundation of Massilia as the former does not mention any element of piracy. Strabo (4.1.5) does mention that the Phocaean who founded the town were militarily strong. He also remembered their fortification of the Stoechades Islands in order to fend off pirates (4.1.10), although we do not hear of any ethnos for these particular pirates. Depending on how far we wish to push the connection between trading by sea and piracy we may find evidence for Massilian piracy in their renown in the field of trade by sea. Besides the sources above, a no longer extant work of Aristotle, in a fragment preserved in Athenaeus (13.576a) claimed that the Phocaean who founded Massilia were involved in trading, and Plutarch records that the founder of Massilia, Protis, was very fond of trading by sea (Solon 2.7). At some later time they may have been involved in the piratical capture of Punic fishing boats which led to the outbreak of a war with the Carthaginians (Justin 43.5).
833 This rivalry may be evidenced by what some scholars have seen as competitive dedications at Delphi: Colonna (1984) and Scott (2010), 91-93. See Torelli (1996), 570.
Cam. 8.8). By 349 we hear of Greek fleets preying on the Tyrrhenian Sea as well as the coast near Antium (Livy 7.25).

While we cannot comment on the actions of these pirates, those pirates who raided the coast are attested in a number of ways. The first two treaties struck between Rome and Carthage concern the issue of coastal raiding. Polybius’ text of the first treaty includes four clauses which refer to seaborne raiding:

4. a list of Latin communities subject to Rome which shall not be harmed by Carthaginians
5. other Latin communities seized by Carthaginians shall be handed over to the Romans
6. no Punic fortress shall be constructed in Latium
7. when Carthaginians do come to Latium to execute hostilities they shall not spend the night (Polyb. 3.22).

The second treaty described by Polybius includes four clauses directly related to piracy:

1. Romans shall not sail beyond Cape Fair to practise piracy, trading, or colonization

The historicity of this event is supported by the survival of the Roman dedication’s base and the fact that the memory of the Liparian who escorted the Roman ships was extant when the islands were annexed by Rome in 252 (App. Ital. fr. 8.3).

The topic of Punic piracy is complex and I have not commented on it here. It is dealt with in Ameling (1993), 127-135. Bispham (2012), 231, proposes that Antium may have been made a colony in the middle of the fifth century to protect against this kind of behaviour.

Paraphrases based on the Greek text of the Loeb edition (1922).

Serrati (2006), 114, believes that this clause is an indication of ‘both Roman and Punic territorial aggression.’ This is in contrast to the earlier idea that Carthage did not have imperialist ambitions before the expansion into Spain, a view forcefully argued by Whitaker (1978). While Whitaker’s position may not be as tenable in its extreme views of Punic isolationism (not his phrase) today as it once was, there is little evidence of territorial ambition in Central Italy.

I follow the enumeration of the clauses of this treaty and the others based on the English translation of Robin Waterfield (Oxford World Classics). The first clause of this treaty may also refer to limiting piratical behaviour, although this time on the part of the Romans. Any Roman or their ally who is forced to sail beyond Cape Fair, wherever that may have been, shall not take anything away unless it is necessary for repairing their vessel or for sacrifice.

᾽ληζεσθαι,’ the term used by Polybius, is commonly associated with piracy.
2. the Carthaginians may capture towns in Latium and keep the booty and captives but must hand the towns over to Rome.

3. Romans and Carthaginians may capture allies of one another but not bring them into one another’s ports.\(^{841}\)

4. If a ship takes water from the other’s territory they shall not then harm those belonging to that state (Polyb. 3.24).\(^{842}\)

While most modern commentators describe these treaties as primarily economic in nature, that is a deceptive conclusion.\(^{843}\) Others have pointed to Rome seeking a treaty with a power like Carthage at the beginning of the Republic to establish itself as a new state, although this view seems to be influenced, in part, from more modern practise and expectations.\(^{844}\) A considerable proportion of these treaties dealt with the regulation of piracy between Rome and Carthage, which itself implies that piracy was a pervasive enough problem to warrant ‘international’ regulation.\(^{845}\) Although there is no evidence for other similar treaties, it is not unreasonable to assume that treaties between other parties to regulate piracy may have existed.

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\(^{840}\) This clause seems to have been ignored by some modern authors, such as Hoyos (2010), 44-45, who points out that Romans were not prevented from raiding Punic territories. That is, in fact, exactly what the first clause does! This second treaty also may imply that the strength of Roman sea power, or perhaps the expanse of their piratical fleet(s), was more extensive than in the period of the first treaty as the treaty limits Roman access to areas of Punic influence which were not completely secured, see Manfredi (2003). Although this argument may be undermined as in Sicily, whose stability was always in question, Romans had the same rights as a Carthaginian. See Maras (2007).

\(^{841}\) This may mean that prisoners taken at sea were fair game, so long as they were not Romans or Carthaginians, and could be sold off as slaves except in ports where they may fall under some protection of alliance.

\(^{842}\) Polybius does not give a date for the second treaty. We may be able to place it sometimes in the 340s, probably between 348 and 344. Livy mentions a treaty between Rome and Carthage in 348 (7.27) and then a Carthaginian embassy in 343 (7.38). Diodorus (16.69.1) records that the first treaty between these two states occurred during the consulship of Marcus Valerius and Marcus Popillius which equates to the Varronian year of 348 (Scullard [1989], 518; Serrati [2006], 119, readily accepts a date of 348 without much question). See chapter 1.3 for the defense of the historicity of the Polybian treaties.

\(^{843}\) Walbank (1957), 337-349, provides discussion of the early bibliography. The literature on the topic of these treaties is enormous.

\(^{844}\) Serrati (2006), 117-118, suggests that the Romans may have approached the Carthaginians for this purpose.

\(^{845}\) I do not believe, however, that Rome was a major naval power during this time, or had much, if any, of a navy proper, as has been argued by Steinby (2007).
Archaeologically, it is difficult to try to discuss evidence of piracy. There is no evidence to suggest that the plethora of Oriental and Hellenic objects found in Etruscan and Latial tombs were seized through piracy. There is, however, a relatively large corpus of imagery depicting armed ships from Etruria. Armed ships are also known from archaeology recovery. The most well known representation of an armed combat at sea comes from the Aristonothos Krater (Fig. 15). This vase dates from the early seventh century, and along with what appears to be a depiction of an armed combat between two ships includes the earliest depiction of a scene from Homer. The naval scene has been proposed to represent a Greek ship, that with oars, fighting an Etruscan ship. Mario Torelli is forceful in his argument that the painter of this krater, in working for an aristocrat of Caere, painted this scene to represent his battles against Sicilian Greeks, with Polyphemus as a symbol of Sicily. This analysis is partially based on a perceived analogy between Polyphemus’ eye and the fact that one of the ships, the ‘Greek’ ship, has an open eye on its prow. As Vedia Izzet has pointed out, however, this is perhaps overstepping the bounds of analysis and there is no way to develop the understanding further. Of Etruscan production, a black figure Hydria from Vulci depicts an armed ship with

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846 For some periods of piratical behaviour there are some archaeological indicators, but unfortunately these indicators are not visible in the archaeological record of our period, Hartnett and Dawdy (2013), 39-41.
848 The Giglio wreck, dating around the turn of the seventh to sixth centuries, contained 28 arrowheads and a helmet, presumably to be used by the crew, Peña (2011), 184-185.
849 This scene is the blinding of Polyphemus, Snodgrass (1998) dissents from the general acceptance of the overtly Homeric nature of this image.
ramming prow and banks of oars (Fig. 16). There is no way of knowing, however, if these represent pirate vessels.

How exactly we should understand this piracy, though, is not straightforward. From an Hellenic perspective, piracy was a widespread and generally respected activity. In the Homeric poems we find that piracy was a common practise. It was widespread enough that a successful lie could be built on the premise that the one telling it had been on a raid (Od. 14.245-72). It may have been common place to ask newly come guests from the sea whether they were traders or whether they were pirates (Od. 3.71-73). This was not necessarily a universally accept view towards piracy, and there has been some suggestion that non-aristocrats may have disapproved of the practise (Od. 14.83-87).

Even if this type of activity was not frowned upon, it did not always end well, as we hear about in two stories about ill fated raids against Egypt (Od. 14.245-272, 17.417-444). As time went on, the view on piracy did change in the Greek world. Thucydides provides a rather lengthy and important discussion of piracy:

οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες τὸ πάλαι καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων οἳ τε ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ παραθαλάσσαι καὶ ὅσοι νῆσος εἶχον, ἐπειδὴ ἤρξαντο μᾶλλον περαιοῦσθαι ναυσίν ἐπ’ ἀλλήλους, ἐτράποντο πρὸς λῃστείαν, ἥγουμένων ἀνδρῶν ὁ τῶν ἀδυνατωτάτων κέρδους τοῦ σφετέρου αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενέσι τροφῆς, καὶ προσπίπτοντες πόλεσιν ἀτειχίστοις καὶ κατὰ κόμας οἰκουμένας ἔρπαζον καὶ τὸν πλεῖστον τοῦ βίου ἐποιοῦντο, οὐκ ἔχοντός πω αἰσχύνη τοῦ ἔργου, φέροντος δὲ τι καὶ δόξης μᾶλλον: δηλοῦσι δὲ τῶν τε ἡπειρωτῶν τινῶν ἐτι καὶ νῦν, οἷς κόσμος καλῶς τοῦτο δρᾶν,
καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τὰς πύστεις τῶν καταπλεόντων πανταχοῦ ὁμοίως ἐρωτῶντες εἰ λῃσταί εἰσιν, ὡς οὔτε ὧν πυνθάνονται ἀπαξιοῦντων τὸ ἔργον, οἷς τε ἐπιμελές εἴη εἰδέναι οὐκ ὀνειδιζόντων. (1.5)

For in these early times, as communication by sea became easier, so piracy became a common profession both among the Hellenes and among the barbarians who lived on the coast and in the islands. The leading pirates were powerful men, acting both out of self interest and in order to support the weak among their own people. They would descend upon cities which were unprotected by walls and indeed consisted only of scattered settlements; and by plundering such places they would gain most of their livelihood. At this time such a profession, so far from being regarded as disgraceful, was considered quite honourable. It is an attitude that can be illustrated even today by some of the inhabitants of the mainland among whom successful piracy is regarded as something to be proud of; and in the old poets, too, we find that the regular question always asked of those who arrive by sea is ‘Are you pirates?’ It is never assumed either that those who were so questioned would shrink from admitting the fact, or that those who were interested in finding out the fact would reproach them with it. (1.5)

A number of observations can be made from this passage. The first is that by the time of Thucydides in the fifth century piracy was not as highly regarded as it once had been.

It may be over simplifying to say that piracy had lost its honour by this time. Xenophon seems to admire them for their hard work in earning their living (Eq. mag. 8.8). Aristotle lists pirates amongst a number of other ways of earning a living; considering that farming and hunting are listed immediately after piracy we may be able to draw the conclusion that it was considered as honourable as the others (Pol. 1256a = 1.8.7). In another instance, however, Aristotle points to the use of metaphor

858 Greek is that of the Oxford text (1942).
859 Translation is that of Rex Warner in the Penguin Classics (1972).
allowing even pirates to call themselves providers (ποριστὰς) through metaphorical speech (Rh. 3.2.10). Plato gives an interesting picture of the effects of greed on people and his Athenian believed that greed can turn people from a quiet nature into: traders, ship-owners, and servants, while of the bold it makes pirates, burglars, temple-robbers, fighters, and despots (Leg. 8.831d-8.832a). Interestingly, we are told that these people are not necessarily ill-natured rather unlucky; this adds a level of fatalism to those who have become pirates. Isocrates did not believe that pirates deserved any praise (12.226). The culmination of these opinions is that the position of pirates between the 5th and 4th centuries was not universal, which could be symptomatic of this being a period of change.  

This can be contrasted with a sixth-century law, in which we hear that groups of pirates had the same legal rights as other fraternities under Solon so long as their agreements and behaviours did not violate the laws of the state (Dig. 47.22.4). 

The second observation that we can make from the passage of Thucydides quoted above is that the main income of piracy was not made on assaulting other ships, necessarily, but by sacking cities. This type of behaviour explains why many of the coastal settlements in the central Mediterranean were either set back off of the coast by some distance or highly defensible.  

In Etruria, this settlement pattern can be seen in the development of the great coastal cities. Vulci, Tarquinia, Caere, and Rome were all set considerably far inland and were thus not easy targets for piratical raids. The construction and use of ports, such as Pyrgi, shows that although these were the centres of trade for their respective mother cities the populations never shifted towards these satellite towns.

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860 The dichotomy between those who practiced piracy full time, as an occupation, and those who occasionally practiced piracy in their leisure, is unclear. It could be that those who plunder for pleasure, rather than as their means of sustenance, were to be despised more so than the others.  
861 This topic is more complex than space allows to discuss: see in general de Souza (1999), 15-42. Torelli (1996).
Why, if piracy had been an accepted practice amongst the Greeks for so long, was Etruscan piracy viewed in a different light? The answer could be that it was part of the construction of Etruscan otherness, which was hard for some Greeks and Romans to otherwise see. Cruelty could also have added to this vilification of Etruscan pirates compared to their Hellenic cousins. Etruscan pirates were supposedly known to tie prisoners face to face with dead bodies as a form of torture (Arist. *Protrepticus* 60 R; Virg. *Aen.* 8.478-488). These pirates were also guilty of cannibalism, at least according to our sources (Hyg. *Fab.* 274.20). This cruelty of eventually became proverbial in the ancient world (Hsch. *Tyrrhenoi desmoi*).

Modern scholars have tended to accept this view of Etruscan pirates. In the face of this evidence it is hard to argue that these were not exceptionally cruel men, that perhaps the Greeks and later Romans were influenced to think this way because the Etruscans were the enemy but unfortunately we cannot prove this conclusively, although it is probable that this played a part in the construction of Etruscan cruelty.

We have seen that piracy was pervasive in the central Mediterranean. Not just Etruscan piracy, but Greek, Punic, and possibly even Roman piracy was ever present. We should not overestimate the impact of this behaviour. Although these forces were certainly at work trade was not completely impeded. Eastern goods and Greek goods still made their way into central Italy, and goods from central Italy made their way out. Piracy in the region must not have been too pervasive to discourage traders from plying their trade. There is also little to no evidence that piracy led to animosity between different έθνη as the sources portray. We know that ports such as Pyrgi, Gravisca, and Punicum were multi-ethnic centres of

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864 Torelli (1996), 568.
865 The flow of goods in the Central Mediterranean is a very complex and deep subject. The best synthesis of the material is Gras (1985).
commerce.\textsuperscript{866} The larger cities, as well, such as Rome also had a multi-ethnic character.\textsuperscript{867} This evidence should make us doubt some of the severe ways in which the ancient sources talk about naval matters in general in the central Mediterranean, and question if the concept of thalassocracies, even piratical thalassocracies, are still valid.\textsuperscript{868}

It is possible that the pirates we hear of were individual actors, probably members of the elite who could mobilize the resources to keep ships and maintain crews. Postumius is the best example of this. This is similar behaviour to the gentilicial raiding which we have discussed, and argued against, above.\textsuperscript{869} Some of our sources have led scholars to believe that there may have been state sponsored piracy, such as Pindar’s praise of Hieron after the Battle of Cumae (Pyth. 1.73-81). This could be the case when we hear of Etruscan fleets preying on the central Mediterranean (i.e. Diod. Sic. 5.9.4). But we must keep in mind that there was a confusion in the Greek world about the political nature of the Etruscans, as they were usually clumped together as one single political unit, rather than a group of independent city-states.

If Tyrhenian city-states were in control of piratical fleets directly, this would have been a major undertaking. The construction and maintenance of large fleets is costly and would have relied on a strong and effective managerial system. The requirements of maintaining a fleet of triremes, in particular, has been shown to be extreme and encouraged the development of sophisticated financial systems in Athens.\textsuperscript{870} As is argued above in chapter 4, the existence of strong state systems was probable in central Italy from a rather early time, and these could have had the power

\textsuperscript{866} Boitani (2008); Fiorini (2008); Demetriou (2013), 64-104.
\textsuperscript{867} Ampolo (1976-1977).
\textsuperscript{869} Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{870} van Wees (2013).
and structure to maintain fleets, including piratical fleets. The treaties between Rome and Carthage imply that piracy practised by Roman citizens was something that could be controlled by the state, which may imply state involvement in the practise as well.

Even if states were in control of piracy, rather restricted groups of elites controlled those states. The domination of Roman politics from the end of the sixth century through the end of the period under investigation by elites is hard to question. If the state controlled piracy, it would have been these elites in government who oversaw it. This does not necessarily mean that they themselves practised piracy, but it is possible. Even if they did engage in piratical behaviour, the treaties between Rome and Carthage imply that they would have been able to influence the practise. Whether elites themselves were pirates, outside of civic control, or they were those in control, piracy was probably restricted to the higher echelons of society.\footnote{Although owning and operating a ship was expensive (as we have evidence for Athens), a counter point to elite dominance in this field could be that a poorer ship owner practiced piracy precisely because they needed the resources.} If we accept that elites controlled this piracy, either independently or collectively in each city, then it is evidence of how warfare was used to control economic power.\footnote{Peña (2011), 191-192, believes that this may have been the case. He sees the conflict in the Central Mediterranean being more intense than I believe it was and he believes that there was considerable tension in the emporia such as Pyrgi and Gravisca, because of ethnic conflicts in the wider world. There is perhaps grounds to suggest this, especially the conflict narrative that we have received from antiquity, but the overwhelming evidence of continuing trade throughout this period, until at least the end of the fifth century, is convincing to me that the situation was in no way as dire as it was made out to be by a collection of ancient citations.}

A brief note on naval tactics is necessary. The practise of naval warfare throughout the archaic period is not well attested in the literary evidence. When we do find references to naval battles, few, if any, details are given. We can reconstruct how this combat worked to some degree from the archaeology. Early depictions of ships from Etruria do not show any observable armament or armed passengers (Fig.
The imported Aristonothos krater is generally thought to depict a Greek and an Etruscan ship in combat (Fig. 15). There is no scholarly consensus on which ship would represent which of these εθνή; the ship on the left is armed with a ram and the ship on the right has a high bow, perhaps designed to prevent it from being rammed or taken bow to bow.\textsuperscript{873} Both ships were complimented by a crew of armed men, with round shields, spears, and crested helmets. This implies close combat, hand to hand, which would have involved boarding an enemy ship. The spears, as well, could be representations of javelins, which would imply ranged combat. Ships with rams are common in later depictions of armed ships and naval combats.\textsuperscript{874} Ranged combat was still important, however, as archers are depicted aboard ship, and the Giglio wreck carried with it a compliment of Ionian spearheads.\textsuperscript{875} Although many shipboard warriors are depicted wearing crested helmets, a Negau type helmet was dedicated by Hieron after the naval battle of Cumae, and must have come from an Etruscan warrior present. Naval combat began as an open fashion using ranged weapons, which escalated to ramming and close combat between shipboard warriors.

5.4 Conclusions

We have seen above that warfare in its loosest sense, meaning armed conflict between two groups, was used as an economic policy in central Italy. Small groups were probably responsible for early raiding, and as the horse became more and more common in warfare it is possible that this raiding intensified.\textsuperscript{876} Raiding by individual kin groups may have been practise[ed before the rise of states, but we have seen above that the existence of gentilicial or condottoio armies was not widespread, if they existed at all. For Rome, the raiding practises of state armies

\textsuperscript{873} Cf. Izzet (2004).
\textsuperscript{874} Cherici (2006).
\textsuperscript{875} Peña (2011), 184-185.
\textsuperscript{876} See also below, chapter 6.
were used as retribution against similar acts by enemy forces, but Rome also practised raiding as a regular form of warfare. This raiding allowed for the accumulation of booty in the form of removable wealth and agricultural products. The raiding of cattle is well attested and must have represented the most valuable type of agricultural raiding. Piracy, as well, was widely practised by the inhabitants of central Italy. The exact nature of those people who practised piracy, though, is not entirely clear. What is clear from the Carthage-Rome treaties is that states could exercise some level of control over pirates originating from their harbours.

Raiding and piracy reflect the impact of military power on changes in economic power. For individuals already in possession of military power, such as magistrates, kings, or clan leaders, this meant that they could readily further their position in society by drawing off of the economic power of their targets. Economic competition between elites, then, would have helped to fuel wars and the practise of piracy.
6. Warfare and Religion

Religion held a deep sway over the peoples of the ancient world. Ideological power, it seems, is deeply rooted in human nature. The commonality of religion in human societies, especially in ‘early’ societies, is so prominent and easily visible that some modern scholars believe that it has a root in evolutionary biology. This trait evolved to ‘account for the origin and nature of the cosmos and the forces that animated it, the origin and nature of human beings, the fate of individual humans after death, and the way in which humans might regulate relations with the supernatural to their advantage.’ The same author believes that religious knowledge, specifically the knowledge of how to improve ‘relations with the supernatural,’ was the basis of most, if not all, early elites. In some branches of anthropological thought it was through the ‘smoke and mirrors’ of religious ideology that early socio-political systems began to centralize. This brief image of religion plays out in the analysis of Etruscan and Roman culture. This chapter examines how religion, particularly the religion of the elite, interacted with, governed, and was affected by warfare.

The Etruscans are occasionally described as a notoriously superstitious people when it came to religion. Livy describes the Etruscans as ‘more devoted to religion’ than all other peoples (5.1.6), while Arnobius, at the beginning of the fourth century AD, could still recall the Etruscans as the source of all superstition (7.26.4). This picture is often repeated by modern authors, but at least as far back as Pallottino, we have been reminded that perhaps it was the differences between

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877 Gorski (2006), Mann (2012), 22-24. For the purposes of the present work, I use the term ‘ideological power’ to generally refer to religious power. There are many facets of ideological power in the modern sociological literature, but here we only exam religious.
878 Trigger (2003), 639-644.
879 Ibid., 647-649.
Greco-Roman religion and that of the Etruscans which resulted in this ancient consensus. While considerable work has been done on the religion of the Etruscans in the last century and first decades of this century, its relationship with warfare has been almost entirely ignored. While Etruscan religion shares some common ground with the Greco-Roman religions which dominated the Mediterranean for centuries there were many differences. Etruscans were especially known for their interpretation of prodigies.

The Romans, as well, were notoriously religious, though historically in a different way than the Etruscans. Religion was woven into the historical narrative of Early Rome as an essential element of the formation of the city. Elements of Roman religion were remembered as having been founded throughout the history of the city, from the mythical presence of Evander in Rome onward (cf. Virg. Aen. 8.51-54; Plut. Rom. 13, 21). The development of many of the elements of Roman religion supposedly occurred during the regal period. Romulus and Numa are variously accorded the development of much of the ritual practice. The calendar, an essential element of Roman life and religion, was supposedly developed by Romulus (Mac. Sat. 1.12.3); importantly for the current study, this calendar began with the month of Martius, that dedicated to Mars, the god of war. Much of this historical development was probably speculative when recorded by the earliest

882 The typical view of modern authors: Macnamara (1973), 152. Skepticism on this type of position, Pallottino (1975), 138-39.
883 For an up to date introduction to Etruscan religion (with bibliography), see Camporeale (2011), 135-56. The overview of Torelli (1986b) is still an important introduction. Jannot (2005) provides a readable synthesis in English.
884 Turfa (2012), 19-33.
885 Pallottino (1975), 139, succinctly summarizes the Roman approach to religion as a ‘prevalently juridical concept.’
886 This is true of the narrative of Livy, cf. Liebeschuetz (1967), Levene (1993), 126-174, Mellor (1999), 57-8, Davies (2004), 21-78. Dionysius, however, seems to have avoided, when possible, the inclusion of mythological or divine elements in his version of the Roman narrative but the divine still played an important role in his history of early Rome, Gabba (1991), 118-38.
888 Beard et al. (1998), 1-5.
889 Rüpke (2011), 23-37, on the early history of the Roman calendar.
Roman historians, but they had ample evidence at hand in the form of temples, dedications, and obviously archaic rituals to create a somewhat accurate reconstruction.

This chapter looks at the connections between religion and warfare in Etruria and Rome. It begins by examining the connections between priests and non-ideological social power which overlapped with the political and military social power. The connection between war, religion, and social power is most obviously manifest in the temples of central Italy, which is the topic of the second section of this chapter. The final section of this chapter examines the connections between the gods and war. The gods and other religious figures of central Italy were affected by war and other violent conflict in their existence. They also interacted directly in the warfare of mortal men, influencing the tide of battle as at Lake Regillus or by advising men on the course and approach of wars.

We can see the intertwining of ideological and military power as far back as the Terramare culture, for which we now have evidence of ritual destruction of bronze swords/daggers being incorporated into a burial ritual. Although these practices were not common in Etruria during much of the Bronze Age, as the Iron Age culture developed, the institutionalizing of the warrior identity in burial began to be elaborated. The ritualized warrior burial reached its zenith around the turn of the eighth century, a predominance which lasted until the middle of the seventh century. These “ritualized warriors” should not, however, be confused with actual warriors/soldiers; we cannot say for sure whether the individuals we have recovered from tombs actually fought in wars, but what is important for us to acknowledge is

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890 See above, 3.1.1.
893 Stary (1979), 179-206.
the inclusion of this warrior ideal as an element of elite identity. It is only after this period that we may speak in detail about the connections between ideological and military power.

6.1 Priests and War

Between the worlds of gods and men stand representatives. In many societies, including early Rome, the mediating individuals were kings. Through the evolution of societies, however, more and more individuals were inserted between the mortal and godly realms, often creating a priestly bureaucracy. In Etruria and Rome we have evidence that this began happening rather early in the period under examination. Although from the earliest periods of the Iron Age we do not have the necessary evidence to distinguish between kings, princes, priests, and warriors, on a sophisticated level, as literary evidence becomes more prominent it is a much easier topic to discuss. This chapter examines the connections between these priestly bureaucracies which developed in central Italy and the practise of warfare.

Evidence in the mortuary record for the overlap between priest and warrior, in their abstract forms, begins in the eighth century. Although the militaristic aspects of these burials is often emphasized, they provide evidence that power was expressed in a more complicated way, and often included religious, or cultic, aspects. As Riva points out, tools relating to ritual sacrifice and cooking were present in a number of these tombs. Connections between military and religious power exist, also, outside of the tomb. For example, the frieze from Poggio Civitate (Murlo) (inv.

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895 ‘Strategies of ritual’ have been identified as significant social forces in a number of societies in the Central Mediterranean, most recently for the Sicilian Greeks (Martín [2013]) and Nuragic Sardinia (Ialongo [2013]).
896 Because the kings before him were the chief priests, for instance, Numa created the flamen dialis to look after priestly duties whilst the king was out of the city (Livy 1.20).
897 By ‘priest’ and ‘warrior’ I mean the inclusion of ‘ritual’ and ‘martial’ items in the same burial.
68-265) depicts a seated figure, most probably a figure of authority, holding a lituus while his attendant, immediately to the figure’s rear, holds a spear and sword at the ready. An actual example of a lituus was found in a sixth-century tomb at Caere. This priestly “wand” is described by the Roman sources as a “curved staff without knots.”

The evidence of religious ties to elite burials and to facilities which were dominated by the elite (Murlo) indicates an overlap between those in political power and those who held religious power.

We know that certain, presumably elite, families were closely connected to certain deities and certain rituals. When the Romans sacked Veii (c. 396), the young men who were responsible for moving Juno’s statue back to Rome were apprehensive about touching the statue as only members of a certain Etruscan gens were accustomed to touching it. It is also known that some Etruscan families had familial cults associated with important deities, such as the cult of Uni Ursmnei, or Uni of the Ursmnei family. We also know, from the Capua Tablet (TLE 2), that certain families were responsible for conducting rituals prescribed by a formal religious calendar. Private religion and ritual ran deeper than a monopoly of priesthoods in Etruria and was certainly an extremely important aspect of elite family life.

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899 Illustrated in Sinos (1994), 102 (Figure 11.3). Connections between religious and political iconographies of power at Poggio Civitate have been proposed by Tuck (2006), 130-35.
900 Pfiffig (1975), 99.
901 Livy 1.18. It was purported to have been brought to Rome, as a religious or regal symbol by the early kings, cf. Cicero, Div., 2.80; Verg., Aen., 7.187.
902 Livy 5.22.
903 Jannot (2005), 81-82.
904 Ibidem, 81. For a full analysis of the Capua Tablet, see M. Cristofani (1995). Although the Capua tablet was found in Campania, it is an Etruscan text and could be representative of wider Etruscan practice.
Priesthoods and priestly behaviour in Rome were somewhat different from those and that of Etruria.\(^{906}\) In the beginning of the state, the kings held considerable religious power, perhaps in the guise of a high priest.\(^{907}\) It was through their power that many of the religious aspects of Roman culture were supposedly implemented, although the reconstructions we possess in our sources may be pure speculation, much of the Roman religious world seems to have been in place before the fall of the monarchy. Some of these ancient practices were upheld by certain families, like in the Etruscan world. The Potitii and Pinarii families were remembered as being responsible for the *ara maximus* and the cult of Hercules in Rome.\(^{908}\) In a similar vein, the Nautii were responsible for the cult of Minerva (Pallas/Athena),\(^{909}\) in legend the father of the house, Nautes, was made the student of Pallas (Verg. *Aen.* 5.703-705). More generally, religious rites were divided between public and private (Festus 284L).\(^{910}\) The Fabii were known to have a set of gentilicial religious rites which they executed even in times of war.\(^{911}\)

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\(^{906}\) Some public priesthhoods may have been hereditary, cf. Forsythe (2005), 169.

\(^{907}\) Festus (198-200L) preserved what may be a hierarchical list of Roman priests, at the head of which was the *rex sacrorum*, the Republican priesthood which inherited the religious responsibilities of the ancient *reges*. Cf. Forsythe (2005), 136. Varro, though, claimed that the *flamen dialis* may have been the highest of priests (Gell. *NA* 10.15.32) but it is not certain, the problem hinged on his wearing of a white cap, the only of the *flamines* to wear one. The alternative explanation given is that the white cap may relate to his sacrifice of a white victim, although we must concede that neither of these may be correct, and without the entire discussion of Varro it is hard to argue either way. Livy (1.20) claims that Numa created the *flamen dialis* because of the foreseen long-term and frequent absences of the king from Rome, which could imply that he was the highest priest except for the *rex* himself, thus it would make sense that after the fall of the regency the *rex sacrorum* would have become the highest priest in Rome.

\(^{908}\) Verg. *Aen.* 8.270; Serv. *ad Aen.* 8.270; Livy 1.7; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.40.4. Diodorus (4.21) gives a slightly different version of the story than Livy, and associates only the Pinarii with the cult of Hercules.

\(^{909}\) On the Nautii and Minerva’s cult, see Serv. *ad Aen.* 2.166, 3.407, and 5.704.

\(^{910}\) Public rites related to the hills, *pagi*, *curiae*, and shrines, while private rites related to individuals, families, and *gentes*.

\(^{911}\) One of the possible reasons given for the destruction of the *gens* at the Cremera was that they were leaving their fortress to return to Rome to perform a sacrifice (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 9.19). During the Gallic Sack, a Fabian *sacra* was to be conducted on the Quirinal and only executed through the brave maneuver of Caius Fabius Dorsuo (Livy 5.46), although, this story could be a Fabian fiction. The Claudii were also associated with gentilicial rites (Festus 274L). At some point, a temple of Diana on the Caelian was the focus of gentilicial sacrifices (Cic. *Har.* 32), the antiquity of this temple may be
Public rites and general religious activities were executed by the numerous colleges of priests. There were so many colleges of priests that public religious power was quite diffuse. However diffuse this religious power was, it is unclear how much overlap there was between it and political power in the archaic period. The college of the pontifices was the principal college of Roman priests during the Republic. The head of this college was the pontifex maximus, who was chosen by his colleagues to head the college in the early Republic. The three principle single deity priests were the flamines Dialis, Martialis, and Quirinalis. The flamen Dialis, the chief priest of Jupiter, had an odd relationship with war. He was forbidden to ride a horse and was forbidden to observe the army arrayed for battle (Gell. NA 10.15.3-4). It is quite probable that the origin of these prohibitions is quite ancient, and the explanation for the creation of this priesthood given by Livy (1.20), that Numa created the priesthood so that the rites of Jupiter could be performed during the king’s absence due to war, helps to explain why this priest was forbidden to associate himself with warfare. Although we do not have as detailed knowledge of indicated by its function amongst the gentes but there is no definite dating for its construction, though Coarelli (2007), 215, describes it as 'a very ancient shrine.' Mitchell (2005), 142, postulated the existence of a ‘hidden religious aristocracy’ which only came into public office in later Republican times. This is based on a number of families from prominent gentes which may have had religious duties in the past but emerged as novi homines in the politics of the middle and late Republic. This idea is not extremely convincing, perhaps based on the scarcity of evidence, although it must be consigned that there is a possible grain of truth in this idea. Perhaps the rex was at the head of the college during the Regal Period. That these particular restrictions were of great antiquity is indicated by their presence in the first book of Fabius Pictor (Gell. NA 10.15.1). This priesthood is generally considered incompatible with political and military office (cf. Cornell [1995], 233, and Forsythe [2005], 138), though Aulus Gellius only says that this flamen was rarely (rareenter) made consul (NA 10.15.4). The loosening of restrictions on flamines may have occurred later in the Republic, cf. Beard et al. (1998), 28. These prohibitions could also have resulted from a conscious (on some level) effort of the elites of early Rome to prevent further accumulation of social power by those who attained the priesthood of Jupiter. Manipulation of priesthoods, their practices, and the pool of people whence they may be drawn was used in other city-state societies to change the balance of social power; recently this has been shown with considerable evidence for Athens and the Periclean citizenship reforms, with some of this power in the form of priesthoods being monopolized by certain families, see: Blok (2009) and Lambert (2010); Rasmussen (2011) doubts the hereditary nature of some of these priesthoods.
the other chief flamines, the flamen of Mars may have been prevented from going to war because he was not allowed to leave the city.\textsuperscript{918}

The college of priests most closely associated with the actual practise of warfare was the fetiales. This group was charged with the regulation of ‘just war,’ the conclusions of treaties, and making demands for reparations after wars. Supposedly, these priests had their origin early in the Regal Period, although the exact origin of their regulatory ability towards warfare is disputed in the sources. Dinoysius (\textit{Ant. Rom.} 2.72) and Plutarch (\textit{Num.} 12.4-8) both attribute their creation to Numa. Cicero, though, says that Tullus Hostilius instituted their regulation of warfare (\textit{Rep.} 2.31).\textsuperscript{919} Not all scholars are convinced by the antiquity of the whole \textit{fetial} rite, but suspicion cannot be substantiated in the ancient evidence.\textsuperscript{920} It is also not clear exactly who the \textit{fetiales} were. The earliest name associated with them is Marcus Valerius, who Livy (1.24) names as the \textit{fetial} priest at the time of Tullus Hostilius.\textsuperscript{921} If Valerius is an authentic early \textit{fetial}, then it is probable that this college, like the \textit{pontifices}, consisted of patrician members.\textsuperscript{922} One of the most extreme postulations of who the \textit{fetiales} were has been put forward by Richard

\textsuperscript{918} Liv. \textit{per.} 19. This particular instance is set during the First Punic War (242) when the \textit{pontifex maximus}, Caecilius Metellus, forbade the \textit{flamen Martialis}, Aulus Postumius, to fulfill his duty as consul to wage war.

\textsuperscript{919} Livy does not tell us about the origin of the \textit{fetiales}, but we do see them early on in his narrative concluding a treaty with the Albans during the reign of Tullus Hostilius (1.24). He also records a tradition which claims Ancus Marcius originated the \textit{fetiales'} procedures for initiating a ‘just war’ (1.32; cf. \textit{De vir. ill.} 5.4 and Serv. \textit{ad Aen.} 10.14). A post regal introduction is suggested by Servius (\textit{ad Aen.} 7.695) but this is unlikely. The procedure of the fetiales was considered to have been imported to Rome by many sources, from Ardea (Dion. Hal \textit{Ant. Rom.} 2.72.2), the Falisci (Serv. \textit{ad Aen.} 7.695), or the Aequiculi (Livy 1.32; Dion. Hal. \textit{Ant. Rom.} 2.72.2; cf. \textit{ILLRP} 447). On the introduction of the \textit{fetiales} and their rites regarding warfare, see in general Penella (1987).

\textsuperscript{920} Cf. Wiedemann (1986). Rawlings (1999), 113, believes that the important element in the chronology is the memory that the \textit{fetiales} were a regal institution.

\textsuperscript{921} Marcus Valerius may be a name added to the tradition by a later member of that gens.

\textsuperscript{922} Dinoysius (\textit{Ant. Rom.} 2.72.1) records that they were chosen from the best of families.
Mitchell, who believes that they were senators performing the function of ‘international relations.’

While it is not entirely clear exactly who the fetiales were, their practices are slightly better known. The procedure for declaring war, as recorded by Livy, is as follows: the fetial goes to the border of those from whom restitution is sought, declares himself to Jupiter and the borders, and then makes his demands. If restitution is not made within three days, the priest declares war, invoking both Jupiter and Janus Quirinus, seeking the consent of king and senate (later probably just the senate), and finally launches a spear over the border of the country on which the Romans are declaring war (Livy 1.32). Livy also recorded the procedure for making a treaty. Like in the declaration of war, the king is consulted if this is the path which he wishes to take, after which the fetial harvests a piece of sacred turf from the Capitol and using a ceremonial branch designates another person (perhaps a fetial) as the pater patratus. Jupiter is then invoked as the binder of the treaty, and a pig is sacrificed using a flint knife as a symbol of the fate of those who broke the oath of the treaty (Livy 1.24).

The reasons for the creation of the fetiales are generally assumed to be somewhat straightforward by modern scholars. They have typically been seen as a necessary element in regulating the warfare of marauding kings, warlords, and gentilicial groups, but as we have seen above these are not as important as once

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923 Mitchell (2005), 142-144, cf. Idem., (1990), 109-113. In both of these works he describes the fetiales as ‘shadowy’ in nature. His argument partially rests on the translation of pater patratus, the title given to the principal fetial during missions, as ‘the father of the fatherhood,’ with the fatherhood being the senate (1990, 109-110; 2005, 143). This is an enticing possibility, which carries along with it the implication that rather than being a dedicated college of priests the fetiales were more of an extension of the senate, which provides continuity with the later practice of senatorial legates, who eventually took over many functions of the fetiales.

924 Just war required that the Romans were not the aggressors, rather that they were making war in search of restitution for previous wrongs.

925 It is interesting to note that the Romans are the only Latin people among whom we see Jupiter as a deity associated with warfare.

926 The knife was kept in the temple of Jupiter Feretrius, on which see below.
thought.\textsuperscript{927} The exact nature of this regulation is, like all things about the \textit{fetiales}, somewhat hard to understand. Much of this rests on the interpretation of the group itself, whether it was an extension of the senate or a separate group of priests. Quite interestingly, Alan Watson has argued that their practise fits in with general Roman legal practise, almost acting as judges representing Jupiter.\textsuperscript{928}

If the \textit{fetiales} were responsible for commencing a just war and concluding ‘fair’ treaties, the \textit{salii} were responsible for the Roman people before and afterward. The Salian priesthood was supposedly instituted by Numa (Livy 1.20; Dion. Hal. \textit{Ant. Rom}. 2.70; Plut. \textit{Numa} 13) and enlarged by Tullus Hostilius (Livy 1.27; Dion. Hal. \textit{Ant. Rom}. 3.32.4). Like the other priesthoods that we know of from early Rome, the \textit{salii} were patricians (Livy 4.54). The two groups of priests were devoted to Mars and Quirinus, respectively.\textsuperscript{929} On the 19th of March, the Salii performed a ceremony by which the arms of the Romans were cleansed and readied for the coming campaigning season. Conversely, on the 19th of October they cleanse the Roman people of the campaigning season.\textsuperscript{930} The antiquity of this priesthood and these cleansings is indicated by two points. The first is that the \textit{salii} were associated with single hills, those of Mars to the Palatine, probably in connection to the period before a unified city of Rome existed, but hilltop villages did. The second point is that to later Romans, the songs of \textit{salii} were incomprehensible because of the antiquity of their language (Varro \textit{Ling}. 7.2; Quint. 1.6).

\textsuperscript{927} The bibliography which links the fetial priests to this type of warfare is quite large, see in particular Rawlings (1999), 112-115, Rich (2011), 216.
\textsuperscript{928} Watson (1993).
\textsuperscript{929} Gerschel (1950).
\textsuperscript{930} Ibid.; Dumézil (1970), 276; Scullard (1981), 92-94, 195-196. I follow the interpretation of Dumézil regarding the functioning of the Salian ceremonies being related to war, rather than to agriculture as some have suggested. The ceremonies involved the sacred shields, \textit{ancila}, which were kept in the Regia.
It has been proposed by some scholars that the Roman triumph represented another act of cleansing after a season of campaigning. The procession of the ritual dedicated spolia as offerings to three different gods: the first outside the pomerium (Mars), the next were dedicated at the entrance to the city (Janus Quirinus), and the final was dedicated on the Capitoline (Jupiter Feretrius).\(^{931}\) Although much of the emphasis in later literature is on the triumph as a ritual of victory,\(^{932}\) Festus preserved the purificatory nature in a single passage, saying that the soldiers which followed the triumphant general’s chariot into town were cleansed of the bloodshed they had perpetuated (104L).\(^ {933}\) Bonfante has proposed similarities to rituals in Umbria and Etruria whose communities may have practised similar rites.\(^ {934}\) While the triumph included purificatory elements, the ability to show off the spoils of war, especially in a religiously sanctioned ritual, would have been beneficial to the triumphant general.\(^ {935}\) Armstrong has proposed that the triumph as an element of elite competition which allowed generals to publicly display their success in the previous campaign.\(^ {936}\) This religious ritual, then, served both as a cleansing ritual as well as a way for leaders to show off their success throughout the community.

### 6.2 Temples

Temples were central places in which Romans and Etruscans could conduct dealings with the gods.\(^ {937}\) For the Romans, temples provided places in which rituals could be performed, many of the earliest temples of Rome were probably preceded

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\(^{931}\) Charles-Picard (1957), 130; Magdelin (1984); McDonnell (2005).

\(^{932}\) Rich (2014).

\(^{933}\) This is not a literal translation, but an extrapolation based on the passage: *aureati milites sequebantur currum triumphantis, ut quasi purgati a caede humana intrarent urbem.*

\(^{934}\) Bonfante-Warren (1970), 55-64.

\(^{935}\) The existing literature on the triumph is extensive and too much to deal with as a whole here. For up-to-date bibliographies, see Armstrong (2013b) and Erskine (2013), 53 n. 54, and the collected essays of Lange and Vervaet (2014).

\(^{936}\) Armstrong (2013b).

\(^{937}\) On Etruscan temples in general, see Colonna (1985), on Roman temples of the Republic, see Ziolkowski (1992).
by earlier open air sanctuaries.\textsuperscript{938} The rituals which focused on these sanctuaries consisted of both public and private rites, as we have seen above. Etruscan temples, likewise, were centres of ritual activity, although it does not seem that Etruscan ritual required such elaborate buildings.\textsuperscript{939} The connection between sanctuaries, rather than temples proper, and warfare dates back to the earliest periods of civilization in central Italy, although this connection is rarely detectable in the archaeological record. In early Greece, sanctuaries had considerable connections to taboos and norms in war.\textsuperscript{940} In later times, a number of Greek sanctuaries and temples were used to deposit victory commemorations.\textsuperscript{941}

Unlike in the Greek world, there was not a strong tradition of dedicating captured arms or spoils in Etruscan and Roman temples. Early in the history of Rome martial dedications may have been made to Vulcan, but we know little about this.\textsuperscript{942} The \textit{spolia opima}, however, deserves some comment. In the historical tradition, the dedication of captured arms to a god is limited in Rome to the \textit{spolia opima}. This tradition is first attributed to Romulus (Livy 1.10; Plut. \textit{Rom}. 16; Serv. \textit{ad Aen}. 6.859).\textsuperscript{943} Only two other generals were to make this dedication in Roman

\textsuperscript{938} Cornell (1995), 108-112.
\textsuperscript{939} Barker and Rasmussen (1998), 219-227. There was considerable variance in size of buildings used for cultic purposes, ranging from simple altars and small shrines up to large temples, discussed as a survey in Colonna (2006a). An important element, if not the important element, of Etruscan temples, regarding ritual, was the sacred area established around the central altar or shrine, with or without a building, Izzet (2007), 126-30.
\textsuperscript{940} Whitley (2001), 134-40.
\textsuperscript{941} Famously, two Etruscan helmets, captured by Hieron I of Syracuse and dedicated at Olympia.
\textsuperscript{942} Carafa (1998), 105-110, details the finds in the archaic Volcanal, including a number of spearheads. Spoils taken from defeated enemies were occasionally burned in honor of Vulcan, with one instance of this occurring in the archaic period (Livy 1.37), but the practice is better attested in later Roman history (cf. Livy 30.6, 41.12).
\textsuperscript{943} The versions given by Livy and Plutarch are rather similar but show that there was not a unified tradition down to the time of the latter’s writing. Livy’s narrative is much simpler and plainer than that of Plutarch, who gives an elaborate version of events: Romulus and Acron (king of Caenina) challenge one another to single combat, Romulus vows a dedication to Jupiter if he is allowed to win, he carefully considers how to make this dedication, he then cuts down a gigantic oak tree to construct the trophy. The most elaborate element of Livy’s narrative is Romulus’ dedication of the temple of Jupiter Feretrius. The construction of the trophy by Romulus in the eighth century has been doubted, especially as the narrative traditions describe it in terms of a Greek \textit{tropaion} (Ogilvie [1965], 71).
history, Aulus Cornelius Cossus (Livy 4.19-20; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 12.5; Prop. 4.10; Val. Max. 3.2.4; Festus 204L; Front. Strat. 2.8.9; Plut. Rom. 16, Marc. 8)\(^\text{944}\) and Marcus Claudius Marcellus (Livy Per. 20; Verg. Aen. 6.855-859; Prop. 4.10; Val. Max. 3.2.5; Festus 204L; Front. Strat. 4.5.4; Plut. Marc. 7-8). The origin of this ceremony is a debated issue in modern scholarship. Some scholars believe that the rite did indeed date to the regal period, while others contend that it was a later innovation.\(^\text{945}\)

Adding further to the controversy of the antiquity of the *spolia opima* is the nature of the ceremony itself. There seems to have been a rather confused tradition which reached the Late Republic and Early Principate. According to Livy, the *spolia opima* could only be dedicated by a Roman commander who had killed an enemy commander in battle (4.20.6).\(^\text{946}\) Another tradition remembered that there were three different kinds the *spolia opima*, the first to be dedicated to Jupiter Feretrius, the second to Mars, and the third to Quirinus (Festus 204L; Plut. Marc. 8; Serv. ad Aen. 6.589).\(^\text{947}\) Scholars have offered a number of suggestions as to how these three types

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\(^{944}\) Cossus’ dedication is famously complicated, as Augustus supposedly found the linen corselet which was part of this dedication during his restoration of the temple of Jupiter Feretrius (Livy 4.20). This ‘discovery’ was possibly a tactic used by Augustus to deny Marcus Licinius Crassus the ability to dedicate the *spolia opima* after his defeat of the Bastarnae in 29 B.C., this is because Augustus claimed evidence that Cossus was consul, rather than military tribune, under the dictator Mamarces Aemilius. See Rich (1999) and Sailor (2006) for a detailed discussion of the interplay of historical authority and political authority in the early Principate and earlier bibliography on the discussion. It is notable, that the name of the king of Veii, Lars Tolumnius, was preserved in the Roman tradition. In the later siege and capture of Veii the name of the king was unknown to the annalists, even though the latter event was of considerably more importance in their narratives (cf. Livy 5.1, where we hear stories about this king but are given no name). This leads me to believe that there was some type of epigraphic evidence for the defeat of Tolumnius surviving during the time of the early Roman historians; this evidence had clearly disappeared by the time of Livy, with him only able to cite the linen books and the earlier historians, especially that information cited by Licinius Macer (Livy 4.20).

\(^{945}\) Stewart (1998), 80-89, believes that the process dated to the regal period. Flower (2000) argues that the version of the ceremony that is preserved in our evidence was the invention of Marcus Claudius Marcellus.

\(^{946}\) This is supported further by statements in Propertius (4.10) and Festus (206L). On the Propertius passage, see Garani (2007).

\(^{947}\) This second tradition was supposedly based on the books of Numa, themselves a matter of controversy and undoubtedly not genuine to the time of Numa, if they existed at all. Livy (40.29) tells the story of the discovery of the books of Numa which were buried along with the king (cf. Plut. Numa 22).
of dedications related to one another. One suggestion is that they each corresponded to a different dedicatory location, to the shrine of Mars in the Campus Martius went the third, the second to the temple of Janus Quirinus, and the first to Jupiter Feretrius.\textsuperscript{948} John Rich has argued against this idea.\textsuperscript{949} It has also been suggested that the three types of spolia represented a hierarchical system of dedications, donated in descending order by a commander who slew an opposing commander, by a leader fighting under the auspices of another, and then by a normal Roman soldier.\textsuperscript{950}

There is evidence that certain Etruscan cites or individual elites did dedicate offerings of some kind after a military victory, although this does not seem to be common.\textsuperscript{951} Rather than practicing this ritualized dedication, it is probable that Roman and Etruscan elites dedicated entire temples after military victories.\textsuperscript{952} This behaviour was common in the Roman Republic, with Becker counting 37 instances of new temple dedication during the Republican period for this purpose.\textsuperscript{953} The only certain instance of an Etruscan temple being dedicated by an individual is that of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{948} Picard (1957), 131-33 and Bonfante Warren (1970), 49-66.
\textsuperscript{950} Rüpke (1990), 219-20.
\textsuperscript{951} There is some evidence of Etruscan dedications at Delphi after a military victory. Though the source of the dedications in question is unknown, Strabo (5.2.3) does record that Caere kept a sanctuary at Delphi and it is possible the dedications originated from that city. The Etruscan dedications may have been part of a play for ‘spatial dominance’ at the sanctuary, possibly competing with Lipara; see Scott (2010), 91-93 and Colonna (1984), 557-78. Evidence of individuals dedicating offerings after a victory is provided by the \textit{Elogia} from Tarquinia, which may claim that Velthur Spurinna dedicated a number of metal items to a deity following a successful military campaign, Torelli (1975), 30-38. Interpretation of these inscriptions, however, is difficult and should be made with caution; although it is possible that the events they commemorate relate to the time period under question in this work, it is not entirely clear, see the review of Cornell (1978), 167-73. Rome is said to have dedicated a golden bowl to the Apollo of Delphi (Livy 5.25, 28) after the defeat of Veii. This occurrence has generally been accepted, with Ogilvie (1965), 689, giving evidence in favour of believing the story about the Liparian pirates.
\textsuperscript{952} Becker (2009). Lulof (2014) argues that there was a considerable expansion in temple construction in Central Italy during the late sixth century that was spurred on by elites.
\textsuperscript{953} Ibidem, 92 n. 20. In all 48 temples were known to have been constructed based on a vow, out of about 80 which were built. During the early Republic, we only hear of six temples vowed because of war. Two may be argued for the regal period, being two temples dedicated to Jupiter. The practice is then better attested in the middle Republic, for which the historical evidence is richer and possibly more accurate. We should not, however, read back the circumstances of the later dedications into the early period, as it is dangerous to assume such a static nature was involved in Roman religious and political dialogue.
\end{footnotesize}
Pyrgi, dedicated by Thefarie Velianas.\textsuperscript{954} In Rome, however, we know of a number of temples dedicated because of military campaigns. For instance, in 396 Camillus vowed to rededicate the temple of Mater Matuta, which had originally been dedicated by Servius Tullius, before marching against Veii (Livy 5.19).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temple</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Adversary</th>
<th>Vowing</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Sources\textsuperscript{955}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jupiter Feretrius\textsuperscript{956}</td>
<td>Regal</td>
<td>Caenina</td>
<td>Romulus Rex</td>
<td>L 1.10</td>
<td>D 2.34.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jupiter Optimus Maximus</td>
<td>Regal</td>
<td>Sabines</td>
<td>Lucius Rex</td>
<td>L 1.38;</td>
<td>Tarquinius D 3.69.1</td>
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<td>Priscus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Castor (and Pollux)</td>
<td>499/496</td>
<td>Latins</td>
<td>Aulus Dictator</td>
<td>L 2.20</td>
<td>Postumius (D) 6.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liber, Libera, Ceres\textsuperscript{957}</td>
<td>496(?)</td>
<td>Volsci</td>
<td>Aulus Dictator</td>
<td>D 6.17</td>
<td>Postumius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mater Matuta</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>Veii</td>
<td>MarcusDictator</td>
<td>L 5.19</td>
<td>Furius Camillus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juno Regina</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>Veii</td>
<td>Marcus Dictator</td>
<td>L 5.21</td>
<td>Furius D 13.3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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\textsuperscript{954} Colonna (1965).

\textsuperscript{955} L = Livy; D = Dionysius of Halicarnassus Ant. Rom.

\textsuperscript{956} We do not hear that this temple was vowed before or during the war, but its dedication was the direct result of the conflict. Although the stories surrounding the foundation of this temple are almost certainly anachronistic, the association of this temple with an early rex named Romulus or something similar, is not impossible, and the association of this temple with warfare is quite explicit throughout the sources.

\textsuperscript{957} The reasons given for this dedication are not limited to warfare, perhaps the most important reason for this dedication was the drought which had ravaged Roman crops. Dionysius does note, however, that the war with the Volsci prevented the import of grain from abroad, thus contributing to the vowing of the temple.
Perhaps the most spectacular story of a dedication, however, comes from the Battle of Lake Regillus (499 or 496). The Dioscuri were said to have helped the Romans to win the battle (Cic. Nat. D. 2.6, 3.11-13; Tusc. 1.28; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.13; Val. Max. 1.8.1A, c; Front. Str. 1.11.8; Plut. Aem. 25.2-4; Cor. 3.4; Flor. 1.5.4; Lact. Inst. 2.7.9; De vir. Ill. 16.3). As the tide of the battle was turning towards the Romans, Aulus Postumius Albinus, the dictator, vowed a temple to Castor (Livy 2.20). There is evidence that this temple indeed dates to a very early period of the city’s history. The historicity of the vow, and the story of the Dioscuri at Lake Regillus, has been doubted and a fourth-century terminus post quem has been suggested. Other scholars point out that certain elements of the story likely came into the tradition in the second century. The temple, however, could represent, in part, the Roman praise for the cavalry in the Battle, which is carried over in the traditions of the vow and the battle which we possess. A similar line of thought allowed

958 The existence of an archaic structure beneath the late Republican temple to Castor and Pollux may validate the historicity of an early Republican foundation, Holloway (1994), 7-8, which has been accepted and repeated by other authors, such as Cornell (1995), 68. That worship of these twin deities had reached Latium by the traditional foundation date of the temple is suggested by a dedication to them found at Lavinium in 1958, castorei podlouqueique quirois (ILLRP 1271a).
959 Richardson (2013), 903-905.
960 Wiseman (1994), 137, Idem. (2004), 188, believes that the part of the story regarding the bronze beard of Domitius was likely added to the story with the first consulship of a member of that family. The first of their line to be elected to this office was Gn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who was consul in 192. This seems like a probable conclusion, but does not merit regarding the entire story as fiction. If the story of the Battle of Lake Regillus was already a famous event, then it makes sense why the family would have tried to write themselves into it.
Tagliamonte to propose a connection between the spread of elite ‘horsemanship ideology’ and the worship of the Dioscuri.\footnote{Tagliamonte (2004).} This possible element in the construction of this temple is only part of the complex identity of these gods.

It is worth noting, that during the early Republic, we see most temples being vowed in war by dictators. The one exception was the temple of Mars, vowed during the Gallic War, by Titus Quinctius, a duumvir sacris faciundis.\footnote{Later known as the decemviri sacris faciundis, this was a college of priests founded during the reign of Tarquinius Superbus (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.62). They were primarily responsible for the maintenance and consultation of the Sibylline Books (cf. Livy 7.27, 21.62, 31.12). Originally a collegiate position, their numbers were increased to ten in 367, with half being patrician and half plebian (Livy 6.37, 42). Their numbers were increased again, twice, in the later republic, once by Julius Caesar (Dio Cass. 42.51). They were responsible for the games dedicated to Apollo (Livy 10.8) as well as the secular games (Tac. Ann. 11.11). Servius implies that they were priests of Apollo (\textit{ad Aen.} 3.332).} This could be symptomatic of the vower needing to possess \textit{imperium}. Whilst the consuls typically held the highest type of \textit{imperium} in the Republic, during times of crisis this power was invested in the dictator alone. With sole possession of the highest power in the land, dictators were able to bind the state, through solemn vows, to build these temples.\footnote{Orlin (2002), 45-66. See, though Ziolkowski (1992), 195-198.}

If, indeed, temples were commonly dedicated by victorious generals, or other private citizens, after a military victory, their importance should not be underestimated. These structures add a religious element to the dialogue of monumentality already at play with elite constructions, such as those at Poggio Civitate and Acquarossa.\footnote{Meyers (2012).} Temples dedicated after a military victory would keep that success in the forefront of socio-political discussions in those communities. Keeping these memories in the minds of their contemporaries enhanced the status
and power of those who dedicated the temples.\footnote{Marcus (2003). Orlin (2002), 66-73, though, has pointed out that dedications in the middle Republican period often involved consultation of the Senate, and if this practice can be read back into the archaic period, we may have to question the effectiveness of this practice of display.} Religious power, exercised through temple construction, then, actively affected the maintenance of military power, in a theoretical sense. This would have been extremely important in a socio-political environment which saw elite families competing for power so fiercely within their communities, as was the case in central Italy.

Temples and other monumental structures also provided ample space for elites to display, advertise, and encourage their way of life, including warfare.\footnote{This display would have been important within the immediate community, as well as on a regional level if it is true that foreigners would have frequented these temples, Glinister (2003).} This is best shown by the terracotta plaques which were used to decorate many of these structures.\footnote{Roth-Murray (2007).} These frieze plaques showed a number of military scenes, such as the departure of warriors, victory,\footnote{Roth-Murray (2007).} and cavalry charges/manoeuvres.\footnote{For instance, the cavalry frieze of the so-called Veii-Velletri-Rome system shows a number of charging horsemen. See Winter (2009) 311-94.} Beyond the basic association of some of these plaques with temples, there is a possible linkage of religion and warfare in the images themselves. The best example of this is from Tuscania, but currently in Munich;\footnote{Museum antiker Kleinkunst 5033.} the plaque shows the departure of two warriors on foot, and a third mounting a chariot, but the lead figure, who is not armed, is holding what is most probably a \textit{lituus}.\footnote{Note the analysis of the iconography of power at Chiusi by Jannot (1993), which shows that the \textit{lituus} could also function as a political symbol.} Whether this is an image of warriors being escorted to the next life or departing for actual war, the presence of a priest confirms a connection between warfare and religion.\footnote{Chateigner (1989), 124-25.}
6.3 The Gods and War

The gods of Etruria and Rome were portrayed, in some instances, as warriors. This is not uncommon in the Ancient Mediterranean. In the Hellenic world, a number of gods were associated with war or were thought to actively participate in mortal warfare.973 Ares was the god of war par excellence. He is portrayed in some sources as representing “the mindless carnage of combat” and all of the awful things that that entailed.974 Alternatively, Ares, the embodiment of war, could also be seen in a more positive light, even being described as πολισόος (protector of cities),975 which is more often associated with Athena. Sharing primacy in war along with Ares was Athena, who is often represented as the cool and cunning side of warfare: tactical and orderly. The personalities of these two deities of war, however, are considerably more complicated than we have time to explore.976 Within the Greek pantheon, as well, we find a number of other deities associated with war, which may have varied from polis to polis.977

The Etruscan pantheon is no less diverse and interesting than that of the Greeks, in some ways it is even more interesting. What sets it apart, however, is our comparative lack of knowledge, thanks to the usual combination of lack of Etruscan literature and questionably useful Greco-Roman sources. We do know, however, that this pantheon was complex and seemed to have been influenced, in some ways, by contact with Hellenic and Latin culture, although, we cannot underestimate the differences between the Etruscan deities and their supposed Greek and Roman

973 Rawlings (2007), 177-79.
976 See Deacy (2000).
counterparts. This being said, the pantheon of the Etruscans had parallels for both Ares/Mars and Athena/Minerva.

Laran has come to be identified with Ares/Mars within the Etruscan pantheon. It has been suggested that this deity was added into the Etruscan pantheon relatively late in their cultural history. We do not hear of him until the fourth century BC, and he is not found among the gods of the Piacenza liver. His equivalence with Ares/Mars is confirmed by a number of depictions along canonical lines, such as his participation in a gigantomachy on a mirror from Populonia or his placement with Turan, Aphrodite. Athena/Minerva is represented in the Etruscan pantheon by Menerva. Many images exist of Menerva as an armed deity, often using similar iconography to that of the Hellenic variety of the deity. The origin of Menerva is controversial, with some scholars believing her to be an indigenous Etruscan deity, while others believe that she was an externally influenced creation.

Other deities appear as armed figures in Etruscan iconography. Mariś, once thought to be the Etruscan equivalent of Mars, appears armed in many depictions. The nature of this deity, though, is controversial, and his place within Etruscan religion is not well understood. De Grummond has proposed that Mariś is best understood as an equivalent to the Latin Genius, although a consensus has yet to be reached. Sethlans, the Etruscan interpretation of Hephaistos/Vulcan, is depicted on

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980 Jannot (2005), 164.
981 Simon (1984), 501 (with bibliography).
982 Ibidem, 502-503.
983 de Grummond (2006), 71-78.
985 For example CSE 2.16a, which shows Mariś, armed with a spear, seated in the presence of Tinia and Lasa.
986 de Grummond (2006), 140-44.
a fourth-century mirror from Arezzo wielding a two headed axe. Although there is no strong connection between Sethlans and warfare, as a god of crafts he may have been associated with the production of arms and armour, although his cult is almost unknown from the archaeology of Etruria.

Many Roman gods were associated with warfare. The most readily to mind is Mars, who is remembered primarily as the god of war. Mars may have also been associated with the agricultural cycle of archaic Rome, although his primary function as a war god is probable. His function and place in the regal period is indicated by his presence in the calendar at the beginning and end of the campaign cycle. During these festivals the population of Rome is cleansed and readied for war and then cleansed of the filth of the actual practise of war. These festivals are very old, although we have no secure dating. The presence of the Salii in the lustrations, and the storage of their sacred shields in the Regia, implies that these rights date to the regal period. It is also here that we find one of the only associations of Mars with the kings, besides his siring of Romulus and Remus (Livy 1.4). It could be that Mars was a deity especially identified with Romans besides the reges, as the Campus Martius was either dedicated (Livy 2.5) or rededicated after the expulsion of the Tarquins (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.13.2).

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987 CSE 1.1.13a.
989 Dumézil (1970), 205-272. Dumézil’s arguments were built up over a period of decades, and are convincing to me in his rejection of Mars as a primarily agricultural deity. I do not, however, agree with his conception of an ‘archaic triad’ of Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus, as representing the ‘three functions’ of Indo-European society, the theory of which does predate his studies by almost a century.
990 Scullard (1981), 85-87, 89, 193-195. In many ways, this overlaps with the agricultural cycle as well. The militaristic aspects of the ceremonies during these times, such as the parades of the Salii, however, belie the relation of these rites to warfare. See the brief comments by Balsdon (1966).
992 Coarelli (2010) advocates an archaic date, finding evidence that the development of the city and of the calendar make a logical pair.
993 In the version preserved by Dionysius, the reason that the Campus Martius had to be rededicated was that the Tarquins had usurped its divine use for their own.
Two other gods are directly associated with the practise of warfare in early Rome, Quirinus and Jupiter. Quirinus was associated with the opening and closing rituals of the new campaigning season. The Salian priests dedicated to this god participated in these rituals alongside their counterparts devoted to Mars, and represented the transition from peace to war and from war to peace. His relationship to Mars is often complicated by the combined name Mars-Quirinus appearing a number of times, especially in reference to agricultural issues. This connection could be due to the necessity of military protection to the safety of agriculture in the archaic period; as we have seen above, raiding often threatened agriculture. Quirinus is also invoked, in the guise of Janus Quirinus, in the procedure of the fetiales when making peace (Livy 1.32). The role of Quirinus was in the conclusion of war and the maintenance of the Roman community between campaigning seasons. The role of Jupiter in warfare is perhaps more subtle than Mars and Quirinus, but the association is definite. That the spolia opima was dedicated to Jupiter Feretrius indicates that he was seen as being directly responsible for victories of this kind. And like Quirinus, his invocation in the conclusion of treaties (Livy 1.32) demonstrates that he played a role in the ending of wars.

A number of Etruscan heroic figures, whose story is as much mythology as history, are also characterized by their military character. Important for our discussion are the figures of Caele and Avle Vipinas. The exploit most closely

997 Dumézil (1970), 589-590; cf. Rich (2011). In a later attestation, Polybius attests that whilst the first treaty with Carthage was made invoking Jupiter, later treaties invoked Mars and Quirinus (3.25). This is a point on which we know very little.
998 Magdelain (1984). According to Festus, Quirinus was not defenseless as he was armed with a lance (238L). Polybius calls him ‘warlike’ at one point (3.25.6) which is hard to deny. His role as a military deity may be further argued for if we trust Festus (204L) that the spolia tertia were dedicated to him.
999 The silex used by the fetial priests to sacrifice the pig, necessary in treaty signings, was kept in the temple of Jupiter Feretrius (Paul. Fest. 81L).
associated with the Vipinas is the etymological association of Caele and the Caelian Hill in Rome. The often cited speech of the emperor Claudius also describes Caele as the companion of Macstarna, who was to become the Roman king, Servius Tullius. Importantly for Etruscan religion, however, the brothers Vipinas famously ambushed and probably captured the prophet Cacu. In various images, the brothers are depicted as armed and threatening towards the prophet and his assistant, Artile. This story may illustrate the importance of the revealed divine knowledge of Etruscan religious belief, it was important enough to be taken by the sword.

The gods of Etruria and Rome were not just figures to be etched on mirrors or sculpted in bronze, they played an active part in the lives of these peoples. The gods communicated through a variety of signs which could be interpreted by those with sacred knowledge. Knowledge of divination was passed down through families, and was probably a guarded secret. Of these practices, the divinatory examination of livers and entrails (haruspicy) is possibly the most well known. This examination could tell the haruspex the will of the gods through observation of the blood, anatomical defects, or disease. Undoubtedly the gods were consulted in this manner regarding warfare. Although typically associated with Roman practices, divination by watching the flight of birds, “taking the auspices,” was practised in Etruria. We might have an example of this practice being used to seek the gods’ will regarding warfare in a painting from the François Tomb, Vulci. An Etruscan augur named Vel Saties is watching the flight of what has been identified as a woodpecker, a bird sacred to Laran. If this interpretation of the painting is

1001 de Grummond (2006a), 28 (fig. II.5), 174-75 (figs. VIII.1-2).
1002 de Grummond (2006a), 53-54.
1005 Etruscan haruspices were consulted, but ignored, by the emperor Julian on whether or not he should execute a certain campaign (Amm. Marc. 23.5.10).
correct, it shows the importance of avian divination to warfare. This type of divination is very public and served as a means of legitimating a military campaign or action, this is an exploitative crossover between religious and military social power.

The form of Etruscan divination for which we have the most knowledge of, however, is the art of the *fulgurator, brontoscopy*, the examination of thunder and lightning. Understanding the will of the gods through lightening was extremely important for the Etruscans. The exact nature of how this worked is not quite clear, however. Some sources believed that only nine gods of the Etruscan pantheon could wield the lightning-bolts which communicated with mortal men. To further elaborate the tradition, Seneca describes three different types of lightning which have different meanings. This tradition is controversial among modern historians, however, and influences ranging from the Near East to the Greek world have been proposed as the source of this Roman tradition about the Etruscans. What is important for the current study, though, is a divinatory calendar based on brontoscopy preserved in an early Byzantine text.

John the Lydian (fl. sixth century AD) compiled a work on omens (*de ostentis*) which included a section (27-38) on *brontoscopy*. For some time, this text has been neglected because it drew strong opinions on its antiquity. Recently, though, a strong argument has been made by J. M. Turfa as to its usefulness in analyzing Etruscan society. In brief, although the calendar owes some of its structure and contents to a Near Eastern or Mesopotamian origin, the bulk of the

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1007 Pliny, *NH*, 2.138-40. Tinia is also credited with possessing three types of lightning.
1008 Sen., *Q Nat*, 2.39, 49; see however 2.47.
1009 For the most up-to-date discussion with full bibliography, see Turfa (2012), 51-9.
1010 Dumézil (1970), 637-49.
information it contains can be included in the discussion of Etruscan history. The contents of the calendar reveal the importance of divining war to the Etruscans. While thunder being heard on four days throughout the year may indicate the coming of peace, approximately thirty-one days of the year signal war if thunder is heard.\(^{1012}\)

The details of these predicted wars are diverse. For example, if thunder is heard on “25 November” the coming war will be “very dangerous,” while thunder on the next day, “26 November,” will signal civil war and much death.\(^{1013}\) The varying degrees of severity and threat could indicate a mechanism by which the diviner could manipulate those listening to his advice. The abundant appearances of warfare in the *Brontoscopic Calendar* are a further link between religion and warfare in Etruria. Because the interpretation of these omens was restricted to certain elite families, this ritual helped to further the dominance of the elite classes of military power; they knew when war was coming, or when to wage war.

The taking of the auspices is the Roman practise of divination for which we have the most evidence and is most connected to the sphere of warfare.\(^{1014}\) Traditionally this was the practise of divination through watching the flight and actions of birds. The term later became synonymous with many other types of divination in Roman religion. It is well attested in the annalists for the archaic period, and might have had its origins quite early in the history of the city.\(^{1015}\)

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1012 We could, possibly, include two more instances. For “27 June” thunder would indicate “danger from the army for the men in power,” while thunder on “3 January” indicates “loss after victory for those in war.” Although these do not directly predict war, they do pertain to war. Translations adapted from Turfa (2012), 88, 96.
1013 Turfa (2012), 95.
1014 On the auspices and *imperium*, see above chapter 4.
1015 Livy (1.6-7) relates that Romulus and Remus used augury to decide who would rule the city that they had just founded. Whilst this story is almost certainly fictional, it shows that the Romans associated augury with the earliest phases of their city. Reference to augury can be found on the Lapis Niger. Cf. ter Beck (2012).
a divinatory art that was connected to Jupiter. The practice was executed by both magistrates and a special college of priests whose job it was to interpret these portents. The power to read the auspices was central to the authority of magistrates (Gell. NA 13.15.4). Before a military commander went on campaign he was required to take the auspices to make sure that the future campaign was satisfactory to the gods. This was a very public act which legitimated the magistrate’s ability to wage war in the eyes of the people. By performing these ceremonies, Roman magistrates were able to combine religious and military power to further affect their goals.

6.4 Conclusions

This chapter has examined the role of the gods in warfare. Certain deities were closely associated with warfare, and show close parallels to Greek gods. The association between these gods and warfare, however, ran deeper than Hellenization, as they were associations deeply rooted in Etruscan and Roman culture. These gods directly impacted the warfare of mortals, typically through the practise of divination, although some are said to have fought alongside mortals, such as the Dioscuri at Lake Regillus. Likewise, martial pressure in the form of an ambush or raid allowed certain Etruscan heroes to seize and exploit the religious knowledge of prophets, knowledge that no doubt helped them later in their stories. Between the actual deities of the Etruscan and Roman pantheons, and the revealed knowledge of the prophets, enlightened Etruscans and Romans were able to see the will of the gods through certain portents, the best known to us being through thunder and birds. All of this shows that religion and warfare were deeply connected in central Italy.

For instance, Jupiter is invoked when Numa took the auspices as he was deliberating becoming rex in Rome (Livy 1.18). Cicero says that Jupiter is the god who controls the portents (Leg. 2.20).


It was even essential to the power of the kings, see Scullard (1980), 66-69, Cornell (1995), 143.
The evidence of ceremonies and divinatory practices are examples of the religious elite of central Italy also possessing the power to influence the realm of warfare. This was an important tool that allowed the religiously dominant groups to affect behaviours beneficial to them, whether that was waging war or coming up with an excuse to avoid it. Through military victories, elites were able to fund and justify the construction of temples throughout the region. This construction allowed these figures to perpetuate ideals which benefited their social group, in many cases this a promulgation of warfare, either through post victory dedications or through the commissioning of militaristic decoration. Through this art, as well, elites developed their identity, associated with both war and religion, by having their deities portrayed in the same image as the elites. This interplay between warfare and religion aided in the social dominance of elite groups.
7. General Conclusions

Our understanding of central Italy is constantly changing. The progress of archaeological research over the past century has increased our knowledge of the region considerably. One of the most visible results of this archaeological work has been to show that the primary settlements of central Italy, the great city-states of the historical period, emerged at the beginning of the Early Iron Age and began a centuries-long period of extensive growth. The inhabitants of these places gathered around themselves a vast wealth over the course of almost a thousand years, before Rome conquered the peninsula. Throughout this growth and accumulation, these cities became more and more centralized. Burial patterns begin to hint at the existence of state structures from at least the eighth century, at which point these centres begin to build monumental defensive structures. It is probably not a coincidence that these two turning points almost coincide; it is at this point that we see non-kin, non-familiar, states coming into being. At the centre of this development was the practise of warfare.

The rich and powerful were buried with arms, perhaps in an attempt to identify as ‘warriors’ in death, perhaps a reality in life. This identity was created in an environment where warfare was rampant, so rampant that settlements had to be specially protected against it. In order to create these personas, though, central Italian elites did not rely solely on local traditions and customs. They enhanced their position through the import of exotic metal armours from northern Europe, perhaps even using their positions of power to import craftsmen. These imports allowed the quasi-political military figures of the Iron Age to create an ideology accessible only to those like them, with a restricted repertoire of imagery, primarily martial in nature.
All aspects of social power were tied up within this group and it was through the actions of these powerful persons that the early states developed. During this great period of urbanization and social formation kings ruled, at least in Rome. The evidence for rulers in Etruria is unclear, although there is mythologized literary evidence that kings also ruled in the Etruscan polities. These figures, whether reges or something else, used their monopoly on social power (ideological, economic, military, political) to control the settlements in which they lived. According to the problematic, and much elaborated historical narratives, there were state mechanisms in place to coerce individuals into military service under these figures. This is the time of the supposed Romulean army, which is probably a reconstruction of Republican historians, but there is probably a kernel of truth to the existence of a state army.

By the sixth century, the Roman state had become strong and centralized. The major army reform of this period, the so-called Servian Constitution, marked a new era in Roman warfare. In the absence of the shadow of the oppressive hoplite narrative, we have shown that this reform looked a lot more like the version preserved in the literary sources than has been believed for some time. The theory that the Servian army was made up of a single class, forming a Roman phalanx, has been shown to be weak and grounded in few pieces of substantial evidence. Instead, it has been demonstrated that in the literature of the late Republic and early Principate there was a continuing confusion over what the term *classis* meant before the Middle Republic and that confusion is not enough to dismiss the received memory of a complex Servian army. This complex system continued to be used into the Republican period because it allowed for the ruling group to coerce citizens into
military service. This system survived the fifth century and was probably a core component of Rome’s strength for much of its rise to power.

Contrary to the recent trend of emphasizing the role of private warfare, this study has argued that this played a very limited role, if any at all, in the warfare of central Italy from the sixth century onward. The so-called expedition of the Fabii was not a patriotic private war, but an elaborated story about a powerful family. The other actors typically described as condottieri may have been violent individuals, but their practice of warfare was not private. Sextus Tarquin, Appius Claudius, and Coriolanus all went to war on behalf of states. Within this social milieu, though, existed men who were willing to go to war for pay, in whatever form that may have taken. All of this is evidence for horizontal social mobility in central Italy, but not for extensive private warfare.

This is not to say that competitive behaviour was unknown, but this competition was centred on the community. Competitive display and acquisition of religious and economic power drove warfare. Waging war gave elites the opportunity to dedicate temples, thus creating a monumental legacy for themselves and their family. This same warfare allowed for the accumulation of material wealth through the capture of booty, which we know was a common behaviour.

The same religious concepts which encouraged elites to go to war encouraged their communities to accept this warfare. The image of deities and mythical heroes overlapped with the successful political figure. Through the development of artistic styles and norms, elites could visually equate themselves to these figures. Sacred knowledge allowed this same group of elites to claim knowledge of the will of the gods, allowing them to manipulate when or if war was made. The involvement of the gods, as well, could allow individuals with sacred
knowledge to exculpate themselves from military failure by manipulating the interpretations of certain signs. In these ways, warfare and religion were deeply connected in Tyrrhenian Italy.

The accumulation of material wealth was an almost unavoidable outcome of successful warfare. Slaves and cattle were seized at will during successful wars, two extremely valuable resources. The trade with the eastern Mediterranean which was fuelled by the elite’s lust for exotic objects opened up the opportunity for material gain through piracy, a form of low-intensity warfare. Piracy was practised from an early period and eventually became endemic in the central Mediterranean. Considerable wealth could be collected through this activity.

Throughout all of these discussions one thing remains clear, that warfare was deeply connected to political, economic, and ideological power in central Italy. The overlapping of these sources of social power created a matrix of social dominance, this matrix being controlled by the elites. As the execution of these powers was focused on settlements, we come once more to the key point of this work. Private warfare was an unnecessary and unproductive activity; competitive elites could achieve the same ends that have been argued as the motivation for private warfare, through the execution of state-based warfare. In any case, states had considerable control over warfare and piracy and thus we may conclude that the Tyrrhenian way of war was one of states.
Appendix 1 – Figures

Most figures carry two citations. The first being the source of the image and the second being the original publication of the artefact or one of the principal studies of the artefact, where further bibliography may be found.

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