Informal Land Controls,

A Case of Karachi-Pakistan.

This Thesis is Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or any other university or place of learning, nor is being submitted concurrently in candidature for any degree or other award.

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Table of Contents

Chapter 5
North Nazimabad:
A Symbol of Karachi's Socio-Spatial Divide

Chapter 8

Summary

This thesis aims to explore the socio-spatial control mechanisms, termed as *Informal land controls* – used by informal power intermediaries termed *informal structures* to produce space to claim public resources in Karachi-Pakistan. Such informal structures include but are not limited to: political parties, bonds of tribe and kinship, religious authorities, neighbourhood committees, gangs and other criminals. The concept of informal land controls is integrally embedded within the processes of informality and production of space in Karachi and is used to examine political conflicts, social divisions and the spiral of violence evident in Karachi, especially from mid-2000 onwards.

The study introduces the concept of informal land controls to address the gap in the literature, both on informality and production of space, which currently remains focussed on the state, market and the poor, and thus, neglects the role of power intermediaries. Such informal processes of production of space that are neither 'from above' i.e. state and market driven, nor 'from below', but 'from between'.

The research is based on four case study areas in Karachi – North Nazimabad, Lyari, PIB Colony and Scheme 33 – which demonstrate how multiple and overlapping informal structures initiate and maintain informal land controls, and how these are linked with the failure of formal government and prevailing informality in planning decisions. A wide range of licit and illicit measures are used – including political domination; religious discourse; cultural practice; tribal identity; property control; barriers, flags and wall-chalking; harassment; extortion; violence, street control and homicides. The result is a complex network of socio-spatial divisions that form 'no-go' areas of varying degrees, which have exacerbated social divisions and violence in the city. The research argues that understanding such processes is essential to underpin interventions to reduce violence and extortion, and ensure more equitable access to urban resources.

Disclaimer

This research has been conducted and the document produced for the sole purpose of academic research and understanding, without any political or monetary objectives. The analysis and conclusion of the research are based on the interviews of the relevant people, whose names have been anonymised due to ethical and security reasons, and secondary sources that are referenced appropriately. The author is not responsible for the authenticity of the degree of validity of the facts reported in the newspapers, however, such news reports have been triangulated by confirming that it is reported by all major newspapers. The nature of the research topic entails to talk about political parties and their role in the city in connection with the research, however, utmost care has been taken to present the viewpoint of both the conflicting groups wherever possible. However, the aim of the research is not to target any political party and to damage its popularity or question its ideology, the research is done in good faith to identify urban problems of Karachi that its residents are facing.

List of Abbreviations

AHI	Abul Hasan Isphahani Road
ANP	Awami National Party
ASWJ	Ahle-sunnat-wal Jamat
CDGK	City District Government Karachi
DHA	Defence Housing Authority
F-UC2	Formally developed area of Union Council 2
I-UC2	Informally developed area of Union Council 2
JI	Jamat-e-Islami
JUI	Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam
K.E	Karachi Electric. (Previously, Karachi Electric Supply Corporation)
KMC	Karachi Municipal Corporation
KRC	Kutchi Rabita Committee
KWSB	Karachi Water and Sewage Board
L J	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
LDA	Lyari Development Authority
LEA	Law Enforcement Agencies
MDA	Malir Development Authority
MNA	Member National Legislative Assembly
MPA	Member Provincial Legislative Assembly
MQM	Muttahida Qaomi Movement
MWM	Majlis-e-Wahdat-ul-Muslimeen
PAC	People's Aman Committee
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf
SH	Shahrah-e-Humayun
SITE	Sindh Industrial and Trading Estate
SLGO	Sind Local Government Ordinance
SMP	Sipah Mohammed Pakistan
SNJ	Shahrah-e-Noor Jahan
SSP	Sipah Sahaba Pakistan
SSS	Sher Shah Soori Road

List of Figures

List of Tables

List of Maps

List of Boxes

Box 4.1: Sindh Local Government Ordinance (SLGO 2001) & City District Government Karachi

Box 5.1: Water Issue

Box 5.2: Rangers presence and issues for the residents and businesses

Box 5.3: *JIRGA*

Box 5.4: Sunni-Shia Conflict over Water

Box 5.5: The shutting of wine shop

Box 5.6: Ordinary issues to conflicts on religious basis

Box 6.1: Conflict over installing barrier; access control as change in boundary

Box 6.2: Rules in Deer Colony

Box 6.3: Extortion demand and defending the leader and the territory

Box 6.4: *Karahi* Hotel; a case of access and resource control

Box 6.5: Encroachments on parks and development of apartments.

Box 7.1: A Muhajir ex-patriates experience of investing in property in Scheme-33

Box 7.2: A Pashtoon resident's experience of living in various parts of Scheme 33

List of Pictures

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Since the year 2000, Karachi has been facing rising violence and spatial segregation along ethno-political lines. Almost 18,500 killings took place during the last 15 years, with 2,789 killings in 2013 alone (Chapter 4, Table 4.1 & 4.2). Karachi, once called the 'Paris of the East', cleanest city in South Asia (Sibtain, 2013), and 'city of lights' (Gayer, 2014, p. 17-18) is now seen as a 'divided city' (Gayer, 2003), 'contested city', 'city up for grabs' and an 'arena for national conflicts' (Gayer, 2014).

The majority of killings have been along ethno-political and sectarian lines, especially of people with an active political-party affiliation. As a result, there has been increasing segregation, with the emergence of enclaves and gated communities partitioned along ethnic, sectarian, religious and political lines. Although gated communities were designed, and enclaves emerged, to protect against violence, they have added to the security problems (Kaker, 2014), with organised groups including military cadres of ethno-political parties, religio-political parties, gangs and organised crime groups competing for power (Yusuf, 2012; Gazdar, 2011; HRCP, 2011; DGR, 2014; SMC, 2013).

Current violent events, described above, cannot be seen in isolation from the socio-spatial and political developments, planning decisions and regional issues since partition of 1947. The current situation, briefly described below, is multifaceted, however, the overall outcome of the situation is that; the state is weak and partially absent in service provision while the state's absence is filled by multiple informal groups who claim and channel the state's resources to their legitimising groups and thus compete with each other. Land plays a central role in this competition as a resource itself, financial and political both; thus a reason of conflict and a subject of control.

The thesis intends to theorise the whole situation, connecting the described processes and actors, with an emphasis on control over land as the focus of study, since land links social and spatial domains both - covering all actors, processes and resources under discussion (Section 2.3).

1.2 Background

The background dynamics of the events identified are connected with a variety of processes that range from historical socio-spatial and political development, planning decisions, issues around

service provision, market dynamics, security issues etc. (Chapter 4). Some of these will be briefly discussed here to describe the rationale of the thesis.

Multiple processes, actors and role of land

The thesis identifies multiple processes and actors crucial in understanding the background dynamics (Chapter 4). For example; the state, over the years, failed to provide various services impartially, such as housing from 1960s onwards, security from 1980s onwards, and water provision is lacking since long. Informality in services provision has become widespread, which is a symbol of state's failure. This failure has provided opportunity for informal groups, which work along political, religious or ethnic identities, for political entrepreneurship and claim over public resources.

At another level, the regional conflicts such as Soviet war in Afghanistan and later war on terror has led to drug trade and presence of militants in the city, adding to the deterioration (Gayer, 2014). Karachi's role being the business hub of national and international trade and transportation in the country, has also played a vital role in attracting migrants, militants and criminals from the region. The provincial and national politics has added another layer of claimants to the public resources in Karachi and has weakened governments due to politicisation and blurring of formal-informal divide for political claims and benefits. Various ethno-political groups, corresponding to the city, provincial and country levels, claim for the legitimacy to own the city and its resources; which is a crucial reason of political conflicts and violence.

The competition to control public resources is played out on both formal and informal domains (Chapter 4). The formal domain encompass the city and national levels, and covers various tactics including; competition over formal decision making bodies, local government system, service provision institutions, electoral boundaries, housing and other policies etc. While the informal domain links to the city level but is operationalised at the local level; and covers both social and spatial control mechanisms (Section 2.5). Several control mechanisms are being used to ensure supremacy over opponents however, control over demography which is ensured through production of space – territoriality - is central for political as well as financial gains (Section 2.3).

Production of space through territoriality i.e. control over land, along with other resources, plays a vital role in both formal and informal domains (Section 2.3 & 2.5). Various tactics have been systematically employed to ensure control over settlements either through policy decisions on formal level such as Gothabad Scheme and Katchi Abadi Regularisation Program etc., while,

demography control, control over property transactions, violence and other inclusion-exclusion tactics are found to be employed in the informal domain (EC 1, EC 3, Chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7).The socio-spatial polarisation and politics.

The socio-spatial pattern i.e. presence of multiple ethnic groups at particular locations in the city, has played a vital role in the overall situation of Karachi (Section 4.2). Various reasons are identified; first, migrations since the emergence of the city, second, pre partition and post partition planning decisions, third, violence in 1980s along ethno-religious lines, and fourth, rise of private sector in land and housing etc. In this connection, since the partition of Pakistan and India in 1947, politics in Karachi has been aligned with ethnic and religious identities, thus struggle to control the city has its roots in history, while the spatial distribution of social groups has made it worse (Budhani et al., 2010, p. 07; Gazdar & Mallah, 2013, p. 2; Yusuf, 2012; Gayer, 2014, p. 17-52).

The city has been subject to multiple waves of in-migrations. In each wave of migration different ethnic groups came and settled at a particular geographic location, thus the city polarised both along social and spatial dimensions (Chapter 4).

This settling of various social groups, at particular locations, led to incidents of ethnic and religious polarisation, conflicts, violence and segregation in the city, from 1970s and especially during 1980s. The city went through enclavisation in which people preferred to live with their own social groups out of fear and convenience (Chapter 4).

Periods of military rule, uneasy democracy and pollicisation of institutions have created an uncertain context of urban governance (Chapter 4). Local government system in the city has remained under political exploitation since long; most recently, the system (SLGO 2001) introduced in 2001 was suspended in 2009, adding to a political and urban management vacuum. This void, over the years, has been augmented by power intermediaries , including political parties, religious groups, gangs, tribal leaders, and ethnic groups, who emerged to fill this gap for their respective social groups.

Power intermediaries, especially political parties, compete for territorial control and limited public resources, formal or informal, to consolidate voter power (Gayer, 2014, p. 21-30). Such power intermediaries, defined here as *informal power structures,* increasingly use force, rhetoric, or intimidation to delineate and control territory, using a variety of measures to entrench power, including: control over water; intimidation by vigilante groups; establishment of sectarian

religious centres and schools; setting up informal road blocks and gates, and control over purchase of property. These measures, defined here as *informal land controls,* have resulted in an acute spatial segregation of the city and rapid escalation of urban violence (Chapter 4 for detailed background).

It is important to mention, here, that the situation in Karachi is unique as compared to the larger national context of Pakistan; the socio-political polarisation, the politicization of administration, political conflicts, competition to control public resources and to channel the resources to legitimising groups in competition is completely localised.

1.3 The Research Problem

In cities of the developing world, informality is shaping the city and defining the development paths (Roy, 2005). In many such contexts segregation along social identity and territorial lines is linked to crime, violence and social unrest, as is the case of Karachi (Yusuf, 2012). Karachi has seen unrest over a long period but it has also been observed that such conflicts never cross the line to become a city level civil war, highlighting presence of 'regulatory mechanisms' that ensure order within the visible disorder (Gayer, 2014, p. 13). Such regulatory mechanisms vary from the city to the local-level, and from structure to human agency, and are moulded into the formal to informal institutional fabric, adopting specific control mechanisms that ensure control over public resources. There has been very little research into the mechanisms used by informal structures to consolidate power, a gap which this research aims to address.

The concept of *informal land controls* refers to the means through which *informal structures* establish control over communities and productive assets, by defining a geographic area through visible and invisible boundaries of influence. Such control is exercised through a wide variety of socio-spatial control mechanisms that range from benign to violent, which operate both locally and at city-wide scale. The operation of these controls is the subject of this thesis.

1.4 Research Hypothesis and Questions

This research study aims to analyse and examine the establishment and operation of *informal land controls* through a case study of Karachi. The research seeks to explore the causes of

segregation and territoriality including ethno-political and religious conflicts, the emergence of *informal power structures* that pursue segregation, and the dynamics of relations between various actors that enable the operation of informal land controls.

The research questions emerged with the identification of gaps in the literature. First, literature on power in social sciences, encompassing Marxist strands, is largely seen as dialectic between the state and market, and the role of non-state and non-commercial actors is not widely explored. Second the operation of such 'informal power structures' that cut across formal and informal divides and work 'from between' is not fully understood. In addition, the mechanisms through which such operations are translated into social and territorial control in Karachi, and the violent outcomes that result, remain dynamic and emergent. Each is addressed through this thesis.

Although this qualitative research is organised around research questions, however, it is neither purely deductive nor inductive research approach but benefits from both approaches and is termed as 'deductive-inductive hybridity' (Chapter 3). This enables the researcher to have a preconceived stand on the issues based on the initial understanding developed during literature review and researcher's own experience in the context. Thus, the starting hypothesis of the research is that:

"The emergence of a socially and ethnically distinct enclave-based spatial structure in Karachi is, to a significant extent, a result of the emergence of informal (or non-state) land controls. This is a result of power wielded by key political, religious, ethnic or other actors through various channels, including control over space and establishment of actual or perceptual boundaries. Together these combine to exacerbate social and spatial segregation and exclusion underpinning ethnic and political tension."

To examine this hypothesis the following research questions are posed:

1) Drawing on a literature review, how can the concept of informal (non-state) land controls be formulated and theorised, and their operation be understood (Chapter 2)?

2) What are the city level dynamics (or structural reasons) behind the operation of informal land controls in Karachi (Chapter 4)?

3) Through case studies of different districts in Karachi, representing different enclaves (exhibiting both spatial segregation and political/ethnic tension), how are informal land controls played out? Who are the main actors and what are the main mechanisms of control? These are examined through case studies of different enclaves, in order to explore:

a) Social processes and outcomes: explore how and why informal structures emerge and earn legitimacy; and how this impacts the legitimising and non-legitimising social groups? (Chapter 5 and 7)

b) Spatial dimensions and outcomes: explore how space and connected resources are controlled and then defended, i.e. what socio-spatial mechanisms are used, furthermore, how the controlled space reflects the relation between the informal structures and their identity-based social group;? (Chapters 6 and 7)

1.5 Structure of the thesis

The thesis is structured around the research questions.

Chapter 2, deals with Research Question 1), with the aim to review the literature and theorise informal land controls. The literature explores the complex relationships between actors – the state, political parties, market, informal actors and social groups – both through classic literature and authors focused on South Asia and other similar contexts, examining informal processes of urban development in order to define the concept of *informal land controls.* The chapter then examines the literature on power, considering the role of non-state actors as power intermediaries in space production, before examining mechanisms of spatial control and the relevance of the divided cities literature to the context of Karachi.

Chapter 3 outlines the philosophical underpinnings of the research methodology leading to methods for data gathering and analysis. The theoretical framework produced after the literature review formed the basis for developing the hypothesis and as a means to organise the research methods, data gathering and analysis process in the deductive-inductive hybrid model. A critical realist approach forms the epistemological basis for the creation of valid knowledge used in this thesis, in order to look behind the apparent events, or issues in the context of Karachi, and explore the background relations, structures and mechanisms. The chapter explains the detailed analysis undertaken to select the main case study of North Nazimabad, and the supporting analyses in Lyari, PIB Colony and Scheme 33, to represent different eras of development, geographical locations and political influence. The chapter also explains the limitations of the research due to security reasons.

Chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7 deals with the analysis of case study of Karachi. More specifically, Chapter 4 sets the context examining Karachi city as a whole, and is organised around Research Question 2. This chapter looks at the historical development of Karachi that led to current socio-spatial patterns, along with performance of government and its institutions, private sector, rising informality and the role of various informal structures in the whole process. It explores the background issues and covers the macro level or structural dimensions linked to informal land controls.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 look at case studies within Karachi, and are organised around Research Question 2. More specifically, the case studies are explored under two broader thematic questions i.e. social domain and spatial domain. The social domain intends to look at social processes and their outcomes and also to explore various queries such as; how informal structures emerge; what social control mechanisms are used to establish and retain control; what services they provide to earn legitimacy; what are the trade-offs of such service provision, and what kind of social divisions emerge as a result? Whereas, the spatial domain intends to seek answers to queries around spatial and territorial outcomes of the land controls. More specifically it tries to examine; how urban space is defined to reflect the relation between the informal structures and their identity-based social group; what types of spatial control mechanisms are used to control space and public resources in these enclaves; and what is the result if boundaries, physical or non-physical, of the enclave representing a power-society nexus, is violated by other competitors?

Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the main case study of North Nazimabad. Chapter 5 is dedicated to exploring the emergence of various informal structures and their operation, and the various social groups with which they are linked. The chapter highlights the reasons for the legitimacy of informal structures and the trade-offs that the residents have to accept to gain their protection and service provision.

Chapter 6 deals with the operations of spatial control in North Nazimabad. In that, the impact of social identities is linked with spatial dimension to explore how social relations have shaped space and how segregation and territoriality are practiced.

Chapter 7 examines the three smaller case studies. First, the case of Lyari covers the old city and examines the operation of criminal gangs as informal structures and their strong link with city-level power politics. Second, PIB Colony highlights the central city, and explores the rise and fall of a gang who challenged the monopoly of a political party which first lost and then regained

territory. Third, Scheme 33 explores the outer and peri-urban parts of the city, and highlighted how a weak local state triggers political conflicts and competition between parties, religious groups and criminals to control land.

Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. It draws together the analysis and reiterates the analytic conclusions by addressing each research question summarising the whole thesis. It also discusses the implications of the power-society-space nexus observed for urban development processes. The chapter also suggests various policy recommendations, along with reiterating the theoretical contribution. The chapter concludes with the reflection on the validity of the hypothesis.

Chapter 2

Literature Review:

Towards a Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction

'Informal land controls', the term adopted in this research, requires an understanding and theoretical framework that covers the complexity of social and political control over land in Karachi. Karachi has been experiencing acute political and ethnic conflicts, which affects the spatial development of neighbourhoods and their urban functions. The outcome is social violence and segregation, spatial informality and territoriality, accompanied by partial failure of the state in the provision of urban goods and services. The literature on underlying urban processes that contribute to this process of violent territorial control is explored in this chapter.

The literature explores the complex relationships between actors − the state, political parties, market, informal actors and social groups − and the formal and informal processes through which development takes place − including informality, political conflicts, violence, segregation and territoriality, but there are gaps in this discussion. Two main gaps are identified; first, the literature on informal processes mainly deals with spaces beyond the formal legal framework, whereas, the issue of informal land controls in Karachi cross the formal-informal legal divide. Second, although informal processes are often seen as the failure 'from above' of the state in the provision of goods and services in connection with the rise of neo-liberal policies and market mechanisms, and as an entrepreneurial project of the poor 'from below', the debates ignore the role of non-state actors who fill the gap in state provision, providing services 'from between'.

After the introduction, Section 2.2 discusses the nature of informal processes of urban development, in land, housing and infrastructure and in economic development. Section 2.3 examines the literature on the production of space, based on the work of Lefebvre (1974). However, this debate focusses on society, space and power relations defined by state and capitalist structures, ignoring the role of non-state actors as power-brokers and contention between social groups in the production of space. Section 2.3 concludes by developing the definition of 'informal land controls' used in this thesis.

Section 2.4 explores the literature on power, addressing the gap in the literature that lacks discussion on the role of non-state actors as 'power-intermediaries' in space production 'from between', or the role of multiple competing non-state actors in claiming access to space and resources and the resultant partitioning of spaces. Section 2.5 explores the practical mechanisms that combine to produce space, including various socio-spatial control mechanisms used in producing and reproducing the balance between power, society and space. There is also a

relevant body of literature dealing with mechanisms of control over land and linked resources, but this focusses on formal mechanisms involving the state and formal institutions i.e. 'from above' (see Yiftachel, 1990; 1992; 1996; 1998; 1999; Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2003; Yiftachel and Ghanem, 2004). Some of the relevant literature explored is contextually different such as the discussions on divided cities e.g. Beirut and Northern Ireland; first, due to dominant role of state and formal policies and second, due to the nature of conflicts embedded in national, international and historical contexts as compared to Karachi's localised and more recent conflict.

Each section concludes, defining essential working definitions and concepts including informality, informal power and governance structures, power intermediaries, production of informal spaces, socio-spatial controls and informal land controls. The conclusion in Section 2.6 links all the sections leading to development of a theoretical framework through which to examine informal land controls in this thesis.

Given the fragmented literature and gaps, the overall focus of Chapter 2 remains to develop a theoretical framework to understand the link between actors and processes in the production of informal land controls. Some theories explored are relevant and help to developing a framework for this research, such as debates on the social production of space (Lefebvre, 1974), informality (Roy, 2005), power (Foucault, 1982), concepts around territoriality (Sack, 1983; Brower, 1980) and socio-spatial controls (Tilly, 2004; Yiftachel, 1990; 1992; 1996; 1998; 1999; Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2003; Yiftachel and Ghanem, 2004). However, the role of non-state actors needs to be examined in connection with the use of informal land controls; each of these ideas is developed further below.

Lack of an appropriate theoretical framework is not unusual. Sometimes, where theories are not completely relevant and are unable to explain the problem under study, "the literature acts as proxy for theory. In many instances, theory is latent or implicit in the literature." (Bryman, 2012, p.22). In that case, research questions are outlined in order to enquire about the problem identified, as in this thesis, where the first research question examines how the concept of informal (non-state) land controls can be formulated and theorised.

2.2 Informal Urban Development

In the cities of the developing world, informal processes can no longer be ignored as 'informality', but have developed into a "generalised mode of metropolitan transformation" (Roy, 2005). The importance of informality and informal settlements has been discussed for many years since Keith Hart (1970, 1973) introduced the concept of informal sector employment. Still, there is much disagreement in the literature on informal urban development processes; whether such informality is a process 'from above' or 'from below'; whether informality is beneficial or problematic; whether informality is limited to economic sectors or a term for a 'generalised mode' of urban development irrespective of sectoral limitations and, where informality stands between legality and illegality?

This section thus explores various interpretations of informality and the reasons for its emergence, to examine the connections between state, market, non-state actors and citizens, and the socio-economic and power dynamics that underlie those connections. More specifically, the section explores the role of informal actors (section 2.4) in informal development processes. This understanding aims to interpret informality and underpin the analysis of 'informal land controls'.

2.2.1 Various Interpretations

A variety of interpretations are available around informality and related processes, with a multitude of terms that vary with the context for example: informality, urban informality, informal sector, informal space, informal processes etc. (explored in the following sections). This research looks at outcomes, such as informally developed settlements, processes of urban development and its underlying politics, and actors such as religious bodies or tribal leadership etc. In this background, this research uses the term 'informality' generally to cut across sectors, processes, and status of land, with the aim to examine domains other than 'formal' in its common sense applied to land tenure. In other cases sometimes terms such as 'informal spaces' or 'informal structures' are used for specific meanings and are defined when required.

Early debates in the literature on informality have been characterised by later commentators as expressing a "simplistic dualism" and "binary thinking", and as oscillating between legality and illegality (e.g. by Varley 2012). As Roy notes, informality (urban) represents the absence of legality but does not fully fit in the definition of illegality (2009, p.80). Gayer (2014, p. 39-40) use the term 'unofficial', for informal transactions or status, especially relating to land, to reject the formal-

informal dichotomy and identify the intentional deregulation of the 'officials' for financial and political benefits, and by this, he tries resolve this issue of interpretation of 'informality' in the context of Karachi.

The literature on informal urban development processes covers many aspects, including the informal economy, the spatial and settlement domain, and (self) governance, including aspects of socio-economic fragmentations. The literature defines and explains informal processes within five larger categories, i.e. informality as; i) relative, ii) independent, iii) interdependent, iv) marginal or un-intentional and v) central or intentional.

First, informality is defined as a 'relative' process, i.e. informality is interpreted in reference to the formal processes and structures. For example, "legalists", a term used by Rakowski (1994), see informal processes as alternative to the complex and legally bound formal or official domain. Similarly, the literature dealing with "spatial categorization", as Waibel and McFarlane (2012) highlight, i.e. the concept of informal settlements, is also relative to the legality of land titles.

Second, informal processes are seen as distinct and 'independent', beyond any connection to formal sector structures or processes. Chen (2006) describes this approach as "dualist", but argues that such interpretations fall in the trap of considering as formal-informal dichotomy where the two domains are distinct and separate.

The third type of interpretations could be termed as 'interdependent' i.e. the formal and informal are linked together and form a 'continuum' and are 'symbiotic'. "Structuralists" see the informal sector as sub-ordinate and having two-way working relations and productive transactions with the formal sector in this approach (Rakowski, 1994).

Fourth, informality is also looked at as a marginal, un-intentional and un-organised process, driven indirectly "from below" often by poor and marginal social groups, and which results in low quality, unorganised and ill-disciplined sector, services or spaces. Such interpretations are in line with interpreting informality as "organisational form" highlighted by Weibel and McFarlane (2012). Similarly, Roy and AlSayyad (2004) also highlight a similar approach in the literature where informality is taken as local, every-day and self-governing related to urban development in the global South, and thus, considered as undesired in the literature.

The fifth category of interpretation looks at informality "from above", i.e. as an 'intentional' process, 'central' to the formal processes deployed by the state. This strand of literature

highlights that defining formality enables the state to differentiate between the formal and the informal, and to carry out processes of inclusion and exclusion with political intent thus, in this case, informality behave as "government tool" (Weibel and McFarlane, 2012). In other situations, state actors and institutions intentionally keep the boundaries between formal and informal vague, and can intentionally "deregulate" rather than "un-regulate", as Roy (2009, p. 83) suggests, while Weibel and McFarlane (2012) term the same as "negotiable value". Actions such as "un-mapping" (Box 2.1), in which governments do not map parts of the city, or do not adopt master plans, mean that they remain flexible and use development processes for political or economic benefits.

Box 2.1: Un-mapping

Roy (2003; 2009, p. 81) elaborates one of the practices of the city government in Calcutta-India, which she call "un-mapping" or not developing maps of the city demarcating the exact boundaries of properties along with its ownership and land use. "Un-mapping" also includes not developing master plans for future development and not mapping the existing development. This "un-mapping" provides the government officials and politicians the liberty to use the land, particularly contested land, without clear ownership or beyond permitted zoning limits, to be vested and to be used for political objectives or financial gains. Mapping, as information, generates a kind of knowledge-power for the state to control land and related social and financial aspects and to guide and control development. Formal maps also show the areas 'under control' i.e. the areas for which the state is responsible for providing services etc. In contrast, "un-mapping" means to give away state powers of 'control', i.e. encouraging informality. By un-mapping the government deliberately refrains from exercising its powers to control urban development and provide services, and creates a partial vacuum, leading to space for informal actors to fill this gap.

Recent commentators have tried to define informality and informal spaces beyond the trap of "binary thinking", but still falling within the confines of the five above. According to Roy and AlSayyad (cited in Roy, 2005, p. 148) attempts to understand urban informality as a sector should be rejected in favour of seeing it as a "series of transactions". Roy (2005, p.148) explains that:

> "along with Nezar AlSayyad, I have used the term urban informality to indicate an organizing logic, a system of norms that governs the process of urban transformation itself. Against the standard dichotomy of two sectors, formal and informal, we suggest that informality is not a separate sector but rather a

series of transactions that connects different economies and spaces to one another."

That analysis rejects formal-informal dichotomy and suggests considering informal processes as 'interdependent', forming a 'continuum' or 'symbiosis' with the 'formal'.

Roy (2009) notes that those in formal power allow informal process to flourish in order to fill shortcomings of resources, faulty regulations, and the influence of the market forces. Roy (2009, p.80) defines informal settlements as "a state of deregulation, one where the ownership, use and purpose of land cannot be fixed and mapped according to any prescribed set of regulations or law." Informality is not planned, or operated by the formal institutions of governance (public or private) using laws and regulations laid down by the state (i.e. "from above"). Instead, informality depends on *de-facto* controlling structures, that are not illegal or completely 'from below', but represents processes in transition, highlighting 'symbioses' and 'continuum'.

Beyond the academic debates, international donor organisations and governments are more influenced by the 'relative' definition i.e. informality as opposed to formality. The UN definition of informal settlements refers to " i) residential areas where a group of housing units has been constructed on land to which the occupants have no legal claim, or which they occupy illegally; ii) unplanned settlements and areas where housing is not in compliance with current planning and building regulations (unauthorized housing)." (UN, 2001, p. 111-112). However, this definition of informality, in terms of informal settlements and land tenure, makes it transient, as when titles are regularised a settlement is considered as 'formal', irrespective of who actively controls it and provide goods and services, whether formal institutions or non-state actors. In addition, this narrow link to land titles takes no account of the quality of infrastructure, service provision or dimensions of governance etc., The empirical evidence in this thesis suggests that informal urban management is experienced in settlements with formal land tenure.

2.2.2 Impacts of informal urban development

The literature on informal urban development processes differs on its outcomes. Hall and Pfeiffer (2000, p.129) in Roy (2005, p.148) consider informal governance to be a problem that makes cities ungovernable. Similarly Hasan (2010) also thinks that informality has made cities difficult to govern. In contrast, as discussed above, Roy (2009, p.80) and Davis (2004, p.15-16) argue that

informality is deliberately used by governments as a tool to exploit the poor and create obedient subjects.

Second, informality is also seen as having a reformist nature as revolution "from below". Amos (1984), de Soto (1989), and Bayat (1997) consider informal actions as a way for the poor to fulfil their needs, particularly where the state acts as regulator rather than provider and market dynamics make commodified goods and services unaffordable for the poor (Section 2.2.3). For example, de Soto (2000) describes informal settlement as a "heroic entrepreneurship" that can reduce poverty and boost the economy by giving the informal settlers titles to land. In the context of Karachi, Budhani et al. (2010) argue that "informality has done well" in providing urban goods and services to the poor. Bayat (1997) sees informal urban development as a "quiet encroachment of the ordinary", an autonomous way of living and functioning, based on the silent claim of housing, services and the domain of work. However, this concept of silent claim is too simplistic as there are often actors that exploit uncertainty. Moreover, informal development may solve problems for a limited time and for a few people but it can create issues in the long run, for example facilitating violence and criminal control, as in Karachi.

Third, processes of informality and resultant outcomes are also seen as worth learning as these have achieved goals that a planned activity could not, and thus could be seen as a planning strategy (Innes et al. 2007), and an opportunity to learn from the informal processes and (socially) innovative actions (Berner, 2001).

2.2.3 Drivers of Informality

In general, the literature commenting on the emergence of informal urban development processes examine the phenomena at two different scales. The first strand, adopted by Marxist theorists, links informal development processes with capitalist driven processes of urbanisation and globalisation, linking these to neo-liberal and capitalist development policies (Sassen, 1999; Purcell, 2002; 2003; Harvey 2008; Marcuse, 2009). This highlights how capitalist development creates spaces of injustice in which the urban poor are excluded socially and spatially from the benefits of urban life (Harvey, 2008).

Capitalist driven neo-liberal policies and profit-oriented development result from class divisions that exclude the poor from formal domains, who thus finds 'alternative' mean to access housing and related services. Such 'alternative' means and processes are then categorised as informal

(Soja, 2010). Although this exploratory route goes back to Karl Marx, however Lefebvre (1968), and Harvey (2001, 2008) have extensively written about it.

Harvey (2008) elaborates the link between capitalism and urbanization arguing that capitalism strives for profit-making, and produces surplus value that needs to be reinvested for further profits, while urbanization provides the best conditions for such cyclic operations. However, history has shown that these cyclic dynamics of capitalism have resulted in class divisions and exclusion of the poor from commodified spaces and services. In the same light, Sassen (1999) and Purcell (2003) suggest that economic globalisation weakens nation states and see a new global political and social order emerging; creating a network of capitalist cities that forms the unit of the global enterprise, and influences the production of space through multi-site operations, which diminishes the role of state.

The crux of this debate is that there exists a strong link between neo-liberal policies, urbanization and capitalism, and that the capitalist processes have led to weakened governments and commodification of land, resulting in exclusion, dispossession and disjunctive citizenship on the basis of ownership of formal property rights.

The second strand of the literature identifies the failure, inaction or incapacity of the state to provide goods and services to its subjects as the reason for the rise of informality, seen from two different angles. First, a body of literature sees a diminishing role for the state under neo-liberal policies, explored above, with its role changed from provider to enabler (UNESCAP, 1997). This 'intentional' absence of the state, suggests that urban residents have two choices: either to buy the goods and services available in the market, or to create informal 'alternatives'. The second debate considers informality as a failure of formal planning processes and thus a failure of the state (Roy, 2005), which opens up new avenues for capitalist-driven bodies to invest and re-invest and thus exclude the poor, by differentiating the formal from informal through legal standards (Mayer, 2009). This failure of planning and inability to provide services is due to technical shortcomings, lack of material resources, or an 'intentional' failure for political benefits (see Section 2.2.1). Thus state or government is itself a political construct with political ambitions affected by intentional practices of "deregulation" (see Roy, 2009; Gayer, 2014) to benefit from global investments. 'Un-mapping' is one such example of intentional failure or inaction of the state (see Box 2.1).

The last category defined by state failure or incapacity holds potential for this research. However, the literature does not explain who fills the gaps, although empirical evidence suggests that non-state actors may fill the gap 'from between'. Weinstein (2008) has identified the link between the liberalisation of markets, government, organised crime syndicates and political parties in Mumbai, suggesting the criminals have stepped in to provide services where government regulation has failed. This situation has escalated with the liberalisation of the Indian economy, where international investors are looking to invest in real estate. Meanwhile criminal gangs in informal settlements are profiting from real estate investment, or provision of informal services, making them a powerful stakeholder in informal urban settings. In addition Kudva (2009) (citing Megaly, 2006; Perlman, 2006; Gooptu, 2007) argues that the absence of the state creates opportunities for criminals to fill the gap, by exploiting public resources, leading to segregation, crime and violence.

2.2.4 State and Market

The role of the state and its link to market forces is also important to explore. The rise of the state as a concentration of political power has been discussed by many including Foucault (1982, p. 782-783) who argues that the modern state, as compared to medieval religious authorities, gets legitimacy to rule from citizens based on promises to fulfil the basic needs, covering domains such as safety, security, shelter, health and general wellbeing. In relation to urban land supply, with the rise of capitalism and the liberalisation of economies, the role of the government has changed from being a provider of land to being a regulator of land markets (UNESCAP, 1997). Viewed in this critical light, the state has ceded basic responsibilities to the market, which sells the goods and services to citizens, on the basis that whoever has the buying power can get their needs fulfilled irrespective of identity. Citizens who do not have the capacity to afford these goods and services are automatically excluded and must resort to informal markets to fulfil their needs.

When the state regulates the market it create systems, mechanisms and tools to ensure the proper functioning of the land market (see Section 2.3), including the institutional framework for land management. These institutions are termed the "gate-keepers" by Farvacque & McAuslan, (1992, p. 17), since through them the land enters into the market and they work as the representatives of the government and regulate the land market. Thus for any state, the main characteristics of a functioning land market is to ensure its efficiency, equitability and environmental sustainability. Compatibility with the social, physical and legal contexts is also

essential (UNESCAP, 1997). However, the role of the state is still questionable because of neo-liberal policies and elite control of decision-making (Yiftachel, 1998).

2.2.5 Critical Analysis of the Literature on Informality

An overview of the literature on informality has identified useful insights for this thesis, but also several shortcomings. Informal urban development processes are sometimes defined as part of a dichotomy with formal processes; these debates remain focussed around the state, capitalist structures and the poor, a typically Marxist approach, but ignore identity-based and class divisions amongst the urban poor. This approach also ignores the role of non-state actors in the provision of 'alternative' means of survival for the poor, while remaining focused on informality as the 'self-help project' of the poor, in which the poor are considered as unified, ordered, and working together for common objectives such as accessing housing or livelihoods. A further challenge is that debates see informality in relation to incapacity of the state, which does not explain how gaps in formal service provision are filled. Meanwhile these debates ignore the nuanced nature of informality when applied to different facets of urban development, e.g: land tenure, service provision or employment. However, the broad critique is summarised below.

First, informality is definitely 'alternative' to formal, but not illegal. In addition, in state and market-controlled domains of life, informal processes cannot be seen in isolation, as forming a 'continuum' or 'symbioses' with formal development processes. Informality can also be seen as the intentional failure of formal government and state processes, or as a "negotiated value" in the provision of urban goods and services, exploited by the political actors for political or material gain (Roy, 2009). In such cases, informal processes are never an 'un-intentional' or marginal activity but a 'central' and 'intentional' process of governments with defined objectives.

Second, the identification of informal settlements is again 'relative' in that formal tenure systems set the conditions for informal tenure. However, this poses a challenge in contexts such as Karachi, where settlements with both formal and informal tenure are experiencing controls by non-state actors through informal processes (see Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7). In such cases, land tenure alone cannot define the nature of formality or informality, but settlements enjoying impartial state services should be considered as formal and vice versa. This definition of informal settlements cuts across the tenure type and urban control yet identifies spaces serviced or excluded by the state.

Third, the identification of capitalist processes as the reason of rise of informality is valid, yet poses issues of contextualisation. This Marxist notion of subject-power relations limits itself to relatively few actors; i.e. state, the capitalist structures and the poor, but does not comment on social or identity divisions within the groupings of the urban poor, nor explore the presence of non-state actors. This limitation diminishes the role of non-state actors, as the empirical evidence suggests (Weinstein, 2008; Chapter 5, 6 and 7) in the provision of 'alternative' means of survival and space production. This poses a theoretical limitation in explaining informality and production of informal spaces.

A generalised critique on the literature on informal urban development processes is the variety of concepts discussion sometimes embraces, including governance, economic transactions, employment, the legal status of land, and informally built settlements etc. However, this thesis looks at 'informal land controls' in connection with a wider definition of informality that is not limited to legal status of land, economic sector, services provision and governance but cuts across all of them.

2.3 Land, Space and its Production

This section focuses around the topics of land and space generally and production of space specifically. The concept of space has changed over the period of time, from a 'uni-dimensional' material, tangible or geometric meaning to a more abstract meaning having 'dual dimensions' of physical and social domains. This transformation is quite recent; "until the 1970's most human geographers considered space to be a neutral container" (Hubbard et al, 2004, p. 4). The geometric concept of space was seen as a container or a passive backdrop to social life, thus having nothing to do with people, societies, cultures, economies and politics, but this material concept of space was countered, by Marxist writers such as Lefebvre (1968) and Harvey (2008), as a central issue in the capitalist society highlighting handling of 'land', in terms of impact on city and its people, as the essential problem in the land-labour-capital trio.

Lefebvre (1968) argued that this 'uni-dimensional' use of space made it a commodity. This, he argued, has transformed cities, from a traditional city, with an emphasis on social value, to a capitalist city emphasising exchange value, a city where citizenship rights and opportunities are linked to the ownership of property, essentially land (Purcell, 2003, p. 578; Harvey, 2008; Simone, 2010, p. 59; Brown, 2010; Brown, 2013, p. 958; Brown and Kristiansen, 2009, p. 14-15). The

transformation of land into an urban commodity also divided society by economic status and buying power, eventually leading to exclusion of those without formal property (Section 2.2.3). Lefebvre (1974) also saw space as a social product, having a 'dual dimension' incorporating both a physical and social domain. Thus society and space are interrelated and affect each other mutually to create dialectic (Soja, 1980). However, it is interesting to note that the physical dimension of space as 'land' is almost exclusively adopted at official level, e.g. the UN definition of informality contains only the physical dimension of space, and formal spatial policies and institutions all emphasise the same aspect.

This section thus explores both the 'uni-dimension' and 'dual dimension' of space. The literature on the spatial domain, in connection with informal land controls, can be categorised in two distinct, yet linked, categories to further explore production of space. The first category deals with tangible, geometric and economic aspects of space as a commodity, termed as 'land'. The second category deals with the theoretical concepts of space in connection with social relations.

2.3.1 Land

Land is a physical finite resource that links people, resources and processes of controlling powers within its geographic limits. Moreover, it underlies the relationship of government to its subjects (Moore 2005, Peluso and Lund 2011, UNESCAP 1997). Control over land ultimately provides people with control over resources within the limits of a given territory (Peluso and Lund 2011); in addition, land is a pre-requisite for food, shelter, other economic activities and urban development (Amos 1984, UNHABITAT 2008). UNESCAP (1997) considers land as a prime factor in the capitalist economic system along with labour and capital, thus the land market can influence the capitalistic economic system.

However, this interpretation of the importance of land focuses on conditions of free-market economies that are widely criticised because of their unjust distribution of wealth. Marxist writers such as Lefebvre (1968) and Harvey (2008) argue that such free-market economies exacerbate class-based divisions and exclude the poor (Section 2.2). Nevertheless, the importance of land is not itself contested and the efficient functioning of land markets is considered a pre-requisite for any city to function properly and is often the reason for many of the problems of development (Amos, 1984, p.406).

Land market and management of land

The way land is used, controlled and transacted highlights interconnections between the state, market, and the un-official but traditional structures such as tribal and religious authorities that influence access to land. It also provides a glimpse of power dynamics in any society as in 'who controls land and how?' and in that debate, state and market have largely been explored.

When land is traded as a commodity, a land market is said to exist (UNESCAP, 1997). Governments, are the main owners of public land through land management institutions, and often initiate development processes and release land to satisfy social and economic need (Amos 1984, UNESCAP 1997). However, treating land as a commodity has led to class divisions and exclusion, disjunctive citizenship further leading to informality as the excluded groups survive with 'alternative' options (Section 2.2.3). Countering the effect, more recently particularly in Latin America, advocacy and practice has challenged capitalist land markets, by arguing for the social function of property in which people's need for housing land is balanced with the rights of private sector owners (Harvey, 2008; Parnell and Pieterse, 2010)

In cities of the global South informal tenure systems arise partly because formal systems have failed to meet the needs of the poor, and in many cities a wide variety of tenure systems and land submarkets coexist (Brown, 2015). Land tenure is described as "The way land is held or owned by individuals and groups, or the set of relationships legally or customarily defined amongst people with respect to land. In other words, tenure reflects the relationships between people and land directly, and between individuals and groups of people in their dealing in land." (UN-HABITAT, 2008, p. 5).

Different land tenures describe different types of lands in terms of management. Payne (1996, p. 3-11; 2001 p. 416-418) identifies five main categories of land tenure: customary, private, public, religious and non-formal tenure types. UN-HABITAT (2008, p.6) describes private and public tenure systems as 'formal' with sub-categories of freehold and leasehold (the latter including both public and private rental), and 'informal', but does not distinguish between informal land tenure types.

Often, in the formal domain, governments bring forward urban land for sale and development through institutions of land management or 'gate-keepers'. For the disposal of land, institutional arrangements vary depending on the country. Farvacque and McAuslan (1992) identified the core institutions usually involved in land sale and disposal as: land administration agencies, local

governments and development authorities and private organisations, but these formal structures may vary with context.

However, under liberalised market conditions state institutions do not serve the end-user or the citizen directly. Payne (2001) considers public land to be better than private land in terms of equity and inclusiveness. The latter introduces a tier of private organisations in the form of builders, developers and investors between the end user and the state institutions. Such private bodies work for profits leading to difficulties for the poor in accessing land and shelter (UNESCAP, 1997). The poor then look for 'alternatives' to both the public land and private land options for their shelter, and thus the informal sector fills that gap and informal settlements emerge.

2.3.3 Space and Production of Space

Lefebvre's book, "The Production of Space" (1974), transformed understandings of space by moving from describing space as a physical entity to a social product. Space and society are mutually constitutive, each is defined in relation to other; "space is not a reflection of society, it is its expression. In other words, space is not a photocopy of society, it is society" (Castells, 2000, p. 441). Society impacts, constructs, controls and produces, space and *vice versa* (Soja, 1980).

The nature of space produced through social activities reflects the nature of social relations. Space is thus a social construct and produced through human activities and the reproduction of social relations; thus it is a spatial manifestation of social relations and activities (Lefebvre, 1974). Madanipour (1999) further explains that the spaces we inhabit define our social existence, and space and spatial relations together define social reality.

Lefebvre (1974) introduced 'spatial triad' to explain, through organisational analysis of space, the way that social production of space takes place. The triad consists of three fundamental aspects related to space, i.e. "spatial practice", "representation of space" and "spaces of representation". These three linked processes take place over time (*space-time relation*) to produce social space.

Spatial practice represents "*perceived spaces*" that result from everyday practices involving tangible configurations in space, i.e. "the directly experienced world of empirically measurable and map-able phenomena" (Soja, 1999, p. 265). These everyday interactions create an awareness through bodily experience, termed *perceived space.* Thus, Soja (1980, p. 31) suggests that "space itself may be primordially given, but the organisation, use and meaning of space is a product of

social translation, transformation and experience". This represents a 'co-production' of space created by humans working within the natural environment (Goodman, 1999), that combines nature (mountains, river, land) and manmade infrastructure or 'second nature' i.e. roads, dams, bridges, houses, parks etc. This argument suggests that space is intrinsically linked to society and its practices.

Representation of space represents the "*conceived spaces*" that are first envisioned before coming into existence, drawn from theories and formalised representations used by 'professionals' such as scientists, planners, or related organisations. Conceived spaces also depend on processes of attaching meaning to a space, followed by production of space. Such spaces highlight the power dynamics in a society, for example Lefebvre (1974, p. 49) described such spaces of capitalism as "repressive", he says "… monuments have a phallic aspect, towers exude arrogance, and the bureaucratic and political authoritarianism immanent to a repressive space is everywhere.". This also suggests that power shapes space and society and that space is produced "from above" in this case.

Spaces of representation involve everyday practices and use of available space, so are also termed as "*lived spaces*", combining *perceived* and *conceived spaces* to highlight how humans actually use *conceived spaces* irrespective of the formally assigned, mapped and codified use. Lefebvre (1974) considered such spaces as a resistance to the hegemonic *conceived spaces*. This also suggests that society shapes space and that space is produced "from below".

Lefebvre (1974) identified a change in the nature of space over time, with respect to the process of its production, from an "absolute space" to an "abstract space". The "absolute space" refers to space produced after human activity of assigning usage to the natural environment. "Absolute space was made up of fragments of nature located at sites which were chosen for their intrinsic qualities (caves, mountains etc.) but whose very consecration ended up by stripping them of their natural characteristics and uniqueness. "Thus, natural space was soon populated by political forces" (Lefebvre, 1974, p. 48). 'Absolute space' is more in line with 'spaces of representation' as it covers the co-production of space involving humans and nature.

Conversely, "abstract space" emerged with the industrial revolution, and rise of capitalism, which stripped space from its natural settings to transform it into a commodity. Commodification emphasised life derived from economy in that social relations became sub-servient to economy rather than economic processes meant to serve the society (Yiftachel, 1998), whereby

"reproducibility, repetition and reproduction of social relationships" accomplish preference over nature (Dimendberg, 1998; Lefebvre, 1974). The commodification of space highlights space whose use value is only liberated through materialisation of its exchange value by selling it in the market. In this scenario, "representation of space" becomes the starting point of space production "from above" and thus the instrument of producing society, in which, "spaces of representation" and "spatial practices" are influenced through such power practices.

However, Lefebvre's spatial triad does not fully explain emergence of informal settlements, here described as a process of production of informal spaces. The spatial triad lacks in this context since, there is no "representation of spaces" in this case, as informal settlements (spaces) are beyond the formally laid out, codified and planned spaces that are also commodified spaces. Informal settlements do incorporate "spaces of representation" and the "spatial practices" of common people, but this concept misses out the role of informal actors in developing such spaces 'from between', and thus is not fully explained through the spatial triad.

2.3.4 Power and Social Production of Space

The link between space and society is reiterated throughout the literature on social production of space, yet the role of power remains hidden and the discussion is generally limited to state and market. "Representation of space" remains the only way of organising space that identifies power dynamics, and within larger globalised economies such conceived spaces dominate spatial intervention. Space itself is an expression of power (Hirst, 2005), while Peluso and Lund (2011) have shown that controlling land (the physical dimension of space) gives bundles of powers to the controller (Section 2.4).

In a capitalist city, owned-space as property forms the basis of access to many aspects of urban life, which strengthens the role of capitalist structures in social relations (Purcell, 2002). Lefebvre (1968; 1974) and Harvey (2008), both find a strong link between space and social relations in a society. Social relations can be controlled by controlling the space and *vice versa*, elaborated by Soja (1980).

Within the debates around space, public space is a central theme. Brown & Lloyd-Jones (2002, in Brown 2006, p. 11) suggest that "the public realm is symbolic of the civic and community life of cities, but control of urban public space is also important as a demonstration of municipal power". Public space also forms the space of contestation, conflict and exclusion as it is here that the

interests of both groups, capitalists and the deprived, clash with each other (Mitchel 2003, p. 18). Capitalists find, as always, the possibility of profit and seek power to control such spaces, while the poor find opportunities for livelihoods and social networking. Mitchell (2003, p.34) questions the role of governments in restricting access to the poor in public space, clearly favouring the exchange value of capitalistic structures. In fact, public spaces serve as a barometer to gauge who has the control over the city (Brown, 2010, p. 4).

Thus, space as a social product is unavoidably infused with power relations, demonstrated above. However, Marxist writings often focus on the state-market-poor trio in examining power dynamics in society. This analytical approach overlooks the role of non-state actors in informality as noted in Section 2.2.5. Although, the role of power is embedded within society and social relations, merging power with society does not explain the effect of power on space and society. It is important, to consider power as a driving force influencing spatial and social relations.

Thus the power-society-space link specifies a nexus between the three linked factors, as the literature, especially Lefebvre's spatial triad, has suggested (Figure 2.1). This nexus argues that power, space and society are linked, and produce and reproduce each other in a dynamic way, a core concept used to examine the role of state and non-state actors in informal land controls analysed in this thesis.

Figure 2.1: Power-Society-Space Nexus two-way and yet dynamic relation

2.3.5 Defining Informal Land Control; a Type of Production of Space?

Drawing on the discussion above, this section seeks to explore and define the concept of informal land controls. Apart from social processes involved in the production of space, various spatial

mechanisms are also used, including *territoriality, land grabs*, and *land controls* considered below, which all fall under the larger umbrella of informal land controls.

The concept of territory is helpful in this research, as it brings together power (by the individual or group effecting control)*,* society (objects, people and relationships) and space (by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area) and thus reiterates the importance of power-society-space nexus. The literature discussed in Section 2.2 suggested that informal land control is carried out by middle men - mafias, organised crime groups, criminals or political parties. These actors seek to create and maintain a distinct territory, by establishing a system of informal governance by controlling and overseeing the land and land access, development processes, the occupants and their relationships, and any potential revenue streams. Sack (1983, p. 56) describes territoriality as "The attempt by an individual or group (x) to influence, affect or control objects, people and relationships (Y) by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area" or "territory". Similarly, Brower (1980, p. 179-180) in the book "Human Behaviour and Environment" writes "... the act of laying claim to a geographic area, marking it for identification and defending it when necessary against others of the same kind is called – territoriality".

Peluso and Lund (2011, p.669) examine how territoriality is associated with land control, and how different mechanisms and practices are used to "… acquire, secure and exclude others from land in intense competitions over control". Peluso and Lund (2011) have explored new frontiers of "land controls" in the context of agricultural or productive land. The authors have explained that new strategies are evolving to control productive land, as such strategies give "bundles of powers" to influence people, land and resources. Peluso and Lund (2011, p. 668) further argue that "by 'land control' we mean practices that fix or consolidate forms of access, claiming, and exclusion for some time. Enclosure, territorialisation, and legalization processes, as well as force and violence (or the threat of them), all serve to control land". Furthermore, they argue that "land controls direct our attention to how actors are able to hold onto the land, and to institutional and political ramifications of access, claims and exclusion." (Peluso and Lund, 2011 p. 669).

Although Peluso and Lund (2011) explore "land controls" in an agrarian context, however, it is the *'productive nature of land'* which makes it the focus of struggle and conflict, an argument that can also apply to urban land, particularly in neo-liberal economic context in which land is a commodity and a setting for production. Thus, Yiftachel (1998) rightly argues that under capitalist land markets, society becomes subservient to economy instead of markets serving society. This productive nature of land, operating in the interest of elites, tends to result in the poor being

dispossessed from developed land (areas) of the city, enabling informal actors to develop new spheres of control, particularly over informal settlements developed on un-productive land with limited market value (Lefebvre, 1968; Harvey 2008).

The concept of 'informal land control' highlights a different kind of space production, as it involves controlling existing settlements or spaces, both formal or informal, establishing territory and claiming resources within a territory. The concept thus deals with 'lived spaces', involving both physical and social dimensions of space.

Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, the term 'informal land control' is defined to mean *establishing control over people and productive assets, both physical and non-physical, by delimiting a geographic area through visible and invisible boundaries of influence, wielded by individuals or groups in intense competition. Such competition embraces preserving and practising culture, religion or political ideologies, claiming control over physical or financial assets such as informal rent and votes, through bounded territoriality, brought about through various social and spatial control mechanisms that range from benign to violent* (Section 2.5).

The concept of land controls thus links the concept of power with space and its project of controlling space and resources. It can be seen that social conflict will always remain a part of urban society, since, defence of territory is one of the goals of territoriality (Section 2.5.3). The terms "divided city" and "segregation" often refer to the presence of territoriality and informal land controls in a city (Section 2.5.3 and 2.5.5).

It is also important to distinguish between informal land control as a means of space production, and the mechanisms of control (*socio-spatial controls* explored in Section 2.5) as a combined effect of various processes, for example dynamics involving identities, and various socio-spatial mechanisms. Thus, socio-spatial control mechanisms are one of the many aspects used to establish informal land control.

2.3.6 Informal Land Controls: Linking Social and Spatial Domains

In seeking to frame and define the concept of 'informal land controls' this section has highlighted various gaps in the literature.

First, while Lefebvre's work (1974) is useful, his spatial triad - spatial practice; representation of space; and spaces of representation (see Section 2.3.3) - does not fully encapsulate the processes

of production of 'informal' spaces in the global south, for example Karachi. Second, the narrow formulation of power structures as relating only to state and capitalist institutions, limits the scope of this body of work in explaining non-capitalist forms, other than the state and the market, of space production and exclusions. Both are discussed below.

Informally developed settlements form an exception to Lefebvre's spatial triad (1974), as such spaces do not incorporate 'representation of space' derived from formal physical planning processes, but are a symbol of absence of, or reaction to, exclusion from such 'conceived spaces" and processes 'from above'. However, 'perceived spaces' and 'lived spaces' do influence informal settlements at various scales. Informal settlements develop from "spatial practice" of various informal actors; for example in Karachi, such settlements are usually developed on hazardous lands through invasion and illegal subdivision – on river banks, railway reservations, steep slopes, vacant public or private land, or on peri-urban agricultural land. After delimitation of such informal spaces, communities define "lived spaces" through their own divisions between public, private and community spaces. It also includes claiming control over existing settlements, formal or informal, and thus deals with 'lived spaces' that are 'conceived' by hegemonic structures beyond the state and market. Thus informal settlements represents different type of 'representation of spaces' in which state, capitalist structures or state institutions (city or local government) are not involved but alternative groups act to control to plan, codify and manage spaces.

Second, the concept of production of space follows the Marxist path of analysing poverty through processes of capitalism and commodification, and hence focuses on the state, capitalists and the poor. In addition, the literature tends to see the poor as a homogenous group and disregards the city as a space of struggle for power (Mayer, 2009, p. 368-369). Earle (2011) explores different case studies analysed from a rights perspective, and argues that there are many power structures other than capitalist powers responsible for restricting people's rights, "…the city can also be a space where citizenship is denied or compromised, for example in slums and informal settlements where life is dangerous, and where the right to a dignified standard of living is undermined. A city's heterogeneity can be a double-edged sword." (Earle, 2011, p. 2).

Thus, the power-society-space nexus is helpful in the conceptualisation of any process of production of space, as it opens the debate to any type of power structure and its role in the informal production of space.

Against this background, the concept of 'Informal land control' suggests that land, its social structures and productive resources, are being controlled by informal or non-state actors, resulting in a process of territorialisation. Furthermore, processes of control are developed and maintained through the use practices, mechanisms or tactics explored in Section 2.4 below.

2.4 Processes of Control – the Role of Power

This section explores the literature gap, identified in the previous two sections, regarding processes of land control, and the social structures underpinning that control, lying beyond the remit of the formal domain of the state and legitimate legal processes (defined to include the state, its representatives and institutions, and the legal private sector). This thesis describes such non-formal processes and structures as 'informal power structures' (shortened to 'informal structures') in contrast to 'formal power structures' (or 'formal structures'). This section explores the nature of informal structures and the power relations these entail.

The literature available on power is diverse, its concepts and meanings are varied and contested (Gaventa, 2006), with different theories and perspectives adopted in different fields such as sociology and political economy etc. In this review, the concept of power is approached mainly as a social relation, and as a driving force leading to social ordering and the production of space, thus the literature in connection with these social and spatial aspects is reviewed in this section.

The section is divided into three sub-sections. The first sets out to define power and power structures in general terms; its types, dynamics of working, its basic characteristics and nature. The second develops the basic understanding of power relations covering the emergence of power structures, and legitimation, etc. This section will also address the role of informal structures operating in the spatial and social domains of a society. The third section examine issues of the liberalisation of economies, social control, and production of space that forms the background of developed understandings of power.

2.4.1 Understanding 'Power'

In the social sciences, power represents a social relation, referring to the ability to influence individual or group behaviour, with or without the consent of the individual or group falling under this influence. Goldhamer and Shils (1939), Bierstedt (1950), Gerth and Mills (1953), Luke (1974),

Foucault (1982), Gaventa (2003,2006), and (Vermeulen, 2005), among others, seem to agree to this widely accepted definition with slight variations, e.g. Luke (1974) sees power "as the imposition of internal constraints, and those subject to it acquire beliefs that result in their consent or their adaptation to domination by either coercive or non-coercive forms" (in Lorenzi, 2006, p.88).

However, it is not enough simply to understand power in terms of social relations, since production of space through informal land controls involve both social as well as spatial dimensions. Power should also be seen as a project of control over productive resources and their exploitation, and as argued by Gaventa (2003): "the political economy approach sees power as the ability to command control over resources, and may be especially useful for conceptualising 'powerlessness' as well as power." In this definition, the political economy approach broadens the definition of power seen as a process of social control to include controlling both people and productive assets (resources), either physical or non-physical, suggesting an additional dimension that should be explored in examining informal land controls.

In summary, power refers to an ability produced from having a relatively superior position (due to moral, knowledge-based, legal, institutional, physical, resource-based, religious, social, or cultural assets), that allows the power holder to influence and control the individual or group behaviour of subjects, their resources and actions, with or without consent of the people so influenced. The process through which this 'relatively superior position' is achieved refers to process of 'production of power', while the agents or the structures that control and use power are termed 'power structures' in this analysis.

The concepts of French philosopher Foucault about power are intriguing as he saw power freed from agency, personality or institution, arguing that "power is everywhere" (Foucault, 1978, p. 93). In his concept, power cannot be counted or calculated and cannot be located, it is relational and is produced, and thus can be traced only when exercised (Rowland, 1997, p.12).

Nature of power

Power itself is a neutral term but its usage defines its nature, which may be both 'positive' and 'negative', reformist or oppressive, depending on its objectives, means of implementation, outcome, and from whose perspective the outcome is seen.

Lukes (1974) sees power as negative in terms of domination, authority, superiority, prestige, use of force, manipulation etc., suggesting that a sense of subjugation and oppression is necessary for the power-holder to achieve a 'superior position' over subjects. However, power is not always negative and oppressive.Foucault in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison* (1977, p. 194) challenged this notion of negativity: "we must cease once and for all to describe the effect of power in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it 'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production." Previously, Bierstedt (1950) had already pointed towards the positive side of power by saying that "power supports the fundamental order of society and the social organization within it, wherever there is order. Power stands behinds every association and sustains its structure. Without power there is no organisation and without power there is no order." Similarly Lukes (1974) when he introduced his famous concept of the "three dimensions of power", also pointed out that power is not only a negative term but also helps in political decision-making and problem-solving.

Lukes's (1974) book, *Power: A Radical View,* described three dimensions of power that underpin political decision-making. "One-dimensional" power is *visible*, the power that is written and everybody can see and access, and can try to change, such as powers of heads of state or constitutional power. The "two-dimensional" view of power refers to *hidden power* wielded as a tool of exclusion from the main topics of debate, e.g: by not allowing access to the sources of information or knowledge in order to exclude certain ethnicities, religious groups or genders from decision making. "Three-dimensional" or *invisible power* refers to the power tactics which develop a "false consciousness" in the subjects or subordinates, where the subjects 'internalise' powerlessness and consider that they are not worthy of taking part in decision making. Although the literature considers the three attributes of power in relation to class struggles and the dominance of one economic class over other, the approach is broad enough to analyse any type of power structure.

However, this literature does not adequately explain the 'relative' nature of users of power. Some power-holders maybe positive and supportive towards their subjects, but their actions may also result in negative outcomes for subjects or other competing or contending power-holders. For example, as already discussed, informal urban development processes sometimes benefit the poor, yet at the same time, have made cities ungovernable (Section 2.2). Thus, power against the background of informality has a relative and 'dual nature' that is also 'scalar', positive on the local-level for one type of stake holder while negative for another and at the city-level.

Power as action or having capability of action and inaction

Power refers to the capacity and ability to influence behaviour or action. Bierstedt (1950) sees this as an inherent capability: "Power itself is the predisposition or prior capacity which makes the application of force possible. Only groups which have power can threaten to use force and the threat itself is a power" (Bierstedt, 1950, p. 733). However the capacity can be an illusion until it is applied, as Foucault (1982, p. 789) argues: "something called Power, with or without a capital letter, which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or diffused form, does not exist. Power exists only when it is put into action." Further, (Ibid, p. 789), "what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future". However when Foucault (1982) discusses actions that may arise in the future, the argument resembles Lukes's (1974) third attribute of power, i.e. "the power to prevent the formation of grievances by shaping perception, cognitions, and preferences in such a way as to ensure the acceptance of a certain role in the existing order" (in Lorenzi, 2006, p. 92). Sometimes the threat of power is more important than its action. Luke argues that 'inaction' may be a tool of the power-holder who might abstain from using power to avoid conflict, so 'avoidance' when the capacity exists is another strategy open to power-holders.

The decoding of 'inaction' is difficult, since it is possible that the power structure might not have the required power to take action. For example, Amos (1984) and de Soto (1989), identify the rise of informal settlements as the people's response to the incapacity or 'inaction' of the state, but here incapacity or failure symbolises lack of power. The state is not abstaining from exercising power; in this case there is no capacity or resources to exercise power. For example in Karachi various influxes of refugees have been allowed to encroach on undeveloped spaces because the state did not have the capacity to accommodate them (Hasan, 2002, see Chapter 4). Furthermore, as seen in Section 2.2, informality is used as 'negotiable value' where the government can assume power through 'inaction' to allow "deregulation" (i.e. ignoring the rules) rather than "un-regulation" (i.e. changing the rules) in order to maintain flexibility when required.

Power relations and expression of power

The concept of power implies a two-way social relation, which describe the production of power. The power-holder cannot exist in isolation, but requires subjects to influence, rule, or gain legitimacy over, in order to control behaviour, actions or resources. Simmel (1950, p. 136), for

example, explains that "where the significance of the one party sinks so low that its effects no longer enters the relationship with the other, there is as little ground for speaking of sociation as there is in the case of the carpenter and his bench." This two-way relation can be of two types i.e. "A power relation is 'unilateral' if only one party to the relationship exercises power over the other and 'bilateral' if both parties exercise power over each other." (Goldhamer and Shils, 1939, p. 175). Furthermore, the nature of this two-way relationship can be coercive or voluntary depending on the type and objectives of power and its working dynamics. In the case of non-state actors, there can be cases of both unilateral and bilateral power. For example, in informal settlements, where the provision of goods and services can be organised by criminal groups or political parties, the relationship is usually bilateral i.e. the power providing the service gets something in return; money in the case of criminal groups, political obedience and votes in the case of the political parties representing the state (Weinstein 2008, Roy 2009). In the case of informal structures involving drug gangs and violent methods of control, power is usually one way and a total obedience is required from the subjects – this is a kind of 'unilateral' power, as explored in detail by Rodgers (2005) in Nicaragua.

Some authors identify how power is practiced and produced (Rowland, 1997). First, "power over" is widely linked with the negative connotations of power, "Power is seen as a win-lose kind of relationship. Having power involves taking it from someone else, and then using it to dominate and prevent others from gaining it. In politics, those who control resources and decision-making have power over those without. When people are denied access to important resources like land, healthcare, and jobs, 'power over' perpetuates inequality, injustice, and poverty" (VaneKlasen & Miller, 2002, p.45). Space production under neoliberal market policies is seen from the same perspective (Holloway, 2005), where state and capitalist structures use "power over" subjects as the policy tools to keep the cycle of surplus value moving.

Others highlight more just and collaborative ways of producing and using power i.e. "power with", "power to" and "power from within" (VaneKlasen & Miller, 2002, p. 45). "Power with" highlights the potential power of collective action derived from common or shared objectives. It requires the identification of common strengths and potentials to collaborate towards achieving common interests, so that collective action 'empowers' the otherwise weak and powerless group. "Power to" argues that every individual has the "power to" bring change based on their unique strengths. Such potential when nurtured and utilised collectively, as "power with", makes a difference. "Power within" is focussed around agency of the individual that is 'empowered' through building self-consciousness and self-esteem, with important potential to bring about change.

One aspect of power structures less explored in literature is the scope for a power structure to develop and renew itself; e.g. through creating competition or expansionist agendas. This project of growth leads such structures (i) to increase the number of people/subjects controlled, (ii) expand productive resources, and (iii) strengthen the structure of the organisation. These three aspects have been described by Bierstedt (1950, p.737) as sources of power. The non-state actors, as power structures, have the same tendency, e.g. to upgrade from being informal to being a legal, and hence legitimate, formal power structure. Legal legitimacy gives further access to state institutions and benefits thus enabling further control, as explored comprehensively by Yiftachel (1998). Similarly, the involvement of informal structures in electoral politics is similar, as winning an electoral seat gives an otherwise non-legitimate structure or individual legal powers. Organised criminal groups and their links with the political parties has been identified by Weinstein (2008), Kudva (2009) and Roy (2009) in India, and Yusuf (2012), Gayer (2014), Hasan et al. (2015) in Karachi-Pakistan. In addition, non- state actors are always working with state officers, politicians and other institutions to keep increasing their formal power. This is documented in many of the cases discussed by Weinstein (2008), Roy (2009), Kudva (2009), Budhani et al. (2010), Hasan (2010), Utas (2012), Gayer (2014) and Hasan et al. (2015).

Although the literature seems to cover the power-subject relation, it does not shed much light on power-power (power-holders) relations. A situation in which there are two or more powers structures wielding their power through control over the same resource like land, electoral votes or settlements as a market for their products becomes competitive. The power-power relation is also important to explore because to understand and interpret situations when state power is weak or absent, often more than one power structure arises to fill the gap, leading to competition which, in many cases, can be termed as conflict, civil war, gang war etc.

2.4.2 Types of Powers and Power Structures

There are many ways to define types of power control or structures. Some authors have looked at it through the lens of legality, or the way in which power operates and how decision-making takes place. However, the literature has very little to offer around non-state actors, political parties, or religious groups as power structures. The debate around power also oscillates between legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, welfare based, voluntary or oppressive.

Systems of differentiation

The literature explores various systems of differentiations i.e. that "which permits one to act upon the actions of others" (Foucault, 1982, p. 792). This approach is useful to help examine various forms of control, and the relationship of superior-to-subordinate and means through which the superior party gains legitimacy to exercise power, whether through legality, oppression, tradition, resources, knowledge and class etc.

Existing hierarchies

Relative superiority based on existing hierarchies and status can take various forms. Simmel (1950) explored "domination" as a power. Goldhammer and Shils (1939, p. 171-172) examined the "type of influence brought to bear upon the subordinated individual" including: physical power or "force"; "domination" conveyed through the order to act, and "manipulation" when the influence is on behaviour without clarifying the purpose i.e. objectives are intentionally made hidden or wrongly described as the truth might not fetch the same results − the latter resembles the three-dimension of power identified by Lukes (1974), already explored.

Power structures can gain legitimacy on the basis of "coercion", by threat, blackmail and violence. Although Goldhammer and Shils (1939, p. 172) consider such coercions as points of departure from legitimacy, since this coercion is the basis for acceptance of power and no resistance is posed, it can also be seen as a form of legitimacy, as there is still freedom and without freedom there is no power relation (Foucault, 1982, p. 790, Simmel 1950, p. 136).

Legality

This refers to the acceptance of exercise of power by virtue of the rule of law. Such powers are usually termed as "legal legitimate" powers, e.g. a government formed by political parties has legal powers to devise and control policy and institutions. Weber (1946) call such legitimacy "authority", whereas, Goldhammer and Shils (1939, p. 172) go a step further and define the types of legitimacies or "right to rule", however it can also be termed a typology of power. When power is acknowledged and accepted by subordinates it is a "legitimate" power and when it is not, it is called "coercion". They further define the sub-types of "legitimate" power as (i) "legal" when the law legitimates power; (ii) "traditional" when the norms and culture of society allow power to

flourish; (iii) "charismatic" if power is accepted on the basis of its personification in a 'hero' or on the basis of other qualities.

Tradition

Traditions and values in many societies are accepted as the basis of legitimate power. Some traditional roles gain legal recognition and a formal position in national or local governance and administration, while others are informally accepted and respected by people. Bourdieu's (1989, p. 21) concept of "nobiles" is relevant – i.e. those who acquire 'symbolic power' and attain social 'authority' as a superior position due to access to social, cultural or economic capital. Various examples can be quoted; e.g. the role of tribal chiefs in land management in some parts of Africa is legally accepted, and in the tribal areas of Pakistan tribal elders are legally accepted (Shinwari 2012). Some modern democracies still retain a monarchy, as in the UK. In many sects of Islam, religious leadership traditionally transfers to family members, e.g. amongst Bohri Muslims and Ismaili Muslims (Lokhandwalla, 1955; Daftari, 1998). Similarly, many Arab and African countries still follow ethnic or tribal leaders in their social lives (Utas, 2012). Goldhammer and Shils (1939, p. 172) call these traditions a 'charismatic' legitimacy that involves emotional attachment to a position or institution.

Identity discourse

Discourse is central in the production of power, especially around the issue of identity, which helps people accept the exercise of religious, ethnicity, gender, politics or other discursive power structures (Foucault, 1978, p. 100-01; Laclau and Mauffe, 2001). Foucault (1982, p. 777) identifies "bio-power" as a type when "it operates through techniques of disciplining, ordering, ranking, making visible and subjecting to knowledge" and relates this power to schools, hospitals, jails etc. Similarly, Foucault (1978) identified discourse as important in power production, suggesting that a power that emerges around discourse can be called a "discursive power".

Power and the state

Foucault argued that, "... a new political form of power has been continuously developing. This new political structure, as everybody knows, is the state" and he compares the state as a power structure with the religious authorities (structures) in Christian society (Foucault, 1982, p. 782-783). However, he argues that despite various similarities between "state power" and "pastoral

power", the state is based on a political power structure that earns its legitimacy from promises to provide services to ensure the needs of wellbeing of its citizens, whereas "pastoral power" is oriented around a need for 'salvation'.

In the context of spatial development, Gaventa (2003, p.12), exploring Scott's (1998) concepts, explained that government and formal structures seek rational strategies and to make power "visible" in order to create governable subjects, whereas informal structures try to keep their subjects and space "invisible" and under control on the promise of upgrading to a formal status. The concept of informal power structures is dealt in detail below (Section 2.4.3)

Fulfilling 'need'

Many powers are produced and obtain legitimacy around the subjects' 'need', either real or perceived (based on discourse). When Foucault (1982, p. 782-783) talks about state power, he argues that state power gains legitimacy from 'worldly aims' and the basic needs of people i.e. safety, security, shelter, wellbeing etc. Thus people elect or legitimate political parties who can best serve to their needs, while conversely political parties can develop or invent needs e.g. the 'need' for protection from an enemy (ethnic, religious, national) to increase their legitimacy. Likewise, informal structures also seek legitimacy around the concept of fulfilling people's 'needs' e.g. for land, shelter, services or formalising informal settlement, as explored by Roy (2009) and Weinstein (2008).

Resource control

Bierstedt (1950) considered productive resources as a core foundation of power, suggesting that "resources are media through which power is exercised as a routine element of the instantiation of conduct in social reproduction" (Gidden, 1984, p. 15-16). People or organisations with access to social, economic and material capital, to finance or an army of support, can accumulate power at scale. Social networks can also be understood as a resource and a network of supporting actors can increase the legitimacy of power. For example, markets can be manipulated if the numbers of producers are limited. Informal structures also prove resourceful in claiming legitimacy over their subjects, but may have to compete for power with another claimant over the same territory or subjects.

De facto power

Some power structures are relative or reactionary, a counterpoint to the action or inaction of an opposing power structure. Foucault (1982, p. 780-781) considers 'struggle or resistance' as, "a type of power which makes individuals a 'subject', subject not In the sense of controlled by someone else. Foucault (1982, p. 781) identifies three types of struggles (or power) i.e. (i) struggle against domination (e.g. ethnic social or religious), (ii) struggle against the exploitation of dispossession or primitive accumulation, and (iii) struggle against subjection or complete submission.

The concept of "substitute" power proposed by Goldhamer and Shils (1939, p. 174) seems the most directly relevant to this research and the concept of informal structures emerging from this discussion. Goldhamer and Shils (1939, p. 174) explain that, "If attempts of a person to exercise power fail, the power act may be followed either by a *substitute power act* or by a sanction. A *substitute power act* is intended primarily to attain the original aim of the first act. Substitution may take place both within or between types of power."

2.4.3 Defining Informal Power Structures

The above conceptualisations of power structures help in defining the role of informal and non-state actors, and in addressing the gaps identified in the literature on informality, production of space and power, and will help in theorising informal land controls. These concepts are summarised in Figure 2.2.

In this thesis 'informal power structures' (shortened here to informal structures) are understood as the concept of "substitute power" put forward by Goldhammer and Shils (1939, p. 174) which substitutes for government-held power, and can be held by either individuals or organisations, both legally legitimate organisations such as political parties, or illicit structures such as organised crime groups. There are many types of power-holders between these two extremes, which draw legitimacy from various domains including: "tradition" e.g. tribal structures and elders; "discourse" e.g. by religious authorities, or "charismatic personalities", such as individuals with resources and social or religious standing, criminals such as drug gangs, and "neutral" power structures such as neighbourhood committees, civil society organisations or NGOs (Figure 2.2).

Some of power structures, given in figure 2.2, cannot be fixed as either formal or informal. For example, political parties are formally registered and work according to their manifesto within the boundaries of the law. However, the empirical evidence suggests that such structures blur formal-informal divide; since they channel public resources and development through the legally non-legitimate infrastructure such as political party offices and their representatives. In such cases, the role of elected representatives becomes subservient to the party hierarchy (See chapter 5, table 5.3). Similarly, formally elected representatives and government employees equally blur the formal-informal boundaries.

Such informal structures work 'from between' as 'power intermediaries' that connect formal structures that work 'from above', in implicit and open ways or may even be part of the politically elected government, as explored in literature on informality (Section 2.2). Furthermore, they are also connected with the people in many ways, e.g. through political parties, religious authorities and tribal leaders, or gangs, and work 'from below', and often control people through 'informal land controls' as they earn legitimacy by providing urban services to the people (Sections 2.2.5 and 2.3.6).

Thus, the concept of 'informal structures' is used here to refer to any form of leadership or social control mechanism operating illicitly in the fields of urban development, urban management or territoriality. In Karachi, these include political parties operating through informal mechanisms, tribal elders and *Jirga* (councils of elders), *Baradary* (brotherhoods), religious councils and committees, neighbourhood committees, criminal gangs and musclemen (thugs) (Chapter 5, 6 and 7). Such informal structures bank on the "needs" of their constituents, either material e.g. for housing or water, or non-material e.g. religious or cultural needs, that enable the poor and minorities to gain acceptance. Such informal structures build on established social groups, but assume status as informal structures once the formal government fails to provide services impartially.

The concept of 'informal structures' is seen in contrast to 'formal structures' that include the legal, legitimate power structures of the state, together with legitimate structures of the private and commercial sector, which holds powers vested by the state.

Figure 2.2: Hierarchy of power structures

Structure for governmentality

Foucault coined the term 'governmentality' to refer the way in which the state governs its citizens. Here, this term is examined to explore how informal structures are able to exercise controls in relation to their structure and hierarchy both in organisational terms and in human resource.

Informal structures can be agency-based or have a hierarchical structure. When agency-based, they depend more on the 'charisma' of the personality that may be due to 'tradition' e.g. tribal systems, 'discourse' e.g. religious personalities, or out of 'need' fulfilment. In hierarchical structures, e.g. political parties, religious hierarchies etc. a system of networks is essential. This network is used to implement controls and to earn legitimacy, for example through surveillance, threats or punishments (Section 2.5). Such networks can be of two types:

i) A closed network, with restricted and monitored membership, having a hierarchy and defined roles and limitations. For example, Rodgers (2005) has demonstrated how drug peddlers in Nicaragua have a sophisticated hierarchy of operations, Hossain (2012a) has identified how political hierarchies operate in Bangladesh, and Gayer (2014) has elaborated on Pakistani political parties (especially MQM) and their strong hierarchies that enable them to resist any attack or call the city to a halt through a strike call.

ii) The second type may cover informal networks based on tribal, family, kinship, ethnic or political ties. These can be an extension of first type and might help the formal hierarchy in achieving its control and legitimacy. For example, Budhani et al. (2010) has explored the role of solidarity networks of kinship, ethnicity and family as a basis of establishing territoriality and producing space in the ethno-politically diverse context of Karachi.

An established network can be used in many ways, for example in conflict resolution and contract enforcement. Budhani et al. (2010) consider contract enforcement as an essential and central service operated by informal structures in informal settlements that reduces the demands on formal government and increases dependency; make the informal structure the guarantor and arbitration authority in the settlement.

2.4.4 Concluding Debate on Power

Power refers to an ability produced due to having a 'relatively superior position' (due to moral, knowledge-based, legal, institutional, physical, resource, religious, social, cultural or other superiorities). Such power allows the controller to influence and control both, individuals and group of subjects, their resources and behaviour, with or without their consent, in order to achieve the desired 'objectives'. Such power is not tangible or containable, but is diffused, and is

found both in 'action' and 'in-action'. It is not limited to institutions but can be found in structures, in agency and in individuals, and is a two-way or "bilateral" relationship, in which, the subject 'produces power' while the 'structure' accumulates power. This two-way relationship is based on mutual interests, for example, in the case of the state and citizens, or capitalist structures that profit from users of commodities, and informal power structures which provide goods and services to deprived and marginal communities. "Patron-client" relations are another example of such bilateral relations.

The main distinction that arises between two types of power structures are the 'legally legitimate', termed 'formal structures' in the text, and the 'non-legally legitimate' power structures, termed 'informal structures' here. As noted at the start of the Section 2.4, formal structures are considered those that act according to defined rules and objectives, including the state, governments and their representatives and institutions. Here, the formal structures are often linked to state governance systems and dedicated to the provision of goods and services, with citizens seen as subjects, and the state having responsibility to ensure their wellbeing. Formal structures also include the private sector and legally legitimate organisations, developed and working according to state rules, widely termed the 'market' in the literature.

In contrast, 'informal structures' are 'substitute power structures' that can be seen as the 'power intermediaries' working 'from between' as an alternative to the formal structures, and channelling state resources to citizens for political and material benefits using informal means. Informal structures embrace a broad spectrum of superior-subject relations, from legally legitimate structures such as political parties using coercive means through to illegitimate structures such as organized crime groups. There are shades between these two extremes that draw on various sources of legitimacy including; tradition, discourse and charismatic personalities. Informal structures also draw on subjects' needs, either civic, religious or cultural. Thus, informal structures are able to produce and reproduce social relations with the people they control and thus impact on the production of space. In Karachi, the intentional and unintentional failure of the state's governance systems have left a void which 'informal structures' have claimed resulting in the acute spatial segregation and violent power struggles that characterise everyday life in many parts of Karachi.

2.5 Mechanisms of Socio-Spatial Control

Socio-spatial controls discussed here are means of developing and maintaining power relations through the process of subject-making, establishing social order, leading to the control of a territory, variously described as making "pure" space (Sibley, 1996) or a "homeland" (Yiftachel and Ghanem, 2004, p. 651). This also provides an understanding about the importance of the linkage between social relations, space and power.

The literature reviewed here does not generally distinguish between formal and informal structures or issues of scale. However, the section suggests that there is a huge gap in the literature in the identification of 'mechanisms' of 'informal land control' as a means establishing subject-power relations and production of spaces (informal spaces). The connection between socio-spatial controls and 'informal land controls' has already been discussed (Section 2.3.5) in that socio-spatial controls are specific mechanisms that are operationalized to achieve informal land control.

This section is divided into two parts. The first explores the links between socio-spatial controls, territoriality, boundary-making, segregation, exclusion, and other socio-spatial concepts, and the second section examines the identification and implementation of controls and their categorization in the literature. Control mechanisms are examined in terms of social and spatial controls, reflecting back to the power-society-space nexus, to see how each affects the other.

2.5.1 The Concept of Control

The term control here means the 'mechanism' used to regulate the order, relations and identity of social groups, and to regulate the production and distribution of space and other resources, with the purpose of developing and maintaining social, political and economic domination and ownership. It is similar to the idea of "societies of control", i.e. "to tax rather than to organise production, to rule on death rather to administer life" (Deleuze, 1992, p. 3).

Three broad themes are evident in the literature: (i) Debates on social control from the perspective of social psychology and urban sociology and the specific mechanisms used as controls (ii) spatial controls found in political geography, human geography and urban and regional planning literature, and (iii) topics dealing with the outcomes of socio-spatial controls,

such as division within cities, like boundary-making and divided cities etc. Each is discussed further below.

2.5.2 Social Control

The concept of social control, first coined by Ross in 1901 (Coser and Rosenberg, 1969), has developed from a debate in social psychology with positive connotations to being seen as a policy tool of exploitative nature.

The concept extends from externally imposed mechanisms to exploiting internalised control; from an individual's interaction with their environment to the state control and exploitation (e.g. of ethnic groups); from obvious and visible actions to invisible and hidden policy tools, and from legally defined control mechanisms to informal tactics of domination.

The early literature, covering Ross (1969), Durkheim (1969), Mead (1969), Piaget (1969), and others, is found dealing with the relation between the individual and society (the environment), and controls related to norms, values and customs, and how these are maintained and transferred to the next generation. The literature also highlights that social controls are there to bring order to society and ensure sufficient conformity by individuals to social norms. Coser and Rosenberg (1969, p. 97) argued that, "Social control refers to those mechanisms by which society exercises its dominion over component individuals and enforces conformity to its norms and values".

Ross (1969) suggested that some social controls are necessary for "social and moral order" while others such as law, belief, ceremony, education, and illusion are consciously used as policy tools for exploiting people and resources. However, social control is seen to embrace both the formalised legal frameworks, and informal structures of control. As Coser and Rosenberg (1969, p. 97-98) suggest, "there is a wide range of control mechanisms and that law, which had earlier been seen as the only important mechanism, was one of many, and possibly not even the most important".

Ross (1969) identified social controls that work "externally" and require some mechanism to keep people in line, such as traffic laws. Ross (1969) distinguished between controls related to moral values and sentiments like religion, art etc. and political controls dealing with class benefits. Other commentators such as Durkheim (1969), Mead (1969), Piaget (1969), and Foucault (1977, 1982),

identified controls that are "internalised', some of which were indirectly discussed in the literature around power, e.g. 'manipulation' as described by Goldhammer and Shils (1939), or Lukes's (1974) third dimension of power (Section 2.4.2), which reflects 'invisible' mechanisms of social control.

Implementing social controls

Social controls can be further grouped under two sub-categories, (i) controls related to demography and, (ii) controls related to discipline and obedience.

Demographic control

Demographic control is a broad mechanism to restrict the population of an area to a specific group. Demography in an urban locality can be controlled in many ways (e.g. through voluntary clustering, in-migration of group members, property transactions, harassment, or evictions). Demographic control can also involve converting identities from "them" to "us" through discourse – encouraging people to invoke new identities, change their political support or change identities. The most extreme form of demographic control is conversion by force, for example, the deadly mechanism of ethnic cleansing which usually has the same objective.

Demographic control has been widely explored in the literature. Yiftachel and Ghanem (2004) have examined state-level ethnic-oriented policy interventions in Israel, Sri Lanka and Estonia intended to control "others". Yiftachel (1998) has explored the role of urban planning, including tools of demographic control, as a controlling mechanism in detail, while Yiftachel (1990, 1996, 1999) and Yiftachel & Yacobi (2003) have identified cases of "demographic engineering" in Israel, where different formal strategies, explored below, control the ethno-religious composition of a settlement and are used for establishing territorial control.

Yiftachel (1990, 1996, 1999) and Yiftachel & Yacobi (2003) expose the project of the Judaising of Israel, in which new settlements and international in-migration were designed to increase the Jewish population, to strengthen the Jewish state and reduce the land occupied by Muslim ethnic minorities. Yiftachel (1990, 1996, 1999) and Yiftachel & Yacobi (2003) also describe policies to convert settlements with an Arab population concentration into ethnically mixed neighbourhoods, i.e. changing the demography through positive discrimination in property occupancy. Demographic control by informal structures has also been identified in informal

settlements in Karachi where people from the same ethnicity are allowed to live while others are forced out, resulting in ethnically divided neighbourhoods (Yusuf, 2012) .

Demographic controls are also achieved through land agents that act as middle-men in buying, selling or renting properties as identified by Hasan et al. (2013, p. 44-48) in the context of Karachi. In many urban settings, social networks of friends, family, relatives and relations of kinship and solidarity play a vital role in creating ethnically homogenous informal settlements (Budhani et al. 2010; Hossain, 2012a, 2012b). Property prices too tend to group people of different income levels together.

Demography is also controlled through control of identities. As everyone has multiple identities (Tilly, 2004) and power structures invoke identities (Foucault, 1978; Laclau & Mauffe, 2001), thus, the demography of "us" versus "them" is malleable and can be controlled. Discourse plays a vital role in invoking identities and creating symbolic boundaries based on identity. Social boundaries later convert into physical boundaries and the aim of the discursive power of making 'homeland' is achieved.

Obedience and conformity

Creation of obedient and disciplined subjects is a core objective of controls. The act of control is not necessarily oppressive (Bierstedt, 1950; Luke, 1974; Foucault, 1977), but can also be for the benefit of people as control can bring order and stability. Discourse around identity can help create social stability and disciplined subjects, i.e. the subjects 'internalise' and act upon the control voluntarily.

The concept of punishment and sanctions forms the most common means of both establishing power relations/disciplining subjects, and as a tool of power to facilitate other controls. "A sanction is a power act initiated primarily as a reprisal for non-conformity with a prior act of power; its intent is punitive and not primarily directed toward achieving the goal of the prior unsuccessful power act." (Goldhammer and Shils, 1939, p.174). The punishment could be verbal, monetary or physical. Violence and threat of violence are commonly used forms of punishment, and are often used by informal structures to create power relations. As Rodgers (2005, p.9) reports in the case of drug traffickers in Nicaragua "...perhaps the most basic form of social regulation is achieved through the use and threat of violence", and also, "violence, the on-going

threat of it, and its memory as a residual threat, is a major component in the making of territory, property, and of course the state."

Sanctions and punishments can be imposed on subjects, while the use of violence on 'others' or outsiders is another important tool that works in two ways. Firstly, it excludes 'others' and keeps the boundary intact, and secondly it shows power to save subjects from the 'enemy'. For example in Karachi, the ethno-political violence has been explored by many such as, Budhani et al. (2010), Yusuf (2012), Hasan (2010), Javaid and Hashmi (2012), Gayer (2012), as further described in (Section 2.5.3 and Chapter 4).

Sanctions such as social boycotts, peer pressure and ties of kinship are not debated in the literature. Such sanctions are effective in contexts where social networks are based on ethnicity, religion or tribal customs. Furthermore, sanctions related to money are also not widely addressed under social controls, although Budhani et al (2010) and Yusuf (2012) has identified cases of rent-seeking in Karachi.

Many commentators have also identified indirect controls in informal settlements, which makes residents of the settlements compliant. Roy (2009, p.80) and Davis (2004, p.15-16) consider that the 'inaction' of government which allows informal settlements to develop is a way of controlling large poor communities, and of avoiding any political challenge. The 'informal' status of the settlement keeps the poor obedient to the state, which enjoys this obedience reinforced by the threat of evicting 'illegal' occupants of public and private land. Similarly, political parties earn political loyalties as a trade-off for their protection against evictions, against promises of lobbying for settlement upgrading, land titles, welfare works and basic services provision (Weinstein, 2008; Kudva, 2009). Budhani et al (2010) and Shahdat Hussain (2012a, 2021b) also supports this argument through their case studies of informal settlements in Karachi-Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Against the background of discursive identity and boundary making, power-seekers use the threat of the "enemy" to justify their acts of exploitation and control, convincing subjects that loyalty will save them from a common threat, as Christensen (2012, p. 64) found in Sierra Leone, and others confirmed e.g: in the discussion of Africa's 'Big Men' and their networks (Utas, 2012); Hardt and Negri's (2012) "securitised person", and examples from Israel by Yiftachel (1990, 1996, 1999).

Controlling decision-making and institutions

Control over decision-making provides an opportunity to manipulate institutions in one's favour, in both formal and informal domains. Yiftachel (1990, 1996, 1999, 2000) has identified how urban planning policies can be devised to support the project of control, "planning, that is, the public regulation and 'production of space' is shown to serve as instrument of social control" (Yiftachel, 2000, p. 419). This is important because, in the context of global South, many informal structures are able to influence formal structures, either through employees who may be sympathisers, or through elections. Secondly, controlling cash can give an edge over rival groups, e.g. by directing development funds to specific areas and depriving other areas (Yiftachel, 1999). Yiftachel (2006, p. 504) has also identified manipulation of administrative boundaries such as municipal boundaries as an important tool to "include" or "exclude" areas from development. Similarly, establishment of electoral constituency boundaries are of great importance, although not much is found in the literature linking administrative boundaries with power and production of space; however, Yusuf (2012) and Gazdar & Mallah (2013) identified electoral constituencies and ethnic segregation as a key reason for violent conflict in Karachi. Gazdar and Mallah (2013) identify the importance of geographic location of polling stations (where the votes are cast) with the results as polling stations in controlled areas lead to results favouring the controller due to illicit ways of influencing voting patterns.

Again in the context of Karachi, Hasan et al. (2013) and Gayer (2014) mentioned an example of the control of land-owning agencies by rival political parties when in government, in order to control land, and eventually voters, in order to retain electoral power. Similarly, Budhani et al. (2010) has identified how in Karachi political parties develop links with government officials in the land-owning agencies and also with the police as an important way to influence institutions.

2.5.3 Spatial Control

Space is a social construct, and an outcome of social processes (Lefebvre, 1974); hence, the concepts of spatial controls are largely associated with the social relations of a society. Conversely, space itself confers power on its occupants (Sack, 1993), as "...territory becomes a key group resource for asserting ethnic control, collective identity and economic superiority." (Yiftachel, 1998, p. 397)

Defence of the territory is part of the objective of territoriality and often results in social conflict (Sack, 1983). Sack (1983) suggests that territoriality is established through the control of people, activities, space and the resources. Such territorial control can be benign, working for the conservation of identity or for the survival of a group, but it can be malign as for example in the operation of a criminal gang or mafia 'group feeding' as Weinstein (2008) explored in the context of Mumbai.

The literature does not define the concept of 'informal land control,' and the debates are mostly limited to the legitimate power of the state, or people's relations within a group. However, the issue of land control is central since access to land is often a reason behind struggles over distributive justice, inclusion/exclusion and urban rights in cities.

Mechanisms of spatial controls

The concepts of *territoriality, land control, rent-seeking, segregation, boundary-making, divided cities, ghettoization* etc., all are associated with and are manifestations of the spatial dimensions of social control. Inherent to the concept of spatial control is the idea of control over productive resources, particularly land, but also financial resources and the basic necessities of water, shelter and other utilities. The concept of productive resources was forwarded by Bierstadt (1950), explored earlier.

Land control

A core element of spatial control is the control of land as a physical asset. Control may take place through legal ownership, occupancy or expropriation, or through extra-legal means including force. Demographic controls as outlined above can also strengthen control over neighbourhoods or localities.

Yiftachel (1990, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000) and Yiftachel & Yacobi (2003), examine the case of the ethno-religious Jewish majority of Israel and its project to control land, and identify many spatial control mechanisms. Demographic control forms the main strategy through two mechanisms, the infiltration of predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods, and building new settlements in occupied areas in order to safeguard the boundaries of the national state (Yiftachel, 1990, 1996, 1999) and Yiftachel & Yacobi (2003). Yiftachel (1996, 1999) also identified 'property transaction control' as another spatial control mechanism, in which minorities are restricted from land-occupancy in

certain areas, 'expropriation' whereby land is taken away from the minority group, and encouraging in-migration by the majority group. Similar methods have also been observed in Karachi, where use of violence has been reported as tool for excluding "others" from territory (Yusuf, 2012), and property transactions are monitored by land agents and middle men (Hasan et al. 2013, p.44-48).

There are also indirect, subtle and invisible mechanisms for controlling land. Classic examples are given by Harvey (2008) and other Marxist writers such as Weinstein and Ren (2009), who identify the expulsion of poor groups of people in redevelopment and regeneration projects, both through market dynamics and through expropriation and evictions, leading to processes of gentrification. Peluso and Lund (2011, p. 671) suggest that this, "primitive accumulation, enclosure, and privatization are important ways of establishing control of land and resources".

The use of violence and force is also a mechanism to control land. Budhani et al. (2010) and Yusuf (2012) identify land grabbing and encroaching on public and private land as one way of establishing control and as reason of conflict between contesting groups in Karachi. Forced purchasing or incentive purchasing i.e. purchasing at prices above the market rates, could also be another category (see Chapter 6).

Rent-seeking

Financial gain proves to be an important reason for establishing power relations in informal settlements. Budhani et al. (2010) find that in a context of weak government, informal structures milk public resources and fight over their domination. Hossain (2012a, 2012b) has highlighted the process of contestation and negotiation in land, electricity and water supply in a *Bosti* (informal settlement) in Bangladesh, finding that middle men – from local offices to NGOs – have a key role in strengthening political networking in informal settlements, often partly financed by control of utility distribution networks.

Rent-seeking is an important form of financial control. Budhani et al. (2010) and Hasan et al. (2013) highlighted the rent-seeking behaviour by political parties and land mafias in Karachi, which includes land-grabbing, encroachments, and controlling public land including pavements, amenity spaces, parks and play grounds etc. to gain land for leasing, selling or for different forms of rent-seeking. Yusuf (2012), in her work on Karachi, identifies tactics of taking money from well-to-do residents, commercial enterprise owners, vendors etc. as extortion or protection money for

leaving their assets safe and to 'protect' against others and the administration. This also includes seeking charity money, and donations of valuable hides of animals sacrificed at *Eid*, to sell on for profit. Thus, rent-seeking is used both for financial gain, and to force undesired people out of the area although this needs further research as not much is written about it.

Segregation and boundary making

Boundary-making through controlling access and policing plays an important role in controlling land. Segregation can be internally or externally driven. Ploger (2006) examines how marginal communities in informal settlements in Lima avoid insecurity by creating enclaves in settlements in order to control 'access' or unwanted incursions, by using gates, barriers, boundary demarcation, walls, security guards and a communal policing system. Similarly, Bollens (2012, p.58) identifies the use of walls and barbed wire in Belfast to partition groups, while Calame and Charlesworth identity similar measures in other cities such as Beirut (2009).

However, the resulting 'spaces of power' created through boundary-making tactics have largely been ignored in the literature e.g. the local political unit offices, mosque or seminary, office of the NGO, a meeting place of community elders etc., which form an important symbol in political geography and boundary-making tactics. Segregation can also be externally driven, such as when particular groups are confined to specific areas, or low-income areas are given poorer service connections, as in Karachi.

Boundary-making and territoriality is not limited to physical barriers and objects, and writers on political geography also explore the use of graffiti (Brighenti, 2010), processions and other cultural celebrations involving parades, mass gatherings, displays of cultural artefacts, shouting slogans, and singing songs (Marston, 2002; Harney, 2006), and also, use of other symbols like wall chalking, flags, emphasising entryways etc.

Mechanisms of attack and defence

Defending boundaries is an important means of establishing and maintaining territoriality. This may include controlling access (described above) and 'attack and defence' mechanisms (Tilly, 2004). Budhani et al. (2010), Yusuf (2010), Javaid and Hashmi (2012), Gayer (2007, 2012), and Inskeep (2011) have highlighted the ethno-political boundaries, both symbolic and physical, in Karachi and the presence of military wings in political parties that try to defend territory and

attack the 'enemy' or 'others' both physically and politically – those who infiltrate within their boundary. These political parties have a strong network of surveillance and policing, and thousands of people have been killed on an ethno-political basis since mid-2000 (See section 1.1; 4.2; table 4.1; Inskeep, 2011; Yusuf, 2012; Gayer, 2012; Gazdar & Mallah, 2013).

Controlling information

Knowledge is an important tool of control, and mapping is used by formal institutions as a tool for including areas within formal jurisdictions and service provision regimes. Controlling access to information becomes especially important in the case of voter registration and service connections.

2.5.5 Outcomes of Socio-Spatial Controls

The outcomes of socio-spatial controls have various spatial manifestations. Kliot and Mansfeld (1999) comment on segregation and divisions; "… this is basically a problem which results from hierarchy of power and wealth in which those in political and economic control decide and others are decided for." (p. 167), while Marcuse (1993) declare that such segregations will remain there while such power hierarchies exists. The chapter has already looked at the concept of power (Section 2.4) while here it looks at the outcomes of power hierarchies in the form of: dynamics of identities (group or individual), segregation, and ghettoization, divided cities etc.

Identities, conflicts and segregation

Identity is an essential topic in understanding spatial division, and it is reflected in many socio-spatial concepts such as boundary, borders, nation states, ethnocracy, economic class divisions etc. Every person has multiple identities as Tilly (2004, p. 215) suggests, through which he or she is perceived and recognised by him/herself and by others. Identities activate and deactivate with the contextual conditions, similarly, Barth (1969) cited in Lamont and Molnar (2002, p. 174) explains ethnic identity as a relative phenomenon rather than an absolute social category, "…feelings of communality are defined in opposition to perceived identity of other racial and ethnic groups". According to social identity theory "pressures to evaluate one's own group positively through in-group/out-group comparison leads social groups to attempt to differentiate themselves from others" (Tajfel and Turner 1985 cited in Lamont & Molnar 2002, p. 170). The

emphasis here is on group dynamics and social psychology, and the link with power is weak, the argument being that conflict arises from the leadership rather than the group itself.

The concept of identity is not just a social category but is often manifested spatially (Paasi 2001, p. 10). Identity is linked to a socio-spatial dialectic, i.e. identity produces space (boundary making, territoriality etc.) while identity itself is a spatial product, "the meanings of boundaries are thus underlined by the fact that identities are produced through these boundaries." (Paasi 1998, p. 81).

Kliot and Mansfeld (1999) suggests that spatial divisions or partitions are a result of the movement of identity groups, or conflict. Social identities – economic, ethnic or religious – in contested contexts lead to the creation of boundaries, both physical and non-physical, which can result in various forms of segregation including housing, economic and political. If these occur on larger scale they can lead to divided, contested, polarised or partitioned cities.

Divided cities

Cities bring together people with diverse backgrounds, having different ethnicities, cultures and economic backgrounds, and segregation is not a unique occurrence (Javaid and Hashmi 2012, Vaughan and Arbaci 2011). A common identity binds communities, often leading to ethnic concentrations; as a result, phenomena of segregation and divided cities are observed. Vaughan and Arbaci (2011, p. 128) declare spatial segregation as "un-deniable urban reality", similarly, Marcuse (1993, p. 355) finds the divided city as "nothing new historically".

The literature on divided cities is discussed only briefly here, but is not explored in detail, as the debates usually refer to city-wide partitioning, rather than the local ghettoization observed in Karachi. Nevertheless, several terminologies used to describe spatial outcomes of socio-spatial divisions are relevant, e.g. spatial segregation, enclaves, ghettoes, territories, and are discussed below. Various other terms used to describe the cumulative impact of such divisions at city level (e.g. divided cities, contested cities, polarised cities, dual cities, frontier cities etc.) are less useful and not covered in detail below.

Segregation

Gaffikin and Morrisey (2011, p.58-59) argue that all cities are tainted with inequalities on the basis of income, status, or power. In addition to economic inequalities (Section 2.2.3), many

identity-based segregations exist such as "the racial ghetto or the gay precinct, or in the case of communities like the Amish, distinctive religious settlement" (Ibid, p. 58). However, "it is right to distinguish between imposed and intentional ethnic enclaves…" between say, in the case of the US, the black ghetto and the Orthodox Jewish community (Varady, 2005 in Gaffikin and Morrisey, 2011, p. 58-59). "Spatial segregation can be defined as the relative residential separation of population categories from each other … Spatial segregation exists when some areas show over-representation and other areas show under-representation of one population category." (Musterd et al, 1999, p. 575-576)

Spatial divisions – the neighbourhood level

Segregation may result from either 'inclusion' or 'exclusion', and it might be from choice or imposed; both the latter result in 'territoriality' or marked territories. Such territories or 'ghettoes' can be the location for social contest including social unrest, crime or violence (Vauhan and Arbaci, 2011). Implicit in the definition of territoriality, is the issue that the group or individual claiming the control is not always benign, working for the conservation of identity or for the community, but can be malign in the form of a criminal gang, mafia or organised group.

'Enclaves' is another spatial term, and although this does not have a negative connotation such as ghetto or territory, it implies segregation with intent of 'inclusion' rather than 'exclusion', although exclusion is implicit in its practice. Conventionally, an enclave is defined as "a small piece of territory that is culturally distinct and politically separate from another territory within which it is located … a city neighbourhood displaying distinctive economic, social and cultural attributes from its surroundings." (Gregory et. al. 2011, p.191). This definition suggests that an enclave is a socio-spatial configuration not conforming to the surrounding context. However, in this thesis, the term enclaves refers to socio-spatial units mainly occupied by a particular social identity group, representing resident dominant social identity that contrasts with the surrounding area, sometimes with sub-divisions.

Spatial divisions – the city level

Gaffikin and Morrisey (2011, p. 55) finds the term 'divided cities' ambiguous, as many writers refer to the term but there is no consensus on a definition and thus, the concept is indistinct. Musterd et al. (1999, p. 575) define a divided city as; "a city in which spatial segregation is manifest in such a way that at least some of the residing population categories involved, and

possibly a broader range of people, consider this a problem." Furthermore, Musterd et al. (1999) reject the prevailing notion that the concept is limited to economic inequalities; "divided cities are about cities, (ghetto) neighbourhoods, separated areas, but not automatically about poor people or unemployment. But usually it is supposed that statements about divided cities also deal with poor and/or unemployed people." (p. 576). In fact the concept of divided city represents "a physical crisis nestled within a political crisis" (Calame and Charlesworth, 2009, p. 171 in Bollens, 2012)

'Contested city' is another term used in similar context. Bollens (1999, p.3 in Gaffikin and Morrisey, 2011, p. 79) identify the ethnic 'contested city' as the one "where identity and nationalist claims combine and impinge significantly and consistently" on the city. Such cities experience conflicts over sovereignty such as in Nicosia, Belfast, and Jerusalem (Gaffikin and Morrisey, 2011, p. 79).

Gaffikin and Morrisey, (2011, p.55) highlight work of Hepburn (2004) that distinguishes 'divided' and 'contested' cities; "the former can arise from antagonism between two or more ethnic or religious groups, while the latter relates to a more fundamental hostility about the ownership and control of the city". In addition, Hepburn (2006 in Gaffikin and Morrisey, 2011, p. 55) define the contested city as: "a major urban centre in which two or more ethnically conscious groups— divided by religion, language, and/or culture and perceived history co-exist in a situation where neither group will recognise the supremacy of the other". Thus, a divided city is a partitioned city along economic, political or ethnic lines manifested in consolidated physical terms, whereas, the contested city shows a city in progression and experiencing constant competition over its control for a range of reasons including ethnic, national, political and religious antagonisms.

'Polarised city' is another term used to describe political or social contest. Bollens (2012, p. 6) explains such cities as characterised by political, spatial and other social contestations and have an antagonism far greater than 'divided' cities. In addition, in such contexts the competing political groups try to establish political systems and spatial enclaves along identity basis to protect themselves, and such attempts often lead to conflicts and violence. It is also found debated that the reasons of polarised cities are often embedded within the wider national and international conflicts whereas 'divided' cities corresponds to more localised conflict; for example the city of Jerusalem can be considered as a polarised city (Benevenisti, 1987 in Gaffikin and Morrisey, 2011, p. 55).

Other literature refers to 'frontier cities', as contested cities with a geographical emphasis, or 'dual cities' having a similar connotation to 'polarised'. 'Division' is generally taken as imposed from outside, while 'partition' works from the inside when the city is split because of a schism that splits society (Kliot and Mansfeld, 1999, p. 171). In addition partitioned cities are also spatially divided through physical means such as walls or barriers making them fortified enclaves, which can become an accepted formal policy as Calame and Charlesworth report on Belfast, Beirut and other divided cities (2009, p. 4).

So to avoid use of terms with narrow differences, the thesis will limit itself to 'divided cities'. In any case use of such terms serves the objective to understand the context of Karachi; "If the concept of 'dual' or 'polarising' city is of any reality, it can serve only as a hypothesis, the prelude to empirical analysis." (Musterd et al., 1999, p. 576)

Many cities in the world are considered to be divided, on religious and ethnic grounds such as Beirut and Belfast, or on a racial basis including cities of South Africa and North America (Kliot and Mansfeld, 1999, p. 168-170). Racial segregation in South Africa took place at a policy level through apartheid, which was reflected in the spatial geographies of development of both cities and regions (Kliot and Mansfeld, 1999, p.170). Yiftachel and Ghanem (2004) argue that some states, e.g. Israel, Sri Lanka and Estonia are 'ethnocracies', in which minority groups are controlled and excluded from urban domains through policy tools. Calame and Charlesworth explored several partitioned cities in detail, such as Beirut, Belfast, and Jerusalem and suggest that the social schism and religious and sectarian antagonisms were not local but already existed at a global scale, while physical partitions were used formally to avoid violence.

Karachi is quite different from such cases; first, there is no simple social division but many, ranging from ethnicity, religion and socio-economic divides; second, the antagonism is local; third, political parties are prominent in exploiting social identities and public resources (See section 1.2 and Chapter 4); fourth, the national government is neither ethnicised nor physical partitioning a formal policy, and fifth, as Gayer (2014) mentions, the conflict never reaches a situation of civil war, highlighting a controlled and informal institutional fabric that uses violence for political bargaining (See Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis).

2.6 Conclusions

This chapter, aimed at theorising informal land controls, has explored a variety of literature strands covering concepts and theories around; informality, production of space of various nature including territoriality, power, socio-spatial controls and divided cities. The literature explored has highlighted the complex relationships between actors – the state, market, informal actors and social groups – and processes through which development takes place – including informality, political conflicts, violence, segregation and territoriality.

The broader theoretical discussion suggests tolook at informal land controls as a process of production of space, conceptualised by Lefebvre (1974), which sees space as a social product and emphasises the interrelationships between society and space. However, this literature review suggests an added emphasis on the role of power, originally seen as embedded within the social role, as a separate actor in the process of production of space. Exploring power as a separate actor enables a better understanding of non-state actors, as a basis for gauging their impacts on production of space. Thus, this power-society-space nexus is helpful in linking the aforementioned actors and processes, further conceptualisation and in the fieldwork, explored below.

Two main gaps are identified in the literature review; first, the literature on informal urban development deals mainly with spaces beyond the formal legal framework, whereas, the issue of informal land controls in Karachi cross the formal-informal legal divide. Second, informal urban development and service provision are largely seen as failure 'from above' involving state and market, or as 'from below' by the poor, but not as services provision 'from between' organised by informal structures. Thus, the role of informal structures as 'power' is crucial, along with the 'society' and 'space' and their interrelationships to better understand the reality.

Two core concepts are developed, embedded in the power-society-space nexus, to address the identified gaps; first, informal land controls and second, informal power structures. Informal land controls are defined as: *establishing control over people and productive assets, both physical and non-physical, by delimiting a geographic area through visible and invisible boundaries of influence, wielded by individuals or groups in intense competition. Such competition embraces preserving and practising culture, religion or political ideologies, and claiming control over physical or financial assets such as informal rent and votes, through bounded territoriality, brought about through various social and spatial control mechanisms that range from benign to violent* (Section 2.3.5).

Informal power structures are seen as *"power intermediaries" which substitute for government-held power. Such power can be held by either individuals or organisations, both legally legitimate organisations such as political parties, or illicit structures such as organised crime groups.* There are many types of power-holders 'between' these two extremes, which draw legitimacy from various domains including: tradition, discourse, and can include; charismatic personalities, criminals such as drug gangs, and neutral power structures such as neighbourhood committees, civil society organisations or NGOs. Informal structures work 'from between' as 'power intermediaries' that connects to the formal structures and the people who they control through 'informal land controls' as they earn legitimacy for formal services provision.

Various theoretical aspects of informal land controls drawn from the literature review have been used to guide the fieldwork.

First the thesis explored the nature of informality and scope of informal practices in the case study areas, and the extent to which informal urban development processes contribute to the social production of space, emerging as "substitute power" (Goldhammer and Shils, 1939) after state withdrawal of urban services provision. The concept that the state 'inaction' might be intentionally guided by political opportunism leading to "deregulation" (Roy, 2009) was also explored.

Second the fieldwork looked at 'power intermediaries' and the informal structures that occupy the void in effect state management, investigating the nature of informal structures and their links to political, *baradary* (brotherhood) kinship, ethnicity, or religious identities. The thesis then examined socio-spatial control mechanisms, territoriality and boundary making that operate in the case study areas, drawing on demographic control, violence, or cultural and religious codes, identified as relevant from the literature.

The Interrelationship between various informal power structures in the city and neighbourhoods forms a crucial link in the study. Thus, the overall analysis seeks to examine both the city-level and the local-level and the resultant impact of informal structures and informal land controls on social exclusion, conflicts and segregation.

The fieldwork is used to explore the argument that Karachi is quite different from the examples in the literature on divided cities, because of the complexity of social, religious, economic and political divides, because antagonism is local, because of its historical legacy and modern-day political manipulation, and because of a delicate balance of restraint by informal structures in

which violence is a means of political bargaining, rather than a route to civil war. These concepts are further analysed in detail, in Chapters 4 to 7 below.

Chapter 3

Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This research about 'informal land controls' face several challenges, which made the research unique, but also formed limitations to the research. The challenges were both theoretical to practical. Theoretical challenges included issues in defining and theorising informality (Varley, 2012, Roy, 2005), lack of similar research as the most relevant studies dealt with formal controls (see Yiftachel, 1990; 1992; 1996; 1998; 1999; Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2003; Yiftachel and Ghanem, 2004; Calame and Charlesworth, 2011). Some of the relevant literature is contextually different from Karachi, such as the discussions on Beirut and Ireland (see Calame and Charlesworth, 2011). Also there is no single comprehensive theoretical framework that explains the operation of informal land controls in Karachi, although some theories are relevant, such as debates on the social production of space (Lefebvre, 1974), informality (Roy, 2005), power (Foucault, 1982), concepts around territoriality (Sack, 1983; Brower, 1980) and social controls (Tilly, 2004) that are used in this research.

Several practical issues have influenced the research. Karachi is a city of 23 million people, spread over 3,600 sq. km., and so could not be documented in full. However, the problem of security was the most decisive factor in shaping the research methodology. The research topic was quite sensitive owing to prevalent ethno-political violence, social segregation, the nature of informal actors and groups, including banned religious outfits such as the Taliban, and the social identity of the researcher himself. Several activists and researchers have been threatened or killed while documenting activities of such groups, for fear it would threaten informal rent-seeking (Section 4.4.3). However, since 2000 several foreign and local researchers and news reporters have managed to explore the ethno-religious fault lines underpinning violence in Karachi, whose work has been consulted throughout this research (Verkaik, 2004; Budhani et al., 2010; Gazdar, 2011; Khan, N. 2010a; 2010b; 2007; Hasan et al., 2015; 2013; Yusuf, 2012; Gazdar and Mallah, 2013; Gayer, 2014; 2003).

The chapter describes the research strategy and research design to provide the 'chain of evidence' (Yin, 2009, p. 123) that forms basis for the overall structure of the thesis, including the theoretical framework, methods of investigation, data collection, fieldwork, analysis and conclusions.

The research aims to explore the causes of the events leading to violence, segregation, informality and territoriality in Karachi and its subsequent link with diverse actors including state, market,

informal structures and citizens. This is explored through critical-realist epistemology following a deductive-inductive hybrid research design strategy, discussed in Section 3.2 on the research strategy. Section 3.3 deals with the research design and the case study approach is adopted as the most practical option in difficult circumstances. Section 3.4 explains the research methods employed for the data collection and field work, and the strategy for data analysis. The fieldwork is then explained along with the difficulties of access and the extremely helpful role of gatekeepers who vouched for the researcher. Section 3.5 discusses the limitations of the study and the ethical considerations.

3.2 Research Strategy

The logical basis of research rests on the research strategy (Blaikie, 2010, p.8), outlined in the following section.

3.2.1 Theorizing Informal Land Controls

Theory can be considered "… as an explanation of observed regularities." (Bryman, 2012, p. 21), or it may also be considered as "…something that guides and influences the collection and analysis of data" (Bryman, 2012, p. 24). It plays a central role in research, either in a deductive approach by applying or testing an existing theory, or in an inductive approach developing theory as an outcome of a research (Bryman, 2012, p. 21). In other cases, the link between theory and research is not definitive, linear or one-directional, but implies both types of strategies, and may be termed as deductive-inductive hybridity (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006).

Theories in social science research are of different types depending on their connection with the research and levels of abstraction and their ability to guide research. Merton (1967, cited in Bryman, 2012, p.21) describes two major categories. Grand theories have higher levels of abstraction and it is generally difficult for these to guide in the process of empirical evidence collection (Merton 1967, cited in Bryman, 2012, p.21). Mid-range theories are considered appropriate to guide comparative and empirical enquiry but their scope is more limited (p.21-23). Sometimes, where theories are not completely relevant, "the literature acts as proxy for theory. In many instances, theory is latent or implicit in the literature." (Bryman, 2012, p.22). In that case, research questions are outlined in order to enquire about the problem identified.

The literature review in Chapter 2 forms the theoretical basis for this research. Given the nature of the research, a single comprehensive theory did not fully cover the complexity of the research, but several bodies of literature were evaluated looking at informality, the social production of space, power and socio-spatial controls. The resulting gap identified a need for understanding the contextual phenomenon of informal land controls, within broader theories on production of space and power relations, and the role of informal power structures in facilitating informal land controls. This complex dynamic was theorised as a power-society-space nexus (Section 2.3.4).

3.2.2 Deductive vs. Inductive Strategy

There are several reasons that guide selection of either a deductive or an inductive approach. Deductive research strategy is mostly related to, but not limited to, quantitative research strategies where the hypothesis is deduced from theory and forms the basis for empirical enquiry (Bryman, 2012, p.24-26). The hypothesis is either confirmed, rejected or is amended according to the analytical findings (Bryman, 2012, p.24). However, it is often difficult to follow such a linear research process, and starting with a theory to explain a context disengages with the complex and unique context found in social science research (Lennon, 2013, p. 80-81).

In contrast, the inductive approach intends to develop theory from the empirical data, which is then generalised leading to a theory that may then be used deductively in other research (Bryman, 2012, p.25-26). However, it is rare that generalisations can be developed that are context-free (Lennon, 2013, p. 81). An inductive strategy does not work linearly, but entails an iterative process, which involve deduction from theory at the end of each iteration (see Bryman, 2012, p.26).

In contrast, deductive-inductive hybridity (Feredey & Muir-Cochrane, 2006) employ both a deductive basis for theoretical underpinning, but also gives weight to themes emerging from the empirical evidences to influence theory, which makes the researcher review the hypothesis and theory.

This research effectively uses a deductive-inductive hybridity, as informal land controls have been theorised from the literature review using a deductive approach at the start. However, feedback is provided from the fieldwork and the researcher's own experience in the field leading to an inductive research strategy that shaped the selection of case studies, and analytical themes generated from the data. The requirement for macro-micro (city-local) level split was also

identified during the data analysis process, and the research process adjusted accordingly following the deductive-inductive hybrid method.

3.2.3 Epistemological Basis

The validity and acceptability of any empirical research deals with the fundamental question of epistemology, i.e. "the theory of what constitutes valid knowledge" (Johnston et al. 2000, p. 226). The discussion on epistemology is important as it describes the rationale behind all the research decisions adopted for this study, which seeks to explore and theorise the causes of the 'reality' of informality, segregation, ethno-political conflicts and violence in the city of Karachi. The research aims to explore and theorise the dynamics, structures and relations between various actors and factors behind 'informal land controls' (Figure 3.1). This process of causal explanation, and knowledge generation, can be explained under a 'critical realist' research paradigm.

Level 01 *The Events*	**Informality, ethno-political segregation, conflicts and violence**
Level 02 *Background Dynamics*	**Power politics** (Contestation over controlling resources)
Level 03 *Background Relations and Structures*	**Informal land controls** (Establishing territory using socio-spatial control mechanisms, ousting opponents, power hierarchy)
Level 04 *The Theory*	**Theory explaining informal land controls** (Power-society-space nexus)

Figure 3.1: Various levels of understanding the reality in this research

Critical realism falls in between positivism and relativism, and implies that social reality cannot be understood either completely through observable facts, or through subjective speculation, but employs both approaches (Bhasker, 1989; Sayer, 1998; Bryman, 2012). The critical realist approach seeks to look behind events (observable) and explore relations, structures and dynamics (causes) that make reality (Bryman, 2012, p.29). It implies that, as opposed to realism, events are observed but reality can only be interpreted (Bhasker, 1989; Sayer, 1998, 2000). As Bhasker (1989, p.2) argues, "we will only be able to understand - and so change - the social world if we identify the structures at work that generate events and discourses … these structures are not

spontaneously apparent in the observable pattern of events; they can only be identified through the practical and theoretical work of social sciences" (Bhasker, 1989, p.02).

The approach tries to understand reality in two stages, first through a theoretical framework to try and explain the underlying mechanisms and structures, and second through empirical analysis to explore the dynamic complexities of these (Lovering, 1990; Peet, 1998; Sayer, 1998; 2000). The analysis flows in a two-way relation between the 'concrete' and the 'abstract' (Sayer, 2000). Understanding the complexity of the concrete requires abstract concepts that can explain the relations and structures behind events (Sayer, 1998).

Background mechanisms and structures are interconnected, and could be of two types: 'external' and 'internal' (Sayer, 2000). In the case of Karachi, the 'external' context includes national politics, the history of planning, the private sector, and regional events such as the Afghan war, natural disasters and the migrations they produce. The 'internal' context plays essential role in informal land controls and the resulting segregation, and is significantly influenced by individuals, ethnic groups and the ethnicity-based politics of Karachi. These two understandings also help define the a 'macro' and 'micro' split in the influences that affect informal land controls in Karachi. This inductively developed macro-micro split has also shaped the research design, and methods of enquiry.

3.3 Research Design

Bryman (2012, p. 45) defines research design as the "… framework for collection and analysis of data … a framework for the generation of evidence that is suited both to a certain set of criteria and to the research question in which the investigator is interested." Social research fundamentally follows answers to two basic research questions; firstly, what is happening – termed as 'descriptive research', and secondly 'why' such happening is taking place, which explores the causes – termed as 'explanatory research' (De Vaus, 2001, p. 1-8; Hancock and Algozzine, 2006, p.33). This thesis reports facts and events such as the violence, segregation, territoriality and conflicts in Karachi, and then seeks to analyse various mechanisms behind such territorial issues. Furthermore, the research also tries to answer why such events are taking place, through theoretical assumptions and hypothesis, and in this context the case study approach is the most appropriate method because of its ability to cover both descriptive and explanatory research issues (Yin, 2009, p.10-11).

3.3.1 Case Study Research Study

The phenomenon of informal land controls in Karachi cannot be fully understood without understanding the context. The case study research design helps to understand the phenomenon as it is inseparable from the context, and allows the context to be part of the study (Yin, 1993, p.3).

Several case study approaches are found in research methods literature (see Stake, 1998; Creswell, 1998; Travers, 2001; Ryan et. al, 2002; Yin, 2009; Bryman, 2012), but this study could be described through two categories, namely descriptive and explanatory case study research designs. As this study intends to describe and explore the case study in order to analyse the causal relations outlined in the research hypothesis and questions, thus the case study approach adopted here will be a hybrid of a descriptive (documenting control mechanisms) and explanatory research design (exploring the background dynamics and structures).

3.3.2 The Macro and the Micro Level Analysis

Given Karachi's spatial and demographic scale, the study has been split into two scales, macro and micro-level analysis (i.e: city and the local-level). The macro scale deals with the city-level aspects including the historical context and present-day socio-spatial patterns, the politics, the formal institutional set-up, the private and informal sectors (land and housing) and the city-wide conflicts, segregation and violence. The micro-level investigation tries to understand how these macro level dynamics are played out at the local-level, in specific districts and neighbourhoods. The micro-level investigation examines the social and spatial aspects of power politics including; territoriality, segregation, violence and control over public resources. The analysis considers the extent to which micro level case study areas can be generalised at the city-level.

The macro-micro level split corresponds to the objectives of identification of 'external' and 'internal' relations as part of understanding the background forces that determine urban realities. Each scale of investigation can be taken as a complete case in itself, however, to understand the causal mechanisms both complement each other. At macro level, power politics amongst various political parties underpins state failure in the provision of goods and services and conflict over access and control of public resources, which fuels violence, territoriality and segregation; while, the mechanisms through which territoriality and segregation are played out, and informal

structures (Section 2.4), are used to develop visible and invisible boundaries, must be examined at local-level.

3.3.3 Selection of Micro Level Case Study Areas

The case study selection followed a systematic approach. First, city-level experts (interviewees) were consulted to identify possible case studies, on the basis of which typologies of enclaves (defined in section 2.5.5) were identified, and a table was developed identifying possible case studies (Table 3.1). From the initial key informant interviews, four broad categories of enclaves were identified:

	Types of Enclaves (based on nature of control)	Legal Category	Social Characteristics	Examples
1	Politico-ethnic Enclaves (Controlled by Political Parties)	Formal Areas	Multi-ethnic Middle Income	**P.I.B Colony, North Nazimabad, Gulistan-e-Jauhar, KDA Scheme 33**
			Multi-ethnic low income	Khuda ki Basti
			Single-ethnic middle income	Liaquatabad, Sharifabad
			Single-ethnic low Income	Nishter Basti, Angara Goth.
		Informal Areas (+notified)	Multi-ethnic	**Lyari, Orangi**
			Single-ethnic	Several
2	Faith based Enclaves (Religion Based/Political/Apolitical)	Formal Areas	Religion ased	Parsi colony, Ismaili settlements
			Sectarian based	Rizvia Society/ Abul Hasan Isphahani Road & surroundings (Scheme 33)
		Informal Areas (+notified)	Religion based	Eisa Nagri/Pahar Gunj
			Sectarian based	Parts of lines area and many other areas.
3	Ethnic/Clan Based	Formal Areas	Ethno-religious	Shabbir Abad/ many others
			Ethnic	Old Villages
		Informal (+notified)	Ethno-religious	Azam Basti.
			Ethnic	Several /Baldia
4	Socio-Economic (Class Based)	High Income	Ethno-religious	Ismaili settlements
			Multi-ethnic (open)	Defense Housing Authority (DHA)

Table 3.1: First-stage categorisation of case studies (areas in bold selected for further analysis)

(Source: derived from KI interviews)

- Politico-ethnic enclaves, controlled by political parties but with strong ethnic affiliation;

- Faith-based enclaves, religious-based and both political and apolitical;

- Ethnic/clan-based enclaves linked to rural urban migrations, and

- Socio-economic or class-based enclaves, linked to formally developed and informally developed status, income groups and the Muhajir/non-Muhajir split to some extent (see Section 4.2.2)

The second step was to identify case study areas representing a mix and maximum number of divisions (identity based, formal-informal, and economic-based) controls and contending groups/powers. A table was developed to assess the advantages and disadvantages of each of the possible local case study area (Table 3.2).

The assessment of advantage and disadvantage was based on various aspects. Given the volatile security issues in the city and the sensitivity of the topic, and considering the ethnic identity of the researcher[1], several criteria were used to assess the potential interest of the shortlisted cases including: links to the community; easy and safe accessibility to the location; possible threats, and whether the area had already been documented. The aim was also to analyse different localities within Karachi through several micro level case studies.

Based on discussions with Key Informants, one main case study was selected within North Nazimabad. The case study area includes the informal areas around Kati Pahari, and formal areas of UC2 and Blocks A and C, as the area has a significant variety of divisions and social groups (Chapter 5; Map 5.1 and 5.2). It represents the 1960s urban outskirts and upper middle-income area of the city.

Three smaller case studies were also selected, Lyari, PIB Colony and Scheme 33 in order to:

- Confirm the processes emerging from North Nazimabad;

- Cover maximum range of social groups, enclaves, informal structures and their mechanisms, or situations which were not covered in North Nazimabad, and

- Analyse different spatial locations of the city in terms of inner-city, centre and periphery, representing different times of development, having diverse socio-economic

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[1] The researcher is a 'Muhajir' by ethnicity and would not ordinarily be welcome, without a local referee, in Sindhi, Balochi or Pashtoon dominated settlements experiencing political conflicts and violence, found in large parts of the proposed case studies.

characteristics, so as to explore whether similar processes were observed throughout the city (Chapter 4).

	Types of Controls/Controllers	Against	In Favour
Gulistan-e-Jauhar (Around Jauhar Chorangi)	- Political Enclave. - Ethnic Enclave. - More than two Ethno-Political parties against each other. - Poor Vs Middle Income. - Formal Vs Informal. - Relatively New development.	- Less connection in the area. - Less of existing work. - Un-predictable results and safety.	- It could be good, if role of builders is analysed, along with the informal transactions. - Links could be developed once decided. - Could be a detailed case study.
Orangi (Qasba and surroundings)	- Politico-Ethnic Enclaves. - More than two Ethno-Political parties against each other. - Poor Vs Poor. - Informal Vs. Informal	- Safety issues. - Much has been written and explored about it.	- Good with respect to connections and availability of data. - Already known in the literature. - Could be a detailed case study.
Lyari (Baloch and Kutchi areas)	- -Politico-Ethnic Enclaves. - Two Ethno-Political parties against each other. - Poor Vs Poor. - Informal Vs. Informal. - Religious Enclave. - Historic quarter. - Forced ethno-religious migrations.	- Accessibility is an issue. - Difficult to deal with the gangs.	- Good, if connections are found. - Lots of available exposure b/c of recent violence. - Could supplement the detailed case study because of less variety of controllers and segregations.
North Nazimabad (Kati Pahari area)	- Politico-Ethnic Enclaves. - Religious Enclaves. - Sectarian Enclave. - Formal Vs. Informal. - Poor Vs Poor. - Poor Vs middle /upper income.	- Less explored and lack of data. - Violence is on the rise. - Bad image due to Kati Pahari.	- Less explored. - Gives a vast variety of controls and controllers. - Could be a detailed case study.
PIB Colony	- Political Enclave. - More than two Ethno-Political parties against each other. - Poor Vs Middle Income. - Formal Vs Informal. - Post partition development	- Less explored and lack of data. - Monopoly of one group.	- Less explored. - Gives a good example of change in control of one group. - Could supplement the detailed case study.
Scheme 33 (Abul Hasan Isphahani Road and surroundings)	- In the periphery, developed and developing parts. - Political and sectarian conflicts and controllers. - Monopolistic and contested territories both. - Middle income.	- Less explored and lack of data.	- Good example from periphery. - Covers various types of conflicts and controllers. - Could supplement the detailed case study.

Table 3.2: Second-stage of identification of case studies (Source: derived from KI interviews)

The three additional case studies covered (Map 3.1) are: the old inner-city area of Lyari with unique problems of drug gangs and their controls; PIB Colony, the post-partition middle-income Muhajir locality in the centre of the city; and Scheme 33 (Abul Hasan Isphahani Road and surrounds), a developing middle to low-income area on the periphery representing developed and developing parts and reportedly the worst affected by the contest over control of land. As Scheme 33 is quite large, two detailed localities were selected for study, one abutting Abul Hasan Isphahani Road and the other beside the Super-highway) (Map 7.6 and 7.7). Orangi was not included as it has already been explored as compared to North Nazimabad case study area, while Gulistan-e-Jauhar was not included due to unavailability of any reliable gatekeeper and possible security threats associated.

Map 3.1: Location of case study areas in Karachi

All the case studies have a mix of formal and informal settlements, which ensured a blend of social groups from different socio-economic backgrounds in the study areas. Here, formal areas/formal settlements are those that were formally planned and developed, whereas informal area/informal settlements refers to informally developed settlements that may have been regularised or notified (formally accepted to be regularised and going through administrative

procedures) for regularisation[2], but the areas usually contain distinct socio-spatial characteristics in contrast to formal areas (e.g: as home to rural migrant communities), so they are called here informal areas. The term informal/formal area usually refers to a broad area of several settlements, while informal/formal settlement refers to a specific and defined locality. The scale of enclaves varies in the city (Section 4.2.2), whereas, it is also relative e.g. A large Pashtoon enclave comprises of UC2 in North Nazimabad (Chapter 5) when compared with Muhajir enclave of Block A and C, whereas, there are sub-enclaves within the larger Pashtoon enclave based on tribal identities.

3.4 Research Methods

Research methods refers to "… techniques of collecting data" for the research design and strategy (Bryman, 2012, p.46). Given the sensitive nature of the study and lack of data covering the enquiry around power contestations leading to power politics and control mechanisms; qualitative methods, mainly interviews, were employed. Other supporting methods were used to fill the gaps and for triangulation, including; informal talks, observation, photography, mapping and extensive document analysis mainly of news reports/articles.

Interviews

The main method of data acquisition in this study was interviews, given their practicality and because this is "one of the most important sources of case study information" (Yin, 2009, p.37). Interviews are suited to collecting data on issues around social perceptions, experiences and description of events (Punch, 2005; Silverman, 2005). Interviews are also instrumental in exploring complex and dynamic contexts and help in developing an in-depth understanding because they are flexible and issues can be clarified during the process of interview (O'Leary, 2005; Denscombe, 2007; Kumar, 2014). Interviews also complement the observational research, given the sensitive research topic and issues of security and complex social relations. However, the interviewer must be careful to account for any bias presented by the interviewee (O'Leary, 2005; Denscombe, 2007; Kumar, 2014). This issue has been taken care of through triangulation and appropriate sampling that includes ensuring equal representation from the contending sides.

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[2] Regularisation refers to the formalisation of the informal settlement/property by granting lease documents.

Interviews can either be structured, semi-structured or unstructured (Bryman, 2012, p.469-470; Kumar, 2012). Structured interviews use structured questionnaires and are also termed as questionnaire surveys. Semi-structured interviews use semi-structured questionnaires or prompts for a flexible but focussed discussion, while unstructured interviews follow an open discussion around the issue under research (Ibid).

Given the security issues, the researcher had to be circumspect to avoid any confusion about his identity (e.g: being taken as a political worker or from law enforcement agencies) and thus, avoided structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews guided most of the interviews both at the city-level and in the case studies. Detailed questionnaires were developed according to the interviewee type (Section 3.5; Table 3.3; Appendix 3.1-3.4), but these were not filled at the time of interview due to various reasons including security and avoiding public exposure, since the majority of the interviews were conducted in public spaces or on the street. More specifically, in the informal areas, questionnaires were not used as some residents were alarmed and reluctant to discuss issues when these were recorded in writing and unwanted attention needed to be avoided, thus the unstructured interview method was adopted and the prompts identified in the questionnaires were followed. In contrast, in the formal areas the researcher was asked to show identity, authority letter and a formal questionnaire was much appreciated but since these interviews were also conducted in public space, prompts and audio recording served the purpose.

Semi-structured interviews were used for Key Informants. Interviews at macro or city-level were designed to help understand the emergence of segregation, dynamics of power and informal land controls in Karachi and its typologies leading to identification of case studies. Interviews at the micro or local-level case studies were intended to identify the power relations, processes and mechanisms through which informal land control is consolidated. Different questionnaires were developed for each group. The topics explored are covered further in Section 3.5, and interview pro-forma given in Appendix 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.

Informal talks

Unstructured interviews, referred as *informal talks* here, were used with several individuals in the informal areas. Conversations were held with different people of different age groups, while the researcher spent time in the case study area, talking to interviewees or spending time sitting in local shops with the initial contact and gatekeepers. The discussions were mostly unstructured but around the topics of concern and helped to understand society and people's attitudes, and

were helpful in understanding the interview answers and for triangulation, and in developing locality profiles. Informal talks with labours and street vendors were also quite helpful, especially in PIB Colony and Scheme 33, as they formed additional interviewees to support the key informant information.

Observations

Observation as a method of collecting data, triangulation and a way of understanding the complexity of social relations proved to be a useful tool. Observation leads to undiscovered data, from other methods, as the researcher can develop a rapport with the subject(s) and their environment, both physical and non-physical, to attain unique information (Kumar, 2012).

The utmost objective of the observation is to study the subjects within their natural settings without making them conscious about it (Gray, 2004). Observation tries to capture the reality of what people really do instead of recording what they say (O'Leary, 2005). It helps in triangulation and to observe and understand relations that are not mentioned by the interviewees, reflecting social relations and culture instead of depending on subjective accounts (Foster, 1996; Mason, 1996). This method was very helpful in understanding topics that the residents did not wanted to talk about openly, or felt very strongly about, clearly identifying the power dynamics in the settlement. Similarly, in a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic environment it is important to observe how identities are played out and defined in spatial terms. In that case language, clothes, the role of women and their clothes, were defining factors for a non-resident of the area. Similarly, graffiti and the presence of flags are worth observing, which at times contradicted the narrative of power politics within the settlement, e.g. flags and graffiti related to religious groups which residents sometimes avoided talking about in detail.

Observations were mainly carried out during interviews, spending time with the gatekeepers at their shops or while walking or going on motorbike through the area with the gatekeeper especially in the informal settlements of North Nazimabad. Field notes were taken whenever possible and safe, while a detailed account was written after the fieldwork on each day. The gatekeeper was questioned on the spot, or at later suitable time, for triangulation.

Photography was used where possible with the permission of the local people and the people facilitating the fieldwork, although usually a local representative had to be present. Photographs of indicators of controls were important, including wall-chalking, barriers, flags etc.

Documentary analysis

Documentary analysis refers to use of secondary data related to the case studies at both macro and micro scale. Yin (2009) considers this a common strategy in the case study approach. Data sources may include news reports/articles, government publications, minutes of meetings etc.

The use of documents may help in triangulation, to detail events mentioned by an interviewee, or to fill voids in the series of events in a narrative with the aim to strengthen the data-collection process (Mason, 1996; Yin, 2009). Some documents may also provide knowledge that otherwise is difficult verify e.g. due to death of a key person (Mason, 1996; Henn et. al. 2006). In this research, it was impossible for the researcher to access the Head of the Sindh Rangers (a paramilitary force in Karachi), but he was interviewed in a daily newspaper that gave insights into the issue. A local investigative journalist documented several issues that the researcher could not access e.g. mechanisms that Taliban militants used to control settlements, but unfortunately, a senior police officer, Inspector Chaudhry Aslam, who had agreed to an interview was killed in a bomb blast a few weeks before the planned interview.

However, documents such as news reports might be biased, and could be unreliable (Finnegan, 1996; Macdonald, 2004; Henn et. al. 200), and thus require triangulation. One of the most insightful journalists, whose reports describe several reported events in this thesis, was interviewed to talk about his reports and the methods he used for it, to check the reliability of these reports. Luckily there were a number of news reports on the most inaccessible case study, Lyari. The case study write up of Lyari is thus rather different from the other areas, as many of the key characters behind power struggles and local conflicts were named in the press, so the research could use secondary sources to document family feuds. Although the researcher is aware of some of the characters who dominated the other areas, their role had to be somewhat played down.

In this study, relevant news reports/articles were collected from December 2012 onwards, and other archives were consulted when required. Two major English daily newspapers, Dawn and The Express Tribune, were used, supplemented by other reports from The News, Jang (Urdu). This method was instrumental in linking the case studies with the wider urban and national context.

Mapping

Mapping or cartography is supposed to be the best way to document, understand and communicate spatial attributes (Schuan and Brewer, 2010). Maps are now seen as "flexible tools for knowledge building. In addition to platform for representation of static information" (Schuan and Brewer, 2010, p.146), having the ability to represent qualitative data and analysis, in parallel with spatial aspects. Maps in this study are used as a data collection tool and visual form of representing data for better analysis.

Maps of the formal and informal localities were derived from aerial photos, and further developed, with the help of interviewees, to show socio-physical layers, such the social composition, the territorial boundaries, the administrative boundaries, the barriers, the encroachments and the amenities, political affiliations and controls in different sub-localities. Other maps including maps of violent events and electoral results were also used to understand the dynamics and links of enclaves, and informal land controls with the larger issues in the city. Mapping helped analyse the definition of territories or enclaves that were eventually reflected in the violence data (map) at the city-level.

3.5 Field Work

The city-level fieldwork started in January 2014, and continued till the end of February to help identify cases studies. Potential case study sites were visited to check the potential safety, and existence of a 'gatekeeper' who could facilitate the research. The case studies were finalised in mid-February, and interviews in the main case study area, North Nazimabad, started at the end of February 2014 with the help of a social worker and activist from the Urban Resource Centre, an NGO working throughout Karachi. Fieldwork continued till May 2014.

The interview process was slow, because of safety concerns and the difficulties outlined above. Interviews were conducted in Urdu, and a research assistant was hired to help transcribe the Urdu audio recordings, and help with the AutoCAD mapping. Interviews continued until the final day of the researcher's fieldwork in May 2014, when the Ismaili community representative finally agreed to a meeting.

In total 50 interviews were carried out as follows. Most were semi-structured but a few had to be unstructured informal interviews for safety reasons:

- *City-level interviews:* 16 interviews, with three interviews covering city and local-level: Interviewees included; urban planners, sociologists, economists, researchers, academics, representatives of government planning agencies, the City Commissioner, journalists, and political representatives etc. The objective was to examine broad issues of informal land controls. Most of the interviews were recorded but two respondents did not give consent for recording so notes were taken (Table 3.4).

- *Case study interviews:* 31 local interviews plus the three which covered both scales: These included 26 focussing on the main case study of North Nazimabad, and 5 in the supplementary case studies in the city. The interviewees represented a mix of stakeholders including residents, business people, social workers, politicians, community leaders, community elders, political representatives, and professionals such as doctors and teachers etc. Most of the interviews were recorded while three respondents did not consent to be recorded, so notes were taken during the interview (see Table 3.5 for list of interviewees).

As mentioned different stakeholders were interviewed, and five categories (Table 3.3) can be identified:

i) *City-level experts and professionals:* interviews tried to look at phenomena from the perspective of city-level experts and to examine various types of segregation, informal structures, control mechanisms and the reasons behind these.

ii) *State representatives*: interviews sought to explore the perspective of the appointed state officials', running the state institutions, attitudes to segregation, conflicts, violence, rising informality and weakening state writ. Officials of land development and owning agencies were specifically interviewed.

iii) *Politicians:* Politicians representing their political parties and not the state institutions; these interviews sought to explore political objectives which were very similar to state-related interviews and tried to explore power perspectives on the issues.

iv) *Residents:* these interviews aimed to understand how informal structures are able to control land and related functions, win legitimacy and exclude "others" at the local-level and the implications for residents. The research specifically explored what power hierarchies exist, and what kind of services are provided and what socio-spatial controls are practiced.

v) *v) Social activists and journalists:* these interviews explored perspectives of people observing   the phenomena as bystanders to enquire about power hierarchies that exist, and the nature of relations between them, relations between residents and the informal structures, and mechanisms used to control settlements and the people and oust the opponents.

	Interviewee & Questionnaire Type	Objective
1	Urban planners, sociologists, economists etc. Questionnaire 1 (Appendix 3.1)	From the perspective of experts: to understand how what types of segregations, informal structures and enclaves exists and what and how informal land control are practiced? What is the reason of the phenomenon, both current and historical? Role of state, market, informal actors and the citizens?
2	Officials from the state institutions. (Appointed officials running institutions e.g. Commissioner, officials of the formal land agencies etc.) Questionnaire 2 (Appendix 3.2)	From the perspective of the state power and formal institutions (representatives): To understand the perspective and role of state officials in the issues of segregation, informal land controls, violence and its impact on the city. What is the reason of the phenomenon, both current and historical? Role of state, market, informal actors and the citizens?
3	Politicians/Religious group leaders/ (controllers, politicians as representatives of their political party even when they are elected, similarly, the religious group leaders have their own informal influence over people and areas) Questionnaire 2 (Appendix 3.2)	From the perspective of political power: To understand objectives of control, reasons of conflicts, narrative around such power politics and earning legitimacy, in addition perspectives about other informal structures. Opinion about the major conflicts in the city including governance system, migration, violence and the role of state in all these processes.
4	Locals – Residents, business owners, local political workers. Questionnaire 3 (Appendix 3.3)	From the perspective of residents (subjects that are included/excluded): To understand how informal structures are able to control land and related functions, win legitimacy and exclude "others" at the local-level. What power hierarchies exists? What kind of services are provided and what socio-spatial controls are practiced?
5	Social activists of the area, NGOs, Journalists, Suppliers (Grocers/Salesmen from other areas) and others. Questionnaire 4 (Appendix 3.4)	From the perspective of the bystanders or stakeholders observing the phenomenon: What sorts of power hierarchies exists, and what is the nature of relations between them? What kind of relation exists between residents and the informal structures? What mechanisms are used to control settlements and the people and oust the opponents?

Table 3.3: Objective of interview and related interviewees

3.5.1 The Process of Field Work in Micro level Case Studies

North Nazimabad

North Nazimabad formed the main micro level case study area for data collection. In the case study area, sampling followed connections from the initial contact, who introduced three of the key community elders (gatekeepers), which led to a snowball effect. The identity of the initial contact has been anonymised for his security.

Response to interviews varied between the informal and formal areas. People in informal areas were more cooperative and willing to talk without fear and were willing to invite the researcher into their homes once the gatekeeper had introduced the researcher. People in the formal parts of the case study area were unwilling to talk about political and ethnic issues, suspecting the reasons for the interview. Almost half of interviews in the formal areas were conducted on the street, as respondents were hesitant to welcome the researcher into their home, despite being introduced by a gatekeeper. Only one interview with a woman was achieved but this was difficult, as her older children investigated the researchers' details and she was accompanied by one of her sons during the interview. In addition almost half of the respondents in the formal area did not disclose their employment; however the gatekeeper filled that gap from his sources.

Other case study areas

The other three case studies, including Lyari, PIB Colony and Scheme 33, were chosen to investigate informal land controls in other areas of Karachi. The respondents of these areas were identified through the experts and social workers from the Urban Resource Centre (URC), an NGO. The fieldwork and interviews followed the same pattern as for North Nazimabad, with the exception of Lyari, which was too dangerous to visit, so the interviews were held elsewhere such as the URC office and NED University[3], and the primary research was supplemented with secondary newspaper reports. The number of interviews in these areas were limited but were in-depth. The researcher has been living in PIB Colony for the last 30 years, which helped in understanding the complexities in a short period of time. Scheme 33 had been observed by the

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[3] NED University of Engineering and Technology, the biggest public sector engineering and technology university in Karachi, the researcher is employed at the university.

researcher during other projects since 2000, and was coupled with extensive field survey, observations and informal talks which substantiated the limited number of interviews.

The role of the gatekeepers

The role of the gatekeepers has been of immense importance in successfully carrying out the fieldwork, especially in North Nazimabad. The gatekeepers are local people who facilitated the researcher's work by introducing the researcher to the case study area, its people and its intricate social and political details.

Several gatekeepers have been involved during the process of field work on different scales. Mr. Rashid[4] was the first person who introduced the researcher to the case study area (North Nazimabad) and his chain of introductions covered 75% of the case study area. Mr. Rashid introduced Mr. Khan, Mr. Abid and Mr. Wali as three gatekeepers for different communities. Amongst the three, Mr. Khan proved to be the overall gatekeeper introducing the researcher to almost all the communities from formal and informal areas. Mr. Abid covered the Christian minority community; while Mr. Wali did not involve much in the research process as he is a senior person having high rank in a political party (ANP).

Mr. Khan further introduced some of the locality based gatekeepers in particular communities and in particular localities, such as Mr. Habib without whom it was not possible to talk to people in Balti Community area, similarly, Mr. Khan introduced Mr. Pir who is the community leader and controller of one of the important informal settlements and whose approval was needed to work in the settlement. Furthermore, Mr. Khan introduced the researcher to Mr. Saad, his master chef in a restaurant, who was instrumental in introducing the researcher to the Hasan Zai Pashtoon community, an area supposedly inaccessible for non-Pashtoon outsider. Mr. Khan was not only instrumental in informal areas but was also helpful in the formal areas; it was he who helped in getting the only woman interviewed. Furthermore, he introduced the researcher to others in the formal Blocks A and C. Mr. Khan was unable to find links in the Bohri community and the Ismaili communities, for which other contacts were used.

For the Bohri community, the researcher found a colleague Mr. Yasin from his university who lived in Block C. He introduced a Bohri friend who then made it possible to enter the Bohri neighbourhood in Block C. The researcher also found that one of his students lived in Block C; who

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[4] Names and professions have been changed to protect anonymity of respondents.

became the gatekeeper for the Bohri neighbourhood. The Ismaili community in Nizari Society remained inaccessible for a long time, but a breakthrough came when the researcher identified another student from the university who made introductions to the community leader.

Mr. Khan was immensely helpful as a gatekeeper to North Nazimabad, introducing the researcher to people and explaining the delicacies of the social patterns, especially in the complex setting of the informally developed area. More than 20 meetings took place with Mr. Khan within the case study area. The researcher also had to inform Mr. Khan, when coming and leaving the area, for security reasons.

In return, the community asked the researcher to use his connections to address the issue of water shortages in the informal area. This expectation helped the researcher to move in some of the inaccessible localities. The researcher tried to meet the expectations by developing a proposal for a water desalination plant as there are a few brackish wells in the localities. The gatekeepers also used this as an excuse to people whom they thought might be a danger to the researcher or the gatekeepers, explaining that the research is on the issue of water. The researcher will further address the issue of water supply to the area when he returns to Karachi. The issue is complex as lack of supply is due to political problems, and involve various risks but there are some simple technological solution that could partially address the issue, for example, using ground water or community water tanks to mobilise collective resources.

3.5.3 Difficulties

Several difficulties were encountered during the fieldwork. The first was size. Karachi is a city of 23 million spread over a 3600 Sq. km, it cannot be studied in its entirety, but a smaller case study may not be typical of whole of the city.

The most critical issue was regarding security. The volatile security situation, ethno-religious fault lines, inaccessibility of certain areas, and presence of militant groups was a barrier for the researcher (see Section 3.7.2). Several activists and researchers have been targeted and killed for identifying such informal groups and their rent seeking businesses (Section 4.4.3). However, researcher's links that led to reliable gatekeepers made the fieldwork possible.

It was very difficult to select the case study because of the informal territorial controls that exist. First, within North Nazimabad, the neighbourhood of Kati Pahari has a very violent image based on media reports, although the violence had subsided. Second, there was concern about Taliban

presence in the areas, as reported by the media, law enforcement agencies and political parties. Third, because of ethnic tension between Pashtoons and the Muhajirs, the researcher, as a Muhajir, was advised to wear the *local shalwar qameez* in the field, although this restriction became less essential as people started know him and he was always with a local person (Section 3.7.2). Fourth was the problem of timing of interviews, as the researcher was advised to leave the case study area before sunset, while workers would return after sunset, which meant that many interviews had to be conducted on Saturdays or Sundays.

	Code	Identity
1	EC1	City Expert, Planner, Academic
2	EC 2	City Expert, Planner, Academic
3	EC 3	City Expert, Planner, Academic
4	EC 4	City Expert, Ex. Chief Planner (Govt.)
5	EC 5	City Expert, Economist, Researcher
6	EC 6	City Expert, Activist, Researcher
7	EC 7	City Expert, Planner, Academic
8	EC 8	City Expert, Planner, Ex. Civil Servant
9	EC 9	City Expert, Planner, Ex. Civil Servant
10	GC10	Expert, Government Land and Planning Department
11	GC 11	Expert, Government Land and Planning Department
12	GC 12	Expert, Government Land and Planning Department
13	GC 13	Expert, Karachi Municipal Corporation
14	GC 14	Commissioner Karachi
15	PC 15	Political Party Leader
16	JC 16	Journalist, Crime reporter
17	PCCS 1	Political Leader, Resident of Case Study Area
18	ECCS 2	City Expert, Activist, Researcher, Resident of Case Study Area
19	JCCS 3	Journalist, Resident of Case Study Area
20	KI	Key informant (Anonymised)

Table 3.4: City-level Interviewees and codes

Issues were also faced in accessing people, getting permission to talk, and making them realise that the study only had academic objectives. Government officials were particularly difficult to approach and they kept deferring appointments. Some residents, especially from the Ismaili community, were unwilling to meet. Talking to women in the area was the most difficult, as under Pashtoon traditions women are not allowed to go out alone and meet non-related men. Most of the women from the Hasan Zai Pashtoon community were not even allowed to go to polling stations or to attend schools or colleges, which explains why only one interview was managed with a woman in the area.

Code	Identity	Affiliation/Locality
INN1	Shopkeeper, resident **(INN: Informal area North Nazimabad)**	Block Q, N. Nazimabad
INN 2	Resident, social worker, community leader/elder	Balti Shia community area
INN 3	Resident, Social worker, political & community leader/elder	Balti Shia community area
INN 4	Resident, social worker, political & community leader, doctor, Jamat-e-Islami (JI) Political Party	Kohistani community area
INN 5	Resident, social worker, political & community leader/elder, shopkeeper, JI Political Party	Kohistani community area
INN 6	Resident, social worker, community leader/elder, Doctor	Kohistani community area
INN 7	Resident, social and political worker, political & community leader, shopkeeper, Pakistan Tehreek Insaaf (PTI) Political Party	Kohistani community area
INN 8	Resident, social worker, community leader/elder	Kohistani community area
INN 9	Resident, social worker, political & community leader, cottage industry, PTI Political Party	Kohistani community area
INN 10	Resident, social worker, community leader, Gatekeeper, Businessman	Kohistani community area
INN 11	Resident, political & community leader, Awami National Party (ANP) Political Party	Kohistani community area
INN 12	Resident, activist, community leader/elder, gatekeeper	Pahar Gunj, Christian Comm.
INN 13	Resident, activist, community leader	Pahar Gunj, Christian Comm.
INN 14	Resident, social worker, political & community leader, businessman, ANP Political Party	Hasan Zai community area
INN 15	Resident, political & community leader, ANP Political Party	Hasan Zai community area
INN 16	Resident, political & community leader, social worker, ANP Political Party	Hasan Zai community area
INN 17	Resident, social worker, teacher	Hasan Zai community area
INN 18	Resident, political & community leader, employer	Deer Colony
FNN 19	Resident, social worker, political leader	Block Q, N. Nazimabad
FNN 20	Resident **(FNN: Formal area North Nazimabad)**	Block C, N. Nazimabad
FNN 21	Resident	Block C, N. Nazimabad
FNN 22	Resident	Block C, N. Nazimabad
FNN 23	Resident	Block C, N. Nazimabad
FNN 24	Resident	Block A, N. Nazimabad
FNN 25	Resident, political activist, JI Political Party	Block A, N. Nazimabad
FNN 26	Resident, community leader	Nezari Society, N. Nazimabad
FNN 27	Resident	Block C N. Nazimabad
GH 28	Resident **(GH: Gulzar-e-Hijri Scheme 33)**	Scheme 33
GH 29	Resident	Scheme 33
LY 30	Resident **(LY: Lyari)**	Lyari
PB 31	Resident **(PB: PIB Colony)**	PIB Colony
PB 32	Resident, political activist, MQM Political Party	PIB Colony
KI	Key informant (Anonymised)	

Table 3.5: Micro case study level Interviewees and codes

Due to reasons of anonymity, codes have been used instead of names of the interviewees in the text. The tables for codes and its corresponding interviewees are given in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. In the write-up even the codes did not always provide sufficient anonymity, and in that case a generic reference for key informant (KI interview) has been used.

The city-level interviewees with experts who knew the researcher were easily accessible. However, many others were very difficult to access such as leading politicians and government officials, including the commissioner and the police, and the journalist writing on the topic could not be reached. The researcher's affiliation with a local public sector university played a vital role in getting in touch with the government representatives. The Registrar and Dean of the University were extremely helpful in putting the researcher in touch with the interviewees. The Dean managed to put the researcher in touch with the political leadership of MQM[5], the Commissioner and the representatives of the public land owning agencies. Three reporters interviewed were introduced by a friend of the researcher who is a sub-editor in a local newspaper. However, all the efforts to find the right person from the Law Enforcement Agencies (the police and Rangers) did not work out. The researcher had an introduction to one of the senior police officials known for his in-depth knowledge about informal actors in the city, but sadly the police officer was killed in an attack before the researcher could meet him. Similarly, real estate agents would not talk about the informal actors as they may face life threats.

3.6 Analysis Process

Analysis usually refers to the process of managing, scrutinising and interpreting the collected data; however, the analysis process covers the whole process of research (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996, p.11).

The analytical approach adopted here follows a pre-defined analytical approach. This is usual, as there is no hard and fast rule for analysis and it depends on the researcher's interpretation (Yin, 2009, p.127). However, the analysis process, specifically regarding coding and categorisation of interview, largely follows a deductive part of deductive-inductive hybrid model. While some parts of analysis could be considered as 'strategic discourse' analysis as they depend mainly on interviews, to examine the links between power, society and space. Thus the emphasis was on

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[5] Muttahida Qaomi Movement (MQM), representing Muhajirs. See Appendix E for details.

logical consistency in interpreting data in a systematic way (Coffey and Atkinson 1996, p. 13). The analysis process is described graphically in Figure 3.2 below.

The first step was to transcribe all the interviews verbatim in Urdu. These were then translated into English, in two ways. First, interviews were summarised to extract the core meaning of what the interviewee wanted to say according to the main themes identified in accordance with the questionnaire, the hypothesis and research questions. The summaries generated are not made part of this thesis due to possible risks for the interviewees and the researcher; however the summaries can be made available if required as an evidence for analysis. Second, quotations used in the analysis were fully translated as accurately as possible. The summary and the specific quotations are used through the analysis chapters (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7) as indented 'quotations' and does not distinguish between the summarised and the specific quotes. This process enabled the first level of 'thematic' coding to be undertaken. The following first-coding themes were explored, identified from the literature review and an initial reading of the transcripts:

- *City-level interviews*: background of interviewee/organisation; safety and security; informality; boundary making; social divisions; social enclaves; segregation; politics; sociology; politics of control; informal land controls; law enforcement and future directions of change.
- *Case study interviews:* background of interviewee; history of settlement; sociology; politics; safety and security; conflict and conflict resolution; services and future expectations (undertaken for each case study).

Next, the resultant transcripts were uploaded into NVivo software, which is a qualitative data management and coding software and helps in analysis by allowing to tag or code the data that can be reorganised according to the themes or codes (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.45). This process could also be termed as de-contextualising to later re-contextualise according to the theoretical framework, hypothesis or research questions (Tesch, 1990; Coffey and Atkinson, 1996, p. 31-32; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 201-203).

The third step involved a painstaking process of coding the transcripts, followed by separation of macro level and micro-level data. The data was further coded according to the themes in steps; first according to the broad deductive themes i.e. power, society and space. Secondly, within each broad category, themes were identified both deductively and inductively - see Figure 3.2 for the long list of codes/tags employed on both scales under larger themes of power, society and space.

Interviews (Urdu Language)

Transcription (Urdu Language)

English **summaries** with **quotations**

Coding: Reflecting back to literature review for using vocabulary

Re-arranging the text on broader themes
- Introduction of the interviewee.
- Settlement development history
- Summary of the main themes
- Sociology, Politics, Safety-Security
- Boundaries, conflicts & conflict resolution
- Service provision & controls
- Future expectations

Power (Micro Scale)
- Objectives
- Mechanism to bring power relation
- Control mechanisms
- Form/type of institute
- Extent of power usage
- Scale and tendency
- Basis of power
- Relation with society and space
- Power-power relation
- Power vacuum
- Unchallenged Power
- Role in bringing order
- Conflict resolution
- Formal Vs informal divide
- Use of discourse and narrative

Society (Micro Scale)
- Order, hierarchy
- Controlled, by whom?
- Reasons of emergence
- Relation with power and space/land
- Gender aspects
- Discrimination/Bias issues
- Us vs. them concepts
- Role of identity
- Identity and benefits
- Conflicts and resolution
- Crimes and its basis
- Role of formal institutions
- How thinking is shaped?
- Newspaper and other tools of opinion making

Space/Land (Micro Scale)
- Order, hierarchy
- Controlled, by whom?
- Reasons of emergence
- Relation with power and space/land
- Gender aspects
- Discrimination/Bias issues
- Us vs. them concepts
- Role of identity
- Identity and benefits
- Conflicts and resolution
- Crimes and its basis
- Role of formal institutions
- How thinking is shaped?
- Newspaper and other tools of opinion making

City level
- Historical development
- Role of Formal institutions
- Failure of formal structures
- Rise of informality and informal actors
- Private sector
- Power politics and its various manifestations

Finding links and themes for analysis

Reflecting back

Conclusions

Figure 3.2: The analysis process

The categorised data was then analysed according to the themes and codes, and each was examined to identify linkages, to weave a narrative to explain the data. This process is actually the analysis because coding is only a step in the analysis (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996, p.27). The de-contextualised data when put together revealed several linkages and themes to address and refine the research questions and validate the hypothesis, using the deductive-inductive hybrid approach.

In the final stage, the data was re-contextualised and assembled into case studies at city and local scale. All the analysis chapters were structured around the themes and narrative, which argued that failure of formal power structures, has facilitated the rise of informal structures that compete over public resources and wield power through various control mechanisms.

The quotations from the interviews are used extensively in the analysis chapters, to keep the analysis embedded in the context, such quotations are written without inverted commas in a

centralised indented paragraph in the text. Meanwhile, other quotations, from published works, are mentioned within the text but identified by quotation marks and related citation. The interviews are identified through the codes mentioned in Table 3.4 and 3.5, while code 'KI' is used to anonymise the interviewee as the key informant (Section 3.7.2).

3.7 Research Ethics

Social research demands attention to research ethics throughout the research process (Kvale and Brinkman, 2009, p. 62). Such consideration becomes essential when involving people, recording their views and stories in a contentious context. Furthermore, research in developing countries entails far more complex social realities that include positionality of the researcher and power relations between the researcher and the society being researched and of process of "knowledge generation, ownership and exploitation." (Schyvens et al. 2009, p.139). Thus several steps were taken to address ethical considerations in this study.

To address ethical issues, as per standard procedure and given the sensitivity of the topic, various steps were taken. The researcher first obtained an ethics approval from Cardiff University, according to standard practice before embarking on field work. The ethics committee was provided with all the questionnaires and possible ethical issues that might occur at any point of the research were highlighted. Other considerations are explored below.

3.7.1 Informed Consent

Informed consent is given high priority amongst the other ethical considerations in academic research (Wilson, 1992, p. 185). Informed consent entails agreement of the research participants, interviewees in this case, to participate in the research process based on clear understanding of the research project and its possible uses (Schyvens et al. 2009, p. 142). This also gives them the right to withdraw from the research process at any stage (Kvale and Brinkman, 2009). This becomes more important when the participants are accessed through gatekeepers, in that power relations may play a role as a social pressure (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 71).

The interviewees at the city-level were duly informed and asked for written consent for an interview and its recording, and several interviewees requested that certain parts of the interview be anonymised where they talked about political parties and certain powerful personalities. The

interviewees from the local case studies were asked for verbal consent, as many could not read and, especially in informal areas, residents avoid formal procedures linked with the government and resist any attempt to document them and the settlement that might be harmful for them in future. The gatekeeper often had to explain the research and introduce the researcher in their native tongue that gave the residents the confidence to speak openly. Two of the case study area interviewees, both political leaders, did not allow audio recordings of the interview, while one city-level politician requested the same.

3.7.2 Anonymity, Confidentiality and Issues of Harm

Anonymity and confidentiality should be given due importance during the research process (Wilson, 1992). Anonymity entails confidentiality of the research participants, while confidentiality requires non-disclosure of personal information and views of the participants that may or may not cause them any issues, including security issues, in future if disclosed. The analysis process followed these guidelines, in that the identities of the interviewees were anonymised and given codes (Table 3.4 and Table 3.5). Several interviewees requested that their interviews be anonymised due to possible security threats and the sensitivity of the topic, discussion and views. In some parts of Chapters 4-7, even the specific interview code has been withheld, replaced by 'KI', for fear that specific reports might be traced back to their originator, to protect sources.

The researcher's safety was also an issue, both during the fieldwork and in the write-up, as some actors have extensive research organisations that trace relevant published material. The research talks about political parties and their informal actions, and actions of the government, which is usually represented by a political party, and might create issues for the researcher. For example, political critique of the processes and policies of government may bring threats to the researcher (Scheyven et. al. 2009). This may be a problem for the researcher, and thus several experts recommended that the language be toned down and the researcher should avoid using the names of the political parties in some contexts. Also, during the fieldwork, the researcher had to accompany the local gatekeeper or the person identified by the gatekeeper, especially in the informal settlements. In addition, extreme precaution was observed while photographing people, especially women were not covered to avoid any conflict due to cultural limitations. Furthermore, the researcher also followed the local dress code, especially in the Pashtoon dominated areas, while fieldwork was never carried out after sunset to avoid any possible harm (Section 3.5.3).

3.7.3 Ethics Involving Researcher and Gatekeepers

Involvement of researcher and gatekeepers in the context, where they are part of the social and political realities, involves various ethical considerations. "Power dynamics and researcher positionality have relevance for researchers working in any area where gatekeepers are used to access participants, though these may be particularly significant in relation to research with minority groups." (McAreavey and Das, 2013)

It is accepted that in contexts, like Karachi, research cannot be fully independent of such 'insider' influences (Sayer 2000; Flyvbjerg 2001; Atkinson et al. 2003).However, this value-laden research is consistent with the adopted critical realist approach (Bhasker, 1989; Sayer, 1998; 2000) that emphasise to understand reality by looking at the facts or events and its subjective interpretation. In this critical connection, the researcher's position in this research has various dimensions. First, as a researcher already involved in various researches in the city (e.g. Sadiq et al. 2010; Hasan et al., 2013; Ahmed, 2013; Hasan et al. 2015) that helped understand and analyse the complex social, political, spatial and historical context. Secondly, being a resident of the city, and growing up with people of various ethnic groups, provided a basis for understanding sensitivities of cultures of the communities under study. Third, being staff at a local university did help find the right networks and gatekeepers to carry out fieldwork. However, this 'insider' position also created some challenges. The Muhajir ethnicity of the researcher was a problem on various levels; first, access to areas dominated with 'other' ethnic groups was a challenge that was solved by the gatekeepers. Second, winning confidence of the 'other' ethnic groups while interviewing and discussing the issues that are usually attributed to Muhajir ethnic group and their representative political party was another sensitive issue, which may have forced the interviewees to hide their emotions to avoid any controversy. However, this also was solved by involving the gatekeepers and introducing the researcher and the actual objectives of the research. Third, to counter 'insider' influence in terms of ethnic bias in interviews and analysis, all the groups are given equal opportunity in the interviews and all the political parties are equally discussed in terms of their informal land control measures and related activities.

Involvement of gatekeepers in the data collection process generally, recruiting interviewees and conducting interviews more specifically, has various methodological constraints and ethical requirements. Involvement of gatekeepers in accessing difficult to reach population, such as minority groups, is considered very important, in fact helpful (Eide and Allen, 2005). However, this requires the researcher to take ethical decisions regarding recruitment strategy to evaluate

gatekeeper's position and motives and how the relation between researcher, gatekeeper and the interviewee is established (McAreavey and Das, 2013), since these relations carry power relations and can influence the authenticity of the research. The researcher is usually reliant on the gatekeeper as it provides access to the community and thus has the power to allow or influence the interviewees, either to cooperate or to opt out (McAreavey and Das, 2013). Gatekeepers as an interpreter (Eide & Allen, 2005; de Laine, 2000; Jezewski, 1993; Whyte, 1993) help the researcher learn the local culture. However, gatekeepers may have biased or preconceived ideas about the research that may influence the research outcomes (McAreavey and Das, 2013).

Another body of literature, from health related research that highlights the role of interpreters in cross cultural contexts, is also relevant. Interpreters in such context are more like gatekeepers of information. There are different views on whether the interpreter should be from the ethnic group of the community under study or not. Some researchers recommend that the interpreter should be from the community (Baker, 1981, Hennings *et al.* 1996), while others consider it a hindrance in confidentiality (Pernice, 1994) because it can influence the interviewee to hide information. The interpreter might also decide to hide information as per his/her perception of possible harm to the interviewee (Murray and Wynne, 2001) and even, interpreter may answer him/herself assuming the interviewee will answer in the same way (Jentsch, 1998).

Various steps were taken to counter ethical challenges related to involvement of gatekeepers. A detailed account of the process of finding gatekeepers and their facilitations has already been mentioned in section 3.5.1. First and foremost, interviews of the gatekeepers were also conducted as local residents and community leaders, to understand the power dynamics in the locality. This also gave insight of the politics between gatekeepers, and thus provided opportunity to know both sides of the story and to triangulate information from other sources. The main gatekeeper in North Nazimabad, was previously a religious political party representative, who had quit his political party to become apolitical and started working as social worker. Such a background of the gatekeeper was quite helpful in neutralising researcher's ethnic background, in front of interviewees, and developing confidence in interviewees to talk their hearts out. The gatekeeper always left the interview place after introducing the researcher; this helped in confidentiality and in triangulation of information given by the gatekeeper about interviewee.

It is also important to mention that the gatekeeper introduced the researcher across the board irrespective of ethnic affiliations of the communities and the political affiliations of the

interviewee. However, the researcher had to accept the gatekeeper's recommendation to avoid certain people that were notorious about their alleged criminal connections and illegal businesses. At one occasion, the gatekeeper had to introduce the researcher, when encountered with such people in the field, as the person researching about water shortage in the area and welfare works of local community leaders to mitigate that shortage, as the researcher was specifically there to visit community leader owned water wells. This did pose ethical issues, but this was one time happening and was used to avoid bigger threat.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined philosophical basis of the research methodology leading to methods for data gathering and analysis. It has also explained the whole process of fieldwork. Deductive-inductive hybrid model is identified suitable for this study, corresponding to the theoretical framework developed after the literature review, to organise data gathering and analysis process. Critical realist approach is identified as the suitable epistemological basis for the creation of valid knowledge, that looks behind the apparent events and explore the background relations, structures and mechanisms, which is an appropriate framework for the complex context of Karachi. The chapter also explained the process of selection of the main case study of North Nazimabad, and the supplementary case studies of Lyari, PIB Colony and Scheme 33, to represent different eras of development, geographical locations, social groups, and political influence. It is also highlighted that, due to sensitive nature of the study, data has been anonymised, while the study has limitations as it did not explore the religious extremism factor in informal land controls. In addition, use of gatekeepers in the research process and positionality of the researcher posed various ethical issues that have been countered systematically.

The subsequent analysis is spread over various chapters. The city-level analysis drawing on interviews is outlined in Chapter 4. The analysis of North Nazimabad is divided into two chapters – Chapter 5 discusses formal and informal structures in connection with resident social groups, and Chapter 6 looks at the spatial controls. Chapter 7 covers the three smaller case studies according to the defined themes. Chapter 8 is the conclusion.3.8 Limitations

There are many limitations to this study, including the sensitivity of the research topic, cultural issues, the variety of informal structures and their control mechanisms, the scale of the city, lack of data and absence of any previous study. First, the study is limited to exploring informal land

controls in connection with ethnicity based political parties on broader level including various identity based structures under their umbrella. Other informal structures are also operating such as religious extremists but these were intentionally avoided due to security reasons. However, irrespective of the empirical data, the theory seems to be enough to explain their mechanisms. Similarly, the drug gangs and the areas they control areas were not examined for safety reasons, but secondary information and off-site interviews provided enough depth to analyse the situation, particularly in Lyari.

Cultural-religious codes were also responsible for some limitations. Only one female was interviewed in the micro-level case study areas and that with enormous difficulty as the researcher was male. This limits the study from the perspective of women and how they experience and look at informal Land controls, and although some of the secondary data does talk about such experiences but still it is not immediate enough to answer the main questions. Similarly, children were not contacted, given the limited accessibility for the researcher to the case study areas and sensitivity of the topic. It was also not possible to interview representatives of law enforcement agencies.

However, the chapter has tried to elaborate the authenticity and credibility of the whole process, which included data gathering methods and process, analysis and theoretical outcomes. It has also tried to ensure a clear trail for any future audit.

Chapter 4

The Context of Karachi

4.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses research question 2, with the objective to exploring city-level and structural factors that underlie informal land controls, in the context of ethno-political conflicts, violence, segregation and territoriality in Karachi. It discusses key mechanisms of power and control across the city that eventually shape and leads to informal land controls in the production of space. The chapter explores two aspects; first the background of city-level power contestations, for example the local and regional historical events, politics, policies and planning decisions, and second, how such power contestations are played out, for example between political parties, and their linked informal structures, kinship, clan or religious affiliation. This chapter sets the background for the local-level case studies in Chapters 5 to 7.

The contextual analysis largely draws on primary interview data. This is corroborated by secondary data drawn from official documents, news reports, investigative and analytical and research articles and books.

The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 4.2 introduces Karachi and sets the background for the issues, processes, relations and structures identified in the chapter and for the analysis chapters that follow. The section highlights current political and socio-spatial settings featuring segregation rooted in historical developments, including migrations and the resultant politics of power between the groups, urban planning decisions, and security issues. Section 4.3 explores the role of the state, in terms of government services and its link to current socio-spatial divisions. It highlights the reasons underlying the state's gradual withdrawal from providing urban goods and services and the rise of alternatives, both formal-private and informal structures, and the engagement of these groups in power politics and contest over resources. Section 4.4 focuses on the politics of Karachi, focussing on ethnicity based politics and political parties, to explore the various formal and informal control mechanisms used.

4.2 Karachi: The Background

4.2.1 Introduction

The current situation, featuring violence, segregation, territoriality, informality and ethno-political conflicts, is complex and multifaceted. First, it is embedded in historical developments that led to current socio-spatial settings featuring migrations and planning decisions. This is coupled with emergence of informality and informal structures including criminal groups such as land mafias which started to operate as the security services weakened in certain areas. Local conflicts overlap with political and religious conflicts at city and the national level and are interwoven with regional issues such as the war in Afghanistan (Kaker, 2014, p. 94; Hasan et al., 2015). However, this research focuses mostly on ethno-political conflicts and the involvement of various power intermediaries at a city and local level.

For many decades, Karachi has been a city of migrants. Karachi is sometimes termed 'mini-Pakistan' having representation from all over Pakistan (Appendix 4.1). Politics has often been aligned with ethnic and religious identities (Budhani et al., 2010, p. 7; Gazdar & Mallah, 2013, p. 2; Yusuf, 2012; Gayer, 2014, p. 17-52). The government has weakened over the course of time (Section 4.3.3) and political parties, and other organised structures, sought to fill the power and governance vacuum, by controlling public resources and taking on roles in the provision of goods and services; in parallel there has been a rise of informality and the private sector (Gayer, 2014, p. 21-30). Conflicts between political parties and religious groups have severely affected social life, leading to the emergence of ethnic and identity based enclaves throughout the city, with a resulting segregation that has added to safety issues and violence in the city (Kaker, 2014).

Since partition in 1947, Waseem (1996, p.623) has identified four waves of migrations to Karachi, reflected in the city's current ethno-political enclaves. The first wave came during partition, 1947, with the arrival of some 600,000 Muslims from India, known as "Muhajirs" (Hasan et. al., 2002, p. 14-21) more than doubling the city's population. This migration created resentment amongst Sindhi locals, as incoming Muhajir political leaders controlled many aspects of government (Gayer, 2014, p. 27-28). The second migration wave occurred from 1960-1980, when Punjabis and northern Pashtoons moved to Karachi, mostly to informal settlements around the SITE industrial area, and the urban periphery on the Orangi Hills. These Pashtoon enclaves were at the forefront of the first Pashtoon-Muhajir riots in 1965 and 1985-86.

Pashtoon-Muhajir riots are important to mention as these have important impact on the socio-spatial pattern of Karachi. The first Pashtoon-Muhajir riot occurred after the presidential elections of 1965, which took an ethnic colour as the Muhajirs supported the Muhajir female leader, Fatima Jinnah, while the Pashtoons supported the Pashtoon candidate, the military dictator General Ayub Khan. Ayub won the election and the procession to celebrate winning turned into, allegedly, organised attacks on Muhajir settlements in which several people were killed and injured (Gayer, 2003; Baixas, 2014). Second, Qasba-Aligarh massacre of 1986 is famous for organised attacks by Pashtoon mobs, allegedly, appearing from Orangi hills to attack nearby Muhajir localities that resulted in riots throughout the city, killing hundreds of people (Gayer, 201, p.83-86; Baixas, 2014, 2.1). The rise of MQM is said to be embedded such events, apart from the political resentment.

In the third migration wave, during the 1970-90s a number of rural Sindhis shifted towards Karachi which deepened the Muhajir resentment, as Sindhis dominated the provincial government due to the supporting policies of Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then prime minister belonging to Larkana-Sindh. The fourth migration wave during the 1980s-1990 was the most turbulent time, when the Afghan immigrants flocked to the city following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This period also saw the rise of MQM[6] the main Muhajir party (Gayer, 2014, p. 79-100). A fifth migration mainly of Pashtoons and rural Sindhis started in 2000, but was intensified after natural disasters of the 2005 earthquake and 2010 flooding and later due to military operation and Taliban insurgency in the North. As the Pashtoon population swelled, ANP emerged to challenge MQM as the major political rival in the city, especially during post 2000 period (Gayer, 2014, p. 24-27; Gazdar, 2011, p. 4-8).

In 2011 the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), in its fact-finding report, captured a fraction of the issues, focussed around violence, while terming Karachi the most dangerous city:

> In addition to crimes common to most big cities, organised gangs of extortionists, land grabbers, mercenaries in turf wars among political parties, ethnic groups and criminal gangs … have complicated the city's law and order woes … Those involved in violence are armed with sophisticated weapons, including automatic rifles and hand grenades, and even rockets … (HRCP, 2011).

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[6] For introduction to political parties, see table.

The report urged that the "state must use all means at its disposal to safeguard people's right to life and fundamental human rights", and that "mainstreaming and integrating all communities in Karachi is fundamental because of the polarisation of the city" emphasising the dormant role of the state in the whole situation (HRCP, 2011). The role of the state is far more important given the central role of Karachi in the economy and politics of the country.

Karachi is considered to be the country's engine of economic growth (Javaid & Hashmi, 2012). Its economy is about one-fourth of the national GDP, it produces 30% of the total manufactured products, and it handles almost 95% of the imports and exports of the country and contributes more than 65% of national revenues (CDGK, 2007). Almost all the banks in the country have their head offices in Karachi, and there are around 15,000 industrial units involved in the manufacturing sector (Javaid & Hashmi, 2012).

Map 4.1: Map of Karachi with district and town boundaries *(http://www.kmc.gos.pk/)*

Karachi is the largest and the most developed city of the country covering an area of 3, 600 sq.km (CDGK, 2007). The population is estimated to be around 23 million (WPR, 2014). It is the capital city of Sindh Province and the financial capital of Pakistan (See Map 4.1). It contains 7% of the total population and 23% of the urban population of the country (Ahmed, N. 2010, p. 120). The current rate of population growth is between 3.5% to 5% (CDGK-2007), if it continued to grow with the same speed the city could soon become the world's second most populous city (Cox, 2012), given that the population doubled in the last 15 years (Saiyid, 2014). The evolution of Karachi from a fishing village to a mega-city has taken a relatively short time.

The history of Karachi is traced back to 356-323 BC, when it was known as "Krokala". However, the history of modern-day Karachi dates back to 1729 when, as a fishing village of Baloch and Sindhi fishermen and wa called "Dirbo", later as "Kalachi-jo-Goth", it was selected as a port town by local Hindu merchants (Lari and Lari, 1996, p. 4-10).

Year	1985-1989		1990-1999		2000-2009		2010-2014		Total (1985-2014)
	Year	Killings	Year	Killings	Year	Killings	Year	Killings	
1			1990	576	2000	471	2010	1595	
2			1991	431	2001	598	2011	1923	
3			1992	366	2002	591	2012	2432	
4			1993	371	2003	585	2013	2789	
5			1994	866	2004	798	2014	1810	
6	1985	190	1995	1687	2005	782			
7	1986	277	1996	557	2006	834			
8	1987	271	1997	804	2007	929			
9	1988	389	1998	1009	2008	1177			
10	1989	370	1999	532	2009	1146			
Total[7]	1497 (5.5%)		7199 (26.5%)		7911 (29.1%)		10549 (38.8%)		27156
Ave/Year[8]	299.4		719.9		791.1		2109.8		905.2

Table 4.1: 30 Years of Karachi homicide data (Arfeen, 2015)

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[7] Totals are calculated for each column having particular number of years. Division of years are mentioned at the top of each column.

[8] Average number of people killed per year in the given division of years.

Karachi city, once called the 'Paris of the East', the 'cleanliest city of whole of India' (Sibtain, 2013), or 'city of lights' (Gayer, 2014, p. 17-18) is now termed as a "divided city" (Gayer, 2003), "contested city", "city up for grabs", and "an arena for national conflicts" (Gayer, 2014). Recently writers have compared Karachi's Lyari Town with Colombia (Kirmani, 2014). Some have considered it ungovernable (Marshall, 2012) and others see it the most dangerous city of the world (Abbas, Q. 2011). Almost 18,500 killings took place during the last 15 years, mostly owing to political conflicts, with 2,789 killings in 2013 alone (Arfeen, 2015, See Table 4.1). The violence is mostly attributed to ethno-political and religious conflicts (Kaker, 2014; Tables 4.1 & 4.3).

Political Party	Full name and major support base
MQM	*Muttahida Quaomi Movement: Muhajir*
PPP	*Pakistan People's Party: Sindhi, Baloch*
ANP	*Awami National Party: Pashtoons. Claim to represent Pashtoons beyond religious affiliations, while majority of other political parties with Pashtoon support base are religious political parties.*
PTI	*Pakitan Tehreek-e-Insaaf: General but majorly Pashtoon*
JI	*Jamat-e-Islami: Religious party with majorly Pashtoon support base*
PAC	*People's Amn Committee: Baloch, Sindhi. Worked as* de facto *militant wing of PPP. Initially shared support base with PPP. However, PPP has officially denied any connection with PAC.*
JUI	*Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam: Pashtoon*

Table 4.2: Major political parties and their support base in Karachi

Despite the gravity of the issues identified, Gayer (2014, p. 4-5) sees an order in this apparent disorder, which makes it possible for people to live, survive and enjoy life, despite the widespread violence, owing to invisible rules, and regulatory mechanisms that keep conflicts under control.

Political parties play an important part in the territoriality and segregation examined in this thesis. There are several national and local level parties operating in Karachi;four national level liberal and two national level religious political parties are important to mention, while several local level political parties also operate, summarised in Table 4.2 below and examined further in the rest of this chapter and Chapters 5 to 7.

District[9]	Killings	Specific Areas	Killings
West	6718 (25%)	Orangi	718 (10.6%)
		Peerabad	649 (9.5%)
Malir	3897 (14%)	Sohrab Goth	1186 (30%)
		Korangi	995 (25.5%)
		Quaidabad	585 (15%)
Central	4830 (18%)		
East	6499 (24.5%)		
South	4495 (17%)		
	26439		

Table 4.3: District wise, 30 years of Karachi homicide data (Arfeen, 2015)

4.2.2 Karachi, A Divided City? Current Socio-Spatial Pattern

Urban planning experts interviewed for the thesis agree that there exist various social groups, both economic and identity-based, who are associated with specific geographic locations (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, EC 4, EC 5, EC 7, EC 8, ECCS 2). The experts also agree that the city is segregated along such social groupings, but the categorisation of divisions varies with the frame of reference of the expert, as outlined below.

Experts on the city tend to categorise social groups as two overlapping categories, first on the basis of class (EC 1, EC 2, EC 5, EC 8) and second on the basis of identity that includes ethnicity and religious affiliations. Some experts (EC 3, EC 5, EC 8) also argue that there is a distinction between dwellers in planned settlements and un-planned or informal settlements, since residents of informal settlements carry out different political struggles to access resources that eventually impact on the city politics (EC 3, EC 5, EC 8). However, whatever the larger frame of reference, the economic and identity-based divisions largely, if not completely, overlap, with political affiliation in an identifiable geographic pattern.

> … there are three types of major divisions, while there are many minor divisions within those larger divisions, that are reflected in space as well. First, is the class-based division, which … is on a formal level, such as on the basis of plot sizes, and so different classes are segregated and get services accordingly. The second is on an ethnic level, but there are sub-divisions as well, such as within Muhajir areas there are further divisions on political or on language basis, and in Pashtoon areas there are divisions on a tribal basis. Third is the

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[9] Five districts of Karachi, see map 4.1 for their relative location in Karachi.

religious division, including the Muslim-non Muslim divide and segregations on the basis of sectarian affiliations between Muslim sects. (EC 3)

A senior expert (EC 1) considered the city is divided into 'four smaller cities'[10], which are very different to each other in relation to history, the nature of development and planning, land records, means of land transactions and identity-based groupings, and these cities work in almost isolation. He also saw a fifth city developing in the periphery along class-based and identity-based divisions.

Another expert (EC 2) described five social categories in the city, which correspond broadly to the categorisation by EC 1, summarised below;

1. Elites are beyond identity-based divisions and live in the south, but a few identity-based enclaves exist as exceptions (EC 3).

2. The majority of upper middle groups are found in the Central District of Karachi, in areas such as North Nazimabad, Gulshan-e-Iqbal etc. and are mostly Urdu speaking "Muhajirs", but include other communities such as Punjabis mixed with Muhajirs.

3. The middle-income and lower-middle income groups are much larger, with two different sub-categories;

   a. The Urdu-speaking group, concentrated in Karachi Central district, North Karachi, Landhi and Korangi.

   b. Non-Muhajirs including Sindhi and Pashtoons that are either in pockets in the city or on the periphery.

4. The low-income group is also very widespread, found in various locations but mostly in the North-West, and is divided on identity bases, including:

   a. The old city areas are dominated by Baloch and Gujrati, and more recently Pashtoons.

   b. Qasba, Orangi, Landhi and Korangi have low-income groups mainly divided between Muhajir and Pashtoon enclaves.

   c. Peripheral areas which are still developing are divided along ethno-religious lines, but are often dominated by Pashtoon and Sindhi in-migrants or original Sindhi villagers.

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[10] The expert meant to mention multiple nuclei in the city, and how strong they are in thier characteristics such that these could be termed as 'cities'.

5. Within these defined layers, certain patterns create exceptions;

    a. There are historic Sindhi/Balochi villages throughout the city. Such villages or "Goths", as they are locally known, have now become part of the larger planned localities and create zones of exception in the larger homogenous enclaves. These have increased in size to accommodate informal settlements, accommodating other communities such as Pashtoons and Baloch villages, particularly along the Lyari and Malir Rivers.

    b. Religious enclaves are spread throughout the city including Hindu and Christian enclaves. There are also sectarian enclaves spread out through the city irrespective of income including Ismaili, Bohri and Shia enclaves, and some ethnic enclaves mainly for Pashtoons many of which are controlled by extremist Sunni groups such as the Taliban, and local religio-political groups such as banned outfits like Sipah Sahaba Pakistan.

    c. Informally developed areas are also common zones of exception. Such settlements are found throughout the city except in Defence Housing Authority (DHA) areas[11]. These are mainly found along river beds, on hills, along the right-of-way of railway lines, or around historic villages, abutting high income group areas or in the periphery etc. (EC 8). The informally developed areas (referred to as informal areas in this thesis) are further described in Section 4.2.3.

Given the scale of the city and variation in social characteristics, it is very difficult to find generalizable conclusions or typical areas, but the four case studies cover almost all the categories of social groups and geographic zones noted above except the elitist group and their respective areas (Chapter 3). However, the city is not divided along very clear lines, and the scale and nature of enclaves varies throughout the city.

Scale and nature of enclaves

The literature on segregation and division in Karachi (Yusuf, 2012; Gayer, 2014) gives the impression of clearly defined enclaves and a partitioned city, but many analysts do not see

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[11] The Defence authorities are developing former military cantonment areas for elite housing

identity-based divisions as large enough to add to segregation in the city. The exceptions, described in Point 5 above, give a sense of a city with a mixed social configuration.

The term 'enclave' in this text is not used strictly in its conventional sense. In this text, the term refers to socio-spatial units predominantly consisting of a particular social identity group. Here, the enclave is not a sub-set of larger surrounding area, but shows a dominant social identity that contrasts with the surrounding area, which might also be further sub-divided into smaller enclaves with contrasting social characteristics (Section 2.5.3).

In Karachi, there are larger enclaves that can be clearly defined and influence electoral results, and smaller enclaves within such larger enclaves (EC 1). Central District is a good example, consisting mainly of an Urdu-speaking population but containing smaller enclaves of other identity-based groups (EC 1). This suggests that the city is not completely or clearly divided on an identity basis and there is no clear pattern (EC 1, EC 5; Gazdar, 2011). Although the dominant identity group counts, there is evidence that smaller identity-based enclaves have contributed to violence and demographic change (EC 1). Apart from apparently isolated social groupings, political affiliations in the middle- and low-income groups have led to a hierarchy in social patterns reflected in space. Several researchers have developed maps of the dominant ethnic composition of the city to show social segregation and the resultant violence (Maps 4.2 & 4.3; Yusuf, 2012). Map 4.2 shows dominant ethnic groups and their spatial concentration, while Map 4.3 maps the violence pattern in 2012 that eventually relates to various ethnic enclaves, highlighting a relation between the concentration of social groups, enclaves and violence.

Not all social enclaves add to social segregation and territoriality. Territories can be closed or relatively open, depending on how easy it is for non-residents, other social groups and the law enforcement agencies (LEAs), especially police, to access the settlement and the kind of mechanisms used to control entry and exit (Kaker, 2014). When an enclave is completely in-accessible for outsiders or the LEAs then it is termed a no-go-area. Access control mechanisms are explored in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

Map 4.2: Map of Karachi with dominant ethnic enclaves (Jacobson, 2011; Dawn-GIS [*No date*])

No-go-areas are defined as places the LEAs cannot enter, and the police have admitted before court that no-go-areas exist in the city (see Sahoutra, 2013). The Karachi Operation was a response to a court order in 2013 for the police to clear such areas (*The Express Tribune*, 2013d; Section 4.3.2). However, a no-go-area is a relative term, as an area closed to the police is not necessarily closed to all and some areas can be accessed with precautions e.g. by accompanying a local person (EC 1).

Khan (2013a), an investigative journalist, has categorized such enclaves in two categories: first, areas that are complete no-go-areas inaccessible for the LEAs, often linked to religious militants such as the Taliban or to gangs such as in Lyari (case study, Chapter 7); second areas that behave as no-go-areas for certain ethnicities at times of conflict and tension, largely attributed to political party territories and turf wars (ibid), such as PIB Colony (case study, Chapter 7).

Map 4.3: Pattern of violence in reference with ethnic enclaves (Dawn, 2011b)

The majority of complete no-go-areas, as identified by Khan (2013a), are mostly linked with Pashtoon settlements, except for Lyari. As described in Section 4.3.2, the Pashtoon population has multiplied in recent years, and certain journalists have identified specific geographic Pashtoon locations in the city (see Shah and Hasan, 2014), linked to the 'eight most violent flashpoints in Karachi' (*Dawn*, 2013d), which mostly include Pashtoon settlements, as the Taliban (Pakistani factions) are Pashtoons from various tribes that live in various parts of Karachi mostly in informal areas. Shah and Hasan (2014) mention that Pashtoon settlements are mostly located at the entry and exit points of the city and it is feared that the Taliban might take over these settlements as they have swept out ANP from these areas during 2012-2013 (*The Express Tribune*, 2013i; EC 3, EC 8, EC 9). However, such geographic configuration is not a conspiracy (EC 2) and mainly results from the engagement of Pashtoons in intra- and inter-city transportation.

4.2.3 History of Enclave Formation & Social Divisions

The current socio-spatial settings in Karachi, explored in the previous section, are attributed to four historical causes: migrations; planning decisions; religious and political violence in the context of religious extremism and ethnicity-based politics; and the growth of informal areas. A brief description is provided below (see Appendix 4.1 for detail).

Migrations and socio-spatial changes

As noted above, Karachi has been a migrant city for many years (Gayer, 2014, p. 23). Migrations towards Karachi have been considered as an unavoidable process due to regional, rural-urban, and socio-political realities in Pakistan (EC 1). Migrations have also been described as planned and politically motivated with the aim of developing a political power base, resulting in political resentment and conflict in Karachi (EC 3, EC 2, EC 8, EC 9, EC-13). The ensuing socio-spatial configuration has resulted in enclave formation, which facilitated the current ethnicity oriented politics and conflicts. Figure 4.1shows a change in ethnic demography and that is eventually reflected in the politics of resource distribution.

Figure 4.1: Trends and projections of the city's ethnic demography-1981 to 2025 (Gazdar, 2011)

Planning decisions

Formal planning decisions have also contributed significantly to the city's current socio-spatial pattern and to shaping ethno-political (EC 5) and economic divides (EC 8) (Appendix 4.1). For example, the post-partition planning decisions to rehabilitate Muhajirs ended up in developing Muhajir enclaves (EC 5). In addition, development of industrial areas without adequate provision of housing for the low income groups has resulted in rise in informal settlement, that later gained ethnic orientation as well.

Ethnic and religious conflicts and violence

Issues around safety and security, rooted either in ethno-political or religious conflicts, are also a major reason for enclave formations (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, EC 6, EC 8, GC 10). In the 1980s, in the context of a failure of formal security provision, ethnic and sectarian riots undermined confidence between various social groups, so that people preferred to live with their social groups or in gated communities and enclaves. Enclavisation further exacerbated the violence (Kaker, 2014).

Rise of informal settlements

Informal areas have been an important development that shaped the city's current socio-spatial pattern. It is difficult to generalise, but those coming from rural areas with strong ethnic identities, often end up in informal areas (EC 5). Punjabis and Pashtoons were the earliest low-income rural migrants, and most rural migrants prefer to live with their relatives because of tribal and kinship ties (EC 5, EC 8).

Enclaves, a problem or symptom of problem?

It is evident that Karachi is experiencing violence in connection with ethno-political conflicts, in which various actors including political parties and criminal groups are involved. Politics is aligned along ethnic identities while various identify-based groups live at particular locations. Thus the conflict shows a very strong spatial dimension and the violence follows this socio-spatial pattern. Many other cities in the world have such socio-spatial pattern and enclaves, but in Karachi the unique element is that this socio-spatial division has provided basis for identity-based political entrepreneurship involving competition to appropriate power and resources using ethno-political rhetoric (Section 4.4.2).

Thus, the current pattern of social enclaves has ascended because of four main factors: in-migrations to specific localities; state planning decisions to house post-partition immigrants in public housing schemes; the rise of informality especially in housing, and security threats and violence especially faced by minority religious groups. However, this spatial division has proved to be a cyclical process in which the segregated pattern of development has further exacerbated conflict, violence, and segregation.

4.3 Role of Formal Sector

However, failures in the performance of government have played a decisive role in the rise of informal structures, and the resultant conflicts in the city. Government performance can be analysed in various ways, from the performance of the institutions set up for the provision of goods and services such as housing and security to various tiers of the government including local government, provincial etc.

4.3.1 Institutional Performance

Several factors point toward institutional failure in housing provision, planning, development and provision of security etc. including politicization, temporariness, and a multiplicity of aims without a clear coordinating strategy. The role and status of local government is discussed separately later in this section.

There are many different agencies in Karachi with overlapping functions. Because of Karachi's strategic, political, historic and economic position, both the federal and provincial governments have interests in the city, reflected in the structure of local governance, and the presence of different federal, provincial, military and private land management agencies (Hasan et al., 2013). According to Karachi Strategic Development Plan-2020 (CDGK-2007), there are 20 different and parallel development authorities/agencies responsible for planning, development and land management without a coordinating body. This results in contested powers between various tiers of government and conflicts over the interests of the multiplicity of land-owning and planning agencies and thus planning, development, maintenance and service provision suffers (Hasan et al., 2015). For example the city is unable to get any master plans approved by the provincial government while the Master Plan 2020 was the only one approved and adopted by local

government. Similarly, the responsibility for security has been divided between the provincial Sindh Police and federal Sindh Rangers and shows conflict of interests.

The experts interviewed for this research including representatives from land regulation, planning and development agencies agree that the institutions are politicised and that the creation of multiple agencies has served political ends due to which service provision has been affected (EC 4, GC 10, GC 11, GC 12). In this context, comparing formal housing supply per annum with housing demand in Karachi clearly shows the shortage of low-income housing (Hasan, 2014[12], Table 4.4). In addition, vast tracts of public housing land allocated in the 1980s are still vacant, for example Hawks Bay Scheme No. 42, Taiser Town, Shah Latif Town and many others (GC 10, GC 11, GC 12, GC 13; Table 4.6). This failure is due to speculation, land hoarding, and failure to provide land for the low-income target groups (GC 10, GC 11, GC 12, GC 13). Since the late 1980s, no housing announced by the public sector has achieved its occupancy targets, leaving informal settlements as the only housing option for the poor (Hasan et al., 2002, p.59-60). This has led to development of 1.0 - 1.2 million informal low-income housing plots along the Northern Bypass (Hasan et. al., 2015, p. 138) which has triggered political strife, and conflicts over land control among various political power structures (EC 3). In addition, more than 200,000 plots have been allocated for elite housing in Bahria Town and the outskirts of DHA City irrespective of demand (Table 4.5; Ahmed, N. 2014), a clear failure in government policy on housing for the poor (Hasan et al. 2013).

Category	Housing Units	Percentage
Demand	80,000	100
Formal Sector Supply	27,600	34.5
Katchi Abadis[13]	32,000	40
Densification	Remaining is met through densification process.	

Table 4.4: Housing demand and supply in Karachi. (Hasan, 2011)

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[12] According to Hasan's (2014) calculation from the Karachi Strategic Development Plan 2020 (CDGK, 2007), the housing demand is 80,000 housing units per year. Building permits are issued for only 30,000 units, whereas 32,000 units are built informally, while the rest is accommodated through densification of existing settlements.

[13] *Katchi Abadi* is a local term for informal settlements. Literally means the temporary housing settlement, but legally, a settlement without legal land rights and formal tenure.

Furthermore, the corruption in government land and housing agencies is widely discussed, in connection with political parties, mafias and other interest groups, considered as a key reason for the failure of impartial service provision.

> Government officials are also involved in corruption, issues of encroachment and informal settlements formation in the city. Many of the officials are running their own private companies and they take part in bidding for development and construction works, so it is quite a difficult task to control here. The government officials take 3% to 5% kickbacks officially, while the rate goes up to 10% to 15% unofficially. So how can one expect the government machinery to improve the situation? (KI)

Government officials who are keen to solve the problems face several issues, such as pressure from senior staff and politicians e.g. a high-ranking official from the government land agency (KI) explained how he was demoted several times because he did not wanted to be part of the corruption. Similarly, another official (KI) explained that they get threats while carrying out anti-encroachment drives and recently a deputy director of KMC was killed by the land mafia (EC 6, GC 11, GC 12, GC 13; Khan, 2014a). Furthermore, another official (KI) mentioned that the encroachments on government land are backed by politicians and enforced through fully equipped musclemen, and government officers cannot counter them as the law does not protect them:

> Government officers fear the mafias while enforcing the law, because the state machinery does not come to rescue them when they need it. Take the case of Wali Babar (a journalist who was killed, allegedly by a political party workers; see CPJ, 2014) all the eye-witnesses were killed one-by-one until the case was transferred to the interior of Sindh (KI).

Household Category	% Total	No. HHs	Avg. Plot Size
Low Income	62%	1,000,333	120
Middle Income	31%	502,026	240
High Income	7%	114,081	500
Total	100%	1,616,440	-

Table 4.5: Demand identified by KSDP-2020 for 2005-2020 (CDGK, 2007b[14]).

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[14] Details of housing unit requirements were available in the first draft version of KSDP-2020, but were later removed in the final version in which only percentages were mentioned.

	Name Of Scheme	Year Of Notification	Current Occupancy Status
1	Scheme No.25-A	1980	5.0%
2	Scheme No.33	1971	20%
3	Scheme No.42	1983	5.0%
4	Scheme No.43	1986	0.0%
5	Scheme No.45	1986	5.0%
6	Scheme No.25-A	1980	5.0%

Table 4.6: Recent public sector housing schemes (CDGK, 2007b)

Complex formal procedures are another aspect that makes people avoid government agencies (EC 7) as the informal processes of provision of goods and services have become 'one-stop operations' where everything is done at the same place by the same person without cumbersome paperwork.

Utility and other civic services

Just like the housing sector, the utility services provision is marred with limited services provision due to un-intentional reasons such as lack of funds and incapacity, and due to controllable reasons such as politicisation of institutions, corruption and use of such services for political and material gains by the employees and the political structures involved in power politics at the city and national level (Section 4.4).

Karachi is facing a water shortage since long age and at the moment the demand is 972 MGD (Max) against the supply of 670 MGD excluding 35 percent of line losses leaving 435.5 MDG for the citizens (KWSB, [no date]). The Karachi Master Plan 2020 (KSDP 2020) also sheds some light on the appalling situation; only one hour average supply was recorded in the city (Table 4.7) . Given that formally developed areas get better supply for 2-3 hours every 2-3 days , the informal settlements are the worst hit with an average of a few minutes per week (Rehman, 2008). The targets identified in KMP 2020 for the year 2015 are not realised by fraction and the situation prevails as was in 2005. This demand and supply gap is also further marred with corruption and political influence, in that hundreds of illegal water hydrants are operating on main supply lines syphoning off water to be sold off to the citizens at high rates, further exacerbating the situation (Maher and Ilyas, 2015). Thus, it is clear that water supply services is clearly a failure and has not shown improvement over the last decade.

Indicator	2005 Baseline	2010 target	2015 Target	2020 Target
% households connected to water supply network	60%	85%	100%	100%
Hours of water service per day	1	6	24	24
Tariff collection/billings	60%	70%	80%	85%
Non-revenue water	40%	35%	30%	25%

Table 4.7: Benchmarks for water supply system performance, 2005-2020 (CDGK, 2007b)

Solid waste management is not an exception to the formal service provision trends. Mahar et al. (2007) finds that municipalities collect solid waste in Pakistan, and Karachi is not an exception, in which the efficiencies range from zero percent in informal settlements to 90 percent in formal settlements. Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC) only has collection capacity around 40 percent whereas disposal capacity is even less (Ali and Hasan, 2001). The remaining garbage is taken care of by KMC employees in private capacity and by throwing away garbage in the nearby rain water drains, open sewage channels and open plots (EC 2). The trend continues in other services including electricity supply.

Security

Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are blamed for the rising crime statistics – for example their inability to quash the attacks against the anti-polio campaign staff and the 'Karachi Operation[15]' (EC 2, EC 3, EC 4, EC 6, EC 8, EC 9, EC-12, JCCS-16) (Table 4.8). These are discussed further below. The Supreme Court, in its verdict over law and order in Karachi, blamed the Sindh Police for the decline in safety and security in the city and due to political influence, also substantiated by the DG of Sindh Rangers in an interview (DGR, 2014; SMC, 2013). If political influence in policing is reduced substantial security issues will be solved (DGR, 2014).

As a result of poor police performance the Rangers, a paramilitary force under the Army, was brought into the city in the mid-1990s. Now Rangers work in parallel with police, and recently have been given new powers including policing and investigations when required, thus creating another layer of rift between provincial and federal governments.

> … in three ways the LEAs are unable to curb trouble, firstly … LEAs have deflected from their main purpose and corruption has penetrated in the rank...

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[15] At the time of field work, in 2013, the 'Karachi operation' did not show any betterment in the violent crime scene of Karachi, in fact 2013 proved to be the most violent year in the history of Karachi.

> Secondly … even when they apprehend criminals, then criminals influence the legal system to be freed: this may involve threatening or influencing the judge and making the witness withdraw or even by killing them. Thirdly … strong mafias are often at behind these criminals, including powerful political personalities who can threaten police officers with losing their job or demotion. Thus police officers also become a target of the criminals as they see him as hurdle… they (LEA) opt for swift retribution by killing criminals in a fake encounter. (EC 4)

The formal security apparatus is considered to have collapsed during the 1980s, as discussed earlier in connection with spatial divisions and enclave formations (Section 4.2.2). The free movement of war-hardened people from the Soviet-Afghan war, and the availability of arms and ammunition, eventually led to the collapse of formal security services and the rise of informal structures (EC 5). Informal structures are discussed in Chapter 5. Alternative security services provided by private guards or political parties took over security responsibilities (Ali, R. 2014), to the extent that currently private guards in the city outnumber the police force (Hassan, 2008). In addition several separate formal security services have been set up for elites (Ali, R. 2013; *The Express Tribune*, 2014d; Section 4.4).

Anti- polio campaign

Various groups had criticised the anti-polio immunization campaign for more than 15 years, as a symbol of western influence due to various myths attached to it, such as; it being sterilisation of male children to control Muslim population etc. (EC 1, EC 2). However it took a violent turn when paramedics, especially the female workers administering the vaccine door-to-door were attacked and killed (*Reuters-Dawn,* 2014). The most violent day was when four different teams were targeted simultaneously in four different districts, Orangi, Baldia Town, Ittehad Town and Landhi, all Pashtoon localities (*BBC,* 2012) and the problem continues. In the last incident, in 2015, a police guard was killed (*The Express Tribune*, 2015b) and the campaign had to be halted in 24 Union Councils, mostly Pashtoon-dominated and assumed to Taliban-infested (*The Express Tribune*, 2014g). The police have several times stated that it is difficult to provide the security necessary for the campaign and thus, the Police could not take up the responsibility (Bhatti, 2015), although the Chief Minister had ordered to establish a special force for the purpose (*The Express Tribune*, 2014i).

Karachi Operation

The deteriorating safety and security issue in Karachi (Table 4.8) had led to a *suo moto* notice taken by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 2011 (Zulfiqar, 2011a). In 2011 the court announced its verdict – that the militant wings of various political parties, sectarian organisations and crime syndicates are the main culprits and reason for lawlessness (SMC, 2013; Zulfiqar, 2011b). The court directed the law enforcement agencies and the government to take appropriate action.

Thus, a paramilitary operation was launched by the federal government, through the interior ministry in September 2013 (called the Karachi Operation) to root out criminals and terrorist elements across the city (*Dawn,* 2012b). Rangers and police were given responsibility of planning and executing the actions (*The Express Tribune*, 2013n). Initially the police and Rangers showed some success, but reportedly, police performance soon fizzled out due to political influence and the core police team was dismantled (Ali, I. 2014a). However, the Rangers continued according to the plan. The Rangers even raided the headquarters of MQM in April 2015 (Khan, 2015a), which was considered previously invincible.

	Crimes	Numbers
1	Killed (Civilian)	2,715
2	Killed (Police & Rangers)	191
3	Killed (Criminals)	125
4	Kidnappings	108
5	Cases of extortion	519
6	Cases of robbery	3,082
7	Vehicle thefts	4,068
8	Motorcycle thefts	22,284
9	Cell phone thefts	10,501

Table 4.8: Crimes reported in 2013 (OSAC, 2014)

The start in 2013 did not see any significant fall in the crime rate, as 2013 was the most violent year in the history of Karachi (Table 4.1), although the LEA's argued otherwise (Arfeen, 2014). However, 2014 showed a downward trend in crime, as per LEAs claims (*Daily Times,* 2014). The decline continued in 2015, in line with the Rangers' target and claims of halving the crime rate from the start of operations (*Express Tribune*, 2015e). There are also counter claims by citizens' organisations (Shahbazi, 2014; Ali, I. 2014b) and allegations of extra-judicial killings, in alleged armed encounters of apprehended criminals carried out by the LEAs (Ahmed, M. 2015; Ali, I.

2015a). In connection with morale-damaging criticism and protests by political parties, the high command of Army reportedly backed the Karachi Operation and has reassured the public that the operation will continue till its logical end and will root out all mafia elements in the city (Yousuf, 2015). Political parties, especially MQM, blame the para-military forces for biased behaviour against MQM and of extra-judicial killing of its workers (*Dawn*, 2015d; *Dawn,* 2015e).

The local government

> Good governance and the better division of resources are only possible if there is third tier of government or local government. Things in Karachi were improving while there was such system (SLGO 2001). Every feudal system had become absorbed into local government, the poor were happy and development was taking place, but now just because of political issues, the local government system is hanging in air. This city badly needs a local government system. (GC 13)

Elected local government has been a very strong symbol of the state's governance during the last 15 years since it was launched in 2001 (SLGO 2001). From 1987-2001 the city was a District, run by an appointed Commissioner in five districts and six municipal councils for rural areas. In 2001, the military government introduced elected local government throughout the country – in Sindh this fell under the Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 2001 which set up the devolved system of 18 Towns and 178 Union Councils, but local government elections scheduled for 2009 never took place since then, despite political debates and agreements (Box 4.1).

Experts mentions the political conflict over resource and power distribution as the main reason behind the halt in local government elections, as it diminished the role of provincial government and hence its control over institutions, decisions and development funds (Box 4.1, EC 1, EC 3, EC 4, EC 5, EC 6, EC 8, EC 9, PC 15, ECCS 2).

The experts, the government representatives and even the case-study interviewees (Chapter 5 and 6) argued without exception that a local government system is badly required. The residents were happy with the former system, as it gave them voice and access to people who could address their problems.

Box 4.1: Sindh Local Government Ordinance (SLGO 2001) & City District Government Karachi (CDGK)

Between 1987 and 2001 Karachi had appointed local government system when before 2001, Karachi was divided into five administrative districts, run by appointed bureaucrats, namely; Central, East, West, South and the Malir District. Along with these urban districts, six rural councils were responsible for peripheral rural areas (Ahmed, N. 2010). The municipal functions were run by Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC), with a Commissioner at the head of the administration, and five Deputy Commissioners heading each district administration.

As part of a process of national devolution, the Sindh Local Government Ordinance (SLGO 2001) was announced in 2001, introducing a three-tiered local government system in Karachi. The military ruler General Pervez Musharraf, who took over power in a soft military coup in October 1998 issued the ordinance. According to the SLGO 2001, Karachi was declared a City District and the government was called the City District Government Karachi (CDGK), with 18 Town Councils, and 178 Union Councils (Ahmed, 2010). An elected *Nazim* (mayor) was the head of the city council, while towns had *Town Nazims* and Union Councils had elected union councillors. KMC and other city administrative offices, previously under provincial control, were brought under the city government. The elected administration was supported by the appointed staff, previously in district administration and the within the various institutions, at all tiers.

The first local government elections for 2001-2005 were held on a non-party basis, but each political party had their own panel of contestants. Jamat Islami (JI), won the first term and their candidate was made the City *Nazim*. MQM boycotted that election.

An MQM based-panel won the second term (2005-2009) elections an MQM candidate became the City *Nazim*. At that time, MQM controlled both the city and provincial government, and had a good political position at federal level, under national military rule.

With the introduction of local government, Karachi witnessed an abundance of development funds and projects, partly as transfers from provincial government, and partly because development funds previously directed through provincial and national assembly members were now channelled via local governments. The funding transfer is supposed to be one of the reasons why the post 2009 provincial and federal government opposed local governments. The developments funds were mostly invested in underground infrastructure, transportation and especially parks and playgrounds in both terms.

With the general elections in 2008, the PPP-led democratic government came to power at both federal and provincial levels. With the end of second term of CDGK, the third elections never took place, and instead political disagreements between MQM and PPP continued over the nature of system and distribution of power between provincial and local government. In the absence of elected local government, the provincial government reinstated the five pre-2001 Districts, but included the 18 Towns as administrative sub-divisions. Union Councils ceased to function. After the Supreme Court ordered the provincial governments to expedite local government elections on several occasions (*Dawn,* 2015a), political conflict over power distribution between the two tiers is said to be the main reason behind the halt in local government elections (KIs).

Local government elections were finally held in December 2015, and again, MQM took the majority. However, even after three months the elected representatives, and the related system, is not materialised increasing political resentment and creating further issues in services provision.

However at provincial and federal level, political parties avoided local government. MQM found the SLGO-2001 based local government system ideal because they had a majority of local government seats in Karachi and they could control the city government, but had little chance of controlling the provincial government. In contrast, the PPP found it difficult as they had very little support base in Karachi and wanted a commissioner system to ensure their grip on the city administration (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, EC 5, EC 6, EC 8, EC 9). This conflict forms one of the many tactics of power politics in the city that shows city-local level split in interests and struggle to capture public resources.

4.3.2 Private Sector Performance

Given the problems of efficient and impartial government-provided service provision efficiently, especially for low-income groups, private entrepreneurs have filled the void especially in the housing sector (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, EC 4, EC 4, EC 5, EC 7, EC 8, EC 9, GC 10, GC 11, GC 12). If the informal sector housing provision is considered as private then, it is the only sector currently catering to the needs of the urban poor (EC 1).

All experts contacted for this research considered the current pattern of formal, private-sector housing development has negative effects. Examples of housing schemes by private-sector enterprises include Bahria Town and DHA City, both elite housing totalling almost 200,000 plots[16] developed on the city limits (Azmat, 2013; *The News,* 2014a). There is no housing in the vicinity for workers in the service sector that these housing projects will generate, so such developments are likely to exacerbate the growth of informal settlements, (EC 1, EC 3, EC 4, EC 5, EC 6, EC 7, EC 8). In addition, the extent of high-cost land controlled by the private sector has eroded the capacity of government planning agencies to cross-subsidise land development for middle and lower middle-income groups (GC 11, GC 12).

Some government representatives, however think that land-cost escalation is a market-led process and it does not create divisions in the city (GC 13, GC 14), although they were unable to explain the disparities of land supply in relation to high- and low-cost housing areas (Table 4.4 & 4.5).

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[16] The latest and largest housing supply in the formal sector has been by either Defence Housing Authority, who is developing 12000 acres of land outside the city with the name of DHA city for the elites (Azmat, 2013), while the other private developer is "Bahria Town" with their already sold-out 100,000 plots for the elites (*The News* 2014a).

The private authorities are providing 90% of the housing units per annum for the 5% population of the city while they are unable to support low-income groups because the profit margin is too small. Government authorities develop their schemes on no-loss-no-gain basis, in which the smaller plots for poor groups are cross-subsidized through the sale of commercial and larger sized plots, and all government schemes have 80% plots for middle and low income groups. However, land speculation has been a major problem in development of government housing schemes, as there is still not more than 10% occupancy rate in the Hawks Bay Scheme 42, released in 1985. All these factors contribute to the development of informal settlements (GC 12).

Some experts and government representatives find no conspiracy in the rise of the private and informal sector as it is fulfilling the demand (EC 3, GC 14) and is working beyond ethnicity, political or religious divide and thus depoliticizing land (EC 2). However, some also see the rise of the private sector for elite housing as another form of control. Strengthened by the rise of the military as the developers of former military cantonment land and large housing companies such as Bahria Town PVT. Ltd., like informal actors, such developers use mechanisms to evade planning and development control laws (EC 3, EC 4, EC 5, EC 6, EC 8). DHA, the military real-estate enterprise has launched 27 housing schemes in the country in just 12 years from 1991-2003, and more have been added since after 2003 (*Dawn,* 2003). Commenting on Bahria Town's new project in Karachi, one interviewee identified several irregularities and administrative changes were introduced in the government land owning agency to facilitate the developer; highlighting a close nexus between the private sector and the intentional de-regulation of the land agencies and the political parties in power.

…currently, a huge theft of lands in Karachi is taking place, this is done by Bahria Town (Private Development Authority) … they announced a housing scheme publicly in Karachi without having a land and without approval of layout plans. However, by law no builder or developer is allowed to advertise a project for public sale until the developer has leased the land and the proposal is according to the land-use zoning in the Master Plan. However, this (particular project) has been made possible by creating changes in the government institutions like that making of SBCA[17], and then merging of Master Planning department under SBCA, which is illogical. (KI)

In addition, Bahria Town Pvt. Ltd is also alleged to use the power politics of Sindh to facilitate several development projects. A report in the Dawn newspaper noted the chairman of Bahria Town's proposed university development had the name of the MQM premier, 'Altaf Hussain'

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[17] Sindh Building Control Authority.

(*Dawn*, 2014c), and also MQM's ex-mayor of Karachi, Mustafa Kamal, is supposedly employed by Bahria Town Pvt. Ltd. to look after the projects in Karachi (Salim, 2014). Bahria Town Pvt. Ltd. is also, reportedly, planning to develop a bus rapid transit system, worth 25 billion Rupees in Karachi (Salim, 2014). Bahria Town also provided soft loan of 1.89 billion Rupees for public transport infrastructure to KMC, to facilitate the development of a high rise building (*The Express Tribune*, 2015f) – although off-site development to support major new housing schemes can be acceptable, processes should be transparent, which seems missing as the examples of deregulations in approval of scheme and facilitation of infrastructure without involvement of stake holders. In addition the role of government as regulator is evident rather than provider.

Experts (KIs) are also critical of the involvement of the military as a housing provider in Karachi. It is fast converting cantonment lands reserved for army purposes into elite housing, and buying new land such as the DHA City project. Experts (KIs) informed that, the army uses it powers to influence land agencies, and has bypassed normal planning mechanisms by its own by-laws that do not follow the master plan and city or provincial government directives (see Hasan, et al., 2013).

4.3.3 Has the State Failed in Providing Goods and Services to All?

In conclusion it appears that the government has lost control, intentionally or un-intentionally, over several aspects of the development processes. The homicide data (Table 4.1) shows the worsening situation over more than a decade, although 'Karachi operation' brought a relative peace but it is also marred with political conflicts, e.g. the Sindh government refused to extend special powers to Rangers creating a rift between Federal and Provincial governments (Tunio, 2015), making the future of 'Karachi operation' questionable. Similarly, the anti-polio campaign has facing security threats since long. Furthermore, service provision, especially in housing sector and water supply has shown a clear failure. Several reasons have been identified in this background; firstly, experts (EC 1) think that the government and its agencies have no capacity to solve the housing needs of the poor, and that there is an anti-poor bias at official level that favours the private sector (EC 1, EC 3). Others (EC 2, EC 3) think that enclave formation, and informal settlements (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, EC 4, EC 5, EC 7, EC 8, EC-11, EC-12, GC 14, PC 15) show the dominance of market-led development, as informal or private providers have taken on services that the state is supposed to provide. The case of extremist religious enclaves, particularly those where the Taliban have some control, and the encroachment on peripheral land, has led to

government losing control over land in specific areas. One of the experts (EC 5) commented that state failure is different in intensity and form at different locations of the city. Others think that the failure of government is actually intentional, and could be avoided if corruption and power politics is controlled (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, EC 4, EC 5, EC 6). Government institutions are highly politicised and thus, development follows the same line as intentional de-regulations and blurring of formal-informal divide are common.

4.4 Rise of Informal Structures and Power Politics

Political infighting and the lack of consistent functioning local government, has resulted in three outcomes. First, has been the rise in informality across all sectors including housing; second, there has been a strengthening of informal structures; and third informal structures have adopted state-like attributes, including co-opting state funds, raising local revenue and territorial sovereignty resulting in segregation and socio-political conflicts (EC 5). The nature and scale of such informal structures varies, ranging from formal organisations such as political parties and religious groups to organised crime groups, banned outfits, or gangs, to some more benign structures such as neighbourhood committees. One expert aptly summarised the situation,

> … different organisations emerged (in the 1980s) who saw that the state had left a vacuum that they could fill to benefit their community. When this starts to happen, then ethnic issues start to emerge, and it gets politicised and can take a violent turn. In such a situation other groups think that they can save themselves by using the same ethnic and organizational tactics to become disciplined and armed … each group is deriving legitimacy from other groups and because there is no power that is accepted by all – the role that the state is supposed to have … however, this is not a complete picture because in parallel negotiations are taking place according to market or other dynamics … (In addition) after the breakdown of state organizations, different models emerged to fill the gap, many were successful but others were not … Political parties adopted a model of organization of the state … under the classical state territorial control, is included so they (alternative groups including political parties) adopted state-like characteristics and practiced territorial control. When other organizations saw this successful model they copied it and established territorial control reflected in boundary-making, so if a political party claims to control a settlement their supporters may give them legitimacy … as a result a sense of territorial division along ethnic lines started to emerge. (EC 5)

4.4.1 Role of Informality and Power Politics

Thus, informal processes and structures have become the main way through which essential goods and services, such as housing and transport, reach Karachi's urban poor, and as a result play a central role in the city politics. Many experts see this as positive, and even say, "informality has done well" in providing goods and services to the urban poor (EC 1, EC 5, Budhani et. al. 2010). Furthermore, it is argued that informality facilitates access by the poor and avoids cumbersome processes, as compared to discriminatory, elitist formal processes, especially for housing and services (EC 1, EC 4, EC 3, EC 5, EC 7). In contrast, others argue that informality has reduced opportunities for better governance in the city (EC 2, GC 14), and that crime, violence and conflicts have become part and parcel of informality;

> Informality is making city growth more difficult; it becomes more and more difficult to ameliorate the problems of informality, and see a transition into formality if the first becomes larger than the latter; informality is not providing desirable options to the city but it is creating long-term problems for the city in governance, administration and service delivery. (EC 2)

Experts (EC 3, EC 5, EC 7, EC 9, EC-14, ECCS-20) also accept that despite the benefits, informality in service provision, spatial domain, and governance is not an ideal situation. Furthermore, the dominance of informality, especially in housing sector, will continue given current socio-economic and political realities, although a continuous process of upgrading and regularization is required (EC 5).

However, the scale at which informal housing and urban processes are currently taking place is exacerbating political conflicts and security issues. Much violence is concentrated around informal settlements (Map 4.3) and also occurs in no-go-areas (Khan, 2013a). In addition, many criminals have been apprehended in informally developed localities, especially for terrorist activities. For example, the Mehran base, a naval air force facility in Karachi, was attacked by terrorists in 2011 and one of the points of entry was through the informal settlements abutting its rear wall. Likewise, the Karachi airport attack in 2014 was followed by another attack on its training academy, again the adjoining informal settlements were reportedly the main entry route for terrorists (Siddiqui and Khan, 2011; *BBC,* 2014, *The News*, 2014b). Similarly, a tunnel was discovered from Ghousia Colony, an informal settlement abutting the central jail Karachi, with supposed motives of getting the terrorists freed from the central prison (*The Express Tribune,*

2014h). Furthermore, many political workers comes from informally developed settlements or the poorer communities (EC 5), this highlights the role of informal settlements in the current issues.

In fact, political parties often use poor communities for political gain, as Roy (2009) and Weinstein (2008) identify in Indian cities. They develop rhetoric and political campaigns around the needs of the poor and then provide them the services to consolidate their control (Roy, 2009; also See Chapter 5 and 6). Some of the experts interviewed for this research even describe politics in Karachi along formal-informal lines (EC 5, EC 6, EC 9); given the overlap between ethnicity and politics, such settlements and their residents play a central role in the electoral politics, and thus a patron-client relation develops between the political parties and the residents of such settlements through which both parties benefit.

> … the urban area of today has a salient class division, particularly around planning status, in contrast to the classical distinction around work… this class division has impacted the politics … The collective action taken to become regularised, to get infrastructure, is significantly impacting the city especially the urban politics. (EC 5)

Section 4.2.3 has argued that informality existed well before the rise of identity-based politics and politicization of the administration. However, informality did provide a basis for the gradual usurping of the state-led service provision. Ethnicity-based politics and conflicts have co-opted and, in the process, exacerbated informality, resulting in consolidation of informal structures that later engaged in power politics.

4.4.2 Power Politics and its Connection with Socio-Spatial Pattern

> "Historically, Karachi's ethno-political violence has pitted Urdu-speaking Muhajirs of the MQM against Pashtoons represented by the ANP. But clashes between the rural, Sindh-based PPP and Karachi-centric MQM are increasing as part of a broader power struggle between the city and provincial-level governments … The armed wings of major political parties, including the MQM, PPP, and ANP, are the main perpetrators of urban violence. The parties clash over city resources and funds generated through extortion." (Yusuf, 2012, p.3).

This section looks at how the current socio-spatial pattern is also shaping current politics and conflicts, in addition to the historical developments covered in Section 4.2.3. The alignment of politics with ethnicity coupled with the geographic concentration of ethnic groups underpins

various problems in the city. For many years, the majority ethnic group in Karachi has been the Muhajirs, represented by MQM, but changing demography has led to fear that this dominance is slipping away (Gazdar, 2011, p.4-8). Groups with increasing political and demographic power, such as Pashtoons, aspire to the same status and access to resources and power as the Muhajirs (Gayer, 2014, p. 24-29). Furthermore, Sindhis, the indigenous ethnic group in the province, think that the city and its resources are slipping out of their hands, especially as city government is dominated by MQM, so they use Baloch and Sindhi rhetoric to claim that they are owners of the land (Gayer, 2014, p. 17-30).

> Essentially, the conflict is about control over Karachi's public resources including jobs, revenue, higher education institutes, health facilities, which are more concentrated in Karachi than in the rest of Sindh, so who controls Karachi essentially controls employment in Sindh. PPP can only succeed in controlling the city if there is a centralised system of governance, whereas, MQM profits more from a highly decentralised system as their supporters are scattered around the city. Thus PPP does not have control over the province's capital city, but MQM (Muhajirs) feel as though all the non-locals (Sindhi in provincial government and administration and Army and other LEAs being predominantly Punjabi, while Sind Rangers comprise of mostly Sindhi speaking) are ruling them as most of the Sindh Government employees (the Provincial government) are Sindhi speaking. (KI)

The politicians also agree that the issue is about the changing demographics of the last 15 years (Appendix 4.1 and figure 4.1) and the resultant distribution of resources . There has been no census since 1998, so MQM claims that the population has increased, but the budget and number of electoral constituencies and seats are still based on the last census (PC 15).

> The future of the city is good, if and only if the resources at the Province and State level are distributed according to the population … the resources are distributed here according to the 1998 census, in which the population was 9.8 million and now it is 25 million (*an exaggeration[18]*). Most of the population are now migrants and the population in their home towns must have declined considerably, but there is no reflection of this in their budget … these people are accounted for in their native provinces but are sucking resources from the city as well. Similarly the seats in the Provincial and National Assemblies are still the same, which should have been adjusted; in a way they are consuming the resources twice, and if this continues, it is bound to have destructive effects on the city. (Representative of the city's majority political party)

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[18] Author's view.

There is also an urban-rural ethnic divide within the Province of Sindh i.e. the predominantly urban Muhajirs versus mainly rural Sindhis. At provincial level, the urban and rural populations are almost equal, but the rural areas are geographically large and Sindhis claim ownership of the larger Province including Karachi (EC 3, See Section 4.2.3 on Migrations). Historically, control over Karachi has been a source of conflict since independence (Section 4.2.3). The administrative set-up and electoral jurisdictions led to PPP dominance in the Provincial Assembly, while MQM almost dominates Karachi and holds a few seats in other cities in Sindh (ECP, 2013; Alahsan, 2013; Map 4.4). Thus, the city level administration was always at loggerheads when MQM led (including the institutions where MQM worker unions held power) with the Provincial administration.

Map 4.4: Party position provincial assembly Sindh-election-2013   (Alahsan, 2013)

Quota (in Jobs and educational institutions) system is blamed as a tool to deprive residents of Karachi the right to equal access to jobs and other opportunities. In return, the rivals claim to be owners of the land, the PAC leader, in a published interview, claimed that the majority political party of the city is controlling all the resources, and that either PAC will take its 'share of the cake' or destroy the 'whole cake' (*Sama TV,* 2013; Section 7.2). In opposition, Karachi residents blame the in-migrants (EC 4, GC 11) and allege that the rural ethnic immigrants treat Karachi as a free

service as it does not affect their original villages, similar arguments prevail in provincial legislative level.

> … there is an urban-rural conflict in the (Sindh) assembly as most of the members are from rural areas and don't belong to the urban areas, and for any bill to get approved, support from these members is required so they remain indifferent or act negatively… The Master Plans have never been ratified by the Provincial Assemblies just because of this urban-rural divide … keeping matters flexible is better for them. Now there are no plans and the vacuum is filled by office orders that give much flexibility and freedom to manipulate things. (KI)

Several experts argued that the conflict is actually between political parties, who portray this conflict as ethnic. However, others (EC 1, EC 3, EC 6, EC 9) thought that root cause is conflict over resources, but the ethnic rhetoric is actually for material benefits and not the other way round. Ordinary people do not fight along ethnic lines (ECCS 2), although they have developed a fear that eventually shapes their choice of housing location and access to services (EC 3).

It is quite clear that, given the polarised political context, socio-spatial patterns play a crucial role in electoral politics, hence the reason for various mechanisms to control it, from ethnic rhetoric to migrations and from demography control to an extent of using violent tactics (explored in the coming sections) in order to achieve territorial sovereignty.

4.4.3 Other Manifestations of Power Politics

The contest over resources is played out at several scales, from formal to informal, but formal-informal divide is blurred. For example, as one expert said,

> …the whole situation of power-politics in Karachi should be looked at three levels first at the national and internal political levels and how this impacts on the city, second politics at the city level, and thirdly trade, commerce and the economy. The economy is a powerful factor in Karachi, and in many cases influences ideology rather than other way round. (EC 3)

The City-level conflicts are played out at the local-level and *vice versa* with the ultimate project of control:

> "These competitive claims over the ownership of the city are at the heart of its increasingly complex conflicts, where the battle for votes *(formal)* overlaps

with a contest for economic rents *(informal)* (land, water, electricity, jobs, development funds, Bhatta…). For the smaller stakeholders, such as the PPP, the ANP and the PAC, ownership entails the exclusive control of the populations and economic rents of their respective turf. MQM remains more ambitious. Although its militants are involved in a small-scale turf war *(Local-level)* against political rivals or criminal groups, MQM is not merely fighting for the turf in Karachi, but for control over the local state *(City-level)* and its different organs – the city government, the police, the courts, universities and colleges, and so on." (Gayer, 2014, p. 30) (Bold italics in brackets, author's additions)

Power politics in the formal domain

At city level, power politics is mostly formal, and involves the co-option of various planning and development mechanisms to influence local government and service-provision agencies.

Formal policies are widely used for the politics of control, (see Sections 4.2.3 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.2). Other policies with an underlying agenda of control include the Goth Abad Scheme, Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA) Act and Master Planning and development decisions made under the MQM-led city government, outlined below.

Goths are villages, and in 1985, the Goth Abad scheme was introduced when Mr. Junejo, the Prime Minister under military rule, as part of regularisation promoted under the 'Million Houses Program'. The Goth Abad scheme was used in rural areas to regularise established housing, and to release people from the threats of feudal landlords. Families were given title deeds to formalise their occupancy, but the scheme was also used politically to reward voters (EC 1, EC 4, EC 8, GC 12).

Then, the Sindh government introduced Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA) Act-1987 (GOS, 1987) with the objective of upgrading and regularizing informal settlements (EC 8). A cut-off date was identified, before 23 March 1985, later extended to 30 June 1997 that defined the eligibility of settlements for inclusion in the programme. The possibility of regularization created scope for political entrepreneurship, as residents demanded regularization, which was exploited by politicians (EC 8). Currently, a large number of villages and informal settlements on the outskirts of Karachi are using the Act and Goth Abad schemes to get their settlements regularised as urban settlements, mostly benefitting PPP which gains from Sindhi support (EC 1). However, other actors are now also involved.

> Under the Goth Abad scheme settlers on land could get legal title if they had lived in a location for more than 40 years, although the process had a long list of legal formalities … However, for any villager it is virtually impossible to get the documents following formal procedures. Instead, this has provided an opening for informal entrepreneurs, who contact villagers and offer a deal for legalising the land and completing the procedures. This deal is subject to an agreement that 80% of the land will be developed in partnership with the owner, the developer, the police and the land department government officials (and presuming that politicians also get their cut).

> The partnership ensures protection for the owner, plots for the owner, police and government officials, while the developer, carries out subdivision, marketing and selling the plots. Although PPP tried to benefit politically, the benefits were not large-scale since the newcomers after subdivision were Pashtoons. MQM was also unable to profit politically, as although the investors are usually Pashtuns, the landowners, government officials and the police are Sindhi, and usually only the middlemen are Muhajir or Punjabi. However, there has been no ethnic violence amongst the groups and this procedure has 100% helped the poor, and is much more effective than formal methods of housing schemes and land development. (EC 1)

The local government system established from 2001 until 2009 (SLGO-2001) poured unprecedented development funds into the city. MQM was completely in charge of the city from 2005-2009, as PPP was not in provincial government at that time (Gayer, 2014, p. 101-109; Box 4.1). Attempts by opposition parties to regain control, particularly PPP and ANP, were thwarted. Control over land was one of the main arenas of local government's intervention with political consequences, many experts mentioned.

Experts identified several manifestations of power politics and control by the local government during 2005-2009. Anti-encroachment drives and evictions in informal settlements hit the Pashtoons and Sindhis (although low-income Muhajir settlements were equally affected e.g. the Lines Areas Project, Lyari Expressway project etc.); controls on rickshaws, including banning two-stroke rickshaws and introduction of Qingqi and CNG-based rickshaws also affected the Pashtoon-dominated intra-city transport business (KI). Although, such development measures were openly taken, since some ethnic groups dominate in certain trades, e.g. Pashtoons in the transport sector, such policies disproportionately affected them. The ANP and PAC, allegedly, emerged to counter the advances of MQM, resulting in conflict and violence in the city.

The MQM-led local government also oversaw huge infrastructure developments, especially roads. Much of this development was concentrated in and around MQM-dominated electoral

constituencies, as many allege, particularly around formal settlements, however, most of the constituencies are MQM dominated so it is difficult to generalise. However, several projects with political intent have been identified by experts, for example the North Nazimabad-Orangi Link road (the Kati Pahari Road), adjacent to the main case study area selected for this thesis, and the Bacha Khan flyover built to enable Muhajir commuters to avoid the Pashtoon-dominated Banaras Chowk (crossroads). The, alleged, intention was to give an alternative route for Muhajir commuters from Orangi at times of conflict between MQM and ANP (EC 1, EC 3), in addition to the technical benefits of shortening of distance and travel time from Orangi to the city centre.

Control over governing bodies, including local government, is one of the most important aspects of the power politics in Karachi (ECCS 2). For this purpose, various tactics are used from demographic control to affect the vote bank or controlling constituency boundaries.

Several formal policy mechanisms are used, including changing constituency boundaries, not allowing elections to take place, or changing the geographic limits of the constituency through formal procedures (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, EC 6, EC 8). In 2012-13, the conflict between MQM and PPP over local government took another turn, when the Provincial government introduced a policy to carry out boundary definition on the Supreme Court's orders with the objective to avoid territoriality and ensure mixed social groups (SMC, 2013, p. 152). In response, new constituencies were proposed by the Election Commission of Pakistan, incorporating recommendations by the Sindh Government, which were heavily criticised especially by MQM as being politically biased (Abbas, M. 2012; *The News*, 2013b).

> … [under the former system of local government] in the whole of Sindh there were around 1,200 Union Councils, while in Karachi there were only 178. With a 50-50 population ratio between rural and urban, how could this inappropriate distribution be justified? The same bias can be seen in recent boundary definitions, and we are thankful to the Supreme Court that they kept the Sindh High Court decision intact, which declared it unlawful for the Provincial government to redefine boundaries, which should be the responsibility of the electoral commission. The Provincial government was trying to impose control on the city, taking 50,000 as the population base for an electoral ward, whereas in other areas it was 20,000, how can you justify this? … Some researchers predict that if migration continues at the same pace, by 2,040 Pashto will the most dominant language in the city. (MQM representative)

Control over institutions, service provision and decision making, is another tactic that enables control over resources. After the introduction of elected local government (SLGO 2001), many

institutions that were formerly controlled by the Province were put under city government administration and development funding was transferred from the National/Provincial assembly representatives to locally-elected representatives. The SLGO 2001 was not revived after the end of the second term of local government in 2009 (**Box 4.1**).

> Although before SLGO 2001, there was a rift between the Provincial (PPP) and local administration (MQM influenced) over the control of development agencies such as KDA, after 2001 two new departments, Malir Development Authority (MDA) and Lyari Development Authority (LDA) were created that controlled all the undeveloped peri-urban land while KDA was left with only the already-developed area.

> … KDA itself was a political entity … There were three labour/staff unions in KDA, supported by MQM, PPP and JI respectively, of which the MQM-supported union was the strongest. However, under the PPP government, the PPP considered that the MQM group was controlling the whole of KDA[19]. When the labour union referendum was due, a Minister from PPP visited KDA and made a speech to the PPP union and other staff, suggesting that if they developed PPP support then KDA will develop significantly … otherwise, he threatened, the government would tear KDA apart … However, in the referendum the MQM labour union won and then the operation to break up KDA started, with the justification that KDA focussed development on the urbanized area of the city, while the peripheral areas including Malir and Lyari (PPP strongholds) were neglected … and this gap could be addressed by creating MDA and LDA, effectively a political decision to dissolve KDA, as MDA and LDA got the assets of undeveloped land while KDA got only liabilities. Two housing schemes of KDA (Shah Latif Town and Hawks' Bay Scheme 42) were transferred to MDA and LDA[20]. (KI)

In 2009, the Provincial government (PPP controlled) brought back all the institutions that existed before the SLGO-2001. The Provincial government also set up a new building control agency and gave it precedence over the master-planning department, an illogical but lucrative decision (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, EC 4, EC 6, EC 8, EC 9, GC 11, GC 12). There was also conflict about control of the water board and over party-based distribution of jobs (see Tunio, 2014a). The solid waste management department was also brought under the Province's Chief Minister in 2014 (Ali, I. 2013, Tunio, 2014b), although waste management should be a local government function, which then led to the privatization of waste management. The Health Department (Mansoor, 2014), Education

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[19] Staff unions did play an important role in KDA, however, the institution was under the Ministry of Housing and Town Planning of Sindh province.
[20] MDA refers to Malir Development Authority and LDA refers to Lyari Development Authority

department (*The Express Tribune*, 2014e) and Universities (*The Express Tribune*, 2013k) also ended up under Provincial control. Although, these changes show devolution of power from federal to provincial level, but the Provincial Government is not willing to delegate powers to local government that is against the rule of devolution.

The issue of land control has also led conflict of interest among various institutions with a political bias that have economic and land-holding interests, such as the Army and other agencies, MDA and LDA(EC 6, EC 9).

> … the Hawks Bay scheme was originally subdivided and put out to ballot by KDA, but the Board of Revenue grabbed large amount of land along the road, in an attempt to profit from the land, as KDA represented the MQM-led city whereas Board of Revenue (BoR) represents the Provincial government or PPP. (EC 6)

Power politics in the informal domain (informal land controls)

Apart from the formal mechanisms of policies and administration discussed above, several types of control mechanism operate informally, and sometimes illegally and against basic rights, but are part of wider power struggles involving both formal and informal actors. These include territoriality, demographic control, rent-seeking, control over land, control over utilities, violence and threat of violence etc. Most of such mechanisms operate at the local-level but impact on city-level power politics. These mechanisms are discussed in detail in Chapters 5, 6 & 7, but briefly introduced here.

Territoriality: Establishing 'turf' is a powerful mechanism of power politics in Karachi and is at the heart of the city's conflict and violence (EC 1, EC 3, EC 4, EC 5, EC 6, EC 6, EC 8, EC 9). Thus territoriality is a spatial term but can be defined by a location-specific community and their structures of control, which leads to segregation on an identity basis (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Shutting down the city, organising rallies and political gatherings have also become symbol of showing power and territoriality. The most recent by-elections (April-15) in NA-246 constituency is an example of territoriality in which PTI faced obstacles in campaigning in an MQM stronghold (see *The Express Tribune*, 2015c; Khan, 2015b).

> In such acts of 'power-play', the controlling power always needs a base, a … territory … that they can defend, so that they can control the community residing in that 'base'. Violence and fear of violence is one mechanism through which communities are controlled; … second is the ideology that gives

legitimacy to the controlling forces to control the people … It is the ideology through which legitimacy is attained …, violence is legitimized, and sympathies are gathered. (EC 3)

Demographic control also help in territory making, and involves facilitating supporting groups and excluding opponents from a territory, by controlling property, land grabbing, encroachment to house political supporters or certain groups, illegal conversion of land etc.

Rent-seeking of various types is part of territorialisation, and billions of Rupees are earned through various forms of rent-seeking in the city, as the city has a huge informal business market (see Bengali and Sadaqat, 2002, p.7-9; *The News,* 2013a). Territoriality defines which group has the right to extort in a particular zone, which often underpins conflict and violence. The Director General of the Rangers has stated that the political parties and their leaders are behind much rent-seeking (Ranger DGR-2014). The most lucrative form of rent-seeking is 'extortion', which includes: rent from informal businesses; money to provide protection from opponents or formal public agencies such as transport companies etc. Rejecting an extortion demand could be fatal (Siddiqui, T. 2011) – the most violent event is said to have been the Baldia Town Factory carnage in 2012, in which more than 250 textile factory workers were burned to death when a fire was reported as being deliberately started after the owner refused to pay an extortion demand, and the joint investigation team alleged one of the political party worker's involvement (Sahoutara, 2015; Figure 4.2), however, the party denied any such claims. A detailed account of extortion in North Nazimabad is given in Section 6.3.3.

Figure 4.2: An Extortion demand receipt   (*Reuters-Dawn*, 2013b)

Encroachment, land grabbing and property controls are also forms of rent-seeking. Karachi has long experienced land-grabbing but since 2000 the involvement of political parties has increased (EC 1, EC 3, EC 4, EC 5, EC 6, EC 7, EC 8, EC 9, GC 11, GC 12). Several studies and news reports also allege that political parties are actively involved in the process (Baloch, 2011; Ousat, 2014a; *The Express Tribune*, 2012c). However, interviewees and the press report that that criminals related to a 'land Mafia' take refuge within political parties and create a two-way patron-client relations (ECCS 1). Land encroachment is locally known as 'China-cutting'. China cutting refers to illegal subdivision of encroached amenity plots, open spaces including parks and play grounds to be sold as residential and commercial plots, sometimes apartments are also constructed in the process and flats are sold. The land mafia, in connection with political musclemen, provide guarantees and contract enforcement. Often, the name of a political party or its political leaders is used to enforce contracts, although the parties are never directly involved[21] (EC 6).

Control over utilities is another dimension of control, particularly over water supply. Illegal water services provide an estimated 35% of the city's water supply system (EC 2; Ousat, 2014b; Mumtaz, 2008) (see Chapters 5 and 6 for a discussion of the illegal water trade and illegal water hydrants). TV cable and Internet services are also controlled (Chapter 7).

Violence and threat of violence

> … violence is inevitable in Karachi as informality is dominant … (over the last 15 years) violence has occurred over economic activity and to profit from the large economic sectors in the city, and availability of money in the market, whether in real estate, the stock market, or commodity shortages such as flour or sugar etc. (EC 3)

Violence itself is a control mechanism that supports other mechanisms. Many experts consider that violence is unavoidable at present due to several reasons (EC 2, EC 5, Gayer, 2014, Budhani et. al., 2010). First, violence, and threat of it, is a regulating mechanism enforcing informal transactions. Second, the contract-enforcement function has been taken over by informal structures underpinned by the threat of violence (Budhnai et. al., 2010). Third, violence is essential for maintaining territoriality: for example riots on 12th May 2007 occurred because MQM-linked militants claimed territoriality by opposing the arrival of the Chief Justice in Karachi,

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[21] According to an interviewee, the term 'China' reflects the perception that Chinese products are usually for one time use, small in size and un-reliable to use

in opposition to an alliance of other political parties including PPP, ANP, JI, (HRCP, 2007; Budhani et. al., 2010, p. 8-9). Similarly, riots which erupted following Benazir Bhutto's assassination on 27th December 2007 were said to be reaction to MQM's territoriality. On that day anti-MQM political parties brought the city to a halt to show their control clearly dividing the city into centre and the periphery while rioting, arson and theft took place on a mass scale (Budhani et al., 2010).

According to a Supreme Court verdict, DG Rangers and many other authors, the armed wings of political parties are involved in violence (Yusuf, 2012; Gazdar, 2011; HRCP, 2011; DGR, 2014; SMC, 2013). It is also noted that violence has been used as mechanism of influence during political bargaining (Gayer, 2014, p-15). Violence also influences people's locational choices and thus shapes the ethnic demography of settlements, which in turn consolidates territorial control (EC 1, EC 6).

Religious and more recently Taliban factions are also influential, and resort to violent tactics. Several law enforcement personnel, especially the police, have been killed around the Orangi area, and the LEAs mostly attributed homicide to Taliban factions (Rehman and Walsh, 2014; Ali, I. 2014c).

Violence has been extensively used to silence opposition and even civil society and NGOs have not been spared. Seventeen estate agents have reportedly been killed over land transactions (*Dawn,* 2009c). The director, Perveen Rehman of the Orangi Pilot Project, the world-renowned NGO famous for community-led infrastructure provision, was killed in 2013 as she documented issues of land grabs, including illegal water businesses, and her successor was later attacked, but survived (Ahmed, N. 2014). A famous social activist, Nisar Baloch was killed as he ran a campaign against encroachment on *Gutter Baghicha* the parkland in Lyari, allegedly by a dominant political party representative (Shehri, 2009), while Waheed, a Pashtoon social worker, was also killed as he ran an anti-polio campaign in Ittehad Town, said to be Taliban stronghold (*Dawn,* 2013c). These are many other examples.

Other mechanisms of control are also used, such as discourse and narrative of identity, which most ethno-political actors use to claim legitimacy (EC 3). Control over particular economic sectors such as transport is another example (See Khan, 2013b and Ahmed, M. 2015 for a brief discussion of other mechanisms).

Power politics, the reason behind weak government and strong informal structures

Thus it is clear that the governance of Karachi is marked with politicization of the administration and the rise of informality that has gradually eroded the government's capacity to provide services, creating a spiral of decline. The socio-spatial pattern has resulted in rise of contending informal structures who vie for territorial sovereignty. Power politics – political tactics to claim for more power to claim for more resources in a competition and to oust the other competitors – is played out at all levels and scales from formal level involving mechanisms to control formal institutions and policy to informal domain involving local level rent seeking, territoriality and violence. Power politics eventually blurs the formal-informal divide and is the main reason behind weak formal structures and strong informal structures controlling public resources.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has identified several aspects that form the basis for understanding the prevalence of violence, segregation and conflict in Karachi, drawn from interviews carried out for this research, a detailed review of newspaper reports and other research studies. First, it is evident that social groups in Karachi, based on identity or economic divisions, have consolidated over time due to in-migration, planning decisions, violence related security problems and the growth of informal settlements. Although it is not unique to have multi-cultural enclaves in any megacity, in Karachi the socio-spatial pattern has meant that ethnicity has become aligned with politics. The competition between ethnic/political groups to control territory and dominate the rent-seeking potential of areas, furthers socio-spatial divisions. Second, conflict over resources and segregation has been exacerbated by the rise of informal processes and informal structures. Given, the week state control and other neutral structures, various groups strive to control public resources and provide these to their legitimising groups, which results in competition between claimants and leads to conflicts and violence often, thus, informality has been one of the reasons of conflict. In the same connection, the groups claiming for the public resources essentially work from between, they are neither in the government nor they are fully part of the common citizens, but they connect the both ends by connecting with the state resources and channelizing it to the legitimising groups. Third, the gradual rise of informality undermines the operation of formal governance and state-led service provision. Infact, it is found that the boundaries between formal and informal are intentionally blurred, usually it is intentional e.g. in the case of providing public resources to the legitimising group through the process of active connection between elected

representatives and party representatives, to claim for political benefits. Thus, informality forms a symbiotic relation with the formal.

The success of the informal processes, in Karachi, depends on their efficiency, non-cumbersome processes and predictability, while these aspects depends on the ability of informal structures to enforce contracts largely through territorial controls or violence. The outcome of all of the processes discussed is that enclaves have emerged and citizens want to live in particular enclaves for security reasons, deepening divisions in Karachi to a much greater extent than other cities.

Three periods of social change can be distinguished in Karachi that have shaped the current power politics and socio-spatial configuration of the city:

a. Until the late 1950s the government provided for housing need through various housing schemes, but with the rise of industrialisation and other capitalist interventions, during 1960s, housing need for the poor was neglected giving rise to informal labour settlements that later expanded uncontrolled.

b. The 1980s was marked by the failure of formal security services leading to the rise of identity-based informal structures, to ensure security for their groups. As politics increasingly became aligned with ethnicity, especially with the rise of MQM, such groups gained legitimacy by taking over service-provision, including water, security, contract enforcement, provision of jobs and protecting the physical, political, ideological interests of their communities. The politicization of the administration and blurring of the formal-informal divide, led to competition between different groups to access public resources, resulting in on-going conflict. In parallel, the private-sector provision continued.

c. Finally, from the late 1980s onwards, each informal structure including the private sector consolidated geographically, consisting of: the social group that legitimized the control; the territory controlled, and the mechanisms, or rules of control.

The correlation between power, in terms of government, various social groups representing society and the city representing space, identifies variety of situations. First, the federal and provincial interests clash in Karachi over control of revenue and other resources, as Karachi is the economic hub of the country, although identity rhetoric is not used at this level. Second, Karachi faces contested control between provincial and local level, which is transformed into identity

politics between Muhajir and Sindhi communities. The Sindhi political parties (PPP) has upper hand due to control over larger province and its administration, whereas Muhajir (MQM) is urban and more specifically Karachi based. This rift has been established for a long time, manifest in terms of power politics regarding demography, control over institutions and policy tools. The third level is within the city; due to migration Pashtoons have become the second largest social group in the city and is continuously increasing due to its larger social base in the north, while Muhajir population is increasing only slowly as they form an urban group with no other population base. The ensuing power and economic contestation is displayed in almost all the venues ranging from formal to informal and from legal to illegal mechanisms of power politics.

The resultant, on the city-level, is a socio-spatially segregated city, weak government and strong informal structures. This has created a cyclic process in which the segregation is a further reason for conflicts around electoral politics, conflicts over resources, violence and power politics along ethnic lines, which eventually form a political rhetoric for ethnic political and counter power politics involving informal land controls. However, on the micro-level the legitimising groups are able to get services which the state fails to provide.

Chapter 5

North Nazimabad:

A Symbol of Karachi's Socio-Spatial Divide

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the social dimensions of informal land controls by analysing the empirical findings around power and society from the case study area of North Nazimabad. The objective is to analyse the rise of informal structures at the local-level and their social dimensions. More specifically, the chapter aims to explore: how informal structures emerge; what social control mechanisms are used to establish and retain control; what services they provide to earn legitimacy, what are the trade-offs of such service provision, and what social divisions result. The chapter explores the social control mechanisms used in establishing and retaining control over different social groups and the kind of social relations that result. This discussion also links the city-level power contestations and social divisions (Chapter 4) to local, everyday practices. Chapter 6 then explore the role of spatial practice in North Nazimabad.

The chapter also addresses at least two gaps identified in the literature. First, it highlights how, in Karachi, informal structures have moved in to fill the gaps state-supplied service provision, in the case study area, both in the poor and informal areas but also in middle income formal areas. Second, informal structures – including political parties, and identity-based structures based on the bonds of ethnicity, kinship and religion etc. – play a central role as non-state actors, and 'power intermediaries', in the processes of informal development and informal urban management in Karachi.

The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 5.2 gives background information on North Nazimabad, and analyses the socio-spatial configuration of the area. Section 5.3 looks at the role of power in the case study area, first analysing the operation of formal governance structures in service provision including the performance of elected representatives and institutions. The chapter then examines the rise of informal structures in North Nazimabad drawn from social identity, political affiliations and people's collaboration, explored in order of influence from political groups and *Baradary*-based groups, to religious and neighbourhood committees.

Section 5.4 covers the social dimensions, exploring relations between the informal structures and the corresponding social group. It identifies the emergence, legitimacy and survival of informal structures, and the goods and services they provide, or strive to provide. It also examines contestation amongst various informal structures that correspond to their political, ethnic and religious identities, resulting in social divisions. Finally, it explores the trade-offs that the residents have to make to attain services provision from the informal structures. Section 5.5 is the conclusion.

The data and analysis is drawn mainly from site observations and interviews, and distinguishes between informal and formal areas, as the outcomes are very different. Comparisons between areas are thus also made.

5.2 North Nazimabad, the Context

The main case study area (termed 'the area'), the North Nazimabad neighbourhood, falls within the administrative boundaries of North Nazimabad Town (Section 3.3.3), one of 18 administrative towns established under the Sind Local Government Ordinance, 2001 (Box 4.1). North Nazimabad Town lies within Central District, one of six commissioner-based administrative divisions in Karachi (Map 5.1).

Map 5.1: Location of North Nazimabad Town and case study areas in Karachi

The area covers 2.5 Sq. Km, stretching 1.8 Km. along Shahrah-e-Noorjahan Road (SNJ Road) with a depth of 1.4 Km on both sides of SNJ Road, and is divided into two administrative blocks. The first covers one complete union council, UC2 (Pahar Gunj), while the second covers parts of two union councils UC3 (Khandu Goth) and UC4 (Hyderi) (Table 5.2).

The area is further divided into formally developed and informally developed areas (Map 5.3). The concept of formal and informal in North Nazimabad is complex. Formally developed areas were those laid out in the formal Planning Scheme. Informally developed areas were originally squatted, and although land titles in these areas have now been granted so they are no longer technically informal, they remain distinct in many ways (Section 6.2.3). As noted in Chapter 3, for ease of writing these are referred to as formal areas and informal areas, but this terminology refers to their origin rather than current status, and also reflects the perception of the residents and the government especially when looking at informal areas.

Map 5.2: Case study 1 North Nazimabad; spatial divisions, including formal-informal divide (Author)

The formal areas known by their planning names as Block A (part of UC3) and Block C (part of UC4) are combined together for analysis (termed UC3-4) as they have similar socio-spatial characteristics. UC2 lies to the northwest, divided from UC3-4 by SNJ Road, and includes both formal and informal areas (Map 5.2; Section 6.2.4).

The formal area of UC2 includes Blocks U, P and Q (termed as F-UC2). The informal area of UC2 (termed I-UC2 in this text) climbs up the hillside to the Orangi Hill, a steep ridge dividing North Nazimabad from Orangi Town (Map 5.1 & 5.2; Table 5.2).

North Nazimabad has generally been considered as an upper-middle income settlement with a high literacy rate and access to urban amenities and services (Gazdar, 2011; see Appendix 5.1 for the history of its development). The larger area has remained peaceful, but the western boundary with Orangi Town has been the focus of Pashtoon-Muhajir conflicts since 1985-86 as it forms a border between Muhajir and Pashtoon strongholds (Gayer, 2014; Gayer, 2007; Budhani et. al, 2010). The violence increased during 2007-2013 as part of the city-level political conflicts, especially after the opening in 2009 of the dramatic Kati Pahari Road which passes through a deep cutting in the Orangi Hill to connect the two towns. The Kati Pahari area (in UC2) is now one of the eight most violent flashpoints in the city as reported by the English-language daily *Dawn* (2013d[22]). Most of the violence has been around ethno-political conflicts, and SNJ Road Police Station alone registered 35 politically-motivated killings during 2011-2012, and Taimuria Police Station registered 28 cases during the same period (Hashim, 2012b). However, street crimes and rent seeking of all sorts are much higher than that which is reported on any formal platform.

5.2.1 Socio-Spatial Setting

The main socio-spatial groupings in the area are shown in Maps 5.3, 5.4 and Table 5.2. UC2, Pahar Gunj, is bounded by three roads including Orangi Road, Shahrah-e-Noorjahan Road (SNJ Road) and the Nazimabad-Orangi Link Road, also known as the Kati Pahari Road, while, on the fourth side the ridge of the Orangi Hill defines the boundary.

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[22] The GIS section of Dawn newspaper of Pakistan, developed map of most violent areas of the city based on the violence data and given social settings that may lead to future violent incidents as well.

Map 5.3: North Nazimabad, socio-spatial composition (Author)

It is impossible to get an accurate estimate of the population[23], so the figures below have been derived partly from union council estimates and partly from local knowledge reported by key informants. The breakdown is given in Table 5.1 which suggests that there are around **195,000** people in the case study area[24].

Informal area: The informal area, I-UC2, consists of three main neighbourhoods, Umer Farooq Colony, Deer Colony, and Pahar Gunj Colony. The population of I-UC2 is estimated to be 120,000 (Table 5.1).

    a. *Umer Farooq Colony* is the largest with several sub-localities, including: the Balti Colony settled by the Balti community; Usman Ghani Colony settled by the Kohistani community, Mawara Colony occupied by Hasan Zai Pashtoons (although these are also spread

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[23] The last census count took place in 1998, since then many socio-spatial changes have occurred in the area, especially in I-UC2.

[24] According to government estimates in 2005 (KMC-GOS, [*No date*]), the population of UC2 was approximately 65,000 people. The population may well have doubled by 2014, given the 5% growth rate of the city, and the rapid increase in population and housing density in I-UC2 during the last ten years and is estimated as around 120,000 people (Interviews; Table 5.1; Appendix 5.2 for area and community wise breakdown of population).

throughout the area), and the central area of Chamra Chum behind De Silva Town. The area abutting the infamous Kati Pahari Road is now known as Kati Pahari (Table 5.2).

b. *Deer Colony* is occupied by Pashtoons from Deer, part of Deer District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPP, formerly North-West Frontier Province).

c. *Pahar Gunj* was established on an amenity plot reserved for hospital, and is mainly inhabited by Punjabi Christians. There are 3,000 families living in 1,000 housing units in Pahar Gunj, according to a local resident and social worker whose NGO conducted documentation and research on the settlement (INN 12).

	Area (Sq. Km)	Population 2005	Population 2015 (*Estimate*)
I-UC2	0.45	52,000	100,000
F-UC2	0.60	10,000	20,000
UC2 (Total)	1.05	62000	120,000
UC3 (Case Study)	0.75	30,000	40,000
UC4 (Case Study)	0.75	25,000	35,000
UC3-4 (Total)	1.5	55,000	75,000
TOTAL (Case Study	**2.55**		**195,000**

Table 5.1: Areas and population

Formal area: To the SW of SNJ Road, UC3-4 comprises of Blocks A and C. The population is estimated to contain around 75,000 people in 2015[25] (Table 5.1). Within Blocks A and C there are further sub-settlements, e.g. within Block C, one locality is called Nizari Cooperative Society (or Nizari Society), having 200 units for the Ismaili community only. Another part of Block C is informally called Bohri Mohalla (Bohri Neighbourhood), which houses the largest concentration of the Bohri Community in Pakistan, i.e. around 25,000 people according to local claims (FNN-22, FNN 23). Similarly, in Block-A, there is a specific area controlled by the paramilitary Rangers' Force (Appendix 5.2 for area and community wise breakdown of population).

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[25] The population according to 2005 government estimates totals around 190,000 in UC3 and UC4 combined, but the part of case study area (UC3-4) is estimated to contain around 75,000 people in 2015 (Table 5.1).

Boundary	Status & Term Used	Settlements	Sub-Settlements or Localities	Social Composition
UC2	Informal Area (Partly regularised now) **I-UC2**	Deer Colony	-	Pashtoons from Deer
		Umer Farooq Colony	Mawara Colony	Pashtoons from Kala Dhaka
			Chamra Chum	Pashtoons from Kala Dhaka
			Usman Ghani Colony	Dominated by Pashtoons from Kohistan (Swat), also some Hasan Zai and Afridi Pashtoons
			Balti Colony	Shia Muslims from Gilgit-Baltistan
			Kati Pahari Area	Dominated by Pashtoons from Kohistan (Swat), also some Hasan Zai and Afridi Pashtoons
		Pahar Gunj Colony	(Sometimes it is considered within Umer Farooq Colony)	Punjabi Christians dominated. Also Punjabi-Muslims and Pashtoons of Kala Dhaka.
	Formal Area **F-UC2**	Block U	Formally Developed Part	Mixed, predominantly Muhajir, Pashtoons
			Deer Colony	Mentioned separately in *"Informal Area"*
		Block P	De-Silva Town (Formally Developed Part)	Mixed, predominantly Muhajir, while previously wealthy Christian Dominated, now Pashtoons of Kala Dhaka and
			Pahar Gunj Colony	Mentioned Separately in *"Informal Area"*
		Block Q	Formally Developed Part	Mixed, predominantly Muhajir.
			Usman Ghani Colony	Mentioned Separately in *"Informal Area"*
UC3	Formal Area **Part of UC3-4**	Block A	Rangers Controlled Area	Federal Govt. institutional property for State Bank employees.
			Mixed Public Area	Mixed, predominantly Muhajir.
UC4	Formal Area **Part of UC3-4**	Block C	Nizari Society	Only for Ismaili-Gujrati Muslims
			Bohri Neighbourhood	Although open area for the public, dominated by Bohri-Gujrati Muslims.
			Mixed Public Area	Mixed, dominantly Muhajir.

Table 5.2: North Nazimabad, socio-spatial composition (Author)

The rest of UC3-4 is dominated by Muhajir ethno-political social groups and, although it can also be occupied by others, it is seen as a predominantly Muhajir territory in terms of political identity (Figure 5.1).

The formal area consists of bungalows on plots of 200-2000 Sq. yds. Building regulations permit only two stories structures (G+1), however there are many apartment buildings in Blocks A and C abutting Sher Shah Soori Road (SSS Road). Many of the families in the formal area are owner-occupiers. The informal area mostly consists of irregular plots of 80 sq. yards or below with G+2 structures with most occupants being tenants in Usman Ghani Colony of the Kohistani Pashtoons while owner-occupier dominated in other parts of I-UC2.

Some of the settlements in UC2 (table 5.2) are complex to be categorised under single head, as they are physically part of formal area but, due to social and political reasons, equally belong to the informal area (I-UC2). This complexity has important impact on defining territorial boundaries, explored in chapter 6)

5.3. Power and Governance Structures

This section explores the role of governance in terms of power, suggesting that formal government has failed to cater to the needs of the residents creating a context in which existing informal structures based around politics, kinship, tribe, and religion develop urban management skills have flourished. Furthermore, in areas where communities are not linked by identity, non-political neighbourhood committees or local political party offices and workers fill this gap (Figure 5.1).

5.3.1 Formal Governance Structures

> If it is possible for me, I will never give income tax to the government just because the government has given nothing in return, neither services nor security!, Why should I give tax when I have to arrange for all the services by myself. (FNN[26] 21)

FNN 21, a middle-aged male resident of UC3-4 was very disaffected by the government's poor provision of services. Although this statement is not completely true, it sheds some light on the opinion of the residents towards the effectiveness of the formal structures.

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[26] Names of interviewees have been coded for anonymity reasons. INN refer to interviewees from informally developed part (I-UC2) of North Nazimabad while, FNN interviewee from formally developed part (F-UC2 and UC3-4).

The interviews suggest that the residents of the area assess formal structures based on their effectiveness in delivering services, particularly water, and electricity, role of formal civic institutions including law enforcement agencies, and activities of elected representatives in local government or other tiers. In addition, residents of the informal areas (I-UC2) perceive and refer to the majority political party in the city, MQM (and its non-elected and party representatives) as formal structures, as the party's labour unions and workers are influential in many service delivery organisations such as the Water Board, Karachi Development Authority (KDA), and Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC) etc. Such government employees-cum-political-affiliates work in their informal capacities for the local political offices, or are contacted by them, to provide formal services, blurring the formal-informal divide.

The elected government

Elected representatives form the most visible link to the formal government, but the last general elections were held in 2013 in which two MPAs[27] and one MNA[28], belonging to MQM, were elected in the North Nazimabad constituencies (PS 101, PS 103 and NA 24). There is no elected local government at the moment[29] as the last local government elections were held in 2004-05, which completed its tenure in 2009. In the absence of local government elections, the system reverted back to the appointed Commissioner-led bureaucracy, and union councils were cancelled, so the local administration has a very weak connection with the locality and residents (Box 4.1). The absence of a functioning local government system has created many issues for residents.

The interviewees, both in the formal and informal areas, feel alienated as they cannot reach their current elected representatives, and elected representatives rarely come to the area especially in I-UC2 due to political and security reasons. Many interviewees reported that the situation was much better when union councils and elected local government was operational (INN 6, INN 9, INN 12, INN 14, FNN 21, FNN 24, FNN 25).

> Local government elections are a need of common men, without elections there is no relief. A common man cannot approach an MNA or MPA, whereas

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[27] Member of the Provincial Assembly.
[28] Member of the National Assembly.
[29] At the time of the fieldwork, while local government elections are expected to take place in December 2015, a section on updated situation is mentioned in Box 4.1, and section 8.5.

it is always easy to reach the area Nazim and Naib Nazim[30], in fact these people are usually from our community and family (in I-UC2). (INN 9)

… at least someone was there to listen to you (during local government), one could access people who were answerable for their work, in one way or the other, issues used to be resolved, but not any more now – the local government system should be there. I am neither satisfied with any public service provider nor the police. (FNN 21)

Formal institutions

Two attributes that define the presence of formal structures are the effectiveness of utility provision, and security. There are significant differences in service provision across North Nazimabad, as service quality is good in some settlements catering to certain socio-spatial groups; others remain deprived where residents have weak connections to formal government and other power bases, resulting in partial failure and intentional inaction of service delivery on government's behalf.

Utility services

Although in both administrative and physical terms, trunk infrastructure is available, services are poor or non-existent in some localities and the infrastructure is not maintained or serviced. KMC (Karachi Municipal Corporation) is responsible for solid waste management, cleaning and maintenance of infrastructure, KWSB (Karachi Water and Sewerage Board) for sewerage and water supply and K.E (Karachi Electric) for the electricity supply and SSGC (Sui Southern Gas Company) for the gas fuel.

The interviewees revealed a huge gap in the KMC related services. Service provision is not a complete failure, as it works when there is pressure from powerful actors in formal structures or influential political parties or individuals. In the informal areas (I-UC2), during the JI tenure of local government[31] (2001-2004), services were reasonable and the *Nazims* (heads of union councils) had enough staff to service the area properly, but the service is almost non-existent now (INN 6, INN 10, INN 11, INN 14, INN 16). In the formal areas, UC2, and UC3-4, the situation is also poor, although one area of housing for government employees is mainly inhabited by Rangers, the

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[30] Administrative head and vice-head of Union Council or Town.

[31] First local government after the introduction of SLGO 2001, Jamat-e-Islami (JI) assumed the office of local government (see Box 4.1).

paramilitary force, and is relatively secure and well serviced (FNN 19, FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 25), highlighting an intentional failure to provide services impartially.

> … we (residents of UC3-4) spend Rs. 4,000 to 6,000 every month on it (sewage management and cleaning street and garbage collection). No representative or worker of the public agencies comes here… there are no government sweepers here, they are appointed, they take a salary but divide it amongst their supervisors and themselves and work privately in other parts of the city, just like the private sweepers work in our locality whom the residents pay themselves to get the street swept and to collect the garbage. (FNN 20)

In I-UC2, especially on the hill, the electricity company representatives do not repair street-level faults, or disconnect illegal connections because of the difficult terrain and threats to the company employees (INN 10; Section 6.3.1). Most residents on the hill have illegal electricity connections and do not pay their bills (INN 2, INN 3, INN 6, INN 7, INN 9, INN 10, INN 11, INN 13, INN 16, FNN 19). To recover costs lost to illegal connections, the company now distributes the cost of power losses to all paying customers.

> The electricity issue is that the system of distribution and billing is not just. Illegal connections are numerous on the hill, you could do a survey there, while the people down here have to pay the price because the electric company does not go up there, whereas they just recover their charges by distributing the losses to the people who pay the bill[32]. People who don't steal are suffering, while those who steal are enjoying the benefits. (INN 7)

The residents of I-UC2 are facing an acute shortage of water, which is only supplied every 16-18 days, whereas all the neighbouring formal areas get piped water on a regular basis. Various reasons for the shortage were found, including illegal water hydrants on the supply pipes, and the sale of water to nearby industrial areas, allegedly by local political and community leaders. Most of the I-UC2 residents blame MQM as the KWSB is thought to be controlled by the MQM workers' union; KWSB and MQM are thus equated with government or as formal structures by the locals. The issues of water supply are important and give insights into power dynamics and controls (see Section 6.3.3 and Box 5.1 for details).

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[32] It is found that the electric company calculate the power losses of the area, and then they recover their losses by charging the residents, irrespective of who is responsible, through bills. Eventually, the residents who use legal connections and pay their bills diligently suffer the most.

Box 5.1: Water Issue

Water shortages in I-UC2 are acute and their dynamics reflect the social structure and power politics. The supply is provided every 16-18 days, and each settlement within I-UC2 gets water for only 2-3 hours on supply days. The residents on the hill are the worst hit, as the water supplied does not have enough pressure to reach the top, so residents in these areas use two or three suction pumps along a pipeline to get the water, although the water pipelines are there, and the pumping station is working. Several reasons for this failure were explained during the interviews, and some measures have been taken to control the situation.

First, the main Karachi water reservoir the 'Hub Dam' ran out of water in 2014 when fieldwork was being carried out, due to a relatively dry season, but the adjacent formal areas near I-UC2 were getting water without problems. Second, it was widely reported in newspapers and confirmed by local residents, that illegal water hydrants had been established by the water/tanker mafia in adjacent informal areas, consuming all the water to be supplied in these localities (Mumtaz, 2008; Maher & Ilyas, 2015). The same illegal hydrants then sell water to residents from water tankers. Third, many of local community leaders are said to own illegal hydrants, and also operate water tanker services. The only neighbourhood in I-UC2 that gets water on a regular basis is Deer Colony, which has a strong leadership and geographical advantage of being at the head of the supply line. The leader of Deer Colony had also developed several wells and a storage system for the community to get water. Fourth, corruption is thought to be the core problem, as the locality received some funds during the second term of local government for solving the problem and then the local PPP leader also received funds during PPP central government (2008-2013) – piping was installed but was not operational at the time of survey and it showed signs of wear and tear already due to long-term non-usage. Fifth, residents think that elected representatives and the Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB) have sold the allocated water to nearby SITE industrial area. Finally, it is alleged that supporters of the majority political party in the labour union of KWSB are deliberately depriving the locality for political revenge.

Several attempts have been made to address this issue. Previously, there was no mechanism for distributing water when there was shortage of supply, and the valve men had to be bribed to get the water to the settlement, as there are 64 valves in I-UC2. This led to many conflicts so the elders decided to set up a water management committee to oversee the distribution. The committee included representatives of the communities, including the alleged illegal hydrant owners (KI). By 2014, supplies had improved, especially for those who live at the bottom of the supply line. Some leaders have invested in water wells, and sell water to their communities at Rs. 100-200 per hour, for example in Hasan Zai, Kohistani and the Balti neighbourhood. The Imam Bargah in the Balti neighbourhood has built an underground water storage tank, supplied by water tankers, and permits residents on the hill and beyond the reach of tankers to pump water to their homes. (Based on interviews in I-UC2)

Law Enforcement Agencies (Police and Rangers):

Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are important in maintaining the writ of state control and local security. It is interesting to note that, throughout the area most residents are sceptical about the performance of LEAs, and some even blame LEAs, especially the Police Department, for the problems.

> … I think no one in the city would be happy with their (LEA's) performance and they (LEAs) themselves are reason of crime. (FNN 20)

This lack of trust results from corruption in the police, and it is widely alleged that they demand bribes, demand a monthly income from encroachments (squatting and informal street trading), and overlook criminal activities (INN 10, INN 12). Several interviewees said that the LEAs do not bother to go onto the hill, which has thus become a safe haven for criminals (INN 7) and that SNJ Road has also become a no-go-zone at night times due to the high crime rate. Some residents consider the presence of LEAs a problem, as although Rangers patrol the streets they try to protect themselves from any potential terrorist attack, and do not allow public parking on the streets or vehicle delivery to local garages and mechanics' workshops (Box 5.2; FNN 24, FNN 25).

Box 5.2: Rangers presence and issues for the residents and businesses

The Rangers' residential complex has created many issues for the residents and the businesses nearby. The Rangers' headquarters in Block B has been attacked three times (*The Express Tribune,* 2014c). It was first attacked in 2012 with a bomb and since then the security has been heightened. The offices and residential complex in Block A has also been facing threats that led to closing of many roads leading to the Rangers' housing and offices; residents are annoyed but cannot complain. Similarly, when the Rangers patrol in the area, especially where they station their vehicles at Pahar Gunj Roundabout, they do not want parked vehicles near them, in order to avoid terrorist attacks. This badly affects the business of all the mechanics' workshops in the area, as the Rangers do not allow any vehicle to park at the workshops. (INN 10)

Similarly, a resident of Block A said that the Rangers have developed a guard post near his house and now no cars can be parked in that street due to the security risk. When the interviewee complained and insisted on parking his and his relative's vehicles "…they (Rangers) said that just follow the orders, otherwise they (Rangers) would make me listen in their own way by taking me away and nobody would know where I have vanished", He was referring to the many missing persons in the country but, despite rulings by the Supreme Court ordering LEAs to present people who had been detained, the dead bodies of missing people are routinely found on road side. The interviewee's family is now thinking of shifting to a new location after that incident (KI interview).

The prevalence of illegal weapons, increasing crime and drug gangs, and the ineffectiveness of the Karachi Operation[33], a military operation that started in 2013 with the aim of purging crimes in the city (Section 4.3.1), are also symbols of ineffective security services, as several community leaders claimed (INN 4, INN 11, INN 5). The presence of gates, barriers and private security guards throughout North Nazimabad is a response to such security issues (Section 6.3.1).

Spaces of exception: symbol of intentional failure

The area controlled by the Rangers in Block A (Section 5.2) is an exception. The area is relatively safe and usually receives regular services, including sweeping, water supply, electricity and policing. The businesses in this area do not have to close during political party strike calls, and people from surrounding areas also use facilities there during strikes. In fact, this is the only area that demonstrates full control of formal government.

> Water is abundantly available in the (Rangers) neighbourhood…the sweepers come in the morning (in certain areas linked with the Rangers complex)…electricity supply in this locality is quite good as there are no outages…the Rangers-controlled vicinity along with its commercial zones remain open throughout strike calls, and only closes on government gazetted holidays. (FNN 24)

Formal government void and informal structures

Thus, in I-UC2 the performance of the state and its institutions - the formal structure - has been either fully absent or partial. Furthermore, political parties in government are found intentionally blurring formal-informal divide and channelling public funds through informal means to claim for political credit. This failure goes beyond the formal-informal area divide, and only the area with an effective security force - the Rangers - where their members also live, has full government control, good security and regular service supply. Businesses in the area follows gazetted holidays and are not forced to close for other reasons, unlike other areas that are controlled by informal structures such as political parties. As already established, such state failures are often avoidable (Chapter 4). The reasons for the failure are complex and include the politics of ethnicity, political party influence and incapacity of the formal institutions.

Informal structures fill the gap in formal governance and services provision. The concept of informal structures was defined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4). In the area, informal structures are

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[33] This was reported at the time of survey but the situation has changed after 2015 (Section 4.3.1),

varied in terms of their nature, origin, operation and scale. Three categories were found: first, district-level political parties including both religious and secular; second, at neighbourhood-level, informal structures around social identity, such as tribe/family or kinship (*Baradary)*, religious structures and where identity based structures are not there political parties fill the gap through its political offices and workers; and third, on street level neutral structures such as neighbourhood committees, each discussed below. The district and neighbourhood structures combine to form a local level in comparison to the city-level. These local-level informal structures work in a complex web, some overlapping and some operating in parallel. The important aspect to understand is that informal structures, in addition to community control and service provision, contribute to social divisions and conflicts, particularly when working in parallel (Figure 5.1).

5.3.2 Informal Structures - Political Parties

Political parties are the most powerful informal structures in the area, because of their formal nature, objectives, links and experience with formal governance at city level. Political parties work at both the levels in the area, i.e. at district-level by co-opting identity-based structures, and at neighbourhood-level, through its political offices and workers (Table 5.3). For example, in the Pashtoon-dominated I-UC2 area, residents have a strong political awareness and the political parties and their leadership form an extension of their cultural and tribal governance system, except in the Christian-dominated Pahar Gunj. However, in UC3-4 the majority political party forms district, neighbourhood and street-level informal structure, except in areas under religious control and where neighbourhood committees are functional. As discussed in Chapter 4, in I-UC2, ANP was the dominant political party and formed the district level (intermediate level) informal structure, along with JI and JUI to a lesser extent, but in 2012-13 ANP has lost power due to threats from the Taliban.

As a Kohistani Pashtoon community leader said,

> People vote for different reasons some vote for religious reasons, some have personal reasons, some due to friendship and on a community basis etc. Almost all the political parties are here, and since the people are mostly Pashtoon and belong to the *Deobandi* sect of Islam, MQM is not present here (I-UC2), and no *Barelvi* (Sect) political party has any presence here. (INN 5)

In contrast, in the formal areas of F-UC2 and UC3-4, many interviewees confirmed that residents often try to avoid politics (FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 24, FNN 25, FNN 27). Even where the community is organised on the basis of ethno-religious identity, such as the Bohri and Ismaili communities,

identity does not overlap with politics, unlike I-UC2 (FNN 22, FNN 23, FNN 26). In addition, where there are no ethno-religious or kinship bonds, the residents may form their own street-level neighbourhood committees to lobby for improved services. There is one dominant political party i.e. MQM, that forms district-level informal structure, with JI and more recently PTI (Chapter 4).

Thus in North Nazimabad political affiliation follows the dividing line between the formal and informal areas. In the formal area, the 'street power' or the physical control of the neighbourhood rests with MQM, irrespective of the presence of other political parties and informal structures (FNN 20, FNN 23, FNN 24, FNN 25, FNN 27). While in I-UC2, ANP held the active 'street control' until 2013.

The concept of 'street control' refers to physical control over territory, with the ability to expel opponents, enforce contracts or solve problems through informal networks and rules. 'Street power' actually defines the informal structures in the area.

> …you know that in this neighbourhood, in fact, in the whole city it is like a 'one man show' there is only one political party (MQM) that is the most powerful in terms of street power and control. (KI, a resident of formal area)

The political parties, as informal structures, establish control and earn legitimacy in myriad ways, including provision of services and welfare work, which also gives them control over resources (Section 5.4.1, 5.4.2 and 6.3).

Political parties have strong hierarchical and spatial structures that stretch from city to local-level. In ANP the smallest unit of organisation is 'ward', whereas in MQM it is 'unit'. The person in charge of a 'ward' or 'unit' is the person responsible at local level, who links the settlement to the city, and the city to the settlement (Table 5.3). Political parties, in the case study area, work both as controller and provider of services through already existing structures of identity i.e. *Baradary* based (or tribal) and religious or, where these do not exist through its political offices and workers at the neighbourhood and street levels.

Political Party Based Informal Structure:	
City-district-neighbourhood-street scale, organised and hierarchical structure	
MQM	MQM operates Units and Sectors at district and neighbourhood levels. A Unit is the smallest unit of administration headed by a 'unit in-charge', the grassroots administrator, who is often as powerful as elected political leaders. A Sector comprises 15-20 units, and Sectors report to MQM's central administrative committee called the 'Tanzeemi committee'.
	The Unit -in-charge and Sector in-charge are selected by the central secretariat in London on the basis of history, loyalty and abilities. These in-charges run the day-to-day party activities, from solving people's problems to carrying out the party- political agenda, including collection of welfare funds etc. The workers follow the orders of the in-charge, and can be given 'special tasks' (Gayer, 2014, p.104-109).
	A 'Unit' is usually well aware of minute details of any events in the locality from property transactions to political activities, through an informed network of political workers and party sympathisers (not registered as workers). However, Gayer (2014) mentions that the central command used to give 'special' tasks to particular party workers bypassing Unit and in-charges. The workers show a keen interest in getting political progress in the party, e.g. during strikes they will ensure that businesses follow the party's 'request' to shut down. Workers are given duties to collect money and sacrificial animal hides for the welfare wing of the party.
	Centrally, there are two administrative hierarchies in MQM, organisational headed by the 'Tanzeemi Committee', and political headed by the 'Rabita Committee'. The unit and sector links and operationalise the city and national level political objectives of the party at the neighbourhood and street levels, it is alleged that, this organisational structure form a powerful alternative structure involved in service provision and channelling public funds informally for development.
ANP	With headquarters in Northern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhua (KPK), political and organisational leaders are the same in the party. ANP operates through 'Wards' at local level, but the role and powers of the 'Ward in-charge' are not the same as the 'Unit in-charge'. The local leaders are also selected based on their financial and social capital. Every political leader of ANP in I-UC2 happens to be community leader as well, but not all community leaders and elders are involved in electoral politics. It has also been reported that various criminal groups had entered ranks of the ANP party, as these were helpful in establishing and defending territory against the opposition political parties, but continued their illegal businesses such as extortion rings and other rent seeking activities (Section 7.4).

Table 5.3: Political parties as informal structures

5.3.3 Informal Structures – *Baradary*

In both types of settlement, communities based on ethnicity and religious identities exhibit multi-layered affiliation with informal structures, particularly the tribal/family (*Baradary*) system at the neighbourhood level, which is widespread.

> The whole area (I-UC2) is based on *Baradary* (community/family/ tribe/kinship/ethnicity) system, in which each community lives together and people are related to each other. In addition, everyone knows each other in the settlement and everyone participate at times of happiness and sorrows of the family. (INN 14)

The concept of *Baradary* is important in understanding the informal structures. In I-UC2 it is based on social relations, family and kinship, ethnicity, and tribes or place of origin of the resident group. *Baradary* is a brotherhood, and implies that the community is linked through tribe or kinship. The *Baradary* forms a unit controlled, supervised or headed by one or more community leader/elders that organize the community, and solve problems and conflicts according to unwritten social rules, e.g. in Pashtoon tribes the traditional 'tribal code' is called 'Pashtoonwali' that prescribe a particular way of traditional living including the laws governing society and individuals (Table 5.4, Box 5.3).

The *Baradary* is an important informal structure in I-UC2. Pashtoons are defined by their tribes and places of origin, such as the Hasan Zai Tribe, Afridi Tribe, Pashtoons from Deer and Pashtoons from Kohistan, and together they form a larger *Baradary* (INN 10, INN 14, INN 16, INN 18). The Punjabi-Christians and Balti-Shia also have a traditional system around *Baradary* headed by community leaders influenced by Pashtoon traditions, adopting the *Jirga* system (Box 5.3; INN 3, INN 10, INN 12, INN 13). Gujrati-Bohri and Gujrati-Ismaili communities from UC3-4 also operate as *Baradary,* although their minority religion dominates their ethnic identity, like the Balti Shias in I-UC2.

In I-UC2, political relations are subservient to *Baradary* relations (INN 7, INN 9, INN 11, INN 14), as political party structures draw on the existing *Baradary* structure, to the extent that political leaders have to be community elders or leaders to stand in elections (INN 10, INN 11, INN 13). Often the community decides collectively whom to support during elections, representatives from the tribe making the initial selection (INN 5, INN 6, INN 7, INN 13, INN 18).

> Every community has their leaders, who looks after the matters of the community and the people also go to them to get their problems solved...

There are also some leaders who are involved in politics and have links in government and administration. These political leaders are consulted and followed in issues related to civic and political nature… sometimes the community and political leadership is the same. (INN 10)

Box 5.3: *JIRGA*
The *Jirga* is a traditional mechanism of addressing conflicts, problems and decision making amongst Pashtoons.   In Pashtoon communities, they have a *Jirga* system in which the elders of the community sit together and decide about general or problems in the area or community, or an individual's issues brought to them. Each community has their own *Dera/Baithak* (guest area/community area) where elders usually gather informally on regular basis along with the common residents (INN 5).   *Jirga* means to get together and deliberate on a solution of a problem. In practice, the community or tribal elders and wise men are responsible for holding a *Jirga*; the solution or verdict becomes the binding on all parties in a dispute. For community matters, the elders decide hold a *Jirga*, chose a place and all the people/tribe/community involved are responsible for the food and other needs of the members of the *Jirga*. If the issue is between two parties, then both the parties approach the elders for justice and they pay a heavy amount for the food etc., which is actually a fee to the *Jirga* members. Usually in tribal areas, both the groups have to submit valuables as collateral and that collateral is forfeited as a penalty if any party does not agree with the solution/verdict prescribed by the *Jirga*. (INN 10)

The concept of *Baradary* is also a relative concept corresponding to the identities in the area. The residents of the UC3-4 describe I-UC2 as the 'Pashtoon area' irrespective of the various sub-identities, while I-UC2 residents consider UC3-4 as the 'Muhajir area' (Figure 5.1). This generalisation gives a sense of larger community organised under one identity in common defence against a competing social group, e.g. Muhajir-MQM, which shapes social relations and eventually physical boundaries (INN 7, FNN 24, FNN 25). The overall socio-spatial identity that emerges from UC2 can be termed as informal-Pashtoon-ANP territory versus the formal-Muhajir-MQM territory (UC3-4); this spatial dimension is addressed in Chapter 6.

> The formally developed bungalows' area down from here (referring to Kohistani Chowk) starting from the restaurant at the corner (the junction of I-UC2 & F-UC2), from there it's the MQM area, while above that restaurant, the informal settlement starts and they assume it is an ANP-controlled area, although all the party members live here (I-UC2) but they think it's the ANP, similarly we also assume the same for their (Muhajir community) area. (F-UC2, UC3-4, INN 7)

Baradary Based Informal Structure: Tribal, family or kinship based structures	
Pashtoons	*Baradary* are characterised by tribal and ethnic identity bonds. Each tribe is headed by tribal leaders and elders, usually more than one, with the exception of Deer Colony, where the community has one chief, who is also the tribal leader (along with others) and the political leader. Tribal leaders ensure the people are following the traditional 'code of living' or 'Pashtoonwali'. The role of the leaders is to guide people, solve problems, resolve conflicts and ensure the tribal code of conduct. These tribal social boundaries are strictly linked with the original tribal groups in the North, and a collective decision in the North is equally applicable here, such as if someone is given a death penalty in the North, it could be equally applicable in Karachi as well. Tribal leaders emerge for various reasons, including having money, male children and family members, or other resources, having links to formal agencies and officials, or having knowledge and literacy. Leadership could also be inherited, as seen in the case study area. Tribal leaders may be political leaders but not necessarily. Tribal bonds transcends political bonds. The strong bonds provide immunity for criminals from the tribe, unless a *Jirga* is called which decides against him/her.

Table 5.4: *Baradary* based informal structures

Community Leaders and Elders

Each *Baradary* (Tribe) in I-UC2 is headed by resourceful, knowledgeable and widely accepted community elders/leaders. There can be one or more community leaders in a tribal community, but only one Chief (*Sardar* or chieftain), e.g. in the case of Deer Colony while other tribes do not have Chieftains. Several of the interviewees for this research were community leaders and elders anonymised for security reasons while they were introduced and given access by the gate keepers in the area (Chapter 3).

Leadership is assumed through various routes. First, there are some specific hereditary tribal leaders (INN 5, INN 11, and INN 18). Second, leaders may gain their legitimacy because of their personal standing and ability to solve problems (reported by several respondents in I-UC2), while others gain the position due to wealth and resourcefulness – several interviewees suggested that the Hasan Zai Pashtoon political leaders gained their position this way (INN 5, INN 6, INN 10, INN 11). The ability of a leader to solve people's issues, personal or institutional, defines the power of the community elder/leader, together with other traits such as having money, personal links with formal government, number of sons, male members of their family and number of people they

command. Older community leaders are considered as *Buzurg* or 'elders' and gain acceptance beyond ethnic or tribal boundaries. The elders are involved in inter-community issues and solving large-scale problems.

> Sometimes community leaders and political leaders are the same and sometimes not, actually, for being political leader here, one needs to become community leader first in order to get the confidence of people. Sometimes the community leader is approached by a political party to run an election for them, as they are supposed to be respected by many, and have a greater chance of winning votes than a common person or outsider. (INN 5)

5.3.4 Informal Structures – Religious

Various religious identity-based communities (minorities) exist in both parts of North Nazimabad, e.g. Punjabi-Christians and Balti-Shias in UC2, while Gujrati-Bohri and Gujrati-Ismaili groups are in UC3-4. In such communities, a two-layered governance system exists, the first consisting of the religious authority, while the second represents the people from the locality through their respective community leaders. There are some smaller groups with narrow influence, such as Punjabi-Barelvi Muslims in Pahar Gunj and the Shia families in F-UC2 & UC3-4 (Table 5.5).

Punjabi-Christians

The Punjabi-Christians of Pahar Gunj in I-UC2, are distinct from surrounding communities in three ways. First their ethnicity, appearance and language contrasts with surrounding Pashtoon-dominated communities; second being non-Muslim they have different customs and are allowed to consume alcohol, and third they were traditionally *Bhangi* (sweepers and sanitary workers, term with derogatory connotations). The origins of the term *Bhangi* is linked with the Hindu lower-scheduled caste reserved for cleaning professions, and it is still a derogatory term. Thus Punjabi-Christians are a bit lower in the local social hierarchy and thus a weak community, despite being the area's third largest community with around 5,000 votes, although now the Christians have diverse professions (INN 12, INN 13). Politically, most of the Christian residents are linked with PPP, although some also support MQM and ANP (INN 10, INN 12, INN 13).

Punjabi-Christians have a two layered ethno-religious governance and power structure. The first layer around family and community is embedded within the community and focuses on solving problems, and representing the family and the community in decision-making and conflicts. At a higher level, the Church works strategically, directly or through NGOs, to empower the community and support literacy and livelihoods (INN 13; Table 5.5).

There are four big families in the Christian community (1) Bhatti family, (2) Khankey family (3) Tamboli family and (4) Maari family. 'Bhatti' is a caste, while the Tamboli and Khankey are the names of the village they migrated from...Each family has their own family head, usually the older and wisest, which represents the family on area level and solve issues of the family when brought to him, and the family follows his orders and instructions. (INN 13)

Box 5.4: Sunni-Shia Conflict over Water

In the mid-2013, a conflict took place between Shia and Sunni groups in the area that caused five deaths. It started when a Sunni-Pashtoon resident tried to tap water from the supply line for the Balti neighbourhood. One of the Balti residents protested but was manhandled. The Sunni-Pashtoon man had several brothers, two in the LEAs, and the family was considered influential.

According to different sources, when the conflict over water started, one of the Sunni-Pashtoon men went to the mosque and used its loudspeakers to announce that the Balti-Shias had attacked the Sunni Mosque by firing gun shots at it. This announcement was then reiterated from several mosques in the surrounding areas according to one source, that ignited the conflict and several outsiders (possibly SSP or ASWJ activists according to locals) came to fight with Balti-Shia community, making it a sectarian conflict. The Balti-Shias were also prepared and they retaliated quickly, resulting in the deaths of two Sunni-Pashtoons and three Balti-Shia. The police came to the area, but were unable to contain the situation. One of the Sunni leader said that the fight was so fierce that even the police ran away, although later the Rangers force were called in.

On arrival of Rangers the fight subsided, the elders came to investigate the allegation of gun-firing by Sunni-Pashtoons. The case was not taken to the police as per local norms. Firstly, the elders of the two communities met in the presence of other neutral elders. One of the Shia leaders mentioned that the Sunni-Pashtoon asked what the Shia wanted – war or peace? He replied that the Shias were ready either way. However, the sense prevailed and they started to talk about peace. The *Jirga* was also attended, allegedly, by the local drug smuggler Mr. Afridi, as a neutral *Jirga* elder to enforce the final 'contract'.

The *Jirga* deliberated and formed a committee of four people, which took five days to deliberate. It was concluded that both the sides were responsible for the bloodshed, and both should forgive each other. To avoid such situation in the future, all the Mosques and their leaders were warned that they should not be involved in such situations otherwise an official complain would be lodged against them by the police. The people will bring the issue to the elders without trying to fight by themselves. While some other Sunni-Pashtoon leaders requested that the contract included a restriction of Shia processions to certain parts to avoid past the Sunni Mosque, and it was agreed that both groups should avoid using loudspeakers at *Mosques/Imam Bargah* to avoid sermons being heard in other's territory. Both the parties agreed the contract. (KIs)

Balti-Shia

The Balti-Shia community is concentrated near the Kati Pahari area, in I-UC2, and is far more religiously controlled and organised than the Punjabi-Christians. The role of religious authority is strong and, with the community elders, links religious power structures with the community and helps in governing the settlement. The *Imam Bargah* (Mosque) forms the place of power and governance, where all the decisions are made. The prayer leader of the local *Imam Bargah* forms the head of the religious authority, while a committee of local residents helps the prayer leader in carrying out various tasks (INN 2). The local committee is powerful enough to make community members abide by decisions, and uses punishments such as social boycotts, fines or peer pressure to ensure obedience (INN 3). The community elders are always there to help the people on an individual basis (Table 5.5).

> The community and the area is controlled by the committee headed by the prayer leader of the *Imam Bargah*. The head is supported or helped by around five elders of the area. The head of the committee and *Imam Bargah*… communicate with the higher religious authorities, and communicates their instructions to the community. All the donations for religious purposes are given to him, who then submits them to the higher authorities. Similarly, disputes among the community are solved by this local prayer leader as the head of the local committee. The local Balti religious authority is registered as the Baltistan Trust. The Shia community follows one Imam in the world and acts according to his instructions, at the moment the Imam is in Iraq. The prayer leader of the *Imam Bargah* works as subordinate or representative of the *Imam*. (INN 2)

Gujrati-Bohri and Gujrati Ismaili

The Gujrati-Bohri and Gujrati-Ismaili, in UC3-4, are both guided and governed by their respective religious authorities as the informal structures. In both communities there is a *Jamat Khana* (community centre) which forms the centre of power, and is a religious and social gathering space where the elders deliberate and decisions are made. Both the communities decide collectively about political support and voting (Section 6.3.2).

In the Bohri community, the religious authority forms the top power layer drawn from an elite religiously educated group, while local community members are selected to help the religiously-trained members (Table 5.5).

> The affairs of the community and the settlement are run by the local organisation of the community that is also the local religious authority. This local organisation is run by dedicated people, who go through the religious

training in the Saifia University (Bohri religious university). Furthermore, the whole local organisation is run by the central religious authority, under the Imam or *Da'I* who lives in Soorat, India. The local religious authority follows the directives of the central religious authority in Soorat. The decisions, instructions or commands cover all aspects of life of the community. Sometimes the authority makes recommendations such as to start plantation in the area, or to clean the locality through community participation etc. There is another organisation that is developed by young educated males of society, who are organised around the issue of safety and security, and look after the affairs of barriers, watchmen and more recently other services of TV and Internet Cable etc. (FNN 23)

The Ismaili religious governance system works in the same way as the Bohri community, but is more formal and multi-layered because they are located in the Nizari Society area, which is a registered cooperative housing society.

There are two administrative layers or institutions in the Society that looks after the social and administrative aspects of the community and the locality. First is the Nizari Cooperative Housing Society that looks after the issues of the settlement, its maintenance, transfer and other day to day tasks, it follows the guidelines of the government as per Society's Act 1860, while socially it reports and follows the higher religious authority. The second is the local religious authority, the top institution of comprehensive nature that is linked with the religious hierarchy of the community. It is formed by the religious authority and works from the Religious space (*Jamat Khana*), the head of *Jamat Khana* forms the head of the local ethno-religious committee that communicate with the higher religious authority along with the '*Mukhi*' (The prayer leader) and looks after the overall administrative, social and other issues. The administrative heads and office bearers of that authority are selected from the locality it is serving … Beyond the confines of the settlement, for solving issues of people we have two committees one is called the Public Relations Organization (PRO) and the second the Reconciliation and Arbitration Board (RAB), people first go to the '*Mukhi*' of the Jamat Khana, and if not satisfied secondly they go to PRO and RAB. If the problem is still not solved then they can go to the court. We don't have any kind of punishment system everyone is allowed to live together or separately. (FNN 26)

The relations of religion-based communities with political parties vary considerably. Communities with religious identity in I-UC2, take an active part in party politics in order to survive in the local power struggle, due to the importance of political parties in accessing public goods and services (Section 5.4.1). In UC3-4, Bohri and Ismaili communities and their religious structures always try to remain politically impartial, as they are resourceful enough to address their own issues, but they do not challenge the political party ventures and remain subservient to political controls and power hierarchy, thus the street control is left with the political party.

Religion Based Informal Structures:	
Punjabi-Christians	There are four large Christian families, each having their own elders who look after the affairs of the families, just like the Pashtoon tribal elders. There is no such tradition as such, but with time this pattern has emerged. There is a strong presence of the church that connects the community with the city and country context. The Pastor of the church is selected and appointed centrally.
Balti Shia	Balti Shia are organised under the religious structure headed by the prayer leader at the local *Imam Bargah*, who is appointed by the city religious administrations. He connects the community with the city level administration and from there to country and internationally. The religious leader is supported by locally-selected elders from the community, who volunteer and have various social and economic capital at their disposal. The religious command binds the people together, guides them and solves their problems. Apart from religious administration, the elders also help people in their individual capacities. The people follow the instruction as part of religious discourse.
Bohri	The Bohri community has a centralised religious administration, headed by religiously educated individuals, who are supported by locally-selected residents to create link with community and carry out various administrative tasks. *Jamat Khana* forms the seat of power, and that connects the community with the larger community and to the central religious administration in Soorat, India. The religious administration carries out community support programs, and helps people in times of need. The head of the *Jamat Khana* called *Da'i* is appointed by the central religious authority. The people follow the authority with religious
Ismaili	The Ismaili community has a centralised administration, a combination of religious leadership and local community representatives who are elected by the community to look after the affairs of the community. The *Jamat Khana* forms the seat of power that connects the community to the city administration and to the headquarters in France. There exists very strong institutional fabric at city and national levels that looks after the needs of the community, while the local committee solve their civic problems locally. The head of *Jamat Khana* called a *Mukhi* is appointed by the central religious authority. The local committee is headed by the locally elected resident representative.

Table 5.5: Religion based informal structure

5.3.5 Informal Structures – Neighbourhood Committees

The influence and popularity of political parties in I-UC2 contrast with the formal area. Almost all the respondents in F-UC2 & UC3-4 mentioned that the residents avoid help from political parties and want to keep away from political control, at the same time they don't want to challenge existing power dynamics. Many residents are resourceful, and have the education and finance to

resolve problems without external support (FNN 19, FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 23, FNN 24, and FNN 25). Thus relative wealth and education gives them some freedom.

> … why would they (political parties, especially MQM) help and come to us? They only come during the election times and disappear after that… In the informal area some people work to become political leaders. Since people want to get services without any charge, and since they are many, their votes are important, and the political leaders will even undertake illegal work for them like laying water pipelines without tax collection, or arranging for leases without bringing the settlement up to standard. In our (formal area and middle to upper-income community) there is nothing illegal, we pay water tax, income tax etc. Had we been stealing or using services without paying, then we could ask a political party to help and cover us. (FNN 20)

Instead, residents get together and form 'neighbourhood committees' to solve their civic problems. The concept of neighbourhood committees is quite straightforward; any resident of a street talks to other residents over a common issue such as security, and if they agree to take measures collectively they involve other residents and form a committee and agree on how it will work. Some residents opt out of collective action but these non-subscribers also get services in the end (FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 25). These neighbourhood committees work without any formal recognition.

Most neighbourhood committees emerged in response to concerns regarding security (FNN 19, FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 22, FNN 23, FNN 24, FNN 25, FNN 27). With the passage of time and success of such committees, the scope of work has extended to manage other services including solid waste management, street lights etc. (FNN 19, FNN 20, FNN 24, and FNN 25).

The neighbourhood committees work independently without interference from political parties. The committees do not pose a threat to political parties either to their territoriality or electoral supremacy, and the neighbourhood committee's security installations are helpful in keeping party opponents at bay. Residents of UC3-4 (FNN 19, FNN 21) reported that at times of tension, political workers used to sit at the barriers as part of watch-and-ward duty, and also used to take information from the hired guards and watchmen on duty.

5.3.6 Informal Governance; a Paradigm or a Structure?

Section 5.3 has highlighted how in North Nazimabad, informal structures have in part filled the gap left by the absence of elected local government and the non-provision of services including security and utilities. The nature and scale of informal structures is defined by political ideology at

broad district level, and on an ethnic, tribal and religious basis at the neighbourhood level. These social groups in part derive their identity from wider communities, e.g: the Pashtoon of Northern Pakistan, or Bohri from Soorat, but the research has also highlighted how each community and informal structure is linked to its neighbours in lateral tension. A schematic framework showing in the informal structures is set out in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1: Matrix of informal structures and corresponding social groups in the area

In the formal areas, residents are generally resourceful, and neighbourhood committees, at the street level, formed by groups of relatively influential residents have been able to address problems of security by partitioning and guarding streets, although the Ismaili and Bohri enclaves protect their communities. In UC3-4, the power structure is vertically hierarchical with the majority political party (MQM) topping the power structure overarching the ethno-religious structures. The ethno-religious informal structures, Ismaili and Bohri, work in parallel and do not have any apparent working relations with each other and the political party.

In the informal areas the gap in service provision has left communities vulnerable to the influences of pre-existing informal structures including political parties, *Baradary,* and religious authorities, creating opportunities for control around service provision. The informal structures vary as set out in Tables 5.3, 5.4 & 5.5. I-UC2 has parallel and overlapping structures, as tribal and political leadership are sometimes the same, although the tribal, ethnic or kinship bonds supersede that of political bonds which operate more at district rather than neighbourhood level (Figure 5.1). The Pashtoon ethnicity links the, otherwise diverse, community as one against the Muhajir group, and the ANP as political party represents the overall community in political rivalries with MQM. Each tribe has distinct identity and does not marry into each other's community. They also prefer to vote for their own community leader, but with time a few tribal leaders have emerged as collectively respected elders and are considered as collective leaders.

5.4 Evaluating Social Dimensions of Informal Structures

This section evaluates the social legitimacy created by informal structures to understand dynamics of subject-power social relations. The most basic function provided by informal structures is to address residents' problems, whether civic, cultural, political or religious. The different types of informal structures correspond to different social identity groups, which accept various socio-spatial controls as a trade-off against the provision of services, which thus produces and reproduces social relations within and amongst social groups. This section focuses around informal service provision and provision of cultural and religious requirements of the minority groups in the area.

5.4.1 Service Provision and Legitimacy

There are several reasons why residents legitimise and empower informal structures. First is the basic need for urban goods and services, and almost all the informal structures earn legitimacy and control through addressing this essential gap. The 'un-resourcefulness' of residents, especially in I-UC2 adds another dimension (INN 4, INN 5, INN 6, INN 10, INN 11, INN 16, INN 18):

> The people of this area are mostly illiterate and do not know how to deal with government agencies for their needs, so they contact the area leader/elder. (INN 4)

Second is faith and the discourse around it. As all the religious groups in the area are minorities, they incline towards their religious structures, buttressed by the opposition and persecution they face in the city[34].

Third is the traditional rural social structure around *Baradary*, especially in I-UC2, which retains active rural connections. The tribal groups want to keep the tribal structure intact as an extension of their place of origin.

Benefits of linking with a political party

Given the exploitative nature of political parties, the question then arises as to why people legitimise and accept such exploitation. The most important reason is the need to access services, but also the need for political backing that links an otherwise minority or localised group to the city-level political dynamics, decision making and access to services.

> … here (I-UC2) the system runs according to power of the political party (that the community supports), whichever party gets water is more powerful while those that get less water are not. Since, we are with MQM which is quite weak in this area, we have all kinds of issues here, we experience political bias, religious bias etc… (INN 3)

Thus residents of I-UC2, strive to be affiliated with the strongest political party, as affiliation to the right political party could bring development and legal land titles, or regularisation of otherwise informal settlement (INN 2, INN 4, INN 5, INN 7, INN 10, INN 11, INN 12, INN 13, INN 16, INN 18). Some groups in I-UC2 bargained for services in exchange for votes and shifted political loyalty, for example Deer Colony, which is not respected amongst the other communities.

> I have been affiliated with different political parties – the reason for this shifting affiliation is that all I want is to bring development and funds to my area and this is only possible if I am with the ruling party. (KI)

Residents are ready to give long-term allegiance to whichever political party will solve water shortage problems (INN 7). That is why JI is widely supported in the informal areas, since it

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[34] Most of the religious communities in North Nazimabad identified the biased behaviour of majority groups towards them and the threats they face (INN 2, INN 3, INN 8, INN 10, INN 12, INN 13, FNN 21, FNN 22, FNN 23, FNN 26). Shia sectarian minorities have been facing targeted killings for many years, while more recently Bohri and Ismailies have also been target of the sectarian extremism.

brought legal titles, installed water and electricity, and now run schools and various welfare works (INN 1, INN 4, INN 7, INN 8, INN 10, INN 12, INN 13).

Political parties when in government blur the formal-informal divide benefitting both the party and its workers. The case of one political leader in I-UC2 is important, who allocated his own residence for local government use as the Union Council office when he became Nazim[35], but several years after the elected local government was abolished in 2009[36] he continues to run the office - he controls the area (Box 6.2) and takes political credit for the formal services provided, including issuing National I.D cards and birth certificates (KIs). Similarly, political workers are asked to carry out formal tasks in an informal capacity and are paid by the party when in government (INN 10).

Political parties in government are formal structures at city level, but operate informally at local level, both in winning electoral support and in co-opting public funds for service provision (Section 6.3.3). The neighbourhood level political offices are strongly linked to residents and lobby for their needs with the elected party members and workers in the service-provision agencies, and channel development funds (KIs).

In I-UC2, community leaders have for a long time been involved in problem-solving and decision-making, but now political parties are making it part of their role (INN 9, INN 10, INN 12). ANP Ward Offices also started to provide such services, copying MQM Unit Offices that started earlier (see Chapter 4).

> Previously the conflicts were resolved amicably between the elders, but now things are different…now they (Pashtoon leaders) decide at the political office (unit/sector/ward), it has become like the Supreme Court. (INN 12)

Political parties use their numerous followers to safeguard the settlements in both parts of North Nazimabad at times of tension and conflict (INN 11, FNN 21; Section 6.3.4), and thus links with a political party enables an otherwise weak individual or group to be part of larger network of support.

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[35] Head of Union Council.

[36] The elected local government system according to SLGO2001, managing Karachi with 18 towns, was abolished in 2009 to be replaced with 5 district system under commissioner and with KMC having management of infrastructure and several other services (Box 4.1).

In contrast, in the formal areas most residents try to avoid links with political parties as discussed in Section 5.3.

Thus, there is a pragmatic and symbiotic link between ethnic and community groups and political parties. The link provides services and some security, but at the same time entrenches divides and bypasses formal government and those involved have extensively profited from the hiatus in local government resulting from the stalled election process. The political interests are the biggest reason for blurring the formal-informal divide and channelling of public funds through informal means.

Benefits of identity based (Religious and Baradary) informal structures

This section explores services provided by the identity-based *Baradary* and religious structures, which earn legitimacy on an identity bases, advocating for their communities with formal structures, and using personal resources and links to solve civic issues, carry out welfare work, resolve conflicts, and enforce contracts, explored in detail below.

Order and consensus

Creating consensus amongst the community, not only helps people access services but also works as a mechanism of control. This covers all domains of life including politics, in which community leaders from I-UC2 are very actively involved. Although they may not take part in elections they are always instrumental in shaping political decisions (INN 3, INN 6, INN 10, INN 18). The same function is performed by the ethno-religious authorities in Balti-Shia, Gujrati-Bohri and Gujrati-Ismaili communities (INN 3, FNN 22, FNN 23, FNN 26).

> The community (Kohistani-Pashtoon) meet to decide whom to vote for in the election. In the recent election, they had a gathering in which many suggested voting for PTI or MQM as they were not happy with the ANP, but the idea of voting MQM was vetoed by a Community elder, as it could have created issues for the community and the area. (INN 6)

In addition to influencing electoral politics, the community elders from I-UC2 keep checks on politically elected leaders from the community. A one-time elected leader (KI) reported that he had to work hard to convince the community elders to join an MQM-based government panel during second term of elected local government in 2005-2009. Community leaders also collaborate with religious leaders such as Prayer leaders in the mosque to address social issues or

arrange demonstrations or rallies. In the case of the wine shop due to be opened in the Christian Punjabi area of Pahar Gunj, just before it opened, the shop was destroyed by the locals after rallies of protest by Pashtoon residents under the guidance of the religious and community leaders (Box 5.5).

Box 5.5: The shutting of wine shop

In the late 2000s, a wine shop was about to open in the Pahar Gunj area. Alcohol is banned by law following religious prescription, but non-Muslims are allowed to buy alcohol from licenced shops. The shop was in a property owned by a Christian in Pahar Ganj, but it was found that the investor was a Muslim-Pashtoon living nearby. The Muslim residents of the area protested and asked the Christian owner to stop the shop opening, but work continued. One of the prayer leaders of the Mosque also visited them and requested the Christian elders to stop. Local residents feared that the men from the area would also get addicted once the alcohol became available. In reaction, after late afternoon prayers many local Pashtoon residents, led by the local Mosque prayer leaders, walked to the area protesting against the shop. Later it was found that a group of unidentified men, barged into the shop and destroyed everything. This attack ended plans for the alcohol shop in the locality. (Refer INN 8)

Civic problems

Community leaders and political leadership overlap in I-UC2. The agency of leaders is far more important than the structure of the party, which is why credit for obtaining services always goes to the community-political leaders. For example, the JI local leader (INN 4) is widely respected for bringing services including water, roads and electricity to the locality, to such an extent that his son has now become a political leader (INN 2, INN 3, INN 7, INN 9, INN 10, INN 14).

The critical issue of water shortage in I-UC2 has been addressed by community leaders in various ways. Several local leaders in Deer Colony, Hasan Zai Pashtoons, Kohistani and Balti-Shia communities develop and manage water wells (INN 2, INN 3, INN 4, INN 5, INN 6, INN 10, INN 15, INN 18). The previously unorganised and unjust water supply system has now been regulated by 'water committee' of community leaders from all the communities to ensure an equitable supply of piped water during times of shortage. Some leaders are still trying to address the issue with their links and resources (Box 5.1).

> I have developed contacts, so we have been to see Mr. S. (officer in water board and next to Minister for Local Government)… Mr S. has promised to provide water pumping machines for the area... I have done everything with the water board people in order to get the supply, I have made them happy by bribing, I have used force, I have even brought them (lower level KWSB

workers) to physically force them to cooperate, but of no use. (KI, Kohistani
Pashtoon Leader)

The religious groups also address civic problems in the community. The *Imam Bargah* helps the residents of the Balti neighbourhood and surroundings to get free drinking water through various facilities (Box 5.1). Similarly, the Bohri *Jamat Khana* plays a vital role in urban management e.g. finding property, street cleaning etc. while the Ismaili *Jamat Khana* administration is also involved in solving civic issues (FNN 22, FNN 23, and FNN 26).

Welfare Works

The tasks carried out by informal structures are both welfare work and a way of earning legitimacy. There are no charges, but the social legitimacy earned gives them authority and control over resources and helps win elections (Section 5.4.2 and Chapter 6). This political project includes bringing services, providing leases, solving the water crisis, guiding people in civic and political issues, or conflict resolution, and welfare work such as setting up free clinics or schools.

> I am in full control of the area, I spend almost Rs. 100,000 - 150,000 a month
> on related issues (especially water) and that is why all the people accept my
> leadership and decisions. (Pashtoon Community-Political Leader, see Box 6.2)

Some welfare initiatives include establishing NGOs. For example, a Kohistani leader set up an NGO for civic works (INN 9), the Christian youth leader initiated an NGO for vocational training (INN 13), and a Pashtoon social worker initiated an NGO for youth and adult education. Another NGO supports new converts to Islam from Christianity in the neighbourhood (INN 17). The most significant NGO provides for funeral requirements including food for three days for guests and the family (INN 7, INN 8). Some local leaders who are trained as doctors have personal clinics where they provide free diagnoses and medicines for the poor (INN 4, INN 6, INN 10, and INN 16). Two doctors (KIs) help government health workers, on a regular basis, during the anti-polio campaign in I-UC2.

The ethno-religious structures of Bohri and Ismaili communities are highly organised and their welfare services are centralised and large-scale. The Bohri authority has several welfare schemes for the poor including housing, education and health (FNN 23), while the Ismailies have extensive funds to support poor community members in many ways (FNN 26).

> Many of our community (Ismaili) members are migrants from Northern
> Pakistan and from the interior of Sindh. Our welfare board support them in

getting education and they are given monthly allowances…Our community-based organizations always have jobs for the people if they are willing to work. (FNN 26)

Conflict Resolution

Given the variety of social groups present, conflicts are common in I-UC2 (INN 14). Conflicts are usually violent, weapons are widely used, and killings may occur. The multi-layered society requires diligent community leaders to watch out for social conflicts and stamp out the conflict as soon as it occurs, especially religious or sectarian fights (Box 5.2 and 5.6). The communities and the leaders in I-UC2, usually prefer not to go the police or courts.

Box 5.6: Ordinary issues to conflicts on religious basis
An event told by several interviewees was as follows. In mid-2013, a Christian boy bought some food from Pashtoon street vendor, and then he wanted to return the stuff which the vendor refused. The boy misbehaved and the vendor reciprocated and slapped him; he got hurt and went home to tell his elder brother. His elder brother came to see who started the beating, but seeing this two other Pashtoon vendors came in to help their friend, and this resulted in attracting Christian young men to the fight. In few minutes the news spread like wild fire, and people from the Pashtoon community came with weapons and started firing on people and the church. Later when police and Rangers came, the Pashtoons alleged that some Christians came and started throwing stones at the Mosque and the Pashtoons just reacted. The allegation was unlikely as it is almost impossible for Christians to go into Muslim neighbourhood, throw stones at the Mosque, and return unhurt. However, the elders from both the sides sat down and resolved the issue amicably. (Refer INN 10, INN 12, INN 13, INN 14)

Another incident reflects community relations involving religion. There were two partners in a business, one Christian from Pahar Gunj area, and a Muslim-Pashtoon from the Pashtoon area. The two had a business dispute, the Christian owed money to the Muslim partner but was unable to return it after a long time. The Muslim partner turned this fight into religious allegations; such allegations affect the whole community, as it can easily turn into organised attacks. Because of the sensitivity of the accusations, elders stepped in to investigate on the spot, "such incidents cannot be left for tomorrow, one has to clarify everything as soon as possible, otherwise the miscreants makes mountain out of sesame seed in minutes" (INN 13). |

> … if something happens like this (conflict), we have a committee of elders, we solve it and we try our utmost to avoid taking the case to the police station, even if the people go to the police station, we get involved and try to get it solved amongst ourselves. (INN 8)

For Pashtoons, the *Jirga* is a well-established traditional mechanism for addressing conflicts (Box 5.3). Community elders and leaders assemble to solve problems presented before the *Jirga,* or selected by elders. The *Jirga* system is widely practiced in the informal areas, and non-Pashtoon communities also subscribe to it, such as the Punjabi-Christians and the Balti-Shia.

In UC3-4, unlike I-UC2, personal conflicts are rare, but if they happen are never violent (FNN 20, FNN 21). In addition to MQM's Unit offices, all the religious-based communities have conflict-resolution mechanisms for their own communities, such as the Ismaili community which has a Reconciliation and Arbitration Board (RAB) (Section 5.3.4).

'Contract' Enforcement

Conflict resolution is a kind of contract enforcement, in which decisions of the *Jirga* or committee become a contract between the contending parties which both accept. Contract enforcement may also cover business deals, marital agreements, property transactions or house rental, and the elders ensure that both the parties abide by the initial contract (refer INN 6, INN 7, INN 8, INN 11, INN 18).

> …they (Kohistani Pashtoons) even send their elders to broker the property deal, as this creates pressure on both the parties to keep the deal transparent; similarly, houses are rented based on personal references from people within the community, and estate agents not much involved. (INN 7)

> Property transactions are not registered at the government offices, it is done through stamped paper in which I (the community leader) form the guarantor of the transaction, and no one would dare to illegally occupy or grab land or the property. (INN 18)

Protecting and representing the Community:

The community leaders protect community interests and represent the community at times of conflict, but also face the consequences. For example, as also discussed in Section 6.2, the Pashtoon leader (KI) during 2006-2007, confronted the opposite party's leadership from UC3-4 about the erection of a barrier at the entrance to the informally developed settlement; this led him to drop his support for a local government panel, during second term of elected local government 2005-2009, but his brother was then killed in a targeted attack, allegedly in connection with the incident (Box 6.1).

> If someone gives me a threat, it is not because of my personal standing, it is because I am community representative. (A local community leader)

Community leaders help resolve conflicts, and for example the water management committee has community representatives from all communities (INN 4, INN 5, INN 10, and INN 12). The ethno-religious leadership of the Bohri and Ismaili communities also represent the community when political delegations want to communicate with the community (FNN 22, FNN 23, FNN 26).

Absence and weakness of informal structures

The importance of informal structures can only be fully understood in contrast to areas without such structures. INN 1 belongs to a locality that was part of UC2 but was separated after the construction of the Kati Pahari link road. The separation caused a power gap, as the political leaders from UC2 no longer had an interest in this settlement. A drug gang temporarily emerged taking advantage of the power gap, but the gap re-emerged once the drug gang was curtailed by the law enforcement agencies..

> There is no leader or resourceful person in the area, whom people could approach to get their problems sorted, and since this area was controlled famous drug gangs, people try to avoid coming here. There was a committee developed by Afridi people who were also asked by the locals to sit here as well and look into matters, but that did not work out…since, there is no leader and few political parties take an interest in the area. (INN 1)

Weak communities, like the Christians and the Balti-Shia, suffer in accessing goods and services. The Christians are weak, being a minority as compared to Pashtoons, while MQM and ANP both want to benefit from the large number of votes they represent and other resources. Christians feel helpless between two contending powers, and cannot support any one political party (INN 12, INN 13). The Balti-Shia suffers from injustice in distribution of services such as water, as they are politically weak (INN 2, INN 3).

Thus, informal structures bring various benefits, including services, possibility of regularisation, security and stability to areas experiencing inefficient formal government and related services. Conversely, such service provisions comes with trade-offs.

5.4.2 Trade-off of Informal Structures

At the core of service provision by informal structures, lies acceptance of implicit socio-spatial controls, which help ensure their legitimacy and also establishes a socio-spatial territory and keeps it safe and intact from competing informal structures.

Prevailing social controls in North Nazimabad are of three types: first controls implicit within service provision; second controls linked to social identity and the mechanism to differentiate one group from another, and third political trade-offs centred around political parties. The practicalities of service provision were discussed in Section 5.4.1 but the trade-offs are analysed here.

Service provision and control

Service provision by informal structures carries implicit control mechanisms. Such controls may include: access to formal agencies; decision-making and punishment; information control and demographic control, explored below.

Controlling access to formal structures of power and governance

Service provision relieves the pressure on formal institutions to address problems, and bypasses formal institutions such as the police, courts, land registry, and utilities agencies. Many residents, especially from I-UC2, no longer need such formal services, as discussed in Section 5.4.1. Such controls are practiced by most of the informal structures except neighbourhood committees.

For residents in I-UC2, control over services also limits their choice of leadership, as the leaders (and service providers) are usually resourceful enough to exclude anyone challenging the existing hierarchy (INN 11). It was also found that leadership and legitimacy can be hereditary (Section 5.3.3).

Decision-making and punishment

Decision-making is executed by an elite group that ordinary community members cannot join. In the Bohri community, decision-makers are only those who have a religious education. In political parties such as MQM, decision-makers must start as an ordinary worker and work up the hierarchy, while in ANP community leaders and affluent members can lead (KIs).

The decisions and instructions from political parties and informal structures are binding on followers, either because of the internal cultural and religious bonds or through threat of punishment to ensure obedience.

> Whenever there is a call for strike or shut down by the religious-political party in the area, young men with covered faces ride in on motorcycles and ask people to close the shops … shop owners usually don't want to take risk of violating the call as they fear violence. (INN 10)

Those who do not comply may suffer extreme reprisals, ranging from being asked to leave the settlement in Deer Colony (INN 18), to social boycott in Christian-Punjabi areas (INN 3, INN 10, INN 13) or house confinement for a period of time in Pahar Gunj (INN 13). Peer pressure, and overall behaviour of the *Baradary* also ensure compliance (INN 3, FNN 23), while for religious groups, religious discourse plays a vital role in disciplining the followers.

> …if someone in the area doesn't follow the defined rules, then we (the leaders) caution him and if still he adopts the same attitude we ask him to sell his property to us at market rate and ask him to leave the locality. (Community leader, KI)

Information control

Seeking information about the community, ideologies or leadership without prior permission is considered a violation of power hierarchies and territorial boundaries in most areas of North Nazimabad. An outsider needs local reference and permission from the community leaders (INN 6, INN 10, INN 11, and INN 18), which made research for this thesis difficult. Photography, especially of women and in Pashtoon areas, could lead to extreme consequences[37]. Information control around women in Pashtoon areas is strict.

Often leaders give selective information, mentioning the positives and avoiding controversial aspects of their work. Leaders of minority religious groups avoid talking about their ideologies and rituals, which leads to many myths about the more closed Bohri, Shia and Ismaili groups (FNN 20, FNN 21). Leaders also try to avoid mentioning the presence of religious extremists belonging to

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[37] Several people cautioned the researcher during the fieldwork in Pashtoon areas. In the Bohri settlement, the resource person warned him, while in the Ismaili area (Nizari Society), the watchmen and guards did the same. In the Balti Neighbourhood, the local resource person mentioned it, and even Sunni-Pashtoons questioned the Balti-Shia resource person about the researchers' photos. In F-UC-02, the MQM member on surveillance duty asked the interviewee about information being gathered by the researcher.

banned religious outfits, such as Sipah Sahaba or Taliban, in the area although other interviewees clearly hinted on such presence (INN 6, INN 9, INN 10, INN 11, INN 16, FNN 21).

Demographic control

Demographic control, through various mechanisms, is practiced throughout North Nazimabad, but since this topic overlaps with the physical control and territoriality, it is discussed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.3.2).

Control over illegal activities and crime

Given the fragile security and high crime rates, informal structures were asked about their role in curbing the crime and ensuring the safety of residents. Most interviewees agreed that there is a high crime rate on SNJ Road, but within the Pashtoon settlements (I-UC2) crime rates are at minimum (INN 4, INN 5, INN 6, INN 7, INN 8, INN 9, INN 10, INN 11, INN 14, INN 15, INN 16, INN 17). Some interviewees suggest that criminals on the run enter the Pashtoon areas where no outsider dares follow (INN 4, INN 4, INN 6, INN 7, INN 9, INN 10, INN 11, INN 13, INN 18).

Since, tribes are closely related and everyone knows others, local criminals commit crimes outside their tribe and territory. They are also protected by the tribal fellows against formal government and other contending ethnicities and tribes (INN 10).

Social identity and control

Identity-based informal structures are an outcome of cultural and religious characteristics manifest through symbols, ideologies and practices. Such social practices are secured by the informal structures through various social control mechanisms, and form the basis for differentiating one group from another and for their identity and existence. Such controls also influence social relations within and amongst various social groups and thus eventually affect the social process of territory making (production of space), explored in Chapter 6.

Symbols of identity and controls

There are several symbols of cultural identity, often linked to controls. While cultural and religious identities and practices overlap, given the complexity of social identities in the area, the overall symbolic identities are clear, and distinguish one group from other and thus help demarcate non-physical boundaries in the territory, as discussed below.

> Although there is no specific boundary within these contiguous neighbourhoods (UC2), other types of boundary exist… but we know in which area we are standing, there is a big difference in culture … we understand by language, by the flags in the area and by the wall chalking and graffiti. Another one way of looking that boundary is through women. For example, in Christian-Punjabi culture women are independent they do not observe hijab, move freely and also work, while the Pashtoons are not used to this. (A Christian community leader)

Languages distinguish people and can enhance social divisions, and are thus essential in the project of territoriality. The whole I-UC2 is generalised as a Pashtoon settlement because of their common language, irrespective of tribal and religious differences (INN 7, FNN 24, FNN 25). In UC3-4 residents are widely termed as 'Urdu speaking' or 'Muhajir' by the Pashtoons (refer INN 7, INN 8, INN 11). Punjabi and Balti communities have completely different languages, while Bohri and Ismaili speak Gujarati because of their origins, but the generalisations ignore such small differences.

Clothing is the most evident cultural aspect, after physical appearance, which distinguishes different communities and localities, and helps in non-physical boundary making. This aspect leads to cultural conflicts, especially relating to women, but also helps to identify the person, and to understand his/her political, ethnic, religious and geographic background. Clothing is both the symbol of identity and is a control exercised through the community.

Various dress codes can be identified across communities. Muhajir and Punjabi Christians form one group, Pashtoons including Balti Shia the second, while Bohri community forms the third. Male Muhajir, Ismailies and Christian Punjabis do not have a specific dress code but wear either westernised clothing or the local *shalwar qameez*. The women mostly wearing localised fashion trends in *shalwar qameez*, both at work and at home, but the Sunni/Shia Muslim women may or may not wear the *hijab*, unlike Christian and Ismaili women (field notes, observations).

Pashtoons, including Balti-Shia men mostly wear *shalwar qameez* for cultural reasons, while the Pashtoons consider it a religious practice. Elders and religious leaders do not approve of westernised clothing such as jeans and T-shirts (INN 17). Pashtoon women observe strict *hijab* that includes covering the head and face (INN 10), while Balti-Shia women also observe the *hijab* but covering the face is not mandatory (INN 3, INN 10).

In the Bohri community, men and women have a religiously prescribed dress code. Men carry a particular cap with a long while shirt, while women cover their usual dress with a *hijab* that includes a head cover and a coat-type shirt.

> … women from the Bohri community are easily recognizable because of their particular religious attire, they observe *hijab* with uncovered face. (FNN 20)

Funerals are very important community rituals that combine culture with religious prescriptions. In almost all the communities, it is a cultural and religious obligation on neighbours, relatives and friends to attend the funeral. Skipping funerals is not well received. The Pashtoons are more concerned if someone misses the condolence without an excuse, and even enemies offer condolences at a funeral (INN 14). Due to the significance of funerals, an NGO has been set up that looks after the whole process and everyone feels connected through the monthly contributions to the NGO (see Section 5.4.1). Religious groups also form an invisible boundaries for non-community members in such rituals, who may not get fully involved in rituals such as funerals, e.g: a Sunni might not take part, or might not be openly invited to a Bohri funeral prayer or Ismaili funeral, but they can go to the graveyard, likewise with Christians and Sunni-Pashtoons and the Balti-Shia.

Marriage forms the most important factor in identity, social control and community bonds and defines social boundaries. In almost all the communities in North Nazimabad, marrying outside the community is forbidden, even across different Pashtoon tribes, and across different religions including, Christians Bohri, Ismaili or Shia communities.

There are increasing cases of marriage between Kohistani Pashtoon boys and Punjabi-Christian girls, but usually, the girl has to convert to Islam and elope from her parents' home (INN 10, INN 12, INN 13, INN 17). It would be unthinkable that a Pashtoon girl could be involved with a Punjabi-Christian boy as this could bring disaster to the area (KI, Christian). Previously, even the Pashtoon/Kohistani boys, if married to a Punjabi-Christian girl, was boycotted by the community (INN 10).

> … A (Kohistani Pashtoon, father of KI) got married to a Punjabi girl in 1970s, a very rare happening at that time, as he married out of the community, so he was boycotted by his community, and till now the family is not well connected with the community. (INN 10)

A Pashtoon girl marrying outside the community, and without family approval, is very rare. This is considered an issue of honour in tribal Pashtoon communities and involves the whole community and could lead to killing of the girl and the boy involved. Such incident has happened only once, in

1998 when a girl married a Muhajir boy; this was followed by violence, tension amongst the communities and even migration of Muhajirs from the Pashtoon areas[38].

Education uniquely reflects the ideology and absence of government in I-UC2. The gap is mainly filled by religious seminaries that are run by the community and religious leaders. The religious education is so strong that any new non-religious school is considered a competitor; the religious seminaries charge a small fee, so given the large number of students, the income is significant.

In the late 2000s, an educated social worker started an English-medium school with a non-religious syllabus in I-UC2 (INN 17). He attracted students from the seminaries, especially one belonging to the brother of a Pashtoon leader. The leader adopted different tactics to oppose the school, including buying the property where the school was started, and distributing pamphlets amongst the residents at the local Mosque claiming the new school was anti-religion and a conspiracy against Muslims (INN 17). Since the social worker wore western cloths and did not wear a beard, he was vilified as being against Muslim culture. The school was shut down but started again elsewhere, but the social worker had to start free religious teaching along with the general syllabus, however residents understood the importance of education and that there were no bad intentions (INN17). In UC3-4, religious schooling is either taught at home or in Mosques but forms a second layer of education after the 'western' school system. However, in the Bohri neighbourhood, the country's largest religious university for Bohri Muslims, both girls and boys, is located.

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[38]In a famous case in 1998 an Afridi Pashtoon girl got involved with a Muhajir boy and eloped, and the case was reported in the national media. The girl's family registered a case of kidnapping against the boy. Although boy's family had nothing to do with it, the girl's family also involved them, and the dispute became Muhajir-Pashtoon issue. The girl's family called a tribal *Jirga* that announced a death penalty for the girl, on charges of being involved in extramarital relations (Hussain, 1998b). This issue also ignited riots between Muhajirs and Pashtoons in the city, resulting in two deaths (Hussain, 1998a).
The couple were arrested and the issue was supposed to be presented before the court. On arrival at the court, the boy was attacked, allegedly, by the girl's father and brother. The boy received several bullet wounds but survived. The girl in the court denied any charges of kidnapping, and said that she married willingly.
The couple remained in secure custody and kept applying for asylum abroad. The girl's father and brother were convicted of attempted murder, and later the couple got asylum (*Hurriyet Daily News,* 1998).
The issue also resulted in tension between the two communities in North Nazimabad, especially, the De Silva neighbourhood (Block P). Muhajir residents of De Silva town had to flee after selling their houses fearing violence against Muhajirs. The Afridi in the area still do not want to talk about this issue (FNN 21; Goodwin, 1998; Burke and Pophan, 2009)

Religious identities and controls

Many of the controls discussed above are also used for religious purposes. Such controls include of dress code, marriage controls, and gender controls especially in the Pashtoon community, all of which have a religious connections.

Many actions serve to strengthen religious identity. The Balti-Shia and Bohri observe *Muharram,* the first month of the Islamic calendar, with religious commitment. Processions, religious gatherings and sermons are arranged in which almost all the community participate. Such gatherings bring control, including mandatory closure of businesses in the area (FNN 23), control over people's mobility and erection of more barriers and security gates along with security personnel (INN 2). Other communities respect such ceremonial displays but frequent conflicts arise amongst Shia and Pashtoon Sunni groups (INN 9). Similarly, any development of new religious buildings, such as a mosque, *Imam Bargah* or *Jamat Khana* of another community is not welcomed. For example, the Bohri *Jamat Khana* in Block C was built almost opposite a Sunni Mosque, and people responded by writing letters to the formal administrative offices of the district (previously, Town Office), although the conflict was solved amicably involving the community representatives looking after the religious spaces and the religious leadership (FNN 21, FNN 23).

The community leaders also ensure that any anti-religious activity is quelled. For example protests were organised against the proposed wine shop Pahar Gunj, the Christian area, forcing it to close (Box 5.5).

Status and role of women

Differences in culture can also be understood through the presence, absence, attire, role and status of women, and women's marriages, mobility, education, work and movement which are all important symbols of social control.

Women from the Muhajir, Bohri, Ismaili and Christian communities are free to move around, can access education in any institution of the city and can work alongside men. The Balti women, are independent in movement and education but do not usually work as part of their culture. In I-UC2 part, Christian women are the most independent in terms of mobility, choice of marriage and work (INN 10, INN 12, INN 13), while differences in dress codes have already been identified.

The Pashtoon women are the ones facing most restrictions, as part of the tribal code. Male family members should provide food and other necessities for women, which is considered part of the honour of being the family head. Women are not allowed out alone, not usually sent to co-educational schools, not allowed to work, and in some of tribes not allowed to go to polling stations to vote (INN 6, INN 10, INN 12, INN 16). Kohistani Pashtoons are the least strict of all the Pashtoons, as many of the families send their girls to school, while a few older ladies are also involved in social work (INN 10).

The agency of women is different in each male-dominated context. Independence is a blessing for the Punjabi-Christian women, but it becomes an issue for the Christian leaders (INN 12, INN 13). The neighbouring Pashtoon community is not used to women's independence and that women can talk to men in public. Often the Pashtoon young men misbehave with Christian women resulting in conflicts amongst the communities, as the KIs explained. The Pashtoons also want the votes of Christian women as they do not allow their own women to vote (KI). While, in marrying out of community, it is the Christian women who suffer the most, as discussed above. Pashtoon young men are also blamed for inappropriate behaviour with Ismaili women, which is why the barriers were first erected in Nizari Society (KIs from formal area).

> Pashtoons are not used to this (independent women, moving alone and talking to male strangers, and without *hijab*). Sometimes they misbehave and often they talk to each other in shops and elsewhere, so they develop relations and sometimes the girl wants to marry the boy. This creates conflict and if any girl wants to marry a boy from the Christian area it creates a huge problem…90% of Pashtoons do not send their women to vote, and to cover the gap they use every possible mechanism over us (Christians) to send our women to vote for them. (KI)

Such restrictions and the limited role of Pashtoon women are also reflected in the lacking women's facilities, including schools, clinics, and a maternity hospital etc. While the women are fully aware of the situation and complain about it.

> …the major problem that women talk about is their closed environment and restricted mobility, but there are no facilitates like separate girls' schools or proper maternity clinics, so the women have to go the male doctors which is frowned on by their families. However, (the interviewee) found a way out and developed several seminaries for girls in the locality, and now the women are quite happy that at least they have a kind of education, and many young girls go to such seminaries regularly. (A female political and social worker, KI)

The limited role of women is also reflected in the lack of women social or political workers in I-UC2. There are a few in the Kohistani community but it would have been inappropriate for a male interviewer to talk to them (INN 10, INN 11). Meanwhile, increasing political violence is discouraging women in social or political work (FNN 19).

Control of political activity

Social controls also include control over political affiliation and political party activities. Political and other identities overlap, so controls are attributed to both the political parties and to community leaders. In I-UC2, community leaders are found to be at the centre of tactics to oust rival political parties or communities linked to them. In UC3-4, such controls are usually practiced by the dominant political party.

New political parties

The emergence of a new political or apolitical structures is usually resisted, while in I-UC2 it is resisted if the initiator and followers are not from the same *Baradary*. There are several NGOs operating in I-UC2 but the 'Christian Development Forum' (CDF) initiated by youth leaders of the Christian community was shut down due to apparent threats from a political party which feared it was starting a new, rival party (KIs).

> … we started with putting up a medical camp, trying not to give the impression that a new political party was being formed. We were trying to avoid giving such an impression to people from other communities and political parties, we included people from almost all the political parties as well ... Now there are some political hindrances, that I cannot explain (Hesitant to name political parties and their tactics, to avoid any possible threat) so we stopped working from under CDF. (INN 13)

However, in I-UC2, the same controls were not felt when a new political party emerged involving community members (INN 7, INN 11, INN 9). For example, Pakistani Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) received an overwhelming response when it set up in both the formal and informal areas, and it did not face any resistance in I-UC2 (INN 7, INN 8, INN 9, INN 10, INN 11, INN 18). This is contrasted in UC3-4 where PTI leaders and workers do not openly carry out political activities although they received good number of votes during general elections 2013, describing how people feel and what they expect challenging existing power dynamics (FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 25).

Control over MQM in I-UC2

MQM is the largest political party in the city, but it is not welcomed in I-UC2, although residents know its importance in control over many civic and development agencies in the city. All the Pashtoon *Baradary* are united against MQM, irrespective of the internal divisions, claimed several leaders (INN 4, INN 5, INN 6, INN 9, INN 10, INN 11, INN 12, INN 13), and some are quite vocal while others take a diplomatic route to negate MQM's presence.

> MQM cannot hold this area, because there are not many supporters and it faces strong resistance from the Pashtoons, whereas PPP has less support but can work openly as many Pashtoons are also in PPP. Pashtoons from any political or religious party, see MQM as threat. (KI and community leader I-UC2)

Pashtoon leaders reportedly make several allegations against MQM to justify its exclusion from I-UC2. MQM is the dominant party in Karachi influencing civic agencies, and dominated the last local government elections during 2005-2009, and was in provincial government till 2008, and later as part of coalition provincial government till 2014. However, as I-UC2 is not getting water and other basic services, Pashtoon leaders conclude that MQM opposes Pashtoons (INN 7, INN 10, INN 11, INN 16). Often 'formal government' becomes synonymous with MQM in the narrative of Pashtoon leaders (Section 5.3.1). It is also assumed that MQM wants to enter Pashtoon areas to control land and votes (INN 11) (see also Chapter 6). Any work by MQM is seen as a conspiracy against the Pashtoons and their settlements (refer INN 2, INN 6, INN 7, INN 8, INN 11, INN 10, INN 16).

> …but they (MQM) have carried out so many atrocities on (Kohistani) Pashtoon communities that even, if they dug a canal of milk for us here, they cannot win our hearts. Many young men have been killed in the city, just because they were Pashtoons. (KI)

Control over ANP in UC3-4:

ANP is strongly resisted in the formal areas. A resident of Block C (FNN 21) described the most recent attempt by ANP to enter formal areas and the majority political party reaction to halt this.

> …Pashtoons (referring to ANP) started to be found together in these localities, wall chalking for ANP started to appear… then flags were seen around. The movement of young Pashtoon men increased, which meant there were

deliberate attempts to influence or capture Block C… and then the majority party reacted and strengthened its surveillance system, even I was affected by the controls. I had a Pashtoon friend who used to come and visit and we used to walk and sit at the outdoor café to smoke or drink tea. The people from the majority party indirectly sent me a message that I should stop inviting this Pashtoon guy into the area. There were many deliberate attempts by the majority party to stop entry of ANP and Pashtoons in this neighbourhood. Later …armed majority party workers started to sit at the entry points of each street, they used to come in the evening and would go early morning (performing watch and ward duties and to avoid any possible attack). (FNN 21)

Such physical measures were followed up by rhetoric and even rumours that the Pashtoons are going to attack Muhajir settlements (KIs) and that they are targeting the Muhajirs in the city, especially in the peripheral areas where they dominate (KIs). The word 'Pashtoons' was generally used, rather than using the name of the political party, to invoke the 'Muhajir' identity of the residents. Residents of UC3-4 often assume that crime in the locality is linked with the informal areas (FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 27) and that there are religious extremists who are against the religious minorities like Bohri and Ismailies (FNN 22, FNN 23, FNN 26). This thinking makes the residents oppose any Pashtoon political party working in their locality and thus legitimises MQM's stance.

5.4.3 Trade-offs or Mechanisms of Control?

This section has explored social dimension of informal structures and how and why communities legitimise them and what are the benefits and trade-offs of such acceptance. Various conclusions are evident.

First, the combination of need and identity leads to the emergence of various power-subject relations. The informal areas show much stronger links between social groups and their informal structures, as they exhibit a need to establish identity, for security and to access services. This dual need creates a vertical hierarchy in which identity-based leaders group together under one political party. In contrast, residents of formal areas try to stick to one identity i.e. religious or non-political structures such as neighbourhood committees, while the political party is accepted either to avoid security threats or to avoid being considered as part of the opposition.

Second, once services are provided the informal structures establish controls and ensure people follow their rules. The formal and informal areas again show similar behaviour in terms of identity-based informal structures which are accepted by residents, e.g. religious prescriptions

and the concept of serving the community. However attitudes to political parties differ, as residents of UC3-4 adopt a strategy of avoiding nuisance, while in I-UC2 political support is part of the survival tactics in the city.

Thus service provision and controls define the social relations within and between communities, which consolidates social and territorial boundaries of influence.

5.5 Conclusion

The North Nazimabad case study has a population of around 195,000 inhabitants living in an area of about 2.5 Sq. Km., and has proved to be a highly complex yet interesting case in Karachi. The area has at least eight distinct social groups with unique ethnic and religious identity of which five are found in the informal area of I-UC2. The socio-spatial complexity is coupled with absence or co-option of formal governance and services, resulting in the rise of informal structures to fill the service provision gap ranging from civic services to community needs.

Each identity-based group has its own informal structure located in the area, reinforcing socio-spatial divisions on the city-level, yet, providing the lacking services on the local-level. Such informal structures at the local-level are further linked with the district and the city-level respectively, being influenced by the city-level power politics and social issues and *vice versa*. This highlights three aspects; first, informal structures from symbiotic relation with the formal structures, second, the informal structures work from 'between' connecting the formal structures and the common citizens. Third, the power-society-space connection is quite evident, in terms of informal structures extracting their controlling powers from the social groups to establish territoriality. Such structures are legitimised by the affiliated group due to their cultural, religious, social and civic service provision and facilitation, for which the people have to accept certain trade-offs that depend on the nature of the informal structures ranging from political to ethnic, cultural and religious affiliation and acceptance of rules. These are further explained below.

The fieldwork has demonstrated the formal-informal symbiotic relation and the work of informal structures from 'between'. There are two levels at which the informal structures work, district level and the neighbourhood level - that also includes street level. The district level usually involves politically affiliated informal structures, and such structures link the community to the city-level drawing on the strength of neighbourhood identity-based groups and their related informal structures. In areas without identity-based structures at neighbourhood or street level,

political party offices and their workers fill that gap. Such local identity have different levels of working relation wit the neighbouring group; in I-UC2 each is in lateral tension with its neighbours, while in UC3-4 lower-level structures work in parallel. This network of power intermediaries works neither from below nor from above but from 'between' as a broker and custodian of power and decision making, connecting street-level residents to the city, province and the country level.

Several broad and general, but contextual, conclusions about the social and political factors that highlight relation between power and society and that eventually connects with space, which underlie **informal land controls,** can be drawn:

1. The tribal affiliations and intense territoriality are most acute in the informal areas, which are largely associated with Pashtoon-ANP affiliation. This is partly a result of poverty and relative social isolation which entrenches tribal and religious ties through the *Baradary* system, partly a result of history which provided the context and setting within which I-UC2 grew, and partly the failure of corrupt government which blocked local government elections and services. Residents are highly dependent on community leaders to direct political affiliations and control services. Conversely, leaders cling to power, using mafia-style control and using violent tactics where necessary. This creates a flashpoint between sects within the settlement.

2. The formal areas (F-UC2 and UC3-4) are mainly associated with MQM affiliation and operate much like middle class areas in many other places in Karachi. Communities are mixed, and residents form neighbourhood committees to lobby government for services, which are apolitical, and do not directly challenge existing political and street control. Certain religious groups such as Bohri and Ismaili, are well-connected and able to lobby for their rights. However, all communities are faced with an ever-present threat of violence, and the need to defend themselves against political and criminal encroachments, and they are increasingly defensive and develop barriers as a means to deter intruders.

3. Three formal areas form an exception to this rule – Nizari Society, the Bohri community and the Rangers' area – each of which operates highly exclusionary practices to compartmentalise the area and exclude strangers, although they also do not challenge existing power dynamics, street controls and other political control mechanisms. However, such areas also emphasise that how change in social group impacts nature of

controlling power e.g. in the case of Ismaili and Bohri communities, similarly, how change in controlling power impacts space and service provision e.g. in the case of Ranger's residential area.

4. Service provision is key. Water supply networks exist but connections to some areas are allegedly blocked, or are deliberately not solved, for political gain. I-UC2 is the least-serviced and least government-controlled part of the area, and has the most variety of informal structures. In contrast, the Ranger's area is the best-serviced and best-connected to formal service providers and thus, has least informal controls.

5. Political battles at both city and local level are played out in North Nazimabad, with intense competition and sometimes extortionary tactics in the battle for votes. This benefits the otherwise isolated communities of I-UC2, but drags the otherwise introverted communities of UC3-4 into city level politics and issues.

Informal structures define social relations in the area, and the relations between groups cover a wide spectrum from cooperation to antagonism. This also highlight the background dynamics of conflict and violence connected with informal areas and informality, especially connecting the power structure with the affiliated social group.

1. Each informal structure has a wide network of overlapping affiliations, being vertically linked to home territories in the tribal regions, or international religious networks, and in lateral tension with each other, specifically in I-UC2.

2. Relations within the social groups are hierarchical, both in the informal and formal areas, with community or religious leaders exercising strong control.

3. In I-UC2 communities suppress internal differences to combine under an umbrella political party. In UC3-4 identity-based communities join in the political contest, but they do not threaten the existing hierarchy. However, both Bohri and Ismailies link to city-wide and national networks and are thus, better resourced than their I-UC2 counterparts.

4. Tribal Pashtoon groups in I-UC2 maintain tribal identities when dealing within other Pashtoon tribes, but are united when dealing with non-Pashtoon groups such as Punjabi-Christians, Balti-Shias and Muhajirs. Similarly, they align politically under the ANP party (or other Pashtoon representing party) to oppose the Muhajir-dominated MQM. The

Pashtoon versus non-Pashtoon conflicts are almost always violent, thus UC2 is the violent part of the area.

5. Social relations are generally inflexible, violent and non-violent social divisions, which becomes evident at times of tension and conflict both locally and at city scale, especially when issues are political or related with minority groups, which clearly show the city-local level link.

Social control is evident in both the formal and informal areas but the usual understanding that the lack of formal services leaves a void in which political exploitation and patron-client relations occur, is a simplification of a complex reality. At local level, agency based on the extent to which leaders can build a power and financial base through service charges and extortion, seems to be at the centre of power dynamics. Such local agency supports political parties which in turn influence the city level structural power base.

The diversity in North Nazimabad is not unusual in a large urban neighbourhood, but the entrenchment of ideology, rigidity of social practice, and violence in street-level control has both resulted from and contributed to absences of local government and formal services, and feeds political conflict in the wider Karachi setting.

Chapter 6

North Nazimabad:

Space and Segregation

6.1 Introduction

This chapter considers the spatial and territorial outcomes in the North Nazimabad case study, deepening the political and social domains explored in Chapter 5. The objective is to understand how geographic boundaries of social influence and control, i.e. territories, are created through relations between the informal governance and power structures and the corresponding social groups, and to identify the spatial control mechanisms, including control over public resources, are used to achieve such territoriality. Furthermore, it also explores how resultant multiple territories and the corresponding informal structure and social group interact with each other and form hierarchies.

The chapter argues: first that the production of space in North Nazimabad depends on the role of informal structures; second that informal land controls define social relations and thus produce space; and third, while informal structures use informal land controls to focus on manipulating capitalist land markets in both formal and informal settlements, they superimpose social and spatial controls through cultural and religious persuasion or physical force, resulting in acute segregation and intense conflicts over space.

The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section explores how space is produced and linked to informal structures in North Nazimabad. It explains the concept of territory, its boundary and centre, and the variety of socio-spatial territories found. The second section explores the spatial control mechanisms used by informal structures to delimit their territories, including social groupings based on identity and the material benefits of such territoriality. Furthermore, it also explores how different territories interact as a geographic manifestation of power, leading to conflicts and attack and defence mechanisms resulting from attempts to encroach on territorial boundaries.

6.2 Territories, Boundaries and Centres

This section explores how in North Nazimabad a territory becomes a geographic manifestation of power, with boundaries defining its extent, and a centre as the functional seat of power. Chapter 5 has already described the various social enclaves in the area, existing in more or less defined locations controlled by distinct informal structures. The processes through which boundaries, centres and territories are defined are analysed below.

6.2.1 Territory

Territory is a spatial term, but in North Nazimabad it has both physical and non-physical attributes. First, a territory can be defined in relative terms by the resident social group and the informal structure that controls it, e.g. ethno-politically defined territories such as Pashtoon or Muhajir territories or religiously defined territories such as Sunni or Shia areas, etc. Second, territory can be considered as the geographic manifestation of power or the limits of claim e.g. political influence, such as in the MQM or ANP area. Third, it can also be defined through physical attributes, by planning, plot sizes and street patterns, e.g. the formal areas stand out in contrast to the informal areas that are now regularized but have the poorer quality infrastructure. Finally, territory can also be defined in terms of governance structures, e.g. government-controlled areas versus the informal structure-controlled areas. Each of these divisions is explored below in Section 6.2.4.

It is also important to understand the historical context of territories and social groupings, to better understand the link between the spatial and social dimensions in the area. Certain groups are there because of the physical attributes of the settlements, e.g. the formal areas (F-UC2, UC3-4) attracted middle to upper middle-income Muhajirs, while I-UC2 attracted poor rural migrants including Pashtoons and others. In some cases, social enclaves were established well after the early residents moved in, e.g. the Bohri community first came because of the social amenities and later create a gated territory. The Ismaili hierarchy, the Agha Khan network, was the first to define space by purchasing land through a cooperative society, and the Ismaili community then grew. Thus, social groups have shaped the boundaries and similarly have defined the nature of informal structures and *vice versa* (See Appendix 5.1 for the detailed history of development of the area).

6.2.2 Territorial Boundaries

Territorial boundaries represent first, the extent of the community, second, the geographic extent of social controls practised by its informal structure, and third, the meeting point of two or more territories. The nature of boundaries vary and are identified through both physical and social attributes (Section 6.2.3). Such boundaries behave as 'fault lines' that come into force when another community or power structure threatens a change to the *status quo,* as any infiltration or boundary change is considered a challenge to the neighbourhood (Section 6.4.1). For example, the Kohistani Pashtoon leader challenged the Muhajir majority party's leadership in UC3-4 about the erection of a barrier at an entrance to the informal area, I-UC2 (Box 6.1). The barrier was

erected for security, but residents saw it as an attempt to control access to I-UC2. This conflict, during the MQM-led local government in 2005-2009, led him to drop his affiliation with the coalition in the then elected local government panel[39], but later his brother was targeted and killed, allegedly in connection with the incident and ensuing city-level ethnic conflicts (INN 7, INN 9, INN 11, INN 18; Box 6.1).

6.2.3 Territorial Centres

Territories often have a centre, although not always in the strict geographic sense. The centre represents the seat of power, the space where decisions are made and controls are implemented and the nature of the informal structure that defines the territory. For example, religious/prayer space forms the centre of religious territories (INN 2, INN 3, INN 13, FNN 22, FNN 26); political offices are the centres of politically defined territories (INN 9, FNN 24, FNN 25); and community gathering space, the *hujra/baithak*, provides the focus for tribal community centres (INN 15).

6.2.4 Types of Territories, Corresponding Boundaries and Centres

The communities in North Nazimabad observe various types of territories, boundaries and centres, defined both by physical and non-physical attributes.

Physical definitions

This physical definition of territory overlaps with social characteristics, and cannot be seen in isolation. As mentioned earlier, the formal area (F-UC2 and UC3-4) attracted specific socio-economic groups i.e. Muhajirs, compared to the informal areas (I-UC2) where rural migrants congregated, especially Pashtoons. The social groupings furthered the social divide that later overlapped with the political divide.

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[39] The local government elections were held on a non-party basis in which individuals running for seats developed and joined panels, which were political parties in reality, to form government or opposition. Any member of the council could join government panel and this was the case with this community leader (INN 11) from I-UC2.

Box 6.1: Conflict over installing barrier; access control as change in boundary

Pashtoon leaders explained a conflict between the majority political party and ANP that considerably affected the area. The Pashtoons claimed that the majority party always wanted control over the Pashtoon areas, but they were denied even though the local Pashtoon *Nazim* (Union Council mayor) and *Naib Nazim* (vice-mayor) panel were part of the majority party led local government. The majority political party was in conflict with ANP and wanted to control movements to find potential criminals, the leader claimed. The majority political party, with the agreement of the residents of Block Q (F-UC2), abutting I-UC2, started to install a barrier at the access between the two settlements. The Pashtoons thought the barrier would lead to the majority political party's control of their area, and might resulted in targeted killings and other security issues.

When majority party's workers came to install a barrier, the Pashtoon leader and Naib Nazim came heard of the incident. "I rushed there. My friends wanted to stop me, but I kept going so my friends called ANP workers to ensure support if a fight broke out. When I reached there and ordered them to halt the work, the police were also there, so I asked the Station House Officer (SHO) to stop the work and reminded him of the court orders to remove barriers from the city rather than to put up new ones. Seeing the tense situation and armed men on both sides, police called the Rangers." (KI). The Rangers' commander ordered his subordinates to remove the barrier at once and to arrest people who obstructed the clear-up.

After this, the Pashtoon leader resigned from the majority party's local government panel and joined ANP. However, it was alleged by several people that after the incident, the then *Nazim* and *Naib Nazim* did not receive any development funds for I-UC2, and the brother of that Pashtoon leader was also killed, allegedly in connection with the ensuing city-level ethnic conflict (KIs).

Formal vs. informal area territories

The two largest and most widely-understood territories in North Nazimabad are the formal areas (F-UC2, UC3-4) and the informal areas (I-UC2). North Nazimabad locality was formally planned in the early 1950s, as part of the federal capital city, and started to develop in the early 1960s. When the national capital was moved from Karachi to Islamabad, the neighbourhood was offered on the open market, and middle and upper-income Muhajirs mainly bought properties. The informal areas of the case study started developing in the 1960s, with the industrial boom that attracted labourers from all around the country for whom the formal supply of housing for the poor was unable to cater (Appendix 5.1).

The formal processes of development and town planning standards have attracted people with different socio-economic backgrounds compared to residents of the informal areas. I-UC2 has smaller plot sizes, an irregular street pattern and has limited social amenities and planned infrastructure, and much of the construction is incremental which reflects the economic and cultural divide between the two communities (Section 5.2.1).

Administrative divisions also define the two territories. The formal areas of Blocks U, P, Q (F-UC2) are physically adjacent to informal areas but are considered separate because of the formal-informal and the social divide, also that because of different land agencies deal with them, i.e. formal areas come under KDA for property-related matters, while the informal areas deal with KMC and Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA).

The local government constituency demarcation aptly reflects the socio-administrative divide between the two territories, i.e. UC2 and UC3-4. Parts of UC3 and UC4 behave as one territory i.e. formally-developed, Muhajir-dominated and MQM-represented, while the formal areas of UC2 (Blocks U, P, Q) and informal areas become one entity i.e. informally-developed, Pashtoon-dominated and ANP-represented (UC2 is also called Pahar Gunj). The formally developed part of UC2, i.e., F-UC2 does not merge with UC3-4 although both have similar characteristics, partly because SNJ Road acts as a buffer between the two and makes F-UC2 part of UC2 both physically and administratively. Thus, the Muhajirs of F-UC2 becomes a minority within the larger Pashtoon dominated UC2, on one hand they are ethno-politically linked with UC3-4 but cannot be part of it, on the other hand, they are unable to merge with the adjoining informal-Pashtoon-ANP controlled area. Many interviewees highlighted the resulting divide (INN 7, INN 10, FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 23, FNN 24, FNN 25, FNN 27). Thus, two larger territories exist in the area; first, informal-Pashtoon-ANP (I-UC2) and formal-Muhajir-MQM territories (UC3-4) reflecting the area's complex socio-spatial identities, legal status and historical development.

The centres of power in these territories are complex, especially in I-UC2. The political party represents the territory in exchanges with the political opposition and forms district level or intermediate informal structures, although normally community leaders (Pashtoon tribal leaders, Punjabi-Christian community leaders or religious leaders in the case of Balti-Shia) oversee the neighbourhood informal structures. However, the political and community leadership overlaps in I-UC2. On the other hand, MQM commands street control in UC3-4, and thus solely represents that area politically; although Ismaili and Bohri religious and community leaders do not form part in the political power dynamics of UC3-4 and stick to the neighbourhood level control. The political

party office works as the centre of political power in the area and links higher echelons of MQM to the local community.

Figure 6.1: Various territories existing in the area

In this formal versus informal territorial divide roads and streets form the boundaries. In the case of I-UC2 and F-UC2, the street morphology divides the area both physically and in terms of perception of the residents (INN 4, INN 7, INN 9, INN 11). At the wider level, especially in people's perception, SNJ Road forms the border between the two territories (FNN 21, FNN 23, FNN 24, FNN 25, FNN 26).

Non-physical definitions

While the formal-informal divide coincides with the Pashtoon-Muhajir ethnic and ANP-MQM political divides at the broad level, the two territories are further divided by social identities at the

neighbourhood level. These territories may be culturally, ethnically or religiously-determined territories as discussed in Chapter 5.

Culturally or ethnically defined territories

Within I-UC2, several territories are defined by ethnic identities around tribes and places of origin, particularly Deer Colony, Chamra Chum, Mawara Colony, and Usman Ghani Colony. Each of these territories has a dominant social group, separate informal structure and sense of boundary (Map 5.2 and 5.3, Table 5.1).

In I-UC2, Deer Colony forms the strongest of such territories, with its strong leadership provided by tribal elders and specific socio-spatial controls (Box 6.2). The community differentiates itself from the other Pashtoon communities in I-UC2, i.e. the Hasan Zai and the Kohistani Pashtoons, to the extent that there is a constant sense of conflict between them (Section 6.4). Deer Colony has an defined boundary marked by a controlled entrance with a barrier and a check post. The former Union Council office, which operated until local government was suspended in 2009, was based in a building donated by the community leader to the town administration. This building is still run by the same community leader as the headquarters of his fiefdom of Deer Colony from where he oversees security patrols, service provision and operates various residual government functions (e.g: formal documentation processing birth and death certificates) (KIs). The tribal chief has issued various rules for social order and local welfare (Box 6.2).

Hasan Zai Pashtoons are the most dominant ethnic group in I-UC2 in terms of both power and population. Their territory covers an extended area in more than one locality, including Chamra Chum, Mawara Colony, and other smaller neighbourhoods. The community is characterised by its strong history and affiliation with ANP and other religious-political parties, and by its link with the historic Pashtoon-Muhajir riots in 1986-87 (Appendix 4.1). Many ANP political workers come from the same area (INN 4, INN 5, INN 7, INN 9, INN 10, INN 12, JCS 16). It is difficult for other groups to mix with Hasan Zai Pashtoons, as they have a strong tribal identity and sense of bonding. They also form the largest tribe of Pashtoons in the area, thus draw power over others from their numbers and political dominance.

The leader in Deer Colony has developed several rules to control and manage the locality, and the community obeys these rules:

    I.   There should be no bachelor housing in the area, as this attracts illegal and immoral activities that we do not want in this locality.

    II.   Conflicts are resolved through us.

    III.   We do not allow any tea house or hotel in our locality. This control helps us keep unwanted people and activities away from the neighbourhood.

    IV.   For strangers in the area, the person whom the stranger has come to meet or stay with is considered responsible and answerable for their behaviour.

    V.   We tax property transactions, and on each transaction, the owner has to pay 1-2% of the property value to the two Mosques and the Seminary, which helps fund these free amenities.

    VI.   Property transactions are not registered at the governmental civic agencies, but we stamp the contract. I am the guarantor of the transaction, and no-one would dare to illegally occupy the land or property.

    VII.   If someone in the area does not follow these rules, then we (the elders headed by the tribal chief) caution him, and if still he continues we offer to buy his property at market rates and ask him to leave the locality.

    VIII.   Anyone of any ethnicity can live here, provided that he follows our rules.

    IX.   We decide whom the community will support politically in elections, and for whom they should vote. (KI interview)

There is no physical boundary or demarcation for Hasan Zai territory. Residents identify fellow community members and usually a street forms the boundary between one settlement and another, although the community is gradually expanding into other communities including Kohistani Area and the Punjabi-Christian area. The central community reception space *hujra/baithak* forms the centre of power. It is a covered public space in the middle of Chamra Chum, with many *charpoy* (low beds) where the community leaders sit, deliberate and decide issues (Picture 6.1). The space is also used for funeral and marriage ceremonies (INN 10, INN 15).

The Kohistani community delineates another territory within the larger UC2, although this is one of the most mixed social groups at present due to the increase in rental housing in the neighbourhood (INN 7, INN 8, INN 9, INN 11). Kohistani Chowk (cross-roads) is a busy local commercial centre and the territory is usually called Usman Ghani Colony (INN 10). No particular location is seen as the centre of power, but the leaders use their house's *hujra/baithak* (reception area) for communal gatherings and meetings. Due to the social mix, the boundaries are blurred,

and sometimes determined by neighbouring territories, including Pahar Gunj, Mawara Colony and Balti Colony, and it is thus one of the more open and accessible territories in North Nazimabad.

Picture 6.1: Hasan Zai community elders and residents at their *Baithak* (gathering area)

Religious based territories

Religious based territories are the most clearly defined in North Nazimabad. These communities have unique ethnic identities that are subservient to the dominant religious identity and all such groups are religious minorities in the city. The territories include: in I-UC2 the Punjabi-Christians in Pahar Gunj territory, and Balti-Shia in Balti territory, and in UC3-4 the Gujrati-Bohri in Bohri Neighbourhood and the Gujrati-Ismaili in Nizari Society (Maps 5.2 and 5.3, Table 5.1).

Punjabi-Christians occupy Pahar Gunj, and the difference between them and the surrounding Muslim-Pashtoons creates a spatial divide that is heightened by the cultural differences including holidays, celebrations, the status and the role of women, and the use of alcohol.

Although there is no specific boundary to Pahar Gunj, it is broadly bounded by Godaam Gali Street to the north, the electricity sub-station to the east, the formal area of De Silva Town (Block P) to the west, and SNJ Road to the south. The entry point for Pashtoons living on the hills behind is

through Pahar Gunj, making it an accessible or a weak territory. However, the Christians have a very strong sense of territory and in the past, whenever required, had mechanisms to defend it (INN 13). The community elders constitute the informal structure, sitting daily on the street, but the Church is the centre of identity and power, and has thus been subject to attack at times of conflict (INN 13).

The Balti-Shia also have no defined boundary but are segregated by the Sunni-Pashtoon groups across the street. The territory is defined by Shia residents belonging to Gilgit-Baltistan province in the north, who speaks a distinct language and all are related to each other (INN 2, INN 3). However, the relations with surrounding communities create social boundaries, as the Shia face discrimination from the local Sunni-Pashtoons (INN 2, INN 3, INN 8, INN 10). This division is intensified by the presence of anti-Shia religious-political outfits such as SSP and ASWJ (KIs). Given the absence of a defensible physical boundary, the community tries to establish a physical boundary around its centre and space of power, i.e. the *Imam Bargah*[40], through routine use of barriers and gates, and regular processions and religious gatherings (Picture 6.2). The influence of the *Imam Bargah* on social relations is powerful and people would give their lives to defend it (Section 6.4).

> We will not leave the area, because of the *Imam Bargah* and will protect it at any cost. Although the situation is not good here, the children are not happy and we could afford to leave the area ... and sometimes I think of leaving the area but it all depends on the *Imam Bargah* - again we cannot leave it. Many residents of the area have migrated to other better areas … so that's why we are not leaving just to defend it and keep it intact (INN 3).

The Bohri Neighbourhood in Block C is one of the largest and strongest religion based territories in UC3-4. It is defined by the Bohri community and controlled by their religious authority. Over time, the community has ousted most non-Bohri residents through market mechanisms of property purchase (FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 22, FNN 23, FNN 24) (Section 6.4). The fear of insecurity from street crimes and apparent threats from Sunni religious extremists has led them to cordon off space using guarded gates and moveable and fixed metal barriers (FNN 22, FNN 23), which also means the territory can expand in future (Map 6.1).

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[40] Shia religious space comprising of prayer space or Mosque and a space for gatherings involving *Majlis* and other religious rituals.

Picture 6.2: Balti area, children on street and the openable barrier

controlling access to *Imam Bargah* in the background

Nizari Society is a formally-developed social enclave and territory, a cooperative housing society for the Ismaili community. The cooperative has 200 contiguous housing plots, a *Jamat Khana* (community centre) and a community hall. No other community can buy or rent in the society. Previously there was no boundary demarcating the community, but in the last eight years the community has been cordoned off using metal barriers to protect against unwanted incursions e.g. criminals (FNN 26; Map 6.1). The *Jamat Khana* forms the centre or space of power, from where the community is governed by the community leaders and religious authorities (FNN 26).

6.2.5 Territories; an Interplay of Physical and Social Dimensions

A complex variety of overlapping territories exists with varying scales and boundaries corresponding to the residents' social groups, administrative boundaries, physical boundaries and political affiliation. Two scales are evident in this local level case study i.e. district-level that falls between the city-level and the neighbourhood-level, (city-level being the largest) which corresponds to the physical definition and overlaps political, administrative and social dimensions, while the neighbourhood-level corresponds to local group identities. The district-level highlights the presence of two territories i.e. (i) informal-Pashtoon-ANP territory and (ii) formal-Muhajir-MQM territory. The neighbourhood-level, or non-physical definition, highlights sub-territories

delineated by the social identities of residents and includes; ethnicity based territories, which are largely Pashtoon and the Muhajir territories, and sub-territories corresponding to a variety of tribal groups (*Baradary* based) in I-UC2; religious sub-territories within both UC2 and the UC3-4 e.g. Punjabi-Christians, Balti-Shia, Gujrati-Bohri and Gujrati-Ismaili territories (Figure 6.1). The neighbourhood committees are neutral and operate at street-level; they do not vie for spatial control and do not pose a threat to the dominant political control.

The nature of informal structures, the centres of power and boundaries varies with the territory. The political party offices, community gathering spaces and religious spaces form centres of power, whereas, streets, roads and residents' identity create both physical and perceptual boundaries. Territories are also relative, in that, they emerge or disappear along with identities, for example I-UC2 emerged as a Pashtoon territory in opposition to the UC3-4 Muhajir territory. Thus, territories are a socio-spatial construct that combine social groups, physical and administrative boundaries and the play of controls enforced by informal structures. The territory making also reflects the myriad of ways, involving social and spatial dimensions both, which lead to space production.

6.3 Spatial Controls

This section explores how the informal structures develop, consolidate and defend territories, and how they impose effective control and extract resources, e.g. informal taxes or 'protection money', from the area. A defined territory is the spatial outcome of the trade-off that communities accept in return for services provided by the informal structures (social benefits were explored in Section 5.4). The mechanisms through which spatial controls are imposed are explored in this section.

Spatial controls serve two major purposes, first to establish territory around political, ethnic or religious identities and exclude alien social groups, and second to extract resources, including all sorts of informal rents, from the territory. Spatial controls define the degree of openness or closure of a territory, also the degree and extent of inclusion-exclusion measures applied to other groups living or entering the territory. The main forms of spatial control include (i) entry and exit control, (ii) property control or demographic control, (iii) extracting protection money or informal rents (iv) conflicts, leading to attack and defence mechanisms, and (v) control on political activity, socio-cultural and religious activity (the latter is been discussed in Section 5.4.2).

6.3.1 Access Control – Inclusion or Exclusion?

Access control may cover activities such as passing through for business and political activities, using amenities, or performing state and institutional tasks, and serves several purposes, such as political control, crime control, etc. Access control mechanisms can also be understood as both physical and non-physical measures.

Physical Measures

Perhaps the most distinct forms of physical access control are the gates and barriers, found throughout the case study area, but particularly in the formal areas. Much of the formal area is partitioned by a series of metal barriers, some of which are manned, creating a symbol of exclusion and fear (Figure 6.3 & 6.4, Map 6.1). Barriers are the most common means of exclusion, but there are also some gates and walls.

Picture 6.3: Guard post room at barrier, UC3-4

Picture 6.4: Metal barrier, UC3-4

Use of barriers

Barriers are used for controlling and regulating both pedestrian and vehicle movements in the area. Although some barriers are guarded, the pedestrian movement is often not strictly controlled but the barriers show pedestrians that they are entering an observed area.

The formal and MQM areas (F-UC2 and UC3-4) have the most barriers. In I-UC2 territory only Deer Colony and Balti Colony make much use of barriers. All the religious territories also have barriers, except Pahar Gunj. In contrast, most of the *Baradary*-based territories do not have any barriers

except in Deer Colony, as social signals and the complex street pattern serve as barriers for outsiders.

Interviewees in UC3-4 described the main purpose of barriers as being for security. The perception of security changes with the territory and the community while the location of barriers highlights the importance and level of collaboration amongst residents. In religious communities, the focus of security is the power centre or the religious space, and the Bohri and Ismailies have cordoned off their areas effectively making them gated communities (Map 6.1; INN 2, INN 3, FNN 22, FNN 23). In F-UC2 and UC3-4, excluding the two religious territories, the street level forms the neighbourhood and security unit and thus barriers are installed at the entrance of each street (FNN 19, FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 24, FNN 25, FNN 27). For political leaders, the political territory forms the geographic unit of security, which is guarded, e.g. SNJ Road forms both the boundary and the barrier between the two territories (INN 7, INN 11). The two major political parties, i.e. MQM and ANP, do not erect barriers in their territories, but both the political parties use existing barriers installed by residents in their favour, as a tool to exclude their opponents (Section 5.4.2; FNN 19, FNN 21).

The barriers have far greater meaning than just a physical means of access control. First, they are linked to the perception of safety and security, as they allow the control over intruders and through traffic (FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 23, and FNN 25). Second, they define the territorial limits of control establishing a boundary, as for the Bohri community and Nizari Society (Ismaili community) where barriers give a clear sense of inclusion-exclusion (INN 7, INN 9, INN 11, FNN 20, FNN 25).

Putting up barriers means defining a boundary, but this is never done in isolation. A new barrier could be a flashpoint for a conflict if the neighbouring informal structure does not approve it, for example, the Kohistani leader fought with the majority political party over the installation of a barrier on the access road to I-UC2 that goes through F-UC2. The installation of barrier was taken as a violation of territory as already discussed (Box 6.1; Section 6.2.2).

In F-UC2 and UC3-4, neighbourhood committees manage the barriers and have brought previously isolated people closer. The committees mean that neighbours meet periodically and are now addressing problems other than safety and security, including services and street lights, etc. (Section 5.3.5; FNN 19, FNN 20, FNN 24, FNN 26). For example, a middle-aged man from the formal area (FNN20) mentioned that they started their neighbourhood committee to hire security guards and install barriers and since they met up every month other civic issues were also raised.

They found that they could tackle civic issues better and more economically if they collaborated together, so now they are also managing the street lights and solid waste.

Map 6.1: Use of gates and barriers as access control mechanism in UC3-4 (Source: author).

Gates and walls

Gates and walls make another form of physical control, and are more exclusionary than barriers as they stop all types of movements. Only a few gates and walls have been built in formal areas i.e. F-UC2 and UC3-4, mostly around religion based territories.

All the gates and walls observed were located at a junction between the main road and a side road leading into the territory. In Block Q (F-UC2) residents have built walls and installed gates on the streets connecting to the Kati Pahari Road (FNN 19). The Bohri Neighbourhood has metal gates at the access to Shahrah-e-Humayun (SH) Road and Cricketers Avenue, while Nizari Society has metal gates at its connection with SNJ Road.

> … after building the Kati Pahari Road the whole locality became unsafe, there have been several burglaries, as in response the residents of the locality closed the street leading to Kati Pahari Road… after constructing the wall, the residents have now put in a door that is opened when the local children go to school as their bus comes to that road. (FNN 19)

Street morphology and slopes

Street morphology and physical features including slopes in North Nazimabad play a central role in access control, especially in I-UC2, where the upper hillside is very steep with uneven and temporary stairs, making it difficult for outsiders and vehicular access. The irregular street morphology was not intentional in I-UC2, but its effect on outsiders is intentionally exploited (Pictures 6.5 and 6.6).

The first impact is on security. Interviewees mentioned that criminals vanish into I-UC2 after committing crime on SNJ Road, and no one dares to enter the settlements because of fear of getting lost and harmed in the winding streets (INN 4, INN 5, INN 6, INN 7, INN 9, INN 10, INN 14, INN 15, INN 16). Limited vehicular access in some areas of I-UC2 means that the LEAs cannot use vehicles in the area. The physical challenge is also supported by the social landscape as Pashtoons are mostly related to each other and support kinsmen in difficulties, even if their difficulties are crime-related (INN 7, INN 10).

> … especially on the hill, there are all kinds of criminals, just because no one goes up there. Police and Rangers don't go there, as a result, these have become safe sanctuaries for them (criminals), which you call no-go-areas, no-one can catch them. (INN 7)

Picture 6.5: Winding street pattern in Chamra Chum area

The second impact is on the utilities in I-UC2. It is tough for people living on the higher slopes to get water, as water tankers cannot navigate the narrow streets (INN 2, INN 3, INN 7, INN 10, INN 11, INN 15, INN 16, INN 17). However, it is also easy for them to use services without paying as the utility services inspectors do not go there either (INN 2, INN 3, INN 7, INN 11, and INN 16; Picture 6.5 & 6.6).

The UC3-4 and F-UC2 also create the same labyrinthine effects in the street pattern by using barriers, so that only locals know the accessible streets. This discourages street crime and unwanted movements.

Making the settlement difficult to navigate makes it safer as strangers cannot pass through and are easily identified. However, access control also brings social isolation. Outsiders do not want to pass through as they get lost, and friends and relatives avoid coming especially in the formal areas, according to an educated middle-aged resident of UC3-4. Map 6.1 elaborates on the labyrinth created out of use of barriers and gates that only daily users could understand and navigate.

> … friends and relatives avoid coming to this locality (UC3-4) and if they come they always complain about the maze of streets with closed and open barriers, it is tough for any new comer to find their way through. (FNN 20)

Picture 6.6: Stepped streets, leading to the hill, lined with water pumping equipment and the lines in Chamra Chum area

Making new or blocking existing roads

Access control is also used for political ends, both to liberate controlled areas and to exclude opponents. For example, the decision to build the Kati Pahari Road linking North Nazimabad and Orangi Town was taken by an MQM-led local government (2005-2009). The majority of voters in Orangi were MQM supporters but had only one access route to the city *via* Banaras Chowk, a long-term Pashtoon-ANP stronghold. Kati Pahari Road was intended to provide a shorter route and avoid Pashtoon-controlled Banaras Chowk that would be a no-go zone for Muhajir commuters during conflict. However the project had several unintended consequences, as it provided criminals with an easy through route to North Nazimabad, the ANP-MQM conflict intensified as the Kati Pahari Road still passed through Pashtoon-controlled areas, and it opened up North Nazimabad to the historic Pashtoon-Muhajir battle zone of Qasba Colony in Orangi, resulting in increased violence and crimes in North Nazimabad (INN 4, INN 10, INN 11, FNN 19, FNN 24, FNN 25, PCS 1).

Non-physical measures

Access is also discouraged or regulated using non-physical means including surveillance, the watch-and-ward system, policing and questioning a person. This involves a network of people supporting the access control mechanisms either working for the community leadership or on their own initiative. Other non-physical means are more implicit, built on social perceptions and take place involuntarily involving internalisation of differences by the community, such as the concept of "us" versus "them" (Tilly, 2004). Such perceptual controls are supported by discourse, narrative and rumours. Such non-physical controls work from inside, such that outsiders avoid accessing such territories for fear of intimidation or crime. Residents thus internalise protection and collectively form a defensive barrier. These are explored in detail below.

Surveillance

Policing, surveillance, watch-and-ward, interrogation etc. are all used to regulate access (collectively termed surveillance here), by keeping a watch on movement through territorial boundaries. There are two types of surveillance in the area i.e. organised and unorganized.

Organised surveillance involves both people specifically assigned for the task mostly by political party workers in both UC2 and UC3-4, and watchmen and guards at the barriers privately hired by the residents in F-UC2 and UC3-4. Political party workers are usually assigned tasks of surveillance or watch-and-ward duties to control opponents (INN 11, FNN 19, and FNN 21; also refer section 5.4.2 on information control). A journalist and local resident confirmed that during an ANP-MQM conflict political activists develop signals to check identities, e.g. the journalist, who travelled on motorcycle, was asked to blink his bike lights in a particular pattern to get safe access at night (KI). The street-level neighbourhood committees and the religious Bohri and Ismaili communities have hired street guards, who question newcomers and check the identity of vehicle drivers (pedestrians are only checked if suspicious) (FNN 20, FNN 21).

Organised surveillance in I-UC2 is used at times of perceived threat, as people know each other and newcomers are easily identified. A male respondent of Pahar Gunj, mentioned that their community also had a system of armed surveillance during times of ANP-MQM conflict to avoid any harm to the community. It is understood that the tribal leader of a locality in I-UC2 employed an army of 50 local men to safeguard both the locality and himself, after he received an extortion threat allegedly from the Taliban (Box 6.3). In the same territory, land use is also controlled to avoid unwanted people and the need for surveillance is minimised.

> There is no bachelors' housing in the area, as this attracts illegal and immoral activities that we don't want in this locality… We don't allow any tea house or hotel in our locality, this also help us keeping unwanted people and activities away from this locality. (KI)

Unorganized surveillance is undertaken informally by residents, mostly in the *Baradary*-based territories of I-UC2, where a new person is easily recognized. This works in several ways, controlling crime as no outside criminal can enter, and protecting leaders as criminals know the local leaders who are usually spared, and thus many local leaders have never experienced street crime (INN 4, INN 5, INN 9, INN 14, INN 16). The surveillance works as a network and observations are communicated directly to leaders or political workers *via* their dedicated people, or by residents who inform organisation workers usually found at major activity zones and access locations.

> Thus there is a lower crime rate in I-UC2 because of the community-based system, as people can identify criminals and the criminals cannot enter in these settlements. (INN 14)

Box 6.3: Extortion demand and defending the leader and the territory
A tribal leader in one of the Pashtoon settlements received an extortion threat, as he described, allegedly from the Pakistani faction of the Taliban. The leader consulted with other elders and decided not to fulfil the demand. He called a meeting with the resident tribesmen, who also endorsed his decision. The decision was followed up by development of a protection army of 150 local resident tribesmen to avoid any attack after the refusal. They developed check points and a guard system with young men guarding the checkpoints 24 hours a day. The leader used his own connections in Waziristan (a Tribal Agency in North West Pakistan, supposedly a Taliban stronghold where a military operation is currently taking place) and found that the letterhead used was not original. Later it was found, allegedy, that it was somebody from a local political party who used the name of the Taliban to extract political revenge on the leader (KI).

Perceptions

Perception also plays a role in access control in the area. Perceptions about other groups, political parties, spaces and individuals, are developed over time, intentionally or unintentionally, through narratives or through the media. Some perceptions are deliberately developed through false narrative or rumours, while others are based on evidence, such the need to avoid access SNJ Road due to its high crime rate.

Residents on both sides of SNJ Road, avoid going there at night due to increased crime (INN 3, INN 6, INN 7, INN 9, INN 10, INN 11, FNN 20, FNN 22, FNN 23, FNN 26) although the reasons mentioned vary. Residents from UC2 have no other route except SNJ Road, but UC3-4 have other alternatives. The residents of UC3-4 think that crime on SNJ Road is linked to the presence of criminals in I-UC2 (FNN 20, FNN 24, FNN 25). The Bohri and Ismaili community link this crime to the presence of extremist Pashtoon groups in I-UC2 (FNN 22, FNN 23, FNN 26).

People fear going out at night on the Road (Shah Noor Jahan). Street crime is high on the road, and also there is a fear that somebody might kill on ethnic or sectarian grounds. Para-transit vehicles will never bring people here in the area; they refuse to come here late at night. Salesmen to this area do not come at night time (INN 10).

Perceptions are often based on a false premise. The case of Kati Pahari is one example. The north-western end of Kati Pahari Road, beyond the Orangi Hill, has always been violent but the North Nazimabad side was only violent for a short time (INN 11). However, due to a general perception people avoid coming to the area (INN 10, INN 6, and INN 5).

> Safety and security in Kati Pahari is not as bad as is portrayed in media … the violent area is on the other side of the Kati Pahari hill, not this side … the image of the area has been destroyed by the media so that even a rickshaw driver in this city is not willing to come to this area at night. (INN 6)

Perceptions are also developed deliberately, through narratives, discourse and rumours, which are actively used by political parties to strengthen territories. As reported by interviewees, there were rumours in UC3-4 that there is a high possibility of Pashtoon attack and that only the majority political party could save the area[41]. Political workers have, allegedly, offered to sell residents weapons to counter this threat (KIs). Other political parties also try to shape people's perceptions in the Pashtoon areas.

> … (The party) did created a hype that Pashtoons are coming to attack the Muhajir localities, and we heard that in Block G and Block L they conducted neighbourhood meetings and told people about possible threats from Pashtoons, arguing that people should buy weapons to protect themselves… it was also rumoured that the Pashtoons are identifying Muhajirs in buses and

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[41] One of the Muhajir residents of Block C talked about an event during *Eid-Ul-Adha* when he sacrificed some animals. The political party worker came for the collection of hides, on refusal the worker said, "…then don't come to us for help when the Pashtoons will come (to attack, harm or control the locality)."

cutting off their ears and fingers, although we have not seen anything like that or known anyone an eye-witness or suffered such an event. SNJ Road has become a danger zone for many, but in their imaginations. (FNN 25)

Thus some of the violence is bred from fear and misunderstanding rather than actual threats and that eventually helps control access to and from the area.

Flags, graffiti, wall chalking etc.

Flags, graffiti and wall-chalking are physical yet perceptual forms of claim, and an important symbol of identity and demarcation of territorial boundaries, and thus a means to control opponents. All political parties, religious or non-religious, have flags and extensively use wall-chalking to campaign for a leader or ideology and to lambast opponents. Religious groups also use wall-chalking and flags, especially during festivals and ceremonies e.g. the Balti-Shia use black flags as a religious symbol and Punjabi-Christians erect Christmas stars.

Flags are also hoisted to mark a boundary (INN 12). One interviewee showed the researcher the symbols of a possible ANP take over in Block C, which otherwise is a MQM controlled area, evident through wall-chalking and a display of party flags (FNN 21, see below and Section 6.2). Similarly, in an interview, a Pashtoon leader explained his resolve not to allow any MQM offices or flags in his area, demonstrating the importance of flags as territorial markers and symbols of control (INN 11).

Access for businesses

Access control can also affect businesses and create threatening situations. For example, at the city-wide famous *Karahi Hotel* (Box 6.4) the owner allegedly refused to pay extortion money, so political party workers made it difficult for customers to dine at the restaurant and created fear. The workers had a regular routine of firing aerial gunshots which made the customers flee, and in few months the business hit its lowest turnover (INN 10, INN 15, INN 16; Box 6.4). Similarly, when the Rangers' patrol parks their Mobile[42] vehicle at the Pahar Gunj Roundabout, they do not allow any parking nearby, although the vicinity is famous for its auto-mechanics, auto-part shops and garages, but this surveillance has proved to be a disaster for the local businesses as customers do not come to the shops as they fear being attacked (INN 10; Box 5.2). In the Bohri neighbourhood, during first 10 days of the Islamic month of Muharram, shop owners around the *Jamat Khana* and

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[42] Six to eight Rangers personnel on patrolling duty mounted on four-wheel army vehicle (called a Mobile).

along the route of religious processions are asked to shut down their shops to avoid any security threat (FNN 22, FNN 23).

Box 6.4: *Karahi* Hotel; a case of access and resource control

The *Karahi Hotel* is a famous restaurant in De Silva Town, Block P in North Nazimabad (F-UC2). The restaurant is well-known for its meaty dish called *Karahi Gosht*, literally meaning meat in a round-bottomed wok. This dish is famous in the northern Pashtoon areas of Pakistan, and has been transported to Karachi by Pashtoon restaurant owners, and is particularly popular amongst Pashtoons in the transport sector, long-haul drivers and cleaners. The *Karahi Hotel* in De Silva town is well-known throughout Karachi for attracting customers from all ethnicities. Business turnover was high till 2011, when the restaurant owner reportedly had to give extortion money as a 'donation' to the controlling political party in the settlement. One of the local leaders said that that when party workers tried to put up a banner calling for donations of sacrificial animal hides in front of the restaurant, the owner did not allow this, so the party workers became angry and decided to retaliate, while others allege that the conflict started when the owner was asked to increase the extortion money, which he refused. The political workers made a habit of firing aerial gunshots in front of the restaurant during busy times, and as a result the business almost folded; the customers feared coming to the restaurant (KIs).

6.3.2 Property Control

Property control is one of the main forms of spatial control in the area. Property control, like access control, has a dual purpose in helping to control both the physical and social dimensions of territory, which enables the informal structures to consolidate territories, alter boundaries, and exclude people from other backgrounds to avoid any possible threats. Excluding opponents also has a political motive, as it results in an increase in favourable votes that may lead to formal control.

Many tactics were being used for property control in North Nazimabad. Tactics include controlling property transactions through real estate agents, or through pressure on property owners not to rent or sell property to opponent groups. Crime and violence, and fear of crime also affects demography and property transactions. Different groups use different property control mechanisms as discussed below.

Religion based territories

The religious territories exhibited the strongest property control mechanisms. In UC3-4, The Nizari Society is a registered housing cooperative, developed for the Ismaili community members (FNN 21, FNN 26). Under the cooperative society rules, the cooperative's elected representatives control occupancy. This is the strongest form of formal property control that cannot be challenged or changed through informal means. The cooperative frees the community from fears of demographic change or losing territorial control, although the market value of cooperative properties is correspondingly reduced.

The Bohri community has used, previously and even now, real estate mechanisms to capture and control property. Initially, when a few Bohri residents started living there the religious authority, representing the community, bought properties from the government and then from local non-Bohri residents in the area for the *Jamat Khana*, the university and related uses, including housing, offering them prices higher than market value (FNN 20, FNN 22, FNN 23). The wider Bohri community also followed the same tactic and started buying properties at above-market rates, and soon Bohris became the majority group in the territory. On one occasion, a non-Bohri bought an apartment building on SSS Road that was built overlooking the *Jamat Khana*; to avoid such an event happening again, the *Jamat Khana* developed a trust through which they bought all the commercial properties facing SSS Road at almost double the market prices (FNN 22, FNN 23). The *Jamat Khana* helps community members find sale or rental property, and helps Bohri developers in finding Bohri tenants for new apartment projects (FNN 23, FNN 21, and Section 5.4.1). Blocks A and C are fast being dominated by Bohri residents.

In I-UC2, the Balti-Shia leaders ensure property control especially around the *Imam Bargah*. Non-Shia buyers and tenants are avoided to ensure security (INN 2, INN 3). Residents also become aware of property control through discussions and instructions and through peer pressure.

> For every property transaction either buying/selling or for rental (especially around *Imam Bargah)*, the newcomer is fully investigated, especially in terms of sectarian affiliation. The community do not want to allow anyone who could cause harm to the people, neighbourhood or the *Imam Bargah*, as there are many threats around for the *Imam Bargah*. (INN 2)

The Punjabi-Christians also want to control their territory, but are unable to lay down effective controls as the Pashtoons are buying properties in their settlement (INN 13). Christians think that they are being pushed out by Pashtoons, and many are thinking of moving out (INN 12, INN 13).

Losing control over property has become a symbol of losing control over society and territory. The Church, given its weak position, is investing in nearby property to keep its environs secure, a common trend in religious territories (INN 13).

Baradary-based territories

The *Baradary*-based territories exhibit control mechanisms implicit in the bonding around tribe and *Baradary.* The communities emphasise sticking together which leave less room for any other community to settle among them. In I-UC2 politically-influenced mechanisms also overlap, and it is difficult to distinguish as community leaders are often political leaders as well, although they prefer to take credit as community leaders rather than representative of a political party.

The community leaders in I-UC2, were found to be actively involved in property control through both explicit and implicit mechanisms. Social bonding, culture, perceptions, and contract-enforcement each play a vital role in control mechanisms over both sale and renting of property. The political parties, overlapping with *Baradary*, also play a role by getting the informal settlements regularised ('leased' local term for regularised i.e: titled), thus ensuring both political gains and demographic control. Property control also involves control over land use.

Many Pashtoon leaders in I-UC2 claim that there is no restriction on anyone coming to live in their territory, referring specifically to Muhajirs (INN 6, INN 8, INN 9, INN 11, INN 14, INN 16, and INN 18). However, there is also an acceptance that the Muhajirs (e.g: in De Silva Town in F-UC2) prefer not to live with or adjacent to Pashtoon communities because of differences in culture, fear and high crime rates in I-UC2 (INN 7, INN 14). The Kohistani Pashtoon leaders claim that their settlement is the most accessible of all, and the elders/leaders now avoid controlling property and instead facilitate transactions (INN 7, INN 8, and INN 11). This relaxation of control is partly because the rise of rental housing in the neighbourhood is a major source of income for many families, so any control that would hinder the business would make the leader's position controversial (INN 11).

The Pashtoon community leaders are explicitly involved in contract enforcement during property transactions. This both gives them credibility as service provider and a contract enforcer, and enables them to see and control the transaction (INN 7, INN 8, INN 18; Box 6.2 and Section 5.4.2).

Cultural differences between communities and tribal traditions, fear around this divide, and political conflict have also led to property control and demographic change, which has affected

the ethnic mix in the area. For example, in De Silva Town (Block P, F-UC2), the Urdu-speaking Muhajir population is leaving the locality because of fear, violence and crime, due to the proximity of Pashtoon-dominated I-UC2, so real estate values have fallen, and Pashtoon households are buying up the properties at a very low prices (INN 7, INN 10, INN 14, FNN 19, FNN 20, FNN 21, and FNN 25).

> …many Urdu-speaking people have left the area because there are drug-peddlers and drug addicts who burgle the bungalows (of Muhajirs), so people are worried. People are also afraid that the Pashtoons would attack us if there is any clash between MQM and ANP, so that's why they sold their properties very cheaply and left the area. (INN 7)

Getting the informal settlement 'leased' (local term for regularised i.e: titled), and getting formal status, has been a mechanism to control property and develop political territory. Firstly, JI, the religious political party, successfully lobbied and got certain parts of I-UC2 regularised (excluding Pahar Gunj and housing on the hill) which made JI one of the notable political parties in the area and increased its popularity in the settlement (INN 4, FNN 20, FNN 21). However, Pahar Gunj could not be regularised because it is on an amenity plot, which by law cannot be changed to any other land-use (INN 12). However, the land mafia[43], allegedly backed by the city's majority political party, patronised encroachments over parks in F-UC2 and UC3-4, and apartments were developed there (Box 6.5). Local interviewees assert that when the MQM-led local government subsequently wanted to regularise all the encroachments they regularised all the informal settlements in North Nazimabad, even Pahar Gunj, which otherwise were threatened with demolition (INN 13).

Property control also affects commercial properties and their use, mostly in I-UC2. Commercial properties act both as an economic asset but also as a symbol of territory, for example a tea stall or Carom shop[44] which allows many people with the same ethnicity or political affiliation to sit

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[43] A commonly used term in Karachi denoting organised individuals or groups involved in the illegal business of grabbing public or private land or properties and selling it to the public for profits. Many times, builders or investors may collude with the officers of the civic agencies and the political parties to initiate such profit making ventures and are collectively termed as mafia, in press or by individuals, to avoid directly pointing to political parties or individuals that may risk their safety.

[44] One Key Informant told the following story about a Carom shop. Carom is a 'strike and pocket' table board game. There is a Carom shop (locally termed as *Dubboo*) at the edge of Christian area owned by a Pashtoon muscleman, and local young men and children, allegedly some criminals also, come to the shop that remains open till late night. The shop owner put benches in front of the shop which extended in front of the house of a local Christian man. The people sitting on the benches used all sorts of slang and sang loudly. When the Christian man complained to the shop owner, the Christian man was beaten up badly. Local Christian leaders had to step in to resolve the issue, after using connections in the Pashtoon communities

and hence assert territoriality. Similarly, certain commercial ventures are controlled to avoid unwanted people coming to the area who might challenge territoriality[45]. Deer Colony has very strong land-use control rules as Box 6.2 explains (INN 18). The religious leaders of I-UC2 also keep an active watch on commercial activities that might contravene religious prescriptions e.g. the incident of opening of wine shop explains the control over land use, already discussed. Similarly, the Chieftain from Deer Colony described the reasons for not allowing tea stalls and restaurants in Deer Colony as these attract outsiders and people that may challenge the territorial integrity of the settlement and may be involved in crimes (Box 6.2).

The interviewees suggested many reasons for the alleged majority-party backed encroachment and development of amenity plots. The Pashtoons of I-UC2 see it as an attempt to control their territory through votes and as a conspiracy to access their resources (INN 11). Residents from UC3-4 look at the encroachments as rent-seeking and a political tactic to increase votes and curtail Pashtoon expansion, while some respondents even saw the new apartments as surveillance points put up by the majority party to oversee Pashtoon movements (KIs).

> By controlling I meant (the majority party) wanted to have their vote bank here, they wanted to build apartment houses like they built just behind the Kati Pahari Police Station where they gave the apartments to their sympathisers, as they don't have a large vote bank in this area... There might be only around 150-200 votes but they manage to get 1200-1300 votes and it's just because of their (majority party) rigging in the elections. (local Pashtoon political leader, KI)

The majority party's political representatives accept the involvement of party members in the encroachments. However, they deny that this is party policy and suggest that a few people used the party name for personal gain and that the land mafia had infiltrated the party for this purpose. Whatever the reason, the fact remains that as street-control lies with the majority party, such activities could not take place without the knowledge of its political offices and workers.

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the shop owner showed some concern. Now the shop users at least do not sit in front of the door of that person.

[45] Similarly, a Pashtoon-run tea and food shop/hotel was set up in the busiest and widest street of Pahar Gunj, the Christian neighbourhood, the only street where vehicles could enter the area. The Pashtoon hotel-owner arranged customer seating on the road, eventually blocking it. In response, the local Christian leaders asked the shop owner to clear the road/street which he refused. The next day the hotel owner brought four armed men who sat on the seats on the street to demonstrate power. In response, Christian youth leaders asked all the Christian men in the settlement to bring their licenced weapons. On seeing so many people with weapons, the four men fled and the hotel was eventually shifted onto SNJ Road.

Box 6.5: Encroachments on parks and development of apartments

North Nazimabad has been experiencing encroachment and illegal construction, both on the hill and on the parks. Encroachments allegedly have the backing of political parties: on the hills these are linked with Pashtoon leaders and the Pashtoon-based party, while encroachment on parks are linked with Muhajir-based party. (INN 4, INN 10, INN 11, FNN 19, FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 24, FNN 25, and FNN 27).

The encroachment on parks reduced the parks and playgrounds in the neighbourhood, and strengthened political and ethnic divides, thus exacerbating ethno-political conflict. Four parks around or abutting SNJ Road have been encroached on for housing development. For example, there was an open space/play ground near the new Kati Pahari Road. One of the local interviewees, who was part of the JI tenure of local government (2001-2005) mentioned that the site was initially occupied illegally by Pashtoons, who had used it for parking buses and large commercial vehicles, but around 2004 it was cleared and converted into a park. Later during the 2005-2009 local government, the new Kati Pahari Road took some land from the park and an apartment complex was built on the remaining area. The flats were given to families of the martyrs of MQM workers who died during the state-run military operation during 1992-1995 or were killed in politically targeted killings. Other interviewees said that the apartment block created a rift between MQM and ANP. Some think that MQM used the apartments as a check-post to oversee opponents and to retaliate during armed conflicts. One of the interviewees mentioned that the wall facing the Pashtoon area in the apartments had been constructed of reinforced concrete to withstand bullets. Later a police station was also established on some open space abutting the apartment block(FNN 19, FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 24, FNN 25, JCCS 3).

The encroachment on parks and playgrounds peaked during the 2005-2009 local government term, when so-called *China cutting* took place. As mentioned earlier *China cutting* refers to illegal encroachment and subdivision of amenity plots, parks and play grounds, which are then sold as residential and commercial plots - sometimes apartments are built and the flats are sold. The land mafia, in connection with political musclemen, provide guarantee and contract enforcement. Often, the name of the political party and political leaders are used to enforce contracts, although the parties are never mentioned.

The courts have issued orders to demolish these illegal constructions on cases filed by local residents backed by political parties such as JI, but no action was taken until September 2014, when one of the apartments (not on SNJ Road) was demolished on court orders by Karachi Municipal Corporation anti-encroachment team (*The Express Tribune,* 2014f).

Shehri-CBE has done extensive research documenting the encroached plots in the whole city, and has published a book. The book did not go into reasons and dynamics for the encroachments probably to avoid possible political issues, but the research identified a very high percentage of encroached parks in North Nazimabad, compared to any other developed middle income settlement in Karachi (Shehri, 2012; Bhagwandas, 2009).

After the 2013 general elections, the majority party's Chief expelled many such land-mafia related members from the party (*The Express Tribune,* 2013e), while the party administration was reshuffled to avoid such events in the future (*The Express Tribune,* 2013f).

> Regarding the encroachments on parks and playgrounds in North Nazimabad, yes, some people linked (with the party) were involved and have created illegal situations in the past, but now they have been kicked out of the party and it is not the same now. Those people have actually used the party name for their own benefit, and once the party name is mentioned nobody can oppose ... (KI)

6.3.3 Resource Control

Control over productive resources is an important outcome, or even objective, of territoriality. Resource control is a broad term that overlaps with other already explored social control mechanisms, and covers several wider mechanisms including control over resources such as land and property, management of utility services such as water, and rent-seeking of all sorts – from extortion to control over formal development funds.

The control extends to both physical and financial resources of the territory and its people, including land and property, informal fees and rent-seeking from residents, diverted government development funds, and fees for utility services. Human resources – the number of people on which a political party can call – are also important and include both the numbers of potential voters, and young men from the neighbourhood without regular employment who provide vigilante forces when required.

Land control

Control over land, as a physical resource, is practiced in several ways. Mechanisms include property control, control over land use, land grabbing and encroachments, as discussed above. However, the concept of 'land controls' goes far beyond the physical meaning and includes control of all the resources linked with land, be it physical aspects such as property, utility services, or infrastructure development, and political benefits and human resources etc. In addition, it also covers the social aspects explored in Chapter 5, including controlling political affiliations, religious practices, marriages and the role of women.

Rent-seeking

Control over financial resources is one of the most critical rewards claimed by informal structures. Such controls were found to finance the activities of certain informal structures such as political parties, organised crime groups such as land mafia or water mafia that overlaps with community and political leaders, and can also be termed 'rent-seeking' – including extortion, selling or renting out public property or infrastructure, crimes including street crimes, corruption in controlling public funds for development etc.; these are discussed below.

Extortion

Extortion is the most commonly used rent-seeking tactic in the area, allegedly linked to political parties or individuals belonging or using the name of political parties and criminals using the names of such outfits such as the Taliban. It has various types, depending on the target, the rent seeker, the process of extortion and reason for which the money is extorted[46] (see Section 4.4.3 which discusses city-scale rent-seeking).

Interviewees identified various types of extortion in the area. The first type is aggressive – the extortion demand comes via a phone call or written letter, targeting a wealthy person, with the amount demanded instructions not to inform the LEAs, and consequences of reporting the demand such as risking the life of the recipient or a family member. In one incident the extortionists even included a Rs. 500 note to buy a coffin if the demand was not fulfilled (INN 5). In another case, extortionists sent a bullet to threaten the person (Figure 4.2). Usually, the recipients do not inform anyone or the LEAs and either meets the extortion demands, or leaves the settlement and sells the house as reported in one case (INN 4, INN 5). People rarely ignore such demands and take appropriate measures to be safe (Box 6.3), as there are incidences of killings. Sometimes in I-UC2, people are asked for cuts of any financial transactions, such as property transactions, as reported by the Christian community. In UC2 the Pashtoon-supported

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[46] A local community leader reported that… a wave of extortion has arisen in which letters are delivered to houses of the well-to-do along with unused bullets demanding extortion money. If the demand is not met, they fire gun shots at house and threaten to kill the occupants. Many people just give the money demanded without reporting it to other residents or police. The criminals are actually those whom ANP used for support and to counter rivals, but now that ANP is dormant they are working by themselves using the Taliban's name since everyone fears the Taliban but none has seen them. The leader saw no difference in Pashtoon or Muhajir representing political parties; "… Pashtoon political party has adopted the same violent culture that majority political party has." In the bungalows area (F-UC2) whenever a property transaction takes place, they ask for extortion money. Similarly all the fuel stations, schools and other commercial businesses around the vicinity are asked for extortion money by Pashtoon political party (INN 5).

political party is blamed along with other gangs and banned outfits as such demands are traced back, allegedly, to affiliated party individuals or criminals using the party name or claiming to be Taliban (INN 4, INN 5, INN 9, INN 10, INN 13, INN 18).

The second type of extortion is milder, targeting local shops and small businesses, mostly in UC3-4. Contributions are demanded under the guise of donations for the welfare wing of a political party, or in the name of religious tax *(Fitra, Zakat)*. The case of *Karahi Hotel* has already been discussed, in which the business of the hotel was damaged on denial of paying extortion money (Box 6.4). Fear of violence and or damage to the property and business spurs people to pay the demand (INN 10, INN 15, INN 16, and FNN 24). Some shop owners report making regular monthly extortion payments.

> …I don't think any businessmen could refuse to give the money out of fear. They just don't show their political affiliation and give the money silently including myself. When they came to ask at my restaurant, my elder brother told me that we are doing business and not politics and that we should follow what others are doing. He further told me that he did not want the business to suffer because of my political affiliation… and told that we will stop giving money when the others stop giving. (KI and business owner)

The third type of extortion, found in both UC2 and UC3-4, is through purloining materials that cost money. Sometimes political party workers take stuff that is being sold in the shops, such as tea or food from a restaurant (FNN 23). Residents may face demands to donate animal hides during the Muslim religious festivals of *Eid-ul-Adha* (FNN 21). Hides are valuable and sold for leather, but the political parties collect the hides, claiming that the earnings will be used for welfare according to religious prescription.

The fourth type of extortion relates to development works, and residents may be charged for development that has undertaken with public funds. For example, residents of the Christian settlement were reportedly asked for money by MQM party representatives, who laid new water pipes over the existing ones and each house was charged a fixed amount for 'reconnection' without a government receipt (INN 13). A similar case was reported by a Pashtoon resident and shop owner in I-UC2 (INN 1).

Religious and Welfare Collections

The religious informal structures also collect and distribute money for community welfare (Section 5.4.1). However, such donations are voluntary in response to religious discourse, and the

religious authorities collect money openly, such as Kohistani leaders' collections for funeral services (INN 6, INN 7, INN 8). Similarly, the construction of Mosques/religious spaces is a community effort, usually done by people through contributing money or labour. Both the Balti-Shia and Kohistani Pashtoon communities have developed Mosques in this way (INN 2, INN 9). However, banned religious outfits[47] are also said to take donations using religious discourse in the mosques in I-UC2 (FNN 21). Political parties also collect money under this head claiming that it is used for the welfare wing of the party.

Development and utilities

Control over development work benefits the controllers in many ways. Although development funds are usually managed by local, provincial or national governments, if a political party is in government even the non-elected leaders have access to formal development funds. This is also the case for funds for service provision which are often channelled through party or community leaders, and used for political gains resulting in a blurring of the formal-informal divide. For example as discussed in Chapter 5, 75 million Rupees were granted to the non-elected local PPP representative for water improvements in North Nazimabad (Box 5.1), and the leader of Deer Colony continues to run an office after the Union Councils were abolished (Section 5.4.1). This enables the leaders to find employment for followers in government agencies, give development contracts to favoured people, carry out development where they wish, and gain extensive scope for rent-seeking.

MQM is blamed for not carrying out development in I-UC2 (Section 5.3), whereas JI is regarded as the champion which brought funds for development to the same area (INN 4, INN 5, INN 7, INN 8, INN 10, INN 11, INN 16). The Kati Pahari Road is a symbol of how political parties can direct funds for large-scale projects that might benefit their constituencies and side-line opponents (also see Section 6.3.1). There are several other benefits of linking with the dominant political party, such as access to utility services like water or getting informal settlements regularised and, in other cases, to have development in the area (Section 5.4.1).

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[47] There are various banned religious outfits working with different names, e.g. Sipah Sahaba Pakistan was banned in 2002, due to its alleged violent history against Shia minority; however, the outfit changed its name and appeared as Ahle-sunnat wal Jamaat.Similarly, the Shia military outfit Sipah Mohammed is also banned, it was developed to counter Sipah Sahaba while SSP had developed links with Taliban for training and resources (Yusuf, 2012, p. 17-19). One of the key informants mentioned that he had witnessed some alleged representatives of the Taliban in a mosque in I-UC2 collecting donations for their cause, similarly Yusuf (2012, p. 15) mentions that Karachi has become a centre for fund-raising, recruitment and collaboration for such banned outfits.

Control over development projects is also used actively to harm opponents as well as benefiting parties or leaders. The issue of water supply to I-UC2 is an example – MQM has the resources to find a solution as they have two elected MPA[48]s and one MNA[49] from the constituency, and they are perceived to have active control over the water board unions (INN 4, INN 5, INN 6, INN 11, INN 16). However, the Pashtoon community leaders are more active in their personal capacities than the political parties in solving individual water-access problems as they want to take the credit (INN 7).

The water issue in I-UC2 illustrates many dimensions of resource control by leaders and its use for their own benefits. On one hand, community leaders are blamed for the water scarcity and for corruption in selling the water. Some leaders are supposed to be running illegal water hydrants and water tanker supplies, while others are supposedly installing water pipelines selling to the nearby industrial area (SITE area) (INN 3, INN 6, INN 7, INN 8, INN 9, INN 10, and INN 16) (Box 5.1).

> There is only one solution to this problem – that the theft of water from our quota that is taking place by mafias in collaboration with the Water and Sewerage Board, and being supplied to the formally planned areas in North Nazimabad, needs to be stopped. We (the community) cannot hold those thieves (referring to certain local community leaders in I-UC2) directly to account. We don't have any support while those people are resourceful, they have links with gangs, mafias and political parties. We cannot even protest since the law does not listen to us. We are waiting for a revolution to come and solve these issues. (INN 7)

> This (theft) everyone knows, all the settlement knows. It has been published in UMMAT newspaper several times that our water is being sold, our previous Nazim has sold our water, and when people from ANP came in power they also did the same. All the water is going to the SITE area, to the mills/factories. (INN 9)

On the other hand, the same leaders are made responsible for solving water issues. As discussed in Chapter 5, the water management committee set up after a consultation between all the major community leaders of I-UC2 to ensure equal water supply of water to all settlements is an example (Box 5.1). The committee consists of local community leaders and elders. The committee's task is to ensure fair distribution of water across the neighbourhood, but interestingly several leaders blamed for the corruption and water theft are part of the committee (INN 4, INN 5, INN 6).

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[48] MPA: Member of the Provincial Legislative Assembly.
[49] MNA: Member of the National Legislative Assembly.

> How you can expect them (the water management committee) to work properly, as there are people of water mafia in the committee, they will definitely think about their own benefit. (INN 6)

Electricity provision also gives an insight into control over resources. Although electricity is supplied by a private company, many residents in I-UC2, especially on the hill get away without paying bills. Community leaders support them as they are often relatives and poor, and their support is a political asset for the leaders who may have paid money to develop land encroachments onto the hills.

> … but they (residents on the hill) start pleading that they are poor people and can't afford to pay bills, so how can we install meters? They ask us to pay for it and get it installed for them. They just try to avoid payment as much as they can. They use two to three water suction pumps, and in the end it is us who are paying the full amount who suffer. (INN 7)

6.3.5 Conflicts – A Spatial Control or Enforcement of Control?

This section looks at conflicts and explores how various informal structures and related communities respond to any change, threat, or violation of territorial boundaries. Conflict works as a spatial control to establish, expand or defend territory and also as a way of enforcing control, and in either case it demarcates boundaries and consolidates territory. Any attempt at infiltration, expansion or change in boundary, use of resources from another's territory, or harm to spaces of power is considered as violation of territorial boundaries, and is followed by conflicts or "attack and defence mechanisms" as Tilly (2004) describes it.

Almost all the communities and their informal structures have shown an inclination to defend and increase their territorial boundaries, both physical and social, while any change in the socio-spatial composition of a territory is vigorously resisted. As already discussed, each community member has a community identity which differentiates him/her from others and eventually helps define non-physical boundaries. Community members see their community as an extended family, and the settlement as their home, and may fight to resist challenge from outsiders, while social controls create resistance to any change from within the community (INN 3, INN 7, INN 11, INN 13, INN 18).

Attack and defence mechanisms

Conflicts are common in the case study area, especially in I-UC2 (INN 6, INN 10, INN 14, and INN 16). As noted in Chapter 5, different territories and informal structures show different patterns of conflict and conflict-resolution mechanisms (Section 5.4.1). This section focuses on conflicts over spatial incursions.

Conflicts are complex and correspond to the scalar identities of the communities and their territories. The local MQM-ANP disputes represent the conflict between two political territories which has the city-level link and also local implications. In I-UC2 conflict occurs over territorial boundaries, e.g. Hasan Zai Pashtoons have conflicts with the Christians because they share a boundary, while Kohistani Pashtoons have conflicts with both Balti-Shia and Christians as they share boundaries. Deer Colony and its leadership is in conflict with the Hasan Zai and Kohistani Pashtoons and *vice versa* (INN 3, INN 6, INN 8, INN 10). However, the whole territory (I-UC2) is united when Pashtoons (except Punjabi-Christians and Balti Shia) are in political conflict with MQM (INN 2, INN 3, INN 7, INN 8, INN 10, and INN 11). Interestingly, conflicts within UC3-4 are rare.

Religion based territories

Conflicts involving religious communities vary with the community or the formal-informal divide. In I-UC2, conflicts involving religious territories are always violent and usually recurring. The conflicts often start with a general issue but turn into a religious or sectarian fight, as illustrated below. In contrast, conflicts in UC3-4 involving religious-based territories are rare and non-violent. Religious spaces are sensitive locations, as the symbolic power centre of the territory, and disturbance of these can trigger community-wide attack and defence mechanisms.

Prayer areas form the centre of power as well as symbolic representation of the territory. Recent conflicts have been explored in chapter 5 (Box 5.6), which clearly shows how religious spaces are targeted and are used in personal conflicts to make it, first, as community scale conflict by exploiting religious feelings.. However, as a result the Christian community obtained weapons, which they use whenever they need to defend their territory.

The cause of conflicts in Pahar Gunj is similar to the other areas, but the majority or the powerful group always try to give it a religious colour. This way the party, even if at fault, gets help from the community and wins over the weak in terms of numbers. For example there was a conflict in

which someone stole fruit from a Pashtoon vendor, but the conflict became a religious conflict, Pashtoons attacked the Church, and fired at it etc. (INN 12)

In I-UC2, the Balti-Shia have been in constant conflict with the surrounding Sunni-Pashtoons for many years. The Sunni-Pashtoons also admit a bias against the Balti-Shia amongst the larger Pashtoon community (INN 8, INN 10), given the strong presence of anti-Shia religious-political groups such as SSP and ASWJ (KIs). Ideologies and religious ritual forms the ideological boundaries for the two groups, and violating these can trigger conflict. Similarly, resources within a territory also define the boundary, and so violating the boundary could lead to conflict. A recent and serious conflict took place over a water connection, which started when as a Sunni-Pashtoon resident made an illegal connection to the water pipeline that supplies the Balti-settlement reducing the already scarce supply of water, which affected his neighbour the most. The conflict between the two neighbours, Shia and Sunni, soon involved the whole community resulting in armed conflict in which five people were killed (Box 5.1). In this conflict, again, religious spaces played a central role, as the Sunni accused the Shia of attacking the Sunni Mosque and used their Mosques to propagate this message to get help from other Sunnis.

In UC3-4, the Bohri community in UC3-4 have increased their territory and number of residents owning property, resulting in a decrease of Sunni residents. The remaining Sunnis have many reservations about this expansion (FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 22), but cannot challenge it as the property titles and transactions are formal, and the Sunni-Muhajirs do not have any *Baradary*-based bonds. However, religious spaces are still sensitive locations here as well, and in one incident the Sunni-Muhajirs objected to the authorities about the newly developed Bohri *Jamat Khana*, which was built by refurbishing a bungalow located just in front of the Sunni Mosque, but the issue was resolved amicably (FNN 21, FNN 22). The Bohris also protect the main *Jamat Khana* as in 2012 it was bombed and eight Bohri residents were killed (Shehzad, 2012; Mirza, 2012). Another example is that when the apartment housing overlooking the *Jamat Khana* was bought by a non-Bohri it was considered a threat (Section 6.3.2).

Political party and territory

The conflicts and attacks between the two politically defined territories – the informal-Pashtoon-ANP and formal-Muhajir-MQM areas – have been frequent and intense. Fights surfaced after MQM assumed control of the city government in 2004-05 and peaked during 2007-2012, although

it subsided when the Taliban started to take over ANP territories (Gayer, 2014, pp. 184) and ultimately by mid-2013 ANP closed most of its offices in the city (Chapter 4).

Residents of I-UC2 see the activities of MQM as an attack on their territory and ban MQM in their locality. Thus, the dynamics of local political conflict is embedded in city-wide politics (Chapter 4). One of the perceptions of Pashtoon leaders and residents is that MQM wants to control I-UC2, which is why MQM is opposed in the area, and political or development activities by MQM are seen as a conspiracy and attack on the territory (INN 2, INN 4, INN 6, INN 7, INN 11, INN 13). The conflict between an ANP leader and local MQM leaders over the erection of a barrier at one of the main entrances to I-UC2 is an example (Section 6.3.1). Similarly, the construction of the Kati Pahari Road was seen by many locals as a symbol of attack-and-defence between MQM-Muhajir and ANP-Pashtoons, as the project was considered an attempt to infiltrate Pashtoon territory and was not welcomed by the Pashtoon-ANP groups (INN 2, INN 4, FNN 24, FNN 25).

Physical attacks have been widely reported by both MQM-Muhajir and ANP-Pashtoons. Respondents from both sides confirmed armed conflict and incidents of crossfire between the two territories (INN 4, INN 11, FNN 25). In addition, both sides had to develop an armed surveillance and watch-and-ward system to avoid attack, especially at night (INN 11, FNN 21). MQM used existing barriers in UC3-4 to defend their territory against perceived Pashtoon-ANP incursions. Pashtoon leaders interviewed admitted that they carry a pistol on them when they leave the territory because they fear attack (INN 9, INN 11).

Baradary and territory

Territories defined around *Baradary* within I-UC2 territory also experience conflict, attack and defence mechanisms. For example there are serious conflicts between community leaders from Deer Colony and the Hasan Zai and the Kohistani Pashtoon leadership who think that Deer Colony is stealing their water (INN 3, INN 6, INN 7, INN 10, INN 11). However, the Deer Colony leadership blames its opponents for racial discrimination (INN 18). Other communities do not criticise the Deer Colony leadership as they fear a violent response, especially over water (INN 3).

Cultural conflicts

Cultural sensitivities also create conflicts, for example over dress codes and role of women (e.g. clothing, segregation and marriages) which is an important factor in territorial identity (Section 5.4.2). One of the reasons why the Ismaili community installed barriers was because the men

from I-UC2 used to come and show inappropriate behaviour towards the Ismaili women (FNN 20). However, if the researcher had been able to gain better access to women interviewees a different picture of territoriality may have emerged.

Rangers' territory

Although the Rangers control an area in Block A, UC3-4, originally built for government-employee housing, residents from UC3-4 have serious reservations about their presence and often come into conflict with them, according to a leader from the majority political party. Box 5.2 has already mentioned that the Rangers are under threat of terrorist attacks so remain on high alert, and residents living in and around the Ranger-controlled area in Block A face difficulties as the Rangers do not allow on-street parking and close roads. Residents often have to go to the authorities to complain, especially on the road closures (KI). Sometimes residents are threatened with illegal detention if they protest against illegal and unannounced controls (KI).

6.3.6 The Overlapping Socio-Spatial Dimensions of Controls

This section has identified several spatial control mechanisms that help establish, demarcate, consolidate, and defend territorial boundaries, and thus, reflect on space production. However, the majority of spatial controls overlap with social control mechanisms and are difficult to separate e.g. property control and demographic control mechanisms.

Spatial controls mechanisms highlight the process of space production and relate to the social dimension of power, discussed in Chapter 5. The discussion here suggests that that space production takes place through myriad ways, involving both physical and non-physical measures. For example: access control is practiced through creating barriers, gates and walls but equally practiced through perceptions, spreading rumours and establishing invisible systems of surveillance; property control uses both market and non-market dimensions, e.g. the Bohri community has used market mechanism to buy property, but use discourse around community and religion to keep the newly developed properties for the community members only, and use barriers and gates to mark their territory. In the case of Ismaili community, establishing a cooperative housing scheme only for the Ismaili community highlights administrative dimension of space production.

The objective of rent-seeking, distinguishes property controls practiced by *Baradary*-based or religious informal structures from the implicit resource control and political endeavours of political parties and criminals. The objectives and mechanisms of access control varies across different areas; in I-UC2 the religious leaders control access to ensure the security of religious spaces, while in UC3-4, the religious communities prefer to be cordoned off using barriers and gates e.g. the Bohri and Ismaili communities. The *Baradary*-based communities of I-UC2 do not need physical measures as the complex, organic and narrow street pattern and the steep slopes on the hill make it difficult for outsiders to navigate, and unorganised surveillance tactics are common. The political parties are not involved in erecting barriers but in UC3-4 they use of the existing barriers set up by the neighbourhood committees; instead they make or block off roads for access control, but rely mainly on non-physical surveillance, policing or rumours. Neighbourhood committees are the ones that work at street-scale, but the political parties also benefit.

Religious leaders are more interested in their minority identity, and are retreating from crime through non-violent and formal means, first through property control and later through access control. The *Baradary*-based structures vary in degree to which they use property controls, with Deer Colony being the most effective, although non-violent. In contrast, the Hasan Zai territory reports non-passive ways of control, e.g. Muhajirs are leaving because of differences in culture and fear, but not through active intimidation. Thus identity-based structures, *Baradary* and religious-based, use property control for non-rent-seeking purposes. Political parties are the ones that most effectively use property controls for both political and economic benefit, which deepens social divisions and territorialisation.

Any attempt to change, infiltrate or threaten the boundary, real or perceived, leads to conflict characterised by attack-and-defence. In I-UC2, small disputes rapidly flare up into religious-based violent conflict, while UC3-4 rarely experiences any such conflict partly because they do not mix with other communities. In I-UC2, the tribal Pashtoon communities have differences but it rarely leads to a larger conflict, as the community leaders are quick to step or as a minority in the city they avoid such potential flashpoints.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the spatial dimension of the North Nazimabad case study area, corresponding to the political and social domains explored in Chapter 5. It has highlighted the complex overlapping nature of social and spatial dimensions both in social controls and in power dynamics thus adding to the theoretical understanding of power-society-space nexus. It has further highlighted the dynamics of the city to local-evel link, alongwith formal-informal symbiotic relation, especially in spatial dimension by highlighting measures of space production and how these feed into socio-spatial segregation and conflicts around control over resources, thus commenting on the undesirable outcomes of informality. The variety of informal structures and their connection to the government and the common citizens has further concretise the theoretical understanding of working from 'between'.`

It is found that the territories behave as an entity beyond physical dimension operating as a combined, yet complex, construct of social groups, physical and administrative boundaries and the controls enforced by informal structures, highlighting power-society-space connection. This has resulted in a complex variety of overlapping territories with varying scales and boundaries corresponding to social, spatial and administrative attributes. Two scales are evident i.e. district-level (city-level being the largest) corresponds to the physical definition and overlaps with the political and administrative dimensions, while the neighbourhood-level corresponds to identities of the resident groups, whether ethnic, *Baradary* based or religious based. Territories are also relative, in that, they emerge or disappear in contrast to opposing territories, for example I-UC2 emerges as one social Pashtoon territory (informal-Pashtoon-ANP) against the UC3-4 Muhajir (formal-Muhajir-MQM) territory. Likewise, other local groups emerge as Sunni-Shia, Bohri-Sunni, Ismaili-Sunni, Muslim-Christian, and around various tribal affiliations, such as Hasan Zai, Kohistani, from Deer, Afridi etc.

The identity-based informal structures and communities, operational at the neighbourhood-level, form hierarchy with the district-level political informal structures, reflected in territorial configurations in which politically defined territories contain sub-territories on identity bases (Figure 6.1). The *Baradary,* religious-based and neighbourhood committees all prefer not to challenge political controls either because the territories overlap with their areas, e.g. in *Baradary*-based Pashtoon areas, or they do not want to challenge political control out of fear and want to remain aloof, e.g. the religious communities and the neighbourhood committees, thus the street control and strict spatial controls remains with the dominating political parties.

The various communities either internalise or accept the controls which are taken as a trade-off against the service provision, as part of tradition, religious bonds or out of fear, depending on the type of informal structure. Communities gain some benefits of improved protection and service provision, while the leadership (informal structures) profit from improved spatial sovereignty and rent-seeking of various sorts, especially political parties who control public funds channelled through the party using informal means to claim legitimacy and the electoral vote, creating a formal-informal symbiotic relation by blurring formal-informal divide.

Resistance to socio-spatial change is followed by conflict, which has various causes that are directly or indirectly linked with lacking formal services and controls and rising informality. Territorialisation helps religious-based communities to feel secure and to maintain the religious hierarchy and practice their beliefs. *Baradary*-based communities want to retain their traditional tribal culture and tribal elders resist any change in power dynamics (INN 11). Political parties have obvious reasons for territoriality; for electoral supremacy, to serve their identity-based political narrative and to control territory as a resource. Neighbourhood committees in contrast, are reactive – a defence mechanism against an increasingly urban spatial control.

Conclusively, the absence of effective local service provision, security or oversight through union councils, creates space for informal structures to adopt state-like characteristics including spatial sovereignty, service provision and security patrols and gain benefits of funding, power, and legitimacy. At neighbourhood-level, the informal structures i.e. *baradary* and religon based, initiate spatial controls while political structures benefit from identity divisions to add a further layer in the power hierarchy and win politcal support. Local communities gain some benefits of service provision, conflict resolution and protection, and yet in a wider context these territories add to the socio-spatial segregation in Karachi.

The identity based divisions at the neighbourhood-level, are not a unique phenomena and many other cities in the world experience the same issue, however, it is the overlapping of political party structures, blurring of the formal-informal divide, and politicisation of formal structures that makes competition in Karachi intense and violent, especially in connection with informality. Political conflicts at the city and national levels impact at the street level intensifying socio-spatial divisions.

Chapter 7

Supplementary Case Studies:
Showing Patterns of Power Contestation and
Related Socio-Spatial Controls

7.1 Introduction

This chapter also focuses on the local-level and analyses the empirical findings from three supplementary case studies, Lyari, PIB Colony and Gulzar-e-Hijri, KDA Scheme 33. The objective is to add depth to the understanding of informal land controls by firstly, exploring various types of enclaves and informal structures that were not found in the North Nazimabad case study. Secondly and more importantly, the chapter looks at relations between various informal structures competing for spatial and social control over resources in various parts of Karachi, and how they use informal land controls to claim resources, produce space and to oust opponents. It also aims to explore whether the conclusions from the case of North Nazimabad apply to other areas and could be contextually generalised, or whether North Nazimabad forms a unique context.

There were three methodological reasons for selecting these supplementary case studies (Section 3.3.3 and 4.2.2): first, to cover a range of types of enclaves, informal structures and types of informal land controls not covered in North Nazimabad case study; second, to explore whether conclusions are representative of the wider socio-spatial processes in Karachi; third, to cover the various geographic zones of the city developed over various time periods and representing different socio-economic groups.

The chapter is divided into three sections. First, the chapter looks at the notorious area of Lyari, one of the oldest, low-income parts of the city. It introduces drug gangs and politico-criminal groups as informal structures which engage in the spatial contests over control of resources resulting in ghettoization such that the area has become a no-go area for law enforcement agencies (LEAs). The section documents the process of conversion of various criminal gangs into politico-criminal groups that ruled the district and challenged formal power structures. It discusses the contest between competing structures, identifies various socio-spatial control mechanisms adopted, and demonstrates the rise of informal structures from the local to the city level.

The chapter then examines the area of PIB Colony. PIB Colony is a middle income, post-partition area developed by the government, currently, in the geographic centre of Karachi. In this case, informal structures had obtained a monopoly over resources and rent-seeking, which was challenged and taken over by a competing group when the initial group regained its control. The swings of power show the use of various socio-spatial control mechanisms. Furthermore, the case

study demonstrates a blurring of the formal-informal divide by the dominant political party as the party's grass root organisation controls the locality, while the formal services and development funds are channelled through them.

The third section looks at the sprawling peripheral area of Gulzar-e-Hijri, KDA Scheme 33. This case is interesting as a peri-urban area that is part-occupied and part-developing; it is a strong example of the government's weak control over land development processes in the periphery of Karachi. Thus competing informal structures contest in the developed part while in the under-developed part, one group enjoys a monopoly. Since the Scheme 33 is a sprawling area with varying socio-spatial characteristics, sub-areas were identified. The first sub-area covers the fully developed part of Scheme-33 around AHI Road, and the second sub-area lies around about Dawood Bungalows, a suburban partly-developed locality. These show various examples of control, contestation, rent-seeking, and conflicts that result.

The chapter analyses the three case studies using the same framework as in North Nazimabad, but has several areas of departure. First, the methods used were different, as North Nazimabad was a detailed study based on in-depth interviews of a large number of local people. However, it was unsafe to go into several of the areas, so the case studies in this chapter depend on a few, but in-depth key informant interviews and surveys, and local secondary sources, mainly newspaper articles. Secondly, the reporting is different, as North Nazimabad required anonymity of interviewees and informal structures, especially the community leaders. In Lyari individuals could be named where the information was drawn from press reports and names were already published. A few detailed press reports were also available for PIB Colony, especially on the rise and fall of the Magsi gang. Scheme 33 is explored in a less detail than the other cases, first because the area is spread out and second because there is little secondary data, as events in the periphery go comparatively unnoticed in the press. The analysis focuses on spatial controls, but does not examine the broader cultural, religious, gender or ethnic controls discussed in Chapter 5.

7.2 Lyari, A History of Power Contestation and Territoriality

7.2.1 Introduction

Lyari is famous as one of the oldest settlements in Karachi. It has an African minority ethnic group, a relic of the slave trade, and a population of sports-fans and sportsmen, including footballers and boxers that have progressed to international level (Yusuf, 2012). Politically, Lyari has been a stronghold for the PPP since the 1970s but is now slipping out of PPP control against a backdrop of rising power held by gangs and their mutual conflicts[50]. The locality is notorious for its gangs, violence and criminal activities (Kirmani, 2014).

> "Lyari is referred to by outsiders as 'the Colombia of Karachi' because of its perceived control by drug mafias. However, the residents of this area proudly refer to Lyari as 'Karachi ki maan' (the mother of Karachi) because it is one of the oldest settlements in the city." (Kirmani, 2014)

Lyari describes a unique case of power contests and informal land controls practiced by violent politico-criminal gangs. Drug gangs exercise power over different areas, and although Lyari was originally settled by Baloch ethnic groups, some areas are now dominated by other ethnic immigrants. In the words of a local planning expert, the gang war within Lyari is a reflection of power contests at the city level (EC 3). Gang wars of Lyari are characterised by turf wars, illegal rent seeking of all kinds and killings.

Lyari has a long history of gangs, which since 2000 have started to affect both residents of Lyari and the city beyond its boundaries (Figure 7.1). Lyari is situated between the port, industry and the city centre. To the south-west lies the largest port in Pakistan, to the northwest the Port Industrial Area and Sindh Industrial and Trading Estate (SITE) Area, abutting SITE the Shershah Recycled Material Market lies to the north, and City's grain and other wholesale markets and the central business district (CBD) are situated to the south (Map 7.1). Thus, Lyari lies at a strategic location where much of the city's financial transactions and business takes place, which boosts the power of gangs. Conflicts, amongst gangs, revolve around the drug-smuggling money, crimes and the huge possibilities of rent-seeking (Gayer, 2014), whereas, personal vendettas also play a crucial role in the power dynamics (Figure 7.1).

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[50] At the time of the fieldwork, till mid-2014. The conflict has subsided after the start of the Karachi Operation. Criminals have gone into hiding or have been killed.

Figure 7.1: The problems in Lyari have made international headlines. (*The Economist,* 2012)

Lyari has followed a similar path to North Nazimabad, featuring an absence of formal governance leading to the rise of competing groups vying for control over public resources, suggesting a similar impact of city level power-politics (Chapter 4). However, the recent history of gangs of Lyari shows that it has also affected city level politics.

Census 1998 estimates in 2005 (KMC-GOS, [*no date*]) suggest that Lyari Town has a population of 923,177, and covers approximately 8 Sq. Km. Current estimates put the population at between 1.5 to 2.0 million. Under the (disputed) Sindh Local Governance Ordinance 2001 (Box 4.1), Lyari Town lies within South District and had 11 union councils. It includes two full constituencies of the Provincial Assembly, PS.108, PS.109, and parts of two other constituencies, PS.110 and PS.111, and one constituency of the National Assembly, NA 248, and part of one other, NA 249, and is thus represented by various political parties which share boundaries in Lyari.

Map 7.1: Case Study 2: Lyari

Social characteristics

Lyari started as Baloch and Sindhi settlement, however, over time other ethnic groups migrated to the area, particularly Pashtoons, Punjabi and Muhajirs who together now equal the Baloch and

Sindhi populations (Figure 7.1). Smaller enclaves of Hindus and Christians also exist. Irrespective of the demographics, PPP has been the dominant political party in the Lyari constituencies since 1970 (Gayer, 2014, p.144).

Figure 7.1: Population distribution according to the provincial constituencies of Lyari. (*Dawn-GIS*)

The population of Lyari is mostly low-income with many people working in jobs directly or indirectly related to the port, neighbouring industries, and the wholesale markets nearby. There are also Muhajir settlements in the surrounding areas that include parts of Agra Taj colony, areas around Gutter Baghicha and Usmanabad. Muhajirs in those settlements are low-income often working in the marble industry in Old Golimar, and laundry industry along Lyari River. Kutchi Memon, Shia, Khoja-Shia and Ismaili enclaves exist within Lyari Town and the surrounding localities.

Social hierarchy and power dynamics

Historically several elite Baloch and Memon families lived in Lyari who were often recognised as community elders/leaders, for example the Gabol and Haroon families. These families were among the richest families in the city before and just after the 1947 partition. Gayer (2014, p.149) mentions that the British had to limit the Gabols, an elite Baloch family, buying land as they held a majority of the city's land. The Haroons have been famous for their philanthropy, financing schools, colleges, and dispensaries. Both families used to play an active role in local and regional politics, but both families moved out of the settlement when crime and violence started to increase in the 1980s, or perhaps violence and crimes surged when these elite families moved out (EC 1).

Map 7.2: Ethnic composition of Lyari

Gangs and political conflicts have also created a new social hierarchy in Lyari (Section 7.2.2, and Appendix 7.1). This has divided the Baloch areas under control of gangs, while it has also seen a recent ethnic divide especially among Baloch and Kutchi Memons who have been living together since pre-partition times. The Kutchi Memons originally came from area of Kutch, now between the Pakistan-India borders near the Arabian Sea, and are a part of larger Memon community in Karachi and elsewhere. The community has several denominations that are linked together through community organisations that are further linked worldwide[51].

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[51] Generally, Memon community is a common identity term representing people from different origins in Gujrat and Sind region, in actual, there are several sub-communities within Memon community, e.g. Bantva Memon, Kutchi Memon, Kru-kru Memons etc. The communities always have a registered community organisation that is run through donations and charity and carries out welfare works and keep the community intact. The community organisation is further linked vertically to central organisation and to the world organisation such as the World Memon Organisation that has country chapters in each country (WMOP, [*no date*]).

Spatial characteristics

The neighbourhood of Lyari is mixed land-use and the internal roads are dotted with convenience stores. In addition, cottage industry and warehousing on the north side abutting Lyari River and Mirza Adam Khan Road are common. Transport operations, garages, mechanics and auto parts businesses have clustered around Lea Market and along Mirza Adam Khan Road. Shopping areas includes Jhat Pat market and Lea Market area, and various smaller commercial areas. The mixed land-use also makes it favourable for informal rent-seeking activities.

The plot sizes vary from 50 sq. yds. to around 120 sq. yds. However, in recent times there has been a huge demand for housing in the neighbourhood, resulting in increased real estate values, and as a result a large area has been turned into a high-density neighbourhood with 3-5 storey apartments on small plots, served by narrow lanes (EC 1; Hasan et al., 2013).

7.2.2 Petty Drug Gangs to City Level Politico-Criminal Groups

Lyari gangs existed before the 1947 partition, then dealing in contraband items such as liquor (EC 1), but have now expanded from small groups of drug peddlers and strongmen to city level politico-criminal groups. Drug smuggling started in the 1980s during the Afghan-Soviet war and more recently criminal activities extended to include kidnapping, extortion, killings, land grabbing, and street crimes. Gang warfare developed an ethnic dimension, as the gangs developed links with political parties and later became political parties in their own right, as Gayer suggests (2014). Till the mid-2013, Lyari was no longer under the control of LEAs, as officials were unable to enter the locality. For example there was a famous police operation in April-May 2012[52] to root out the criminals, but after almost a week's stand-off the police could still not enter Lyari, and the operation failed (Gayer, 2014, p.155). The Karachi Operation, launched in September 2013 (Section 4.3.1) brought relative calm to the area, reducing gang wars and killings, and opening up access for all, although this success has been mainly attributed to the extra-judicial elimination of alleged criminals by the LEAs (HRCP, 2014, p.75; *The Express Tribune,* 2015a).

Laurent Gayer, a French researcher, who specializes in the study of urban dynamics and violent mobilisations in India and Pakistan studied Karachi, first as Ph.D. researcher then as scholar attached to various research centres, from 2001 till 2013 (SciencesPo Centre de recherches

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[52] Sind Police conducted the military operation under the command of famous police officer Inspector Chaudhry Aslam, who was later killed in a bomb attack on his car.

internationals. [*No date*]). The outcome of the research is a book "Karachi: Ordered Disorder and the Struggle for the City" (Gayer, 2014). The material below draws largely on this study, but has been triangulated and consolidated through extensive analyses of newspaper reports and Key Informant interviews (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, ECCS 2). (See Appendix 7.1 for a detailed historical account of this summarised version)

The origins of modern gang-warfare in Lyari are a direct result of violent rivalries between powerful criminal families dating back 30 or 40 years. Gayer (2014, p. 123-158) (and also EC 3) gives a detailed account of Lyari's history from the 1960s when the district was the sole territory of Kala Nag (Nabi Bakhsh) the famous muscleman.

Later in the 1990s, Rehman Dakait and Arshad Puppo were the main architects of the recent gang wars, involving politico-criminals with political ambitions and Baloch rhetoric in Lyari. They collaborated until the late 1990s, before becoming arch rivals. Their conflict started a new chapter of the rivalry that witnessed the killing of 500-600 people and the emergence and disappearance of several splinter groups from 2003 till 2008 (Ali, N. S. 2014).

The start of the gang war between Rehman Dakait and Arshad Puppo is said to be the point when MQM entered the scene, as Arshad is said to have colluded with MQM against the PPP-supported Rehman Dakait (Gayer, 2014). Arshad Puppo was arrested in 2006. In the absence of Arshad, Rehman offered a truce to other gangs, and they joined forces with other sovereign gangs to create People's Aman Committee (PAC) in 2008 (Gayer, 2014, p. 142).

Under the umbrella of PAC (Table 4.2) and individually Rehman carried out various welfare initiatives that made him the undisputed leader for local residents, who called him *Khan Bhai* (Big Brother). Rehman then became the *Sardar* (Tribal Chief)*.* Changes in Rehman's popular names shows his trajectory of position in the society; first he was renamed from Rehman Baloch to Rehman *Dakait* (bandit), later he was called *Sardar* Rehman Baloch (The Tribal Chief) while many also termed him Robin Hood of Lyari highlighting his social legitimacy and inclinations. During his peak of power, he emerged as a challenger for PPP, as he and later PAC dictated the choice of electoral candidates and political strategy in Lyari (Gayer, 2014, pp. 139, 142, 158). Rehman was killed in a controversial police encounter in 2009 (Gayer, 2014, p.146-147).

After Rehman's demise, Uzair Baloch took over the leadership of PAC. PAC started to increase its influence and attempted to venture beyond Lyari onto MQM's turf (Gayer, 2014, p.152; EC 1, EC 3, EC 4, ECCS 2). During that time PAC had, allegedly, become a *de-facto* military wing of PPP

(Yusuf, 2012, Gayer, 2014, p. 154), and was used to deal with MQM's street power throughout the city resulting high crime rates and violence.

Figure 7.2: History of gangs and their relations

The Karachi Operation started in September 2013 with the aim of bringing peace to the city (Section 4.3.1). Since the Operation entered Lyari, many gangsters have gone into hiding, including the PAC leadership, while many of the lower ranking gangsters and other criminals have been killed in alleged encounters by the LEAs (Section 4.3.1). Uzair Baloch has been, reportedly, arrested by Interpol at Dubai Airport allegedly travelling with a fake ID (Mandhro, 2014c), while some sources claim he has been brought back although not officially disclosed, supposedly, due to political reasons.

7.2.3 Performance of Formal and the Informal Structures

Lyari has been a victim of negligence and blurring of formal-informal boundaries by formal government and its agencies over many years, both in social and spatial terms. The emergence of informal structures is strongly linked to the lack of effective formal local governance and high politicisation of the Sindh Government and its institutions, involving political hiring especially in Police Department, that indirectly involves the area, as the residents are die-hard supporters of PPP who have been in Sindh Government since 1970s, with a few exceptions (seeTable 4.2).

The isolation of Lyari started in the 19th century. Karachi was conquered by British colonial forces in 1839 (Hasan et al. 2002, p.15-21) and developed according to a British Colonial pattern of

spatial development that distinguished "White Town" from "Black Town" or "Native Town" (Lari and Lari, 1996, p. 59). Lyari was designated a "Native Town" and was not allowed representation on the Municipal Council, giving rise to the exclusion and class divide that still exists in many forms today (Viqar, 2014, p. 370-371).

Population growth outstripped development over many years. Until 1976, land rights in Lyari remained un-regularised, and leases were only secured after Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto[53] of PPP came in power which starting the long-lasting political affiliation for PPP in Lyari (Gayer, 2014, p.143-144). During the 1970s, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's regime brought development to the area, many young men went to the Middle East as migrant workers, and others were given jobs in government offices. During that period violence in Lyari remained low while culture and sports thrived. The PPP affiliation continued into the 1980s, and when PPP assumed power in 1988, development projects were again announced and Balochi and Sindhis were given employment. However, this time the promised development projects never materialised, even after PPP won a second term (Gayer, 2014, p. 144). From 1997 till 2008 PPP gradually, lost power; first in the centre, later in city government/administration and then in Provincial government, so other ruling political parties, especially MQM, were blamed for negligence towards Lyari. This period coincides with the emergence of violent gang crime and the drug mafias. During this period the area experienced intermittent interventions of LEAs to restore control over crime, but limited provision of other basic services, the lack of which lead to the violent situation in the first place.

Provision of political-patronage jobs has benefitted PPP supporters in Lyari but has hampered the ability of state institutions to solve wider problems in the city. For example, in the Police Department, it is reported that political parties have found jobs for their supporters, which also gives them access to security information before any action is taken against politicians. Gayer (2014, p.149) suggests that the employment quota in the police was one reason for the conflict between Rehman *Dakait* and Nabeel Gabol, the ex-MNA[54] and popular PPP leader from Lyari. Reports suggested that Rehman wanted to employ men from Lyari and had already developed reliable police connections that enabled him to evade capture by the LEAs, while Nabeel Gabol wanted to recruit PPP supporters from all over Karachi (Gayer, 2014, p.149). Influential sources within the police were also the reason that Arshad Puppo was able to run his gang even from jail from 2006 till 2012 (Khan 2012a).

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[53] Founder of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and father of slain Benazir Bhutto. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was hanged in 1979 under the Martial Law regime of General Zia-ul-Haq.

[54] Member National Legislative Assembly

From 1998 to 2008, the country was under military rule, but local government was established under SLGO-2001 (Box 4.1). MQM controlled local government in Karachi from 2004-2009, and with substantial development funds at its disposal the city witnessed unprecedented development (Box 4.1), but Lyari remained comparatively deprived. Lyari Town had its own development budget and elected representatives affiliated to PPP, however, there was popular discontent about the political leadership and the MQM-led local government was considered biased (Section 4.4.3). This discontent also formed the core of the PAC narrative against MQM and the basis for its political and military developments in both Lyari and other areas. Zafar Baloch, the second in command of PAC gave an interview in September 2013, a few days before his murder, and mentioned that the city has assets, but MQM was trying to control these, which PAC would not allow and would take its due share (Gayer, 2014, p. 124-126; Zahra-Malik, 2013).

Lack of formal facilities in Lyari, particularly for sports, has also played a role in the making of gangsters. Many gangsters were once footballers or aspired to be good sportsmen like Babu *Dakait* (*Dawn*, 2009a) and Ghaffar Zikri (Hussain, 2015). The lack of opportunities was one reason why young men like them ended up as gangsters. Other provincial and federal organisational issues also affected residents of Lyari. Banks and other institutions started to close their sponsorship for sports teams, and Lyari-based sportsmen lost their livelihoods (Gayer, 2014, p.126) while the absence of PPP in provincial government (2000-2008) meant that there were limited opportunities for employment in government agencies.

During the 2000s, MQM dominated local and provincial government through various political permutations because of its strong ties to the military regime. MQM dominated local government until elections were suspended in 2009, and provincial government until 2008 and then in coalition with PPP (Box 4.1). MQM showed strong control over politics and resources during that time (2005-2008). MQM's political control was also coupled with the strong control of service institutions such as the Karachi Electric (KE, previously KESC), KWSB (Karachi Water & Sanitation Board) and KDA (Karachi Development Authority). The absence of government services and development projects in Lyari resulted in very strong anti-MQM sentiments especially from PAC (Chapter 4).

The problem has been exacerbated because of the absence of the elected local government system since 2009 (Alam and Waljidi, 2013), keeping residents of Lyari completely out of formal governance of any kind.

Thus, the void in formal governance and service provision in Lyari has for many years been filled by informal structures led by strong personalities in welfare works. Firstly, it was the Haroon family after partition, who supported many services, such as schools, dispensaries and colleges (EC 1, Gayer, 2014, p.143). More recently, Rehman Dakait, during his heyday carried out extensive philanthropic and welfare work, including financial support for poor families, sports clubs, education and educational institutions and funding other welfare-oriented NGOs making him the favourite leader in Lyari (Gayer, 2014, p. 142-143). He was termed as the "Robin Hood" of Lyari by many, and his murder was not taken as the killing of a gangster but as a blow to Lyari (Rind, 2009). Viqar (2014, p.374-376) describes a well maintained park in Lyari that was controlled by gangsters, and although funding came from government this was channelled through informal structures, a working dynamic common to other political parties in the city.

7.2.4 Territories, Boundaries and Conflicts

The historical account of making, splintering and dissolution of gangs in Lyari has corresponding spatial and social dimensions. Each gang is associated with a particular territory based on the spatial control and social influence.

Territories play a central role in Lyari as different gangs control different zones. Gayer (2014, p.141) identifies various gangs prior to formation of PAC, which includes Rehman Dakait's Gang, the Baba Ladla Group, the Jheango Group, Arshad Puppo's group and the Ghaffar Zikri group as major groups with defined territories (Map 7.3).

Rehman Dakait purged several gangs to form PAC, including those led by Baba Ladla, Ghaffar Zikri and Jheango (Section 7.2.2). His agreement was that all the commanders would retain their territory and their resource-generation sources including the drug business, gambling etc., but street crime and support for Arshad Puppo was not allowed, as Hussain (2015) reported. The rise of PAC made Lyari a single territory with Arshad Puppo's area as exception. The rise of Kutchi Rabita Committee (KRC) and the split within PAC after killing of Rehman Dakait again re-arranged the territorial configurations, now with three contenders including KRC, PAC and Baba Ladla's territories – Khan (2013d) has shown this power configuration in a map (Map 7.4). However, the boundaries within Lyari were difficult for contenders to cross, as PAC, MQM, KRC, BLA and Arshad Puppo's group were closely guarding their territories (Khan, 2013d).

Boundaries of gang control are usually based on the confines of the existing settlements, often separated by roads or streets. In the case of the area controlled by Arshad Puppo's Group, the Lyari River separates it from the main Lyari settlement (Map 7.4). In other cases, there are neutral buffer zones between two contending gangs, such as the Jhat Pat market where violence sometimes occurs when warring gangs attack each other (Khan, 2014b). In other cases, the nature of community also defines a boundary e.g. in KRC, where the Kutchi Memon residents of southern Lyari define the territorial boundary (Map 7.4).

Conflicts amongst the gangs of Lyari have a long history (Section 7.2.2). The reasons for conflict are usually clear, including access to resources, rivalry, reaction to the killing of a gang member, violation of a boundary or damage to businesses etc.

Violating territorial boundaries physically or by extracting rent from an opponent's territory leads to conflict. PAC's ventures into areas beyond its control, like Kharadar and Meethadar, led to conflicts with MQM (EC 1, EC 3, EC 4, ECCS 2). For example, the wholesale markets around Lyari had been under MQM's control for a long time, but MQM was challenged by PAC for consuming resources that belonged to the natives according to political narrative (Zehra-Malik, 2013). This conflict escalated when PAC joined a peace rally with Awami Tehrik (AT) against MQM's demands for a new province, which passed through the MQM-controlled Kharadar; the peace rally was attacked and several people were killed (*The Express Tribune,* 2012b), and sources alleged that the location of the incident was allegedly controlled by MQM.

Personal vendetta also results in conflict and violence. As mentioned above, Arshad Puppo and Rehman Dakait became enemies when Arshad desecrated the grave of Rehman's father (Section 7.2.2). Arshad Puppo was also reportedly responsible for killing Uzair's father, resulting in Arshad's murder allegedly by PAC gangs (Section 7.2.2). The ascent of Ghaffar Zikri is also linked with the killing of his cousin and friend Mohammed Ali which forced Ghaffar to give up the prospect of becoming a footballer, to become a notorious gangster (see Hussain, 2015).

7.2.5 Socio-Spatial Controls

The rise of gangs as informal structures within Lyari has depended on various socio-spatial control mechanisms to control territory, with control over resources as the main objective, along with political control as a more recent addition. Demographic controls by gangs are also important in keeping the support group loyal.

Social controls

It is assumed that the people of Lyari protest when the police try to operate against the gangs. Actually people are frightened and they support the law enforcement agencies, and when there are protests it is because some innocent has been killed or arrested (EC 1).

Control over protests is one example of the many social controls imposed by gangs on Lyari residents, but controls are also exercised over political activities, anti-social behaviour, street crimes, and the ethnicity of residents. Apart from social controls, there have been several social impacts of conflicts on the residents of Lyari (Appendix 7.2).

Control of anti-social activity

The informal structures are always involved in welfare activities that win legitimacy for them, as was found in North Nazimabad (Chapter 5 & 6). Rehman Dakait, when combining various gangs and forming PAC, declared that all the gangs would be responsible for curbing street crimes in their territories (Hussain, 2015). Later on, Rehman chalked out certain social controls (Gayer, 2014, p.148-149) within PAC-controlled territory including, banning drug peddling, and firing aerial shots at wedding ceremonies, failing which would lead to 20,000 Rupees fine. He also tried to curb street crimes through various punishments. He established a system of problem solving and conflict resolution that was further enhanced by his successor Uzair Baloch through a *Jirga* system, or council of elders from various influential families of Lyari (Gayer, 2014, p.147-148; Viqar, 2014, p. 375-376).

Forced political support/political control

Political affiliation and support for the controlling gang is essential. Residents must either support the gang or keep quiet, and there is no other option (ECCS 2). Such a situation has been imposed several times, for example, in the conflict resulting in eviction of Kutchi families (Section 7.2.2). Similarly, the residents of Lyari were ordered by PAC not to attend a PPP rally on 18 October 2014, supposed to be an important political event (Mandhro, 2014b)[55] given that residents of Lyari had been diehard supporters of PPP. Later on, two young residents of Lyari were killed as they openly showed an inclination towards PPP against PAC directives and attended the PPP rally, reported *The Express Tribune* (2014j). Opposing political groups are not welcomed in a controlled

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[55] PAC was against the PPP rally in Karachi while Baba Ladla group was in support (Mandhro, S. 2014b)

territory, and for example, MQM's activists are not allowed to carry out political activity in the PAC controlled territories.

Demographic control

There have been attempts at demographic controls, either to oust opponents or to control resources. These include attacks on Kutchi Memons in Agra Taj Colony and surroundings, which resulted in mass migration of thousands of Kutchi residents (Section 7.2.2). Similarly Hindu and Christian minorities have been excluded from their historical residential areas, reported *The Express Tribune* (2013m; 2014a[56]). In another case, around 200 Shia families moved to Ancholi, a Shia enclave in Central District, Karachi (EC 3), which was not reported in the press. However, there are doubts whether the forced exclusion was due to conflict over land (ECCS 2) or was triggered on the basis of identity.

Gang management

One of the important dimensions that distinguish gangs from political parties is that gang members work for personal gain, power and thrill. Most gang members are young men or teenagers who often receive daily wages for their tasks (ECCS 2), including protection from LEAs and arms and ammunition; this is far more than they could earn while working as skilled or unskilled labours in any factory (JC 16; See *CNBC PAKISTAN,* 2013[57]). Furthermore, ethnic rhetoric also plays a vital role, as mentioned earlier, PAC excessively claimed to be the actual owners of the city and, thus, the legitimate contenders to control city and its resources repealing MQM and Muhajir's claim of being the majority and now the owners of the city (Gayer, 2014).

Good performance of a gang member is rewarded and makes way for promotion to higher ranks. It has also been reported that, during the violent times during 2010-2012, PAC announced a

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[56] Hindu and Christian minorities had been facing threats and atrocities by gangsters since long ago, they could not do anything as they were weak in terms of power, both human resource wise, money wise and on the basis of power of violence. The families were ordered to leave the locality in November 2013, news reports informed (*The Express Tribune.* 2013m). The residents have accused the gangsters of extortion demands and of misbehaving and even kidnapping and raping the young girls, *The Express Tribune*(2014a) reported.

[57] This was also mentioned by one of the main gangsters in an interview to a news channel (See *CNBC PAKISTAN*, 2013).

reward of a Honda CG-125 motorcycle for those who brought information on certain MQM workers or killed them (JC 16)[58].

Map 7.3 Gangs and territories before PAC in 2008

Spatial controls

Spatial controls are prevalent within and around Lyari through defined territories. The territories emerge or disappear with the emergence of a new gang or the defeat of existing gang, or by attacks on the neighbourhood. A new territory is usually protected by a watch-and-ward system with entry and exit controls, which include oversight of all the drug peddling business, gambling dens and extortion from the business within the controlled territory. Once the territory is

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[58] Honda CG-125 motorcycle is the favourite bike of Baloch and other young men in the city due to its speed and sound, while it has been one of the most stolen/snatched motorcycles in the city.

established, the resources within the territory are at the disposal of the controller, and no one can resist as the residents/businessmen are already terrorised.

Access control

Where gangs develop territoriality, they control the local population's entry and exit into the area, using various tactics including a network of informers, eliminating informers from the other groups, and controlling entry of other groups into the locality. The locals are disciplined through threats and violence, killing of possible informers or intruders, and intimidating others. New people coming into the locality need to have a local sponsor who should know whom they have to meet, explains Imtiaz (2013[59]). Outsiders are questioned and asked about their reason for coming and their destination, and if suspected can be beaten up and if found to be from rival other group could suffer extreme torture or even killing. However, people are excused interrogation if accompanied by women or children, whose presence is a statement that the male has no intentions of spying, or is not carrying weapons and has family and a reason to be in the locality (ECCS 2; Diwan, 2015).

> ... entry and exit controls always exist in the controlled areas which applies to everyone beyond any ethnic divisions, if they have a suspicion about the person they can beat or even kill him if not satisfied about his identity ...people from dominant gangs sit and guard the area and have mobile phones and even walkie-talkies to maintain communication with others; they also have a system of informers... their surveillance and information system is so strong and they are well versed in the labyrinthine streets of the old area, so that whenever the police or Rangers come to raid, they take all of their arms and ammunition to other streets through the back-doors of houses, and manage to escape the raid. (ECCS 2)

Lyari is thus accessible and a no-go area at the same time. It is open for local residents and others who mean no business with the gangs, but has proved to be a no-go-area for LEAs when they mean to attack the gangs. A police operation in April 2012 ended in failure, as the police using military force were unable to enter the settlement from 27 April until the operation finished on 4 May 2012 (Gayer, 2014, p.155). However, the Karachi Operation has improved the situation a bit, and now Lyari is more accessible as the majority of gangsters have gone into hiding (Section 7.2.2).

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[59] The reporter explains about how one can enter Lyari, the reason of her links with Zafar Baloch as it essential to have a contact in gangs to enter Lyari.

Thus, political controls overlap with access controls. Political opponents are usually considered enemies, and thus the resultant territories are either dominated by one entity, or the fight continues until there is only one successful controller. For example, Nabeel Gabol, ex-MNA from PPP and later MQM's MNA, cannot enter Lyari although his ancestors were considered respected elders of the settlement, as reported in newspapers (Baloch, 2013).

Control over resources, rent-seeking, and reasons of control and conflict

> (Illicit activities includes)...extortion money, drug smuggling and peddling, running gambling dens and other crimes that might include kidnapping for ransom, but the extortion money tops the list and thus gangs fight to control territories. (ECCS 2)

The strategic location of Lyari makes it attractive for rent-seekers. It lies is between the busiest port of the country, a major industrial area, the city's wholesale markets and the main financial district of Karachi (Zehra-Malik, 2013). In addition, even within Lyari, the illicit business possibilities are enormous, as it is a hub of inter- and intra-city transportation with links to Balochistan. The drug trade and gambling dens have been a feature of Lyari for a long time, while cottage industry and small businesses also attract rent-seekers. It was here that the trend of issuing extortion slips started.

> "Transporters were a rich community in Lyari, who saw their buses routinely being robbed on the way. Their insecurity provided an opportunity for the increasingly powerful gangsters, who offered security to the transporters' union in exchange for hefty sums of money. A little-known gangster, Aurangzeb Baba, had floated an idea, which the fraternity accepted, and the currency of extortion slips and receipts in Lyari was thus instituted." (Hussain, 2015)

Controlling rich territories has been a crucial basis for gang wars. For example, Mauripur Road is the main highway connecting the port with the city and up-country and carries most of the freight including NATO supplies to Afghanistan. Direct access to Mauripur Road enables gangs to control resources from Lyari, as they could threaten the transporters with extortion and could damage the businesses if not paid. The presence of KRC, a rival of PAC, attached to Mauripur Road representing the Kutchi community in Agra Taaj Colony, has created many hurdles for the other groups and has often been a reason for conflict with KRC, Khan (2013c) noted. It was conflict over violation of each other's business boundaries that led to the split between Rehman and Haji Lalu,

and then between Uzair and Baba Ladla, (Khan, 2013e) reported, similarly, between Baba Ladla and Jheango (Khan, 2012d) and many others.

Map 7.4: Gangs and territories after PAC in 2013 (Khan, 2013d)

The land market is also a target for rent-seekers in Lyari. The conversion of single-storey houses into multi-storey buildings has opened up a huge market for small investors and a potential source of money for rent-seekers (EC 1; Gayer, 2014). Similarly, the eviction of Hindu and Christian minorities is also linked with the issue of land and rent-seeking as the land they inhabited has high market value (ECCS 2). Gutter Baghicha, a large area of urban agricultural land adjacent to Lyari, has also been a source of conflict between the larger political parties (Ali, S.I. 2009) that has resulted in killings[60]; before partition the land was more than 1,000 acres, but now only 400 acres remain due to periodic encroachments. Political parties blame the majority

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[60] Nisar Baloch, a social activist who has been trying to save Gutter Baghicha land since long ago was eventually gunned down a day after his press conference in which he accused one of the political parties for their involvement in encroachment over land. Local print media widely reported (See *The Nation.* 2009; *Dawn.* 2009). A video introduction of Gutter Baghicha also available online (See Shehri-CBE. 2012)

political party for its designs on this valuable land using local government powers, *Dawn* reported (2009b) (also Section 4.4.3).

The conflict and violence in Lyari became linked to city-level politics when larger political parties got involved. As noted earlier, PAC started to venture into territories surrounding MQM strongholds that led to violent conflicts with MQM (EC 3). It is clear that the conflict is about rent-seeking as a representative of PAC was reported saying;

> "Right now we are sitting across the table watching the MQM eat whole cake...
> If this goes on, we will either ruin the cake for everyone or get our slice... The
> problem is that the MQM thinks it has the biggest stake in Karachi... Until the
> MQM learns to share, there will always be chaos." (Zehra-Malik, 2014)

Such statements also suggest that the ethnic flavour of the conflicts is not the main cause of dispute, but rather the contest is over land resources. Most of the gangs in Lyari, except for KRC, are in conflict, and at city scale the ethnicity-based political parties engage in ethnic conflict, but the residents do not fight along ethnic lines, and so actually the conflict is about the control over public resources in the form of land and funds using ethnicity as the political entry (EC 3, ECCS 2).

Discussion

This case study of Lyari has identified criminal groups as informal structures supported by personal cults and vendettas, which harness disengaged young men and teenagers to win control over a rich and illicit trade. It has also identified the process of integration of informal structures into the city-level politico-criminal organisations by linking to wider networks and commanding public resources to claim legitimacy. The boundaries between formal and informal are blurred in the process, especially when political parties deal with local criminal outfits. Lyari also shows how the city-level power contestation is played out at the local level and vice versa, and how control mechanisms including attack and defence mechanisms and identity discourse is used to claim and control resources.

Several differences are observed between Lyari and North Nazimabad. North Nazimabad had a two-layered informal governance structure, with political parties operating at district level, and identity-based structures at neighbourhood or street level, whereas in Lyari, there is single local tier of operation i.e. gangs work autonomously, they control the streets and their respective territories and do not work under larger umbrella groups, or have lateral working relations. Secondly, in Lyari, there is no identity-based informal structure, until Kutchi Rabita Committee

(KRC) started representing the Kutchi community, and there are no apolitical informal structures such as neighbourhood committees present in Lyari.

The nature and scale of conflicts in North Nazimabad and Lyari are also different; North Nazimabad had longstanding social divisions, but city level power struggle gave it a violent turn. In Lyari conflicts work in the opposite direction i.e. from local level to city level; in that power dynamics revolves around personal vendettas, control over informal rents and territories rather than political ideologies. PAC was the exception when it scaled up to a city-level politico-criminal organisation. However, some of the city-level political parties were backing gangs in Lyari in a proxy war, to maintain a stake in the area.

Lyari also showed a variety of informal land controls, and mechanisms of space production, which are more violent than North Nazimabad. Violence and the threat of violence played a central role enforcing other controls including rent seeking endeavours and ousting opponents. Furthermore, social controls in Lyari did not affect an individual's freedom as compared to identity-based communities of North Nazimabad that have various strict social customs over marriages, dress code and the role of women. Access controls are more violent in Lyari and do not involve physical installations, but non-physical means such as surveillance. Graffiti is found in both Lyari and North Nazimabad, but the gangs do not carry flags in Lyari. Property controls have also been reported in Lyari as a means of rent seeking and ousting the opponents, and have been violent to the extent that the Kutchi community had to evacuate Lyari.

7.3 PIB Colony – Losing and Re-gaining a Territory

7.3.1 Introduction

The case study of PIB Colony is an example of the swing of power between a political party which first lost territorial control to a politico-criminal gang and then regained it. It echoes the story of Lyari and the evolution of local-level gangs into PAC, i.e. a city-wide politico-criminal organisation (Gayer, 2014). It also highlights that power politics and socio-spatial conflicts at the city-level impacts local-levels throughout the city and that various local-levels of the city are linked to each other, in this case, political issues in Lyari has affected PIB Colony.

Pir Ilahi Bakhsh Cooperative Housing Society, also called Pir Colony or PIB Colony, developed for the Muslim Indian immigrants after 1947 (Appendix 7.4). It covers an area less than one Sq. km (186 Acres) and has an estimated population of 57,224 in 2005 (*KMC-GOSc*, [no date]). According to SLGO 2001 (Box 4.1), PIB Colony covers three union councils in Gulshan Town: UC3 lies completely within the settlement, while parts of UC2 and UC4 also lie within the settlement (Table 7.1). PIB Colony lies in District Central, which is part of 6-district Commissioner-controlled administration. The area is dominated by Muhajirs of different origins including Urdu speakers, Memon, Khatri and Gujrati, and several other ethnicities. Pashtoon, Sindhi, and Balochis are in a minority and belong to various Muslim sectarian groups, including Barelvi-Sunni, Deobandi-Sunni, Shia and Ismailies.

PIB Colony has always been a well-serviced settlement and there has been functional local governance (during 2001-2009), buttressed by the active presence and political monopoly of MQM. The residents had never faced political pressure, political violence or extortion until the rise of ANP, and later PAC in PIB Colony. The city-level political contests made PIB colony one of the local-level playing fields, as noted in the press (Majeed, 2013).

MQM had an historic monopoly from the mid-1980s onwards, but during 2007-2013 this was challenged by ANP, the Pashtoon-based political party concentrated in Nishter Basti locality, and later by PAC (also called the Ahmed Ali Magsi gang) which arose in 2009-10 from Baloch and Sindhi enclaves of PIB Colony (Map 7.5). MQM-ANP conflict in PIB was linked with the city-level power politics, while the Magsi gang challenged the territorial control of MQM, followed by political violence and extreme cases of rent-seeking in the settlement. During the same violent period of 2010-2013, politico-religious party Sunni-Tehreek (ST) also appeared supported by the Barelvi Sect followers in the settlement. As the violence and extortion increased, residents started moving out, property values fell and social and spatial controls were observed for the first time. However, MQM then regained territorial control using various informal land control mechanisms discussed in this section (Section 7.3.5).

Socio-spatial settings

PIB Colony is bounded by important land uses and natural features. Karachi's Central Prison lies to the South, Lyari River and Lyari Expressway to the North, while on the east lies Askari Park (previously the city's fruit and vegetable wholesale market or Old Sabzi Mandi), the Pakistan Printing Press Corporation, and the Pakistan Telecommunication Exchange installations and

housing (Map 7.5). This setting makes PIB Colony a *cul-de-sac* with only one main road forming the central spine of communication, given there are a few new routes in and out of the settlement but for limited use only.

PIB Colony has more than 3,500 housing units and several distinct neighbourhoods (Table 7.1). Some of the neighbourhoods were villages before the development of PIB Colony, whilst others developed later as informal settlements. From KIs, informal talks with locals, and through secondary data, various socio-spatial characteristics have been identified and are explained below.

The **planned areas** fall completely within UC3 and include Jabalpur Colony, Nagpur Colony, Ameenabad, Nafeesabad, Press Quarters and T&T Colony. Most of the area is middle income Muhajir-dominated with various enclaves. Jabalpur Colony, or J-Block as locally termed, is dominated by the Khatri ethnic group, while Nagpur is mixed, with mainly Urdu-speaking Muhajirs. The Khatri community is mostly small-scale cloth traders and forms a middle-income group[61]. Press Quarters is a housing colony for employees of Pakistan Printing Press Corporation abutting University Road on the east. Similarly, there is a Telephone & Exchange (T&T) colony, nearby Pak Printing Press, for the employees of the Telecommunication Exchange installations. There is an upper-middle income Ismaili settlement in the west side called Ameenabad, an isolated gated community with 200 houses built in 1965 by the Agha Khan Trust for Ismaili community (Sadiq et al, 2010).

Informal areas have a strong presence in PIB Colony. The development of the fruit and vegetable wholesale market (Old Sabzi Mandi) in 1964 created a demand for labour and eventually a demand for low-income housing that was not met through formal supply (KIs). This resulted in the emergence of informal settlements for labourers, mostly Pashtoons, along the Lyari River, between the residential zone of PIB Colony and Sabzi Mandi, called Nishter Basti. The labour settlement, called SK-Line, extended further along Sabzi Mandi as far as the Pakistan Printing Press Corporation, and is mainly a low-income Muhajir locality. The gap between Central Prison and the formal residential area of PIB Colony was also occupied by an informal settlement (now

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[61] The Khatri are a minority ethnic group known for their entrepreneurial skills, especially in textile related businesses in Karachi. Sergey Levin (1973) traces Khatri communities in Pakistan to Indian Punjab, however, Muslim Khatris in India live in Gujrat and Rajhastan as well (McLane, 2002, p. 132). This claim is supported by the local Khatri community in PIB colony who link themselves to Rajhastan and Gujrat, rather than Punjab. The Khatri community in PIB is an immigrant community who came after partition. They have a distinct language and are a close community, and prefer to get married within the community. The Khatris of PIB colony are mostly linked with textile trade in one way or the other, either working in weaving factories or clothes shops, and most of their shops are in PIB colony.

regularised) called Ghousia colony, again a predominantly low-income Muhajir settlement (Shamsi and Ahmed, 1996). The vacant land between government land uses, such as Pakistan Printing Press, Pakistan Telecommunication exchange and the planned area of PIB Colony, was encroached by poor Sindhi rural migrants and is now called Sindhi Para. Further west towards Teen Hatti, sandwiched between Martin Road and Lyari River, Nafeesabad includes a low income informal Muhajir settlement along with apartments for the Ismaili community (Map 7.5). Residents of informal areas form the low income group of the settlement.

Area	Locality	UC no	Social Composition
Formal Areas	PIB Colony General	UC3	Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir
	Nagpur Colony	UC3	Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir
	Jabalpur Colony (Also called Block-J)	UC3	Mixed, but dominantly Khatri ethnic group/Muhajir
	Plot No 14	UC3	Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir. Shia Muhajirs strong presence as well.
	Ameenabad	UC3	Ismaili Community. Gated community.
	Pak Printing Press colony	UC3	Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir. Also Shia sect followers as well. Gated community.
	Pak Telecommunication Colony (T&T Colony)	UC3	Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir. Gated community.
	Karachi Centre and A-one apartment complexes	UC2	Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir. Gated communities.
Informal Areas	SK Lines	UC3	Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir.
	Nishter Basti	UC4	Dominantly Pashtoon settlement.
	Nafeesabad	UC3	Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir. Also Ismaili apartment complex.
	Ghousia Colony	UC2	Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir. Punjabi Christians also reside.
Historic Villages	Pir Ilahi Bakhsh Residences (now Pir Heaven Apartments)	UC3	Previously Sindhi domain, now open for all, still Sindhi families residing. Gated community.
	Suleiman Village	UC3	Baloch/Sindhi ethnic group. Gated community.
	Sindhi Para	UC3 and 4	Sindhi low-incom group. Limited physical access, cul-de-sac.

Table 7.1 Socio-spatial setting of PIB Colony

The **historic villages** include Plot No 14 and Suleiman Village. Plot No 14, the oldest part of the settlement, is linked to the Sindhi enclave abutting Pir Ilahi Bakhsh's[62] residence (now Pir Heaven Apartment Complex). Plot No 14 is now a Muhajir-dominated settlement with strong Shia minority group presence with one of the two Shia Imam Bargah of PIB Colony. A Sindhi/Balochi enclave is located further east of the Ilahi Buksh enclave abutting Pakistan Printing Press, officially called Suleiman Village but known as *Baloch Para* or *Makrani Para* locally. Suleiman Village is dominated by Sindhi-Baloch residents and is a gated community or a ghetto within the planned PIB colony.

Map 7.5 Social enclaves within PIB Colony

The **religious orientation** of social groups has a deep impact on the dynamics of PIB Colony. In Khatri community, about half of the families belong to the strong Barelvi Sunni sect, while half belong to the Ahle-Hadees school, another Sunni denomination with a separate Mosque which has split the community. There is ensuing tension between various religious sectarian groups which is beyond the scope of this thesis (see Chapter 3 for limitations).

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[62] Famous native Sindhi Feudal Lord and a progressive political leader who became the first chief Minister of Sindh after partition of 1947. He donated his land to develop PIB Colony for the partition migrants.

7.3.2 Power Dynamics in the Settlement.

The socio-political power dynamics in PIB Colony underlie the process of challenge and change of domination for an initially MQM territory. Several factors intensified the socio-political power dynamics in the settlement, such as the different ethnic groups, political parties, religious groups, cooperative housing society and income groups.

Social hierarchy, religious and political affiliations

Within PIB Colony, different ethnic groups represent an implicit social hierarchy and play a vital role in the local power play. Muhajirs or Urdu speakers are in the main well-to-do households and play a vital political role, generally supporting MQM. The Khatri, although they support MQM, do not take an active role as political workers or activists as compared to Urdu speaking communities. Similarly, the Ismailies[63] of Ameenabad and Nafeesabad remain completely isolated from local social activities and power dynamics. Muhajirs from informal areas such as SK-Lines, Ghousia Colony, Nafeesabad and the adjoining Martin and Clayton Quarters, all low and lower middle-income settlements, form the active manpower for the majority political party. KIs said that Muhajirs also control the Cooperative Housing Society Office and MQM has recently started to play a role in the selection of staff for the office. Sunni Tehreek, a Barelvi-Sunni political party, has also developed its stronghold in the Muhajir informal settlements around PIB colony including SK-Lines and Ghousia Colony. Thus, before the rise of PAC in PIB Colony, MQM held street control.

The Sindhi-Baloch enclaves and some of the Gujrati residents are affiliated with the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). The Sindhis of Sindhi Para are the lowest income group and have very little say in local power dynamics. Sindhi residents of the Pir Ilahi Bakhsh complex are influential because of their link with Ilahi Bakhsh family. Baloch residents of Makrani Para are also active both in politics and social life, as some of the families are resourceful.

The rise of PAC in Lyari, during 2008, was also felt in PIB Colony, as in other parts of the city having Baloch settlements. In PIB Colony, PAC first rose in Makrani Para because of Baloch ethnic connections with Lyari, many of the young men from this locality joined PAC and the locality suffered the most in the conflict, discussed in detail in the coming sections.

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[63] Ismailies are a Shia Muslim sectarian minority group, also the majority in Karachi belongs to Gujrati ethnicity (Also see chapter 6).

The Pashtoons in the formal part of the settlement are mostly well-off, as they are traders in the fruit and vegetable wholesale Market (now relocated along the Superhighway) and had large bachelor-specific-houses (Pashtoon without families that worked for them in Sabzi Mandi) that also worked as their offices. These Pashtoons have little say in the political and social life of the settlement. They have been affiliated with religious-political parties including Jamiat-Ulema Islam (JUI) and Jamat-e-Islami (JI). The Pashtoon areas of Nishter Basti were transformed into a stronghold of Awami National Party (ANP) during MQM-led local government from 2005-06, which intensified after 2008 general elections.

Thus Muhajirs are the dominant social group and power base of MQM in the settlement, who have an upper hand in all matters of the settlement, be it political or administrative. Informal areas and historic villages form an active political base where youth take an active role in party politics and where political parties other than MQM exist. Business-oriented communities including Khatri and Ismailies do not take an active part in politics, and do not oppose the power dynamics in the settlement.

Social issues/concept of others

PIB Colony has multiple layers of conflicts, ranging from political to sectarian, however, this thesis will focus on political parties and gangs. Politically, the MQM-ANP conflict started after the 12 May 2007 conflict, allegedly between MQM and collective political opponents including ANP, PPP, JI and others that cost more than 50 lives in the city (Section 4.4.3). With the rise of the Pakistani faction of the Taliban during 2013, who started targeting ANP workers and offices (Chapter 4), ANP had lost its presence in the settlement; however, during its prime it collaborated with PAC against MQM. The MQM-PAC rift in PIB Colony started to appear during 2009-2010 with the rise of the Ahmed Ali Magsi gang, a Baloch group from Suleiman Village allegedly part of PAC, although PAC denies any link with Magsi (Khan, 2012c), and later Magsi collaborated with the Pashtoons of ANP in Nishter Basti. MQM's response meant that PIB Colony supposedly become a no-go-area for Balochis and the Pashtoons related to ANP[64]. The situation calmed down after 2013, when ANP and PAC lost support in the city (Chapter 4 and Section 7.2.2), and when Magsi finally left the settlement, reportedly his house and shops were burnt down.

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[64] Informal talks with Baloch and Pashtoons from surrounding localities revealed a growing fear of visiting PIB Colony as it was widely rumoured amongst such ethnic groups that they will be held by the MQM vigilante groups on duty on allegations of conducting reconnaissance survey before or planning to attack.

7.3.3 Service Provision

PIB Colony has always been a well-serviced settlement as the residents are resourceful and politically active. Several national politicians came from the settlement, including the MQM's National Assembly Member Dr. Farooq Sattar, MQM's city Mayor Mustafa Kamal (lived for a brief time), PPP parliamentarian and the murdered politician Zuhair Akram Nadeem, and several judges. The list also includes several professors, professionals, literary personalities and international sportsmen such as, Dr. Zafar Saeed Saifi the ex-Vice Chancellor of Karachi University; Ibrahim Jalees the writer; Anwer Maqsood writer and actor; and Munawwar-uz-Zaman the famous field hockey player, highlighting an image of a post-partition progressive Muhajir neighbourhood.

Residents are also active in local politics and lobbied for better services and have never been as politically isolated as the Muhajir residents of North Nazimabad, partly because party politics never turned violent in PIB Colony. Many of the local political activists are also part of formal institutions such as the Electricity Supply Company, Water and Sewerage Board and Karachi Municipal Corporation. Furthermore, young Muhajir men have been actively involved in local politics at the local MQM unit and sector offices, making it easier for the local residents to voice their problems and solve their issues.

MQM's services-provision activities mean that they are seen as synonymous with government resulting in a blurring of boundaries between formal and informal, as in the other case study areas. As in Lyari, public funds for services are usually channelled through the political party representatives who, either directly or through the workers union, are present in local government, (both the previously elected local government and the currently appointed administration), or in other service provision organisations. KIs mentioned that during the MQM-led local government, the elected MQM representatives frequently involved party workers from PIB Colony in development projects and to maintain the infrastructure in various formal and informal capacities. These local workers have enabled MQM to sustain its grassroots support through unit and sector offices, while the workers were rewarded during the MQM-led local government by formal jobs in service agencies and elsewhere (Gayer, 2014, p. 108).

MQM has two unit offices within the wider PIB colony, and the PIB Sector office is located near Martin/Jamshed Quarter[65]. Unit offices use their links with the formal institutions to deal with the service-related complaints of residents. They mitigate conflicts, and refer residents' security concerns to the authorities, for example requesting funds for putting up walls or gates, as for example in the narrow lanes leading to Nishtar Basti along the Lyari Express Way, which had become an easy route for criminals from the adjoining settlements and was perceived as the route for any possible attack on Muhajir residents (PB 32). Similarly, complaints related to water and sewage are reviewed by the office which has been responsible for allocating infrastructure and road-making funds in the settlement, and sent to the elected representatives who are also from the same party. In such situations, the party is actually using formal government funds channelled through informal means. The sector office also provides the conflict-resolution services to deal with issues raised by residents (Section 7.3.5).

7.3.4 Rise of PAC, Challenge to MQM's Monopoly

Before 2005, MQM's monopoly over street control in PIB Colony was never challenged. There was no major political contest and the majority of residents voted for MQM, although the right-wing JI always got some votes in elections. Residents were never coerced, and voluntary support was the norm. The settlement was shut during strike calls and mourning days announced by MQM while calls from other parties would go unnoticed. After 12th May 2007, increased tension at city level between MQM and ANP (or Muhajir and Pashtoon) also affected PIB Colony. The tension strengthened local support for MQM, which was seen to represent and guard Muhajir interests. MQM resorted to several informal land control mechanisms to oust the opponents, anticipating an attack on the territory both physically and in terms of political and economic interests, such as allocating workers to guard entry and exit points especially those linked with Pashtoon areas (Section 7.3.5).

However, the Pashtoon-Muhajir conflict had less impact on the settlement than the PAC-backed Ahmed Ali Magsi gang which fundamentally changed the local power dynamics. The Magsi gang challenged MQM's control from within the settlement, by seeking rent from residents, shoppers and other businessmen. The same pattern of control has been highlighted elsewhere in Karachi (Gayer 2014, p. 111-117).

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[65] Unit office is the smallest political unit in the organisation looked after by the unit in charge. 15-20 unit offices comes under the sector office headed by the sector in charge (refer Gayer, 2014, p. 104; table 5.3).

Magsi was a resident of Makrani Para (officially Suleiman Village), but later moved to a street in the planned area where his family had shops and a house (KIs), also outlined by a report by *CNBC Pakistan* (2012) that introduced him. Many young Baloch and Sindhi residents, also some Gujrati residents, were his associates from Suleiman Village, but Magsi created problems by getting involved in street crime (KIs) and then, in late 2009 and early 2011, by asking for extortion from well-to-do families, shops and businesses (PB 31, PB 32).

By the end of 2011, Magsi was terrorising both MQM and ordinary residents. A crime reporter, interviewed, said that Magsi used to call MQM's PIB Sector Office to inform them that he would come, so the office would shut to avoid him or to be prepared for the attack. Magsi started an extortion ring with a strong network of informers throughout the settlement (KIs), who would inform him about the families of well-to-do residents and about the businesses, who were then given extortion demands. Within a few months, people started moving out, stopped buying or selling properties, renovating or constructing houses or buying new cars, as they would receive an anonymous call for extortion which would be difficult to reject. July-August were the most violent months of 2011 in PIB (*The Express Tribune,* 2011a), when almost one person a day was killed or injured in PIB Colony in targeted attacks.

The KI's from PIB Colony also mentioned that Magsi was pursuing a personal vendetta against MQM, apart from PAC's agenda in the city, as his brother was killed in early 2011 allegedly by MQM affiliates. In response, Magsi went on terrorising PIB Colony, according to reports (Khan, 2012c). However, the rise of Magsi is also linked to the rise of PAC in Lyari in 2008, which influenced almost all the Baloch enclaves in the city where young men formed gangs under PAC support, challenged MQM and got involved in seeking informal rents (Section 7.2.2).

Residents, reportedly, complained to MQM's local representatives, leadership and the unit office about the crimes and violence in the settlement and their lack of response to Magsi's threats. However, interviewees noted that since MQM and PPP were in coalition government, the party could not take an open action (KIs). Then, in March 2012, MQM's unit head Mansoor Akhter and his brother were attacked and killed in broad daylight in their own house. According to eye-witness accounts, Magsi was blamed, which resulted in violence throughout the city and was widely reported in media (Imtiaz, Gishkori and Khan, 2012). Magsi's involvement was also confirmed by the Interior Minister's statement (*CNBC PAKISTAN,* 2012) after which the culprit's name was put on an exit control list to stop him escaping out of Karachi or Pakistan, *The News* reported (29 March 2012). MQM also took a strong stand, the senior leadership convened a press

conference and declared Magsi as the killer, and they also alleged his links with PAC and to PPP (*CNBC Pakistan*, 2012). A week after this incident, three policemen on duty in PIB Colony were killed (*Dawn*, 2012a). According to one report, the police arrested an accomplice of Magsi involved in the incident who stated that they had to open fire on the police because MQM watch-and-ward activists were taking up positions to fire on them when the police stopped the gang's car on PIB Main Road (Perwaiz, 2012a).

The reign of Magsi and his on-off conflict with MQM subsided when he left the area, after MQM's measures to counter him, and under threat of being killed by his rivals or by LEAs, and his paternal uncle was subsequently killed (Hasan, 2012). His influence further subsided when, in May 2012, his house and the market he owned both caught fire, reportedly a deliberate attempt by his rivals, (*The Nation*, 2012). Since the Karachi Operation started, fear of Magsi has further receded but many families are reportedly still paying monthly extortion money (KIs), while the whereabouts of Magsi remained unknown at the time of writing. Residents fear that he will take revenge for his uncle, brother and the burnt property (KIs). However, with the disappearance of Magsi from the contest to control PIB Colony and decline of ANP and PAC throughout the city (Chapter 4), the power dynamic has returned to its pre-conflict status and MQM retains a monopoly over politics and service provision in the area.

7.3.5 Socio-Spatial Controls

The rise of the Magsi gang and regain of control by MQM are both outcomes of various socio-spatial control mechanisms affecting residents, shoppers in the settlement and commuters through PIB Colony.

Problem solving by MQM, as elsewhere, proves an efficient way of both gaining legitimacy and tightening control. The Unit and Sector offices are integral to this process and deal with complaints ranging from marital disputes to business-related and neighbourhood-scale conflicts. MQM's conflict-resolution committee at the Sector Office is a powerful entity, made up of MQM's senior workers appointed by the central administration. The committee can summon the accused in the area and acts like a local court when a case is brought to them. The resolution is determined and both parties are responsible for following the decision while the political party makes sure to enforce the contract. Such was the case of Kashif and his wife[66] in which the wife complained about the husband and in-laws of their insulting behaviour towards her, the issue was

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[66] Names have been changed for anonymity.

resolved through strict instructions to the husband. The husband then changed his behaviour as he knew he cannot get away with violation of the contract.**Violence and threat of violence** was the main way that Magsi was able to dominate the rent-seeking business in PIB Colony. He used to send extortion slips and bullets as a threat (Figure 4.2), KIs and local residents reported. Victims' houses were attacked with aerial gunshots, and a shopkeeper who resisted giving money was injured, although Magsi's name had become enough threat to make the residents obey his demands (KIs).

Access control was the first and the most obvious control introduced after the start of the conflict in PIB Colony, implemented through policing, the watch-and-ward system, and questioning people, while rumours and fear played a vital role in the access control.

At night, MQM armed men guarded PIB Colony and Suleiman Village was besieged so that the PAC men were confined to their territory (KIs). However, Magsi colluded with the ANP in Nishter Basti to find a point that was easier for entry and attack (KIs). Such events made Pashtoons from Nishter Basti equally suspect in PIB Colony and they were stopped by MQM guards and questioned about their identity and reason for coming to PIB Colony[67].

As in the Pashtoon and Baloch settlements, the threats of MQM's measures to counter ANP and PAC were exaggerated which created fear. It was rumoured that Baloch and Pashtoons were banned from PIB Colony so that non-resident Baloch avoid the settlement[68]. Such perceptions did help limit unwanted entries into the territory.

Access control included passers-by, political activists and businesses. Businesses closed during calls for strikes or mourning by MQM, but not for such calls by other parties. Several Pashtoon teahouse and hotel owners were asked to temporarily close their businesses, as happened in other MQM dominated parts of the city, but these were permitted to open after few days with no damage to the business or property (KIs).

Information control is one barometer of control in the settlement. During the MQM-PAC and MQM-ANP conflicts, research was difficult, and researchers were supposed to get permission

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[67] Pashtoon labours and workers, working in PIB Colony informed.

[68] The researcher triangulated in nearby Baloch settlements about the perception of PIB Colony. Residents of settlements such as Nagman village and Anagara Goth in Liaquatabad area were consulted. These formed the nearest settlements and residents used to visit PIB Colony previously but their visit halted amid said rumours of Balochis being targeted in the settlement indiscriminately and that walls have been written with instructions for Baloch commuters in the settlement to leave and not come to PIB Colony.

from the local MQM representative in order to avoid any misunderstanding that they were acting for opponents.

Information-hiding is one aspect of control, while information-gathering is another. The rise of the Magsi gang and his extortion demands were based on detailed information about their target, drawn from a network of informers (PB 32). In response, many young male Gujrati residents were killed in targeted attacks, accused of being Magsi informers, which was a factor in the gang's decline (PB 31, PB 32; see *PPF*, 2012); Hussain Ghanchi, a Gujrati owner of a tyre-repair shop, was also killed on similar allegations (KIs; Perwaiz, 2012b).

Demographic control was much less prevalent than in North Nazimabad or Lyari, but people did move out on an ethnic basis from certain locations. Many of the Muhajirs in Nishtar Basti (Pashtoon-dominated) opted to leave the settlement in the face of perceived or real threats; some sources blame ANP for the threats, noted Majeed (2012) of *Pakistan Today,* while others claim it was a voluntary process in the wake of perceived threats on an ethnic basis. Many residents of PIB Colony also moved out because of increasing extortion and continued violence, without specific group pressure. Likewise, several Baloch families from Suleiman Village and nearby also moved out as they feared violence between MQM and PAC activists, such as the regular exchanges of gunfire that had killed several young male Baloch residents (KIs). On one occasion according to KIs, Baloch representatives met the MQM Member of Parliament, Farooq Sattar, to imply that they were not linked with the Magsi gang and that the Baloch residents wanted an end to hostilities and to live peacefully (KIs).

Control over resources forms the ultimate objective of competing groups in the settlement. The biggest issue facing PIB Colony residents from both the Magsi gang and ANP was extortion. On the other hand, the rise of ANP and PAC in the settlement was a threat to the gang's political stronghold. In contrast, MQM men usually asked for *Zakat* or *Fitra* (religious donations/tax) or donations for the welfare wing of the party, rather than engaging in direct extortion, however, formal political control over the settlement forms a sufficient reward.

Discussion

PIB Colony differs from the two previous case studies for several reasons. It is located in the centre of the city, and the post-partition middle-income settlement evolved over time, incorporating the historic Baloch villages within the planned development. It is also one of the

best-served of the case studies for formal governance and services, so absence of formal structures is not the issue but rather the blurring of the formal-informal divide. Finally, it is an area where MQM first lost and then regained control. In some respects, it mirrors the story of Lyari and the evolution of local gangs into city-wide politico-criminal organisations. The residents of PIB Colony are not isolated from party politics, unlike F-UC2 in North Nazimabad, and so there are no neighbourhood/residents' committees here. The Ismailies and the residents of informal settlements show the same pattern as seen in North Nazimabad in which Ismailies remain isolated from the larger community while residents of informal settlements take an active part in party politics. However, involvement in party politics is different from Lyari, as party politics revolves around service provision where MQM maintains monopoly, except for the period when the Magsi gang challenged MQM's domination.

The power dynamics in PIB Colony are a bit different than previous case studies. Political parties form the local-level (both lower and intermediate level) informal structure, while there is no neutral informal structure such as a neighbourhood committee. The religious-based informal structures are not that strong as compared to North Nazimabad except for the Ismaili community that is almost isolated, due to locational and social reasons, and being a gated cooperative society. The controls have been violent but not that severe as compared to Lyari, the strict non-physical controls, such as surveillance, resemble Lyari while physical barriers were not used. Lack of property controls also differentiates PIB Colony from other cases. However, the role of personal vendetta has been evident in the case of PIB Colony, e.g. the killing of Magsi's brother and uncle and burning of his property, and the killing of MQM's Unit in-charge.

Resource control plays a central role in PIB Colony as well. MQM regained control because of its strong social legitimacy, based on a reputation of problem solving, ability to provide basic services, and as the saviour of Muhajirs from crimes attributed to other ethno-political parties; while Magsi, although powerful and resourceful, was unable to hold onto his position, despite violent control strategies. The case study also highlights that the better service provision was claimed by the party as its achievement, since the services are channelled through the party representatives, un-elected workers at Unit and Sector Offices, which both consolidated socio-political control and blurred the formal-informal divide in service provision and urban management. In this case, the local level party representatives work as power-intermediaries that connecting residents to elected representatives, while government representatives also get political benefit out of this flexible system.

7.4 Gulzar-e-Hijri, KDA Scheme 33

7.4.1 Introduction

This section explore the case of Gulzar-e-Hijri KDA Scheme 33 (termed Scheme 33), which is a peri-urban area that has been suffering from informal land controls, especially rent-seeking and land grabbing, for many years. The area is low-density and varies considerably in terms of physical and social characteristics; the area abutting Gulshan-e-Iqbal is fully developed while the outlying areas are still only partly built-up (Map 7.6).

Scheme 33 is one of the largest housing schemes subdivided in the 1980s by the Karachi Development Authority (KDA), comprising 38,000 acres and almost 70,000 housing units (KDA, 1984). Currently, it lies within the jurisdictions of Gadap Town and Gulshan Town, and, before boundary reorganisation lay, in East and Malir Districts. PS. 126 Provincial and NA. 253 National Constituency cover almost the whole scheme at the moment because of its sprawl. Scheme 33 is spread over an area along the Superhighway.

Figure 7.3: Population distribution according to provincial/National constituencies of Case Study 4. (*Dawn-GIS[No date]*)

Until the late 1980s, Scheme 33 was underdeveloped and was inhabited mainly by Pashtoon rural migrants and Sindhi villagers (Appendix 7.5). During the 1990s as the city grew, other ethnic groups including Muhajirs moved into this area. More recently, during the 2000s, properties along the Superhighway have been favoured by Pashtoon investors in transport businesses who profited from trade, particularly NATO supplies to Afghanistan, as the area is cheaper with vacant

land (EC 3). With new power structures representing different ethnic groups, coupled with weak formal control over public resources especially land, 60% of the allocated vacant plots have been occupied illegally by groups of various affiliations (Hasan et al. 2013, p. 70-74; Box 7.1). Box 7.1, explains a typical story of an expatriate who invested his hard earned money in buying property in Scheme 33 expecting better return and a place to live after retirement, however, many of the properties were grabbed as these remained undeveloped, and are not monitored by public agencies or the owners.

The historical development has led to the presence of varied social groups, informal structures and, subsequently, informal controls and contest to control. In addition to the major political parties in the developed areas, other relatively powerful groups are also found in some of the older villages away from the Superhighway, include the Sindhis related to PPP and other Sindhi nationalist political parties (EC 2). However, several groups operate for rent seeking, especially land grabbing, beyond political and ethnic affiliations and attach themselves to the powerful groups or parties for mutual benefits.

Box 7.1: A Muhajir expatriate's experience of investing in property in Scheme-33
One of the residents of KDA Scheme 33, is currently living in a developed private housing project "Gulshan-e-Maymar" falling within Scheme 33. He worked abroad intending to return to Karachi when he retired and start a property business. He bought several open plots in Scheme 33 and developed only one plot for his own family in Gulshan-e-Maymar. When he came back in 2000, he found all his plots occupied. The plots had boundary walls around them with nomadic families living in them. When he approached the families, armed men asked him to leave and when he showed his grief, the leader of the men came to meet him. The land grabber asked him either to sell the plots to him at very low prices or to pay the same money to get his plots released. The interviewee wanted a guarantee that they would not grab the land again if he paid money to release the plots, as he was in no position to develop or sell the properties. In the end, he did not agree to anything and came back. Later, the interviewee along with other owners of the occupied plots formed a group and filed a court case. To date, there was no outcome after 4 years, and the other property owners are now in a mood to agree to the land grabber's deal.

Scheme 33 shows an uneven development pattern and thus varied power dynamics. The developed areas of Scheme 33 abutting Gulshan-e-Iqbal are an interface between powerful groups including the Muhajir-MQM vs. Pashtoon-ANP and the Shia-Muhajir vs. Sunni-Pashtoon conflicts. A monopoly of Pashtoon informal structures exists in areas near Sohrab Goth and along

the Superhighway. Thus, two sub-case studies are identified to understand the varying nature of informal land controls: 1) the fully developed part at 'AHI Road and surroundings', representing a contest between MQM versus ANP and Shia-Muhajir versus Sunni-Pashtoons, and 2) 'Dawood Bungalows and surroundings' located along the Superhighway, a suburban and developing part of Scheme 33, representing mainly Pashtoon informal structures of various affiliation (Map 7.6).

Map 7.6: Location of Scheme 33 and its Sub-case studies

7.4.2 Sub-Case Study 1: AHI Road and Surrounds

The area of AHI Road and its surrounds is an example of power contest and divided territory between middle-income Muhajirs in the formally developed areas (formal areas) and the low income tribal Pashtoons in the informally developed areas (informal areas). This case demonstrates two types of power contestation and social conflict: the city-level power contest between MQM and ANP which affected this area from the mid-2000s to 2012-13, and the Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict, as many Muhajirs are Shia and live in the Abbas Town ghetto-and-surroundings abutting the Sunni Pashtoon ghetto of Sohrab Goth-and-surroundings. After 2013, the MQM-ANP conflict has largely subsided both in Karachi and Scheme 33, but the sectarian fault line is still active between Shia-Muhajirs and the Deobandi/Sunni-Pashtoons, which surfaces

during Shia religious processions or when there is a sectarian attack or killing involving either group.

Fault lines of social divide and nature of conflicts

Fault lines representing the power and social divides are evident in the built environment. The residents have a clear concept of such fault lines and their physical and non-physical boundaries. The political and sectarian power contests are reflected in two different zones with different socio-spatial conditions, termed Zone-I and Zone-II here.

Zone-I represents the conflicting enclaves of Pashtoons vs Muhajirs at the central part of Metroville-III sandwiched between Sikandar Goth-and-surroundings and Baksh Ali Goth-and-surroundings (Map 7.7). This area also accommodates, to some extent, a formal informal divide between the informal Sikandar Goth and its surrounds and Metroville-III, overlapping the social, economic and administrative divides involving two different land agencies, the Karachi Development Authority (KDA) and Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA).

Zone-I has seen frequent night-time gun battles between MQM and ANP/other Pashtoon groups, as reported by key informant interviewees. The bridge crossing on Songal Nala, which abuts the informal residential area for families of martyred workers of MQM and links the Pashtoon-dominated areas of Baksh Ali-Goth, is where pitched gun battles often take place (see Point A, Map 7.7). The bridge was a no-man's-land during the conflict with a watch-and-ward system provided by warring groups on both sides. However, since the areas are mainly residential, the potential for rent-seeking is lower than Zone II where commercial activities predominate, KIs highlighted.

Zone-II covers Abbas Town, Sohrab Goth-and-surroundings, and represents multiple conflict layers – the MQM-ANP conflict, the Shia-Sunni divide and the formal informal divide (Map 7.7). AHI Road near the junction with the Superhighway, opposite the Abbas Town entrance street, forms a dividing line between Shia-Muhajir and Sunni-Pashtoons. Zone-II has been a conflict zone for a long time as Pashtoons are Deobandi-Sunni who, supposedly, oppose Shia ideology.

Zone-II was affected during the 2007-2013 MQM-ANP conflict and saw regular street gun battles. The divide used to be evident during the MQM strike calls when AHI Road near the entrance of Abbas Town was sometimes blocked with tents (GH 28, GH 29). Similarly, during the MQM-led city government Sikandar Goth was to be bulldozed by the City Government (Younus, 2010, p.16-

17), while opposition parties saved it and lobbied for regularised land ownership, so it became an anti-MQM stronghold both in terms of resident's social groups and the informal structure controlling the territory. Press reports noted that the arrest of various criminals by police are connected to Pashtoon dominated political party (Ali, M. 2013), who were also reported to be involved in torture cells used to control political opponents (*Dawn,* 2013b[69]).

Map 7.7: Socio-Spatial setting of Sub-Case study 1, Scheme 33

Until the end of 2013, the Shia-Sunni violence escalated with violent attacks on Shia settlements; it was assumed that the Taliban had developed control over Sohrab-Goth ghetto, with gun battles supplemented by bomb blasts. The fiercest bomb blast took place in Abbas Town on 3 March 2013 when a remote-control bomb was exploded near the Imam Bargah in front of an apartment building, killing around 50 and injuring more than 150, mostly Shia residents including women and children in their houses (*The Express Tribune,* 2013a). The police reportedly claimed that the culprits were linked to the Taliban-Pakistan (TTP) (*Dawn,* 2013a). One apartment complex was

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[69] A torture cell was found in Sikandar Goth, allegedly, run by ANP.

totally destroyed but later rebuilt with government funding, *The Express Tribune* reported (2013b) (Map 7.7).

Power contestation, its impacts and controls

This section focuses on the power contestations and conflicts around AHI Road but does not explore cultural, religious, gender or ethnic controls which have been illustrated in Chapter 5 and 6.

Socio-spatial impacts and controls

Ethno-political conflicts are characterised by political, access, demographic and property controls, in addition to rent-seeking which remains at the centre of all control mechanisms. Sectarian conflicts include demographic and access controls, and controls over religious amenities and rituals.

Political controls are obvious and easy to enforce, as the population is divided on an ethnic basis. Opposition groups are resisted while carrying out political activities openly in other's territory, and polling stations are controlled on polling day for favourable votes (KIs).

 Access controls are usually evident at times of political conflict, religious gatherings, processions, and funerals. In Zone-I, political access controls are facilitated by the surveillance and watch-and-ward systems used by political parties (GH 28). The division is particularly evident in Zone-II when the road is closed by tents, showing the territorial effect of a political strike call. Beyond the tents, business takes place as usual (GH 28). Access controls in Zone-II are also imposed during the Islamic month of Muharram, which the Shia community observe fervently with ritual gatherings and processions. During such rituals, Abbas Town observes strict access controls including barriers and surveillance especially around the Imam Bargah to avoid any security threat.

Demographic control linked with property control has also been achieved through establishing new settlements and leasing property in informal settlements. As noted above, the majority political party-affiliated group, reportedly encroached on land along Songal Nala (Point 'A' on Map 7.7) and developed housing for families of martyred party workers (KIs). In Sikandar Goth, political control was established by getting the village regularised, thus winning support from low-income groups. This village had been partly demolished, and was about to be fully demolished, by the MQM-led city government to support their vision of making Karachi a world class city by

transforming informal settlements into high-rise apartments, which would have resulted in a demographic change (Younus, 2010, p.16-17).

Box 7.2: A Pashtoon resident's experience of living in various parts of Scheme 33

A key informant Pashtoon interviewee, before buying property in Dawood Bungalows had an experience of renting and buying properties in KDA Scheme-33. His experience as an educated Pashtoon, with a large family, gives insights into socio-spatial issues in the city.

The interviewee, previously lived in a government house at a university as his father worked there. After his father's retirement, the family had to move out. His father had a small amount of money that he got as gratuity after repaying all the loans he had. They bought a plot of 120 sq. yds. in Sohrab Goth in KDA Scheme- 33 at a very low price.

Metroville-III

While in 2010 he was searching for a rental apartment in a better area. He searched in Metroville-III and eventually found an apartment in a Muhajir neighbourhood that was politically controlled by MQM. When he first met the owner to negotiate the deal he wore western cloths, and as he speaks good Urdu, the owner thought he was a Muhajir so agreed to the deal. Later when the interviewee went to pay the security deposit, he was in traditional Pashtoon dress and was easily recognizable as Pashtoon, and the owner was reluctant to hand over the apartment. On assurance from the property broker about the interviewee's honesty and manners and non-political background, the owner final agreed to the deal.

A property in Sohrab Goth

While renting, the interviewee found a very cheap plot behind Sohrab-Goth, a Pashtoon ghetto with crime and drug groups and more recently Taliban influence. The plot was sold by a land-grabber related to ANP at much lower than formal market price. The interviewee bought it and kept it unbuilt, as he was arranging construction finance, given that being Pashtoon would give him an edge to be adjusted in the area and that his investment would be safe. Later on, he came to know that plots in the area, including his own, had been encroached upon by land grabbers from another political party (Sindhi nationalists), as ANP had lost its control over this area and had to close down its all offices due to Taliban threats. The interviewee went to find out what was happening but found armed men guarding the grabbed properties. The interviewee then asked for help from his Pashtoon friends who belonged to different political parties including ANP and Sipah-Sahaba, a banned Sunni-sectarian outfit, who went together in a group of 30 armed men and forced the land grabbers to leave. The leader of the land grabbers came and saw the power of the opponent group and offered to buy the land at the same price at which the interviewee originally bought it. The interviewee's friends suggested he take the deal as the area is controlled by the land grabber, to avoid similar happening in future, so he sold the plot and later invested in a house in Dawood Bungalows.

At a local level, Muhajirs try to avoid renting or selling properties to Pashtoons, due to cultural differences and recent fears of political affiliations and property grabbing. As a result, neutral and higher-income Pashtoons face problems in renting in Muhajir-dominated neighbourhoods (Box 7.2) and no Sunni-Pashtoon will want to live in Abbas Town, nor be able to get a property in the Shia-dominated area (GH 29).

Rent seeking activities are common and the dominant political party is alleged to take money from residences as religious collections to support the party's welfare wing, including demanding the valuable hides of sacrificed animals, *zakat*[70] and *fitra*[71] (KIs).

Problem solving and welfare work is usually a mechanism of control but in these tense surroundings the main problem-solving activity is the provision of security to protégé groups, especially Muhajirs and Shias (KIs). The unit and sector offices of MQM involve in various such works as already explored in earlier case studies.

7.4.3 Sub-Case Study 2: Dawood Bungalows and Surroundings

Dawood Bungalows and its surroundings demonstrate monopoly over power in a peri-urban area along the Superhighway, one of the main expansion areas of the city (Maps 7.6 & 7.8), where Pashtoon ethnic groups exercise control.

Dawood Bungalows is a housing project on the Superhighway around 2.5 Km from the junction with AHI Road. It is a gated community with 90 two-storey bungalows[72] on 120 and 200 Sq. yd. plots. The neighbourhood includes several apartment complexes, gated cooperative housing societies and non-gated housing by private sector builders and developers. Most of the larger land parcels are still undeveloped (Map 7.8).

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[70] Annual religious tax on Muslims, fulfilling prescribed financial criteria, to be given to individuals or organisations largely for the welfare purposes.

[71] Money given by each affording individual during Ramadan but before Eid prayers day, to the poor with the purpose of their welfare and making them able to celebrate Eid.

[72] Note: the term 'bungalow' in Karachi refers to a free-standing dwelling, usually single or double storey house.

Social hierarchy

Dawood Bungalows and surroundings are mainly Pashtoon-dominated, but since properties were, and still are, quite cheap, middle-income Muhajir families have invested in it and during the late 1990s started moving into the cooperative housing, gated communities and apartments. Pashtoons usually work in the employment zone along the Superhighway i.e. the restaurants, fuel stations and intercity transport, and at the nearby city's wholesale fruit and vegetable market, or have businesses in the city but live here because of cheaper properties, family and tribal ties. Many Pashtoons in this area come from settled areas in northern Pakistan and are relatively used to urban living, but those from the tribal regions still follow tribal customs.

Map 7.8: Dawood Bungalows and surrounding areas

The locality is not completely developed and the area is too large for the local police to cover effectively or to face criminals with better training and weapons. Thus the area was dominated by Pashtoon informal structures as many areas experience weak government control and MQM was not active. However, from 2013 ANP lost control as the Taliban took over and threatened to close all ANP offices, and many criminals started operating independently or joined Taliban factions in exchange for a cut in profits, as found in North Nazimabad. Sindhi nationalist parties, or Sindhi Musclemen and groups claiming to be affiliated with them, are also active in several old Goths

who, in league with the revenue department, often grab and convert land and carry out illegal subdivisions and sell the plots (Hasan et al., 2013, 70-74).

Monopoly of power and its controls

The social hierarchy suggests a monopoly of Pashtoon ethnic informal structures over the area. There is no active concept of political parties for welfare; as there is a monopoly, there is no competition. Thus the need for political struggle is removed, on the local level and the focus is on rent seeking.

The scale of availability of public resources, including land, serviced plots and services such as TV/Internet cable services have shaped politics and social relations in Dawood Bungalows and its surrounds. Wider political conflicts were exploited locally by thugs, criminal gangs and local party workers so that they could benefit personally from prevalent rent-seeking opportunities.

Socio-spatial control mechanisms

Pashtoon key informants provided insight into many socio-spatial control mechanisms within and around Dawood Bungalows during the post-2007 MQM-ANP conflict in the city. Dawood Bungalows' 90 units were transformed from a mixed-ethnicity gated community to Pashtoon-dominated housing within a few years. As ANP was in full control of the area until 2013, local Pashtoon musclemen joined ANP's ranks, but after ANP's loss of power in the city during 2013, these musclemen allegedly joined other criminal groups including the Pakistani faction of the Taliban. During this change, informal land controls were kept intact.

During ANP's control, KI informed, its affiliated musclemen threatened many of the Muhajir owner-occupiers of the newly developed Dawood Bungalows, and their properties were grabbed for further options of informal rent-seeking. They were either forced to sell legally at very low prices, or the grabbed properties were rented out, with the implicit option that the owner could return later after bargaining on higher payment of extortion money. Sometimes properties were sold using fake documents, usually to a Pashtoon, which meant that the new owner needed contract enforcement for the lifetime, and thus would remain subject to extortion, as happened to one interviewee. Co-opting property was thus more profitable than rent-seeking from the original Muhajir owners.

Threats of violence were widely used for rent-seeking endeavours. In surrounding housing projects, criminals would fire at people's houses to depress the property values so that no-one would want to live there, and properties were then bought by the criminals to be sold at high prices later (EC 1). Residents were intimidated through threats of violence and the fear of losing property, and people with families were vulnerable as there was no political party, police or LEA to fight for their cause (GH 28). Examples of such ethnicity driven controls in the periphery were largely used by the dominant party in the city, as a narrative, to influence and threaten residents to support the party and its mechanisms against minority ethnic groups and parties, and to avoid such happenings in Muhajir settlements, including access control, attack and defence mechanisms and rent- seeking, as was observed in North Nazimabad and PIB Colony.

Residents' associations in Dawood Bungalows and surrounding apartment complexes were also compelled to pay for services which were not provided, for example, street cleaning and solid waste management. Cable TV and Internet services were also controlled by the group to benefit from these businesses.

By 2013, when the MQM-ANP political rift had stabilised and ANP had shut down its offices in Karachi due to Taliban threats, the criminals changed affiliation and started to harass the Pashtoon inhabitants as well, especially those who were not powerful or politically connected. One Pashtoon interviewee was asked to give extortion money or leave the settlement as they claimed that his house was actually a grabbed property with fake documents. However, the interviewee found a more powerful Pashtoon sponsor and the threat was avoided. According to the interviewee, the party which backed him was a large tribal family with a substantial business which employs many men who form both a workforce and manpower – this family was more powerful in terms of manpower, money, political connections and arms and ammunition.

The KIs said that the criminals now operate beyond ethnic or religious bonds, and will not hesitate to harm their ethnic or religious fellows. They have a permanent income from the inhabitants and from the residents' associations of apartment complexes, collecting monthly sums for solid waste management, TV cable services, safety and security and general maintenance and management of these gated communities. Even after the recent Karachi Operation when many known criminals have been reportedly killed, lower level informal actors have taken their place in rent-seeking and control.

Discussion

The case of Scheme 33 has highlighted an example of a peri-urban, developing area with rich public land resources influenced by various criminals and mafias with no consistent political affiliation. As with the other case studies, problems are heightened by the weak local government and intentional de-regulation by political actors for material and political gains. Exploitation and rent-seeking, especially land-grabbing, is at its most extreme in Scheme 33, as 60 percent of plots have been encroached as one study suggested (Hasan et. al, 2013, p. 70-74).

Power dynamics in the developed part follows the same pattern as the case studies of North Nazimabad and PIB Colony with an extra layer of Shia-Sunni conflict, adding complexity to the existing city level Muhajir-Pashtoon ethnic conflict. In the Muhajir dominant areas, of the developed part, political parties form the local-level (both intermediate and lower-level) informal structures, and no identity based or neutral informal structures exist, while, in the Pashtoon dominant area *Baradary* based lower-level structures exist topped by the political party or banned outfits, such as the Taliban. The peripheral and under-developed areas show a monopoly of informal structures and widespread informal control over resources attributed to Pashtoon social identity. However, the objective of control over resources in the periphery transcends any identity boundaries; given that, the identities are fully exploited if it benefits the objective of rent seeking. The organised conflicts in the developed area are part of city-level power politics and related dynamics, while in the periphery, city level politics affects things to a low extent.

The Shia-Sunni and Muhajir-Pashtoon divide is quite strong in both parts of the case study.This divide becomes evident when the rental properties are given to families from the same ethnicity as that of the owners.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed three different local-level case studies, Lyari, PIB Colony and Scheme 33, which covered various geographical zones that were developed at different periods in Karachi's history and featured a variety of social groups, conflicts and informal structures. The cases explored differed from each other and with North Nazimabad on various levels including methodology of data collection, reporting of facts, and anonymity (Section 7.1). They also differed in the nature of informal structures, communities and the prevalent informal controls, highlighted below. The variety of cases has helped in understanding the phenomena of informal land controls

in the diverse context of Karachi, and also these have added to the emerging themes, from theoretical framework and North Nazimabad case study, including power-society-space nexus, failure of state in service provision, formal-informal symbiotic relation, city to local-level connection, power intermediaries working from between and connection of violence with the informality.

Lyari, the oldest part of the city having a majority Baloch population and with a strategic location, is conducive for all sorts of rent seeking. This case identified criminal groups as informal structures and reported the dynamics of transformation of local-level criminal groups into city-wide politico-criminal structures by co-option of formal structures. Lyari also illustrated that city-level power contestation is played out at local level, however, local level informal structures in turn affect the city, as in the case of PAC. The case study highlighted the strong discourse around identity of the Baloch communities, who see themselves as owners of the city and the claimants of public resources, and thus argue that it is legitimate for them to use tactics to oust their opponents and dominate resources. Thus, the conflict appears to be about control over resources and an ethnic narrative, pursued through territoriality and violence. There is no identity-based alternative structure around *Baradary* or religion, unlike North Nazimabad; the gangs covers both the street-level and wider territory and are sometimes linked to political parties and other gangs, but there is less of a hierarchy between informal structures in Lyari. Lyari has highlighted the most violent case with highest level of local conflicts, rent seeking, torture and killings. The study also found that for ordinary residents, ethnic differences are unimportant e.g. Baloch, Muhajir and Kutchi Memon do business together and have friendships, although employing someone from a different ethnic background whom an employer does not know can create concerns.

PIB Colony, the post-partition government housing in the middle of the city with a majority of Muhajir population, demonstrates swings of power, where monopolistic MQM control was challenged by the Magsi gang but shifted back to an MQM monopoly. The majority party regained its control because of its strong social legitimacy and influential constituency, and while the powerful gangster, Magsi was able to threaten residents, he was unable to claim full control over the settlement, and thus, was soon ousted. Political parties in PIB Colony work at both the intermediate and lower-levels, while identity-based informal structures are not influential, especially in spatial terms like that in North Nazimabad, except for the Ismaili community that behave the same as in North Nazimabad. In addition, there are no neutral informal structures such as neighbourhood committees or NGOs providing services. In this case, the local-level party representatives work as power-intermediaries operating between government and residents.

Socio-spatial controls are not as strict as in North Nazimabad, and space is not compartmentalised in the larger area of PIB Colony reflecting the number of contenders who claim control, however, access control involving non-physical mechanisms operates more like Lyari than in North Nazimabad. Here as well, common residents did not show a sense of antagonism towards other social groups, however, employing people from other social groups did create concerns about being targeted for rent-seeking.

The two sub-case studies in Gulzar-e-Hijri, KDA Scheme 33 – AHI Road and Dawood Bungalows and their surroundings – show how in the peripheral under-developed areas powerful groups are able establish monopolistic control over resources early in the development process, which transcends identity boundaries and is based on criminal extortion. In the developed part of Scheme 33, overlapping political, ethnic and sectarian identities were evident with related conflict in the case of Muhajir-Shia and the Pashtoon-Sunni groups and their related informal structures. In the developed areas there was concern about social mixing, for example Muhajir owners were reluctant to rent to Pashtoon tenants.

The three case studies, apart from their differences, suggest various conclusions. First, each case study showed the presence of social divisions, reflected in space, corresponding to the presence of the variety of social groups with different political affiliations and social identities. Second, informal structures exist and influence the resident communities, legitimised either through ethnic or religious discourse, or on the basis of *de facto* monopolistic control, emphasizing the power-society-space nexus. Third, informal structures compete for public resources and pursue threatening or violent means to oust the competing groups, highlighting how informality leads to conflicts and violence. Fourth, case studies of Lyari and PIB Colony are characterised by a blurring of formal-informal boundaries and the formal-informal symbiotic relation, in that public funds are channelled through the political parties or informal structures for political benefits and electoral gain. Fifth, various control mechanisms are prevalent including land-grabbing, property-sequestration, intimidation, rent-seeking and gang warfare; gangs are violent and the majority political party is violent when challenged, which brings forward connection between violence and informality. The general trend in all the case studies is that informal land controls are not dependent on the legality or illegality of the settlement but on the ability of the informal structures to establish and maintain street control, thus highlighting the limited role of formal land tenure, otherwise seen as basis of safety of tenure and provision of formal services, emphasising on the role of informal structures as guarantors of safety of tenure.

Chapter 8

Final Discussion and Conclusions

8.1 Introduction and Summary

This research was motivated by the rising informality, violence, segregation and territoriality in Karachi with a spate of killings along ethno-political lines, between 2000 till 2014, and aimed to explore the underlying influence of various actors such as the state, the market and various types of informal actors (termed informal structures) in this trend, in service provision and governance of segregated communities in Karachi.

The thesis looked at the city-level in Karachi to examine the structural and policy reasons underlying the conflicts, and then examined how they are played out at local-level – through four case studies of North Nazimabad, Lyari, PIB Colony and KDA Scheme 33 – to highlight how such city-level processes are operationalised. The thesis defines two core concepts to explore the issues identified; first, the concept of *informal land controls,* the means through which spatial segregation is achieved, and second the role of *informal power structures*, the political, ethnic and religious power intermediaries which promote segregation, examined further in Section 8.2.

The research followed a critical realist epistemology that emphasises understandings of reality through understanding background relations, structures and mechanisms, and used a deductive-inductive hybrid methodology (Chapter 3). Under the hybrid approach, the literature review provided the theoretical basis and framework for the exploration, while the empirical evidence added contextual learning, specifically about the hierarchies of informal structures from city to the local-level and the connection with political and the identity based groupings such as tribal and religious based informal structures. The empirical evidence led the research to induced that the political claims over resources are operationalised through identity based power politics and control mechanisms 'from between' connecting both the state and the citizens, further explained below.

The thesis adds to the body of knowledge by addressing two main gaps in the literature explored; first, it explored the concept of informality and formality in land and urban development, beyond the conventional formal/informal divide in land tenure, as extending to a broad swathe of urban development, security and service provision related to the nature of the power structure that controls it and provides services. The findings suggest that both areas with formal and informal land tenure are experiencing informal land controls. Thus, this also suggests that informality could be defined through the status of the controller and service provider to the settlements under study, i.e. informal, if informal controls and informal structures are operational irrespective of the

land titles and tenure. Second, the thesis challenges the binary view that processes of informality are either 'from above' (due to state failure, capitalist processes and neo-liberal policies), or 'from below' as an entrepreneurial project of the poor, the findings suggest that informality is a 'symbiosis', and 'continuum' operationalised by 'power intermediaries' who work 'from between'. Informal structures behave as 'intermediaries' between the two extremes of state and poor communities, using both formal and informal channels to usurp a weak state and gain power for themselves.

8.2 Research Objectives and Questions

This section presents the findings of the thesis and is structured according to the research questions.

Defining informal land controls

Chapter 2 reviewed an extended body of literature covering concepts and theories around informality, production of space, power and socio-spatial controls, broadly addressing the first research question:

1) *Drawing on a literature review, how can the concept of informal (non-state) land controls be formulated and theorised, and their operation be understood?*

The overall critical discussion draws on the concept of 'social production of space', conceptualised by Lefebvre (1974), to understand informal land controls. While Lefebvre concentrated on 'social factors and space', the review suggests that the role of power, originally seen as embedded within the social role in construction of space, be considered as a separate factor. Analysing power as a separate factor enabled a better understanding of informal structures and formed a basis to analyse power structures beyond the state and the market. The resulting *power-society-space nexus* is helpful in linking the actors and processes involved in informal land controls, considered through this research, and were used to shape the analysis of the fieldwork.

The concept of 'informal land controls' was the central concept examined in this thesis, which has not been widely covered in academic debates. However from the literature review, informal land controls were defined as those that: *establish control over people and productive assets, both physical and non-physical, by delimiting a geographic area through visible and invisible boundaries*

of influence, wielded by individuals or groups in intense competition. Such competition embraces preserving and practising culture, religion or political ideologies, and claiming control over physical or financial assets such as informal rent and votes, through bounded territoriality, brought about through various social and spatial control mechanisms that range from benign to violent.

Analysis of the role of 'informal power structures' (informal structures) was essential to explore the operation of informal land controls. Such 'informal power structures' are understood to reflect the concept of "substitute power" proposed by Goldhammer and Shils (1939, 174) which substitutes for government-held power and operates 'from between', spanning both formal and informal urban development processes. Such substitute power can be held by either organisations or individuals, both legally legitimate organisations such as political parties, or illicit structures such as organised crime groups. There are many types of power-holders 'between' these two extremes, which draw legitimacy from various domains including: "tradition" e.g. tribal structures consisting of elders; "discourse" e.g. by religious authorities, or "charismatic personalities", such as individuals with resources and social or religious standing, criminals such as drug gangs, and neutral power structures such as neighbourhood committees, civil society organisations and NGOs.

Politicisation of city-level structural and policy agendas

Chapter 4 examined the structural and policy reasons from wide spread use of informal land controls, broadly examining the second research question:

> 2) *What are the city level dynamics (or structural reasons) behind the operation of informal land controls in Karachi?*

In the context of ethnic and sectarian polarisation in Karachi, the research traces the diminishing role of the state in housing delivery, policing and security provision, especially in low and middle-income areas. The findings confirm the analysis by Roy (2005), which suggests that informal urban development is both a failure of urban planning processes, but is also a deliberately used by the state and its representatives as a "government tool" and "negotiable value" (Weibel and McFarlane, 2012) helping to "deregulate" rather than un-regulate, and maintaining flexibility in urban development processes through blurring the formal-informal divide for political and financial gain (Roy, 2009).

At city-level, the findings suggest that, lacking devolution of power and decision making e.g. delay in local government elections, systems of local government enhancing provincial and national political influences and related power politics resulted in a rise of informality and the use of formal institutions as an exploiting and negotiating tool. The current polarised socio-spatial pattern of Karachi has various origins, including migrations, planning decisions, widespread informality in the housing sector and violence related to security concerns. Politics became aligned with ethnic and religious identities, with intensive electoral competition over identity-based enclaves, and conflict amongst ever-increasing claimants over public resources.

Thus, Karachi represents a "contested city" with resources available for grab and exploitation (Gayer, 2014) where various levels – federal, provincial and city level – with political interests collide around the control of resources. This competition results in the use of power politics with the aim to access formal powers and oust opponents. Power politics is played out at both the city and the local-level and in formal and informal domains. In the formal domain, played out at city and provincial level, control over government remains the core objective to be achieved through electoral politics, following all sorts of policy measures, e.g. reverting back to elected local governments and delaying elections by the provincial government to oust the opponent parties in the city government. Similarly, delimitation of electoral constituencies, control over decision making, development, planning and service provision institutions, also play a crucial role.

The success of power politics in the informal domain requires efficient, unencumbered processes, a loyal following, and the ability to enforce contracts, access formal processes, and impose territorial controls, explored in the later section. The outcomes are often violent, and extrajudicial killings are common, but as Gayer (2014, p.13) observed, such conflicts never cross the line to become a city level civil war due to the presence of 'regulatory mechanisms' that ensure order within visible disorder. The fieldwork suggests that such 'regulatory mechanisms' are found in the relationship between informal structures, once they have established territory and are confident of their power and income base. Although the capacity of state institutions has diminished over time due to politicisation and corruption, and an anti-poor bias is evident in the policies, conversely the market is functioning well, and there is no real political pressure for state reform. Thus, state policies and institutions are used to access public resources and oust opponents in competition. Finally, the absence of elected local government incorporating all the social groups, and loss of effective local service provision, security and oversight creates space for informal structures to adopt state-like characteristics including spatial sovereignty, service provision and security patrols and gain benefits of funding, power, and legitimacy.

Informal structures and land controls at the local-level

North Nazimabad was chosen as the detailed case study because of the extent of its socio-spatial segregation and complexity of segregation on the ground (Chapters 5 and 6). Chapter 5 looks at the power and social dimensions and their operation in North Nazimabad, exploring the operation of informal structures and their power base. Chapter 6 explores the spatial dimensions of territoriality in North Nazimabad. These were reinforced by more limited case studies in Lyari, PIB Colony and KDA Scheme 33, to examine the spatial aspects of control in a central, city centre and peripheral area (Chapter 7). Together these address the third research question – summarised as follows:

> 3) *Through case studies of different districts in Karachi, representing different enclaves (exhibiting both spatial segregation and political/ethnic tension), how are informal land controls played out? Who are the main actors and what are the main mechanisms of control?*

As at city-level, at local-level, the formal-informal boundaries and the interplay of structure and agency are equally blurred. Political parties contest control of city resources, accumulate their power from the local-level, banking on already existing tribal, ethnic, religious or sectarian informal structures, and criminal groups such as land mafias also join in the contest to offer 'protection' and develop a different kind of patron client relation in the field of city-level politics.

The evidence suggests that territory-making through the operation of informal land controls forms the core tool for claiming control over social groups and productive assets, as Sack (1983) highlights. This territory-making takes place as part of the intense competition to oust opponents (Peluso and Lund, 2001). In addition, keeping territory intact requires the ability to defend against threat, and thus "attack and defence mechanisms", highlighted by Tilly (2004), are integral to territorial claim and boundary definition.

A fascinating finding of the research is that, although the informally developed areas had been formalised through issue of land titles many years ago, many other aspects of informal service provision remain. For example, water provision on the hill in North Nazimabad was much worse than in the formally planned areas, due to illegal extraction, but a water committee of elders from various communities ensured at least some equality in its distribution. Nevertheless, conflicts amongst communities are more common in informal areas of the case study, as residents are have less connections and knows little about the cumbersome formal processes and also their resources are limited, e.g. in Lyari and I-UC2 of North Nazimabad. Conflicts are far fewer in formal

areas. Whereas, conflicts are common between informal structures representing formal areas and structures representing informal areas, this pattern is found throughout the case study areas e.g. North Nazimabad, PIB Colony and KDA Scheme 33.

Territory-making exacerbates segregation, either by 'inclusion' or by 'exclusion'. Such territories or 'ghettoes' can be the location for social contest including social unrest, crime or violence (Vaughan and Arbaci, 2011). Implicit in the definition of territoriality is the issue that the group or individual claiming the control is not always benign. The case of Lyari is a good example as the controlling groups target illicit rent-seeking and violence as the main tool of control. In contrast, the monopolistic political control in PIB Colony showed a welfare angle when the controller was the service provider, although public services are channelled through informal processes. 'Inclusion' and 'exclusion' practices remained evident in all the formal areas of the case studies, violent in some such as in Lyari, while benign in others such as in the Bohri Neighbourhood of North Nazimabad where territoriality is achieved through purchase of properties at above-market rates.

Identity is a core element of territory-making, as discourse around religion and ethnicity plays a vital role as the subject "internalises" the control (Durkheim, 1969; Piaget, 1969; Foucault, 1977, 1982) and thus, 'external' measures to control the people are not required, for example the use of religious discourse and ethnic narrative that lead individuals to take action, such as property purchase by the Bohri community. Similarly, PAC's claim as the owner of the city challenging MQM is another example.

The ideology and identity of an informal structure in an area is closely linked to the social identity of the group living in their territory. For example in I-UC2 of North Nazimabad, all the Pashtoon communities, irrespective of their internal differences, support Pashtoon political parties, while religious groups direct their followers' social lives, e.g. in Bohri and Balti Shia communities in North Nazimabad, and Ismailies in North Nazimabad and PIB Colony. Territories reflects identities and are also relative, and thus, overlap and form hierarchies of identities. As noted above, various factional Pashtoon groups in North Nazimabad unite as one territorial entity in politics against the identity-based territory of Muhajirs represented by MQM. Thus, territories behave as an entity beyond the physical dimensions operating as a combined, yet complex, construct of social groups, physical and administrative boundaries and the controls enforced by informal structures. The territory-making is also reflected in myriad ways, involving social and spatial dimensions, leading to space production.

Furthermore, the social groupings in informal areas are far more active than in formal areas, where residents avoid political affiliation but may form apolitical neighbourhood committees to solve their problems, and residents do not challenge the street control of the controlling political party. This is the case, for example, in North Nazimabad and PIB Colony. Conversely in informal areas of North Nazimabad, community ties supersede political ties and political leaders are usually community leaders. Thus conflict between political parties and the community is never a problem.

Although in most areas of the case studies there were competing informal structures, there are also examples of monopolistic controls such as in the case of PIB Colony and Dawood Bungalows in Scheme 33. Monopolistic controls either lead to very good service provision and blurring of formal informal divides e.g. in PIB colony, or they show no benefits for identity-based residents and function purely for rent-seeking, such as in Lyari and in Dawood Bungalows, Scheme 33.

Informal land control mechanisms

Informal structures, including political parties, use force, rhetoric, discourse and intimidation to delineate and control territory and exercise power. Various measures are employed including: control over services such as water and electricity; intimidation by vigilante groups; establishment of sectarian religious centres and schools; setting up informal road blocks and gates, flags and wall-chalking; and control over property purchase. These measures are already defined here as *informal land control mechanisms* (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7). Such mechanisms are used in efforts to oust opponents that may involve conflicts, attack and defence mechanisms and violence. Together these combine to exacerbate social and spatial segregation and exclusion, particularly in low-income and informal settlements, underpinning ethnic and political tension, violence and segregation (Figure 8.2).

Violence is also used as a mechanism of influence during political bargaining, along with its use to oust the opponents and claim territorial control. In addition, apparently, the uncontrollable violence is found to be a controlled mechanism, suggesting hidden regulatory mechanisms and structures that ensure an 'order' in this given larger visible 'disorder' (Gayer, 2014). Violence has influenced the demography of settlements to a large extent and in turn has consolidated territorial divides and controls (EC 1, EC 6).

Different control mechanisms were observed at varying degrees in the case study areas. These have been discussed in this chapter within various discussions.

The city to local-level connection

The empirical evidence (Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7) suggests that there are two scales at which the informal structures and informal land controls operate (Figure 8.1). First at the city-level mechanisms of power politics involve political parties, formal governance structures, various tiers of elected government and the formal private sector (Section 2.4.3 & Figure 2.2). Second at the local-level, there are various identity-based informal structures such as *Baradary*-based and religious structures, and some criminal informal structures such as drug gangs and land mafias. There are also more neutral informal structures e.g. NGOs and neighbourhood committees. The local-level can further be divided into two levels; the intermediate or district-level embracing several communities and informal structures (political parties are mostly found at this level), and the neighbourhood-level, covering the streets and the smaller communities, in which identity-based, neutral and criminal informal structures operate. These hierarchies have been explored in the North Nazimabad case study (Figure 5.1 & 6.1).The political party offices also work at the lower-level where no identity-based structure is strongly entrenched (Table 5.3). Many of the neighbourhood informal structures operate under the hierarchy or control of district-level informal structures, usually political parties, or try not to challenge their street control (Section 5.3).

The city to local-level connection is also highlighted by Gayer's (2014) analysis that the conflict in Karachi over more than a decade has never reached the intensity of a civil war. Despite the graveness of the issues identified, Gayer (2014, p. 4-5) sees an order in this apparent disorder. This makes it possible for people to live, survive and enjoy life, despite the widespread violence, owing to invisible rules, and regulatory mechanisms that keep conflicts under control. Gayer notes however that, "such chronically violent social configurations retain a part of uncertainty and fluidity that prevent routines for the management of violence from evolving into a full-blown habitus." (2014, p. 4). Gayer (2014, p.13) borrows a term 'institutional fabric', covering the actors and factors involved, including their ideology and dynamics of working, in many regulatory mechanisms. It is these regulatory mechanisms and order, or a veiled institutional and socio-spatial pattern, that controls the city which this thesis seeks to understand.

Figure 8.1: Informal structures, from city to the local-level connection

Based on the empirical evidence, Figure 8.1 and 8.2 highlight the flow of connection from the city to the local-level. The informal structures at the city-level operationalise in informal domains to produce space at the local-level. Such operations work in three domains i.e.: social and spatial controls; service provision catering to identity as well as service needs; and informal structures drawing on existing identity-based structures (e.g. in North Nazimabad, political parties operate at district level but draw support from existing tribal and religious informal structures).

Figure 8.2: Informal land controls, from city to the local-level

The research identifies that the outcomes of informal land controls vary with scale. At the local-level the people can get problems solved, collaborate to get services, develop collective security measures, and in some cases access land for housing, e.g. on the hill in North Nazimabad. Local-level territorialisation has brought similar people together, especially minority groups such as Christians, Shia, Bohri and Imailies, and has allowed them to follow their beliefs without fear. Conversely, at the city-level such territories have led to segregation and to conflict and violence, and also it has further weakened state control, e.g. no-go-areas like Lyari.

8.3 Theoretical Propositions and Policy Recommendations

This research study is contextually embedded and has used a case study methodology, which theoretically limits the possibility of generalisation of the conclusions, as discussed in Chapter 3. Although the nature of informal land controls are context specific, the background dynamics,

including objectives and how informal structures, society and space are linked, have yielded some important general conclusions. There is always a possibility of a theoretical conclusion, out of case study research, that could form the basis for other research exercises (Yin, 2009, p. 15, 43). In fact, the theorisation process and the emphasis on a critical realist approach, to look beyond the immediate events, has led to the possibility of various theoretical propositions.

Contribution of deductive-inductive hybrid model

The deductive-inductive hybrid approach was helpful to form an initial theoretical framework to guide the empirical research, while the empirical evidence suggested looking at the various scales of informal structures and at various levels they operationalise from city-level to the local-level. The approach added to the hypothesis that the segregations and conflicts are around control of resources at the city-level involving political power actors, while these conflicts are operationalised at the local-level using the existing identity based social groupings thus, the reasons for conflicts rest with the leadership and not the common citizens who suffer the most. This scaler split is also evident in impacts of informality and informal structures; informal processes and informal structures are found to be useful at the local-level in the provision of goods and services, however, the overall impact on the city is negative in the form of territoriality, segregation and violence.

8.3.1 Theoretical and Empirical Data Contributions

This study has contributed to the body of knowledge in two ways, first in terms of theoretical contribution and second, empirical data in terms of documentation of the context and ensuing processes under study including informal land control mechanisms.

The theoretical contribution are mostly falling under the larger head of informality, related structures and processes, while, power-society-space nexus is the overall theoretical contribution that is able to explain many processes including informality, informal land controls, informal structures, informal settlements, and connected issues of violence.

Informality

The study has contributed to informality in two respects, first by validating existing concepts through empirical evidence, secondly by introducing new concepts.

Literature review-guided theoretical framework looked at informality as failure of the state in the provision of goods and services; the empirical evidence from Karachi on city scale and on local-level case studies has validated this notion. However, the literature fails to explain, who fills the gap in formal service provision? The study concludes that various informal structures, ranging from political parties, structures around *Baradary* and religion, fills that gap by providing goods and services.

Another important theoretical contribution is that; such informal structures work from 'between' contributing to informality, contrary to the popular notions, which explain informality either from 'above' or from 'below'. However, the variety of informal structures explored are found to be connected to the formal structures (above) directly or indirectly and at the same time have a clout among the common citizens (below) either due to cultural, political or religious reasons. Evidence also suggests that such informal structures blur the formal-informal boundary to channel state funds and resources through informal channels and provide to the affiliated social groups to claim for legitimacy. This also suggests that informality is not an isolated process but forms a symbiotic relation with formality.

The study also added to the much overlooked aspect of informality i.e. its nuanced nature in connection with the violence, segregation and divisions. Informality, in literature, is either blamed on the formal processes or is taken as self-help project and achievement of the poor, and also romanticisation of informality is evident. It is found that when the state is weak and is unable to provide services, such functions are taken over by informal structures, the more the informal structures more the competition over limited resources. This competition makes the informal structures to attain more power to be able to appropriate more public resources and also to oust the competitors, this also leads to develop territories and vie for spatial sovereignty. This struggle often leads to overstepping ones boundary and violating competitor's territory, both in spatial terms and in terms of resources, often leading to conflict and violence. All the case studies has shown this pattern, more specifically, Lyari and PIB Colony have been far more violent in the background of informality.

Given the last two nuanced outcomes of informality mentioned above, it is important to note the productive nature of informal structures and informality; such structures are providing services to the people very efficiently on the local-level. Analysis has already identified that the outcomes of informality are variable on two scales, on the local-level; people are catered well by providing various services including land and security. Whereas, on the city-level; informality has led to

other nuanced results, including segregation and violence. The role of informal structures that is embedded in daily lives of the people is really important; who work from 'between' to provide services in the given context of diverse social groups. The working dynamics and connection with people makes such informal structures successfully govern people. Thus, policy recommendations are required to learn and benefit from such structures while avoiding any negative impacts on the city-level. Such policy recommendations are made in the next section.

Formal land tenure has been over emphasised in the informality literature as the basic step towards security of tenure and to access formal services, the evidence suggests otherwise. Formal tenure has limited value in the context of weak state and strong informal structures. In fact, in such contexts, formal and informal settlements both experience informal land controls while the provision of services is ensured by informal structures or the resourceful residents who come together to form associations such as neighbourhood committees. In this background, redefinition of informal settlement could also be suggested; formal or informal settlement should be defined in terms of their controlling and service providing structure, if the settlement is formally serviced and not influenced by informal structures than it should be regarded as formal settlement and *vice versa.* This definition has an ability to make the governments to rethink about their performance and control over the city, and could be used as a parameter to persuade governments to provide better services and controls rather than limiting themselves to formal tenure for political benefits.

Power-society-space nexus

One of the major theoretical contributions is the identification of power-society-space nexus. This relation has led to look beyond the observable events such as; informality, violence and territoriality to understand the background relations instrumental in such processes. From already explained concepts of informal land controls to informal structures, and from territoriality to redefinition of informal settlements based on the nature of the power structure, and from violence to segregation, all are explained through this nexus.

Power-society-space nexus suggests controlling power, affiliated social group and the space, all three are connected. A complete power-society-space nexus gives rise to a territory in socio-spatial terms in which the extents of power of the controller of territory, or extents of the community, define the boundary. While the nature of that territory depends on the nature of the controlling structure and the social group affiliated, e.g. Ranger's controlled area in North

Nazimabad represents formal settlement that is formally serviced, while other case studies show varying intensities of informal controls irrespective of formal or informal land tenure. It is in this background it is suggested to re-define informal settlements with respect to controlling and service providing structure, either informal, formal-public or formal-private.

Power-society-space nexus is materialised through control mechanisms that range from social control mechanisms, to spatial control mechanisms. In the background of territoriality and socio-spatial controls, the nexus is able to explain socio-spatial divisions, conflicts and violence. Thus, power-society-space nexus is able to explain the background relations and actors responsible for the observable events, as per critical realist approach.

Empirical contribution

This study has contributed substantially in terms of empirical data on Karachi, especially the case study areas of North Nazimabad, PIB Colony and Scheme 33. These case areas have not been explored in detail previously both in socio-spatial terms. Whereas, documentation of specific, informal structures, spatial context, and related socio-spatial control mechanisms are contributions that might also lead to further research.

8.3.2 Policy Recommendations

Conclusions highlight a need of policy interventions in improving governance to address service provision at the local-level yet avoid territoriality and violence on the city-level. In addition, it is also required to learn from the context and respect the cultural and religious sensitivities of the communities and the way these translates into local-governance in order to avoid forcing new and conflicting systems of governance.

Given that the violence is endemic, but has not degenerated into outright war, the critical issue is how this can be addressed. Two policy recommendations are evident. First there is a strong need for improving service providing institutions, secondly, for an impartial city government in the polarised socio-political and spatially segregated context of Karachi. Thirdly, there is a need to look at informal structures and their role at neighbourhood level as they hold potential for grassroots level self-governance. These are further discussed below.

Revival of institutions and mixed community development

Empirical evidence suggests that the city needs a formal structure without a political or identity based bias, to ensure the rule of merit. This could be looked at two levels, first the service providing institutions, and second the elected local government.

Regarding the service providing institutions, de-politicisation in staffing and allocation of funds, for development, require special emphasis. De-politicisation of the LEAs especially the police in Karachi would be a giant leap forward. This also requires looking at various service provisions agencies in the city, by examining what kind of services the informal structures are providing, and what is lacking on formal structure's behalf. This specifically requires intervention in relation to land and housing, including strict control and easy availability of land and housing for the poor, which will ensure avoidance of exploitative controls of informal structures.

Future policy interventions in planning are also needed to ensure mixed community development in new areas, both on economic and identity basis. Provision of housing for all the income groups in a cohesive manner through an appropriate strategy could ensure heterogeneous communities living together and will discourage the development of identity based enclaves and gated communities, and will avoid further segregation in the city.

Revival of local government and assimilation of informal structures

First and foremost, the city needs a local government system that could address the issues of the common citizen. The SLGO 2001 based system atleast ensured representation of all the socio-economic groups of the city, although, due to the diverse socio-political context, it also added to the resentment in the minority groups. The local government should acknowledge the ground realities such as *Baradary* system and religious leadership and should incorporate such structures to assimilate and formalise in a way that it does not lead to further segregation and exploitation. Along with many authors and experts on the city, the researcher concludes that informality, driven by informal structures, has made up for the deficit of goods and services to the poor at the local-level. Keeping in view the negative impacts on the city, in the form of segregation and violence, informal structures hold out great promise in the governing of, and service provision to communities as a sort of substitute local government. The connection of informal structures with their communities is surprisingly strong and result oriented. In addition, the links of such informal structures with government representatives, in formal or illicit forms, is also revealing.

Furthermore, the hierarchy and the cooperation between different identity-based informal structures, e.g. in North Nazimabad is a good example for local governance.

In this critical connection, local government system needs to be established with more devolved powers at Union Council level, and Union Councils could e even be further subdivided to strengthen links to the grassroots and ensure that each community, through their representatives or leaders, to ensure they have a say in development decisions. More importantly, powers need to be devolved as much as possible to the ward level. Such devolution of powers may include housing, tax, transport and other basic needs involving development decision making, to enure the adequate local service provision. This could also benefit from delimitation of electoral constituencies on community basis rather than on fixed geographic basis, giving priority to social aspect rather than physical dimension of space.

It is important to understand that, as evidence suggests, conflict arises when there is a competition over territorial controls and where there are un-clear boundaries. It is recommended that to align electoral constituencies according to social groupings, so that minority groups don't consider themselves to be ruled by 'others' and the cultural sensitivities remain intact. There are two issues attached with this policy proposal; first on the local level, how to avoid exploitative nature of the community leaders, secondly, on the city-level, how to avoid resentment in the majority political group? The first issue could be resolved by the initial proposal for de-politicisation of the service provision institutions that will make sure to provide services to all without any political influence. Second, the electoral constituencies or the overall system should not disturb the city-level political dominance of the majority group, this could be ensured either on the basis of election of City Mayor on city level or by overall votes cast for the party. Many other permutations could also be identified. The guiding principal should be to minimise informality and competition over access to public resources informally, services should be available to all formally.

Limitation, Future Research possibilities

The literature reviewed has identified several gaps to be taken up in further research. Firstly, the literature on informality lacks attention to the role of informal actors and informal power structures that would show a different side of informality contrasting with the romanticised concept of it as 'people's creative response'. Secondly, it has been shown that the informality in the housing sector has not considered the concept of production of space, especially in

connection with the role of informal power structures. Thirdly, specific mechanisms of control seem to be the least explored part of the informality literature related to the production of space. This research particularly tried to look at these gaps in the limited context of Karachi, but there is a need to research other contexts to further examine the operation of informal land controls.

There have been certain methodological limitations as well, already discussed in Chapter 3. Firstly, the research limits itself to only a few types of actors as part of the issue, i.e. political parties, local-level religious groups and community organisations. The research does talk about the gangs in Lyari and about banned religious outfits, but is based on secondary sources because of security concerns. Several important actors have not been considered in detail, such as the recent phenomena of the rise of Taliban and other sectarian organisations that developed no-go-areas for the LEAs. There is huge scope to look into such actors, their welfare work and informal land controls. Secondly, the experience of women in relation to territorial control could not be explored because of social restrictions.

8.5 Recent Political Developments in Karachi

Two weeks before this thesis was submitted on 5 December 2015, local government elections in Karachi had finally been held to reinstate Union Councils (now called Union Committees[73]). However, structural change may be far away. MQM is about to come back to formal power at city level after 7 years; as they emerged as the winning political party in all the Districts with maximum Union Councils win (132 out of 209). However, it is yet to be seen how much power will be vested in the Mayor of Karachi, and in practice how much of their current urban management power the Provincial government will agree to devolve (Chapter 4). Second, the most violent period of Karachi started in 2001 when MQM formed a majority local government, which fomented resentment. It has yet to be seen how political bargaining unfolds and how it impacts the political relations between various power-groups in the city, after MQM's take over the city.

The Karachi Operation suppressed violence in the city more recently (Khan, 2015c), but peace may be transient as structural issues remain unresolved, such as the use of power politics,

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[73] The recent local government elections 2015, followed different electoral constituencies and terminologies as compared to previously use under SLGO 2001. Now there are 6 districts and the lowest division is called Union Committee (UC), although current boundaries of current UC are the same as the old ones.

politicisation of institutions, corruption, and lacking formal service provision in housing and utility services. Citizens still have to resort to informal structures to access the services or to get their problems solved. This shows that, once the pressure from the LEAs is removed, the city might bounce back to the same violent situation. The conclusion of this research is that non-criminal informal structures will need a role in local-level governance and security operations if effective peace-building is to succeed.

8.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, the empirical evidence endorses the initial hypothesis, with a few caveats. The emergence of socially and ethnically distinct enclave-based spatial structures in the formal domain of Karachi is to a significant extent a result of historical migration waves coupled with formal planning decisions and various development schemes. Moreover, the emergence of socially segregated informally developed areas has been largely influenced by rural social structures such as Pashtoon tribal structures and minority religious structures such as Christians. However, post 1980s, the socio-spatial segregation has consolidated and boundaries have emerged between various socio-spatial groups. This was, and is, a result of state failures in the provision of goods and services, such as security and housing, creating political and social space in which informal power structures emerged to fill this gap. Such informal power structures included political, religious, ethnic and other actors, which used informal land controls to define and delimit territory through establishment of perceptual and actual boundaries. The result has been rising social and spatial segregation, especially in low-income settlements, exacerbating ethnic and political tensions and violence.

The conclusion reached by the research also suggests that power is an essential element in the socio-spatial dialectic and should not be subsumed into social aspects as philosophical debates suggest. Understanding the Power-Society-Space nexus is essential in analysing the operation of informal urban development processes.

Karachi is a large and diverse city and it is difficult to generalise results. However, the evidence from the four case studies, located at different parts of the city and representing a variety of social groups and informal structures, does confirm that the city at the wider level is experiencing conflict due to competition over control of public resources in various domains due to weak government.

The empirical evidence added to the hypothesis that the segregations and conflicts, around control of resources at the city-level involving political power actors, are operationalised at the local-level using the existing identity based social groupings thus, the reasons of conflicts involved rests with the leadership and informal structures and not the common citizens who suffer the most.

Thus, the hypothesis that the emergence of the socially and ethnically-distinct enclave-based spatial structure in Karachi is significantly influenced by the emergence of informal land controls is largely confirmed. Nevertheless their operation cannot fully be understood without an understanding of the city level politics and power base of local communities and their leadership expressed through informal structures.

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Appendix A: Methodology

Appendix 3.1: Questionnaire for Experts

INFORMAL LAND CONTROLS
SURVEY (Interview Questionnaire)

"Experts"

1-_____

Interviewer: _____
Dated: _____

1- Basic Information

1.1. Title and responsibilities:_____
1.2. Area of expertise:_____
1.3. Professional affiliation:_____
1.4. Works/projects:_____

2- Understanding the City and its Problems. (Social groupings, Identity based groupings vs Socio-economics based groupings, Geography of groupings, enclave formation, informal land controls, impacts on R2C, role of formal policies and institutes)

2.1. How would you categorize social groupings existing in the city, do these groupings overlap or remain separate entity? (Groupings based on socioeconomics, identity, political affiliation etc):_____
_____

2.2. How are these groupings reflected (placed) in the city space?:_____
_____

2.3. What do you think about concentration of certain social groups (enclave formations) in certain locations of the city, explain how it impacts the city (including historical reasons);
a) Socially and physically?:_____
_____

b) Governance/management of the city?_____
_____

c) City politics (Electoral/general):_____
_____

2.4. How and why this enclave formation took place? What were/are the mechanisms used?
a) Spatial/Physical mechanisms:_____
_____

b) Social/Non physical mechanisms:_____
_____

2.5. Is there any role of government/state its policies in the development of such enclaves (or even lack of policy), 0=No, 1=Yes, If "Yes", explain: _____
_____

2.6. If "No", is there any role of informal actors/groups in the development of such enclaves, 0=No, 1=Yes, If "Yes", explain: ___
_____
_____

2.7. How would you categories enclaves existing in the city,
a) In terms of social composition (already answered?):_____
b) In terms of types of boundaries:_____
c) In terms of degree of strictness in boundary (closeness/territoriality):_____
d) In terms of whether the enclave is voluntarily accepted by the residents or is it forced by any informal controlling body:_____
_____

2.8. Does enclave formation beneficial in any way? 0=No, 1=Yes, If "yes" how and who benefits from it:_____
_____

3- The Formal Aspects of Controlling the city. (Social grouping and formal institutions, majority group and access to resources, demography and its control, power politics and politics of control, access to formal decision making institutes, private authorities and impact over low income groups, impact on R2C, territoriality)

3.1. What is the role of ethnic identity in the politics of Karachi?, and how it influence:
a) Government decisions/policies (regarding development of areas, conversion of rural to urban land, delimitation, jobs etc):__
_____

b) Control over public resources (Jobs, Land, Parking, development contracts etc):_____
_____

C) Electoral poitics:_____
_____

d) Migration patterns: _____
_____

3.2. Since, government itself is a social composition and reflect certain social group, do social relations amongst different social groups affect government decisions/policies (CDGK, KDA, MDA, LDA etc):_____

3.3. In the background of politics around identity, how it Impact on social groups (ethnic/religious minority) having no or limited access to decision making institutes (regarding development in their areas, jobs, access to housing and other amenities etc):_____

3.4. What is the relation between control over land and politics in Karachi? And how controls over land is practiced: _____

3.5. Why there has always been disagreement over nature of city administrative systems (elected local govt vs appointed local govt?:_____

3.6. How different political parties (social groups) ensures their ability to access public resources for their own benefits and their ability to have controlling position in the power politics of Karachi? (control over formal institutions and policies)
_____
_____

3.7. Does delimitation of electoral jurisdictions impact on ability of any social group to control local government system, its policies and public resources for their own benefits? 0=No, 1=Yes. If "yes" explain how:_____

3.8. What is the impact of private housing authorities (for the middle income groups and elites only) on the social groupings and subsequently city politics and violence, especially in the background when the government is unable to provide housing for the poor?:_____

3.9. Does regional politics has an impact on the city development and politics (like war on terror in Afghanistan and military operation in FATA)?:_____

4- The Rise of Informality: (Failure of the formal institutions, rise of informality, earning legitimacy, violence and social groupings, future of the city)

4.1. What do you think about the role of government in the provision of goods and services to the poor of the city? Is it Successful, failed, partially failed, explain?:_____

4.2. Which are the major sectors in which the government has fully or partially failed?:_____

4.3. What do you think about the role of informal sector as the provider of goods and services to the urban poor, and how is it impacting the politics, geographic development and social relations in the city?:_____

4.4. Who are the actors representing informal actors, in the background of provision of goods and services to the poor?_____

4.5. How such informal actors/groups operate and earn legitimacy from the people, what type of strategies they use:_____

4.6. What is the relation between such informal actors/groups and formal institutions? Do they overlap, cooperate or otherwise oppose each other, explain in the background of different sectors including housing, utility services, safety/security etc?:_____

4.7. What is the role of informal actors/groups in the formation of social enclaves and in maintaining them:_____

4.8. How the informally controlled areas are managed and kept under control?:_____

4.9. What do you think about the recent ethno-political violence in the city? What is the reason, who is responsible?:_____

4.10. What do you think, why the ethno-political violence has remained concentrated in certain parts of the city while others have shown very low such violence?:_____

4.11. Are there any lessons for learning in the phenomena of informal land control:_____
4.12. What future of the city you see in the background of rise of informality and ethnicity based enclaves:_____

Appendix 3.2: Questionnaire for Government Officials and Politicians

SURVEY (Interview Questionnaire)

"Govt. Officials"

2-_____

Interviewer: _____
Dated: _____

A-Macro Level (city level):

1- Understanding the City and its Problems. (Social groupings, Identity based groupings vs Socio-economics based groupings, Geography of groupings, enclave formation, informal land controls, impacts on R2C, role of formal policies and institutes)

1.1. What do you think about concentration of certain social groups (enclave formations) in certain locations of the city, explain how it impacts the city (Politically or otherwise). Does it create social divide in the city?

1.2. How and why this enclave formation took place in Karachi? What were/are the mechanisms used?

1.3. Is there any role of government/state its policies in the development of such enclaves (or even lack of policy), 0=No, 1=Yes, If "Yes", explain: _____

1.4. If "No", is there any role of informal actors/groups in the development of such enclaves, 0=No, 1=Yes, If "Yes", explain: __

1.5. How would you categories enclaves existing in the city,
   a) In terms of social composition (already answered?):_____
   c) In terms of degree of strictness in boundary (closeness/territoriality):_____
   d) In terms of whether the enclave is voluntarily accepted by the residents or is it forced by any informal controlling body:_____

1.6. Does enclave formation beneficial in any way? 0=No, 1=Yes, If "yes" how and who benefits from it:_____

2- The Formal Aspects . (Social grouping and formal institutions, majority group and access to resources, demography and its control, power politics and politics of control, access to formal decision making institutes, private authorities and impact over low income groups, impact on R2C, territoriality)

2.1. What is the importance of ethnic identity in the politics of Karachi? Does ethnic/geographic identity based politics influence;

a) Government decisions/policies (regarding development of areas, conversion of rural to urban land, delimitation, jobs etc):__
b) Control over public resources (Jobs, Land, Parking, development contracts etc):_____
C) Electoral poitics:_____

2.2. Since, government itself is a social composition and reflect certain social group, do social relations amongst different social groups affect government decisions/policies (CDGK, KDA, MDA, LDA etc):_____

2.3. In the background of politics around identity, how it Impact on social groups (ethnic/religious minority) having no or limited access to decision making institutes (regarding development in their areas, jobs, access to housing and other amenities etc):_____

2.4. Is there any relation between control over land/settlements and politics in Karachi? And how controls over land is practiced: _____

3- The Rise of Informality: (Failure of the formal institutions, rise of informality, earning legitimacy, violence and social groupings, future of the city)

3.1. What do you think about the role of government in the provision of goods and services to the poor of the city? Is it Successful, failed, partially failed, explain?:_____

3.2. Which are the major sectors in which the government has fully or partially failed?:_____

3.3. What do you think about the role of informal sector as the provider of goods and services to the urban poor, and how is it impacting the politics, geographic development and social relations in the city?:_____

3.4. Who are the actors representing informal actors, in the background of provision of goods and services to the poor?_____

_____

3.5. How such informal actors/groups operate and earn legitimacy from the people, what type of strategies they use:_____

_____

3.6. What is the relation between such informal actors/groups and formal institutions? Do they overlap, cooperate or   otherwise oppose each other, explain in the background of different sectors including housing, utility services, safety/security etc?:_____

_____

3.8. How the informally developed enclaves are managed and kept under control?:_____

_____

3.9. What do you think about the recent ethno-political violence in the city? Is there any link with the ethnic enclaves formation and
      its control:_____

3.10. What do you think, why the ethno-political violence has remained concentrated in certain parts of the city while others have shown very low such violence?:_____

_____

3.11. Are there any lessons for learning in the phenomena of informal enclave formation:_____

3.12. What future of the city you see in the background of rise of informality and ethnicity based enclaves:_____

_____

B-SPECIFIC ISSUES:

1-Migration:

1.   The migration from rural areas is on the rise, and the migrants prefer to live in informal settlements and near their family and relatives, usually in ethnically segregated settlements. Do you think rural-urban migration is an issue for the city?:___
2.   Do you think policies of government (provincial/country) are responsible in any way for this migration:_____
3.   Do you think any political party is benefitting from rural-urban migration, if yes how:_____
4.   It is said that migration also brought many criminals and terrorists in the city, and they have developed their strongholds, where even LEA don't have access ;
5.   What is your suggestion on rural-urban migration issues:_____

2- City Government System:

1. Why there has always been disagreement over nature of city administrative systems (elected local govt vs appointed local govt? what suites the city better?
2. Does delimitation of electoral jurisdictions impact on ability of any social group to control local government system, its policies and public resources for their own benefits? 0=No, 1=Yes. If "yes" explain how:_____
3. What are the other mechanisms used by your rivals to outsmart your possible success in local government elections:_

3-Control over Government Institutions:

1.What do you think how political parties (social groups) ensures their ability to access public resources or through control over formal institutions and policies?
2.After since the introduction of sind local government ordinance (SLGO 2001), the provincial government has always tried to bring many of the civic institutions under their control,
   a- Making of LDA and MDA.Do you think, it is for political reasons? How it has impacted the ability of govt institutions to provide housing for the poor?
   b – Scalling up KBCA into SBCA and then putting master planning dept under it.

4- Failure of Housing schemes :
1.   What do you think why housing schemes like Hawks Bay-42, Malir Howsing scheme, Taiser Town scheme are taking so much time to occupy and develop?

5- Cross Subsidy for the Poor Housing:
1. How the govt. institution manages to fund the housing for the poor?
2. There has been very few governmental housing schemes for the elites? Why is it? How it has impacted on the institutional financial capacity?
3. What is the impact of private housing authorities (for the middle income groups and elites only) on the government is unable to provide housing for the poor?:_____

6- Taliban taking over the city:

1. MQM has been the first to warn about the arrival of Taliban in the city and about establishing control on the city. They are mostly found in informal settlments/katchi abadis, how govt land agencies could control this issue?

7- Anti Encroachment Operation:

1. How encroachments in terms of housing and land grabbing could be minimized?

Land Mafia:
1. There is always mention of land mafia in the news and its connection with political parties, do you think there is a land mafia and it uses state land for its purposes?

7- No-Go Areas:
1- How and why a settlement turns into a no-go-area? Is there any link with its planning, or could it be solved through planning intervention?

8- Future:
1- Due to rural urban migration, the demography of the city is changing, what do you see the future of the city?

Appendix 3.3: Questionnaire for Residents

INFORMAL LAND CONTROLS
SURVEY (Interview Questionnaire)

"RESIDENTS"

4-

Interviewer: _____
Dated: _____

A- Background Information to be collected before the interview or done indirectly:

1.1- About the Area:
- Status of the area (formal/Informal/Notified):_____
- Whose area is this/Who controls the area:_____
- What is the dominating ethnicity:_____
- Who are excluded or are not welcomed or with whom the controllers are in conflict:_____
1.2- About the interviewee
- Ethnicity of the interviewee:_____, - Religious/Sectarian/Political affiliation:_____

B- Interview Questions:

2- Household
2. 1.Locality / Area: _____   1.2. Plot No. / Address:_____   1.3.No. of floors:_____
2.4. Type of structure:_____   1.5. Status of household:_____1.6. Total Household members
(Adults/child):_____

3- Occupational Status
3.1.   Occupation / of HoH: _____   2.2. Education level HoH:_____
3.3.   Place of your work: _____   2.4. Any other job:_____
3.5.   Does any other member of household work? 0=No, 1=Yes, explain the type, place etc: _____
_____
3.6.   Do you or any members of house hold run a small business from home?
        0= No.   1- Yes (explain):_____
4- Origin of living
4.1. Living in Karachi sine:_____   4.2. Living here since:_____
4.3. Which part of country does your family originally come from:_____
4.4. Why did you/family chose to live here, explain:_____

5- Tenure Status:
5.1. What proportion of the property does your household occupy: 1=All   , 2- Part (explain):_____
_____
5.2. Does your household own/rent the space you occupy: 1- Own, 2=Rent, 3=Other (Explain):_____
_____
5.3. If renting, who is the owner of this property: 1=Relative, 2=Landlord, 3=Other(Explain):_____
_____
5.4. What kind of documents for the land/property do you have, explain:_____
5.5. Who helped you get the documentation done, explain:_____
5.6. How did you first get access to this land/property, explain:_____
_____
5.7. Who helped you in getting the property? 1= Land owner, 2= Land broker, 3=relative, 4= politician, 5=other, explain the process:_____
_____
5.8. Are you satisfied with the role of government (its institutions) in the provision of shelter for the people?, 0=No,   1=Yes. Explain (in each case)_____

6- Urban Management (Managing Space and Society):

(I am interested in finding out about who manages the neighborhood and how effective they are, and would be grateful for your help on the following.)

6.1. What sort of access to drinking water do you have? 1= Piped to the house, 2=Community tap, 3=Bowsered water, 4= From hydrant, 5=other, explain,:_____

6.2. Who provides the water supply? 1=Local govt, 2=Private company, 3=Other, explain:_____
_____

6.3. Who supervises the sanitation process and related services? 1=Local govt, 2=Private company, 3=resident's cooperative, 4=other, explain:_____

6.4. What sort of access to electricity supply do you have? 1=Metered connection, 2=Fixed rate connection,   3=Direct connection from main line, 4=other, explain:_____

6.5. Who provides the electricity supply to you/area? 1=Local govt, 2=Private company, 3=Other, explain:
_____

6.6. Do you have any household waste collection service in the area?   0=No, 1= Yes,

6.7. If "yes", who provides the service?   1= Local govt, 2= Private company, 3=resident's cooperative, 4= Other, explain:_____

6.8. If you have a problem with any of the above, who do you turn to?   1= Local government, 2= Community leader/elders, 3= Political party representatives, 4=other, explain:_____

6.9. Who are the important leaders in the area? 1= Community elder, 2= Political party representative, 3= Religious leader, 4=All/more than one (explain), 5= Others, explain:_____
_____

6.10. How the leaders (identified in previous question) help in solving problems of the area, explain:_____
_____

6.11. How easily accessible are the area leaders identified in the previous question? 1=Directly accessible, 2= through appointment, 3= Difficult to access, explain:_____
_____

6.12. Is there any organization involved in managing the area? 1= No, 2= Yes.

6.13. If "yes" in the previous question, which organization? 1= Resident's association, 2= Political party, 3= Religious organization, 4= Community elders (committee), 5= All or more than one of them (explain), 6= Other, explain:_____
_____

6.14. Are you satisfied with the role of government and its institutions (KDA KMC) in development and management of the area and relevant services? 0=No, 1= Yes. Explain (in each case):_____
_____

7- Associations and Kinship:

7.1. What are the different types of associations existing in the area, explain:

i= Community association,   0=No, 1= Yes, explain about it:_____
_____

ii= Resident's association,   0=No, 1= Yes, explain about it:_____
_____

iii= Religious association,   0=No, 1= Yes, explain about it:_____
_____

iv= Other association,   0=No, 1= Yes, explain about it:_____
_____

7.2. Which association, do you belong to and why, explain: _____
_____

7.3. Does your relatives or community group live in the area?   0=No, 1=Yes, explain:_____
_____

7.4. Is it helpful to live with your relatives/community group?   0=No, 1=Yes, explain:_____
_____

7.5. Does your community group have any kind of association or political party? 0=No, 1=Yes, explain:_____
_____

7.6. If "yes" in the previous question, what do you think why is it necessary to have such community based organization/political party, explain:_____
_____

7.7. Does your community based association/political party help in: 1= getting Jobs, 2=accessing/managing utility services, 3= getting house/property, 4= provision of amenities in the area, others, explain:_____
_____

7.8. Does your community/religious group/political party has any rules for the members and the area? 0=No, 1= Yes, explain what kind of rules:_____
_____

7.9. How your community/political party deals with members who don't follow laid down rules, explain:_____
_____

7.10. Are there other types of social groups living in the area?   0= No, 1=Yes.
7.11. If "yes" in the previous question, what types of other groups exists, explain? 1= Ethnic, 2=Religious, 3=Political, 4=Other explain:_____
_____

7.12. Do families of other communities live close together in group form as well? 0=No, 1=Yes, explain:_____

7.13. If "yes" in the previous question, how each community group is placed in the neighborhood, explain:_____
_____

7.14. How the communities managed to develop areas for themselves? And how they keep it intact:_____
_____

7.15. How each community demarcate ones area and keep it intact, explain:_____
_____

7.16. As an ethnic/religious/political group, do you have any problem living with other groups in the surrounding? 0=No, 1=Yes, explain:_____
_____

7.17. How your community/political party manages to increase or maintain its membership in the area, explain:_____
_____

7.18. Do you think, local/provincial government represents your community? 0=No, 1=Yes, explain in each case:_____
_____

8- Safety and Security:

8.1. Who carry out policing and ensure public order in the neighborhood? 1= Police, 2= Resident groups, 3= Political party, 4= Other, explain:_____
_____

8.2. If policing is done by other than police, please explain the process and mechanisms used: _____
_____

8.3. Do you feel safe walking in the neighborhood and surrounding, a) in daylight, or b) after dark? Please explain:_____
_____

8.4. Do the women and children in your household feel safe walking in the neighborhood and surrounding, a) in daylight, or b) after dark? Please explain:_____
_____

8.5. Have you or any member of your household personally been affected by problems of violence/robbing/mugging/harassing in the area and surrounding (in the last 18 months)? 0= No, 1=Yes, explain:_____
_____

8.6. Are there problems of violence/robbing/mugging/harassing in the area and surrounding (in the last 18 months)? 0= No, 1=Yes, explain:_____
_____

8.7. Are there any problems with gangs or other anti-social groups in the neighborhood? 0=No, 1=Yes, explain:_____
_____

8.8. Has there been any problem of political violence or conflict in this neighborhood (in the last 18 months)? 0=No, 1= Yes, explain (what, when, what happened, how it affected you):_____
_____

8.9. Are there any other issues or conflicts in this neighborhood and surrounding?   0=No, 1=Yes, explain:
_____
_____

8.10. If issues or conflict arise amongst different communities, how and by whom are these resolved?_____
_____

8.11. Are you satisfied with the role and working of police and rangers in ensuring safety and security in the neighborhood? 0= No, 1= Yes, explain in each case:_____
_____

9- Role of Political parties:

9.1. Is there one dominating political party in the area? 0=No, 1= Yes, explain:_____
_____

9.2. If "yes" in the previous question, is the dominant political party beneficial for your community and area? 0=No, 1= Yes, explain in each case: _____
_____

9.3. Are there more than one political party in the area? 0=No, 1=Yes, explain:_____
_____

9.4. How beneficial are the political parties other than the dominant one, explain:_____
_____

9.4. If "yes" in the previous question, do different political parties represent different ethnic or political groups? 0= No, 1=Yes, explain:_____
_____

9.6. If "yes" in the previous question, how political affiliation impact on the social relation amongst different communities, explain:_____
_____

9.7. Explain about the type of relation amongst different political parties and their workers in the area:_____
_____

9.8. What do you think, why the different political parties are fighting with each other, explain:_____
_____

9.9. In your opinion, which political party is better, and why, explain:_____
_____

9.10. How the political parties increase their support (membership) and decrease the power of other political parties in the neighborhood:_____
_____

10- Miscellaneous:

10.1. Are you happy living in this area? 0=No, 1=Yes. Explain (in both cases):_____
_____

10.2. What are the different disadvantages of living here, explain:_____
_____

10.3. What are the different advantages of living here, explain:_____
_____

Appendix 3.4: Questionnaire for NGOs, Police and Others

INFORMAL LAND CONTROLS

"NGOs/Journalists/Police/etc."

> **5_____**

Interviewer: _____
Dated: _____

A- Background Information to be collected before the interview or done indirectly:

1.1- About the Area OR City (General)
- Status of the area (formal/Informal/Notified):_____
- Whose area is this/Who controls the area:_____
- What is the dominating ethnicity:_____
- Who are excluded or are not welcomed or with whom the controllers are in
  conflict:_____
1.2- About the interviewee
- Ethnicity of the interviewee:_____, - Religious/Sectarian/Political affiliation:_____

Interview Questions

B- Macro Level (city level):

1- The Formal Aspects of Controlling the city. (Social grouping and formal institutions, majority group and access to resources, demography and its control, power politics and politics of control, access to formal decision making institutes, private authorities and impact over low income groups, impact on R2C, territoriality)

1.1. What is the role of ethnic identity in the politics of Karachi?, and how it influence:

a) Government decisions/policies (regarding development of areas, conversion of rural to urban land, delimitation, jobs etc):__
_____
_____

b) Control over public resources (Jobs, Land, Parking, development contracts etc):_____
_____

C) Electoral poitics:_____
_____

d) Migration patterns: _____

1.2. Since, government itself is a social composition and reflect certain social group, do social relations amongst different social groups affect government decisions/policies (CDGK, KDA, MDA, LDA etc):_____
_____

1.3. In the background of politics around identity, how it Impact on social groups (ethnic/religious minority) having no or limited access to decision making institutes (regarding development in their areas, jobs, access to housing and other amenities etc):_____
_____

1.4. What is the relation between control over land and politics in Karachi? And how controls over land is practiced: _____
_____

1.5. Why there has always been disagreement over nature of city administrative systems (elected local govt vs appointed local govt?:_____
_____

1.6. How different political parties (social groups) ensures their ability to access public resources for their own benefits and their ability to have controlling position in the power politics of Karachi? (control over formal institutions and policies)
_____
_____

1.7. Does delimitation of electoral jurisdictions impact on ability of any social group to control local government system, its policies and public resources for their own benefits? 0=No, 1=Yes. If "yes" explain how:_____
_____

1.8. What is the impact of private housing authorities (for the middle income groups and elites only) on the social groupings and subsequently city politics and violence, especially in the background when the government is unable to provide housing for the poor?:_____

_____

1.9. Does regional politics has an impact on the city development and politics (like war on terror in Afghanistan and military operation in FATA)?:_____

_____

2- The Rise of Informality: (Failure of the formal institutions, rise of informality, earning legitimacy, violence and social groupings, future of the city)

2.1. What do you think about the role of government in the provision of goods and services to the poor of the city? Is it Successful, failed, partially failed, explain?:_____

_____

2.2. Which are the major sectors in which the government has fully or partially failed?:_____

_____

2.3. What do you think about the role of informal sector as the provider of goods and services to the urban poor, and how is it impacting the politics, geographic development and social relations in the city?:_____

_____

2.4. Who are the actors representing informal actors, in the background of provision of goods and services to the poor?_____

_____

2.5. How such informal actors/groups operate and earn legitimacy from the people, what type of strategies they use:_____

_____

2.6. What is the relation between such informal actors/groups and formal institutions? Do they overlap, cooperate or   otherwise oppose each other, explain in the background of different sectors including housing, utility services, safety/security etc?:_____

_____

_____

2.7. What is the role of informal actors/groups in the formation of social enclaves and in maintaining them:_____

_____

_____

2.8. How the informally controlled areas are managed and kept under control?:_____

_____

2.9. What do you think about the recent ethno-political violence in the city? What is the reason, who is responsible?:_____

_____

2.10. What do you think, why the ethno-political violence has remained concentrated in certain parts of the city while others have shown very low such violence?:_____

_____

2.11. Are there any lessons for learning in the phenomena of informal land control:_____

2.12. What future of the city you see in the background of rise of informality and ethnicity based enclaves:_____

_____

B- Micro Level (Settlement Level):

1- Social Characteristics:

1.1. What is the social composition of the location and the surroundings (neighboring areas), explain:_____

_____

1.2. Is the locality composed of similar social group?   0=No, 1=Yes, explain:_____

_____

1.3. If "yes", are the people relatives to each other?   0=No, 1=Yes, explain:_____

_____

1.4. How did the similar social group developed their concentration? What were the mechanisms used? Who helped or guided in the process, explain:_____

1.5. Does the resident community group have any specific association or political party? 0=No, 1=Yes, give names of all associations to your household belong to and explain their role:_____

_____

1.6. If "yes" in the previous question, what is the importance of such a community association/political party, explain:_____

_____

1.7. Does the community based association/political party help in: 1=Getting jobs, 2=Accessing/managing utility services, 3= getting house/property, 4=Provision of amenities in the area, 5= Others, explain:_____

_____

1.8. Does the community based associatiion/religious group/political party has any rules for the members and the area? 0=No, 1= Yes, explain what kind of rules and how do they operate:_____

_____

1.9. How your community based association/political party manages to increase or maintain its membership in the area, explain:___

_____

1.10. Are there any other types of associations existing in this area, explain:

i= Community association,   0=No, 1= Yes, give name and explain:_____

_____

ii= Resident's association,   0=No, 1= Yes, give name and explain:_____

_____

iii= Religious association,   0=No, 1= Yes, give name and explain:_____

_____

iv= Other association,   0=No, 1= Yes, give name and explain:_____

_____

1.11. Which association, do you belong to and why, explain:

_____

1.12. Explain about the other social groups (ethnic, religious etc) living in the neighborhood, do they also live with relatives nearby?:_____

1.13. Explain about the other social groups (ethnic, religious etc) living in the surrounding neighborhood, do they also live with relatives nearby?:_____

1.14. How the dominant community in the locality maintains its physical concentration and demarcate its boundary (mechanisms):_____

1.15. How the other social groups developed their concentration in a particular neighborhood, and how do they demarcate and maintain this geographic concentration (Mechanisms):_____

_____

1.16. As an ethnic/religious/political group, do you have any problem living with other groups in the surrounding? 0=No, 1=Yes, explain:_____

_____

1.17. How well does, local/provincial government represents your community? 0=No, 1=Yes, explain in each case:_____

2- Urban Management (Managing Space and Society):

(I am interested in finding out about who manages the neighborhood and how effective they are, and would be grateful for your help on the following.)

2.1. What sort of access to drinking water does the locality have? 1= Piped to the house, 2=Community tap, 3=Bowsered water, 4= From hydrant, 5=other,
explain,:_____

2.2. Who provides the water supply? 1=Local govt, 2=Private company, 3=Resident's cooperative, 4=Other, explain:_____

_____

2.3. Who supervises the sanitation process and related services? 1=Local govt, 2=Private company, 3=resident's cooperative, 4=other, explain:_____

2.4. What sort of access to electricity supply does the locality have? 1=Metered connection, 2=Fixed rate connection,   3=Direct connection from main line, 4=other,
explain:_____

2.5. Who provides the electricity supply to the area? 1=Local govt, 2=Private company, 3=Other, explain:

_____

2.6. Does the locality have any household waste collection service in the area?   0=No, 1= Yes,
2.7. If "yes", who provides the service?   1= Local govt, 2= Private company, 3=resident's cooperative, 4= Other, explain:_____

2.8. If there is any problem with any of the above, who do they turn to?   1= Local government, 2= Community leader/elders, 3= Political party representatives, 4=other, explain:_____

2.9. For buying or selling property in your locality, do you need to take permission? 0=No, 1= Yes,
2.10. If "yes", from whom?   1= Local govt, 2= Political party, 3=resident's cooperative, 4= Other, explain:_____

2.11. For starting a new business on a formal property or on public space, do the people need to take permission? 0=No, 1= Yes,

2.12. If "yes", from whom?   1= Local govt, 2= Political party, 3=resident's cooperative, 4= Other,
explain:_____

2.13. Who are the important leaders in the area? 1= Community elder, 2= Political party representative, 3= Religious leader,
4=All/more than one (explain), 5= Others, explain:_____
_____

2.14. How the leaders (identified in previous question) help in solving problems of the area,
explain:_____
_____

2.15. How easily accessible are the area leaders identified in the previous question? 1=Directly accessible, 2= through
appointment, 3= Difficult to access, explain:_____
_____

2.16. Is there any organization involved in managing the area (controlling public spaces, contract enforcement etc)? 1= No, 2= Yes.
2.17. If "yes" in the previous question, which organization? 1= Resident's association, 2= Political party, 3= Religious organization,
4= Community elders (committee), 5= All or more than one of them (explain), 6= Other, explain:_____
_____

2.18. In which sectors of services provisions (KDA, KMC, KESC, water board etc) is the government most involved in the area,
similarly, in which sector they are not involved, explain?:_____
_____

2.19. Are you/the people satisfied with the role of government and its institutions (KDA, KMC, KESC, Water board) in development
and management of the area and relevant services? 0=No, 1= Yes. Explain (in each
case):_____
_____

3- Role of Political parties:
3.1. How many political parties are there in the area? Tell something about them?:_____
_____

3.2. Is there one dominating political party in the area? 0=No, 1= Yes, which one, explain:_____
_____

3.3. If "yes", how does the dominant political party benefit the community and area explain?:_____
_____

3.4. How beneficial are the other political parties, explain:_____
_____

3.5. Do different political parties represent different ethnic or political groups? 0= No, 1=Yes,
explain:_____
_____

3.6. If "yes", how does political affiliation impact on the social relations amongst different communities,
explain:_____
_____

3.7. How the political parties increase their support (membership) and decrease the power of other political parties in the
neighborhood:_____
_____

3.8. Explain about the type of relations amongst different political parties and party workers in the area? And how this relation
impacts the area and people, explain:_____

4- Safety and Security:

4.1. Who carries out policing and ensures public order in the neighborhood? 1= Police, 2= Resident groups, 3= Political party, 4=
rangers, 5= Other, explain:_____
4.2. If security/policing is done by any group other than police, please explain the process and mechanisms used: _____
4.3. Do you feel safe walking alone in the neighborhood and surrounding, a) in daylight 0=No, 1=Yes, or b) after dark? 0=No,
1=Yes, Please explain:_____
4.4. Do the women and children in your household feel safe walking alone in the neighborhood and surrounding, a) in daylight
0=No, 1=Yes, or b) after dark? 0=No, 1=Yes, Please explain:_____
4.5. Have you or any member of your household personally been affected by problems of violence/robbing/mugging/harassing in
the area and surrounding (in the last 18 months)? 0= No, 1=Yes, explain:_____
4.6. Are there problems of violence/robbing/mugging/harassing in the area and surrounding (in the last 18 months)? 0= No, 1=Yes,
explain:_____
4.7. Are there any problems with gangs or other anti-social groups in the neighborhood? 0=No, 1=Yes,
explain:_____

4.8. Are there any problems of extortion in the neighborhood? 0=No, 1=Yes, explain:_____

4.9. Are there any problems of land grabbing in the neighborhood and surrounding? 0=No, 1=Yes, explain:_____

4.10. Does the people freely use the amenities in the surrounding neighborhoods similarly vice versa, explain:_____

4.11. Has there been any problem of political violence or conflict in this neighborhood (in the last 18 months)? 0=No, 1= Yes, explain (what, when, what happened, how it affected you):_____

4.12. Are there any other issues or conflicts in this neighborhood and surrounding?   0=No, 1=Yes, explain: _____

4.13. If issues or conflict arise amongst different communities, how and by whom are these resolved?_____ _____

4.14. Are you satisfied with the role and working of police and rangers in ensuring safety and security in the neighborhood? 0= No, 1= Yes, explain in each case:_____

5- Miscellaneous:

5.1. Do you like living in this area? 0=No, 1=Yes. Explain (in both cases):_____

5.2. What are the disadvantages of living here, explain:_____ _____

5.3. What are the different advantages of living here, explain:_____ _____|_____

Appendix B: Karachi

Appendix 4.1: History of Enclave Formation (Social Divisions)

The reasons of concentration of social groups and enclave formation are embedded in History, and the history of urban development has been shaped by four factors: First, migrations; second the planning decisions; third the religious and political violence in the background of religious extremism and ethnicity-based politics; and fourth, the rise of informal settlements. Each is discussed further below.

Migrations and socio-spatial changes

Karachi developed as a migrant city (Gayer, 2014, p. 23). Each migration wave brought particular socio-economic group who settled at specific geographic locations in the city. Regional and rural-urban social and political realities of Karachi have made migrations towards Karachi as natural and unavoidable process (EC 1). The political resentment and conflicts in Karachi are equally connected with migrations, as migrations have also been considered as planned and politically motivated with the objectives to develop support and power base (EC 3, EC 2, EC 8, EC 9, GC 13).

The Hindu-Sindhi merchants that arrived as traders after 1729 made Karachi as port town, and were the dominant pre-partition and colonial times local population who migrated to India during partition (Hasan et. al., 2002, p. 15-21).

During the pre-colonial era, the local Baloch also migrated from various locations along Makran Coast (Lari and Lari, 1996, p. 8-10). These groups now reside mainly in Lyari and its surroundings (Chapter 8).

Much before partition, Karachi was captured by British forces in 1839 (Hasan et. al., 2002, p. 15-21). Along with all the developments, the British created the elite vs. the poor divide when they developed white (European) town and black (native) town development pattern (Lari and Lari, 1996, p. 59-66). The colonial forces, civilians, soldiers and their families, lived in protected cantonments now fast converting into elite housing in the southern part (Hasan et. al., 2013; EC 9). The exclusionary elitist development in the south is still continuing and extends as far as DHA, connecting it with PECHS, Cantonments along Shahrah-e-Faisal till Malir Cantonment,

consolidating the elite vs. poor divide. This British occupation also brought religious groups, such as Christians (Goan) and Parsis, as elites who developed several gated communities at that time that still exists in the larger socio-spatial settings as exception.

Since partition in 1947, Waseem (1996, p.623) has identified four waves migrations to Karachi. The first wave came during partition, 1947, when the social structure of the city changed in a very short period, with the departure of Hindus and arrival of the Muslims from various parts of India, later called "Muhajirs" (Hasan et. al., 2002, p. 14-21).With the arrival of 600,000 immigrants the social dynamics changed completely. The population increased from 450,000 to 1.137 million in 1951, in that the Sindhi speaking reduced from 61.2% to 8.6%, consequently, Urdu speaking population swelled up from 6.3% to 50%, while Hindus reduced from 51% to 2.0% and Muslims increased from 42% to 96% (ibid). At first, the Muhajirs occupied open spaces or houses left by the migrating Hindus, bought houses or were allocated housing by the government. Later, they developed informal settlements or the government developed housing for them (see next sections of planning decisions and rise of informal settlements). This migration created a resentment amongst Sindhi locals as Karachi was became the federal capital, and incoming Muhajir political leaders controlled many aspects of government (Gayer, 2014, p. 27-28).

The second migration wave occurred from 1960-1980, when Punjabi and Pashtoons drifted towards Karachi. The Pashtoon migrants who mostly settled around industrial areas and peripheries including SITE and Orangi Hills and developed informal settlements, are blamed to be brought as a political conspiracy turned state policy (Gayer, 2014, p.44, EC 3, EC 8, EC 9). The then military dictator needed a support base in Karachi, which did not generally support his bid for president, and displaced Pashtoon in Hazara district were encouraged to relocate to Karachi as they supported the then president (Gayer, 2014, p.44, EC 3, EC 8, EC 9). Later, these Pashtoon enclaves were at the forefront of the first Pashtoon-Muhajir riots after the presidential election of 1965 and later in 1985-86 in and around Orangi (EC 2, EC 3, EC 9; Gayer, 2003, p. 5-8; Budhani et al. 2010, p. 4-7; Baixas, 2.2, 2014). This period also led to the rise of informal settlements due to rural-urban migrations (EC 9). During that time rise of Pashtoon and Punjabi power in the federal administration also created economic resentment amongst Muhajirs (Waseem, 1996), and in the 1960s the federal capital was shifted from Karachi to Islamabad, alienating Muhajirs further from the spaces of decision-making.

In the third wave, during the 1970-90s a number of rural Sindhis shifted towards urban areas including Karachi which deepened the Muhajir resentment, as Sindhi started to dominate in

provincial government jobs due to enforcement of job quota introduced by Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a Sindhi leader, the then prime minister. This alienated Muhajirs further as they majorly depended on public jobs in various services providing institutions and in bureaucracy (Waseem, 1996). This was the first time when the Muhajirs thought of having a separate province for themselves (Gayer, 2014, p. 28) and these separatist thinking exists today (refer Ali, R. 2015). Advocacy for separate provinces is repeatedly resonates in political debates and in graffiti in public space (*The Express Tribune*, 2014b). This period also observed various control tactics and power politics by provincial government e.g. a Language bill that tried to make all students of Sindh study the Sindhi language, which led to Muhajir-Sindhi riots termed "Language riots" (Gayer, 2014. P. 83-86; Baixas, 2.1, 2014).

The fourth migration wave during the 1980s-1990 was the most turbulent time, when the Afghan immigrants and others flocked to the city following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This period also shaped the ethnicity based politics and the sectarian divide, especially the rise of MQM (Gayer, 2014, p. 79-100). Religious and sectarian groups gained power as they got state (army-controlled) support in recognition of their contribution in the Afghan-Soviet war. This period saw the rise of ethnic and sectarian enclaves, and no-go-areas such as Sohrab Goth (EC 9). This was also the time when the city saw the fiercest Muhajir-Pashtoon riots, such as the Qasba-Aligarh massacre in 1986, when hundreds of Muhajirs were killed in planned attacks by the Pashtoons (Gayer, 2003, 5-8; Budhani et. al., 2010, p.4-7).

The decade of 1990s was period when the state-led military operation in the province against criminals turned towards MQM as main target of operation in Karachi (Waseem, 1996, p. 627-628; Khan, N. 2010, p. 228-229; Baixas, 2.3, 2014). MQM was blamed for hatching a conspiracy to set up Karachi as a separate state, running underground torture cells and instigating violence against opponents (Gayer, 2003, p. 13-16), and having links with secret agents such as RAW (Indian Intelligence agency) which resonates periodically (*Dawn,* 2015c; Ali, I. 2015b)

A fifth migration wave can also be identified that started in 2000. Military operations in northern Pakistan, the earthquake of 2005, and flooding in 2010 brought a new influx migrants, mainly Pashtoons from the north and rural Sindhis (Gayer, 2014, p. 24-27; Gazdar, 2011, p. 4-8). This coincided with the emergence of local government system in the city (refer section on local government in section 4.3.1). The first term of CDGK was really favourable for Pashtoon migrants as the city government was led by J.I. (since MQM boycotted that election) a religious-political party known for its Pashtoon support and role during the Afghan Jihad (refer Chapter 6 and 7). As

the Pashtoon population swelled, and Karachi had the largest urban population of Pashtoons in the country, ANP emerged (the Pashtoon nationalist party) to challenge MQM as the major political rival in the city (Gayer, 2014, p. 24-27; Gazdar, 2011, p. 4-8). Both MQM and Sindhi nationalist political parties used various political tactics, separately, to examine ways to halt the influx of 'Internally Displaced People' (IDPs) in the background of military operation in North (*Dawn,* 2014a**,** *Dawn,* 2014b**).** A similar problem emerged when the Sindhi IDPs started to pour into the city after the 2010 floods who were opposed by MQM (Haider, 2010), infuriating the Sindhi nationalists who consider Karachi to be part of Sindh and as Sindhis they have the first right of its land. The opposition to internal migration has always been on the assumption that the immigrants come in the city and consume already scarce resources, including jobs, while the federal government neither increase budge nor electoral seats in the city despite drastic increase in population (also refer 4.2.2).

Planning decisions

Formal planning decisions have an important role in the current socio-spatial pattern in the city and to shaping of the connected divides (EC 5, EC 8).

The post-partition planning decisions to rehabilitate Muhajirs ended up in developing Muhajir enclaves (EC 5). The initial planning was faced the issue of rehabilitating large numbers of homeless partition immigrants, and the resultant planning created dedicated large settlements first in the now Karachi Central district and later the areas of Korangi and North/New Karachi according to 1958 Master Plan (Hasan et. al., 2002, p. 26-27; EC 5). Political parties, especially MQM, relied on these social groupings to win seats from the 1980s onwards (EC 5).

Formal housing developments for high income groups also shaped the socio-economic divides. Clifton, Bath Island, PECHS, later DHA and the more-recent conversion of cantonments into housing have created official social divisions (EC 8). The continued failure to provide low-income housing has led to development of informal settlements that flourished around high income areas because of the employment opportunities in service provision in these areas (Ahmed, S. 2013).

The formally planned industrial zones and lack of worker housing also spurred the development of informal settlements, around zones such as SITE, Landhi, Korangi and Quaidabad (EC 8), where migrants especially Pashtoons (who arrived in 1960s) consolidated ethnic enclaves (EC 2, EC 8).

Planned housing for the labours at SITE was developed in Orangi and Baldia, but was inadequate resulting in the emergence of entrepreneurs providing informal housing (Ahmed, S. 2013).

Ethnic and religious conflicts and violence

Safety and security issues around connected with ethno-political or religious conflicts, are one of the major reasons of enclave formations (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, EC 6, EC 8, GC 10). It is noted that there were ethnic and religious groups living separately without any tensions between them (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, EC 8), but formerly open enclaves became closed and gated after the political and sectarian violence in the 1980s (EC 2, EC 3, EC 8, GC 10, GC 11, GC 12).

> The enclaves that formed in response to the persecution, forced evictions or compound eviction in the city were the most undesirable enclaves of all. One of the examples of these types are the enclaves that formed since the 1980s as a result of sectarian persecution that forced the Shia community to leave areas such as F.B. Area to live in Ancholi Society. This changed the whole complexion of the that area which became inaccessible and difficult to live in for other groups. Religious leaders also promoted this pattern as it made it easy for them to look after the people in one place together. (EC 2)

Rise of informal settlements

It is known that most of the rural migrants usually choose informal settlements for their place of living in the city (EC 5). Punjabi and Pashtoons were the earliest low-income rural migrants, and all the rural migrants prefers to live with their relatives because of tribal and kinship ties (EC 5, EC 8). There have been three phases of development of informal settlements which have emerged as mixed or ethnically segregated settlements depending on the actors who facilitated change over time (EC 8).

Several reasons have been identified for the development of informal settlements in the city. One reason is availability of vast tracts of vacant government land belonging to different authorities (EC 4). Political influence and politicisation of land institutions and corruption in the land departments are other issues explored later. Cumbersome processes of accessing formal housing for the poor and lack of housing credit (EC 5, EC 7, Hasan. et. al., 2013) as informal systems provide a simple 'one window operation[74]' (EC 7) and also facilitate access to credit (Hasan et.

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[74] Commonly used term to refer ease in the documentation and transaction procedures that require the customer to deal with only one person and in one go.

al.,2013). Lack of formal housing for the poor, missing of target group in government housing schemes, speculation by the middle and upper middle income groups, encroachments by the informal actors, demand and supply gap, and the rise of private housing (EC 1, EC 2, EC 4, EC 8, EC-11, EC-12) have also played their role in development of informal settlements.

Informal actors are important in facilitating the development of informal settlements, who often influence the nature and outcomes of the informal processes and identity-based orientation of the emerging settlement. Over time, these informal actors have changed from a neutral entrepreneur in collusion with the government officers and the police to organised crime groups, mafia and now, political parties that operate at middlemen (EC 8).

> …Regarding the first phase (post partition), it was a "Freak Phenomena" in which the migrants just came and they were allowed to encroach on public spaces, it was limited to city centre there was no middle man, no political influence and no issue of ethnicity, although there was a division (on socio-economic basis)… The second phase (1960s) deals mostly with in-migration due to industrial development and lack of development in rural areas as there was a huge demand of cheap labour in Karachi, and when the labour came there was no housing for them, so they started to look around the industrial sites and started encroaching. Later this task was taken over by "middlemen, informal sub-divider or mafia" and that was also beyond any political, ethnic or religious division and it involved the police, local musclemen and the government officers from the land department … This same second phase also absorbed the migrants from Bangladesh in 1971 and later illegal migrants from other countries including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Iran…this point can be seen as the start of ethnic enclave formation… The third phase started from the mid-2000s when land grabbing appeared … political parties have used both formal and informal ways for land grabbing with three objectives, ".. first was to earn money, second was to increase the people from the same identity background and third was to increase the vote. When MQM did this, ANP adopted the same tactic and controlled settlements where Pashtoons were living, followed by PPP and the nationalist parties from the interior of Sindh, which this led to territoriality and now we have different kinds of issues in different geographic locations including extortion, kidnapping etc." (EC 8)

Thus, the current socio-spatial pattern in the city is an outcome of historic events that includes migrations, formal planning decisions, the security situation and the rise of informal settlements. These factors have also influenced the increase of socio-political conflicts, violence in the city, as both, the political parties emerged out of this unbalanced development and socio-spatial pattern. Alternatively, this segregation embedded in socio-spatial pattern has provided basis for identity based political entrepreneurship involving competition to appropriate power and resources.

Appendix C: North Nazimabad

Appendix 5.1: History of North Nazimabad Case Study

North Nazimabad housing neighbourhood was planned in 1953 as Scheme 2 'Taimuria' of KDA (Karachi Development Authority) then known as the Karachi Improvement Trust or KIT (KDA, 1984 in Dowall, 1991). The neighbourhood was developed for federal government employees as Karachi was then the capital city of the country, but the housing scheme was made available to other people when the capital was moved to the new city of Islamabad and began to be properly developed during the 1960s. Due to its location and planning North Nazimabad remained in high demand among middle, upper middle and high income households, mostly Urdu speaking Muhajirs.

The informal areas to the west grew up a little later than the formal areas. These developed on either amenity plots or on the vacant steep slopes of the Orangi Hills, partly to satisfy the demands for worker housing during the 1960s as the city was going through an industrial boom. Labour colonies were first built as formal development for the nearby Sindh Industrial Trading Estate (SITE), but later informal housing sprung up in Orangi, Baldia and other adjacent areas including North Nazimabad, due to the enormous demand for low income housing for the labourers (Ahmed, 2013). The rural migrants who settled during that period later facilitated their fellow villagers/tribesmen to settle in the city and this area. This included Hasan Zai Pashtoon tribesmen from the Hazara district, who arrived during the construction of 'Tarbela Dam'[75] that displaced 96,000 people in Hazara (Teminsky, 2013). Many of the Hasan Zai tribesmen were helped in relocating to Karachi, and settled on the Orangi Hills in the case study area.

Several interviewees from the informally developed areas (I-UC2) had arrived in the 1970s, and recall that the hills were controlled by Pashtoon (or Kohistani Pashtoon) strongmen, who ran the stone quarries supplying stones to the construction sites, including North Nazimabad (INN 2, INN 3, INN 6, INN 8, INN 9, INN 11). The Balti and Kohistani tribesmen bought properties from the same strongmen. KMC officers allowed the Punjabi-Christians, who were working for KMC as sweepers, to have temporary accommodation on an amenity plot adjacent to De-Silva Town (Block P in F-UC2) that housed wealthy and educated Goan Christians. As the Christian settlement

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[75] Tarbela Dam started in 1968 and completed in 1976.

consolidated, other Christian families were also officially relocated there after they were evicted from a nearby locality (INN 12). All of the communities in I-UC2 followed the similar pattern of expansion, i.e. first having a few houses that attracted relatives and other families of the same community and so on.

Appendix 5.2: Area wise Population in the Case Study Area

	Area (Sq. Km)	Population 2005 (Approx.)	Population 2015 (*Estimate*)
I-UC2 Hasan Zai	0.15	*17000*	*33,000*
I-UC2 Kohistani	0.15	*12,000*	*27,000*
I-UC2 Pahar Gunj	0.06	*12,000*	*18,000*
I-UC2 Balti Shi	0.04	*4,000*	*6,000*
I-UC2 Deer Colony	0.04	*4,000*	*6,000*
I-UC2 Others		*3000*	*10,000*
I-UC2 (Total)	**0.45**	**52,000**	**100,000**
F-UC2	**0.60**	**10,000**	**20,000**
UC2	**1.05**	**62000**	**120,000**
UC3-4 Bohri			*25,000*
UC3-4 Ismaili			*2,000*
UC3-4 Others			*48,000*
UC3 (Case Study)	**0.75**	**30,000**	**40,000**
UC4 (Case Study)	**0.75**	**25,000**	**35,000**
UC3-4 (Total)	**1.5**	**55,000**	**75,000**
TOTAL Case Study Area	**2.55**		**195,000**

Appendix D: Supplementary Case Studies

Appendix 7.1: Petty Drug Gangs to City Level Politico-Criminal Groups

The origins of modern gang warfare in Lyari are a direct result of violent rivalries between powerful criminal families dating back 30 or 40 years. Gayer (2014, p. 123-158) (and also EC 3) explains a detailed account of Lyari's history from the 1960s when the district was the sole territory of Kala Nag (Nabi Bakhsh), soon challenged by his own men, the two brothers Dadal (Dad Mohammed) and Sheru (Sher Mohammed). After the demise of Kala Nag, Dadal and Sheru fought to control the criminal space of Lyari, but both were soon challenged by the son of late Kala Nag, named Kala Nag-II (Allah Bakhsh) supported by Babu Dakait (Iqbal Mohammed). The reign of Kala Nag-II and Babu Dakait soon faced the challenge from Babu's former apprentice, the Haji Lalu (Lal Mohammed). Haji Lalu brought Rehman Dakait (Abdul Rehman), Dadal's son, into the arena to fight against Babu Dakait, and introduced his own son Arshad Puppo into business. Kala Nag-II committed suicide in 2008 (*Daily,* 2015), Haji Lalu breathed his last naturally in 2012 (*The Express Tribune,* 2012a)*,* while Babu Dakait was killed by Rehman Dakait in June 2004 (PIPS, 2009, p. 19). Babu's four sons also faced the same fate by the hands of Rehman Dakait. Mid-2000 brought an end to classical Lyari specific drug gang's war and gave rise to politically oriented gangs that aspired to venture beyond the limits of Lyari.

Rehman Dakait and Arshad Puppo are supposed to be the main characters of current gang wars, who connected the politico-criminals with political ambitions and Baloch rhetoric, in Lyari. They collaborated until the late 1990s – their wives were even sisters (Hussain, 2015) – but Rehman turned violent and reportedly killed his mother in 1995 (Gayer, 2014, p. 138-139; EC 3) because of allegations of adultery or that she was an informer to the LEAs or Babu Dakait. Until the late 1990s, Rehman Dakait and Haji Lalu were working together, all the groups remained loyal to PPP, but the two leaders fell out over a kidnapping and ransom issue (Gayer, 2014, p.140). After the split, Arsahd Puppo (Haji Lalu's son) desecrated Dadal's grave (father of Rehman Dakait) and killed a transport company owner, Faiz Mohammad, the father of the current PAC chief, Uzair Baloch. This started a new chapter of rivalry that witnessed the killing of 500-600 people and the emergence and disappearance of several splinter groups from 2003 till 2008 in Lyari (Ali, N. S. 2014).

Initiation of gang war between Rehman Dakait and Arshad Puppo is supposed to be the point when MQM entered the scene as Arshad colluded with MQM against the PPP supported Rehman (Gayer, 2014). The alleged MQM's support and interest in Lyari gave Lyari gang wars a city-level scale.

Arshad Puppo was arrested in 2006, but his gang was run by his commander Ghaffar Zikri. Ghaffar Zikri continued to align the group with MQM, although denied by Ghaffar (Agha, 2013) and Arshad (Siddiqui, S. 2011). In the absence of Arshad, Rehman offered Ghaffar a truce, and they joined forces with other sovereign gangs including Baba Ladla etc. to create People's Aman Committee (PAC) in 2008 (Gayer, 2014, p. 142).

Rehman carried out various welfare initiatives that made him favourite leader of residents of Lyari, who called him *Khan Bhai* (Big brother). Rehman then introduced a new social position of *Sardar* (Lord) in this urban context, which was unique in the case of Balochs from Lyari. This change became a challenge for PPP, as Rehman continued to dictate the choice or electoral candidates and political strategy in Lyari. Rehman's influence was so broad that he even set social rules and regulations and defined punishments (Gayer, 2014, pp. 148).

Rehman used PAC to bring peace to Lyari and oust MQM, but also to launch his own political career. PAC emerged in most of the Sindhi/Baloch settlements throughout the city and started challenging MQM's monopoly in these areas. The rise of PAC and Rehman irked the PPP hierarchy, but Rehman was killed in a police encounter in 2009. Some theories link Rehman's killing with his links with Baloch separatists in Baluchistan while others link it with the power politics of leaders of PPP (Gayer, 2014, p.146-147)

Uzair Baloch took over leadership of PAC after Rehaman's demise. Uzair took up politics as a challenge because his father was cruelly killed, allegedly, by Arshad Puppo. Arshad Puppo met the same fate, allegedly by PAC commander Baba Ladla (Noor Mohammed) in March 2013[76]. This led to new ventures and conflicts; PAC started to increase its influence and attempted ventures

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[76] It was widely reported in local newspapers that Arshad Puppo along with his brother and another member of the gang were killed (*Dawn,* 2013f). The police officers, also witnesses in the case initially informed in their statement that, the culprits kidnapped the slain people from Defence area, who were brought to Lyari, were tortured and killed. Their bodies were cut into pieces, while the killers cut Arshad's head from body and played football with it. It is also said that the bodies were burned and then drained in the sewage channel. The story, is widely accepted as the gangsters also uploaded the videos of the torture on YouTube . However, later during the hearing, the eye witnesses retracted from their initial statement, allegedly due to political pressure (*The Express Tribune*, 2015d)

beyond Lyari onto MQM's turf (Gayer, 2014, p.152; EC 1, EC 3, EC 4, ECCS 2), which resulted in clashes between the two groups in which several people got killed; the famous massacre of Sher Shah Scrap Market by PAC is one example (ibid)[77]. During that time PAC had become a *de-facto* military wing of PPP (Yusuf, 2012, Gayer, 2014, p. 154), although PPP denies such allegations, used to deal with MQM's street power throughout the city.

PAC opened another conflict when it started to fight the Kutchi Memons of Lyari (Gayer, 2014, p.154). Attacks by PAC on Kutchi Memon localities made the residents flee several times, first in July 2011 and then in July 2013[78]. However, the migrants were forced back by other political groups including Sindhi nationalist political parties such as JSQM, JSM and JST (*The Express Tribune*, 2013j). Kutchi Rabita Committee (KRC) a politico-military outfit representing Kutchi Memons in Lyari, was formed in 2009-2010 in response to PAC to safeguard interests of the Kutchi Memons in conflicts over territories and resources (Gayer, 2014, p.153). However, it is reported that it colluded with Arshad Puppo and directly or indirectly came under the support of MQM (Khan, 2012a), opening another window for MQM in Lyari. Before the 2013 general election, Kutchis remained loyal to PPP politically but in 2013 KRC defected as per news reports (Mandhro, 2013b).

PAC continued to open war fronts and make enemies, including with the then local Member of Parliament Nabeel Gabol from PPP, making it impossible for him to enter Lyari. Due to shifting allegiances between PAC and PPP, Gabol decided to quit PPP and in March 2013 joined MQM (*The Express Tribune,* 2013c). This event coincided with the killing of Arshad Puppo, but the people of Lyari in PAC controlled areas, reportedly, celebrated both events (Mandhro, 2013a), suggesting a strong link between the controlling group, the legitimising residents, the common enemy and the space.

PAC had become the king-maker, as was evident during both the 2008 and 2013 general elections. PPP, the national political party, had to consult PAC to nominate candidates in its former stronghold Lyari. After the 2013 general elections, the newly selected PPP Chief Minister of the province visited Lyari and met with Uzair Baloch in a bid to normalise the relations (Tunio,

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[77] 12 traders were killed mercilessly in Sher Shah Scrape Market, when they refused to give extortion money to, reportedly, PAC extortionists as the area is reportedly controlled by MQM (Gayer, 2014, p. 152).

[78] Around 30000 Kutchi residents of Lyari had to migrate to outside the city, the majority of them had to stay in open or makeshift arrangements, as there were no such provisions for taking care of such numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs), reported *The Express Tribune* (2013h).

2013). This was widely criticised by the media and political parties, as PAC had been banned by the same government and in October 2011 Uzair had been declared a criminal under Anti-Terrorism Act 1999 (amended) (*satp* [*no* date]; The *Express Tribune,* 2011b). The banning of PAC was supposedly due to pressure from MQM as a coalition partner in the Sindh government, however, PAC changed its name to the Awami Aman Committee (AAC) and continue operations as usual (Khan, 2011). Uzair Baloch's house was raided by Rangers just one month after the visit of the Chief Minister, but Uzair was supposedly pre-warned and was not there (Bhatti, 2013). Even after the raid, Uzair was seen in the area and continued tasks such as conflict resolution hearings and problem-solving (Gayer, 2014, p.156).

October 2012 witnessed cracks in the PAC military structure when Baba Ladla, commander of military wing of PAC, and Jabbar Jheango, one of his top commanders, had a fight in which six of their young fighters got killed (Khan, 2012d). Later in 2013 another turn was reported when Baba Ladla defected from PAC to join its archrival Ghaffar Zikri to fight against the PAC (Khan, 2013e). Furthermore, it was also reported that Baba Ladla was supposed to be the commander of the military wing of PAC, while Uzair and Zafar were political leaders *(The Express Tribune,* 2013l). Baba Ladla's defection came a few months after killing of Zafar Baloch, the second in command of PAC (*Dawn,* 2013e[79]). Insiders suspect Baba Ladla's involvement in Zafar's murder because he condemned Zafar for siding with the LEAs which led to killings of Ladla's men (Baloch, 2014). The new conflict between Baba Ladla and PAC resulted in the mass killing of 16 people in March 2014 including women and children caught up in the crossfire at Jhat Pat Market (*The Express Tribune,* 2013l). It is reported that Baba Ladla was supposedly killed in May 2014, on the Pakistan-Iran border while entering Iran illegally (Kharal and Baloch, 2014).

The Karachi Operation (refer 4.3.1) added another chapter in Lyari's history. With the start of Operation, most of the gangsters have gone in hiding, including the PAC leadership; while many of the lower ranking gangsters have been killed in alleged encounters by the LEAs along with other criminals in the city (refer 4.3.1). Uzair Baloch was also apprehended and presented before court in Karachi, While reportedly, he was arrested by Interpol at Dubai Airport allegedly travelling with a fake ID (Mandhro, 2014c).

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[79] Zafar Baloch was next to Uzair Baloch in PAC. He was killed in broad daylight in his own controlled area. Some of the sources said that the killing was a result of internal rift of power in PAC, others also allege Baba Ladla responsible for the murder.

Appendix 7.2: Social Impacts of Power Contestations

Due to power contestation amongst gangs, the residents of Lyari's complex dilemmas ranging from dealing with gangs and LEAs, to countering social prejudice from employers and others beyond Lyari. The residents, while living in such an unpredictable situation, need to keep their incomes intact even when they cannot reach workplaces or open businesses, and face issues about their children and their passion for sports and culture.

Firstly the residents struggle to escape the crossfire, such as the incident of Jhat Pat Market (See Khan, 2014b[80]) and atrocities and allegations of gangs and the police, Hashim of Aljazeera News informed (2012a). They also need to keep their boys away from the attractive gang affiliations that bring money and power, and from police allegations of being a gang supporter. Raheel and Maher have identified one of the cases (2014[81]), in which a young promising footballer of Lyari was allegedly killed by police in an encounter for being a gang member. Similarly, many of the gangsters are said to be once good sportsmen such as Babu Dakait (*Dawn*, 2009a) and Ghaffar Zikri (Hussain, 2015), but the lack of opportunity paved their way as gangsters.

Secondly, the daily violence and closure of the neighbourhood prevents people from going to work, leading to loss of livelihoods. Extortion demands within Lyari have fuelled the situation (Kirmani, 2014), while employers outside Lyari have started to avoid hiring people from Lyari as their attendance is unpredictable which is a problem in industries like textiles in which international consignments have to be dispatched on time. The outside world has stereotyped people from Lyari as gangsters, influenced mainly by media reports (*Dawn*, 2011; Kasim, 2012).

A resident of Lyari and expert on the conflict (CCS-02) mentioned that people are in no way happy with the situation, neither with the LEAs nor with the gangs. They protest against both. However, although the media shows the women of Lyari protesting against raids and arrests, in practice they sometimes protest against the killings of innocents by gangs or LEAs, but may also be forced to protest by the gangs. For example, when people protested against the killing of a sportsman-turned-gangster allegedly in an armed encounter by Rangers, the rally was organised by PAC, *The Express Tribune* reported (2013g). Thus, when people have protested against the LEAs it remains

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[80] Explained earlier, bystanders and common residents are often killed during the cross fire, Jhat Pat Market attack is one example where 19 people were killed including children and women.

[81] A young promising footballer of Lyari was allegedly killed by police in an encounter for being a gang member.

doubtful as who organised the protests, but Lyari residents against the government actions as well as gangsters, as one of the rallies also highlighted (Mandhro, 2014a). One ethnic group is also found to protest publically against another, for example KRC organised a protest against PAC that was met with violence both by LEAs and the opponent gang, as Khan reported in *The Express Tribune* (2013c) (refer Figure 7.2 for graphical representation of all the gangs and their links).

Appendix 7.3: Historical Development of Lyari

Lyari is situated at the confluence of Lyari River[82] and the Karachi port on the Arabian Sea. Lyari got its name from *Lyar,* a tree said to be found in graveyards (Gayer, 2014), while others connect the name with the River Lyari. Lyari and surrounding areas are one of the oldest localities of the city, developed as an unplanned settlement. The first settlement can be traced back to 1729 when it was inhabited by Sindhi fishermen and Baloch nomads (Gayer, 2014, p.127-131).

The village started developing after the silting-up of the port of Kharakbandar, and the establishment of the nearby settlement at Dirbo and port near the present-day Lyari (Lari and Lari, 1996, p. 8). The new port followed and a walled settlement occupied by Hindu merchants was called Kolachi or Kolachi-jo-Goth, named according to legend after a local woman, Mai Kolachi. The village then saw several waves of migrations from the surrounding regions, including Balochs from current day Balochistan and Iran, Kutchi Memons from Gujarat, and the African slaves (known as *Makrani* or *Sheedi*) from the slave trade at that time. The population reached 14,000 in 1813 (Lari and Lari, 1996, p.76) increasing to 81,768 in 1941, and then 360,000 in 1956 making it the largest quarter of the city of that time (Gayer, 2014, p.129).

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[82] Sweet water river then, used for cultivation and fishing, but now has converted into the largest open sewage drain of Karachi.

Appendix 7.4: Historical Development of PIB Colony

PIB colony was planned and developed in 1948, as the first planned settlement offered to the migrants from India after partition of 1947. The PIB Co-operative Housing Society was a brain child of the then Local Sindhi Feudal Lord Mr Ilahi Bux, an educated person who became the first Chief Minister of Sindh after partition (Ahmed et. al. 2014). Mr Ilahi Bakhsh lived in PIB colony abutting the Lyari River beside a small Sindhi village connected with Pir Ilahi Bakhsh residential complex. That Sindhi village still exists, along with its extension named 14-Number Plot. Most of the land has been converted into an apartment complex (called Pir Heaven) by the heirs of Mr Pir Ilahi Bakhsh. This old Sindhi enclave is one of the two enclaves in the wider Muhajir-dominated PIB colony, the other Sindhi/Baloch enclave is further east of the Ilahi Buksh enclave away from the river, commonly called *Baloch Para* or *Makrani Para,* although its official name is Suleiman Village.

Appendix 7.5: Historical Development of Scheme 33

Scheme-33 was allocated for development in 1967, but was reallocated in 1980 with added land as it was not fully developed (Ahmed et. al. 2014). According to the plan large land parcels were sold to cooperative societies and builders, as KDA was supposed to provide trunk infrastructure and developers to complete the internal infrastructure. The result was that land lay undeveloped for a long time, much of which got encroached. This resulted in gated communities that eroded the public character of the scheme.

Areas abutting Gulshan-e-Iqbal started to develop during the late 1980s and early 1990s when people started to move out of central Karachi against the background of a state-led operation against MQM that mainly targeted Muhajir areas. Meanwhile, there was an increase of Pashtoons, especially around Sohrab Goth, who started to arrive during the 1980s in connection with the Afghan war and the transportation business. An Afghan refugee camp was also set up nearby. Sohrab Goth and surrounding areas have remained a Pashtoon stronghold, and the infamous Muhajir-Pashtoon riots of the mid-1980s were ignited when a bus carrying MQM workers was shot at, and later a state-led military operation against drug smugglers in Sohrab Goth, by then a no-go area for local authorities, added to the conflict.

During the mid-2000s, the land market in Karachi was booming, and prices were reaching all-time limits. Many experts thought it was a bubble that would soon burst, but during the boom people invested in land, especially on the outskirts of Karachi. However, this also attracted a 'Land Mafia' connected to political parties, and government employees of the land department and police (Hasan et al, 2013, p. 70-75). Land grabbing in Scheme-33 was the highest because of the presence of infrastructure and undeveloped plots bought for investment; "Sixty per cent of allotted plots in KDA Scheme-33 are occupied today. Land grabbers rent entire families to illegally occupy land and premises, paying them about PKR 15,000 (US$ 167) a month to do so. These families usually belong to the traditional 'lower castes', which have a seminomadic culture" (Hasan et al, 2013, p. 72). This was a large market for the informal actors that they utilised fully; at the same time, it gave rise to contestation between competing groups and their supporting political parties that often lapsed into violence. In addition, the informal control by ethnic identity-related groups resulted in the development of socially divided neighbourhoods (Hasan et al, 2013, p. 70-74).

Appendix E: Abbreviations and Terminologies

Table 1: Political parties

Abbreviation	Full Form	Explanation
MQM	Muttahida Qaomi Movement (United Nations Movement)	Previously called Muhajir Qaomi Movement. A political party came into being in mid-1980 with the claim of bringing back deprived rights of the Muhajir ethnicity, and this party is now the major representative of the Muhajirs. Not all Muhajirs want to link with it but the party claim they represents Urdu Speaking Muhajirs of Sindh, majorly dominating in Karachi. It's a fact that MQM has remained the dominating political party of Karachi in any kind of elections since late 1980s.
ANP	Awami National Party (Public National Party).	Pro-Pashtoon ethno-political party, mostly dominating in the northern Province of Pakistan, got electoral wins in 2008 elections in north and won 2 seats in Karachi, a rare happening. Since it is anti-Taliban and a secular political party, it has come under target of Taliban due to which almost all of its political offices closed down in Karachi and the leadership and workers stopped working openly. Between 2008 till 2012, it gave a very tough time to MQM, and both remain fighting in that period.
PPP	Pakistan People's Party	Initially a leftist political party emerged in 1970s, previously had representation across the ethnic divide; since late 1990s has become a representative for Sindhi population, while this limitation over emphasised since 2008 elections.
PAC	People's Aman Committee	Initially developed by a gang leader of Lyari in mid-2000, which is Baloch community oriented, and Baloch's have been diehard supporters of PPP in Karachi. After the killing of the initial leader, it was alleged that the reins were controlled by PPP, till it became a fierce opponent of MQM, having young men as workers represented across Karachi present in historic Baloch/sindhi villages in the city. It is alleged that PAC actually became a military wing of PPP, to deal with MQM and to remain alive in the politics of violent Politics of Karachi. PPP has always denied such allegations.
KRC	Kutchi Rabita Committee	An ethnicity based political Party, military outfit, of ethnic Kutchi community of the Lyari area, to counter PAC. Supported by MQM.
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (Movement for Justice Pakistan)	Gained popularity across the country since 2012-13, and emerged as 3rd largest political party in 2013 general elections. Lead by the famous cricketer turned politician, Imran Khan, the party has gain popularity across the ethnic

		divide because of its anti-corruption and equality slogans. However, it is not a complete leftist party; whereas huge numbers of Pashtoons have an inclination towards it, at the same time, huge numbers of Muhajirs especially youth voted for it. It is supposed to be an emerging power in the city of Karachi.
JI	Jamat-e-Islami	Religious Political Party, with long history, has been the majority party of Karachi before MQM, however, it still has very strong and organised administrative structure across the country, while it is supposed to be pro-establishment as it has been involved in Afghanistan War along with the Pakistan Army. Subsequently, has very strong representation amongst Pashtoons, while it used to dominate in local government before MQM and assumed the local government from 2001 till 2004, as MQM boycotted that elections, it is supposed to be pro-informal areas, as majority votes comes from there.
JUI	Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam	Religio-Political Party, A Deobandi-Sect dominated, majorly found in Pashtoon areas of Karachi while it is also widely presents in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa the northern Province of Pakistan.
SSP	Sipah Sahaba Pakistan	Anti-Shia community Militarised Deo-bandi sect outfit, banned in 2000s dominated by Pashtoons, changed its name to Ahle-sunna,t-wal Jamat (ASWJ) and became religio-political party. Have been involved in several Shia-clerics and citizens. Mostly found in Pashtoon informally developed settlements.
ASWJ	Ahle-sunnat-wal Jamat	Changed version of SSP, now into politics as well, however, the main anti-Shia agenda remains the same.
L.J	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	Banned anti-Shia Military outfit, has claimed for several incidents of Shia Massacre in Karachi and other parts of the country.
SMP	Sipah Mohammed Pakistan	Shia military outfit, developed to counter SSP, also banned now, however, it continue its operations.
MWM	Majlis-e-Wahdat-ul-Muslimeen	A Shia political aprty, a recent development in late 2000, after Shias found that they are not actively represented by any political party. The party has staged protests and rallies across the city, usually after sectarian based killings of Shia community members.

Table 2: Social Groups and identities.

Group	Sub-Group	Explanation
Sunni		Sunni is a sect of Islam, which denotes its division with another sect called Shia-sect.
	Deobandi	Debandi, follows a school of thought developed in a seminary-university situated in Deoband-India. The religious scholars of that school played a vital active religious role against British colonial rule over India, the same active (physical struggle based) role continued during Afghan War, when the scholars of the sect were officially taken on board to recruit people to train and fight in Afghanistan against he Russia. Subsequently, the majority followers are Pashtoons, and are supposed to follow strict rules of Sharia law. Many of them are found to be anti-Shia like SSP, ASWJ and Lashkar-e-Jhangivi.
	Barelvi	Sub-sect of Sunni sect, softer as they follow and believe in Sufis. They are supposed to be not involved in Jihad or anti-Shia activities, Deobandi are equally involved in conflicts (theoretical) with this sect.
Shia		Shia forms one of the two major sects in Islam, follows the 12 Imams, and differentiated with the Sunni Islam.
	Shia (Jafferia)	As above.
	Bohri	A sub-sect of Shia Sect, also called with other names, but for the study, this group follows its Imam of the time who is in Soorat-Gujrat-India. Majority of the followers in Karachi are Gujrati speaking population migrated from India.
	Ismaily	A sub-sect of Shia Sect, this group follows its Imam of the time the "prince Karim Agha Khan" who lives in France. Majority of the followers in Karachi are Gujrati speaking population migrated from India.
Pashtoons		Pashtoons are characterised by Pashto language and live in the Northern parts of Pakistan, including Afghan territories. The whole of KPK province is considered as Pashtoon dominated, while other ethnic groups also live there including Hazara community, and there are several tribes that reside in the independent territories of 08 agencies abutting Afghanistan. These tribes follow their own tribal rules, however, they are part of Pakistan and are controlled by administration through Political Agents and the tribal elders. The usual judiciary system and other laws does not apply there, while many of the institutions also do not work there include Police, while they have their own system of levies force and frontier constabulary.
	Deer	Deer is part of KPK province, while many tribes live there. The Pashtoons in Deer Colony in the case study area are from that unique socio-spatial setting.
	Hasan Zai	Hasan Zai tribes are from Kala Dhaka, district Torghar (Previously district Hazara) of KPK province. These people came to Karachi after the construction of Turbela Dam in 1960s, due to which majority of the lands in Kala-Dhaka were inundated because of the rising stored water. The

		effectees were never compensated, instead their settlement in Karachi was facilitated. At that time, Karachi was going through an industrial boom and required huge numbers of labour. Secondly, the president Ayub Khan at that time was from the same district and was facing strong political opposition in Karachi as he was a Martial Law administrator; however, bringing these Pashtoons balanced votes for him to gain some support in Karachi. The same Pashtoons were involved in the first Pashtoon-Muhajir violence in the city after the after and winning of Ayub Khan. Furthermore, the same Pashtoons were involved in second deadly riots in the city in mid 1980s in Orangi and the hills of the case study area, which led to the riots lead to rise of MQM. The Hasan Zai are mostly linked with the transport industry, especially para-transit that include Rickshaws and Taxis in the city. They mostly comprise of low income groups.
	Afridi	Afridi Pashtoon are from the Khyber Agency, one of the famous Pashtoon agencies in which famous Khyber Pass is located. They are mostly, peaceful, related to transport business, own large vehicles that they ply for the commercial enterprises etc., and are supposed to be a well-to-do group of Pashtoons.
	Kohistani	Kohistani Pashtoons are basically from SWAT valley in KPK province. They are more liberal than the Hasan Zai Pashtoons, however, they form the same income group.
Gujrati	Gujrati-Bohri	Gujrati are the people who migrated from Gujrat and speak Gujrati language; the Bohri community is a Gujrati speaking ethnic group.
	Gujrati-Ismaili	The Ismaili sectarian group is basically a Gujrati speaking ethnic group as well.
Punjabi		Punjabi people are the people who migrated from Punjab, the province of Pakistan.
	Punjabi-Christians	These Punjabi rural migrants are characterised by having Christian religion, in addition they are supposed to be linked with job of solid waste management and cleaning, and the majority still continue the same profession and are mostly employed in Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC) as sweepers or related staff. Both men and women work.
	Punjabi-Muslims	These live along with the Punjabi-Christians and are difficult to be distinguished on appearance and physical characteristics. However, these Muslims follow the Barelvi Sect of Sunni Islam and hence are unique in Deobandi-Pashtoon dominated surroundings.
Sindhi		Sindhi represents the people of Sindh province, within which Karachi is situated. Sindhi speak Sindhi language, and are inclined towards PPP and other Sindhi Nationalist Political Parties. Many Sindhi villages are found in the outskirts of the city, which now have become part of the city.
Baloch		Baloch are the ethnic locals that existed before the rise of Karachi as a Port city. They mostly existed along the sea coast, however, many Baloch villages developed, that still exist, along the River Lyari and River Malir. Lyari and Malir areas, currently, are the dominated by the Baloch ethnic group.
Muhajir		Muhajir literally means "Immigrant", the term was officially used for the people who migrated from India after partition and came to Sindh,

	although many came to Punjab as well, but they were mostly Punjabi Speaking and so they became part of the culture and province. Muhajirs in Sindh were characterised by "Urdu" language; however, many spoke more than one language like that of Gujrati, etc, but the term defined them together.
Balti	Balti community represents the people from Gilgit-Baltistan Province in the North, they have their unique language, culture and lifestyle, but, the Balti in the case study area have dominating Shia identity.

Table 3: Miscellaneous Terms

Term/Abbreviation	Explanation
Masjid/Mosque	Prayer Space for Muslims. Sunni use the term mostly.
Imam Bargah	Prayer Space, Shia-Muslims use the term for their prayer space.
Jamat Khana	Jamat Khana represents socio-religious space, literally meaning community place. For bothBohris and Ismailies, Jamat Khana is a religious-come- social space. In Bohris, Jamat Khana include Prayer Space, Community Gathering Space where religious and Social gathering like marriages take place, the food is also served and cooked here and along with it is administration facilitates as well.
Muharram	Muharram is the first month of Islamic calendar, respected by all sects; however Shia sect have very strong affiliations and perform several rituals including city wide processions, religious gathering called "Majlis" etc.
Muharram Procession	A religious congregation of Shia Muslims, observed during first 10 days of Muharram and other days of the year as well, in Muharram to mark and mourn the killings of the Grand son and family member of the Prophet (Peace Be upon Him).
Case Study Area	The limited area under study, marked socially and geographically.
Estate Agents	Also known as estate brokers. Dealing in properties and facilitating and guiding property transactions.
Community Leaders	Community leaders refer to representative of the community, irrespective of political or tribal standing and affiliations, usually involved in problem solving. People approach him for guidance and support. They can also have political affiliations and tribal or religious affiliations and powers as well.
Community Elders	Community elders represents the elders of the structures of family, kinship or tribe. They are usually old men, supposed to be having power and authority, and are widely respected. They are consulted for community matters, and they guide people and solve their issues including conflict resolution.
Baradary System	The "Family System" based on bindings of tribe and kinship, in which the family and tribe is supposed to be one entity and everyone is linked with other, every one participate at times of happiness and sorrow and supports each other, and problems are internally solved with the help of community leaders and elders.
China Cutting	China Cutting refers to illegal subdivision of public amenity land and its sale for residential or commercial purposes. The plotting on parks in North Nazimabad town is one of many examples.
SITE	Sindh Industrial and Trading Estate. The largest industrial estate in Karachi, established just after the independence, and has been booming in business till today.
DHA (Karachi)	Defence Housing Authority. Housing authority under the auspices of the army. An on service brigadier heads the authority. Initially developed as a cooperative housing society with the aim to benefit army men, and later became one of the largest real estate businesses in the country, mostly catering to the high-income group housing needs.
DHA City	Defence Housing Authority city, a new housing project of housing for the upper middle and upper income group far away from the city, comprising of more than 20 thousand acres of land.

Bahria Town	Private sector builder and developer. Providing gated communities targeting housing needs of the upper middle and upper income groups across the major cities of the country.
PECHS	Pakistan Employees Cooperative Housing Society. A housing society established for the employees of the government, and mainly consisting of upper middle and upper income group.
SNJ Road	Shahrah-e-Noor Jahan; The road that separates the major formal and informal areas of North Nazimabad Case Study Area.
Da'i	The spiritual leader of the Bohri Muslims
Mukhi	The Prayer leader of Ismaily Muslims
SSS Road	Sher Shah Soori Road
SH Road	Shahrah-e-Humayun Road
AHI Road	Abul Hasan Isphahani Road
PIB Colony	Pir Ilahi Bakhsh Colony
I-UC2	Informally developed area of Union Council 2
F-UC2	Formally developed area of Union Council 2
UC3-4	Parts of Union Councils 03 and 04 combined together as one territory within the case study area
MYLS	Molana Yousuf Ludhyanvi Shaheed Road
AHI	Abul Hasan Isphahani Road
PMT	Pole Mounted Transformer
KMC	Karachi Municipal Corporation
K.E	Karachi Electric. (Previously, Karachi Electric Supply Corporation)
KWSB	Karachi Water and Sewage Board
Sui Gas	The cooking gas company.
MNA	Member National Assembly
MPA	Member of Provincial Assembly
MDA	Malir Development Authority
LDA	Lyari Development Authority
LEA	Law Enforcement Agencies