Investigating the effect of tendering capabilities on SME activity and performance in public contract competitions

Abstract
Barriers to SME participation in public procurement have been the focus of research for many years. Much less attention has been paid to the predictors of SME success. This paper examines the role that tendering capabilities - relational and procedural - play in explaining SME activity and performance in public contract competitions. Analysis of primary survey data from 3010 SMEs supports a capability-based perspective. Procedural capability has a significant effect on number of tenders submitted and value of contract sought. Relational capability does not. However, procedural and relational capability each has a significant and positive effect on contract win-ratio and percentage of total revenue derived from public contracts. For SMEs, these findings underline the importance of investing in tendering skills and devising buyer engagement strategies. Enterprise support agencies and public sector organisations can play their part through the provision of targeted training programmes and better communication with SME suppliers respectively.

Keywords
SMEs, public procurement, tendering, capabilities, public sector
Introduction
Small and medium-size enterprise (SME) involvement in the public sector marketplace has been the subject of investigation for some time. To date, research has focused on explicating the barriers SMEs encounter when competing for public sector contracts. Loader’s (2013) comprehensive review of evidence in this area shows that SMEs’ difficulties emanate not only from the unfamiliarity of public sector culture, policy ambiguity and questionable purchasing professionalism, but also unwieldy tendering systems and SMEs’ limited resources to cope with them. These issues account in no small part for the under-representation of SMEs as public sector suppliers in most countries (Cabinet Office, 2013; MacManus, 1991; PwC, 2014). In response to this less than satisfactory situation it has become standard for governments to enact policies aimed at facilitating greater SME involvement in public procurement (OECD, 2013). These ‘SME-friendly’ policies have also received academic attention, and the justification for them and their likely effectiveness has been critically assessed (Nicholas and Fruhmann, 2014). Latterly, evidence has started to emerge on public buyers’ compliance with these policies and the conditions that support or obstruct their implementation (Flynn and Davis, 2015). Initial indications are that there is still some way to go before ‘SME-friendly’ practices become fully institutionalised in public procurement.

The factors that predict SME activity and performance in public sector tendering have received comparably less attention. In effect, we know more about what stymies small suppliers than what stimulates them to compete for and win public sector contracts. Not surprisingly, recent empirical studies have sought to redress this imbalance. Reijonen et al., (2014), for example, modelled SME tendering activity as a function of entrepreneurial orientation. Their findings revealed proactivity and innovativeness to be
positively related to SMEs’ propensity to search and bid for public sector contracts. Similarly, Tammi et al., (2014) found that the ability of SMEs to gather market-relevant information and leverage it for competitive positioning is associated with higher contract search and bid submission activity. Resource-based perspectives on SME involvement in public procurement have also been advanced. In this vein, Karjalainen and Kemppainen (2008) determined that legal and administrative resources can act as predictors of SME public contracting activity, and that electronic order processing systems increase the likelihood of SMEs working as public sector suppliers. Temponi and Cui (2008) made the same argument in relation to e-commerce and SME public contracting activity, but could not find evidence in support of it.

Several reasons explain why evidence on the enablers of SME tendering activity and performance has not been more forthcoming. Firstly, and as already mentioned, the negative aspects of public procurement for SMEs have been accorded precedence (Loader, 2013). This has tended to obscure the fact that some SMEs are capable, successful tenderers. Secondly, research on the role of SMEs in public procurement has been descriptive rather than predictive in form. Another reason is that scholars have privileged public buyers as actors of primary interest (Murray, 2009; Withey, 2011). A more prosaic cause is to do with challenges around identifying and accessing the population of interest. Not all small firms compete for public contracts, which makes securing data that is representative and of sufficient quantity problematic. The fact that public procurement has largely fallen under the radar of the SME research community means that it has not benefited from the application of predictive models to do with growth, innovativeness and competitiveness in small firms. Finally, allowance must be made for the relative newness of public procurement as a field of academic inquiry (Snider and Rendon, 2008).
Building on recent scholarship, our study aims to contribute to a better understanding of the enablers of SME activity and performance in public procurement. It does so by seeing tendering as a firm-level capability that comprises discrete relational and procedural dimensions. These are believed to be significant in explaining SME activity and performance in contract competitions. The capability-based perspective put forward here is original. Importantly, it takes cognisance of the idiosyncratic nature of public procurement and the particular demands it makes of suppliers. At the same time it complements a nascent line of inquiry based on entrepreneurial, market positioning and resource-based explanations of SME participation in public procurement (Karjalainen and Kemppainen, 2008; Reijonen et al., 2014; Tammi et al., 2014; Temponi and Cui, 2008). Moreover, it extends this line by investigating not only tendering activity but also performance outcomes. To our knowledge this is the first study that goes beyond firm characteristics in attempting to explain SME performance in public procurement. The study also helps to connect SME-public procurement research to mainstream debates on the drivers of SME competitiveness (Barbero et al., 2011; Koryak et al., 2015; Rice et al., 2015). Having information on the determinants of SME involvement in contract competitions is also crucial for policy-practice. Heretofore, support for SMEs has largely come through reform of purchasing practices. Necessary as these reforms are, enhancing SMEs’ capabilities is the other side of the coin in ensuring that they can compete more effectively and secure a larger share of the market.

The remainder of the paper is organised into five main sections. The first section outlines why the agenda for SME competitiveness has come to be interleaved with public procurement. The second section takes a capability-based perspective on tendering by detailing how relational and procedural capabilities can affect SME activity and performance in public procurement. The third section deals with the
mechanics of the research, including: operationalisation and measurement of the predictor and outcome variables; selection of Ireland as the research context; and e-surveying the population cohort of firms active in public procurement. Issues around data representativeness are addressed before key statistical descriptors for the respondents are set out. The fourth section reports on the results of the study. A two-step hierarchical regression model is used to test the impact of relational and procedural capabilities on measures of tendering activity and performance. The results are then subject to discussion in the fifth and final section. Their contribution to research at the intersection of SMEs and public procurement is made clear, as is their implications for practice. The study alights on recommendations to take this line of inquiry forward in the coming years.

The SME-public procurement nexus
SMEs have become central to discourse on public procurement. Elected representatives frequently state their commitment to ensuring that SMEs have maximum practical opportunity to compete for business with the public sector. Pledges of support have translated into explicit policy initiatives. A recent survey of OECD members’ public procurement systems found that 29 of 32 countries had instituted some type of support mechanism for SMEs, and 11 of these had enacted policies or made specific legislative provisions (OECD, 2013). That SMEs and public procurement are increasingly discussed in the same context is the result of two overlapping developments. The first is the centrality of SMEs to enterprise policy and ideas around future economic competitiveness. It is, as Storey (1994:253) presciently observed some twenty years ago, ‘no longer possible to discuss economic policy without recognising the role which small firms play in the economy and in the rest of society more generally’. The EU Small Business Act and its exhortation to ‘think small first’ bears this out (European
Commission, 2008). The second is the recognised potential of public procurement to undergird SME competitiveness. Expenditure on goods and services by public sector organisations approximates to 16% of EU GDP or, in monetary terms, €1.7 trillion. As such, it represents a significant market for commercial actors, SMEs included. What is more, it is under the control of government and, within legal limits, can be leveraged to strengthen the SME sector and foster entrepreneurship (Preuss, 2011).

Public contracts are an attractive proposition for SMEs on many levels. For a start, they represent stable and predictable sources of demand (Fee, et al., 2002; Pickernell et al., 2011). Stability and predictability, in turn, afford SMEs security to plan for the future, invest in new technology and recruit staff. They also come with near certainty of payment (Loader, 2005; MacManus, 1991). Supplying the public sector can burnish a SME’s reputation and help them graduate from low value market niches to the mainstream commercial environment (Ram and Smallbone, 2003). It can even act as a demand-side stimulant to innovation when buyers insist on technologically-sophisticated products or encourage firms to develop novel service solutions (Georghiou et al., 2014). Public sector organisations, too, stand to gain from SME involvement in contract competitions. SMEs can offer competitive pricing arrangements on account of their minimal administrative overheads and streamlined operations. Aside from this, SMEs add to ‘the quantity and quality of competition in public markets’ (European Commission, 1990:2). In terms of innovativeness, SMEs’ ability to recognise opportunities and leverage capabilities to create novel products and services can make them valuable supply partners (Woldesenbet et al., 2012).

While it may be mutually beneficial for SMEs and public sector organisations to do business, the reality of everyday procurement presents a less sanguine picture. SMEs
have consistently expressed their dissatisfaction with public sector tendering processes and procedures (Loader, 2015; MacManus, 1991) and have rated doing business with the private sector more favourably (Purchase et al., 2009). These negative sentiments find confirmation in SMEs’ low participation and success rates in public procurement. As of 2011, only one in five small firms in the UK was using the internet to either access public sector tender documents or sell to public sector organisations (ONS, 2012). Supportive of this data, BMG Research (2013) found that out of a sample of 5000 UK SMEs only 10% had bid for a public sector contract in the previous year. SMEs’ performance outcomes are no better. Nationally and internationally SMEs under-perform relative to their actual number and GDP contribution. Between 2006 and 2008 SMEs won 60% of above-threshold contracts in the EU as against their 99.8% presence in the enterprise population (GHK, 2010). This equated to 33% of the total value of above-threshold contracts - some 20% lower than their GDP contribution. In the UK 10.5% of direct spend and 9.4% of indirect spend was going to SMEs as of 2013, substantially below their numbers and value-added contribution in the economy (Cabinet Office, 2013).

The reasons why SMEs struggle with public procurement can be understood in terms of an unfamiliar and not always efficient marketplace, bureaucratic tendering procedures and the resource limitations inherent in being a small firm (Loader, 2013). Taking the first of these issues, public procurement has been criticised for low professionalism and high risk aversion (Georghiou et al., 2014; Loader, 2005). In an international context, half of OECD countries are said to lack adequate procurement capability as measured by the number of public buyers and their levels of professional expertise (OECD, 2013). Underneath this are problems specific to the public tendering system. These include poorly advertised opportunities, onerous qualification criteria, the large size of public
contracts, and high transaction costs (Cabras, 2011; European Commission, 1990; Fee et al., 2002; Flynn et al., 2013). In the case of the latter, the economic cost of compiling a bid for a standard service contract is estimated to be as much as £3200 in the EU and £5800 in the UK (Centre for Economic and Business Research, 2013). SMEs’ difficulties are not confined to the external environment. Some are simply the product of their small size, limited resource base and low profile in the supply marketplace (Flynn et al., 2015; GHK, 2010; Karjalainen and Kemppainen, 2008).

**Tendering capabilities**

Evident from the foregoing discussion, the marketplace for public sector contracts is at once attractive and challenging for SMEs. In seeking to determine the factors that lead to SME success in public procurement, it is instructive to see tendering as a distinctive firm-level capability. By capability is meant the ability of a firm to exploit its resources using various processes and routines in furtherance of competitive advantage (Javidan, 1998; Stalk et al., 1992). Specifically in the context of public procurement, capability denotes the ability of a firm to marshal its organisational resources in order to identify contract opportunities and subsequently position itself to exploit them. It is the ability to leverage organisational resources – human, technological, financial, administrative, network and reputational – that is posited here to be a crucial determinant of the success of SMEs in contract competitions. Recent scholarship points to the efficacy of taking a capability or even dynamic capability perspective in this area. Woldesenbet et al., (2012) explained SME supply relationships with large corporations in terms of entrepreneurship, networking, resource integration and strategic service delivery capabilities. Tangentially, Barbero et al., (2011) linked managerial capabilities to SME growth trajectories, finding marketing and financial capabilities to be particularly salient. Koryak et al., (2015) did something similar, albeit with a focus on growth-
oriented capabilities in SMEs and their relationship to market penetration, product development and market development.

The nature of public procurement gives some indication of the capabilities that SMEs need to possess to succeed. More so than in the private sector, public procurement is bound up with ‘public value’ goals and the imperatives of transparency and accountability in commercial transactions (Lian and Laing, 2004). The effect, at least from a supplier perspective, is that public sector tendering is bureaucratic, formalised and legalistic in nature. The typical barriers cited by SMEs, such as lengthy form filling, high compliance costs and qualification standards disproportionate to the risk profile of the contract bear this out (Baden et al., 2011; Cabras, 2011; Fee et al., 2002; Loader, 2015). Success depends on SMEs being able to draw on their human, social and financial capital to surmount these challenges and compile a bid that responds to the buyer’s expectations. Public sector tendering is not only a paper-based exercise. Just as in the private sector, relationships matter (McKevitt and Davis, 2015). As such, success is also contingent on the ability of firms to engage with public buyers, market their goods and services to them, and challenge their pre-conceptions of smaller suppliers and what they can offer. All this suggests that relational and procedural capabilities are important for explaining activity and performance in public contract competitions (see Figure 1). These capabilities are subject to further consideration below.

**Relational capability**
At its most fundamental relational capability is about SMEs being able to promote themselves as credible suppliers to the public sector. A common complaint of SMEs is that public buyers rely on large, established suppliers to the exclusion of smaller, younger firms (Loader, 2005, 2015; Walker and Preuss, 2008). By being proactive and marketing their business by, for example, attending trade fairs, arranging product
demonstrations, or exploiting social media, SMEs can increase their visibility to buyers and showcase their attributes. Relational capability is more than SMEs raising their own profile. It also involves influencing tender specifications where at all possible. This is important as narrow bid specifications and overly prescriptive requirements can have the effect of precluding SME access to competitions (Loader, 2005, 2015). So too can situations in which the emphasis is placed on short-term cost savings rather than achieving value for money over the long-term (Cabras, 2011). Anything that SMEs can do to influence public buyers’ priorities and shift award criteria towards their own strengths, particularly on innovativeness and customer responsiveness (Woldesenbet et al., 2012), should advantage them. Relational capability is also about creating demand for new products and services and informing public buyers’ purchasing intentions before they ever issue a formal request for tender (RFT). Pre-tender engagement of this kind has been shown to be associated with above-average bid outcomes for SMEs by McKevingt and Davis (2013).

Relational capability is predicted to impact SME tendering activity and performance outcomes as follows. To the extent that SMEs interact with and make themselves visible to public buyers, they are more likely to be invited to tender, added to shortlists or even consulted about supply requirements at the pre-tender phase; all of which should result in more tenders being submitted. Research by Reijonen et al., (2014) has already shown that proactive marketplace behaviour on the part of SMEs is linked to higher levels of tendering activity. Relational capability is anticipated to affect the financial value of contracts sought. A proven ability to engage public buyers and persuade them of their value proposition provides firms with the confidence and the opportunity to pursue larger value contracts. Relational capability is also expected to be associated with contract win-rates. Two points are relevant here. First, cultivating relationships can help
to counteract the risk and uncertainty factors that dissuade buyers from awarding contracts to small but otherwise competent suppliers (GHK and Technopolis, 2007). Second, by influencing public buyers’ demand specifications SMEs can ensure that they are prime contenders when the RFT is made public. Finally, relational capability is anticipated to predict the percentage of revenue that SMEs derive from public contracting. The rationale is that possessing such capability is conducive to firms building up a client portfolio and revenue stream that includes public as well as private sector organisations. Taking the above points together it is hypothesised that:

H1a: Relational capability has a positive effect on tendering frequency

H1b: Relational capability has a positive effect on contract value sought

H1c: Relational capability has a positive effect on contract-win ratio

H1d: Relational capability has a positive effect on the percentage of total revenue derived from public contracting

**Procedural capability**

Procedural capability embodies a firm’s ability to deal with the administrative and technical demands of the tendering process. In the first instance it means being able to comprehend what it is that public buyers are looking for from their suppliers and the criteria that they use to evaluate them. While this may seem self-evident, criticisms have been directed at SMEs for failing to show due appreciation of the needs and expectations of public buyers (Greer, 1999; Michaelis et al., 2003). Procedural capability also means that a firm is able to satisfy public buyers that they meet the minimum qualification standards. Inter alia, this can include demonstrating supply experience, financial probity, professional competence, and compliance with environmental standards and employment rights (Withey, 2011). Providing evidence to substantiate any claims made is crucial in this regard. Leading on from comprehending
the tender evaluation criteria and being able to satisfy them, firms must also be proficient at articulating their strengths as a supplier in the written tender submission. Many SMEs struggle on this dimension, not only because of the substantial time and resource commitment involved (Baden et al., 2011; Flynn et al., 2013), but also because of the specialist technical, legal and public policy knowledge that is often required (Karjalainen and Kemppainen, 2008).

Procedural capability is relevant even after the tendering process has been completed and the contract has been awarded. In the event of a failed bid firms need to know how to obtain feedback from public buyers. The benefit to a firm of obtaining feedback is that the relative strengths and weaknesses of their bid are made apparent. This same information can then be used to salutary effect in devising future bid strategies, as the reported experiences of both SMEs and public buyers attest (Flynn et al., 2013). With tendering, as with much else besides, the key to success is the capacity to learn from failure. Firms also need to know how to search contract award notices and identify the winner or winners of competitions in which they were involved. In the event of a successful bid it is critical that firms exhibit competence and dependability in managing the contract over its duration (McKevitt and Davis, 2013). Ability to deliver as promised and in line with agreed contractual terms can generate new business opportunities with the same or different public sector customers. Conversely, exposed weakness in contract management damages a firm’s credibility and undermines their prospects of securing new contracts with public sector organisations.

Like relational capability, procedural know-how is predicted to directly affect SME tendering activity and performance. To begin with, it should lead firms to tender more frequently. The ability to discern what public buyers are looking for and respond
accordingly makes tendering a more manageable and less intimidating process. The
time and resource implications of tendering also reduce insofar as firms can take a more
purposeful approach to compiling their bid. The latter is significant as projected
tendering costs are a principal cause of firms deciding not to progress past the contract
identification stage (Centre for Economic and Business Research, 2013). Procedural
capability should also be associated with firms competing for higher value contracts.
This is because astuteness in navigating the procedural aspects of tendering makes it
feasible not only to compete for bigger contracts but also to manage them post-contract
award. Given the formalised and legalistic character of public procurement (Lian and
Laing, 2004), procedural capability is expected to be a significant predictor of contract
win-rates. First, it is essential if firms are to meet the qualification standard (Withey,
2011). Thereafter, it determines how well a firm performs against the objective and
subjective criteria applied at the formal tender evaluation phase; and ultimately whether
the firm is awarded the contract or not. The last relationship concerns procedural
capability and public contracts as a percentage of revenue. Procedural capability
improves the cost-benefit ratio of tendering, so that firms shift more of their operational
focus and revenue seeking activity to the public sector. These points give the following
four hypotheses:

\[ H2a \]: Procedural capability has a positive effect on tendering frequency

\[ H2b \]: Procedural capability has a positive effect on contract value sought

\[ H2c \]: Procedural capability has a positive effect on contract-win ratio

\[ H2d \]: Procedural capability has a positive effect on the percentage of total revenue
derived from public contracting

<Insert Figure 1 here>
Methodology

Independent variables
The tendering capability constructs were developed specifically for the purposes of this study. Consistent with recommended practice (Dillman, 2007), advice from a panel of experts was sought as part of this process. Relational capability comprises three items. These are (i) ability to influence buyer needs prior to tender (ii) ability to communicate a value proposition to inform tender specification and (iii) ability to promote goods and services to public buyers prior to tender. A five-point scale is used to measure each item where 1 = very poor and 5 = excellent. A principal component analysis with Varimax Rotation confirms the presence of a single construct. The construct is found to be reliable (α = 0.87). Procedural capability comprises five items. These are (i) ability to understand contract qualification criteria (ii) ability to satisfy contract qualification criteria (iii) ability to effectively respond to contract qualification criteria (iv) ability to receive feedback and search contract award notices and (v) ability to successfully manage contracts. A five-point scale is also used to measure each of the five items where 1 = very poor and 5 = excellent. After performing a principal component analysis with Varimax Rotation a single construct emerges and is found to be reliable (α = 0.84). Further detail on the factor loadings for each of the two constructs is given in Table 1.

<Insert Table 1 here>

Dependent variables
Four variables are predicted to be dependent on relational and procedural capabilities. These are tendering frequency, contract value sought, contract win-ratio, and public contracts as a percentage of revenue. Similar to Reijonen et al., (2014), tendering frequency is taken as the number of contracts SMEs tendered for with public sector organisations throughout 2013. The typical value of a contract sought is measured by
reference to six financial ranges: €1-25,000; €25-130,000; €130-250,000; €250-500,000; €500-1,000,000; and €1,000,000+. Contract win-ratio is operationalised as the percentage of public contracts tendered for throughout 2013 that a firm succeeded in winning. The fourth dependent variable is the percentage of annual revenue that is attributable to public contracting.

**Control variables**

Three variables are controlled for in this study. These are size, age and sector. Firm size has emerged as a predictor of involvement and performance in public sector tendering across numerous studies (GHK and Technopolis, 2007; GHK, 2010; Pickernell et al., 2011; PwC, 2014; Temponi and Cui, 2008). It is also linked to the human and administrative resources firms have at their disposal for tendering (Flynn et al., 2015; Karjalainen and Kemppainen, 2008). Size is approximated by number of employees. In line with EU classification standards four size ranges are used for measurement purposes: 1-9 employees (micro); 10-49 employees (small); 50-249 employees (medium); and 250+ employees (large). Firm age has also emerged as a significant variable for explaining involvement in public procurement. Evidence adduced by Pickernell et al., (2013) and Reijonen et al., (2014) indicates that older firms have higher levels of tendering activity. Age is measured as the number of years a firm has been trading. Sectoral effects have also been linked to SME participation and success in public procurement (Pickernell et al., 2011; PwC, 2014; Reijonen et al., 2014). Sector is captured by reference to the four categories of construction, manufacturing, services, and other.

**Research context**

The Irish marketplace for public sector contracts is the context for the study. Annual public procurement expenditure in Ireland is in the region of €16 billion, which equates
to 10% of GDP. The public procurement field in Ireland has undergone a series of changes over the last decade. Similar to stances adopted across EU Member States, policies have been enacted by successive governments to reform public procurement in the interests of SME participation. The purpose of these policies is to create a ‘level playing field’ on which small suppliers can compete for and win public contracts; evident, for example, in *Facilitating SME Access to Public Procurement* (Department of Finance, 2010). This is to be achieved by getting public buyers to implement a suite of ‘positive measures’ pertaining to the design, advertising and awarding of contracts. At the same time reducing procurement expenditure and making buying processes more efficient has assumed priority status in Ireland. Pressures on the country’s public finances in the wake of the 2007 international financial crisis have brought this about. As with many other countries, the public procurement environment in Ireland has become more encouraging of SME involvement, but also more insistent on realising ‘value for money’.

**Data collection**
Self-report data is relied on in this study. Self-reporting is the most practical means to capture information on firms’ tendering capabilities, behaviours and performance outcomes. There is also precedent for using self-report data when modelling SME participation in public procurement (Flynn et al., 2015; Karjalainen and Kemppainen 2008; Reijonen et al., 2014; Tammi et al., 2014). Sole reliance on self-report data does come with caveats, such as the possibility of respondents resorting to impression management when answering questions. Yet there is no evidence to suggest that self-reporting is inherently flawed or that the criticisms made of it do not equally apply to ostensibly objective measures (Chan, 2009). To underpin the integrity of the research
and to guard against common method bias\textsuperscript{1} a number of precautions were taken when surveying respondents (Podsakoff et al., 2003). These included guaranteeing anonymity, placing questions on tendering activity and performance before questions on tendering capabilities, having concise scale items, and limiting the number of scale items to eight. Statistical analysis of the data gives no indication that common method bias is present. The variance extracted using Harman’s single-factor test is 21.69\%, which is well below the 50\% threshold that would give cause for concern.

Prior to its distribution and in line with best practice the survey instrument was piloted with ten SMEs (Dillman, 2007). The pilot group reported no difficulties with comprehending the questions, but did recommend minor adjustments to the phrasing of some questions and pre-defined response sets. These were incorporated into the final version of the survey instrument. The research was conducted over a two-week period in December, 2013. An email notification with an embedded hypertext link to the survey was sent to all firms registered on eTenders – the government-managed site on which Irish public contracts are advertised. A reminder email notification, also with an embedded link to the survey, was issued one week after the initial mailing. By the end of the two-week period 5897 responses had been received. Approximately 60,000 firms were registered on eTenders at the time of the research, thus yielding a 10\% response rate. Screening resulted in the removal of 595 large firms i.e. firms employing 250+ persons and 2292 substantially incomplete responses i.e. responses that did not progress beyond the first e-page of the survey. This left 3010 SME cases for final analysis.

**Representativeness**

Before reporting the representativeness of survey respondents some clarification on the public sector marketplace is required. Foregoing research in this area shows that the

\textsuperscript{1} Variance that is attributable to the measurement method rather than to the constructs the measures represent.
profile of firms competing for public contracts differs from the universal enterprise population. Mainly, small firms are under-represented and medium and large enterprises are over-represented relative to their actual number. Proof of this, Flynn et al., (2013) ascertained that 51.2% of firms competing for public contracts in Ireland are micro-enterprises - substantially below their 90.7% share of the national enterprise population (Central Statistics Office, 2014). By contrast, 11.7% are large firms even though they constitute just 0.3% of the population. The same disparities have been reported in other jurisdictions. In the US the number of sole proprietorships competing in the public sector marketplace is not representative of their presence in the economy (MacManus, 1991). The same can be said of the UK. There, data from the Office for National Statistics shows that the proportion of small firms using the internet to access tender documents or sell to the public sector is only half that of large firms: 19.5% versus 38.5% (ONS, 2012). These effects can be explained by the fact that a sizeable stratum of micro and small enterprises in retail, catering and personal services are focused exclusively on business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions. Hence, they are missing from the public sector marketplace.

Given the above, representativeness is understood in reference to the cohort of firms active in public procurement rather than the enterprise population per se. Results from two tests indicate that respondents are representative of the former cohort. First, respondent characteristics were compared against data from a 2011 baseline study of public procurement in Ireland carried out by Flynn et al., (2013). Strong similarities are evident between respondents and the characteristics of firms in the baseline study (see Table 2). On the dimension of size, for example, 54.8% of respondents are micro-enterprises and 23.3% are large firms. The comparable figures from the baseline study are 51.2% and 23.7% respectively. Second, statistical comparisons were made between
early and late respondents based on the principle of extrapolation (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). Independent sample t-tests did not identify any significant differences between early and late respondents on the selected variables of firm size (p = 0.43), revenue (p = 0.22), firm age (p = 0.12), tendering frequency (p = 0.39) or contract win-ratio (p = 0.38). The results from the two tests instil confidence that respondents are representative of the cohort of firms active in public procurement; and so the findings of the study can be generalised to this same cohort.

<Insert Table 2 here>

**Descriptive data**

Descriptive analysis of respondent firms reveals the following about them. As referred to in the previous section, they are bigger than the average firm in the enterprise population. Over one in five respondent firms employ 50 people or more. The corresponding ratio in the enterprise population is one in fifty. Reported annual revenues lend further support to this observation, with over one in three respondents having a turnover in excess of €2 million. Also suggestive of their bigger size, the majority of respondents are oriented to national or international markets while only 15% concentrate on the local market. The sectoral distribution of respondents is a closer match of the enterprise population. Approximately 9% compete in the manufacturing sector and 17% in construction. These percentages are coincident with the enterprise population in Ireland (Central Statistics Office, 2014). Respondent firms are somewhat over-represented in the services sector and under-represented in all other sectors when compared to the enterprise population, however. Respondent firms are quite evenly dispersed in age terms. Forty-two per cent are under 10 years old and 58% are over 10 years old.
Key statistics for respondent firms’ tendering capabilities and outcomes in public procurement are as follows. The mean score for relational capability is 2.82 on a 1-5 scale. The mean score for procedural capability is 3.60 on a 1-5 scale. Evidently, firms rate themselves higher on procedural capability than relational capability. This is not surprising given the arms-length nature of public procurement and the challenges this poses for SMEs in building relationships and social capital with public buyers and other stakeholders (Cabras, 2011; GHK, 2010). The mean figure for the number of tenders submitted in 2013 is 8.47. The majority of firms ordinarily compete for contracts valued at less than €25,000 (36.1%) or €25-130,000 (39.7%). The mean contract win ratio is 23.47%. The mean proportion of revenue derived from supplying goods and services to the public sector is 19.22%.

**Data screening**
Prior to model testing three standard diagnostic checks for multi-collinearity were carried out on the dataset. These did not return any evidence of multi-collinearity. The first examined correlation coefficients between all predictor variables (see Table 3). Correlation coefficients are found to be in the low-moderate ranges. The highest value recorded is 0.53$^2$, which is comfortably below the 0.90 threshold proposed by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) as symptomatic of multi-collinearity. The second diagnostic check involved calculating the Value Inflation Factor (VIF) for predictor variables in each of the four models. The highest observed VIF is 1.42. Only when the VIF exceeds 10 should researchers become concerned about multi-collinearity in their dataset (Neter et al., 1990). The third check looked at the Condition Index. As a rule of thumb, a Condition Index above 30 indicates a multi-collinearity problem (Belsley et al., 1980). Here the Condition Index does not go above 15 in any of the four models.

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$^2$ Strong correlations are indicated by r values above 0.7. Moderate correlations are within the 0.3 to 0.6 range. Low correlations are < 0.3.
Findings
The effect of relational and procedural capabilities on SME tendering activity and performance is tested using two-stage hierarchical multiple regression. The three control variables are entered initially. The relational and procedural capability constructs are entered second. This is done in respect of tendering frequency (Model 1), contract value (Model 2), contract win-ratio (Model 3) and public contracts as a percentage of revenue (Model 4). The output from these four models is described below. The standardised coefficients ($\beta$), standard errors and significance values for the independent and control variables in the case of Models 1-4 are contained in Table 4.

The number of contracts tendered for by SMEs in 2013 - tendering frequency - is the first outcome variable tested (Model 1). H1a and H2a state that relational and procedural capabilities will each have a positive effect on tendering frequency. At stage one the control variables account for 16.2% of the variance. Size, age and sector are all significant. Both SME size and age are found to have a positive effect on tendering frequency. The construction sector also has a positive effect on tendering frequency. The other sectors have a negative effect. At stage two the independent predictors are entered into the model. The variance explained increases to 18% as a result. Relational capability is non-significant ($p = .11$). This leads to the rejection of H1a. Procedural capability has a significant and positive effect on tendering frequency ($p < .01$). H2a is accepted on this basis.

The second outcome variable tested is the value of public contracts that SMEs typically aim to win (Model 2). H1b and H2b state that relational and procedural capabilities will each have a positive effect on contract value sought. At stage one 16% of the variance is
accounted for by the control variables. Firm size and sector have a significant and positive effect on contract value sought. Firm age is non-significant. The variance explained increases to 18% with the addition of the independent predictors at stage two. As with tendering frequency, relational capability has no statistically significant effect on contract value sought (p = .38). This means that we must reject H1b. Procedural capability does have a positive and significant effect on contract value sought (p < .01), which allows us to accept H2b.

The third and fourth variables relate to performance outcomes in public sector tendering. The first of these is SMEs’ contract win-ratio for 2013 (Model 3). H1c and H2c state that relational and procedural capabilities will each have a positive effect on contract win-ratio. At stage one the control variables account for 1% of the variance. Firm size has a significant and positive effect on contract win-ratio. The construction sector has a significant and negative effect. The other control variables are non-significant. With the inclusion of the independent predictors the variance explained increases to 10%. Both capability types are found to have a positive and significant effect on contract win-ratio (p < .01). The effect of relational capability (β = 0.18) is slightly larger than that of procedural capability (β = 0.16). These results lead to acceptance of H1c and H2c.

The fourth outcome variable relates to public contracts as a percentage of revenue (Model 4). H1d and H2d state that relational and procedural capabilities will each have a positive effect on the proportion of SME revenue attributable to public contracting. At stage one only 1% of the variance is accounted for by the control variables. Firm size and sector are again significant. At the second stage the independent variables are added to the model. The variance explained increases to 7%. Both relational capability (p < .05) and procedural capability (p < .01) have a positive and significant effect on the
percentage of revenue that SMEs derive from public contracts. The effect of procedural capability ($\beta = 0.21$) is larger than relational capability ($\beta = 0.05$) this time round. These results offer support to H1d and H2d.

The results are revealing as regards the effect of two capability types – relational and procedural – on SME tendering activity and performance in public procurement. Contrary to predictions, relational capability has no enabling effect on tendering activity, whether in respect of actual number of tenders submitted or contract value sought. By contrast, procedural capability is significant in explaining tendering activity. That said, its effect does not add substantially to the variance attributable to firm size, age and sector. Where relational and procedural capabilities assume greater salience is in explaining performance outcomes for SMEs. Together they explain an additional 9% of the variance in contract win-ratio after controlling for organisation characteristics. Relational capability produces the slightly larger effect of the two on this measure. Equally, relational and procedural capabilities have a positive effect on the proportion of revenue derived from public contracting. On this measure they add 6% to the variance explained after controlling for organisation characteristics. Procedural capability is the more impactful of the two on this measure. Summarising, organisation characteristics in the form of firm size, age and sector are more important than tendering-specific capabilities in explaining the number and value of contracts SMEs seek to win. When it comes to performance outcomes, however, relational and procedural capabilities matter more than organisation characteristics. These results are given further consideration in the next section.

<Insert Table 4 here>
Discussion
SME involvement in public procurement constitutes a burgeoning line of inquiry in organisation studies. This is due in large part to growing sensitivity at government level over the near universal under-representation of SMEs in the public sector marketplace and the steps that need to be taken to reverse this situation (OECD, 2013). Asserted at the outset, for various reasons research has pre-occupied itself with documenting the barriers that confront SMEs when tendering for public contracts rather than predicting their levels of activity and performance. Real as these barriers are, scholarly investigation has to look beyond them. Consequently, this study set out to explain and predict SME activity and performance in public contract competitions by focusing on relational and procedural tendering capabilities. The results support the capability-based perspective put forward. In particular, they show that SMEs capable of interacting with public buyers and proficient in the formal aspects of tendering and contract management enjoy superior outcomes. Of course, the study is exploratory in form and represents the first testing of a capabilities-based perspective on public sector tendering. Further theorising, modelling and empirical research in this area is certainly warranted. Even so, it provides a useful starting point for understanding the relationship between tendering capabilities and SME involvement in public procurement. The results are discussed in more detail below.

That smaller firms are less likely to compete for opportunities with public sector organisations, and when they do compete pursue low value contracts has been established in research across several countries (BMG Research, 2013; Flynn et al., 2015; ONS, 2012; Pickernell et al., 2013). Reasons for this include problems in identifying suitable opportunities, inability to meet qualification criteria, and prohibitively high transaction costs involved in putting together a bid (Cabras, 2011;
Fee et al., 2002; Loader, 2005, 2015; MacManus, 1991). What the findings presented here show is that procedural know-how can help SMEs to increase their participation rates. Specifically, possessing the capability to navigate the procedural formalities of tendering and post-tendering is positively associated with the number and value of public contracts SMEs seek to win. Relational capability, on the other hand, is not. The original hypothesis was that the ability to interact with and persuade public buyers would lead SMEs to tender for more and higher value contracts. Elsewhere, proactivity on the part of firms in exploiting market information has been linked to contract search and bid submission activity (Reijonen et al., 2014; Tammi et al., 2014). It may be that relational capability, rather than causing SMEs to tender for more and bigger contracts, introduces an element of selectivity to their bidding strategies. That is, they are only inclined to enter into competitions which they are already favourably positioned to win.

As well as being under-represented as competitors in public contract competitions, SMEs are also under-represented as eventual winners. This is borne out by various studies which put SMEs’ share of the public procurement market significantly below their weighting in the economy (Cabinet Office, 2013; GHK and Technopolis, 2007; GHK, 2010; PwC, 2014). Against this backdrop, the identification of relational and procedural capabilities as performance drivers is significant. Consistent with predictions, the ability to communicate with buyers and influence their supply preferences is crucial to improving SMEs’ prospects of success – a conclusion that McKevitt and Davis (2013) also reached. Notwithstanding the arms-length character of public procurement (Lian and Laing, 2004), such factors as trust, reputation and familiarity do enter into a public buyer’s calculus when making decisions over which supplier to select. Indeed, given the oft cited high risk-aversion of public buyers (Georghiou et al., 2014), these relationship-based factors are likely to prove critical.
SMEs are advantaged to the extent that they appreciate this reality and actively seek to build social capital with procurement decision makers. As it is with tendering activity, procedural know-how is associated with performance outcomes. This is logical given the legalistic and bureaucratic nature of public procurement. Undoubtedly, knowing precisely what public buyers expect from suppliers and being able to articulate this through the formal tender process increases the likelihood of success.

Alongside its scholarly contribution this study yields a number of practitioner insights. For SME owners and managers serious about doing business with the public sector there is a clear incentive to invest in tendering-specific capabilities – relational and procedural. Relevant here is taking the time to formulate strategies for engaging public sector actors, researching the supply needs and spend profiles of public sector organisations, and acquiring expertise in the assessment criteria used by potential client organisations. As has previously been argued by Greer (1999) and as empirically substantiated here, success depends on SMEs having the capabilities to match the idiosyncratic demands of public procurement; and capability development takes time and the commitment of resources (Stalk et al., 1992). Indicated by recent findings from Whittaker et al., (2014), SMEs should be prepared to not only develop capabilities in-house but also to source them externally via collaborations with third parties. More so again, they need to demonstrate a willingness and aptitude to learn as an organisation and to channel this learning into a product or a service that their customers value (Sanzo et al., 2012). While the capabilities public contracting requires of SMEs are sector-specific, the pressures it imposes for continuous improvement, upskilling and professionalism are universal.
For enterprise agencies and industry representative associations, the findings suggest expanding training provision to encompass the relational side of public sector tendering. In the main, training programmes and workshops have prioritised the procedural and technical element of tendering over ‘soft skills’ to do with networking and selling to public buyers. Yet it is evident in this study that relational capabilities can be even more important in determining whether or not SMEs are awarded public contracts. It is also evident that SMEs are weaker on relational capability than procedural capability; and that this is the area in which the biggest improvement can be effected. Previous research indicates that SMEs are receptive to external guidance and support of this kind and recognise its value for professionalising their business operations (Marlow, 1992). The corollary to SMEs strengthening their tendering capabilities is that public buyers are willing to communicate with them, including by debriefing them on unsuccessful bids. If public buyers are reluctant to do this, and SMEs claim that they are (Flynn et al., 2013; GHK, 2010), then the potential for relational and procedural capabilities to contribute to superior performance is constrained.

The academic and practitioner contributions of this study notwithstanding, it does have limitations. For one, data on tendering capabilities and performance was collected from a single source – SMEs. Future research may wish to explore options for collecting performance-related data from archival sources; published contract award notices on e-procurement sites, for example. The study is cross-sectional and covers SME involvement in public procurement for 2013 only. Re-running this study at some point in the future or, better still, initiating a longitudinal research study is recommended. On this point, the migration of public procurement online means that it is becoming easier for researchers to survey national populations of suppliers. Research into the antecedents of SME activity and performance in public procurement would also benefit
from replicating this study in another jurisdiction. While there is a high level of institutional commonality in national public procurement systems, particularly within Europe (Flynn and Davis, 2015), replication would be useful nonetheless. Finally, the capabilities-based perspective propounded here is one of several that can be used to explain SME outcomes in public procurement. The previously cited work of Reijonen et al., (2014) on entrepreneurial orientations and Tammi et al., (2014) on market orientations are others. Going forward, researchers should consider alternative theoretical perspectives and models, particularly in the area of strategic planning and decision making (see, for example, Basco, 2014).

While the subject matter of this study is SME participation in public procurement, its threads spool out to wider contemporary debates and lines of inquiry on small firms. For instance, its privileging of a capability-based view of tendering resonates with recent studies that have looked at capability types and configurations within small firms and how these variously determine growth, internationalisation and competitiveness. Barbero et al., (2011) generated interesting findings on the relationship between the functional capabilities of managers and the pursuit of high-growth strategies in SMEs. Koryak et al., (2015) highlighted the role of leadership in fostering organisational capability to grow and learn. Raymond and St-Pierre (2013) examined capability alignment in the context of SMEs’ internationalisation strategies, finding it to be of critical importance. Not altogether differently, Rice et al., (2015) modelled SME performance as a function of the interplay between dynamic capabilities and market transformation processes. Already referred to, the findings and their implications also speak to overarching research themes to do with SME professionalisation and the supportive role that state agencies and industry representative bodies can play in this process. As a final comment, public procurement represents relatively unchartered
territory for SME and entrepreneurship scholars. They and it have much to gain from discovering one another.
References


PwC (2014) *SMEs' access to public procurement markets and aggregation of demand in the EU*. European Commission, Brussels.


Figure 1. Predictors of SME tendering activity and performance.

- Relational capability
  - H1a & H2a: Tendering frequency
- Procedural capability
  - H1b & H2b: Contract value
  - H1c & H2c: Contract win-ratio
  - H1d & H2d: Public contracts as % of revenue

Control variables:
- Firm size
- Firm age
- Sector
Table 1. Principal component analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Alpha</th>
<th>Initial eigenvalue</th>
<th>Percentage of variance explained</th>
<th>Factor loading</th>
<th>Communalities extracted</th>
<th>Mean score</th>
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<td>2.41</td>
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<td>Ability to communicate value proposition to inform tender specification</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>.89</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>2.59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ability to promote goods and services to public sector prior to tender</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>3.04</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Ability to satisfy tender qualification criteria</td>
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<td>62.64</td>
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<td>.62</td>
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*a* KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy = .74. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity p < .001 (χ = 4530.67).

*b* KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy = .83. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity p < .001 (χ = 6134.78).
Table 2. Representativeness testing.

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<td>18.3</td>
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<td>All other</td>
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<td>18.8</td>
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<td><strong>Revenue €</strong></td>
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<td>&lt; 2 million</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>62.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>17.5</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>11-20 years</td>
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<td>21+ years</td>
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlations.

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<td>.21</td>
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<td>.04</td>
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<td>.02</td>
<td>.06</td>
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*VIF from Model 1.
Table 4. Predictive test results.

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<th></th>
<th>Tendering frequency</th>
<th>Contract value</th>
<th>Contract win-ratio</th>
<th>Public contracts as % of revenue</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1a</td>
<td>Model 1b</td>
<td>Model 2a</td>
<td>Model 2b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>.35*** (.42)</td>
<td>.32*** (.43)</td>
<td>.35*** (.03)</td>
<td>.32*** (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>.05*** (.25)</td>
<td>.03 (.02)</td>
<td>.02 (.02)</td>
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<td>Sector: manufacturing(^a)</td>
<td>-.05*** (.99)</td>
<td>-.04** (.99)</td>
<td>.06*** (.08)</td>
<td>.06*** (.08)</td>
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<td>.15*** (.74)</td>
<td>.16*** (.73)</td>
<td>.16*** (.06)</td>
<td>.17*** (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector: others(^a)</td>
<td>-.04** (.77)</td>
<td>-.03** (.76)</td>
<td>.03** (.06)</td>
<td>.04** (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational capability</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.03 (.29)</td>
<td>-0.01 (.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural capability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.15*** (.37)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(model includes relational capability)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>2739(^b)</td>
<td>2739</td>
<td>2626(^b)</td>
<td>2626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.50*** (.77)</td>
<td>-13.23*** (1.29)</td>
<td>.93*** (.06)</td>
<td>.19* (.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>107.02</td>
<td>87.04</td>
<td>104.87</td>
<td>86.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R(^2)</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10}. The std. error is in parentheses.\)
\(^a\) Sector: services is the referent category.
\(^b\) Does not equal group total, 3010, due to missing values.