

**IDEOLOGICAL MEDIATION IN THE TRANSLATION OF  
GEOPOLITICAL TEXTS:  
AN ENGLISH-KURDISH CASE-STUDY**

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the  
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Translation Studies

Cardiff University

School of Modern Languages

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May 2016

## **Dedication**

In memory of my father who has been my constant source of inspiration

## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to express an in-depth gratitude to my supervisors Dr Elizabeth Wren-Owens and Dr Cristina Marinetti for their advice and invaluable guidance throughout this study. Without their help and generosity of time, this thesis would not have been possible.

I extend my appreciations to Professor Alexis Nuselovici, Dr Craig Patterson, Dr Montserrat Lunati, and Dr Tom Bartlett for their kind contributions in the early stages of this research. I would also very much like to thank Professor Claire Gorrara for reviewing my thesis and providing invaluable feedback. I am more than happy to have had the chance of benefiting from her impressive academic background, which has broadened my horizon.

I am sincerely indebted to the administrative staff of the School of Modern Languages and the Library of Social Science for their support during my study at Cardiff University.

My deepest gratefulness is due to my family, especially my late father whom I lost during the course of this study, for his constant belief in me, and my beloved mother for her patience, encouragement and accompaniment in every way along this journey.

I extend my thanks to the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research in Iraqi Kurdistan for the scholarship which facilitated my academic performance. I would also like to thank all those who help me during the course of this study.

Finally, I would like to thank my friend Kazi for being there for me at difficult times.

## **Declaration**

This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Translation Studies.

This work is submitted as the result of the candidate's own investigation. It is carried out in accordance with the requirements of Cardiff University's Regulations and Code of Practice for PhD thesis and it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Any views expressed in the thesis, other than referenced material, are those of the author.

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## Abstract

This thesis offers a critical analysis of the implications of ideological mediations in the translation of English-Kurdish geopolitical texts. It makes an original contribution by enabling a deeper comprehension of the role of re-contextualisation of socio-political texts in situations of constant contemporary conflict in the Middle East. It does so by exploring the reproduction of stance and voice in the translations of a geopolitical commentarial genre commissioned by newspapers. The study provides an account of how patterns of translation choices are conveyed in newspaper commentary articles on the geopolitical issues originally published in English and then how these patterns are re-conveyed in full translations of these articles for four quality Kurdish-language newspapers with different editorial policies: *Sbeiy*, *Kurdistan-i-New*, *Xendan*, and *Rudaw*.

The case study explores the Kurdish translation of English journalistic articles covering general political developments in Middle East and Kurdistan in particular over a significant four-year period of 2011-2014. It is employed as an example of the rewriting activity that has been effective in achieving significant geopolitical results in favour of the media agencies that are considered politically aligned outlets. The study questions the extent to which ideologies involved in leading translation practice and inquires what the Kurdish case-study appraises us about wider practice. The methodology is a hybrid of corpus- and critical narrative-analytical methods that operate within the discipline of descriptive translation studies. The study deployed tripartite models to analyse and depict the interplay between ideology and a translator's behaviour within media contexts. It adapts Toury's three-phase descriptive methodology and Chesterman's concept of norms as complementary models in order to describe the type of norms operating within the context of Kurdish media translation. It also developed critical narrative analysis for further investigating and for describing the normative effects of socio-political factors on the behaviour of the translator within the same realm.

The outcomes of the data analysis have revealed that media translation choices are driven by ideology. The socio-political ideology plays a significant role, both historically and currently in the occurrence of stylistic shifts. On the level of meaning, however, the majority of shifts occur due to the current political power dynamics in Kurdistan. The results have also shown that media translation in Iraqi Kurdistan is not neutral and it is largely affected by the policy of the parties to which the media news agencies are aligned. This study encompasses six chapters, a conclusion and appendices.

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## **List of Abbreviations**

BT- Back Translation

CNA -Critical Narrative Analysis

CDA- Critical Discourse Analysis

DTS- Descriptive Translation Studies

SC- Source Culture

SFL -Systematic Functional Grammar

SL- Source Language

ST -Source Text

TC -Target Culture

TL -Target Language

TQA -Translation Quality Assessment

TS -Translation Studies

TT -Target Text

KRG-Kurdistan Regional Government

PUK- Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

PDK/KDP-Kurdistan Democratic Party

### **Symbols:**

[] information added or changed and not part of the quotations

() information is part of the quotation in which the brackets exist.

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## Kurdish Alphabet<sup>1</sup>

<u>Latin</u>	<u>Kurdish</u>	<u>Latin</u>	<u>Kurdish</u>
A	ا	H	ه
-	ئ	E	ه
B	ب	U	و
P	پ	W	و
T	ت	O	ۆ
C	ج	Û	وو
Ç	چ	Î	ی
Ĥ	ح	Y	ی
X	خ	Ê	ئ
D	د	I	.
R	ر		
Ř	ر		
Z	ز		
J	ژ		
S	س		
Š	ش		
E	ع		
Ĝ	غ		
F	ف		
V	ڤ		
Q	ق		
K	ک		
G	گ		
L	ل		
Ļ	ل		
M	م		
N	ن		

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<sup>1</sup> Available online at: <http://www.unilang.org/card.php?res=1462>.

# **Chapter One**

## **Introduction**

Translation is exceptionally important in today's world since it plays a crucial role in an expanding worldwide and modern communication. It is regarded as a significant medium for knowledge and socio-cultural exchange in the media. As a result of globalisation, media translation is becoming increasingly important for rapidly transferring vast amounts of information. The discipline of translation studies, therefore, shows an intense interest in scrutinising the manifold revelation of power relations involved in the translation process and the products of this domain. Translators' choices play a significant role in revealing how knowledge is conveyed and how power relations are communicated within the socio-political contexts in which the translational activities take place. Considering extra-textual constraints, many translation scholars agree that different translation choices made by different translators might indicate different valuable conclusions (e.g., Munday 2012a, p. 2; Toury 2012, 195). Lefevere (1992b, pp.11-25), however, links translation choices to ideology, power relations and manipulation. In the field of media translation, likewise, specific word choices might lead to translation distortions and have a link to the values expressed by the translators belonging to different publication agencies. These distortions represent the interaction between ascendancy and opposition towards narratives elaborated in the source texts (STs) and can be defined in terms of ideological mediations in translation. This aspect of translation behaviour is the focus of this study within the Kurdish media translation context in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The thesis is innovative in the way it grounds the studies of the translation of Kurdish media texts into the framework of the discipline of translation studies by examining the process of geopolitical translation and its textual products in Iraqi Kurdistan. Geopolitical translation can be defined as the translation of those texts which are considered politically, historically, and/or geographically biased writings, aiming to find answers for a particular widespread question (Dalby et al 1998). The study makes an original contribution by facilitating a deeper understanding of the role of translation and re-contextualisation of socio-politically commentarial texts in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict in the Middle East. It

questions the role ideology plays in governing translation practice and inquires what the Kurdish case-study informs us about wider practice. The inspiration originates from the fact that Iraqi Kurdistan has witnessed gradual transformations in many aspects of Kurdistan's socio-political life in the last two decades and that part of this process is reflected in and informed the translations which occurred recently in the media. The Kurdish media, including shadow media<sup>2</sup>, in the post-autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan developed its translation policies and practice as a site of political and ideological struggle. This study, therefore, argues that media translation has a powerful role to play in shaping the values, ideas, and belief systems in Kurdish society and it might be used as a manipulative tool in support of different geopolitical media agencies. The translated texts selected for this study are published between 2011 and 2014. They provide an introduction to the many ideological struggles over the nature, meaning and causes of contemporary geopolitical changes in the territory of Kurdistan. Therefore, the analysis of media translation in Kurdistan not only delivers an insight into the translational activities in the Kurdish context, but also contributes to a better understanding of media and the politics in Kurdistan.

The outcomes are based on the textual data translated into the translators' mother tongues and the analysis is, therefore, a target-culture oriented study. The texts are written in English and translated into Soranî Kurdish<sup>3</sup>. The thesis argues that media translation in Kurdistan is both an institutional operation and a mutual process of norm reorganisation practice in specific contextual models. The study tentatively problematises the dominant target-oriented approach proposed by Toury (1985/2014, 1995, 2012)<sup>4</sup> to translation studies and draws attention to the translation practice being undertaken in non-Western contexts such as Kurdistan. The actual practice of media translated texts under scrutiny in Kurdistan operates as a special case

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<sup>2</sup> Shadow media is media which is indirectly or unofficially aligned to political parties. This is explored in depth in chapter 4.

<sup>3</sup> The Kurdish context will be outlined in the following section.

<sup>4</sup> The Target-oriented approach to translation studies can be construed by the much-quoted remarks of its major theorist Gideon Toury (1985/2014: 19) who puts it as "any research into translation,[...]should start from the hypothesis that *translations are facts of one system only*: the target system. It is clear that, from the standpoint of the source text and source system, translations have hardly any significance at all, even if everybody in the source culture 'knows' of their factual existence (which is rarely the case anyway)".

in that the translated topics are derived from and developed within Middle Eastern cultures, in general, and Kurdistan, in particular. As source texts, however, they are written and published by various recognisable English sources, including the Kurdish media itself, which is the producer of a number of the source texts and their translations as well (see chapter 3 for more details about the corpus design of this study). Thus, part of the geopolitical translation in Kurdistan becomes the source-culture-based act of reinterpreting and transforming the source texts (STs) into the target texts (TTs). The translational activities in the geopolitical texts and Kurdish media realm, thus, tend to fulfil unique functions in both ST and TT contexts and exhibit unique features in terms of the discursive formation of the STs and its dynamic influence on the TT production. They might eventually indicate that ideology is largely shaped and informed by the discursive transformation in the domestic spheres and influenced by the practice of geopolitical translation and the course of socio-political development in Kurdistan. In this sense, primacy is allocated to the professional and socio-cultural norms of both ST and TT community. The TTs are considered as textual indicators of ideological manipulations conceived to sustain the socio-political order of the source culture, whereas the target readership will be accounted for the extent that the significance criterion will not be compromised. This is due to the study's objectives, which are oriented towards the exploration of the growing tendency of the translator's behaviour, and the institutions they belong to, rather than their interaction with the target readerships and their response to the translated texts.

An integrated methodology has been formulated in response to these factors. As power and ideology are integrally involved in the analysis of translated media texts, a combined methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and Narrative Theory within Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS), specifically, the analytical three-phase model suggested by Toury (1995, 2012) is employed. The aim is to relate the effect of power performance to text production in both source and target contexts. Meanwhile, given that geopolitical translation is primarily a norm-governed practice, Chesterman's (1997) notion of translation norms is employed and adapted to the study of Kurdish media translation. It is significant to bear in mind that the notions adopted from norms theory tend to be reorganised in a descriptive light and integrated with political and socio-cultural analysis to establish a more convincing and operational link between texts and their socio-political contexts. The theoretical propositions are justified and substantiated by extensive text analysis from a functional perspective. The



corpus of data is formed by a set of parallel corpus of 60 English texts along with their Kurdish translations (60 texts), covering geopolitical commentary genre articles. All the STs and the TTs are online texts collected from official publications from 2011 to 2014. The Kurdish translated texts were delivered by four recognisable Kurdish media newspaper agencies<sup>5</sup> with different editorial policies: *Sbeiy*, *Kurdistan-i-New*, *Xendan*, and *Rudaw* media agencies. They were reproduced on a collective basis by Kurdish political parties that directly or indirectly run these institutions (see chapters 3 and 4 for details). The focus is on presenting a whole picture of the Kurdish media translation through a wide spectrum of geopolitical genres including newspaper commentary articles. This analytic approach appears particularly helpful to identify the socio-political changes and their impact on media translation and translators' behaviour. Given the remarkable level of parallels in both wording and context between the STs and the TTs, it would be of great interest to discover how this phenomenon is dealt with in the translated versions by both the translators and the institutions they translated for. The overall textual analysis demonstrates that when translated, geopolitical topics can be interpreted differently by different institutions in their attempt to promote their respective political interests and narratives.

Framed within the recognised limits as discussed above, it is reasonable to say that any significant textual variations in the TTs might be engendered by the adaptive operation of norms accentuated by fluctuating socio-political representations. Thus, the focus in this study is placed on finding the indicators of textual change in the Kurdish translations. The analysis, however, reflects aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations at both the macro- and micro-structural levels. In a more specific sense, translation shifts are seen as “invariant under transformation” (Toury 1980, p. 12). Invariant refers to the elements that remain unchanged in the process of translation, while transformations occur at various textual levels during the act of translation. It should be understood that the transformations are exclusive of the systematic differences between the ST and the TT which are static and rule-governed. In this study,

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<sup>5</sup> Like the BBC, some of the Kurdish media agencies selected in this study are considered part of broadcasting organisations that include all the broadcasting devices and facilities.

however, only the value-laden<sup>6</sup> transformations will be accounted for as the outcome of the socio-cultural and political positioned translation behaviour. According to Toury's (1985/2014, pp.35-38) formulation of descriptive translation studies (DTS), the transformations in the latter form are achieved through the descriptive comparison of the STs and the TTs, and they are ultimately connected to norms. In this study, the compilation of translation shifts obtained at the textual-functional level across the range of geopolitical genres over the four years may identify the characteristics of geopolitical translation as well as the adjustments of social and institutional norms.

The norms can, therefore, be highlighted by scrutinising the translation shifts and comparing the shifts diachronically and synchronically amongst various sets of parallel examples consisting of identical textual ST segments and their corresponding TTs extracted from the texts. The types of shifts of translation strategies could be better determined and analysed along the course of discursive evolution in the socio-geopolitical sphere. According to Toury (1980), the description and explanation of shifts in translation ought to be concerned with the dynamics of culture rather than the static descriptive contrast of the languages. Therefore, since this research is a descriptive study in nature, it favours lines of inquiry seeking to determine properties of translated language from a communicative perspective in the Kurdish socio-cultural and political context. This ultimately leads to the exploration of the aspects of socio-political and institutional conditions for the production of the translations.

## **1.1 Kurdish Media, Geopolitics and Translation**

The outline above has given an introduction to the theme of this study. It will also be more productive if the thesis provides a comprehensive literature review of Kurdish language and translation, including its practice and study, diachronically in Iraqi Kurdistan, before designating the study's questions and starting the data analysis. The study is informed by the

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<sup>6</sup> In line with White's perspectives (2006, p. 37), this study considers that media geopolitical texts is anything but objectives, it is in fact "value-laden, ideologically determined discourse with a clear potential to influence media audience's assumptions and beliefs about the way world is and the way it ought to be".

specific linguistic, political and cultural contexts of the Kurdish language in Iraqi Kurdistan. The complex geopolitical history of the region and the development of the Kurdish language will help demonstrate the importance of an approach to the translation of media texts that takes into account ideology as well as the linguistic and cultural dimensions of translational norms. This section, therefore, presents an overview of the Kurdish language, media, and translation before and after the establishment of the Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq in 1992 with the aim of introducing the key elements necessary for understanding this context.

The codes of repression and the geographical area of Kurdistan have affected the spoken varieties of Kurdish pre- and post the 1990s. Since 1992, two Kurdish variations have been “the working language of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), schools and the media” (Sheyholislami 2009/2015<sup>7</sup>, p. 21). These are the Northern Kurdish variations, also known as Kurmanjî (also Badínanî), and the Central Kurdish, also known as Soranî. The former is used widely as one of the dialects in Duhok city, while the latter that is known as Soranî Kurdish is the language for the rest of the Kurds who live in Iraqi Kurdistan. However, the case-study of this research is based on Soranî Kurdish since it has been the second recognised official local language of Iraqi Kurds and the majority their publications in Iraq from 1970s (Sheyholislami 2011, p. 64).

In recent years, there have been various attempts to standardise Soranî Kurdish by making some significant changes in the status of Kurdish, including its recognition as an official language in the new Iraqi constitution of 2004<sup>8</sup>. However, its long standing status as a non-standardised language<sup>9</sup> has affected the written form of Soranî Kurdish, in particular, in terms of sentence structure and lexico-grammatical choices. This paved the way for the invasion of linguistic borrowing on all levels. Regardless of socio-cultural and linguistic norms and

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<sup>7</sup> It was first published as a conference paper in 2009 and then in 2015 by Research Gate publisher.

<sup>8</sup> According to article four of the new constitution of Iraq (approved in June 2004), “the Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of Iraq,” and this can be considered as an updating version of the agreement signed three decades before. In 1966, it was also confirmed in the constitution of Iraq that Kurdish “is an official status equal to that of Arabic” (Smith 1971, p.66). However, the Kurdish language was only permitted as a local language in the Kurdish areas.

<sup>9</sup> “The authorities, especially the Kurdish Academy, have decided not to have any specific language policy in Iraqi Kurdistan with respect to declaring an official language for the region or granting linguistic rights to Kurdish varieties with fewer speakers” (Sheyholislami 2012, p. 117).

conventions, writers' agency and stylistically arbitrary preferences might be one of the reasons behind such borrowings.

Similarly to the linguistic development of Kurdish, the Kurdish media context has been heavily influenced by the geopolitical development of the region. The Kurdish media has been divided into three ideological camps in the post-autonomous region: the authority-affiliated media; the opposition media; and the independent media. Each media has its own language of use, writers, and translators. This has not only affected the Kurdish language in terms of unification and standardisation, but, as this study will demonstrate, it also affects the translator's decision-making by influencing the translation choices made by individuals affiliated to the different media in the process of translation. Considering the factors mentioned above, this study therefore subjects the Kurdish translation to various questions. Translation choices might be regarded as inaccurate, inaccessible, or biased choices and expressions.

The above notwithstanding, being a stateless nation, Kurds have practiced translation from and into their language under the rule of different successive governments, which influenced the use and development of the language. This is further proof of the vital importance of an ideological dimension in the discussion of translation shifts and translation norms in the study of Kurdish translation. Therefore, addressing the issue of translation for the general public in the public sphere, without considering the socio-political and ideological events that the Kurdish language has undergone throughout its history would be unsatisfactory and misleading. The attempts to show the impact of political changes upon the Kurdish language, especially Soranî Kurdish, reveal obstacles to its lack of standardisation and development so far and shed light on the problems translators face today in Iraqi Kurdistan.

### **1.1.1 The Historical and Socio-political Context of Soranî Kurdish**

This sub-section provides a historical and socio-political context outlining the influence and effect of political and power relations on Soranî Kurdish. This, in turn, might shed light on the interpretation of some aspects of translators' behaviour during the course of data analysis of this study. The Kurds were always considered as a threat by the authorities in Kurdish areas, which led to them being deprived of their rights as citizens. This has rather caused the Kurds to

have less access to matters such as legislating over education in Kurdish which, in turn, has had a negative impact upon Kurdish language development and standardisation. According to *Kurdish Facts and West-Asian Affairs*, “the great problems around the Kurdish language” are “problems closely connected with oppression and partition in Kurdistan” (1962, p.15). This caused the relatively late emergence of the written forms of Kurdish (Kreyenbroek and Allison 1996, p. 2).

The Kurdish language is a language of the Kurds in Kurdistan western Asia. It is a part of the Indo-Iranian group which is a branch of the Proto-Indo European languages of the Indo-European languages family (Kreyenbroek 1991, p. 54; Kirchhoff 2006, p. 9; Zaken 2007, p. 2; Fortson 2011, p. 10). The Kurds are an ancient ethnic group who have lived for many thousands of years in and occupied “a very large portion of the Middle East” (Hay 1921, p. 35). According to the Council of Europe (2007), they are estimated to be around 25-30 million in population, and the largest stateless nation in the world (p. 37). They are the inheritors of an immensely rich cultural heritage, before and after the rise of Islam in the seventh century which led to the partial Islamisation<sup>10</sup> of the Kurds. The Kurdish language was therefore affected by the waves of Arabisation which Islam triggered in the Middle East from the seventh century onwards (Joseph 1983, p. 18; Henry 2008, p. 179). Partial Islamisation caused the use of Arabic words to enter the language in addition to Kurdish ones because Arabic was the language of the Holy Quran and, according to Islam, chosen by God to convey the message of that faith and its associated law. This affected the cultivation of the Kurdish language and culture as Arabic was the only language in which people were educated about religion and people studied at schools which formed part of the mosque system. As a result, this led to some of the books being written in Arabic by Kurdish scholars and even the poets used many Arabic words in their poems because most of them were Mullahs<sup>11</sup>. This caused some Kurdish words to be forgotten and over time to become obsolete. For example, the Kurdish word وه زير (BT: minister) is derived from the Turkish word for *vizier* that is derived from the Arabic word وزير, which means a high official

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<sup>10</sup> Islamisation /Islamization: this term is used to indicate the mass converting of the indigenous population of Kurds to Islam as “they were converted to Islam after the Arab conquest of the seventh century” (Smith 1971, p. 40).

<sup>11</sup> Mullah means Muslim Scholar, i.e., a Muslim cleric who specialises in the interpretation of Islamic religious law

in a Muslim government (BT: minister). Therefore, the Kurdish language was affected, to some extent, by the waves of Arabisation that Islam emanated from the seventh century onwards in the Middle East.

Due to the political changes in the area, Kurdistan was later divided into four parts and annexed to neighbouring countries, namely, Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran and each is considered to be a part of these countries today. In other words, the four parts of Kurdistan which are northern, southern, western and eastern Kurdistan are referred to as Kurdistan of Turkey, Kurdistan of Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), Kurdistan of Syria and Kurdistan of Iran, respectively. Red Kurdistan is the fifth part which was annexed to the former Soviet Union. Today, its population is known as the Kurds of Armenia. In addition, there is a large Kurdish diaspora worldwide. This division was made on two different occasions. In 1514, after the battle of Chaldiran, the Ottoman and Persian Empires divided Kurdistan between them. In 1920-1923, Britain and France further divided that part of Kurdistan which was conquered by the Ottoman Empire by dividing it between Iraq, Turkey and Syria (Meho and Maglaughlin 2001, p. 3; Ember et al. 2005, p. 215-219). Since then, Kurds have fought various empires for their sovereignty. Having a strong connection to their identity, not only Kurds, but also their language, have been confronted by different types of suppression from successive authorities in attempts to erase any trace of their past.

In Iraq, the Ottoman Empire's rule (1534-1917) lasted until the end of First World War (1918) and this led to the establishment of the state of Iraq, including the southern part of Kurdistan under the British Mandate of 1920-1932. During that era, and after the First World War, limited steps were taken to address the Kurdish problem. The British Mandate considered southern Kurdistan, which is now known as Iraqi Kurdistan, to be an autonomous region. The first printed books were published in Kurdish, e.g., *Mam u Zin* (BT: Mam and Zin) (Aziz 2011, p. 42). Education developed and schools were established where Soraní Kurdish was allowed to be studied, e.g., the school of Rushdiye (Gérard 1998). However, the Kurdish language was only allowed to be studied at elementary level (Hassanpour 2005, pp.51) and the graduates could go to Istanbul to continue their study or receive instruction in the Arabic language. Government officials were afraid of the growth of the Kurdish language throughout the educational system. Smith (1971) explains further that “although the Local Language Law promulgated in 1931

specifies that primary instruction in areas where the majority of the population speak Kurdish or Turkish is to be offered in the local language, this provision is not always enforced". Furthermore, "the language of instruction in the primary and secondary schools [was] Arabic" (p. 118-119). Therefore, this caused problems of illiteracy amongst the Kurds during that time. Although, according to the Lausanne Treaty, there was freedom of the press, namely, no restrictions were enforced on the free use of any language in the press or at publication of any kind, there was, nevertheless an attempt to undermine the Kurdish language at the same time by not allowing it to be studied at high school. It has been argued that not only was there a lack in the use of the Kurdish language in the educational system, but also in the provision of Kurdish schools and teachers (Sluglett 2007, p. 127).

Later, in 1932, before the Second World War and the years of the establishment of Iraq, limited steps were taken in the direction of Kurdish education by the British Mandate. Kurdish was permitted in an Iraqi local-language law for teaching in schools, for the election of local Kurdish officials, and for the publication of Kurdish-language books in Kurdish-speaking areas only. This protected the status of the Kurdish language to an extent. In 1932 and 1939, two books about Kurds and the rationale for writing in Kurdish were published and laid the groundwork for Kurdish study (Bengio 2012, p. 7). In 1953, another book entitled *The History of Kurdish Literature* was published (Bois 1966, p. 121). However, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in 1929 supported the state of Iraq to enter the League of Nations 1932 unconditionally without any "formal safeguards for Kurdish interests" (Sluglett 2007, p. 128). Kurdistan became an important, oil rich area which led to it being coveted by other countries and, as a result, several Kurdish movements were founded in order to be active against these authorities. The emergence of different Kurdish movements with different political ideologies typified the Kurdish community.

In 1958, after the dethronement of the monarchy in Iraq and the success of the new republican government of Abdul Karim Qasim, in the first constitution, the Kurds were considered as part of the new state. The new Iraqi constitution recognised Kurdish national rights by stating that "Arabs and Kurds are partners in the Iraqi homeland and their national rights are recognised within the Iraqi state" (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, p. 79). Furthermore, some Kurdish departments were established in some Iraqi universities. In 1968,

the University of Sulaimani was founded in the city of Sulaimani<sup>12</sup>. On the one hand, this led to the Kurdish nationality being recognised as one of the two main ethnic groups with equal rights and legal status (Kurds and Arab). On the other hand, this left an ongoing Kurdish problem “which has led to such atrocities as mass murder, ethnic cleansing and gassing of the civilian Kurds in their cities by various Iraqi governments, from the mandate period to the present” (Izady 2004, p. 95-96). By the time the Ba’th party took over, the new constitution of July 1970 explicitly points to the fact that “the people of Iraq is formed of two principal nationalities, the Arab nationality and the Kurd nationality” (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, p. 142). This led to Kurdish being recognised as an official local language in the Kurdish region of Iraq since then. However, despite this recognition, there has been continuous censorship, conflict and sporadic negotiation between the Iraqi government and the various Kurdish movements (supported by Iran); this led to the Algiers’s agreement<sup>13</sup> between Iraq-Iran in 1975 that caused the end of Iranian weapon supplies to the Kurds in their struggle against the Iraqi government. Nevertheless, while the Kurds have been free to study, write, publish and broadcast in Kurdish under the Algiers’s agreement, no freedom of expression was guaranteed because of severe censorship, and military action continued against Kurds. It was difficult for the Kurdish language to progress in general and particularly in education as well as in the political field, given the taboo of employing Kurdish. According to Human Rights Watch (Black, 1993, p. 33):

On paper the manifesto of March 11, 1970 was promising. It recognised the legitimacy of Kurdish nationalism and guaranteed Kurdish participation in government and Kurdish language-teaching in schools. But it reversed judgment on the territorial extent of Kurdistan, pending a new census. Such census would surely have shown a solid Kurdish majority in the city of Kirkuk and the surrounding oilfields, as well as in the secondary oil-bearing area of Khanaqin,

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<sup>12</sup> Due to the historical events that are happened in the area, there are different spellings of this term such as Sulaimani, Sulaimania, Al-Sulaymaniah, Suleymani and Solaymāniya. This thesis will use the term Sulaimani.

<sup>13</sup> According to the Law of Autonomy issued by the Republic of Iraq in 1977, the March 11 Manifesto of 1970/1974, “Kurdistan region shall enjoy Autonomy, and it shall be referred to as (the region) wherever it exists in this Law” (1977:11) and “the Kurdish language shall be, beside the Arabic language, the official language in the Region” (Ibid: 13).



south of the city of Suleimaniyeh. But no census was scheduled until 1977, by which time the autonomy deal was dead. (Black, 1993, p.33)

In 1979, Saddam Hussein seized power and started a violent campaign against the Kurds such as arresting citizens, bombarding villages, Arabizing Kurdish areas and even using chemical weapons and Anfal campaigns<sup>14</sup> against the Kurdish people. Soon afterwards repression extended to education through Arabisation. This technique was executed through several methods, such as the displacement of thousands of Kurdish families by pro-government Arabs from Kurdish areas to different southern areas of Iraq. Educated Kurds were sent into exile. The Kurdish mass media was hampered by various levels of government censorship. Arabic was made the only official language of all legal documentation, and prestige was conferred upon the Arabic language in terms of its usage. By using these techniques, Arabic was nationally recognised and used in official and educational contexts. Iraq's universities offered their courses in Arabic and in English. Speakers who used Arabic were considered well-educated and from a high class. The Kurdish language almost reached the point of no return. Therefore, outwardly Kurdish existed, but severe censorship, intimidation, and murder posed obstacles to the transmission and diffusion of Soranî Kurdish to develop as a standardised language. For example, the regime closed down the University of Sulaimani in Suleimaniyeh city in 1981 in order to avoid the development of the Kurdish language and nationalism throughout higher education. Although it was re-established in Irbil (Hawler) later, its name was changed into an Arabic name, i.e., University of Salahaddin. It has been argued that, according to some secret documents which were obtained after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, "the regime was planning to put an end to the use of Kurdish as a language of instruction in Kurdistan-Iraq" (Sheyholislami 2011, p. 64). In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, Kurds established the first Kurdish parliament and the Regional Government of Kurdistan. In the new phase of freedom, several political parties with different beliefs but which were

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<sup>14</sup> According to Human Rights watch, Anfal is defined as "a campaign of the Iraqi government and army carried out against the village Kurdish population of Iraqi Kurdistan in 1988, the year during which the Iran-Iraq War came to an end. Anfal was a name used by the Iraqi army. Taken from Koranic verse, it refers to "the plunder of the infidel," and evidently was intended to give the campaign the veneer of religious justification, though the Kurds themselves are Muslims and Iraq is a secular state" (Anderson and Watch1993, p. 4).

radical and at violent odds with each other for several years, posed another obstacle for the Kurdish language to develop.

The media had an immense role in reusing, producing and borrowing words that had an impact on language standardisation and development. In addition, “broadcasting facilities were run by the political parties and the Kurdish government. The two major parties, PUK and KDP<sup>15</sup>, aired programmes for the entire region while other smaller parties had their own stations” (Hassanpour 1996, p.73). With having a parallel administration, each of KDP and PUK has governed about half of Iraqi Kurdish territory<sup>16</sup> and each has its own language, which expresses that party’s ideology. Although they started a process of integration of the two governments into one after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, the language and mass media problem continues and results in the production of two types of media outlet. *Gulan* and *Kurdistan-i-Nwe*, for example, are two partisan newspapers, which directly belong to the KDP and PUK, respectively. *Kurdistan TV* and *Zagros TV* are the PDK’s media outlets, while *Kurdsat TV* and *Gali Kurdistan Satellite Channel* are the PUK’s media outlets. The second type of outlet is the shadow media, which are affiliated indirectly to either the KDP or PUK (see chapter 4 for an in-depth analysis of the Kurdish political parties, and their media agencies, including shadow media). It has been reported that *Rudaw Media Company* is closely affiliated to the KDP (Chomani 2012), although it considered itself as a private media company. *Xendan for Publishing and Broadcasting*, likewise, describes itself as free from party political bias and proprietorial influence, but it is known as the PUK affiliated *Xendan*. This turned the Kurdish language into a focus for political and ideological struggles. In 2009, another political movement emerged as an official opposition party (known as the Change movement) against the ruling two-party coalition that governed the Kurdistan Regional Government. It comprises several media outlets, such as the *Wusha Corporation*, *Sbeyi newspaper*, *Kurdish News Network (KNN)*, and *KNN TV*. Since then, the Kurdish media has been divided into three ideological camps: the authority-affiliated media, the opposition media and the independent media. With each media having its own writers, translators and language of use, not only has the Kurdish

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<sup>15</sup> The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP/ KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)

<sup>16</sup> The Kurdistan Democratic Party has governed Hawler (Irbil) and Dhok’s provinces and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan has governed Sulaimania province.

language been affected negatively in terms of unification and standardisation, but also the translation behaviour was affected in terms of making choices among many alternatives in the process of the translation (see subsection 1.1.3).

The historical overview above has exposed the profound influence of political events upon the Kurdish language diachronically and underlined that Soranî Kurdish has undergone two significant phases, pre- and post-Kurdish self-government. Before having an autonomous region, Kurds had made constant efforts to develop Kurdish and to protect it from marginalisation. Being a stateless nation, Kurdish identity was/is based on the language. Sheyholislami (2009/2015) describes it as “the most salient symbol of Kurdish identity, both culturally and politically, because it separates the Kurds from their neighbouring nations more readily than any other cultural or physical characteristic”. After establishing regional government in 1990s, several universities and cultural centres (including academic centres for studying the Kurdish language) have been established in Kurdistan. Kurdish writers, intellectuals, translators, poets and journalists have contributed to the development of their language through literary writings and publications. Thus, it can be argued that media and modern technologies are able to establish a collective sense of belonging. Being a stateless nation, Kurds have lived under different hegemonic cultures, such as Arabic, Turkish and Persian, for more than a century. Therefore, similarity and difference coexist between Kurdish and these languages. On the one hand, media and modern technologies can help in realising how different Kurdish is from the other three languages. On the other hand, they can show the impact of the historical and current socio-political factors upon Kurdish and its development. Meanwhile, different Kurdish media have developed different ideological directions, which, in turn, influenced the way Soranî Kurdish communicated as a language of the public communication in society. In this way, the way in which the Kurdish language falls along ideological lines has implication for the norms followed by different translators. For instance, the two words قوتابی (BT: pupil) and خویندکار (BT: student) are used in the same sense by different parties and publication agencies indicating ideological affiliation. They are even placed in most of the government’s official documents next to each other due to the ideological diversity of the political parties in power. The term قوتابی (BT: pupil) is common in the KDP affiliated media while the term خویندکار (BT: student) is more prominent in the PUK affiliated media.

### 1.1.2 Kurdish Language and Translation Pre-Autonomous Region in Iraqi Kurdistan

The previous subsection has shown the historical and socio-political development of Soranî Kurdish before and after the foundation of an autonomous region in Iraqi Kurdistan. Delivering a historical view of the practice of translation under the rule of different successive government preceding Kurdistan regional government in north of Iraq, this subsection has two aims. Firstly, it reveals the way historical and socio-political relations might influence translators' behaviour today and shows the role and contribution of translation in the development and standardisation of Soranî Kurdish as well. It also shows that in the pre-autonomous region of Kurdistan, there was considerable translation activity; however, the scholarship on such translation activity is virtually non-existent. This, in turn, further underlines the significance of undertaking this study.

It is argued that texts were translated into Kurdish long before the 19th century. However, evidence of translated published materials might refer back to the time when “the first printing press of Kurdistan was set up in Solaymāniya in 1919” (Kreyenbroek, 2005) under the British mandate. The use of Soranî Kurdish was encouraged as a written language. In the early 20th century, several Kurdish newspapers, such as *Tegeyishtini Rasti* and *Peshkawtin* (Kreyenbroek, 2005) and many translations of western works, such as the translation of Pushkin, Schiller, Byron and Lamartine, emerged (Izady 1992). Before the termination of the British mandate, Britain promised to give the Kurds, as stipulated by the League of Nations<sup>17</sup> in 1926, their right regarding the use of the Kurdish language as one of the official languages in the area; however, no steps were taken to guarantee that. In addition, the Iraqi government did not show any sign of “the promised Kurdish translation bureau (which was to deal with laws and school textbooks)” (Sluglett 2007, p. 127). Therefore, with Arabic being the dominant language at the

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<sup>17</sup> According to the Lausanne Treaty, Article 39 signed on June 24, 1923, language rights were guaranteed for all ethnic groups: “No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings. Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the courts” (Izady 2004:102). All Kurds, like all other nations, were under the domain of the Ottoman Empire at that time.

time, most of the works which were written in European languages were translated from the Arabic versions (Hasanpoor 1999).

The activity of translation and publication for the general public continued until the collapse of the monarchy on 14 July 1958. However, their publications were usually restricted in terms of the content and number. In 1958, the first book entitled *Wergêran Hunere* (Translation is an Art), was published. During the time of Saddam Hussein, the government carefully censored all official mass media produced within the autonomous Kurdish region. Some materials, such as short stories, were written in and translated into Soranî Kurdish. Some Kurdish films that were produced had to pass government censorship. English films were available only with Arabic subtitling. According to Ahmadzadeh (2005, p. 71), “there were hardly any novels translated into Kurdish before the emergence of the Kurdish novel”. In the 1970s, the first novel *Jan-I Gal* (The Agony of People) was published, but it was proscribed by the government (Gunter 2010: 202). The Kurdish press and periodicals, including translated subjects, were permitted on a very limited scale under government censorship. Up to the end of the 1980s, the Kurdish press had not only encountered many difficulties in terms of circulation, distribution, newspaper printing and publishing, but also had “been reinforced by the division of the Kurdish speech community and political restrictions on the use of language” (Hassanpoor 1992, p 276). Therefore, most of the works were written, translated and published in the diaspora. In other words, they are published outside the power of the dominant political system because they differed “relatively sharply from the dominant ideology and/or poetics of the time” (Lefevere 1992b, 21). In Iraq, Soranî Kurdish was tolerated and treated as an official “local language”, by successive Iraqi governments who practiced a policy of Arabisation as a means of containing Kurdish nationalism. It might be difficult to study those works within the scope of this study due to the lack of their availability because the majority of them were lost and many of them had a short-lived existence due to fluctuations in relations between the Kurds and successive Iraqi governments. Besides, they are outside the remit of this study. In addition, the setting up of a more or less autonomous security zone in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1992, in general, and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, in particular, initially led to a great deal of published translated works reflecting the political and social issues of the area. Kurdish literary writers have written a number of novels and poems. In the field of translation and media, many literary and non-literary works including journals, newspapers, periodicals and films, were

translated into Soranî Kurdish. Some research was conducted by Kurdish scholars and linguists into language unification, standardisation, and even language borrowing. Nevertheless, so far there is very little academic research covering translation studies in Iraqi Kurdistan, especially media translation (see the following sub-section 1.1.3 for more details).

### **1.1.3 Kurdish Media and Translation Post-Autonomous Region in Iraqi Kurdistan**

The subsection builds on the historical view of the practice of translation under the rule of different successive government preceding the Kurdistan regional government (KRG) in the north of Iraq outlined above, which illustrates the interplay between historical and current socio-political factors and their impacts on translators' behaviour today. It builds on this by presenting an overview of the latest studies of Kurdish media, geopolitical ideology and power relations in Iraqi Kurdistan in order to provide further justification for conducting this study, arguing that Kurdish media translation has thus far received little attention.

The Kurdish media is of great significance in Kurdish society, particularly since the 1990s with the establishment of an autonomous region in northern Iraq. As explained in the previous subsections, since 1992 media facilities have been run by the Kurdish government and political parties, including the two major ruling parties (PDK and PUK) and, from 2008, the Gorran opposition party. For a long time, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK) has governed Hawler (Irbil) and Dhok's provinces, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has governed Sulaimania province. However, the Gorran opposition party surprisingly won the majority of votes in the province of Sulaimania in the Kurdish national assembly on July 25, 2009, KRG election. Following these dramatic changes in Kurdish society, the Kurdish media represents a means of investigating the language used in the field of translation in order to reveal the wide political and socio-cultural implications impacting on Kurdish translators' behaviours. Their decisions represent the source words of others and are restricted and guided by textual and extra-textual factors, such as commissioners (patrons), norms, audience expectations and target text functions. In addition, they are affected by translators' "own sociocultural and educational background, ideological, phraseological and idiosyncratic stylistic preferences" (Munday 2012a, p.2). However, previous studies have usually ignored translation that blurs the difference between the impacts of these factors, and overlooked theories that foreground ideology in

translation studies. Part of this study's original contribution lies in the way it identifies what can be gained by taking translation into account while investigating the language used in media texts in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The Kurdish media in Iraqi Kurdistan has attracted some researchers' attention after the fall of Saddam's regime in 2003, including Mawlood's 2011 work, *The Impact of the Press Law 2008 on the Role of Journalism in the Kurdistan Region post-2003*; and Sheyholislami's 2011 book, *Kurdish Identity, Discourse, and New Media*. In the field of translation, very little research has been conducted beyond Salih's (2014) work on the use of English and Kurdish connectives in newspaper articles. Birot (2012) has undertaken some work on the role of ideology in translation and Kurdish media in Iraqi Kurdistan via newspaper articles. Nevertheless, the role of ideology in this field, especially in geopolitical commentary articles, has not yet been studied academically. This study thus opens new and important research questions, arguing that media translation has an influential role in shaping the values, ideas, and belief systems in Kurdish society and it might be used as a manipulative tool in favour of different geopolitical media agencies. The translated texts selected for this study provide an introduction to the many ideological struggles over the nature, meaning and cause of contemporary contextual changes. The aim is to reveal the hidden ideology of geopolitical knowledge which leads to the use of a series of repeated translational strategies in Kurdish media translation. This, in turn, not only shapes translators' behaviour and discursive choices, but also reveals various historical and socio-political dynamics behind the interactions between the Kurdish political blocs, successive authorities and the media in the Kurdish semi-autonomous region, and considers the particular circumstances in which Kurdish translators currently operate.

As with many complex and multifaceted cultural concepts, ideology has many possible definitions. Following Lefevere approach (1992b) and van Dijk's approach (1998a)<sup>18</sup>, ideology in the context of Kurdish studies can be defined in relation to language, society and culture including factors such as power, politics and religion. The language and texts used within the field of Kurdish media are thus considered to reflect socio-cultural messages and power

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<sup>18</sup> Details is given in the section 2.3 of the following chapter

relations. In translation studies, it can be argued that the kinds of translations that occur, as texts move along the sociocultural, political and media chain, are usually dependent on the interests and objectives of the existing dominant power and context into which the discourse is being re-contextualised. They reflect the translator's mediation in relation to ideological manipulation in translation studies<sup>19</sup>. The Kurdish media, likewise, might reflect a wide political, socio-cultural context which has its own impact on the translations produced within this field. In Iraqi Kurdistan, they are often the result of different geopolitical ideologies. Their representation could be expected to follow diverse goals and be shaped by different strands of socio-political arguments on the past, present and future of Kurdish society.

Meanwhile, the breadth of knowledge on journalism as an occupation and the adoption of respective techniques post-Hussein's regime in 2003 has led to changes in the modes of representation and the diversification of images in the Kurdish media. Describing Kurdish media productions, Fischer-Tahir (2013, p. 30) argues that "the process of transforming 'occurrences in the everyday world [...] into stories' highly depends on the institutional organisational and personal interests of the media producers". This might also be true for the media translation practise in Iraqi Kurdistan. Apart from radio and television, different Kurdish print publications and the internet sources strive to affect public discourse by selecting and prioritising topics for translation in order to convey certain beliefs and have particular impacts. Therefore, the investigation of the notion of ideology within Kurdish media in general and Kurdish media translation, in particular, is not so much interested in the specific activities depicted in a single newspaper, or media agency. For ideological analysis, the key is the fit between the sense and words within a number of media texts translated by different publication agencies in order to define various reflections, including socio-cultural and political issues. Due to the current political status of Kurdistan, which is a dynamic and ever-changing process, the effect of these particular types of translation in the world of geopolitics is more prominent and of critical importance.

Geopolitics can be defined as "a view or a mode of politics with an active concern for the overall planetary scheme of life" (Beaugrande 1994, p.5). In this sense, geopolitical texts

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<sup>19</sup> See section 2.1 of the following chapter.



disclose knowledge about a region and often motivate geopolitical theory and practice economically, environmentally and so forth. For Dalby et al. (1998), “geopolitical texts are not “neutral” writings from a detached position outside politics, history or geography, attempting to answer a single commonly agreed upon “question” (p. 311). In today’s Kurdish media, they are of interest to the public because they seem to promise unusual insight into the future direction of international affairs and the coming shape of the Kurdish political map. However, specifications of the relationship between geography, power, ideology and translation vary considerably as geopolitical visionaries vie with each other to delimit a “new geopolitics.” For some, the current political status of Kurdistan has allowed the emergence of new geopolitical media dominated by territorial struggles between competing blocs and nationalism. This, in turn, might be reflected in the field of Kurdish media translation when the production of geopolitical discourse is treated by translators as part of politics itself and not as a neutral and detached description of a transparent objective reality. In this sense, ideology might not only be “located in the translated text [...], but also in the voice and position of the translator” (Tymoczko 2010, p. 213). This study, therefore, argues that ideology might reside in the geographical and temporal stance of the Kurdish translators and govern their choices along with their cultural and ideological affiliations. It raises several questions as regards the producers of these particular types of translations and their impacts, the way they move from the field of ideology to that of media texts and the extent to which the knowledge producers are imbricated with issues of ideology and power. This might be due to the fact that these “translations are not made in vacuum. Translators function in a given culture at given time. The way they understand themselves and their cultures is one of the factors that may influence the way in which they may translate” (Lefevere 1992a, p.14).

In the context of this study then, ideology assumes a primary position and becomes an important analytical tool and common ground which reflects the occurrence of different (re)framings by varied users and reframing strategies for different purposes. The observation of such behaviours not only leads to the observation of patterns and trends in Kurdish media translation at a particular period of time, but also allows the study to elaborate a more intricate picture of the positioning of translators and embed them in the existing political reality. Media translation is, therefore, examined as the act of comprehending a context, socially, politically and culturally by translators and rendering it into another language and culture. It reflects the

role of contextual factors in Kurdish translators' decision in relation to the lexico-grammatical choices and how their acceptance, refusal, or modification affect the Kurdish language development and non-standardisation and vice versa.

In sum, the section above has shown that the wide practice of translation for the general public (in the public sphere) from English into Kurdish is not new in Iraqi Kurdistan. However, its practice as an independent and emancipated activity on a limited scale is fairly new and dates back to the 2000s. The section also revealed that Kurdish translators might be under various pressure to make difficult decisions regarding lexico-grammatical choices and finding sufficient lexical resources in order to translate from foreign languages, particularly English. Kurdish non-standardisation results in the lack of, and need for a common ground in terms of how to keep this language updated with the passage of time as new ideas, technologies and translations arise and how to adopt and spell loan words, calques and so forth. Hasanpoor (1999, p. 40) elucidates that “translations have enriched the language with the adoption of new concepts, loans, neologisms, and the introduction of punctuation and stylistic codes”. It can be argued that Hassanpour's statement refers to Kurdish translation in general. However, this study is consistent with what he argues regarding the lack of studies of the contributions and limitations of translated works. The contributions of translation choices and ideology, especially in media translation, have not yet been studied. Translation choices in relation to the meaning focus may be considered as “nothing but arbitrary since there is no reason why a particular perspective should be favoured over competing interpretations” (Strugielska and Siek-Piskozub 2013, p. 20). This makes the present study important and exigent since this study argues that Kurdish translation choices are driven by ideology and according to Lefevere (1992a, p. 14) “ideology is often enforced by the patrons, the people or institutions who commission or publish translations”. Although the existence of a number of translated texts in the public sphere is insufficient for today's growing market demand, nevertheless, the mainstream media has continued to grow over the last decade and the translation demand in Kurdistan is ever rising. For this reason, Kurdish media translation in Kurdistan deserves a more detailed review so that challenges and obstacles to translators' decisions in the region can be identified. In addition, the development of Kurdish language and also translation studies has still to be consolidated. The Kurdish language needs to be promoted, especially in terms of its standardisation and language policy. Standardisation is important because it defines widely-accepted norms for all purposes

of language use in writing in that language. In the Kurdish language, to a great extent, norms are considered to be an outcome of spontaneous exchanges between writers and editors (translators and editors) over a certain period of time, rather than following guidelines offered by an academy or language policy, which does not exist. In the field of translation, this leads to a state of confusion and makes the translators believe that they can do what they want in terms of lexical choices. However, it is undeniable that language standardisation and unification in Kurdish is a gradual process and requires research into different aspects of that language.

## **1.2 Objectives and Analytical Progression of the Study**

The overview of the history of Soranî Kurdish along with the practice and studies of Kurdish media, translation, geopolitical ideology and power relations in Iraqi Kurdistan, presented above, revealed that Kurdish media translation has received little attention so far. Due to this, the current project, focusing on the period from 2011 to 2014, seeks to shed light on English-Kurdish translation and provide an insight into the Kurdish translator's behaviour in the future. This next section, therefore, presents the scope and the main goals of the study and sets out the questions the study seeks to answer through its examination of translation practice.

On the one hand, the initial impulse behind this study is to show the impact of the socio-political context on the translation choices. This study aims to explore the extent to which translation choices/shifts are affected by the historical and current political events in the area, the conservative Kurdish society and culture, and the status of Kurdish in terms of non-standardisation. It thus assumes that the historical, social, cultural, political, and linguistic context of Kurdish has a significant impact on Kurdish translators' lexico-grammatical choices in the target language.

Kurdish media translations are typically produced by translators whose first language is Kurdish. Although their classification is not an easy task, they can broadly be distinguished into three groups: people who are experienced in the field of translation; people who have graduated with English degrees; people who have learnt English in other contexts, e.g., they hold a degree in a field related to their specialism, such as doctors or they have lived in abroad, in English speaking countries in particular. It can be argued that having knowledge of the linguistic and

stylistic aspects of the two languages they work in may not be enough. The occurrence of any of borrowing, omission and addition poses questions in terms of their acceptance or refusal in the target language and culture and involves not only the translators' own sociocultural and educational background, but also their ideological, phraseological and personal stylistic preferences. This study, however, looks at these translators as mediators, and does not explore their personal or professional trajectories. The translations of the journalistic articles in the corpus of this study are published by recognisable media agencies in Iraqi Kurdistan and they are considered to be the production of professional translators. Of the total of the selected 60 translated texts in the corpus of this study, only the names of 19 translators, who translated 35 texts, are known. The rest of the texts came under the media agencies' designations which are *Sbeiy*, *Xendan*, *Rudaw*, and *PUKpb (Kurdistan-i-Nwe)*. There would have been a possibility to follow a few translators through over the period and map changes. However, this thesis does not do this because the focus is on the language in use, and translators as mediators rather than as individuals. This study disregards the individual translators, their personal styles and idiosyncrasies for they may have made it difficult to make strong claims about general translation trends exhibited by each media agency. This orients the analysis to identify patterns of textual change and link them to the ideological positioning of the media outlets.

The study, thus, aims at providing an insight into the significance of the role of various contexts in translators' decision-making. This, in turn, shows the extent to which media translation in Kurdistan is an institutional operation and mutual process of norm organisation practice in geopolitical context models. The study attempts to find out what is common among the factors that determine translation choices in relation to cases of omission, addition, and borrowing in order to disclose the regularities of translation behaviour. This may result in which translation trends are most commonly followed in the public sphere and provide opportunities to reveal the type and effect of operating translation norms in English-Kurdish media today. Translation norms can be defined as "options that translators in a given socio-historical context select on a regular basis" (Baker 2011b:190) and they can be recognised through regularity of translation behaviour (Toury 1995, 2012). Therefore, this study looks at translation mainly as a socio-political and ideological act and translators as active actors who play a specific social role within two different social-cultural frameworks. They have the ability to start a chain of

reflection and see the links between textual items, immediate narrative, metanarrative, the function of the source text, and the function of the target text in its target cultural situation.

In terms of the aim and objectives that the research sets out to achieve, this study thus is generally an original, substantial and sustained piece of work. Considering CNA model of reframing which provided this study with significant tools to investigate the way ideological and evaluative elements in media translation are rendered, the outcomes identifies translation shifts in relation to the prevailing socio-political and ideological factors. However, within the scope and time length of a PhD study, there are limitations to be considered. One of the main limitations in this study was the size of the corpora. As explained in chapter three, corpus representation has been viewed as a controversial matter. Since the study comprises texts that are translated and published over the period of four years only (from 2011 to 2014), it was not possible to include geopolitical journalistic texts translated over a longer time period and of more recent dates. This is due to the fact that the compiled corpus consists only of online published journalistic texts along with their translations. Being a new area in Kurdistan, online translated texts, in particular geopolitical journalistic texts, were not available in large quantities before and even at the time of compilation.

Another limitation originated from the text-based nature of this research, which makes the attempts to relate the textual evidence to the socio-political contexts also seem text-bound. This approach can be reasonably justified within the Kurdish geopolitical context in which the process of text production remains consistently cloudy as a result of the unrecorded regulation by institutional norms. In this case, the investigation of textual data from a CNA perspective would seem effective to relate the textual evidence to the social functions it intends to achieve and to further expound a macro-level of power relation involved in text production. Nevertheless, as highlighted by some translation scholars, such as Mason (2008) and Schäffner (2012) in their most recent work, the practice of using discourse analysis as a way of discussing translator's behaviour and concluding social process has been reassessed and reformulated in an attempt to integrate the research of institutional activities, interactions and agency with text-based translation studies.

This study, therefore, confines the study of socio-historical and cultural factors to an examination of the way they are reflected in translational constraints. In other words, it analyses

the role of context in determining the meaning of texts and shows a variety of factors that influence the translation choices with the objective of finding answers to questions generated by the observation of the corpora. With reference to the translation of geopolitical texts, especially in Kurdistan, this study seeks to find out to what extent geopolitical and contextual factors affect the translation choices in Kurdish media translation. It does so by exploring the following research questions:

- To what extent are translation agencies and newspapers allowing ideology to inform their news output and translation policies?
- Are translators manipulating the STs to favour or undermine the dominant narratives in the target society and/or reframing the ST to motivate the reader to reconsider his/her position regarding these dominant narratives?
- Are these manipulations driven by ideology?
- Are there other possible motivations informing translation practice, i.e., the status of Kurdish language (e.g., its non-standardisation), the current political status (e.g., different political ideologies) in Iraqi Kurdistan, and the translators' own sociocultural and educational background?
- What strategies do the translators use in disseminating or opposing the narratives elaborated in the STs in line with the narrative they accept or dissent from? To what extent does each case of borrowing, omission, addition and literal translation affect meaning and value of the ST and TT? What norms can be discerned from this analysis?
- What type of shift results from the use of the respective strategies? What is common among the factors behind translators' decision-making in relation to these shifts?
- Why is a particular lexicalisation preferred to other alternatives by the translators and/or publishers in the translation process?

This study encompasses seven chapters. This introduction provides a general background to Kurdish translation and the media, and the socio-political and ideological events that have historically informed the Kurdish language. Chapter two comprises a literature review, investigating relevant theories on the study of manipulation and the translator's ideological

mediation in media outlets. It is guided by the research objective to provide a framework to identify the gap this study addresses. This review takes the form of a critical discussion, showing insight and an awareness of differing arguments, theories and approaches. Chapter three includes the methodology and corpus design. This chapter seeks to illustrate the relationships between the methods used to collect and interpret the data and the theoretical models selected in this study. A multidisciplinary approach is employed in order to address the role of the socio-political context in Kurdish media translation. Chapters four, five and six consist of data analysis. Chapter four investigates the state of Kurdish media translation from English into Kurdish through presenting an overview of the four selected Kurdish media agencies, their text-selection policy, and the translation strategies used that lead to stylistic shifts. The focus is on the impact of the strategy of borrowing in relation to the ideology of the translators and major news agencies and newspapers. Chapter five seeks to investigate the strategies used that lead to semantic shifts. It investigates the way in which ideology shapes Kurdish translation processes, through the analysis of the corpus of collected translations. It discusses the translators' lexicogrammatical choices with regard to deletion and addition strategies in the translation of English commentary articles into Kurdish. In doing so, it will explore the role of translators in assenting or dissenting the narratives elaborated in the STs with the aim of revealing the extent to which translators make modifications to the STs to undermine the narratives dominating and/or disapproving the target society. Chapter six scrutinises the way that translations identified in the corpus are framed by the ideology of the political parties to which the news agencies and newspapers are aligned. The research ends with conclusions and appendices.

Consequently, taking English-Kurdish translation as a case-study, this research represents an original contribution to knowledge by discussing the impact of the non-standardisation of the Kurdish language and contextual factors on Kurdish translators' decisions in relation to lexico-grammatical choices. Following ideological and demographic changes in Kurdish society, the state of the Kurdish language and the current political ideology is apparent today in the public sphere, in particular the media. The mainstream media in Iraqi Kurdistan is in constant flux and the demand for translation is growing. This widespread availability and exposure make Kurdish media the primary focus of this research in order to investigate Kurdish translation more academically. There has been very little research in this area so far. This research, thus, provides an opportunity to study English-Kurdish translation as an academic

discipline and sheds light on the Kurdish translators' decisions with the aim of providing an insight into challenges and obstacles they face in the region. Moreover, this research aims at identifying major trends in the overall strategy pursued by Kurdish translators in order to arrive at culturally determined translation norms that underlie the translators' choices and strategies and identify factors beyond purely linguistic ones, i.e., ideological factors. The concept of ideology is investigated in relation to the concept of socio-culture which includes language, manipulation and power relations by investigating various target text selections in the Kurdish media. The status of the choices made in the TT is examined by comparing them to their counterparts in the ST in order to investigate the ideology of individual translators in terms of lexico-grammatical choices and the way that this informs the reading. This leads to a collating of the semiotic, the linguistic, the social, and the cultural perspectives on communicating and helps formulate broader conceptions of what is meant to be understood from the TTs. In addition, researching ideological manipulation in media texts aided by socio-linguistic approaches will provide translation scholars with the opportunity to explore further relevant linguistic methods and media theories for the investigation of particular aspects such as stance and attitude in media texts. This study, thus, attempts to form a framework to facilitate such an examination. The key concepts in ideology and translation studies are investigated in order to support an analysis of the underlying principles and values according to which many social and cultural practices are organised in media translation (see chapter two).



## **Chapter Two**

### **Literature Review**

#### **Kurdish Media Translation and Ideology**

##### **2.0 Introduction**

Chapter one has identified the way this study provides an original contribution to knowledge by filling a gap in the existing literature and indicating that Kurdish media translation has received little attention so far. It also presented a general account of the socio-political aspects of Soraní Kurdish along with media and translation practice in Iraqi Kurdistan, introducing the key elements necessary for understanding this context. This chapter further highlights the relevance of this study to the discipline of Translation Studies through developing a critical analytical framework for the discussion of ideology and mediation in Kurdish media translation in Iraqi Kurdistan. The study employs a multidisciplinary model in order to investigate the normative effects that ideological factors (especially the effect of socio-political factors) may have on translation behaviour in the translation of the online media commentary articles from English into Kurdish.

With the focus on the role of ideology and possible mediation in Kurdish media translation, the framework in this chapter, thus, has two main purposes. Firstly, it provides an overview of literature on manipulation and the translator's mediation in relation to ideology in translation studies. It will also outline the basic paradigms of media language, ideology and translation studies as a discipline by seeking to define aspects of media and translation studies relevant to the tenet of this study. The chapter identifies Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Narrative Theory as useful tools for the exploration of the normative impact of the ideological positioning of the translator within the framework of Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS) based on Chesterman's concept of norms. It does so through giving a comprehensive critical overview of the theoretical models relevant to this study in order to address the way linguistic resources are manipulated to enable such mediation and/or express ideology. This, in turn, helps

in the formation of a critical narrative analysis (CNA)<sup>20</sup> framework in the following chapter that facilitates investigating the connections between the macro-level ideological power and micro-level interactional positioning of Kurdish media translation.

## **2.1 Ideological Translation Choices and Manipulation in Translation Studies**

This section presents some similar terms clustered around the translator's ideological choices in translation studies in order to explore the interplay between translation choices and ideological constraints in media translation studies. The majority of scholars in translation studies acknowledge that translators' choices are affected by a great variety of external factors, often described as constraints. Bassnett (1999) indicates that, "translation always takes place in a continuum, never in a void, and there are all kinds of textual and extra-textual constraints upon the translator" (p. 123). Álvarez and Vidal (1996) observe translators as being constrained by several factors, such as feelings of superiority or inferiority towards the ST, translators' ideologies and common ideologies, dominant poetical rules, the expectations of prevailing institutions and public opinion (p. 6). For Fawcett (1995), these factors can be summarised as cultural and political pressures (p.186), which play an important manipulating role in the production of translations. This study looks at these constraints as ideological factors and observes the potential impact they might have on translators' behaviour and media translation. Based on Chesterman's categorisation of norms (1997), this study explores these factors in relation to the existence of norms at a macro-strategic level that may have impact on translators' attitude across different discourse communities within the media domain (see section 2.5.1 for details).

It is crucial to look into the historical development of the study of the concept of ideology in translation studies and the extent to which it influences the translator's behaviour, as it is one of the common issues concerning manipulation and the translator's mediation in translation studies. The practice of power relations and ideology in translation is not a new issue.

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<sup>20</sup> The expression critical narrative analysis (CNA) is used by Souto-Manning (2014) outside the field of translation studies to refer to the combination of the two approaches to data analysis as an attempt to explore the significant relation between "macro-level power in equities and micro-level interactional positions".

According to Fawcett (1998), “throughout the centuries, individuals and institutions applied their particular beliefs to the production of certain effects in translation” (p. 107). This is due to the fact that translation has historically often been practised in favour of diverse ideological agendas (Tymoczko 2000, p. 25). One of the earliest instances would be the Romans who “involved assimilation of the source text to the target culture” and their particular needs (Fawcett 1998, p. 108). Fawcett (1998) also labels Marxist-Leninist translation theory as another instance from history, for aiming at ideologically recurring translation strategies in order to take advantage of translation’s full manipulative effort (pp.109-10). With the arrival of new techniques for using mass communications for cultural control in the 1950s and 1960s, translators started to attune their translation techniques to accomplish the ideological effects they coveted “to produce in their audiences, whether those effects were religious faith, consumption of products, or literary success” (Gentzler and Tymoczko 2002, xi). Nevertheless, due to the limitation of the linguistic-oriented approaches to address this concept in translation studies, a wide range of work on ideology has been published since “the cultural turn” (some of the most significant being, Lefevere 1992a, 1992b, 1993; Venuti 1995; Álvarez and Vidal Claramonte 1996; Hatim and Mason 1990, 1997; Flotow 2000; Gentzler and Tymoczko 2002; Calzada Pérez 2001, 2003; Faiq 2004; Bermann and Wood 2005). They raise a range of challenging questions regarding the definition of this notion within translation studies, the boundary line between ideological motivations and culture, and the essence of its interference in the selections made during the process of translation (Fawcett and Munday 2011, p. 137).

The cultural-oriented approach has expanded the scope of research in translation studies to include issues of ideology, identity, power relations, and other cultural modes of investigation to understand the beliefs or values of an unfamiliar culture. New translation studies, ultimately, moved away from the traditional perception of equivalence and aimed at explaining how ideological potency can be culpable for shifts in translation. Translation scholars have shown interest in the investigation of manipulation and power relations involved in the translation of various texts. They became familiar with the manipulative potential of translated texts and used functionalist methods that gave rise to early descriptive approaches. In addition, they proposed several terminologies for the study of the phenomena of the ideological distortion in translation today. In effect, these terminological distinctions map out a basic paradigm for studying ideology in translation, fleshed out with a variety of methods and models developed over the

history of translation studies. For instance, the name “manipulation school” is employed to refer to a group of scholars who are often associated with the descriptive branch of translation approaches and mainly concerned with literary texts and culture-related aspects of translation (e.g., Hermans 1985; Holmes 1988/2000; Toury 1995; 2012; Lefevere 1992a, 1992b; Bassnett 1999). They acknowledge that translation choices are affected by a great variety of external factors. However, this next section explains that most of the postcolonial studies, which are preoccupied with ideological concerns, are conducted predominantly through thematic analysis. Few of them considered narratological observations and textual evidence from the texts under scrutiny and the identification of textual differences between source and target language texts as part of their respective research methodologies and explorations. In other words, it can be argued that their textual analysis is not detailed at the level of lexico-grammatical choices, which constitute a significant part of critical discourse analysis (CDA) that contributes to better inform micro-level discussions of the effect of ideology in translation. Calzada Pérez (2001) also suggested that the solution to this “clash” could lie in the translation studies research based on CDA. This study would therefore be considered as another contribution to such a theoretical and methodological pathway (see section 2.3 for more details).

It is important to bear in mind that Hermans’ work (2010, p. 193) on translator’s voice and positioning does employ linguistic and stylistic analysis, and it is significant in this study. He argues for a model of translated narrative that considers the way in which translator’s voice ingratiate into the discourse and adjusts to the modification which translation begets. He (1985, p. 11) also argues that, from the target perspective “all translation implies a degree of manipulation of the source text for a certain purpose”. Shuttleworth and Cowie (1997) further explain Hermans’ concept of manipulation as a kind of text handling by the translator who seeks to bring “the Target Text into line with a particular model and hence a particular correctness notion, and in so doing secure(ing) social acceptance, even acclaim” (p.101). Lefevere and Bassnett (1990) claim that translation is not innocent and they compare it to other modes of “rewriting”. According to them, “neither the word, nor the text, but the culture becomes the operational ‘unit’ of translation” (p. 8). In addition, the idea of Even-Zohar’s<sup>21</sup> literary

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<sup>21</sup> Itmar Even-Zohar defines the polysystem “as a heterogeneous, hierarchized conglomerate (or system) of systems which interact to bring about an ongoing, dynamic process of evolution within the polysystem as a

polysystem theory argues that various literatures and genres, including translated and non-translated works, compete for hegemony (Zhang 2012, p. 754). This led to the development of recognising the importance of sociocultural norms and the role of ideology at the core of the descriptive translation studies (DTS) approach by Toury (1995, 2012). DTS allows this study to look at the function that translation choices play not just as textual devices but as discursive practices that have an effect on the construction of ideological discourses. In addition, it replaces many individual case studies and probabilistic explanations with the so-called translation universals (see section 2.5 for more details). Chesterman's (1997) classification of norms leads this study to answer some key questions about the existence of norms at a macro-level that may have impact on the behaviour and attitude of the members of the discourse community, such as translators and media institutions within the public domain (see subsection 2.5.1 for details). Norms thus is believed to be significant tool to examine media translated texts and to describe the role of ideological constraints on translators' behaviour in this field.

Hatim and Mason (1997, p. 220) underline the role of translators as mediators while talking about the potential of translation to create ideological distortions of a ST discourse. Nevertheless, more recent work has preferred other terms such as intervention (Munday 2007, Halliday 2008), and manipulation (Halliday 2008). However, this study adopts the three terms of manipulation, intervention and mediation in relation to Lefevere (1990b) and Hermans' (1985, 1996) key proponent of manipulation. It uses them interchangeably to investigate the translator's ideological choices in terms of stance and voice, which uncover his/her interpersonal orientation, implications and indirectness outside the domain of literary translation studies. Hermans (1985, 2010) and Lefevere (1992a, 1992b) set out to scrutinise manipulation in translation from a slightly different perspective, aiming at the clarification of some misconceptions of translation as an inculpable practice acting as an innocuous bridge between cultures and societies. Observing from a socio-cultural perspective rather than a purely linguistic one, they highlight significant divergences between the source and the target texts,

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whole" (Shuttleworth 1998, p. 176). He developed the model in the early 1970s, based on the literary theories of Russian formalists. According to Lefevere (1992, p. 14) the Russian formalists considered "a culture, a society [...] the environment of a literary system. The literary system and the other systems are open to each other: they influence each other. [...] they interact in 'interplay among subsystems determined by the logic of the culture to which they belong.'".

and explore the possible reasons for such departures. Lefevere's model of translation as "rewriting" is also considered complementary to polysystem theory (Shuttleworth 1998, p.179). Lefevere (1992b), however, abandons the notion of the polysystem and observes translation as "rewriting". Writing from a literary-studies perspective, he focuses on the scrutiny of "issues such as power, ideology, institution and manipulation" (1992a, p. 2) and dismisses the kinds of linguistic theories of translation that "have moved from word to text as a unit, but not beyond" (1992b, p.87). Instead, he moves beyond the restraint of language and draws attention to the interplay between translation and culture at a macro-level. For him, "translation is a rewriting of an original text which reflects a certain ideology and a poetics and as such manipulates literature to function in a given society in a given way" (p. vii). He explores the way in which texts are refracted through systems of translation, and the way that systems of an existing patronage in a society control the reception and production of these texts. Lefevere (1985) defines patronage as the group of "powers (persons, institutions) which help or hinder the writing, reading and rewriting of literature [and that] can be exerted by persons [...], groups of persons [...], a social class, a royal court, publishers [...] and, last but not least, the media" (pp. 227-228). Patronage, therefore, helps to combine the study of extra-linguistic factors associated with the socio-economic and ideological forces that pervade all social interactions, including media translation. It consists of three interrelating components which are the ideological, the economic and the status component. The first element is considered as the most significant aspect in this study since it indicates that the ideological affiliations of a patron affect the choice of texts, topics and the further development of these. Lefevere (1992b, p.16) states that "the patrons count on [the] professionals to bring the literary system in line with their own ideology". The same might be true for media texts that are translated by the selected media agencies in this study. In other words, since the ideological affiliations of Kurdish media agencies may directly or indirectly reflect the existing Kurdish political parties in Kurdistan, the ideological suitability and availability of their translated texts for the target market may be cast according to their political and ideological orientation. The second aspect of Lefevere's patronage refers to the patrons' powers over the existence of the translator as a rewriter. Since media translators are usually dependent on payment by the media agencies (the patron), they may adapt to the parameters specified by the patrons. However, this adaptation might also refer to the belief and ideology of the translator. The third aspect is the status element that describes the patrons' power

over the eminence of the translators and the extent to which their translated texts will engage in a culture's literary system and polysystem. A work, for instance, that agrees and complies with the patrons' specified guidelines and/or ideology may have a greater chance of publication and success rather than the translator's name.

The media agencies in Iraqi Kurdistan arguably fall under the umbrella of "undifferentiated patronages" for each has all the three components in the hands of one omnipotent patron. Lefevere (1992b, pp. 15-19) argues that undifferentiated patronages do not necessarily have to be based on ideology today as was common in the past for recently the economic component constitutes a prevailing factor in processes of literary rewriting. Nevertheless, this study argues that ideology plays a significant and dominant role in today's Kurdish media translation next to the economic component. Lefevere's rewriting process, thus, provides awareness of agents' possible manipulations at a macro-level and it is not a prescriptive approach since "[t]hose engaged in that study will have to ask themselves who rewrites, why, and under what circumstances, for which audience" (Lefevere 1992b, p.7). It, therefore, needs to be considered in the course of this study at a macro-level analysis. The notion of rewriting enables an analysis of journalistic texts as a tool in the hands of powerful individuals or institutions which can have both positive and negative impacts on Kurdish culture and language. Translators are under a variety of restrictions that lead them to manipulate their work in favour of the prevailing poetics and ideologies in order to satisfy their patrons and thus to succeed in their profession. Lefevere (1992b, p. 7) also argues that the influence of ideologies can also be a motivating force rather than constraining form. After all, translation as rewriting inevitably occupies a dominant position among issues such as power and manipulation and for Lefevere and Bassnett (1990) it "is manipulation, undertaken in the service of power" (vii). In this sense, rewritten media texts can be turned into an instrument of power by media agencies (patrons).

In this study, therefore, "stance" can be defined in the sense of Hunston and Thompson's concept of "evaluation" which refers to the translator's attitudes "towards viewpoints on, or feeling about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about" (2000, p. 5) while reframing STs in TTs. This study investigates translators' stance in relation to translator's decisions of adding, deleting, or substituting lexico-grammatical choices in Kurdish media translation. Voice can be defined in terms of the translator's way of reframing the STs into TTs.

According to Hermans (1996, p. 27), the translator has a voice or discursive presence. He approaches it from a literary narratological perspective, arguing that the translator's voice is always present in his/her linguistic choices (such as word order, idiom, and repetitions) and affects the style. In this study, however, translators' voice will be explored through the cases of lexical borrowing (see section 2.3). From this perspective, thus, the passive role of translators as mere transmitters of information is abandoned in favour of them being considered as active agents participating in the shaping of the ideological discourse of their culture, whose system of values they may accept, contributing to their dissemination or subversion. To do so, this study needs to investigate the translator's stance and voice considering Baker's (2006, 2007/ 2010<sup>22</sup>) dichotomy of dominance vs. resistance towards reframing STs in TTs. This helps in the exploration of the translators' ideological positioning in relation to the political and historical identity that is projected in STs (see section 2.4 and chapter 3 for more details).

## **2.2. Ideology, Media and Translation Studies**

The previous section has revealed the interplay between translation choices and ideological constraints and defined the behaviour of translators in relation to stance and voice in media translation studies. This section describes the relationships between media texts, power relations, and ideology in translation studies (TS) in order to further outline the way the studies of ideology and power relations are pertinent to Kurdish media translation.

The field of media studies has recently developed considerably. The study of print media, including the language of the press, was highly significant in laying the groundwork for critical analysis. Among others, Montgomery (2001, 2007) draws attention to the specific lexical, syntactic and stylistic features of the language of the press. Comparative studies opened up questions in many other areas, such as language quality, language reporting, journalistic ethics, and ideology and/or politics. The study of ideology and power relations has also been

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<sup>22</sup> First published in: Baker, M. 2007. Reframing Conflict in Translation. *Social Semiotics* 17(2), pp. 151–169. Later republished in: Baker, M. 2010. Reframing Conflict in Translation. In: Baker, M. eds. *Critical Readings in Translation Studies*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 113-129.



reflected in the language features and textual structures of media texts (e.g. van Dijk 1985, 1988a, 1991; Fairclough 1995a, 1995b, 2001). In addition, this consideration has most lately been extended to the “new media”, particularly the internet (see van Dijk 2006, p.76, Trimarco 2015, pp.56-75; Sheyholislami 2011; Tannen, and Marie Trester 2013). Nevertheless, a number of researchers have highlighted that translation is typically unobserved in media texts, while the study of reporting politicians’ words in translation is common (e.g. Bassnett 2004, 2005, Schäffner 2005, Holland 2006, Kang 2007, Bielsa 2007, Bielsa and Bassnett 2009, Bielsa and Hughes 2009). There is thus work to be done in examining the role of translation, especially online translation, which has not been fully researched in these studies and indeed has gone almost unnoticed (Schäffner and Bassnett 2010, p.3). Building on these studies, therefore, this study highlights the way translation functions in the context of Kurdish media, arguing that media translation reflects the manipulative existing socio-political ideology in Iraqi Kurdistan.

It can be argued that media and translation share similar characteristics for they are both contrivances and devices of communication. They affect the way societies communicate and thus how culture is moulded in a variety of ways. Media, both as news and entertainment forms, have long been perceived as sites for the dissemination of ideology. According to Gitlin (1980):

Every day, directly or indirectly, by statement and omission, in picture and words, in entertainment and news and advertisement, the mass media produce fields of definition and association, symbol and rhetoric, through which ideology becomes manifest and concrete. (1980, p. 2)

When media forms are the product of powerful agents or institutions, they may reflect the ideas that support their interests as well. The same might hold true when it comes to the translations they provide. Schäffner and Bassnett (2010, p.2) argue that “there is a direct, though usually invisible link between politics, media and translation”. As explained in chapter one, media outlets in Iraqi Kurdistan are typical forms of politically aligned institutions. Thus, it can be argued that the translations they deliver might also support particular forms of socio-cultural and political stereotypes. However, while media reflects society and culture through different mediums such as words, images, audio-visuals and internet, translation does so only by words. The concept of media translation in this study thus is clustered only around media translated

texts and the study corpus of this study includes the available Kurdish online translations of the electronic English journalistic texts. In addition, the topics of the translated texts under scrutiny in this study are derived from and developed within Middle East culture, in general, and Kurdistan, in particular. Therefore, since the focus of this study is geopolitics and translation in media, the study will narrow down the discussion to one specific communicative context and text type, which is geopolitics and translated geopolitical texts (or geopolitical discourse). Following Dalby's definition (1998), geopolitics is understood as a form of politics concerned with international global perspectives and therefore geopolitical texts are often writings that are underlined by ideological positioning (see the subsection 1.1.3 of chapter one). In this study, thus, media translated texts can be interpreted as institutionalised communicational ways of obtaining, establishing and preserving power and/or expressing ideology. With the development of technology, media texts have taken a significant position in today's worldwide mass-media communication. Briggs and Cobley (2002) state that:

These texts are important as a result of their ubiquity and because there is widespread belief that they contribute to the production of our 'common-sense' understandings of the world. As such, media texts are thought to affect, in a very real sense, the way in which we understand ourselves/others and the way we lead our lives. (2002, p. 307)

Amongst different genres, media geopolitical commentary-texts may seem more challenging for translation. Outwardly, they may look as similar to the other text types but the ideas behind the lexico-grammatical choice and message of these texts are enigmatic and subtle. Ideologies, attitudes, and feelings are communicated through the written or spoken language and by scrutinising it we can interpret the writer's thoughts and attitude about or towards an event or phenomenon.

Thornborrow (2004, p. 52) further explains that "the most important and interesting aspects of the potential power of the media from a linguistic point of view are the way that people and events get reported." This reporting comes into view either through a written or a spoken language. Languages have relatedness beyond linguistics which uncover the mechanisms through which one makes sense of the world (Turner 2003, p.12). In other words,

the complex nature of the language of media texts is bound up with socio-cultural relations in terms of the actions, opinions and values of dominant groups in society. Lefevere's (1992b) notion of patronage and Chesterman's (1997) concept of norms help in exploring the way this study demonstrates the relationships between media language and the attitude and values of dominant groups in Kurdish society. Aspects of political and institutional ideology, which emerge from looking at translated media texts, contribute significantly to the way translation shapes media discourses. In this sense, media language tends to act ideologically, not so much due to prejudice, but simply because of the nature of established routine practices. However, it can also be used not only to "*steer* people's thoughts and beliefs but also to *control* their thoughts and beliefs" (Jones and Wareing 2004, p. 35)<sup>23</sup>, with the language of propaganda as a prominent example.

Speaking of journalistic techniques in this respect, van Dijk (1991) contends that the journalistic text is like "an iceberg of information," of which only the "tip" is really expressed in words and sentences. According to him, the analysis of the implicitness is very helpful in the study of underlying ideologies since ideologies and intentions are not always stated clearly and explicitly (p.181). Understanding the textual features of media texts, including translated texts, thus, inevitably involve the creators and readers of the texts as well as the socio-cultural and political relationships holding between the participants involved. This understanding also involves possible statuses between parties concerned that, in turn, beget varied power relations. Power, here, is interpreted as the social power of groups or institutions over the participant's use of language. Media language, thus, is a very significant tool for obtaining and preserving such power in communicative contexts. In this sense, politics can be expounded in relation to power. Chilton (2004) talks about two general aspects of politics as follows:

On the one hand, politics is viewed as a struggle for power, between those who seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it. [...]  
On the other hand, politics is viewed as cooperation, as the practices and

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<sup>23</sup> Italicisation is the original emphasis.

institutions that a society has for resolving clashes of interest over money, influence, liberty, and the like. (2004, p.3)

In any case, since Kurdish media texts are the product of powerful and dominant institutions that are directly or indirectly affiliated to the existing political parties in Kurdistan (see chapters 1 and 4 for details), the analysis of their language can provide insights into how a particular media is used to represent particular social and political groups, and provide ways to resist or incorporate those groups and/or events. In this sense, if the power of the media language can “influence knowledge, beliefs, values, social identities” (Fairclough 1995b, p. 2), it is also feasible to argue that the ability to construct meaning in media translation can be attributed to the mechanisms of language within society and culture. This study therefore aims to explore ideological mediation in translation by investigating the language used in the geopolitical journalistic articles translated into Kurdish from English. This, in turn, might indicate that media translation in Iraqi Kurdistan reflects and helps in shaping the manipulative existing ideology in society.

### **2.3 Ideology and CDA in Media Translation Studies**

This section builds on the analysis of the interactions between power, ideology, media texts and their translation presented above which described the role ideology and power might play in Kurdish media translation. This next section addresses the way critical discourse analysis (CDA) might contribute, as a useful toolkit, to the definition and analysis of the concept of ideology in media and translation studies (TS), whilst also demonstrating the methodological benefits of employing CDA to investigate geopolitical ideology and manipulation in media translation.

As a concept, ideology has come under criticism in terms of its broader scope and definition during the last two centuries. This notion was first conceived by Antoine Destutt De Tracy in 1796, the French rationalist philosopher, who proposed it to imply a systematic study of knowledge, beliefs, and ideas (Williams 2011, p. 126). Despite its original positive-progressive sense, the meaning of this notion shifted dramatically towards a pejorative meaning (Leonardi 2007, p. 35). During the reign of the French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, the term

became synonymous with “false understanding” or “mystification”, when he used this notion to attack the “proponents of democracy” as those “who mislead the people by elevating them to a sovereignty which they were incapable of exercising” (Williams 2011, p. 126). Hence, notwithstanding its positive nature, ideology may have a negative or positive connotation depending on political and sociocultural contexts and the individual’s own positioning in the debate. Irvine (1989, p. 225) redefines ideology as “the cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests”. This denotes that ideology can be defined and investigated through the language used within society and culture. It has been argued that cultural variations within the same language or between languages have been known to reflect deep divisions within society (Scollon and Scollon 1995) and that is recognised as an ideology today.

van Dijk (1998a) expands the notion of ideology further than a mere political sense to comprise the knowledge, beliefs and value systems of the individual and society in which s/he operates. Following a critical discourse analysis approach (CDA), he proposes a multidisciplinary approach to the concept of ideology that encompasses three main elements: cognition, society and discourse. He describes cognition as a system of ideas created by the symbolic field of thought and belief; society as group interests; power and dominance which might be used to support or oppose power; and discourse as language use which expresses ideologies in society, often involving concealment and manipulation (van Dijk 1998a, p. 5). His approach to the concept of ideology is relative to the definition of ideology in this study. This study argues that socio-political ideology plays a significant role in media translation. The multidisciplinary of van Dijk’s approach will help in demonstrating a significant analytical framework for the translation of media texts that takes into account such ideology as well as the linguistic and cultural dimension of translational norms (see subsection 2.5.1 on norms models for an in-depth description of the contribution of van Dijk’s approach to the study of norms).

Critical discourse analysis develops from a critical theory of language that considers the context of language use to be significant. It is, in effect, a discourse that does not consider language use free from ideological perceptions. According to van Dijk (1993a), CDA is “a study of the relations between discourse, power, dominance, social inequality and the position of the

discourse analyst in such social relationships". He considers the notion of "ideology, power, hierarchy and gender together with sociological variables" relevant and necessary for providing an understanding or explanation of a text (van Dijk, 1993, p. 283). In general, CDA is not a single method but is rather an approach. It involves different perceptions and methods for analysing the relationship between language use and social context (Wang, 2006, p. 60). One of CDA's toolkits for textual analysis used to measure translator's ideological behaviour in this study is lexicalisation (or lexico-grammatical choices). As van Dijk (1998b) proposes, "opinions may be conventionalised and codified in lexicon" (p. 205), and lexico-grammatical choices can thus be "the major dimension of [ideologically controlled] discourse meaning" (1995, p. 259). They might be used to deliver specific negative or positive meanings and inferences about in-group or out-group participants that may have an ideological basis (Martínez-Roldán and Malavé, 2004, p. 165).

As an approach, CDA has been broadly practical in the study of ideological positioning in monolingual discourse (see van Dijk 1998a, 1998b, Wodack 1989; Fairclough 1995a, 1995b; Wodak and Meyer 2001) and bilingual comparison (see Puurtinen 2000). Several studies of media discourse employing the approach of CDA have revealed that diverse ideological manipulations can be determined in texts on similar topics and events by different news outlets (see Fairclough 1992, 1995b; van Dijk 1995; Fang 2001). Fairclough (1995b) further explains that media output is "shaped by ideology and media texts may be said to function ideologically. They, therefore, contribute to reproducing social relations of domination and exploitation" (pp.2-44). The same holds true for translated geopolitical journalistic texts where authenticity to the source text is promoted and anticipated, but might not be pursued in translation practice. Nevertheless, whereas CDA has been largely used in the study of ideological manipulation in the media and/or monolingual or bilingual discourse comparison, few CDA studies have investigated ideological mediation in media translation. Moreover, even fewer have been devoted to the ways in which linguistic resources (lexico-grammatical choices) are employed to support ideological manipulation in the translation of geopolitical commentary articles. Many translation studies, which have chosen a linguistic typology based on text linguistics, on CDA, or on systematic functional grammar (SFL), are of great significance for the study of translated political discourse, since they denote the first attempts at unfolding translation shifts in political discourses. For instance, textual indicators studied in translated political discourses include

cohesion (Hatim and Mason 1997), transitivity (Calzada Pérez 2001), or lexical choices (Schäffner 2003). Lande (2010) further elucidates that “CDA within TS has been mainly used to analyse political discourse due to the fact that the main aim of CDA is to uncover ideological and power structures in discourse” ( pp. 26-27). This might be due to the fact that research on CDA within the interdisciplinary field of TS is novel and there have been deliberations whether CDA should be applied to TS or not (Schäffner, 2002, p. 53). This is explored in detail in the following subsection 2.3.1

### **2.3.1 Ideology and Text-centred Approaches in Translation Studies**

This next sub-section will provide a more thorough picture of the interrelation between ideology, culture, society and the textual features that emerge in the texts. It looks into the text-centred approaches that have been used in translation studies, arguing that few studies are devoted to researching the way CDA is employed to deal with lexico-grammatical resources that support ideological manipulation in media translated texts

The integration of text-centred and translation studies approaches has been instigated since the development of functionalist theories of translation (Munday 2001, p. 73). Concepts of context, functions, culture, textuality, style, genre, and discourse that are studied in pragmatics, discourse analysis, cultural studies, and communication studies have developed to influence translation studies. Covering text analysis of the ST, they are oriented to the analysis of text type, language function, the effect of translation and the participants of the translation event. Discourse Analysis has been developed under various labels, such as Critical Linguistics, Discourse Analysis, Register Analysis, Text Analysis, Critical Discourse Studies, and so forth. The first approach to translation studies employed Halliday’s register analysis model (1973; 1978; 2007b), which links language with the situation in which it is used. It was mainly used to analyse the pragmatic functions of linguistic elements in both ST and TT. Halliday’s systematic functional linguistic (SFL) considers language use as a communicative event and describes the three strands of functional meaning as ideational, interpersonal and textual meaning. They work to explain the socio-linguistic occurrence in both the SL and TL and describe how language-in-use operates in the SL and how the translator finds its counterpart in the TL. Ideational meanings are the outcome of language being utilised to represent experience. Interpersonal meanings are

the result of language which is used for human interaction. Power is one of the key types of relationship in the analysis of interpersonal meaning. The patterns of choices made by translators from the array of lexico-grammatical resources of language can establish the interpersonal meaning. Nevertheless, while the SFL model has moulded the basis of some eminent work on text and discourse analysis in translation theory since the 1990s, few of them are oriented to the way in which translation strategies regarding lexico-grammatical choices function to support ideological manipulation, especially in translated media texts.

The most prominent theoretical frameworks in translation studies were proposed by House (1997), Hatim and Mason (1990, 1997), Schäffner (2002, 2003, 2004), Bell (1991), Baker (1992, 2011), Teich (2003), Steiner and Yallop (2001), Mason (2004), Munday (2007, 2008, 2012a), and Calzada Perez (2007). House's model of analysis (1981, 1997) is based on the case study of children's books and the translational strategies used are particularly influential in identifying 'mismatches' (shifts) for translation quality assessment, which is beyond the scope of this study. Baker's work (1992, 2011a) adapts the SFL approach and goes beyond linguistic equivalence and textual features altogether to investigate how language is used to generate meaning at pragmatic level in the real world and how it is manipulated by participants in a communicative situation (1992, p. 217). For Baker (1992), there are three concepts in pragmatics that are particularly relevant to translation and cross-cultural understanding; implicature, presupposition, coherence. She refers to implicature as "what the speaker means or implies rather than what s/he actually says", presupposition as "pragmatic inference", and finally coherence above text level "depends on the hearer's or reader's expectations and experience of the world" (1992: 219-223).

Hatim and Mason's work (1997) explores the role of translation as a form of "mediation" and indicates the potency of translation strategies to produce ideological shifts from the ST discourse. They scrutinise the occurrence of ideological distortions in translation according to lexical choice, cohesion and transitivity. For them (1997, p. 120), ideology covers "the tacit assumptions, beliefs, and value systems which are shared collectively by social groups". They make a distinction between "the ideology of translation" and "the translation of ideology". While the former denotes the basic orientation selected by the translator working within a social and cultural context, the later refers to the extent of mediation provided by a translator of



penetrating texts. Mediation is defined as “the extent to which translators intervene in the transfer process, feeding their own knowledge and beliefs into processing the text” (Hatim and Mason 1997, p.147). This indicates that, regardless of ‘the situations of cultural hegemony’, mediation can be detected, to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the translator’s worldview, i.e., the translator’s ideological orientation and background knowledge (linguistic, social and cultural). In this view, translation is ideological since it reflects the goals of a social group. As an initial study on ideological mediation and shifts in translation, Hatim and Mason’s work, therefore, provides “one of the most explicit statements about ideology from a critical linguistic and discourse analysis perspective” (Munday 2007, p. 199) in translation studies. However, in the investigation of translational strategies employed to examine shifts and their implications at the level of lexical choices, it only focused on shifts in modality in translation without taking into account other possible language features. In other words, the focus was largely on the formal definition of discourse and little attention was paid to the wider effects of discourse that extend beyond the linguistic boundaries to consider the social, political and economic implications of discourse in translation. This study addresses this gap by connecting linguistic shifts, including various lexico-grammatical features, to patronage and ideology. Schäffner (2004:136) argues that texts and discourses are the product of human communicative activity in sociocultural settings which is common in both CDA and translation studies. In addition, Tymoczko (2003, p183) argues that the translator’s choices are also affected by “the translator’s cultural and ideological affiliations”. In this sense, the translator is not only a kind of mediator who converts one language into another, but rather a producer of a new discourse in the TL. Translations, thus, can be observed as target texts in a new socio-cultural environment, which are based on a source text which functioned in its original socio-cultural milieu (Schäffner 2004:138).

Applying critical discourse analysis (CDA) to translation, Schäffner (1997b, 2002; 2003; 2004) has carried out significant research focusing on the cultural, social and political aspects of translation and text production in the source and target cultures. In her observations, she (2004, p. 119) relates linguistic behaviour to politics. She argues that political texts commonly reveal the culture-specific backdrop of the texts’ actions and their translations update a target audience with a communicative act that had already been achieved in the ST community (pp. 127). In this way, the ST can be aimed at a single or manifold TT community. Therefore,

it can be argued that her research relates mainly to the translation strategies that are used to render a culture-bound source text into another target language community with a restricted knowledge of the foreign culture. In addition, her definition of politics is completely general to the extent that what is considered political depends on the participants in a communicative context. A more rigorous definition, however, describes political texts in relation to either political ideas, groups, beliefs and practices of society or part of it or texts that are central in establishing a political community or group. Munday (2012a) also approached the translation of political speeches by the application of the model of discourse analysis. His study focuses on the translation process (rather than the product) and seeks to identify the translator's decision-making as mediation through the realisation of interpersonal meaning that is most likely to express judgment or evaluation. As an approach, it therefore provides an illuminating image for the analysis of new modes of communication affecting the phenomenon of translation, and aids translator and interpreter training and descriptive translation analysis. Likewise, the analysis of the geopolitical texts in the Kurdish context provides a new angle on the application of CDA to translation studies.

Outlining the way translation scholars adapted CDA and/or SFL in their research, the majority of the studies cited Halliday's SFL (Halliday 1978; 1985/1999; 1994) as the foundation and reference for the linguistic aspects of their examination for the purpose of analysing cross-cultural meaning transfer. Nevertheless, they do not explicitly refer to certain aspects specific to translated texts, such as omission and addition, explicitations and implicitation, or the translator's resistance and dominance. The majority of translation scholars working on translated political discourse have hitherto adapted linguistic typologies to their work in translation studies. These typologies were not mainly developed to explore translational phenomena. Moreover, targeting only the linguistic indicators that traditionally used to identify ideologies in texts might beget over interpreting the ideological applicability of these textual indicators (Gagnon 2006, p. 206).

It is important to bear in mind that building on Narrative Theory and relying on several other theories including SFL, Baker (2006) provides an integrative, well-developed framework for the study of political discourse in translation studies. Such a framework can serve as a potential model for the description of the features of the translated geopolitical texts display at

macro-level in this study. Despite its multidisciplinary nature, Baker's approach (2006), however, is limited to narratives (narratological strategies) only and does not draw very extensively on text linguistic findings. Baker's approach is, therefore, productive for exploring how translators, through text production, benefit or withstand the formation and promotion of politically charged narratives. Given the nature of this section, the relevant aspects of Baker's Narrative Theory and its contribution to shifting analysis in this study is explored in more detail in section 2.4 and chapter three as part of the theoretical outline applicable to the study of Kurdish media translation.

As a model, CDA is thus relevant to fields of social research because it conceives language as communication, as a process of meaning-making which evolves from the text producer's lexico-grammatical choices, then relating those choices to a broader political and socio-cultural framework. In translation studies, CDA can, therefore, function as a complementary framework to the existing methodological approaches in order to provide a comprehensive reflection on language and culture (Valdeón, 2007, p. 100). From the functionalist perspective, Fairclough's CDA largely embodies the idea which rejects dissociating the act of translating from its context. It focuses on real-world situational features which are key contributing factors of meaning and interpretation of meaning. In media translation, the question of how to relate the world outside the text to the text is multifaceted. However, it relates quite closely to the concept of the use of language "as a form of social practice" (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p. 285) in CDA which is, in turn, congruent with the analysis required for the translators' lexico-grammatical choices in the texts in this study. Considering translation as a mode of intercultural communication, Trosborg (1997) argues that translation should be comprehended in a wider anthropological sense of all socially-acclimatised dimensions of human life. By providing Vermeer's (1986) three salient aspects, Trosborg (1997) further highlights the socio-cognitive aspect of the concept of culture on which translation studies and CDA can be closely established (p. 146):

- (a) The concept of culture as a totality of knowledge, proficiency and perception;
- (b) its immediate connection with behaviour (or action) and events;
- (c) its dependence on norms, whether those of social behaviour or those accepted in language usage (Vermeer 1986:33).

The first aspect is significant to the observation of “culture” for it encircles the cognitive orientation, which, in turn, places the concept of culture into a broad range of social representations. The composition of socio-cultural representations, however, reflects the knowledge that functions as a bridge having connections with the other theoretical aspects of social semiotics, such as discourse and translation events. This indicates that the notion of culture engages with the knowledge-mediated context of discourse processes. The second salient aspect maintains a relationship between a particular discursive event and its socio-political associations in Fairclough’s (2006) socio-functional theoretical framework of CDA. Establishing this relationship requires the idea of socio-political associations to be presented as a mental concept applied in communicative contexts, developing from van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach (1998a). Meanwhile, the act of translating “naturally involves the transporting [...] of languages and their associated cultures [...] recuperated by specific target reading constituencies” (Faiq 2007:1). The third aspect, however, proposes that culture is usually designed under the name of norms. Like many concepts in translation studies, norms are generally perceived to be located in the social consciousness that expound “social regularity” (Hermans 1999b, p. 80) or the “social reality of correct notions” (Bartsch 1987, p. 76; Chesterman 1997, p. 54). In this study, the notion of norms is socio-culturally and politically embedded and can be seen as part of the ‘tool kit’ (Toury 1999: 16) to describe and discuss the socio-cultural practice, such as, habits, skills, and styles from which translators form strategies of action on a regular basis. Such regularities are evidence of norms and not to be confused with the norms themselves (Chesterman 1999, p 91). In this sense, media “texts may thus be seen as carriers of ideological meaning, a factor which makes them particularly vulnerable to changing sociocultural norms” when they are translated (Hatim and Mason 1997, p.127). In other words, since media translation is interdisciplinary in nature, its process is a multi-level process.

In this sense, CDA can function as an effective tool to explore the way the translated journalistic texts under scrutiny in this study might be informed by the ideology of the Kurdish media outlets and their aligned political parties. The study argues that translators’ lexicogrammatical choices function under a range of constraints that might, in turn, lead the translators to work as mediators and manipulate their work in favour of the prevailing aesthetics (e.g. mannerism) and ideologies in order to gratify the media agencies they work for. In this way, geopolitical translation in the Kurdish context can be integrated into the “orders of discourse”

specified in van Dijk and Fairclough's CDA model as the totality of texts interacting with each other for communicative and ideological purposes. Given the nature of this section, the extensive discussion of CDA and its contribution to the study of norms will appear in section 2.5.1 of this chapter and the following chapter (chapter 3) as part of the analytical framework given its immediate applicability to the study of Kurdish media translation.

## **2.4 Shifts as the Manifestation of Ideological Manipulation and Mediation**

The previous section has explored the significant contribution that critical discourse analysis (CDA) can make, as a useful toolkit, in the definition and analysis of ideology in media translation. This section looks through the models of shift analysis relevant to the course of this study in order to distinguish the types and effects of shifts resulting from the translators' choices of functional translational strategies in the corpus of this study. This study argues that ideology in Kurdish media translation might result in manipulative shifts by exploiting lexicogrammatical choices in the translated texts. It therefore focuses on the way models of shift analysis might manifest such mediations along with their implications.

Several studies have shown that ideology has been approached as manipulation and a rewriting of the source text and culture in the translation process from the perspective of language use and power relations in translation studies since the cultural turn (e.g. Hermans 1985; Lefevere 1992; Baker 1992, 2006, 2007; Hatim and Mason 1997; Schäffner 2004)<sup>24</sup>. The status of this notion, however, is explained as an inexorably partial representation of the source text in translation by Gentzler and Tymoczko (2002), who further state that:

This partiality is not to be considered a defect, a lack, or an absence in a translation; it is a necessary condition of the act. It is also an aspect that makes the act of translation partisan: engaged and committed, either implicitly or explicitly. Indeed partiality is what differentiates translations, enabling them to

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<sup>24</sup> Detailed description about these studies is given in sections 2.1 and 2.3 of this chapter

participate in the dialectic of power, the ongoing process of political discourse, and strategies for social change. (2002, p. xviii)

In addition, Schäffner (2003) argues that there is a multifarious relationship between ideology and translation and that all translations are ideological since “the choice of a source text and the use to which the subsequent target text is put are determined by the interests, aims, and objectives of social agents” (p. 23). Moreover, the text itself is a carrier of ideological meaning both at lexical and grammatical level (Schäffner 2003, p. 23; Hatim and Mason 1997, p.127; Hodge and Kress 1993). In that sense, this study argues that ideology operates at both a macro-level, which refers to socio-cultural manipulation and power relations and a micro-level as it is reflected in the lexico-grammatical choices and that results in partial representation of the STs in the TTs. Such partial representation originates in the shifts made by translators and it might be the way in which ideologies enter translation and change the macro-level function of the text. Studying the nature and distribution of these shifts in translations, however, requires some parameters for a comparative analysis, which is associated with the dynamics of society and culture rather than static contrastive descriptions of languages and cultures.

As a concept, shifts in translation can be explained as the changes which happen to the ST form and meaning when translated into the target language and “all that appears as new with respect to the original, or fails to appear where it might have been expected” (Popovič 1970, p. 79). Hatim and Munday (2004) defined translational shifts as “the small linguistic changes that occur between ST and TT” (p. 26). Nevertheless, linguistic changes arise in both language system and behaviour of the ST when translated into the TT. The concept of translational shifts in this study, however, refers to the field of linguistic behaviour rather than that of the language system. This is due to the fact that translation deals with the type of language-in-use in the respective languages. Therefore, the systematic differences between the source and target languages and cultures, “which pertain to the level of competence, are part of the opening conditions for translation shifts. Shifts, on the other hand, result from attempts to deal with systemic differences” (Bakker et al. 1998/2001, p. 226). In other words, in this study translational shifts are associated with conveying “certain values of expression or content across a semiotic border” (Bakker et al. 1998/2001, p. 226).

The investigation of translation shift typology has a long-standing practice in translation studies. However, with the availability of parallel corpora which contain source texts alongside their translations, it has received more attention in the mid-twentieth century (e.g. Vinay and Darbelnet 1958/ 2004; Catford 1965; van Leuven-Zwart 1989, 1990; Toury 1995; Baker 2006, 2007). van Leuven-Zwart's approach (1989, 1990a) is generally considered to be part of the traditional linguistic-oriented approaches. However, it directs translation towards a more neutral and descriptive view by relating a comparison of ST and TT to the description of the impacts of minor micro-structural shifts at the macro- narrative levels of story and text. Consistent with this approach, the concept of shifts was no longer viewed as "mistranslations" or "deviations of the norm" (van Leuven-Zwart 1990b: 228). Translational shifts are considered inevitable, but not undesirable as the other approaches noted, and their existences reflect the systematic differences between any two languages and/ or cultures. The need to overcome these differences is considered to be the admissible reasons behind such occurrences, assuming that minor shifts at the lexico-grammatical level might, in certain passages or throughout the course of the whole translation, change the macro-level framework of the text. Leuven-Zwart, however, distinguishes between two types of shifts that can be used as significant tools in the course of analysis of this study<sup>25</sup>. They are lexical shifts and stylistic shifts. Nevertheless, she claims that while the former denotes the degree to which the translator's choices make the meaning of the target text correspond to that of the source text, the latter "are considered stylistic variables [...] that [...] do not affect the semantic or descriptive meaning" (van Leuven-Zwart 1989, p. 162). Based on anecdotal data analysis, this study, however, defines stylistic shifts in relation to ideology and argues that the majority of stylistic shifts in the context of Kurdish might not be neutral. This indicates that the process of rendition is considered to be carried out along with the political and socio-cultural norms and principles of translation other than those inherent to the language systems involved in this process.

According to Toury (1980, p. 12), before classifying translational shifts, two interdependent concepts need to be distinguished which are invariant and shift. The former

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<sup>25</sup> As a model of shift analysis, however, it is criticised for its complex classification of thirty-seven different types of shift many of which are overlapping, and many rigorous mappings of shifts to apply without any real attention to the narrative context and function (Munday 1998, p. 3; Munday 2008, p. 233).

refers to the features that remain unchanged in the process of translation, while the latter denotes the changes that arise with the transfer of certain values of expressions or contents in the same process. In this study, the descriptive classification of shifts as linguistic performance (language use) requires the establishment of the degree of correspondence of invariances as functional-relational variables. Toury (1995) disregards the traditional prescriptive concept of equivalence and replaces it with a “functional-relational, historical, variable” notion. According to Toury (2012), “[f]eatures are retained, and recast in TL material, not because they are ‘important’ in any inherent sense, but because they have been *assigned* importance: namely, from the recipient vantage point” (p. 6). In this study, therefore, the notion of equivalence can be used as part of a toolkit in order to explain such relativity as the translator’s attempts to overcome the linguistic or cultural differences, while shifts refers to their ideological manipulation that resulted from socio-political factors. Understanding and identifying these ideological factors and their normative effects on translator’s behaviour, however, requires a systematic study of the nature, causes and effects of shifts that have occurred during the act of translation. In other words, this study investigates those shifts that reflect personal, institutional and collective manipulation (see the subsection below).

#### **2.4.1 Narrative Strategies as the manifestations of Ideological Shifts**

Translational shifts take various forms. They might be manifested as the strategies of borrowing, omission, addition, and substitution. They indicate replacements at the lexicogrammatical level and change the macro-level framework of the text over the course of an entire translation. Toury’s distinction between obligatory and non-obligatory shifts (1980, 1995) is particularly useful for this study as it enables a first mode of discrimination between linguistically and ideologically motivated translation choices. He describes the former as linguistically motivated shifts<sup>26</sup> while the latter is due to literary or cultural considerations.

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<sup>26</sup> In this sense, this type of shift refers to functional-relational, historical variables and indicates that both the ST and the TT carry similar values via different linguistic features due to the cultural variation of the two languages.



According to Bakker et al (1998/2001: 228), optional shifts are introduced by the translators themselves due to ideological, cultural or stylistic considerations (and manipulations).

Chesterman (1997, p. 88) further explains that translation strategies are “ways in which translators seek to conform to norms [...] not to achieve equivalence, but simply to arrive at the best version they can think of” (see sub-section 2.5 for more details). The term ‘strategy’ is, however, borrowed from the other disciplines. It causes terminological confusion in the field of translation studies not only because its usage varies and depends on several approaches, but also because it competes with other terms, such as procedures, techniques, shifts, methods, tactics, rules, plans and so forth (Chesterman 1997, p. 87; Gambier 2010, p. 412). According to Vinay and Darbelnet (1958/1995) and Doorslaer (2007), the term ‘strategy’ refers to the general tendency of a translated text towards either free or literal translation. However, what is termed as ‘procedure’ by Vinay and Darblenet (1958/1995), Newmark (1988/2003) and Doorslaer (2007) is referred to as ‘strategy’ by Chesterman (1997). Chesterman (1997, p. 92) employs the term “strategy” to refer to a mechanism used at a certain point in a translated text, such as borrowing, addition, deletion, literal translation and so forth. In addition, although he draws two important distinctions between global and local strategies, and between comprehension and production strategies, nevertheless the analyses are not set out in detail (Gambier 2010, p. 414).

In this study, strategies are used in the sense of shifts which occur in the TT. They can be defined as the ways in which translators deal with types of text and/or types of difficulties (or problems) which may include metaphors, collocations, proverbs, puns, homers, proper names, culture-specific references, dialects, forms of politeness and so forth. According to Nord (1991), although there is a difference between difficulties and problems, this difference is not well-defined. Assuming that even in the absence of problems and/or difficulties there is a strategic decision, this study focuses on those types of decision that engender shifts with regard to the use of choices available and/or finding sufficient lexical resources in order to translate from the source text. Therefore, the difficulties and/or problems can be defined as a dynamic and relative notion (Toury 2002) since an element or aspect of the ST is not necessarily a problem for the potential readers, but might be in the production of the TT (Lörscher 1991). According to Chesterman (1997), these difficulties or problems can be observed by comparing the translated texts to the source texts and this requires the term ‘strategy’ to make the

explanations more concrete and applicable (p. 77). In order to clarify the terminological use, this study outlines the points that seem most relevant to the way the term strategy is used in this research, before shifting to a more practical level. The adoption is based on the initial data analysis which indicates that not all the translational strategies are applicable for the selected corpus of English-Kurdish media translation. Accordingly, this term is used in this study to refer to both global and local strategies.

Global strategies relate to macro-levels which encompass cultural and sociological constraints that affect the local strategies operated at micro-levels (textual and cognitive level). According to Gambier (2010), global strategies are used to “reconstruct and legitimize a certain type of text and a certain type of identity and power relationship between languages/cultures” (p. 416). In this sense, it can be argued that they are directed by the norms of the target culture. In this study, since the translator’s choices need to be investigated in terms of cultural, political, ideological and linguistic manipulations at this level, these strategies need to be described in relation to Chesterman’s concept of norms (see the following section 2.5.1 for more details). Baker’s model (2006, 2007) of Narrative Theory, on the other hand, addresses a wide range of issues relevant to translators’ behaviour in relation to the effect of the social and political realities in media translation in synchronic and diachronic terms. She describes a model of analysis of framing various and competing narratives through the use and discursive impact of various framing strategies in the process of translation. As a model, it allows this study to move beyond the focus on the supposedly cultural differences to identify the position of individuals and groups within the specific cultures and range of narratives they subscribe to<sup>27</sup>. Baker’s model scrutinises (re)framings that react to the larger narratives disseminating beyond the immediate texts and cannot be explicated by resorting only to norm theory. This, in turn, informs

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<sup>27</sup> Hatim and Mason (1997, p. 146-147) also draw direct inferences of ideological shifts in translation (as explained in section 2.4.2). They present a close analysis of the different translations of the adjective *stand-haftige* in a study conducted by Knowles and Malmkjaer on the four translations into English of Hans Christian Anderson’s fairy tales. However, this type of mediation reflects in the translated texts in terms of unfamiliarity and it can be referred to as what Venuti (1995) call a ‘foreignising’ translation (Hatim and Mason 1997, p. 148). They also investigate ideological shifts according to “lexical choices”, “cohesion” and “transitivity” and which lead to the removal of some significant features of the culture. This, in turn, is indicative that translators apply maximal mediation for “intervene[ing] in the transfer process, feeding their own knowledge and beliefs into their processing of text” (1997, p. 147).

the discursive behaviour of translators in the real world and the power of social structures and the workings of the systems in dynamic rather than static terms.

The model helps in observing both the issues of dominance and resistance through the use of translational choices in relation to wider social and political contexts without overlooking the individual texts and events in media translated texts. It motivates this study to think of the implications of the individual choices as embedded in and contributing to the elaboration of concrete political reality. Consistent with this model, the translational choices in the corpus of this study, therefore, are considered as choices with implications that actuate narratives of what some aspects of the world are like. Her concept of “framing” helps to explore how the ST narratives are framed differently in the TL by translator’s use of different strategies. An anecdotal data analysis indicates that three of the framing strategies are of particular interest to the narratives elaborated in the selected texts of this study. They are frame ambiguity, framing by labeling and selective appropriation. Frame ambiguity refers to the strategies that present “the same set of events [...] in different ways” (Baker 2006, p 107). The outcomes are competing or conflicting ways in which those events can be observed. In this study, the use of this strategy is apparent in the cases of substitutions where addition and omission function as a combined strategy while the ST narratives are framed differently in the TTs. Frame by labelling refers to the use of any “lexical items, term or phrase to identify” any “key element in narrative”, such as a person, place, group (2006, p. 122). Selective appropriation refers to the choices made by translators as regards textual material “realized in patterns of omission and addition designed to suppress, accentuate or elaborate particular aspects of a narrative” (Baker 2006, p.114). The process of reframing in this study, therefore, draws on the lexico-grammatical choices of the translators and their relation to the socio-political factors. However, selective appropriation extends to include other textual material realised in patterns of borrowing as well. The three reframing strategies of omission, addition, and borrowing provide significant tools for performing such an analysis in this study. They constitute part of the local strategies since they occur at micro-level and alter the macro-level agenda of the text.

In the literature of translation studies, however, the choices at macro-level are flanked by non-and complete rewriting, or full and summarised translation, or literal and free translation, or target-oriented (adequacy) and source-oriented (acceptability) (Toury 2012), domestication

and foreignisation translation (Venuti, 1995) and so forth. Besides, each of these dichotomies has been discussed from the perspectives of each other. Although they are not synonymous with each other, they have features in common and sometimes overlap. They all denote that translation is not an unbiased activity and that translators' choices and options are always located between two polarisations which are generally and traditionally known as free vs literal translation. Free and literal translations are defined as two strategies (Jensen and Jakobsen 2000, p. 113; Hatim and Munday 2004, p. 17; Munday 2009, p.191) in which a "translator's potentially conscious plans for solving concrete translation problems in the framework of a concrete translation task" are reflected (Krings 1986, p. 18). In this study, however, since the translators' choices and positions need to be investigated in terms of cultural, political, ideological and linguistic manipulations, these strategies are considered to be less likely relevant since they refer only to the degree to which translators' choices make a text adapt to the target culture. Apart from decreasing the diversity of positions that translators adopt with regard to their texts, authors and socio-cultural and political factors, these strategies also conceal the fluctuating positions of translators within the same text. They minimise the convoluted means by which a translator negotiates his or her way around diverse aspects of a text into almost a forthright choice of domestication vs foreignisation translation, free vs literal translation, naturalisation vs alienating, and so forth. This, in turn, means diminishing the aspects of translator's behaviour this study aims at, i.e., the ways in which translators come to occupy a central and enduring position in the history of media translation and the effect of the ways they intervene and modify the text.

In sum, this study unites CDA and Narrative analysis into critical narrative analysis (CNA) in order to investigate ideological mediation in translation at macro-and micro- levels. This, in turn, describes the choices made by translators and their impact on different socio-cultural and ideological contexts in Kurdish media translation (see chapter 3 for more details). It allows this study to consider translational choices not only as local linguistic challenges but also as contributing directly to the narratives that shape our social world. This accordingly may result in the type and effect of socio-cultural and linguistic norms currently operating in English-Kurdish translations (see section 2.5).

## 2.5 Ideology and Search for Media Habitus and Social Norms

Following the discussion of the significance of a CNA approach to the investigation of the effects ideological factors may have on translator's behaviour, this study assumes that media translation in Iraqi Kurdistan is a socio-political norm-governed behaviour. This section, therefore, provides a critical overview of the concept and type of norms in order to explore the factors governing the translator's behaviour and the interplay between translators and their audiences in the corpus of this study. The study argues that socio-political factors might be internalised by translators and ultimately reveal themselves in the end-results, i.e., the translation product.

The concept of norms is initially derived from sociology where it applies to a wide range of human behaviour of any kind (Coleman and Coleman 1994, p. 241). It denotes a standard, usual, or typical pattern of behaviour which is expected from a particular group or society, especially in terms of social behaviour. As a concept, however, it has been inevitably decoded and re-decoded in translation studies in the last decades (e.g., Levý 1969; Even-Zohar 1971; Toury 1995, 2012; Herman 1991, 1996, 1999b; and Chesterman, 1993, 1997)<sup>28</sup>. Toury made norms the centre of his descriptive program for translation studies with the aim of exploring a methodology that scrutinises translations in relation to the regularity of translation behaviour within particular situations embodying general social values and ideas. Toury's concept of norms is developed from a micro-level textual examination of ST and TT segments. It functions at both micro and macro-level, unlike other theories (for example Skopos) which only function at one level. His concept of norm theory, therefore, explains two important aspects relevant to this study. Firstly, translation norms can focus by presenting a more cognisant descriptive outline of the translation products. It also deals with the decision-making process of translating that is justified by the study of translation products and other concrete sources. The analysis of translation products, thus, can offer an insight into the norms governing translation process and translators' choices as well.

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<sup>28</sup> This notion was introduced to the field of translation studies by Levý (1969) and then Even-Zohar (1971). However, it was developed at the end of the 1970s by Toury in an essay entitled *The Nature and Role of Norms in Translation Studies* first published in *In Search of a Theory of Translation* (1980).

Translation scholars, however, differ in their endorsement of Toury's concept of norms and its value as a conceptual tool for the manifestation of regularities (e.g. Pym 2010; Hermans 1999; Schäffner 1995; Chesterman 1999). Pym describes norms as a 'back door' which "allowed a kind of prescriptivism to be introduced into descriptive studies" (Pym 2010a, p. 75). For Hermans (1995), likewise, regularities of behaviour simply appear as instructions or a prescriptive level of norms. Nevertheless, Chesterman (1999) argues that norms "allow modern translation scholars to take a distance from the prescriptiveness" (p. 90). This line of thought is also reflected in Schäffner's (1995) advocacy of norms when she states that:

Translational behaviour is contextualised as social behaviour, and translational norms are understood as internalised behavioural constraints which embody the values shared by a community. All decisions in the translation process are thus primarily governed by such norms, and not (dominantly or exclusively) by the two language systems involved. (1995, p. 5)

In addition, this study further argues that the concept of norms is vitally important for translation, especially for connecting micro analysis of shifts to socio-historical contexts and questions of ideology and power. Along with this view, this study thus considers the kind of prescriptivism referred to by Pym and Hermans as a shared knowledge between members of every community as to what is considered appropriate or inappropriate as communicative behaviour at a certain time. In addition, Hermans himself, argues that translational norms direct translators' decision-making in terms of how they ought to behave and what to choose among a range of possible alternatives during the translation process because that type of behaviour is expected and considered apposite by the respective society (1999, p. 80; 1991, p. 162). Norms, therefore, exist "only in situations which allow for alternative kinds of behaviour, involving the need to select among these, with the additional condition that selection be non-random" (Toury 1999, p. 15). This leads to distinctions between choices that are constrained by language systems and choices which are language behaviour (see the previous subsection 2.4 for more details).

Hermans (1999) raises another concern regarding how to position the regulatory aspect of norms against "the translator's intentionality, and thus to balance constraint with agency. After all, translators do not just mechanically respond to nods and winks, they also act with

intent” (p. 79-80). Toury, however, argues that (1999, p. 9) “translating as an act and as an event is characterised by variability, it is historically, socially and culturally determined, in short, norm-governed”. This further explained by Gentzler (1993, p. 129-130) who explicates that the main aim behind Toury's norms is to determine a hierarchy of interconnected factors governing translation products. Since this study aims at exploring the nature of conventionalised norms influencing translation choices at certain periods of time from a descriptive perspective, a more interweaving and probabilistic perception of the relationship between various contextual aspects, and the translator's decision process enlightens the debate. Norms, in this way, are more similar to the socio-cultural and political factors conditioning the translator's choices, one type among a number of probabilities, and less like perpetual determinants. They are, therefore investigated in terms of the significance of their socio-political and cultural impact on the act of translating and producing the translation and translator's behaviour.

Discussing the role and nature of norms, Toury describes norms “as subject to constraints of different types and varying degree” (1978/ 2004, p. 206). With respect to their potency, he situates norms between two poles of various degrees of intensity which are rules/ laws and idiosyncrasies. The norms rise between these two poles sometimes “stronger and hence more rule-like, others are weaker, and hence almost idiosyncratic. The borderlines between the various types of constraints are thus diffuse” (1978, p. 206). Hermans (1999), however, sensibly narrows the broadness of the two poles down with a range of rules and conventions (pp. 79-85). He explains that in the domains where power relations, such as political translation, have a more dominant role the potency of norms implies that norms move away from conventions with the less dependence on “mutual expectations and internalised acceptance”, and more on “codified rules in the form of explicit obligations and prohibitions” (p. 82). The term rule is, thus, interpreted as “a strong, institutionalised norm, often issued by an identifiable authority armed with the power to impose sanctions for non-compliance” (ibid). As a result of the prevalent involvement of power relations in the manifold systems of norms, strong norms, thus, tend to acquire an imposed power, stabilise over time and become institutionalised. In this study, thus, the norms' density degree may rise and decline depending on socio-political and cultural factors and different conditions, such as the type of texts, the type of the topic of the narratives and also the translation and publication agencies. Hermans (1999b, p. 58) takes a step further and explicates such social conventions, norms and rules in terms of value. Value is considered a

term covering the cultural and ideological factors that are exploited by power relations. Norms, thus, function as a way to guarantee that general values are transformed into guidelines regulating the existing social action. This explication supports Toury's and Chesterman's assertion that guidelines are not norms themselves but the evidence of them.

Socio-political factors, therefore, can be considered as supporting an assumption that the act of translating, and the quality of production, is based on a careful examination of the context or culture in which such norms obtain. Kurdish media translation might not only reflect diverse values and norms that exist in society, but sometimes create them. Sheyholislami (2011) argues that some programs like cartoons are not permitted to be aired in their original languages, particularly when the languages are Arabic, Persian and Turkish as they are considered as a kind of threat towards Kurdish. However, non-dubbed English programs are aired because English is seen as a prestigious and instrumental global language (p. 104). This denotes that different norms might operate at different levels and contexts in Kurdish media that result in different translational behaviour. Nevertheless, it is important to note that since norms shift over time, they are dynamic and they can only be learnt and studied through observation of the patterns of behaviour at certain period of time (Hermans 1999a, p. 85). According to Hermans, whereas norms change according to settings and potentials, translators are considered to be either following or opposing these fluctuations (ibid: 84). Nevertheless, they are supposed to mainly comply with the prevailing norms of the institutional constraints they belong to. The power and effectiveness of these norms lead to the identification of regularity of behaviour in situations of the same type.

In the context of this study thus, norms are considered as the socio-political environments under which translated texts are produced in the field of Kurdish media. This field reflects the status of the Kurdish world where the majority or group of people share, to some extent, the same doctrines, beliefs, and traditions that characterise its inhabitants that may change over time (through generations) in terms of the type of norms and their power as well. In this way, norms can be analysed and described in relation to the shared knowledge, expectation, acceptance and refusal regarding what is considered appropriate or inappropriate behaviour in Kurdish society and culture or by a particular group within this society at a certain time, and this is consistent with Baker's narrative view. Having established the concept of



norms, this study argues that Kurdish translators' choices might be impacted by various types of norms, including socio-political one and the translator's own ideology. Moreover, the norms that exist within this field are, in turn, influenced by the translators' decision-making. This study, therefore, requires a model of norm analysis in order to carry out a detailed data analysis between 2011 and 2014 in the following chapters. It aims at describing the current patterns of translation behaviour in Kurdish media and at mapping trends with regard to Kurdish translators' choices which are made under the impact of various types of norms during the translation activity.

### **2.5.1 Models of Norm Analysis**

This sub-section examines relevant models of translation norms in order to address their appropriateness to the course of analysis in this study. Scholars working on translation norms tend to develop theoretical models in their elaboration of this concept in translation studies. As a result, a variety of models of translational norms are distinguished. In the course of this study, it would be more productive to present a brief review of the key paradigms to obtain not only an insightful understanding of translation norms, but also an appropriate methodological guidance for the ensuing analysis of geopolitical translations in the following chapters. The description of the current patterns of translation behaviour in Kurdish media entails revising two key prevailing groups of norms. This study argues that the set of norms offered by Chesterman (1997), developed from the theory of norms proposed by Toury (1995) and Hermans (1999b), is more functional to the description of the types of norms in this study.

Toury (1995, p. 56-59) considered norms as performance guidelines for translators and distinguished three types of norms operating at different stages of the translation process: initial norms, preliminary norms, and operational norms. Nevertheless, they are partially applicable to the process of norm analysis in this study. Arguing that translation has to do battle with two cultural traditions, he defines initial norms as a translation in which the translator's basic choice relies on the norms of either the source text or the target culture. According to Toury's initial norms, a translation's adequacy means pursuing the norms active in the source language and culture which "may well entail certain incompatibilities with target norms and practices, especially those lying beyond the mere linguistic ones" (Toury 1995, p. 56). Acceptable

translation means the opposite in pursuing the norms active in the target language and culture<sup>29</sup>. Nevertheless, Toury states that actual translation decisions will inevitably “involve some ad hoc combination of or compromise between the two extremes implied by the initial norm” (1995, p. 57). This perception, however, indicates a sense of broadness or even uncertainty in Toury’s theorisation of norms. The identification of initial norms is, thus, considered as the most challenging part of Toury’s norms because many translation critics usually use the terms adequacy and acceptability with different implications (Hermans 1999a, p. 76-77). This study follows the example of key norms theorists (Hermans 1999a; Chesterman 1997; 1999) and avoids these two terms on the basis of their vagueness.

Preliminary norms operate at the macro domains, with “those regarding the existence and actual nature of a definite translation policy, and those related to the directness of translation” (Toury 1995, p. 58). The former “refers to those factors that govern the choice of text types, or even of individual texts, to be imported through translation into a particular culture/language at a particular point in time” (Toury 1995, p. 58). It has been claimed that the factors that determine the selection of texts to be translated in the Kurdish media in general and in Kurdish newspapers in particular is not a random procedure. The publication agencies purposefully select particular types of texts to be translated and they are translated to serve a certain goal (Biro 2012). This study, however, needs to investigate this further by analysing the study corpus of this study to substantiate this claim. With regard to directness of translation, Kurdish, as a target language, permits translation from intermediate languages. It has been argued that this trend was more common before the twentieth century when Arabic, Turkish and Persian were the dominant languages at the time and most Kurdish writers were educated in those languages (Hassanpour 1999, p. 62).

However, it can also be argued that even today Kurdish tolerates translation from those three languages. Several Kurdish writers, for example, who have been in continuous contact with the Arabs, Persians and Turks as a result of the geographical and political status of the area, turned into bilingual writers. As such, when they translate from western languages (e.g.,

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<sup>29</sup> This distinction seems to be similar to Venuti’s more debated concepts of foreignising and domesticating strategies (Baker 2001, p. 174).

English), most of the time they use those three languages as intermediate languages. In addition, the translators' ideology or the lack of translating resources in Kurdish, such as a reliable English-Kurdish Dictionary might be another reason for following such a way of translation. Kurdish translators often consult an English-Arabic dictionary in order to know what an English word means. However, this study includes a bilingual mono-directional parallel corpus, namely, English-Kurdish. Therefore, it does not consider this type of norm in terms of involving intermediate languages for the whole text because English is the dominant language for the whole text. Yet, the decisions in relation to lexical choices in the translated texts might reflect, to some extent, this type of norm.

Operational norms are considered to direct the translators' choices during the process of translation, with matricial norms governing the macrostructure of the text and textual linguistic norms affecting microstructures (Toury 1995, p. 58-59). In this study, they can be employed to reflect cases of borrowings, omissions, additions, changes of location and manipulations of segmentations in the translated texts to help in the process of identifying translation strategies. Although Toury's three-dimensional model of norms is partially applicable to the process of norm analysis of this study, the extent to which translators' agency can operate against the institutional constraints needs further investigation in the context of media translation in Kurdistan.

Hermans did not establish a model to compare translation norms as Toury did. Nevertheless, his approach to explore norms is better established socially in the sense that the relation between norms and social values is more coherent and practical for the translation studies of media texts. Considering the concepts of values and manipulations in translation, Hermans (1999b, p. 59) suggests three normative levels which indicate that translation can never be value-free. The first level refers to general cultural and ideological norms functioning throughout a community at the macro-level. The second level relates to translational norms emerging from general notions of translatability and linguistic illustrations between STs and TTs, and the third level is about the textual and other pertinence norms prevailing in a particular client system or an institution at the micro-level.

Hermans' discussion calls for an integrative study of discourse analysis with various fields. His concept of power has maintained the postulation mentioned above and provided more justifications to combine translation studies and CDA. His tripartite classification of translation norms seems to be consistent with Fairclough's (1995b) three-dimensional model of critical discourse analysis. Both deal with the general socio-cultural factors and specific textual profile at the top and bottom level, and position a comparable intermediate level involving discursive linguistic representations. Nevertheless, despite awareness of the significance of Hermans' figuration of norms at the macro level, a structurally developed model of translation norms is equally important for the theoretical direction of this study at the micro level. This study, thus, refers to Chesterman's model of translation norms.

Based on Toury and Hermans' studies on norms, thus, Chesterman (1997, p. 175-186) proposes a set of norms, which can be considered as a refinement of Toury's, initial and operational norms, and a more practical model for the analysis of norms in this study. This approach is similar to Toury's in being a descriptive approach "in that he considers the way in which norms and even normative laws appear to operate in the world of translation, without necessarily wishing to recommend or impose them" (Hermans 1999a, p. 77). However, there are some differences in the way Toury and Chesterman view descriptive translation studies (DTS) as an approach. For Chesterman, it is impossible to know the quality of translation, if DTS refuses to include the evaluative elements. He argues that what we need to know is what will be accepted as an appropriate or legitimate, or better translation by a particular community and thus outline the perimeter of the concept of translation for that community.

He introduces the term "meme" into the study of translation norms, which have been broadly discussed as a meme of translation. Meme is socio-biological word corresponding to gene in the depiction of the development of cultural phenomena. Under Darwinian laws of natural selection, genes are transmitted from body to body. Likewise, memes are transferred as similar copies from one brain into another and defined as "a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation" (Dawkins 1976, p. 206, cited in Chesterman 1997, p. 5). Based on the rudimentary assumptions of memes, Chesterman (1997) gradually reaches to a point where memes can be linked to translation:

Human beings are also survival machines for memes, but they are not the only ones. [...] Meme transmission within a culture takes place through imitation and of course also through language. But for a meme to be transmitted verbally across cultures, it needs a translation. Indeed, the need for translation is a neat criterion for the existence of a cultural boundary (Pym 1992: 26). This gives us a fundamental definition of a translation: translations are survival machines for memes. (Chesterman 1997, p. 7)

Chesterman, thus, implies that memes require human brains as concrete transporters or “survival machines” to function as “a unit of cultural transmission”. This is indicative that the notion meme is closely related to cognition. Consistent with the socio-cognitive aspect of van Dijk’s CDA (see section 2.2), knowledge is, therefore, a vital device of discourse production within context and can be interpreted as operating interactively at the personal and collective levels. Nevertheless, transmitting knowledge appropriately from the group to the personal domain or the other way around needs a unit of transmission holding this knowledge and its function. Integrated with the concept of memes, knowledge becomes a more understandable and accessible cognitive notion in the construction and comprehension of discourse. The compatibility of memes and its possibility to integrate with CDA is considered significant for the course of textual analysis of this study and motivates the study to continue with the review of Chesterman’s model of translation norms.

Chesterman argues that norms only exist in the form of social recognition although individuals have individual knowledge of norms (1997: 54). According to him, they affect social consciousness and they have potentiality to access the individual consciousness. From the socio-cognitive perception, this observation appears to entail that norms exist partially in the form of the social and cultural knowledge because personal knowledge is adapted and integrated into a set of descriptive norms, which broadly covers social, ethical and technical aspects and allows ‘evaluative judgments’. These are products or “expectancy norms” and process or “professional norms”.

Expectancy norms are partly dominated and influenced by the predominant translation tradition and scenes in the target language and culture, “economic or ideological factors, power

relations within and between cultures and the like” (p. 67). They are established in the social values of the target community. Consistent with the socio-cognitive perception, values can be comprehended as the multidimensional social knowledge common within a culture. Chesterman’s formulation of expectancy norms, however, has not so far investigated the significant relationship between expectancy norms and the context that surfaces them. The term expectancy carries a deep-seated sense of social cognition that reflects in the mental representations of the target expectations proposed by translators on behalf of the cross-cultural and socio-political knowledge of their institutions. In addition, knowledge is the carrier of memes that are transferred between source and target cultures judged according to an agenda mediated by power relations. Expectancy norms, thus, seem to offer significant potential for the macro- level analysis of socio-political constraints in Kurdish media translation, in that they facilitate the investigation of the selected translated journalistic texts and the exploration of the way these texts conform to the media news agencies’ and the target readership’s expectations as appropriate or acceptable.

Below the level of expectancy norms, professional norms are reflected in the work of translators who are “largely responsible for the original establishment of the expectancy norms’ and whose work naturally become the yardsticks by which subsequent translations are assessed by the receiving society” (p. 67). This type of norm establishes the relationship between the two kinds of norms, with professional norms being subordinate to and governed by the expectancy norms. Thus, since the expectancy norms specify what the end translation products are like and professional norms regulate the translation process, the process norms are identified by product norms as to where the end product would be led to. Brownlie (1999) criticises the vagueness of Chesterman’s professional norms in terms of textual evidence or consultation of the people concerned. Likewise, the expression “competent professional translators” gives a sense of ambiguity and doubt as to in what way professional translators can be regarded as competent. This apprehension accordingly requires a detailed investigation of textual data to allow evidence to materialise from empirical studies indicating how translation norms are retained and negotiated inside the institutional context in the diachronic investigation of the shifts that occur in translation. In order to present the process norms in a more accessible manner, Chesterman groups them into three different types of norms with each group covering a specific aspect. They are the accountability norm, the communication norm and the relation norm.

The accountability norm can be defined as an ethical norm with regard to professional standards of integrity and thoroughness that make the translator responsible for his decisions (1997, p. 68). In the absence of one responsible official association for introducing the basic features of the accountability norms of Kurdish media<sup>30</sup>, this type of norm can only be investigated with regard to the translated products along with the policy of each of the selected media agencies in the corpus of this study. It, thus, postulates that translators owe loyalty to a number of parties comprising the original writer, the commissioner of the translation task, the potential audience and even the translators themselves. With regard to “loyalty”, it is important to reference Nord’s (1997) understanding of this concept. Loyalty differs from the traditional terms of “faithfulness” and “fidelity” in that it is outlined to regulate the trustworthy reproduction of formal ST features into the TT. It supports the accountability translators have towards the participants in translational communication. This type of norm can be comprehended as an interpersonal category of a social relationship between people (p.125). In this way, Nord has helped to make the concept of loyalty more obvious in terms of the nature of the ethical accountability that loyalty denotes.

The accountability norm, as one aspect of process norms, presumes that translators take into account multiple factors such as the publisher, the ST producer and the TT addressees rather than just the expectations arising from the target culture. This, in turn, deteriorates the prescriptive pressure of the product norms. Consistent with Chesterman (1997: 68) and Nord (1997: 126), therefore, loyalty requires the need for a negotiation of the translation task between translators and other involved parties, and that might necessitate harmonising between different primacies. This theoretical discussion of the accountability norm above, to some extent, offers an analytical base for decoding the power-mediated ideological behaviours in the scrutiny of the textual products alongside the source and target contexts in this study. In addition, the pertinent ethical features brought by the accountability norm might also provide practical direction for the institutional operation of media translation in Kurdistan. This will be discussed further in the following chapters.

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<sup>30</sup> There are some principled agencies In Iraqi Kurdistan. However, they are considered more as the individual’s effort. Similar to language policy (Sheyholislami 2012, p. 117), they are not officially recognised.

The second group of process norms is the communication norm. It is social in nature and “specifies the translator’s role as a communication expert, both as a mediator of the intentions of others and as a communicator in his/her own right” (1997, p. 69). This attaches a social dimension to the translators’ decision making process at the macro-level. However, it is obvious that the attempt to optimise communication needs to be based on the balanced needs of different parties as governed by the accountability norm. Therefore, the product of the decision-making process may be identified by the dominant group as knowledge or the prevailing ideology within the institution. This type of norm reflects the extent to which media translators played the role of ideological mediators and what impact they have on the translations they performed in the corpus of this study. Along with the third type of norm, explained below, it can be further distinguished along the CNA approach which provides the study with significant tools to investigate the way ideological and evaluative elements in media translation are rendered.

The third group in the category of process norms is the relation norm. It was developed to govern the technical aspects in the translation process. This norm can be best explored through deviations and similarities, especially through lexico-grammatical deviations. It is employed to indicate that the linguistic relation between the ST and the TT should be established in favour of the text type, the intentions of the commissioner, the ST producer and the assumed needs of the prospective audience (p. 69). Text type is, thus, considered the significant criterion to decide the degree of ‘similarity’ and the whole translation profile. Chesterman explains the significance of text-type by illustrating that legal contracts or political documents might require the translations to give priority to a “close formal similarity to the original” (p. 69) and this may be demonstrated by sentence-to-sentence correspondence. Likewise, the translations of media journalistic texts might also require such primacy in the same manner, since their text-type has an informative purpose for the transference of opinions and assessments of facts. Given that the STs and TTs are geopolitical commentary articles, the majority of their lexico-grammatical choices function as keywords in terms of retaining the authors and/ or translators’ opinions’ and assessments of the geopolitical facts and their impacts on the overall textual meaning (see chapter 3 for more details). Thus, text type is considered a socially projected concept for communicative objectives. It is developed as established textual patterns serving diverse circumstances and takes a significant part in producing mental patterns of identifiable structural



and rhetorical elements in the course of communication. The textual representations help manipulating the text receivers' ways of acquiring the knowledge. In this regard, the relation norm, devising text type as the leading factor in the translation process, can therefore be construed from a profound socio-cognitive perception as keen to this translational study of geopolitical media discourse.

Like Toury, Chesterman discards the narrow concept of equivalence. However, while Toury employed "relational variable", Chesterman proposes "relevant similarity" to describe the complex relation between STs and TTs. This possible relation calls in variation and variation, in turn, covers some parameters, such as the degree of target-culture adaptation considered appropriate, addition or omission of information in relation to accompanying channels and so forth (p. 69). Chesterman refers to these parameters as strategies (see subsection 2.4.3). He rightly moves from the theoretical formation of translation norms to the practical level concerning the detailed study of translation strategies. Translational strategies are employed in the sense that they are observable from translation products in the form of 'explicitly textual manipulation' (p. 89). They are actually a kind of process of 'doing things' (p. 88) in order to arrive at the best version of translation or 'relevant similarity' along with the dominant norms.

To sum up, the overview above has provided the main aspects of norms theory applied in translation studies, establishing that norms are social perceptions and their establishment and evolution are subject to social habituation. Based on Toury's and Herman's analysis of norms, Chesterman's model of translation norms along with van Dijk's socio-cognitive aspect of discourse analysis offers a methodologically and structurally comprehensive approach for the analysis of norms in this study. Chesterman's model encompasses the relation between the social-cognitive dimension of norm construction and the multi-level operation to facilitate its application. van Dijk's socio-cognitive vision of discourse analysis is also a consistent source of motivation for the cognitive interpretation of Chesterman's model of norms. The initiation of the socio-biological notion 'memes' introduces a pioneering direction to relate the socially-formed norms to the cognitively-constructed models of human communication. This, in turn, allows the socio-cognitive perspective to re-interpret the manifestations and effects of norms. The socio-cognitive comprehension leads the traditional concept of translation norms to be

resuscitated along with human communication and can be more thoroughly rationalised in the social contexts by incorporating the external social conditions with internal cognitive influences. In addition, having discussed translational reframing strategies (see also section 2.4) and its relation to Chesterman's norms, it is necessary to consider the strategies that achieve ideological deviations and ultimately led to norms in the corpus of this study.

### **2.5.2 Ideology and Search for Laws of Translational Behaviour**

The exploration in the section above has provided a critical overview of the concept of norms and considered Chesterman's model relevant to the description of ideological shifts in this study for its compatibility with the socio-cognitive aspect of CDA and Baker's reframing strategies. Regardless of ideology, however, the instances of shifts resulting from recurrent translation strategies might be due to various other tendencies in translations. They are either socio-political norms dictated and/or are due to some other preferences. These probabilistic explanations are generally explored for so-called translation universals (Toury 2004: 15). In this study, translational universals can be explained by reference to Toury's general laws and regularities of translational behaviour along with Pym's (2008) propositions since they might be used to further explain why manipulative shifts occur in Kurdish media translation.

Toury has used the notion of "law" for observed regularities and considered them conditioned and probabilistic in translation (Laviosa 2011, p. 306). Toury suggested two representative laws for the way translators produce translations, "the law of growing standardisation" and "the law of interference" from the source text (1995, p. 275). However, several successive studies have proposed the elimination of the notion of laws in favour of translation universals (e.g. Baker 1993, 1995, 1996; Chesterman 2004; Laviosa 1998). This issue remains highly controversial in DTS since the very idea of universals or laws in translation is impossible to validate empirically, as it is impossible to capture translations from all times and languages. In this study, however, translation laws are set out by considering the issue of sociocultural constraints along with translator's mediation in translation. They are investigated through the conditioning factors that reflect the position of the TTs as opposed to the STs as well as within the receiving culture. Thus, one of the points of departure from translation

universals might be Baker's conception of such a term. She defines universal features of translation as the elements that typically arise in the translated texts rather than the source texts and that "are not the result of interference from specific linguistic system" (1993, p. 243). The aspect in her definition that has begun to raise questions, especially when it comes to an empirical work as well as that of the role of ideological constraints, is the status of Toury's Law of Interference. Baker's account appears to ignore the law of interference. Nevertheless, if we turn to an earlier classification of translation universals by Toury, we see that he (1995), in fact, postulates "the law of interference" as an essential law of translation.

Toury describes the law of interference as the phenomena pertaining to the make-up of the source text that tend to be transferred to the target text (1995, pp. 275-276). Pym relates the occurrence of this type of law to the socio-cultural constraints and the social conditions of the two languages that are entangled in the translation process. One of those factors is the situation of the target language as opposed to the source language. In other words, the more prestigious the source culture from the perspectives of the target culture, the higher the chance of interferences, and the other way around. In this study, therefore, the law of interference might be due to the power relations and the mutual prestige of the cultures and languages in question. Interference is thus either seen as contradicting universality, as in Baker's definition, or alternatively a fundamental demonstration of universality, as in Toury's. On the other hand, Toury's second law of growing standardisation has received a lot of attention under different appearances in the literature of translation studies. This might be due to Baker's configuration of translational universals which has left the law of interference in the shadows.

Pym (2008, p. 311) reviews Toury's laws of standardisation and interference and critically questions Baker's later effort to form what she calls translational universals. Despite the complexity and indirectness of Toury's concept of the law of standardisation, Pym considers each of Baker's four universals, explicitation, simplification, nominalisation and levelling out, as repetitive amplifications of this type of Toury's original law while she made no reference to the law of interference at all. According to Baker, simplification brings in features of the sentences shortening, and this contradicts explicitations since it causes the sentence to be longer, or normalisation that involves incomplete sentences (c.f. Pym 2008, p. 319).

Both Baker's four universals and Toury's law of growing standardisation reflect the position of the translated texts within the receiving culture. However, the law of growing standardisation is more inclusive in considering what happens in translation. For Pym (2008, p. 320), the law of growing standardisation occurs when the translation product occupies a peripheral position within the target language and culture. However, the target texts selected for the analysis of this study are newspaper commentary articles written by various political analysts and translated for the Kurdish readership. They are therefore considered to occupy an important position within the target language and culture for conveying geopolitical knowledge about the Middle East in general and Kurdistan in particular. Yet, the extent to which they adapt themselves to the "established models and repertoires" (Toury 2012, p. 307) of Kurdish requires knowing where the law of standardisation is effective in them.

Consistent with Pym's debate, this study thus argues that the dichotomy of Toury's proposition offers a wider view on causal explanations for translational behaviour than Baker's. According to Pym (2008), the explanations cannot be considered completely universal for their reliance on sociocultural variables. He, thus, looks for other alternative explanations with regard to Toury's two translational phenomena and offers the translator's tendency to risk avoidance. In the translation process, translators frequently encounter choices that, in turn, indicate doubt. For Pym (2008), since time is the key constraint and participants' expectations are all part of the equation in practical translation, translators will play it safe and avoid risk through following two general ways of dealing with doubt:

either say what seems normal or safe (standardization) or say what someone else can be responsible for (interference). Both sets of strategies are ways in which translators reduce their personal risk burden. In accordance with both laws, at the same time, many translators do not tend to take on communicative risk in their own name. (2008, p. 324)

Pym develops this assumption further to state that a different system of reward structures might have an impact on how translators respond while confronting a risk. He argues:

If translators are going to be rewarded (financially, symbolically or socially) for taking risks, then they are likely to take risks, rather than transfer

them. Translators may then have an interest in breaking all the maxims, norms, laws or universals that theorists throw at them. (2008, p. 325)

He perceives that the existing reward structure for the translator's performance motivates translators to be risk averse; a tendency that once initiated will reproduce itself. It is here, then, that Pym considers the explanation of certain patterns in translational behaviour, observing beyond the purely linguistic level to include sociocultural variables such as prestige, reward, position, stance and so forth. This is consistent with what Lefevere's interrelating components of patronage, which are the ideological, the economic and status component (see sub-section 2.4.1 for more details). According to Pym, these risk dynamics are a key link in establishing a law which has "a more human causation", that is, "translators will tend to avoid risk by standardising language and/or channelling interference, if and when there are no rewards for them to do otherwise" (2008, p. 326). It might be noted here that this theory of risk avoidance could depict the strategies and practices adopted in Kurdish media translation. The status of translators within the social, linguistic, and cultural system of the media agencies in Kurdistan should be taken into account.

To sum up, this chapter has presented the theoretical models selected for the course of analysis of this study. The aim was to balance the focus of the study in relation to the general categorisation with existing theoretical concepts of norms, CDA and Narrative Theory which the study draws on within the framework of modern DTS in order to explain the behaviour of translators. This study adapts Toury's (1995) proposal of the three-phase analytical model as one of the aims of the research is to describe norms currently operating in English-Kurdish media translations. Toury's norm theory, thus, supports the analysis of this study in terms of identifying and describing the periodic, abstract, systematic behaviour that privileges strong patterns of socialisation into that behaviour. However, it overlooks many individual and group attempts at subverting prevailing patterns of dominant political and social tenet. As a theory, Toury's norms pays very little attention to the involved patterns of interaction between frequent established patterns of behaviour and the constant attempts at undermining that behaviour, i.e., the interaction between dominance and resistance. Such patterns of dominance and resistance are considered to be an outcome of the political and social situations, which is the aspect of the translator's behaviour this study aims at. This study, therefore, employed Chesterman's two

types of norms, which are the product and the process norms, due to their coverage of the socio-cultural and political aspects of the context they arise from. The aim is to distinguish and describe the types of norms currently operational in Kurdish media. In addition, Chesterman's notion of norms helps in bringing several other approaches closer together, such as CDA and Narrative Theory which, in turn, increases our understanding of the way translation operates in the socio-cultural and political contexts in this study. This study, thus, adapts the two discourse-analytic approaches of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and Narrative Theory for their ability to inform one another and as a means to seek a more complete textual analysis. In other words, while CDA focuses on power and language, Narrative Theory is concerned with how translators make sense of their decisions in society through language.

The combination of Fairclough's socio-functional and van Dijk's socio-cognitive CDA model is borrowed as a micro- and macro-analytical framework in this study (see 3.1.2 for more details). As a functional-cognitive model of discourse analysis, it is able to position the relevant textual components into basic contextual models shaped by shared group knowledge or attitudes. This integrated method is formulated to analyse power-mediated discourse. Likewise, the socio-cognitively adapted model of translation norms is designed to account for translation as a social action and can be better understood alongside the contexts which accommodate the development of the functional-cognitive model for discourse analysis. In this way, the model of CDA is consistent with that of translation norms in the sense that they are both dealing with socio-cultural events and rely on the indexes of text to deliver socially-encoded messages to the respective recipients (see section 2.5). The chapter has also revealed that both models of CDA and norm analysis are based on cognitively-composed contextual models and help mediate between textual and social dimensions. It thus depends on discourse analysts or investigators to unveil the underlying objectives in texts. Nevertheless, according to Souto-Manning (2014, p. 164) a discourse is only influential when it is resumed in every day told narratives. This line of thought calls for a combined and balanced approach of CDA and Narrative Theory, focusing on social issues as well as linguistic analysis, considering all the ways in which language and social realm are interweaved. Baker's Narrative Theory describes a model for the analysis of the strategies that are employed to frame various and competitive narratives. It used to describe and interpret discourse as a social practice and analyses media texts in relation to lexicogrammatical choices for their ideological implication. Therefore, her model of framing

strategies provides this study with mature understandings of the discursive effects of various strategies that are used in media translation. It explores the way in which translation functions and translators mediate in the context of ideological conflicts. Accordingly, with the establishment of the relationship between translation norms theory, CDA and Narrative Theory, a critical narrative approach within a descriptive methodology will be formulated in the following chapter for the study of power-mediated discourse in the geopolitical translation in Kurdistan.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Methodology and Corpus Design**

#### **3.0 Introduction**

The previous chapters have provided an extensive literature review of relevant research and theories which will prove instrumental for an analysis of the translation of media texts in the Kurdish context. They also indicated that Kurdish media translation, in general, and geopolitical translation, in particular, has been overlooked in the field of translation studies. This chapter includes a review of the research method and design appropriateness for the discussion of the role of ideology in the following chapters. It illustrates the relationships between the selected theoretical models and the methods used to collect and interpret the data in this study. A combination of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and narrative approach (NA) is adapted, as practical analytical tools, to the framework of descriptive translation studies (DTS). The aim is to explore the normative effects of the ideological positioning of the translator and address the role of the socio-political context in Kurdish media translation. The formulation of a critical narrative analysis (CNA) framework for the study of translation phenomena enables the examination of the connections between the macro-level ideological power and micro-level interactional positioning in the study corpus of this study. It does so through the analysis of the way lexico-grammatical choices are manipulated to facilitate mediation and/or express ideology.

This study will focus on investigating the state of Kurdish media translation through a special focus on geopolitical commentary articles as a branch of translation for the general public. Scrutinising the translation of media texts requires taking into account the role of media agencies and the translators who work for them, and as such, this study aims to investigate the role of both in relation to Kurdish media translation, focussing on geopolitical texts in particular. The main objectives of the research are: 1) investigating the role of ideology in Kurdish media translation, driving the decisions of both agencies and translators in order to disclose the regularities of translation behaviour; 2) revealing to what extent the choices reflect the author's and translator's agency or the SL's and TL's system and culture. These aims will be explored by analysing the data set. This study creates a parallel corpus of English texts and their Kurdish



translations to explore the questions raised in the course of the study. Detailed description about the corpus design is given in section (3.2).

### **3.1 Methodology: the Integration of the Theoretical Models**

This section reveals the overall approach to the research process and the set of methods and principles that are pursued to examine the available data. It also presents the rationale, the contribution and the limitations of using this approach before introducing the functional models selected as an integrated methodological framework for the analysis of ideological manipulation in the context of Kurdish media translation. The aim is to validate and explain the proportionality of the type of research design that will enable it to fulfil the objective of this study. The study also argues that such framework can be replicated to study translation manipulation and ideology in the other contexts.

Translation is no longer considered as the replacement of an utterance in one language by another without distortion. In this study, these distortions are an outcome of diverse interventions that have directly and indirectly operated in media translation practice. The interventions are considered as motivations for ideologically interfering with the original, on the grounds that new information is added to the work. They lead to the fact that shifts in translation are in many cases inevitable and at times even required. This, in turn, suggests that translation is a mediated practice involving ideological interventions (mediations) rather than an unproblematic substitution of code units motivated by dissimilarity of culture.

Therefore, discussions of the theory and practice of translation in this study have sought to highlight the frameworks that take into account sociocultural and ideological contexts (Lefevere 1992, p.4; Hermans 1985, 1996, 2010; Chesterman 1997; Baker 2006, 2007). Nevertheless, the difficulty in moving from a linguistic approach to sociocultural and ideological approaches has resulted in methodological crises in an attempt to develop a unified methodology in the field of translation studies. There is no single linguistic or sociocultural approach when it comes to understanding and translating media texts, in particular, geopolitical texts. As a written language form, media text represents one of the four tools of communication. Along with images, audio and video, it provides the means of various transmission forms and defines the common ground of a variety of literary and non-literary works. As a term, media

text thus can be used to refer to how reality is represented in broadcast, online and print media from television to newspaper, magazine and social media. Therefore, the concept of media translation might be applied to different forms of media translation and raise questions about the role of translation in today's global and digitalised world of communication. However, the data for this study is collected from online media in the form of newspaper commentary articles; the study investigates the reframing of geopolitical knowledge post-Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 in Iraqi Kurdistan (see section 3.2).

In Kurdish media translation, socio-cultural and ideological contexts are considered to occupy a central position within current understandings of how translation operates to adjust to the dominant relations within the target cultural and communication systems. In the context of this study, media texts are considered to reflect different socio-cultural and ideological contexts that might privilege certain sets of ideas and neglect or undermine others. They, therefore, require a multidisciplinary approach in order to describe the choices made by the translators in their translations along with their implications. This study thus adapts the tripartite models of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Narrative Theory, and Norm theory as a single framework for the investigation of such aspects in the following chapters<sup>31</sup>. The focus is on the types of translational shifts along with their implications, resulting from the strategies of deleting, adding, substituting and borrowing the lexico-grammatical choices in the translation of geopolitical commentary articles from English into Kurdish. This, in turn, may result in the revelation of the type and effect of norms currently operating in English-Kurdish translations.

The integration of these analytical approaches to data analysis helps in the exploration of the connection between the macro-level power of institutional and socio-cultural biases and the micro-level positioning of translator's choices in the corpus of this study. The study proposes that CNA unifies CDA and narrative analysis within the framework of descriptive translation studies of normative effects in a mutually beneficial partnership that addresses both theoretical and methodological challenges in translation studies. It also suggests that this framework can be replicated for the study of translation behaviour within other contexts where

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<sup>31</sup> The selected approaches are discussed in detail in chapter two of this study and their functional aspects are explored in the following two subsections of this chapter.

socio-political factors play a dominant role. As explained in the introductory chapter of this study, the purpose of adapting and integrating these three models is to develop the classification of forms of discourse representation for the study of translation and create a set of categories that enable the study of the mediation of translated discourse by means of a description of textual-linguistic features pertinent for the analysis of translated media texts. By employing not only Norm theory, but also Narrative Theory and CDA, this research thus has followed a linguistic and socio-cultural track in DTS. The suggested classification makes it possible to identify a qualitative and quantitative profile for any narrative media texts and their translations in terms of discourse representation, as well as to perform a comparison of similar profiles. In this way, the three models allow the investigations of this study to move beyond the frequency of patterns of behaviour to identify the types of shifts and implications resulting from these patterns and their relations to social and political dogma. Therefore, they are adapted in this study to work as a single framework that recognises and describes the varied, shifting and continuously negotiable positioning of translators in relation to their texts, authors, societies and prevailing ideologies.

The most obvious limitation of this methodology is that it only observes and describes the translator's ideological choices and/or shifts. The focus of interest of this study is translators' behaviour within the framework of their socio-political and historical context. Thus, the analysis will be descriptive and explanatory. Prescriptive or evaluative judgement regarding translator's linguistic competency and translation quality are outside the study's scope and interest. Special emphasis shall be placed on the translator's stance towards the language used and the way it is reflected in the TT, as the issue of language has been a deeply ideological one in Kurdistan historically. Issues concerning the theatrical aspects of the text are beyond the scope of this study. The top-down and bottom-up investigating strategies are involved in this study. The direction and the analysis of the impact of socio-contextual factors on the translation choices in this study are top-down. In essence, top-down analysis, which is also known as macro-analysis, means breaking down the main system to comprehend its compositional sub-systems. It starts with an initial framework of socio-political context and breaks down from there into smaller units. The focus is more on the interplay between the translator's behaviour and the function of the socio-contextual factors rather than the form of the text. However the textual analysis and the analysis of the formulation of the unit of translation in the SL and their counterparts in the

TL are bottom up, i.e., it analyses in detail any level of subsystem to determine the unit of translations in SL and their counterparts in TL. Therefore, the bottom-up analysis takes place once the textual information is extracted from the corpus and analysed according to the framework that includes categories, even the culture-specific ones (see subsection 3.1.2). This will gradually expand to the semantic relationships among them and lead to the scrutiny of any socio-cultural and linguistic differences which, as a result, reflects the type of norms that may exist within the domains. As part of the textual analysis, consequently, six procedures needs to be carried out in this study which are comparison, identification, classification, distinction, quantification and interpretation. The study, therefore, draws on interdisciplinary and complementary models and tools in order to adapt into a single framework for the investigation of the patterns of the translators' behaviour in the following chapters (see the following subsection 3.1.1).

### 3.1.1 The Possible Integration of the Complementary Models

The presentation above has provided the significance of the overall approach to the research process in this study and in the field of translation studies. This subsection shows the interaction among the three key-selected models of DTS, including Toury's (1995) three-phase methodology and Chestermans' (1997) two types of norms, Fairclough's and van Dijk's Critical discourse analysis (CDA), and Baker's (2006, 2007) three types of framing strategies developed from Narrative Theory as complementary models in the course of analysis in this study (see figure 3.1).




Figure 3. 1: Relations between DTS, CDA and Narrative Theory models

Figure 3.1 shows that Toury's Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS) Model is borrowed and adapted as a common-ground analytical framework to show the interconnection between all the selected models operating at different stages in this study. The three-phase methodology of systematic DTS encompasses both CNA and Chesterman's model of norms from its second stage of analysis onwards. The second stage of the methodology is the textual analysis, which involves CNA approach, to identify how socio-political factors manipulate and affect translators' lexico-grammatical choices in relation to the shifts resulting from the translation strategies of deletion, addition and borrowing. This, in turn, facilitates the description of the types of norms in relation to Chesterman's key model of norms in the final stage of Toury's Methodology.

According to Toury (1995, 2012) this study should follow four procedures which are comparison, identification, description, and quantification. However, the target-orientedness approach of this research goes beyond an exclusive focus on the target texts only to cover the constraint factors of patronage and political conflicts in Kurdish media contexts. The study encompasses source text analysis, transfer operations and constraints, transfer features, translation relationships, and target text analysis. It is a target-oriented study "because this is where its observations start" and "would be exhausted" (Toury, 1995, p. 36). DTS is, therefore, appropriate not only in drawing attention to how media texts are translated, but also in examining what media agencies and translators do in the information transmission (Weissbrod 2008, p. 53) which are, in turns, the objectives of this study. In order to achieve these objectives, this research, therefore, will adapt the three-phase methodology of systematic DTS proposed by Toury (2012, pp. 94-95) as explained below:

The first stage of the analysis in this study focuses on the study of the translated texts individually in terms of acceptability and accessibility on all relevant levels not only as target language texts, but also as translations into it. The corpus, which is outlined in detail in the next section (3.2), consists of geopolitical commentary articles. As defined in the first two chapters, geopolitical texts are defined as parts of politics itself and not an unbiased and isolated depiction of an obvious detached reality. The texts selected for this study are produced by various news agencies and translated by four Kurdish news agencies for the general public. The translated

texts are considered prominent Kurdish geopolitical texts since they are accepted as translations of the source texts by four influential Kurdish media agencies, which are *Sbeiy*, *Kurdistan-i-New*, *Xendan* and *Rudaw* news agencies, as well as the general public in Iraqi Kurdistan. Furthermore, the way in which texts are selected for translation is considered to be strongly informed by the direct or indirect affiliation of the four main Kurdish media agencies to different political parties (patrons).

The next stage encompasses a textual analysis in which the ST segments are mapped onto their assumed counterparts in the TL in order to reveal the type of relationships between them. These segments or units of comparison require critical narrative analysis (CNA) in order to examine the relationships between the ST and the TT and identify and interpret where the two texts correspond and differ (see the following subsection 3.1.2). When performing an initial textual analysis, it seems that some linguistic features in the TTs are different from those in the STs in terms of evaluative meanings and styles on the level of lexico-grammatical choices. Therefore, the unit of comparisons that are of interest to this study are lexico-grammatical choices, which may not have always one-to-one correspondence in the TT while mapped onto their counterparts in the source language. They are, therefore, regarded as shifts of evaluation (deviations of evaluation). Thus, the textual analysis of the study focuses on the deviations or distortions resulting from both semantic and stylistic differences in gradation between the English commentary articles and their translations. The quantitative analysis constitutes part of the study that is used as means of providing supporting evidence for a qualitative CNA approach. In other words, the semantic and stylistic deviations in the translated texts are caused by a number of identified reframing strategies known as borrowing, deletion (omission), addition, substitution, and literal translation. The number and percentage of these translation strategies help in exploring and grouping dominant shifts along with their implication. This, in turn, provides this study with a clear description of the mediation evidenced by the deviations in the translated media texts. The ST and the TT are compared and analysed to identify different patterns of departures along with their implications in evaluative meaning and style before quantifying the type of deviations and establishing dominant deviation patterns (see the following subsection for more detail).

Following the comparative analysis process, the third stage of this study, adapted from Toury's DTS draws generalisations on the basis of recurrent patterns of behaviour that are identified in the two texts. The observations, which are based on data analysis including word level and above word level, will indicate if the diffusion of foreign borrowing, addition, substitution and deletion are engendered by the existence of an ideology or the non-standardisation of Kurdish, or if such diffusion is a general norm or tendency (Chesterman 1997; Toury 1995/2012; Pym 2008; Baker 1993, 1995, 1996; Lefevere 1992b; Tymoczko 2000, 2010) pursued among the selected media agencies and translators. The outcome of the data analysis, therefore, is significant since it works as a device to identify ideological shifts in Kurdish media translation, which is the central question this study seeks to answer. In other words, with reference to the translation of geopolitical texts, especially Kurdistan, this study seeks to find out to what extent geopolitical and contextual factors affect Kurdish translators' textual strategies. The recurrent patterns established by the comparative data analysis can be suggestive of the translation behaviours of media translators, on the basis of which translation norms that operate in the current practice of English-Kurdish media translation can be uncovered. This, eventually, leads to achieving the aim of this study which is the identification of the type of norms operating in Kurdish media, including the dominant type and the discussion of the factors behind their existence (Chesterman 1997). This aim supports the selection of text type and genre in this study that is geopolitical commentary articles.

### **3.1.2 Critical Narrative Analysis (CNA)**

The previous subsection has discussed the appropriateness of the three selected models as a means of data collection and data analysis in this study. With the focus on lexicogrammatical analysis, DTS offers a common-ground model of describing the quantitative analysis of the patterns of translation behaviour. The qualitative analysis of this study, however, requires critical narrative analysis (CNA) parameters to explore how translation strategies inform ideology along with their impact on media translation. This subsection, therefore, illustrates how CDA and the narrative model function as useful tools at the second stage of Toury's three-phase methodology. Following CNA approach, the qualitative textual exploration of this study is of twofold analysis:

In the first stage, CDA operates to identify stylistic and semantic deviations in the TT lexico-grammatical choices while compared to their STs. The lexico-grammatical choices are investigated at word level and above word level, including parts of speech, sentences and paragraphs. The determinative series of systematic coupled pairs in the mapping process leads to the identification of the translation choices in relation to the translation strategies which include cases of literal translation, deletions, additions, substitutions and borrowings. At word level, this study investigates shifts arising from the translation strategies with regard to vocabularies as ST individual lexical units in a given contexts (Halliday, 1978, p. 39). Above word level, the lexico-grammatical patterning will be dealt with using translation strategies with regard to words combining with other words to form stretches of language (Baker 2011a, p. 51) which may include expressions such as collocations, phrases, clauses, sentence and even paragraphs. Nevertheless, both individual lexical units and word combinations in the ST may not have one-to-one correspondence in the TT. In other words, they may have been expressed differently or paraphrased in the respective TT due to their non-lexicalisation and/or because of socio-political factors since the STs are commentary articles that represent geopolitical topics. The couple-pair establishment at this stage reveals the type of translation strategy used to make shifts by translators.

Fairclough's socio-functional dimensions provide the analysis mentioned above with a mean of revealing the relationship between language in use (lexico-grammatical choices) and the socio-relations and processes in which language use is imbricated (1995b, p. 73). The textual analysis in this thesis, thus, starts with Fairclough's (1992; 1993) functional three-dimensional model of CDA in which text, discursive practice and social practice function dialectically within every discursive event. Any communicative event in this study is, thus, examined on three dimensions for the way in which values and power relations are encoded in texts.






Figure 3. 2: Fairclough's three dimension analytical model

Figure 3.2 shows that the analysis is performed in three procedures which are description, interpretation and explanation. Text analysis is conducted with the description of linguistic features of the text. This includes the lexico-grammatical choices used for indexing social identities, relations between them, and textual organisation indicative of the broader discourse structure in the discursive situation. The in-between level of discursive practice operates as the bond between text and social practice, interpreting the way a text is produced, construed and consumed. According to Fairclough (1992), the analysis at this dimension should combine the 'micro-analysis' and 'macro-analysis' (p. 85). Micro-analysis denotes the detailed textual analysis delineated above.

Macro-analysis refers to the depiction of the "orders of discourse", which is the relevant wider discursive context in which the text is situated. This realises the nature of the resources being drawn on for the production of texts. Thus, "orders of discourse" effectively covers the notion of intertextuality which represents the links between one text and its preceding texts and other categories of text (Fairclough 1997, p. 119). According to Fairclough (ibid, p. 86), it is because of the interrelationship between the micro-and macro-analysis that the dimension of discursive practice can mediate between text and social practice. Explanation is concerned with the stage of exploring socio-cultural and political factors to explicate possible social facets of the process of producing and interpreting the text. The third dimension of social practice, thus, relates discourse to the notions of ideology and power. According to van Dijk (2006, p. 164), however, "contexts are only observable by their consequences on discourse". Here "consequences of discourse" could be interpreted as the projection of social participants'

interpretations of communicative situations onto the observable parameters such as discourse and text. Thus, van Dijk pays significant attention to the role of text as the basis for discourse analysis. In his words, contexts are only interesting for discourse analysts “because they involved language use, text, or talk as its constituent or component practical activity” (p. 165). The central task of CDA is, thus, postulated as exposing of the embedded ideologies in discursive practices at both micro-and macro levels mentioned above.

In the second stage, narrative model explores the implication of the identified deviated choices by examining the sites and strategies of framing used by the translators both around and within the translated texts, synchronically and diachronically. According to an initial data analysis, which was carried out in order to reveal the type of translation strategies used in the translation of geopolitical commentary articles, the most common strategies employed to transmit the ST information are: deletion, addition, substitution (deletion and addition), and borrowing (Vinay and Darbelnet 1958/2004; Newmark 1988; Chesterman 1997; Baker 2011a; van Leven-Zwart 1989; Nida 1964; Baker 2006, 2007). However, in order to find out the discursive effect of the strategies that are used in media translation, this study refers to Baker’s (2006, 2007) model of framing strategies. The reframing strategies in Baker’s model provide the analysis of this study with helpful tools in examining how the ideological and evaluative elements in Kurdish media translation are rendered. In other words, it helps to find out if translators are manipulating the STs to favour or undermine the dominant narratives in the target society and/or reframing the ST to motivate the reader to reconsider his/her position regarding these dominant narratives. This, in turn, explores the extent to which translation agencies and newspapers allowing ideology to inform their news output and translation policies.

The preliminary data analysis also revealed other types of translational shift in the TTs which are the cases of mistranslations as a result of literal translation strategy. These cases are important as they show where the translator fails to achieve the function of meaning rendition since, regardless of their inconsistency with the STs, the TT correspondences do not make sense to the TT recipient due to the co-text and/or neglect of context. This function element is considered significant to this study’s investigation and also the text type and genre of our study corpus. This is due to the fact that the text-type of both STs and TTs in this kind of genre and text type is information transfer of opinion and/or attitudes. In other words, they have

informative purpose since they transfer opinions and assessments of facts. Bearing in mind that the STs and TTs are geopolitical commentary articles, the majority of their lexical choices function as keywords in terms of maintaining the authors and/ or translators' opinions' and assessments of the geopolitical facts and their impacts on the overall textual meaning. Based on the outcomes of the initial data analysis, the reasons behind those translational shifts which are not mistranslations refer to ideology. This can help us test the first assumption to see if ideology plays a great role in the occurrence of both lexical and stylistic shifts in Kurdish media translation. Besides, the aforementioned translation strategies are all the focus of thorough investigation in the comparative data analysis in order to attain a deeper knowledge of translation behaviours practised by translators in the Kurdish media. This leads to an exploration of the preferred strategies which lead to lexical shift and stylistic shift in Kurdish media translation, respectively. This, in turn, can help us to achieve the third stage of Toury's analysis and find out any correlation between the abovementioned strategies and the lack of standardised Kurdish, ideology or other possible tendencies.

The qualitative analysis in this study thus required examining both the ST and TT texts in terms of deviations and their implications on account of the fact that they provide evidence of processes such as the construction and reconstruction of knowledge and identities and the redefinition of social relationships. Critical narrative theory (CNA), which combines CDA and Narrative Theory, offers a significant mode of analysis by considering the language power differences of institution and society, dissimilarities which have largely been overlooked in the analysis of media narrative. The translated media commentary narratives as a genre offer institutional discourses an effective way to assert themselves as power discourses. CNA thus allows this study to explore how translators make their choices in constant social interactions at both personal and institutional levels, and how institutional discourses affect and are affected by everyday narratives. This is significant because the translator's narratives (strategies/choices) are created and positioned in social and institutional contexts, yet and by large, they are investigated apart from issues of power and/or institution. CNA suggests that when translators make sense of their choices through narratives, they bring together the micro (personal) and macro (social or institutional) contexts in place. Following Toury's comparative analysis and considering translators' choices as strategies to reframe ST narratives, CDA offers the opportunity to investigate the constructions and reconstruction of these narratives in both

the STs and the TT to identify deviations. This is explored in detail in the following chapters where many case studies reveal how textual strategies reframed narratives.

### 3.2 Corpus Design

This section provides a detailed description of the corpus utilised in this study in terms of its selection criteria. These include mode, genre, domain, text type, medium, language, authorship, time and the publication status of texts.

Corpus-based approaches have been an object of study for some decades and the field of translation studies has seen an increased interest in their use and construction. Being rather new in Kurdish, translational corpus compilations have received little attention compared with those in other languages such as English. However, translation researchers do not have a great deal of choice in terms of already existing resources since translational corpus compilation reflects the goals of the study and its context of production, a reason that leads the researchers to build their own corpora (Zanettin 2012, p. 8). This is consistent with the creation of an English-Kurdish media corpus in this study since building such a type of corpus needs to meet the requirements of the respective study. In other words, since this study looks into the translation strategies used by media translators to convey geopolitical information written in English, in particular borrowings, additions and deletions, it requires a corpus rich with geopolitical information and reflecting different views. The translated texts that meet this criterion in Kurdish are geopolitical commentary articles produced by Kurdish media agencies. They are available in the public domain and produced by four known Kurdish media agencies, which are *Sbeiy*, *Xendan*, *Kurdistan-i-Nwe*, and *Rudaw* media agencies. They are readily available in the public domain and the target audience have access to them both as STs and TTs<sup>32</sup>. This leads to a subject of reflexive discourse about what appears in the Kurdish media generally and the four Kurdish media agencies in particular. This study includes a bilingual mono-directional parallel corpus. It comprises a collection of parallel texts of original and

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<sup>32</sup> In many of the online Kurdish newspapers, comments and suggestions at the bottom of the page show that some of the target readers made close readings of both the translated texts and the source texts, in particular in terms of lexical choices.

translated texts that provide an empirical study of the product and process of translation. The original texts are written in English and translated into Kurdish by different translators who are native speakers of the target language. The STs of this corpus are written in English by various authors or commentators who are usually editors or columnists with special expertise on topics judged to be of broad significance to the readership, both STs and TTs. The TTs are translated by Kurdish translators into Kurdish Soranî for four recognised media agencies. The texts, therefore, offer suitable text type and genre for analysis in this study considering the above-mentioned substantial features.

### **3.2.1 Selection Criteria**

The corpus is employed on the premise that it can be used as a representative sample to answer those questions raised in the course of this study. The question of representativeness is somewhat problematic in corpus-based translation studies as outlined by Saldanha and O'Brien (2013). They suggest obtaining representative corpus is most challenging when dealing with translation because "translation flows from and into any two languages tend to be unequal, representativeness and comparability are often conflicting goals" (p. 72). Media is a broad area encompassing many different people, topics and organisations which provide information and news for the general public. It comprises the printed and electronic media such as newspaper, magazine, film, radio broadcasting, TV broadcasting, music records and so forth. Each comprises various types of texts in terms of their function and place in society. They may be used to accomplish different purposes, e.g., providing information, entertainment, political and publicity campaign and so forth. Nevertheless, the corpus of this study includes geopolitical commentary articles and their translated correspondence as a significant representative sample of a language register used among Kurdish media. They are considered to be significant translations performed by different Kurdish media agencies and their translators from English into Kurdish. They are, therefore, a significant sample that can represent the (written) language register of Kurdish used among Kurdish media translators.

It is important to bear in mind that as an Iraqi Kurdish Scholar, I have tried to be objective in my positioning as a researcher. The selection of the study's articles, however, in

relation to the geopolitical situation in Iraqi Kurdistan may subconsciously have its own impact on the judgements of the representative case and reflect elements of subjectivity. As a researcher, I have attempted to include the texts which are authentic and represent Kurdish media translation in terms of the lexico-grammatical choices. To try to counteract that fact that I'm ideologically positioned as a researcher, I have developed a methodology that is heavily based on objective criteria like deletions, additions and borrowings. The focus of the study is on the period after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, in particular from 2011 to the end of 2014, during which time Iraqi Kurdistan experienced a remarkable upsurge of public interest in media translation. Since March 2011, Syria and Iraqi's civil wars have created new opportunities for the long repressed Syrian Kurds and semi-independent Iraqi Kurds to create new forms of Kurdish governance in Syria and Iraq, respectively (King 2014, p. 211-212). This has attracted the world media's attention and headlines which has had, in turn, a significant impact on Kurdish media translation. The language used reflects the linguistic, social, cultural, and political status of Kurdish translation of the time.

In this research, the focus is on the strategies used by the Kurdish translators in electronic commentary articles which reflect online translation. The ST producers are journalists with wide-ranging areas of expertise as well as professional background in Middle East studies, in particular the Kurdish geopolitical question. The significance of this element in relation to our investigation is that it indicates the authors' opinions and assessments of the Middle East facts are of high interest to the target readership since they are considered experts in the field of this type. For instance, the translated articles by the American journalist Thomas Loren Friedman, columnist and author, who writes a twice-weekly column for *The New York Times* and has written extensively on foreign affairs including the Middle East and the Kurdish issue, and has won the Pulitzer Prize three times, are of great interest to the Kurdish readers who gladly received him when he visited Iraqi Kurdistan. With regard to the translated texts in the corpus, they are translated by various Kurdish translators who translate for different Kurdish media agencies. It follows that the policy of the agencies and the translators' ideology and expertise as well apply to the TT's in terms of text-selection policy for translation and lexical choices in relation to translation strategies, the hypothesis that this study tests.

## Size

Since the size of corpus design related to its representation and features this study wants to focus on, it is a significant criteria to achieve such representativeness (Saldanha and O'Brien 2013, p. 73). The corpus of this study includes 60 English commentary articles (STs) which are published by different news agencies plus 60 of their Kurdish translation (TTs) which are published by four Kurdish media agencies. Four important factors contribute to the compilation of the corpus of this study:

The investigation requirements are closely related to the aim and questions of the research (see section 3.0 of this chapter and section 1.2 of chapter one), the features this study focuses on (see section 3.2) as well as the corpus representation tendency (Saldanha and O'Brien 2013, p. 73). In other words, the corpus is employed to answer those research questions raised in the course of this study. The corpus data are described and analysed through various methods and techniques that allow end users to make sense of practical examples and case studies. The hypotheses are tested using a parallel corpus of English texts and their Kurdish translation from one type of genre, commentary articles. The initial criteria for selecting a parallel corpus are peripheral, provisional, and based on the target language system. Each English text is parallel to its Kurdish full translation in terms of its function, topic, and genre. However, they are by multiple authors as well as multiple translators to ensure including diversity of geopolitical topics as well as translation strategies, respectively. In addition, the STs may not necessary have one-to-one correspondence in the TL, therefore, they might be rendered by various strategies such as borrowing, deletion, addition and so forth. The aim, thus, is to uncover TTs that show a variety of translation strategies for the analysis based on their ST correspondence. This leads to the maximisation of the corpus representativeness and uncovering dominant translation strategies.

Time and data availability play a significant role in the compilation of corpus of this study (Hunston 2002, p. 27). The availability of the corpus used in this study is on a limited scale, since it consists only of those published commentary articles that are translated by four Kurdish media agencies. Another issue that delimits the corpus is selecting suitable articles that would meet the study's requirements in terms of topic and recent publication dates. It contains

only those texts which include geopolitical information about the Middle East in general and Kurds in particular. Setting also plays a great role in the process of analysis in general and in the target texts in particular since it contributes to investigating the current trends in English-Kurdish media translation. Setting refers to a time and place when and where the events happened. The time means the date of the publication of the texts. In regard to this, both of the English and Kurdish corpora are roughly published within the same period. The STs and TTs dated from 2011-2014, during which time Iraqi Kurdistan witnessed a remarkable flow of public interest in media translation as a result of political changes in the Middle East. The language used reflects the linguistic, social, cultural, and political status of Kurdish translation of the time.

Time availability for conducting this research is another factor behind the size selection of this corpus since it is limited (Saldanha and O'Brien 2013, p. 73). Apart from theoretical consideration, building a corpus is a time-consuming process in translation studies because they do not already exist as a ready-made corpus. Although the corpus of this study relies on electronic commentary articles, its construction is extremely time-consuming, partly because of the huge number of the texts available (especially English sources) that makes the search difficult. In order to be able to fully analyse and interpret the data within the three years of the study, only a specific period of time can be given to the construction of the corpus. Furthermore, distinguishing between translated and non-translated texts is another factor, since some of the translated texts do not mention the source which they translated from. Attempts were made to collect larger translated geopolitical articles and even other types of genres that include geopolitical topics such as books. Nevertheless, the attempts were not successful due to the restricted time of the research has and the period on which it focuses on, i.e., 2011-2014. Besides, the corpus includes translated geopolitical commentary articles from only four specific Kurdish media agencies and this limits the text availability of such type during the time 2011-2014. As this research centres on the question of the extent to which ideology shapes translation, the most fruitful strategy proved to be the cross-comparison of newspaper articles translated by agencies and newspapers with avowedly different ideologies.

The length of the texts likewise contributes as another factor behind the selected-size of the corpus (Saldanha and O'Brien 2013, p. 73; Olohan 2004, p. 92). Although, source texts and



translations can, in theory, be aligned text by text, paragraph by paragraph, sentence by sentence, clause by clause or even word by word, it is obviously exceedingly difficult to achieve word alignment inasmuch as languages are not translated word for word. Therefore, this study considers the whole text and focuses on the relevant sections where the strategies including borrowing, addition and omission occur. The text extracts are taken from the beginning, middle and end of the texts, where the strategies appear (Bowker and Pearson 2002, p.49). The source texts (STs) are fully translated into Kurdish. The ST segments are compared to their corresponding units in the translation. They are presented within aligning paragraphs and paragraph structure is preserved from entire source text to translation. Since the texts used in this corpus are commentary articles, the length of each is typically between 500 -1500 words. Nevertheless, this denotes that the text selection is also based on some other criteria which are genre, text type, medium, and place.

## **Genre**

Genre refers to a certain type of written or spoken text which has a particular set of characteristics that all examples of this type share. According to Biber (1998, pp. 170), “genre categories are determined on the basis of external criteria relating to the speaker's purpose and topic; they are assigned on the basis of use rather than on the basis of form”. As such, external criteria refer to the intended audience, purpose, and activity type. In other words, genre based on non-linguistic criteria refer to a conventional, culturally established groupings of texts and the subject to change when challenged over time. The genre of the texts used in this study covers online commentary articles. The commentaries usually include both *editorials* and *op-ed* articles. The former are written by or on behalf of an editor while the latter is printed on the page opposite the editorial page in newspaper. However, both have similar functions in that they offer an opinion on a topic regarding what is going on in the Middle East in general and Kurdistan in particular. As geopolitical journalistic texts, therefore, they play a definitive role in the formation and altering of public opinion.

The initial corpus was to include translated texts of two different genres: commentary articles and books. The study, however, excludes books. Although preliminary analysis of the data revealed that both commentary articles and books include geopolitical topics, nevertheless,

they are of different page length and size. The article's typical length ranges from 500 to 2000 words, but very rarely more than 2 pages, while the three books consist of very long chapters. It also indicated that while the translated commentary articles are performed by four selected Kurdish media agencies between 2011 and 2014, the translated books are translated by different publishing houses in 2003, 2004 and 2007. The selected commentary articles have more to do with the current geopolitical situation of the Middle East and key questions of ideology that this study focuses on while the selected books are more historical. Moreover, the initial data analysis shows while the translated articles are performed by more than 27 translators<sup>33</sup> with different ideologies, while the books are translated by three translators. These differences indicate that these two different text genres may not give us logical outcomes if compared due to different features of each. On the bases of the outcomes of the preliminary data analysis, the study's aims and questions were revised and the study corpus includes only newspaper commentary articles.

## **Place**

Place refers to the place where the publications issued. The publications do not belong to one specific agency and furthermore their translated versions are not from one single publication agency as well. The articles form an independent part of publications, i.e., daily newspapers. This study uses 120 articles (60 pairs) published in different news agencies by different authors and translators. The published articles from English news agencies are used as source texts and compared to their counterparts published by Kurdish news agencies. The place of publication is of great importance and value as it has an effect on the TT readers. ST sources are considered worldwide electronic newspapers. The source texts published online have been sourced from 27 sources that allow various opinions and assessments of the geopolitical facts by different writers. Since most of the writers of these articles are academic experts in Middle East Politics in general and the Kurdish question in particular, their views and assessments are of great importance to the Kurdish readers. The source texts are from:

*The New York Times, The Washington Post, Time, The Independent, Reuters, The*

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<sup>33</sup> 15 texts are translated and published by *Rudaw* media agency without referring to the translators' name.

*Commenter, USA Today, CNN World, New Republic, Forbs, The Daily Star, The Metro Daily Star, The Monitor, The Spectator, Rudaw, Bloomberg, Israel Hayom, OpedNews, Foreignpolicy.com, Asia Times, Houstonchronicle.com, WSWS.org, Hurriyet daily News, Netease International News, The National, Socialist International, and Today Zaman.*

The target texts have been published under the “opinion” section in four popular electronic Kurdish newspapers which are *Xendan, Sbeiy, Kurdistan-i-New*, and *Rudaw* media agencies. These newspapers, which are investigated and described in the next chapter in detail (4.2), are directly or indirectly affiliated to the Kurdish political parties. They have their own policy in terms of text-selection for translation and lexical choices, a reason that leads to the use of various translation strategies, therefore comprising an important element of this study.

## **Medium**

Another criterion relates to the medium which refers to the communicative format of the source text and target text (Bowker and Pearson 2002, p. 49). This study utilises Excel which allows broad applicability to data set management manually and systematically computer-based. This corpus only contains electronic versions of published written texts. Being published, the texts are suitable as standards of language production. Although both the STs and TTs are in electronic format, part of the analysis requires a manually created data. The available corpus analysis software tools do not meet the requirements of this study’s investigation, especially in terms of the role of ideology and the occurrence of translation strategies. However, Excel is helpful for creating tables and charts to display qualitative and quantitative data in a graphical format in this study. The advanced features such as power pivot tables and pivot charts, total grand, analysis toolkit, and many templates make it easy to accomplish a wide range of tasks.

### **3.2.2 Data Compartmentalisation**

The manual investigation is carried out on this corpus in order to classify the selected connective devices according to meaning and function. This is then extended to an analogical comparison that allows the further extraction of material which was then analysed

automatically. The ST-TT segments in the corpus are manually encoded in two stages. In the first stage, each ST is compared to its correspondence in the TL in order to determine where the two texts differ semantically and/ or syntactically. When the ST-TT segments are identified, they are inserted into the Excel spreadsheet manually. Since there is no one-to-one correspondence usually, translators adopt strategies such as borrowing, deletion, addition, literal translation. These strategies may, in turn, may lead to translational shifts, syntactically and semantically. In the second stage, thus, the ST-TT segments are classified in terms of the translation strategies used and the types of shift they caused. The aim is to establish significant trends and patterns. At this stage, the data categorisation needs also to include the strategy level in terms of word level and above word level. This allows the addition of another column considering the data in terms of nouns, verbs, expressions, and so forth. After the manual data insertion, including segmentation and categorisation, into Excel is completed, the Excel spreadsheet is manipulated for the data arrangement in rows and columns of a grid and used in calculation.

The manual and systematically computer-based data categorisation is based on the aims and the questions this study seeks to answer. Since this study aims to identify which patterns and trends develop from the corpus analysis, the data analysed needs to be described in accordance with certain criteria. The selected corpus is dependent on wide ranging external and internal scrutiny (Saldanha and O'Brien 2013, p. 71; Zanettin 2012, p. 152). The selection criteria result from the investigation of the communicative function of the texts and are external criteria, while those which reflect details of the language of the texts are internal criteria. Quite regardless of what the textual content of the articles is, the external criteria reveal the sort of articles that people are writing and reading. In other words, it encompasses the corpus size, ST and TT publishers with the date of their publications, genre of publication, ST-TT authors and translators respectively and so forth. Based on external criteria, internal criteria reveals the contents of the corpus of this study with regard to the utilised language in terms of topic manifestation that is certainly found in the used vocabularies. In other words, it refers to ST-TT segments, back translations (BT), mistranslations, translation strategies, and translational shifts. As the corpus takes shape on the basis of internal and external criteria, it maintains comparison between the actual dimensions of the material and the original plan leads to retrieve evidence in support of achieving and answering the aims and questions of this study, respectively.

This chapter has illustrated the overall approach to the research process and the detailed description about the corpus design of the available data in this study. It also shed light on the fact that subjectivity cannot be entirely avoided despite the developed methodology which is based on the objective criteria of deletion, addition and borrowing strategies used by the translators. A triangulation of methods is adapted in order to provide an intelligible scrutiny of mediation at diverse levels: lexico-grammatical, textual, and contextual. Toury's Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS) model is borrowed and adapted as a common-ground analytical framework to show the interconnection between all the selected models operating at different stages in this study. Along with Chesterman's concept of norms, they function as complementary models in order to describe the type of norms operating within the context of Kurdish media translation. The socio-cognitive and functional parameters parallel to van Dijk's and Fairclough's critical discourse analysis of textual analysis serve as a micro- and macro-level device for the close examination of texts in their socio-political contexts. At the macro-level, Baker's model of Narrative Theory accounts for the impact of the correlation between power enactment and discourse production in a more profound manner.

## **Chapter Four**

### **Translation in Practice I:**

#### **Text-Selection Policies and Stylistic Framing in Kurdish Media**

##### **Translation**

#### **4.0 Introduction**

The previous chapter addressed the corpus in terms of its structure as a representative entity by both qualitative and quantitative means with the methodology on which the research of this study is based. This chapter investigates and compares the corpus components drawing on methodology in order to address the aims and answer the questions of the study. It explores the interplay between stylistic shifts and socio-political ideology by examining the way that the strategies of borrowing can be manipulated at lexical level to distort translations, and is informed by (and actively informs) the ideologies of both the translators and major newspaper agencies.

The chapter starts with an overview of the four selected Kurdish media agencies, their text-selection policy for translation, and the hierarchy of the translational strategies used in the translation of English geopolitical commentary texts into Kurdish. The focus will be on the functional translation strategy that led to stylistic shifts in the corpus of this study and it discusses the lexical choices with regard to borrowing strategy in the media from two perspectives, at word level and above word level. The choices include parts of speech, acronyms, expressions and names. In addition, the chapter investigates the role of the four Kurdish media agencies, translators, and socio-political factors in the occurrence of such lexical choices when translated from English into Kurdish. Based on the results of the aggregated data of the comparative study, this chapter endeavours to answer the questions raised in the course of this study. It argues that lexical borrowing is the prevalent translation strategy that leads to stylistic shifts. The chapter questions the possible underlying motivations behind the outcomes of the choices on the part of the translators in Kurdish media translation. The aim is to find out if they are driven by ideology and to show the prevailing tendencies that lead to the identification of the current translational norms in the study corpus.

## 4.1 Text-Selection Policy in Kurdish Media

This section presents a comprehensive overview of the four selected Kurdish media agencies in the corpus of this study along with their relationship to the text-selection policy for translation and the political parties to which they are directly or indirectly related. It investigates the role of socio-political factors in the translation of media texts into Kurdish and the extent to which translation agencies and newspapers are allowing ideology to apprise their news output and translation policies.

Marsden and Savigny (2009, p. 98) argue that ideology in general and political ideology in particular plays a significant role in the selection of texts for publication in Kurdish media. The same holds true in their translation selection policy. Following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, the geopolitical situation transcended domestic issues to become a conflict zone for the Middle East and indeed the whole world (Watts 2010, p. x; Anderson 2004, p. 172). The discussion of the Kurdish geopolitical issue is a significant focus for the world media pages. Being a stateless nation, the Kurds are interested in the discussions that produce, reproduce and disseminate discursive constructions about their identities. Kurdish media agencies play a substantial role in the reproduction and dissemination of what is being written and considered relevant to Kurdish issues in the world media pages. This may be due to a belief among them that what is written and reported from outside would have greater authority and impact than homegrown produce. Within the significant amount of translated texts available, the selection and dissemination policy of these texts reflects the geopolitical rivalries between the political parties in Kurdistan. Birot (2012) argues that, "the role of ideology in translation starts even before the process of translation, i.e. when the translator or the agency chooses to translate a text and not another". However, his findings are based on anecdotal evidence rather than extensive research. Likewise, similar cases can be observed in the four selected news agencies in this study, which are *Sbeiy*, *Xendan*, *Rudaw* and *Kurdistan-i-New* (see sub-sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2). Nevertheless, while different perspectives can be articulated and perhaps be heard and made visible, it is still necessary to inspect and question the motives behind any strategies, if any, of those who translate the messages. Meanwhile, before investigating the translators' choices in relation to the use of translational strategies in the study corpus, it is important to give an overview of the four selected Kurdish media agencies in terms of their associations with

Kurdish parties in the region. In this way, this study provides a comprehensive analysis of the translated texts in relation to the ideology of both the translators and their patrons in the context of Kurdish media translation.

#### 4.1.1 Party Media and Text-Selection Policy

This sub-section investigates the text-selection policy of the two Kurdish media agencies that are directly associated with political parties in Kurdistan. The study will establish a comparative study of the texts selected for translation by the media agencies holding different viewpoints on political and ideological issues with the aim of revealing the relationship between the policy of the agencies and the translated texts. *Sbeiy* media agency and *Kurdistan-i-New* media agency are directly affiliated to the *Gorran* movement and the Patriotic Union Party, respectively. Both *Gorran* and *PUK* are considered left wing political parties supporting social equality, but *PUK* is more centre-left.

*Sbeiy* news agency constitutes an integral part of *Kurdish News Network (KNN)*, which was “founded in 2008 as a subsidiary of the Wusha Corporation”. It launched as an online daily newspaper in 2008 in the city of Sulaymaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan, as noted on its website (<http://sbeiy.com/>). They all belong to the opposition party, the *Gorran Movement* in Iraqi Kurdistan which won 25 seats, an unexpectedly high number (out of 111 seats) in the Kurdish national assembly in the KRG elections held on July 25, 2009 (IBP 2012, p. 159). According to the party’s official website, the *Change Movement* or *Gorran* was officially publicised as a political organisation on 31 May 2010 after receiving permission from the Interior Ministry of the Kurdistan region<sup>34</sup>. *Sbeiy* news agency and *KNN* were known for their strongly critical stance against the main ruling parties and government in Iraqi Kurdistan. Although they describe themselves as an “an independent Kurdish media group” (*KNN*)<sup>35</sup>, their philosophy is based on the ideology of the *Change Movement (Gorran)*. One of the distinguishing ideological factors is hiding behind the blue colour which represents the *Change movement (Gorran)*, led

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<sup>34</sup> <http://gorran.net/En/Content.aspx?LinkID=137&Action=2>

<sup>35</sup> <http://knnc.net/en/About>



by Nawshirwan Mustafa (Figure 1, 2, and 3). Likewise, a similar ideological alignment can be seen in the text-selection policy for translation when it comes to geopolitical texts. For instance, when *Today's Zaman* newspaper published two commentary articles arguing how successful the *Gorran* party was in the elections and what impact it would have on the future of Iraqi Kurdistan, they were translated from English by the *Sbeiy* news agency (Appendix A.1). In a similar manner, several similar articles are translated from English as well as Arabic (Appendix A. 2 and 3). Meanwhile, when *Derstandard* newspaper criticizes Massud Barzani, the president of the *KRG* and leader of the *PDK*, for not being ready to abandon power, and when *Bultann* News describes how Jalal Talabani's party, the *PUK*, was defeated in parliamentary elections in Iraqi Kurdistan, they are translated from German and Persian languages into Kurdish by the same agency, respectively (Appendix A.4 and 5). In addition, a similar article can be seen in the appendix (AE.7) where *Asia Times* criticizes the rule of *PDK* in English and it was translated into Kurdish (AKS.7) by *Sbeiy* media agency. Although some of the articles used here are not translated from English, they are included since they constitute a significant part of the agency's text-selection policy. They are, therefore, used as examples as they refer to the agencies' philosophy in relation to geopolitical ideology.




Figure 4. 1: Sbeiy News Agency



Figure 4. 2 : Kurdish News Network



Figure 4. 3: Official Website of the Change Movement (Gorran)

*Kurdistan-i-Nwe* is the *PUK*'s Kurdish Newspaper available as an online version of a printed periodical at <http://www.knwe.org/Default.aspx>. It was launched in 2000 and, therefore, is considered to be the first Kurdish newspaper to publish a digital version online. It constitutes part of the *PUK*'s group of publications, which includes the Arabic daily *al-Ittihad*, the *Kurdish PUKonline.net*, and *PUKmedia* which publishes in Kurdish, Arabic, Turkish, Russian and English. Since they all belong to the *PUK*, they are represented via similar logos and colours (Figure 4). Therefore, this study utilises all the translated texts (15 texts) published by the *PUK*'s group of publications and presents them under the name of *Kurdistan-i-New*.



Figure 4. 4: Official PUK Websites

Being a partisan media, the translated texts are usually in favour of this party. For instance, when Thomas L. Friedman wrote the editorial article “5 Principles for Iraq” (AE.18), he talked about Najimaldin Omar Karim, who is a political figure in the PUK, in the principle before the final one in a positive way. The article is translated into Kurdish and published twice under two different titles. While PUKmedia translated the same title into Kurdish (A.6), PUKonline changes the title into “تۆماس فریدمان چی لهبارهی عیراق و د.نهمجدهین کهریم-موه دهلیت” (AKK.18), (BT: What Thomas L. Friedman says about Iraq and Dr Najimaldin Karim)(see chapter 6 for details). The overview above has illustrated the direct relationship between the selected Kurdish media agencies of Sbeiyy and Kurdistan-i-Nwe and the two Kurdish political parties of Gorran and PUK, respectively. It has also shown that the text selection policies for translation reflect, to an extent, the ideology of the two Kurdish political parties to which the two media agencies are directly aligned. Such a policy was more prominent in the selection of the articles for translation with headlines including geopolitical narratives that praise the two parties or criticises their rivals. This is similar to Lefevere’s idea of patronage (1992b). The selection of particular texts for translation and the substitution of the headline narratives with specific information that supports the party to which the media agency is directly aligned reflect the institutional power relation. The policy can be interpreted in relation to the ideological component of patronage rather than its poetics. This might be due to the media’s (patron’s) attempt to regulate the relationship between the text selection for translation and the system policy of the political party to which it is directly affiliated.

#### 4.1.2 Shadow Media and Text-Selection Policy

The previous sub-section has shown that political ideology plays a significant role in the text selection policy for translation and reflects the ideology of the political parties to which the

two media agencies are directly aligned. This next sub-section investigates the motivations and ideology behind the text selection policy of the two selected Kurdish media agencies in the corpus of this study which position themselves so as to be free from political bias. They are the media agencies *Xendan* and *Rudaw*.

They are considered to be affiliated indirectly to the two Kurdish ruling parties. Sabir (2013) described both *Xendan* and *Rudaw* news agencies as shadow media for claiming independence while they are subservient to the two political parties *PUK* and *PDK*, respectively. The *PDK* has historically maintained a broad base of political allegiances, acting as a big-tent party ranging from tribal conservatives to socialists. Today this party is regarded as populist and nationalist. According to *Reporters without Borders* (2010, p.8), the term ‘shadow’ is “created to fill the gap existing between the partisan media and the independent media”. In this sense, the two agencies are referred to as semi-independent media which denotes that they are indirectly affiliated to the two political parties (p.9).

*Xendan* newspaper is an electronic newspaper which publishes in the two languages of Kurdish and Arabic. It is one of the projects of *Xendan Foundation* for broadcasting and publishing which was founded in the city of Sulaymaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2004. It launched as an online daily newspaper in 2010 and is available at: <http://www.xendan.org/>, describing itself as free from party political bias and proprietorial influence. However, it is regarded as *PUK*-affiliated media and it is widely believed to be supported by the former prime minister of *KRG*, Dr. Barham Salih who is also a member of the *PUK* (BBC)<sup>36</sup>. For instance, once *SkyNews* and the *BBC* held interviews with Dr Barham Salih regarding what was/is going on in Kobane, a Kurdish city, *Xendan* uploaded the videos of the two interviews with a translation summary of what he said. Likewise, when Adil Abdul-Mahdi al-Muntafiki, an Iraqi Shi'a politician, wrote an article in Arabic entitled, *Talabani Resisted His Illness, as He Resisted His Enemies* (Back Translation), it was not only republished in the Arabic section of *Xendan*, but also translated and published in Kurdish (A.7).

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<sup>36</sup> <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28211544>

*Rudaw* is an online newspaper in Soranî. It is one of the projects of the *Rudaw Media Company* in Hawler (Erbil) which encompasses a website in four languages, Kurdish (Sorani and Kurmanci), Arabic, Turkish, and English and a satellite TV station (Available at: <http://rudaw.net/sorani>). It is regarded as *PDK*-affiliated media and is widely believed to be supported by the current prime minister of the *KRG*, Nechirvan Idris Barzani who is an active member of the *PDK*. It is different from the other three agencies in terms of text selection-policy for translation, in particular commentary articles. Since it also publishes in English, few commentary articles are translated from outside sources as the text-selection for translation mainly depends on the English source from the same agency. Most of the commentary articles chosen for translation are written by David Romano, an associate professor of politics at Missouri State University and Wladimir van Wilgenburg, a political analyst. Their articles often present positive views on issues related to the current Kurdish government, such as, *Looking at South Kurdistan More Honestly*<sup>37</sup> and *Media and the Kurds in Iraq*<sup>38</sup>. When Wladimir van Wilgenburg wrote a number of articles in favour of the *PDK* criticizing *Gorran* and the *PUK* for standing against the *PDK* in English, it was translated into Kurdish by *Rudaw* newspaper<sup>39</sup>. Even when he published an article in *Al-Monitor*, it was translated into Kurdish and published by *Rudaw*. The article, which is entitled *Syria war brings al-Qaeda threat to Iraqi Kurdistan* (AE. 46), starts with “Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani has asked the Kurdish government to form a committee to investigate Kurdish jihadists going to Syria for jihad”. Meanwhile, the article argues that most of these jihadists “came from Islamist strongholds inside the province of Sulaimaniyah, close to the Iranian border”. However, the translated version altered the second part against the *PUK* “زۆر بهی ئەوانە خەڵکی ناوچە زۆر ئیسلامییەکانی ژێر دەسه‌لانی یەکی‌تی نیشتمانی کوردستان” (BT: most of those are from the more Islamic areas under *PUK* control and *PUK* security forces are in control in those areas/ are controlling those areas) (AKR. 46) (See chapter 6).

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<sup>37</sup> <http://rudaw.net/english/opinion/17072014>

<sup>38</sup> <http://rudaw.net/english/opinion/17072014>

<sup>39</sup> <http://rudaw.net/sorani/opinion/26092013?keyword=&isArchive=True>  
<http://rudaw.net/sorani/opinion/300920131?keyword=&isArchive=True>  
<http://rudaw.net/sorani/opinion/161020131?keyword=&isArchive=True>

The analysis in this sub-section has shown the relationship between the selected Kurdish media agencies of *Xendan* and *Rudaw* and the two ruling political parties of the *PUK* and the *PDK*, respectively. The two agencies are described as shadow media for their indirect affiliation to the two political parties. Similar to the partisan media, the analysis above has shown that the text selection policies for translation of the shadow media is informed by the ideology of the two Kurdish political parties to which the two media agencies are indirectly associated. It is also worth mentioning that while the Kurdish parties, including their affiliated media agencies, are in conflict with each other from the inside, when it comes to the outside relations they are all united in their attempts to develop the Kurdish issue (Watts 2010, p. x). In the field of translation, this reflects the selection of those texts that enable the Kurdish reader to gain knowledge about how neighbouring countries view them and their relationship to the Kurdish question in the area in general and in Iraqi Kurdistan in particular.

Similar to the analysis of the previous sub-section, the examples above are consistent with Birot's (2012) argument that the text-selection policy for translation and publication depends on the existing agencies and their views in the Kurdish media. Likewise, they are regarded more as anecdotal rather than a detailed investigation to indicate that the policy of text-selection in Kurdish media is, to a great extent, governed by ideologically driven norms in the target culture. In order to identify which translational norms operate in Kurdish media, therefore, this study needs to investigate the text-selection in relation to the translators' decisions on reframing the ST narratives in the TTs at text level as well. As Lefevere stated, (1992b, p.13), as kinds of ideological entrepreneurs still working within traditional patronage relations of production, media translators had to keep favour with these patrons. The translated texts reflect the translators' decisions in terms of choosing between alternatives in particular in relation to lexical choices within these texts. Therefore, while it is clear, to some extent, why some texts are translated into Kurdish by different agencies, the way they are translated raises questions in relation to the translators' voice and stance regarding the choices and reframing strategies. Finding answers requires an investigation of the way in which the translator's voice and stance insinuate themselves into the discourse by alterations to the narratives that the translation brings about. This, in turn, may explain the translation's associated tendencies in relation to mistranslations, explicitations, or manipulations of the ST messages for socio-political ideological purposes.

## 4.2 Text-Selection Strategies in Kurdish Media Translation

The analysis of the previous section has conducted an overview of the role of socio-political factors in the selection and translation of the type of geopolitical commentary articles into Kurdish. It revealed that there is an interplay between the policy of text-selection for translation of each of the four selected Kurdish media agencies with the corpus of this study and the ideology of the political parties to which the respective agencies are directly or indirectly aligned. This section further investigates the role of socio-political factors in relation to the translators' voice and stance along with the policy of the selected media agencies in disseminating or opposing the narratives expounded in the STs, an aspect of translators behaviour this study is keen to highlight. To do this, it scrutinises the translation strategies adopted by translators in the translation of English media articles into Kurdish in the corpus of this study at micro-level with the aim of identifying which of them seems to be more prevalent and what the implications are of this for Kurdish media at macro-level. This study focuses on the role of ideology in media translation in relation to the findings and observations of the comparative data-analysis on the level of lexical choices. It argues that the translation strategies in Kurdish geopolitical journalistic texts tend toward the manipulations of the ST messages for ideological purposes rather than mistranslations, explicitations, non-lexicalisation, or the non-standardisation of Kurdish.

The corpus was analysed on the level of lexical choices to identify the most prevalent translation strategies used for the translation of media commentary articles. The ST segments were mapped onto their respective TT correspondences. This led to the identification of translation strategies in the corpus of this study. 1086 instances of translational strategies are mapped in the study. The strategies used by translators in the study are borrowing, deletion, addition, and literal translation.

Translation Strategies	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
Borrowing	532	49%
Deletion	223	21%
Deletion+Addition (Substitution)	201	18%
Addition	103	9%
Full Translation	19	2%
Literal Translation	8	1%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>1086</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 4. 1: Frequency and percentage of translation strategies in the TTs




Chart 4. 1: Frequency and percentage of translation strategies in the TTs.

Table 4.1 and chart 4.1 above show the frequency and percentage of the translation strategies of the study corpus. In terms of the frequency of their occurrences in the TT, the study reveals that of the strategies used in translating media commentary articles, there are 532 cases of borrowing, 223 cases of deletion, 201 cases of deletion and addition (substitutions), 103 cases of addition, 19 cases of full translation and 8 cases of literal translation. Nevertheless, exploring the extent to which these strategies are informed by the ideologies of both translators and the selected media agencies requires an extensive scrutiny of each of these strategies in terms of the type and impact of the shifts to the narratives elaborated in the TTs while compared to the STs.

Due to the inclusive analysis of each of the translation strategies involved in this study, they cannot be framed within a single chapter. This study, therefore, follows a hierarchical technique in order to present the analysis that has been triggered by the high frequency of the strategy used in the corpus of this study. It is clear from the table and the chart above that borrowing is the most frequent of these strategies, while literal translation is the least frequent of them. This next chapter is, therefore, devoted to the discussion of borrowing, arguing that borrowing is the prevailing strategy that leads to the stylistic shifts associated with ideology in



Kurdish media translation (see chapter one and three). The aim is to find out the extent to which ideology, non-lexicalisation and lack of standardised Kurdish play a role in Kurdish translators' choices. This, in turn, ascertains which translation behaviour prevails in English-Kurdish media translations, and which translational norms function in that practice.

#### 4.2.1 Historical Context and Borrowing Strategies

The analysis above shows that borrowing has the highest frequency among the strategies used in the translation of commentary articles, accounting for 49% of the cases of translation strategies in the corpus of this study (Table 4.1 and the chart 4.1). This sub-section investigates the respective proportion in terms of its relation to the historical and political context of Kurdistan with the aim of identifying an interpretation of this occurrence when compared to the current political status of Kurdistan (see sub-section 4.2.2). The findings and observations of the comparative analysis will indicate why a particular strategy was preferred to other alternatives by the translators and/or publishers in the translation process over time. This, in turn, uncovers the extent to which these manipulations are driven by the status of Soranî Kurdish, the translator's ideology, or the historical and current political status of Kurdistan.

<b>Borrowed Cases</b>	<b>Frequency of Borrowed Cases</b>	<b>Percentage of Borrowed Cases</b>
Borrowing from English	304	57%
Borrowing from Arabic	164	31%
Borrowing from French	49	9%
Borrowing from Turkish	15	3%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>532</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 4. 2 : Frequency and percentage of borrowed cases in the TTs

Table 4.2 above shows that the total of 532 cases of borrowing are not solely from English, but also from Arabic, French and Turkish. Of the total 100% of the borrowing cases, 57% borrowed from English, 31% borrowed from Arabic, 9 % borrowed from French and 3% borrowed from Turkish. The geopolitical area of Kurdistan plays a significant role in the

occurrence of such strategy, which suggests it is driven by ideology. Since Kurdistan is not a country, and instead is divided into five parts and annexed to the neighbouring countries (see chapter one), the predominance of borrowing, therefore, does not always reflect the use of one-to-one transcription correspondence from only English into Kurdish. 31%, 9%, and 3% of the cases of borrowing in this study are from Arabic, French, and Turkish, respectively. In addition, they embody various types of borrowing such as transliteration, transcription, and double borrowing from the respective languages due to the same reason.

<b>Borrowing</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
<b>Borrowing from English</b>	<b>304</b>	<b>57%</b>
Transcription	160	30%
Transliteration	133	25%
Double Presentation	11	2%
<b>Borrowing from Arabic</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>31%</b>
Transcription	105	20%
Transliteration	59	11%
<b>Borrowing from French</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>9%</b>
Transliteration	42	8%
Transcription	7	1%
<b>Borrowing from Turkish</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>3%</b>
Transcription	15	3%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>532</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 4. 3: Frequency and percentage of transcription and transliteration cases in the TTs

Table 4.3 shows that 25% of the total of 532 of cases of borrowing in the corpus of this study represent cases of transliteration from English while 30% represents transcription from English. 11% of the cases of borrowing show transliteration from Arabic while 20 % of the cases of borrowing shows transcription from Arabic. However, the remaining cases represent 1% of transcribed loanwords and 8% transliterated loanwords from French. In addition, 3% of the cases shows transcription from Turkish.

The cases of transliteration differ from transcription in that the loanword is used with a slight change in pronunciation. In transcriptional cases, the loanword maps the sounds of the language into its writing system. However, there are cases which are partly transliterated and partly transcribed in this study. For instance, the expression *democratic reform package* is partly transliterated as دیموکراتی (BT: democratic) and partly translated into Kurdish as چاکسازی (BT:

reform), but *package* is transcribed. The transliteration of the word *democratic* or *democracy* is not new in Kurdish. It dates back even prior to the establishment of the *Democratic Party of Kurdistan-Iraq* in 1946. According to Hasanpoor (1999, p.146), the emergence of nationalist and communist movements and the formation of contemporary political parties in the 20<sup>th</sup> century led to abundant loanwords, democracy being a prominent example. He (1999, p. 30 and 102) explains further that the Kurdish term دیموکراتی (BT: democratic) or دیموکراسی (BT: democracy) borrowed indirectly from European languages. In other words, it is borrowed from European languages through Arabic and it is phonologically modified. This might be due to the geopolitical situation of Soranî Kurdish and its perpetual contact with Arabic. Hasanpoor (1999, p. 18), attributes this type of borrowing to the impact of Arabic as an official and prestigious language of the Islamic world in the mid-twentieth century and modern Iraq after WWI. The same reason led to Soranî Kurdish borrowing less from Turkish and Persian compared to Arabic. For example, the word یاسا (BT: Law) is borrowed from Turkish and جیهان (BT: world) from Persian that are already established and widely used in Kurdish. Based on Hasanpoor's study (1999, p. 91-143), 28 cases of the total of 532 cases of borrowing in the corpus of this study represent well-established cases of transliteration from European languages through Arabic, Persian and Turkish. They are:

دیموکراسی (BT: geography), جوگرافیا (BT: bombardment), بۆمباران (BT: drama), دراما (BT: dictatorship), دیکتاتۆر (BT: doctor), دکتۆر (BT: democratic), دیموکراتی (BT: dossier), دۆسیه (BT: officer), ئەفسەر (BT: fascism), فاشیزم (BT: philosophy), فەلسەفە (BT: folklore), فۆلکلۆر (BT: general), ژەنەرال (BT: imperialism), ئیمپریالیزم (BT: empire), ئیمپراتۆر (BT: card), کارت (BT: professor), پروفیسۆر (BT: music), مۆسیقا (BT: million), ملیۆن (BT: Kemalists)<sup>40</sup>, کەمالیست (BT: radar), رادار (BT: radio), رادیۆ (BT: senator), سێناتۆر (BT: secretary), سێکرتێر (BT: strategy), ستراتیژی (BT: tactics), تەکنیک (BT: technology), تەکنەلۆژیا (BT: technology).

Being largely motivated by the nationalist aspiration, Kurdish purists have attempted to regulate and construct a Kurdish national language in Iraqi Kurdistan. In a diachronic and

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<sup>40</sup> Kemalists is an expression developed in the republican Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk to refer to those who support Kemalism (Umut Uzer 2011, p. 34).

synchronic study, Abdulla (1980, p. 203-206) shows how Kurdish purists tried to purge the Arabic from Kurdish in Iraq between 1924 and 1973, which, in effect, brought about European loanwords directly. Besides, the emergence of Kurdish nationalism from 1974 onwards as an outcome of the repression and arabisation in Iraqi Kurdistan led Kurdish purists to avoid borrowing from Arabic language. They preferred borrowing from European languages indirectly through Persian and Turkish (and even directly from these two languages) languages rather than Arabic. According to Hasanpoor (1999), 14 cases of the transliterations identified in this study represent borrowing indirectly from European languages through Persian and Turkish language. They are:

کۆنگره (BT: congress/ formal meeting), پروگرام (BT: program), پۆلیس (BT: police), کۆمسیۆن (BT: commission), کۆمیتە (BT: committee), پروپاگەندە (BT: propaganda), راپۆرت (BT: report), رژیم (BT: regime), ریفەڕاندۆم (BT: referendum), ریاڵیست (BT: realist), رۆڵ (BT: role), شۆفینییست (BT: chauvinist), سانسۆر (BT: censor), سۆسیالیزم (BT: socialism).

After the attempt to expel Arabic and Persian loanwords in Turkish, French and English were the second richest sources of loanwords due to their economic, modernization and westernization privileges (Underhill 1986, p. 9; Copper 1989, p. 155). For a long time, French was a more prestigious language than English in Turkey. The significant effect of English on the Turkish language started as the USA became the superpower of the world in 20<sup>th</sup> century and most of the political, scientific, technological developments were pioneered by the USA. Borrowing from English, therefore, could not be avoided in Turkish. Likewise, French was the prevailing foreign language in Iran up to World War II. After the War, English gained more ground and was taught in secondary schools, and the impact of this language on Persian became remarkably resilient (Sadeghi 2003, p. 51). Thus, Soranî Kurdish in Iraq borrowed indirectly from French and English through Turkish and Persian up to the Gulf War in 1991. However, this equation has perceptibly changed after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. An educated generation has emerged with English rather than Arabic as its world language. Soranî Kurdish has become the second official language of Iraq after Arabic (see chapter one). However, Kurds learn English, not Arabic, as their second language in Kurdistan. Neither Arabic nor Persian or Turkish is regarded as a prestigious language. The intensive contact between Kurdish and dominant English has, therefore, produced abundant borrowing on all levels of language use

and structure. However, this does not necessarily mean that there are no Arabic loanwords in Kurdish today. In other words, while only 31% of the cases of borrowing are from Arabic, English loanwords represent the majority in the corpus of this study, comprising 57% of all cases of borrowing (Table 4.2). This might be due to the fact that some of Arabic, Turkish and Persian loanwords are phonetically modified and widely used in Soraní Kurdish. This enabled them to be fully established through time. They are therefore, not recognisable as foreign words. Hasanpoor (1999, p. 24) refers to this process as “Kurdification”. Further, he (1999, p. 153) describes another type of borrowing that is used to Kurdify loanwords in Soraní Kurdish. This type of borrowing is consistent with what this study calls transcription. In transcription cases, the loanword is used according to the rules of Sorani grammar. In other words, the loanword takes the Kurdish affixes such as indefinite article *یک* (BT: a), definite article *• كه* (BT: the), plural ending *ان* (BT: s), etc. For instance, *كيانتيك* (BT: an entity) is transcribed from Arabic and received the Kurdish indefinite article *یک* (BT: a) as a TT correspondence to the ST *an entity*. Likewise, *ئوفيسهكه* (the office) is transcribed from English and received the Kurdish definite article *• كه* (BT: the). However, the sound of the loanwords in the TL maps the sounds of the writing system of both Arabic and English, respectively. Since the sound system of Soraní Kurdish is different from that of English, Arabic, Turkish and French, slight changes usually happen to most of the loanwords in Kurdish which sometimes make the distinction between transcription and transliteration blurry. For instance, the letter *r* is pronounced as it is in Soraní Kurdish, while in most of the cases it is not in English. This can be seen the cases of borrowing words like *ريفورم* (BT: reform) *ريفورميسست* (BT: reformist), and *ئارگيومينت* (BT: argument). In British, the three words are pronounced as /rɪfɔːm/, /rɪfɔːməst/, and /ɑːgʲəmənt/, respectively, while they are pronounced as /rɪfɔːrm/, /rɪfɔːməst/, and /ɑːrgʲəmənt/ in American English. In Kurdish, they are borrowed and pronounced as /rɪfɔːrm/, /rɪfɔːməst/, and /ɑːrgʲəmənt/, respectively. Thus, they can be referred to as transliteration cases if they are compared to their British counterparts and transcription cases if they are compared to their American ones. However, this study categorises them as transliteration cases since the letter *r* in /rɪfɔːrm/, /rɪfɔːməst/, and /ɑːrgʲəmənt/ as loan words in Kurdish is pronounced more heavily while compared to the American English reading.

The analysis above has shown that borrowings represent an ideological strategy in the case of Kurdish context and that the geopolitical milieu of Kurdistan played a significant role in the use of this strategy which took different forms due to the way it was practised. The direct

and indirect way of borrowing from the European languages led to the two different types of borrowing which are transliteration and transcription. According to Hasanpoor (1999), these two types of translational strategies enriched Soranî Kurdish with the adoption of new concepts, loans, and neologisms (p. 62). However, they are contentious in the role they play in the standardisation and modernisation of this language, since they are neither standardised in their spelling nor registered in Kurdish official dictionaries. Although today Kurdish has an abundance of monolingual and bilingual dictionaries, they are the products of individual efforts. Therefore, they do not exist as an officially recognised monolingual or bilingual dictionary. This study will now turn to the level of the occurrence of the strategy of borrowing in the corpus of this study in order to investigate the implication of this strategy linguistically as well as socially and politically in relation to the status of Kurdish Language (e.g., its non-standardization).

<b>Borrowing</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
At word level	509	96%
Above word level	23	4%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>532</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 4. 4: Frequency and percentage of levels of occurrence of the cases of borrowing at word level and above word level in the TTs

<b>Borrowing</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
Nouns	387	73%
Adjectives	58	11%
Acronyms	39	7%
Expressions and Names	23	4%
Verbs	13	2%
Adverbs	12	2%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>532</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 4. 5: Frequency and percentage of parts of speech of the cases of borrowing at word level and above word level in the TTs

Table 4.4 and 4.5 show that the total cases of borrowing are not exclusively individual vocabularies, for they cover the act of borrowing expressions and names as well. Of the total of 532 cases of borrowing, 96% represents borrowing, including nouns, adjectives, acronyms,

verbs and adverbs, as a translational strategy at word level. The remaining cases constitute only 4% and represent the strategy of borrowing above word level, i.e., expressions and names. At word level, table 4.5 shows that noun borrowing has the highest frequency among the parts of speech, comprising 73% of all cases of borrowing.

<b>Noun Borrowing</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
Ambiguity	258	67%
Non-lexicalisation	103	27%
Non-standardisation	26	7%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>387</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 4. 6: Frequency and percentage of cases of noun borrowing in the TTs

Table 4.6 above shows that only 27% of the total 387 cases of the noun loanwords are borrowed due to the ST's non-lexicalisation in the TL, while 67% of the cases of the noun borrowing show that borrowing occurred while there are correspondences for the STs in the TL. This raises questions in relation to the current and historical context of the Kurdish language, the Kurdish translators' agency and the policies of the selected media agencies in the corpus of this study (see section 4.2.2).

<b>Noun Borrowing</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
Ambiguity	258	67%
Non-lexicalisation	103	27%
Proper nouns	26	7%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>387</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 4. 7: Frequency and percentage of cases of proper nouns borrowed in the TTs

Table 4.7 shows that 7 % of the cases of noun borrowing are proper nouns. Such borrowed nouns caused randomness among the translators in relation to their STs. Their occurrence might be interpreted in terms of either translator's confusion due to the non-standardisation of Kurdish or his/her voice insinuating into the narratives resulting from translation. For instance, the proper noun *Ankara* is borrowed 13 times from Arabic and 5 times





to the TT readerships. For example, the word *urbicide* is placed between brackets next to its Kurdish counterpart's شاركوژ and presented as شاركوژ (*urbicide*). According to Pym (2004, p. 93), this type of borrowing raises uncertainties about the probability of absolute equivalence. For him, if there is no doubt about the certainty of what is available as TT correspondence for the ST, there would be no reason behind placing STs next to their TTs in the TL.

<b>Borrowing</b>	<b>526 Cases</b>	<b>48% of the total</b>
Nouns	387	36%
Adjectives	58	5%
Acronyms	39	3%
names	23	2%
Adverbs	12	1%
Verbs	13	1%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>532</b>	<b>48%</b>

Table 4. 8: Frequency and percentage of parts of speech of borrowing cases as part of overall cases of the corpus

The analysis above has shown the role of the status of Sorani Kurdish and the geopolitical factors in the use of borrowing strategy at both word level and above word level. The study will now turn into investigate the practise of the respective strategy in relation to acronyms. Acronyms represent 6 % of the overall 1086 cases and 7% of the 532 cases of borrowing in the corpus of this study. However, table 4.8 shows that borrowing cases of acronyms constitute only 3% of the overall cases of acronym in this study. They are either transcribed or transliterated from English. The remaining cases show the translation of the full names of the acronyms existing in the STs. Their full translation, which constitutes 1% of the cases of in the corpus of this study, might indicate unfamiliarity of the acronyms to the TL readers (Table and chart 4.1). However, their borrowing from English of which they constitute the majority (3%) if compared to their translation (1%) might be interpreted due to the belief that English is the language of globalisation. This is indicative that the simple way out is for the translator to render acronyms as loanwords.

The data analysis, in this section, has investigated the strategies of borrowing in the corpus of this study in relation to the source of their borrowing and the level of their occurrence. The study revealed that borrowing from English and Arabic along with the noun borrowings have the highest frequencies among loanword cases in Soranî Kurdish (Table 4.2 and 4.8). Similar results were also revealed in a study conducted at the University of Sulaimany in terms of the percentage of noun borrowings in the Kurdish political programmes in visual media by Sabir (2013a, p.333-352). The percentages in the corpus of this study might have several interpretations. The reasons might refer to the target readers' familiarity with the two languages due to the prior and the current geopolitical situation of Iraqi Kurdistan, or to the avoidance of misinterpretations in the TL due to the absence of standardised Kurdish correspondents, or to the translators' own sociocultural background and/or voice. The constant geopolitical changes of Kurdistan after the Gulf war in 1991 in general and the fall of Saddam's regime in 2003 in particular affect the dynamic language contact and borrowing in Kurdish by extra-linguistic factors. On the one hand, learning English is considered indispensable for social, intercultural and international communication, educational advancement, professional success and progress in life and media. On the other hand, various ideologies have emerged in the Kurdish media and have played a major role in the field of media translation and translators' choices. Therefore, borrowing and purism needs to be further investigated linguistically as well as socially and politically and are closely tied to current Kurdish political identities and to the ideology of the Kurdish translators in Kurdistan. Details are given in the following sub-section.

#### **4.2.2 Kurdish Media Agencies and Borrowing Strategies**

The previous sub-section has revealed the significant relationship between the historical and political setting of Kurdistan and the way borrowing is manipulated in the translation of geopolitical commentary articles from English into Kurdish at different levels. This sub-section establishes a comparative analysis to investigate the existing relationships between the Kurdish media agencies, the translators' voice and the strategy of borrowing. The outcomes and observations of the comparative analysis will designate the way of preferring particular types of lexical borrowings to alternatives by the translators and/or the media agencies with which they aligned. The TTs used in the corpus of this study are translated by various Kurdish

translators and published by four Kurdish media agencies between 2011 and 2014. The media agencies directly affiliated to parties *Sbei*y and *Kurdistan-i-Nwe*, belonging to *Change Movement* (Gorran party) and *Patriotic Union of Kurdistan* (PUK) respectively (see section 4.1.1), and the shadow media agencies indirectly linked to the parties *Xendan* and *Rudaw* media agencies, affiliated to the *PUK* and *Kurdistan Democratic Party* (KDP), respectively (see section 4.1.2). Since the selected media agencies in this study directly or indirectly belong to the current major political parties in Kurdistan, the strategy of borrowing needs to be investigated in relation to the ideology of the respective media and their translators quantitatively and qualitatively as well. Based on Lefevere's (1992b) patronage analysis, translators can choose to adapt to the policy system of these media agencies in a way, "to stay within the parameters delimited by its constraints [...], or they may choose to oppose the system" (p.13). Table 4.7 shows that only 27% of the total of 532 cases in this study represent borrowing due to the ST's non-lexicalisation in the TL. The remaining cases, regardless of the impact of the prior geopolitical situation of Kurdistan (see section 4.2.1), raise questions in relation to the ideology of Kurdish translators and the current agencies they translate for. Therefore, it is important to further investigate the strategy of borrowing in relation to the four selected Kurdish media agencies in terms of quantity, quality and chronology.

<b>Borrowing Strategy</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
Partisan Media	266	50%
Shadow Media	266	50%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>532</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 4. 9: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Kurdish media TTs




Chart 4. 2: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Kurdish media TTs

Table 4.9 and chart 4.2 show the convergence of percentages in the use of the strategies of borrowing by the media agencies that are directly or indirectly affiliated to the political parties in Kurdistan. Of the total of 532 cases of borrowing in this study, 50 % of the cases represent partisan media agencies and 50 % belongs to shadow media agencies. Given that the TL is a non-standardised language, the occurrence of the borrowing cases might be interpreted in that regard or in terms of the non-lexicalisation of the STs in the TL. Nevertheless, the translator's agency and the ideology of the media agencies play a considerable role in the use of the respective strategy. In order to know the implications of the use of such a strategy, it is important to investigate the respective percentages in relation to each of the four selected Kurdish media agencies in the corpus of this study, translators' agency and the historical and current political situation of Kurdistan.

#### 4.2.2.1 Partisan Media and the Strategy of Borrowing

This sub-section investigates the occurrence level of the percentages of borrowing cases in relation to the translator's agency and the two selected Kurdish media agencies that are directly affiliated to political parties in Kurdistan. The aim is to identify why a particular choice was preferred to other alternatives by the translators and/or publishers in the translation process. This, in turn, reveals the extent to which these manipulations are driven by non-lexicalisation,

non-standardisation or the political ideology of the translators and the two media agencies they aligned to.

<b>Partisan Media Agencies</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
Kurdistan-i-Nwe	141	27%
Sbeiy	125	23%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>266</b>	<b>50%</b>

Table 4. 10: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Partisan Kurdish media TTs

Table 4.10 shows that of the total of 50% of cases of borrowing in partisan media, 23% of the cases by *Sbeiy* media agency, while 27% of the cases belong to *Kurdistan-i-Nwe*. The percentages show that the cases of borrowing by *Kurdistan-i-Nwe* is higher than those by *Sbeiy*. This might be indicative that there is no endeavour to reduce the use of the strategy or to have an directive policy regarding the use of Kurdish by *Kurdistan-i-Nwe* which can be considered the first news agency to be established after the Gulf war in 1991 or by *Sbeiy*, the latest directly affiliated partisan media. In order to find out the possible motivation behind the use of this strategy by the media affiliated parties and their translators, the study will now turn to investigate the percentage of borrowing strategies by each of the two media agencies along with their implications.

<b>Sbeiy</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
Ambiguity	92	17%
Non-lexicalisation	26	5%
Non-standardisation	7	1%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>23%</b>

Table 4. 11: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Sbeiy media TTs

Table 4.11 shows that the representing corpus of *Sbeiy* media agency, which consists of 15 translated commentary articles, shows only 5% and 1% out of 23% of the cases of borrowing are due to the ST's non-lexicalisation and non-standardisation in Soraní Kurdish, respectively.

The remaining cases of borrowing in the translated commentary articles by *Sbeiy* media agency constitute 17%. They are borrowed from English, Arabic and French, while there are Kurdish correspondents for them in the TL.

<b>Kurdistan-i-New</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
Ambiguity	105	20%
Non-lexicalisation	31	6%
Non-standardisation	5	1%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>27%</b>

Table 4. 12: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Kurdistan-i-Nwe media TTs

Likewise, table 4.12 shows that of the total of 15 translated commentary articles by *Kurdistan-i-New* media agency, only 6% and 1% out of 27% of the cases of borrowing are due to the ST's non-lexicalisation and non-standardisation in Soranî Kurdish, respectively. The remaining cases of borrowing in the translated commentary articles by *Kurdistan-i-New* media agency constitute 20%. They are borrowed from English, Arabic and French, while there are Kurdish correspondents for them in the TL. Thus, the analysis above shows that 17% and 20 % of the total of 23% and 27% of the cases of borrowing from *Sbeiy* and *Kurdistan-i-Nwe*, raise questions in relation to the ideology of the translators and the agencies they work for, respectively.

<b>Sbeiy Representation</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
Ambiguity	92	17%
Translator's voice	65	12%
Historical + Political	27	5%
Non-lexicalisation	26	5%
Non-lexicalisation and Culture Specific	26	5%
Non-standardisation	7	1%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>23%</b>

Table 4. 13: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing representation in Sbeiy media TTs

Table 4.13 shows that of the total of 17% of the cases of borrowing by *Sbeiy* media, the highest frequency among the possibilities behind the use of the borrowing strategy is the translator's voice, while historical and political factors constitute 5% of the cases. The socio-political situation of Kurdistan before the Gulf-war in 1991 had led to abundant loanwords in Soranî Kurdish. Most of them are that well-established today are not even recognisable as loanwords. After the Gulf-war, in general, and the US-invasion in 2003, in particular, the semi-autonomous and new socio-political situation of Kurdistan has also instigated another cycle of borrowing from the other languages. The semi-autonomous region gave the right to writers and translators to practice acts of writing and translating more freely than before. Furthermore, the socio-political situation and the rise of some current political movements led to the choice of loanwords being more ideological. For example, the rise of the *Change movement* to which *Sbeiy* media agency belonged in 31th March 2010<sup>41</sup> has introduced many loanwords into Soranî Kurdish. For example, words such as ئۆپوزسیۆن (BT: opposition), ریفۆرم (BT: reform), and کاندید (BT: candidate) emerged with the *Gorran Movement's* election campaign before 2010. Despite the availability of their TT correspondents in Soranî Kurdish, they have become familiar to the TT reader through media publications such as television and print and online publications. They, therefore, constitute part of the borrowing cases that represent the historical and political environment of Kurdistan after 2003 (Table 4.13). However, words such as مێشێن (BT: mission), کۆمێنتاتۆر (BT: commentator), ئهمنستی (BT: amnesty) and ئه‌لتێرناتیف (BT: alternative) are transcribed and transliterated directly from English, while there are established and familiar TT correspondents for them in Soranî Kurdish. The TT reader knows that they are loanwords in the TL. However, they might cause ambiguity in terms of comprehension since they are not familiar to most of the Kurdish readers, in particular to those who have little knowledge of English. Therefore, they represent new loanwords in Soranî Kurdish. This strategy might be used by some translators to give voice to their own constituencies since these new loanwords cannot be considered as outcomes of the historical and political context of Kurdistan before 2000s.

In addition, table 4.13 shows that non-lexicalisation and culture-specific word represents 5% of loanword cases in Soranî Kurdish. For example, the word جیهاد (BT: jihad) is transcribed

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<sup>41</sup> <http://gorran.net/En/Content.aspx?LinkID=137&Action=2>

directly from Arabic as the English text did as well. The word *jihad* is considered to be an Arabic culture-specific and an idiomatic word. It might refer to “a religious struggle (= fight) against evil in yourself or in society [or] a holy war fought by Muslims against people who are a threat to Islam” (Cambridge Dictionary Online)<sup>42</sup>. Furthermore, it may be used in the contemporary sense of terror or terrorism when it is used to refer to the military aggressions and radical groups such as *al Qaeda* (Wright-Neville 2010, p. 122) or *ISIS* since they use it to refer to their deeds. Therefore, the reason behind borrowing such a term might refer to its multiple meaning due to the political and religious situation of the Middle East. On the one hand, as an Islamic term it appears frequently in the Quran and refers to a religious duty of Muslims. On the other hand, it is used in its sense of terror related to radical groups. Non-standardisation constitutes 1% of the total of 23% of the cases of borrowing in the TTs by *Sbeiy* media agency. The cases include the transcription of the same proper noun sometimes from Arabic and sometimes from English. For example, the proper noun *Ankara* is transcribed from Arabic once as ئانقاره and another time from English as ئانكمره (for more details see section 4.2.1).

Kurdistan-i-New Representation	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
Ambiguity	105	20%
Historical + Political	59	11%
Translator's voice	46	9%
Non-lexicalisation	31	6%
Non-lexicalisation and Culture Specific	31	6%
Non-standardisation	5	1%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>27%</b>

Table 4. 14: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing representation in Kurdistan-i-New media TTs

As for the translated texts by *Kurdistan-i-New* agency, table 4.14 shows that of the total of 20%, the historical and political situation of Kurdistan has the highest impact among the possibilities behind the loanwords in Soranî Kurdish, while the translator's voice constitutes 6%

<sup>42</sup> <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/jihad>



of the cases. The majority of the borrowed words and/or expressions reflects the overall socio-political context after the US invasion to Iraq in 2003, such as: كۆمىسيۆن (BT: commission), پروسە (BT: process), كونترول (BT: control), and ئەمجىندا (BT: agenda). Other cases like كۆمىتە (BT: committee), and ناسىۆنالىزم (BT: nationalism) are more like the PUK ideology like. Despite the availability of their correspondents in the TL, they are transcribed and transliterated from English and French, respectively, i.e., in the same way they are used in PUK's publications and figures. 9% of the cases of borrowing represent translators' voice. Despite the availability of familiar and established Kurdish correspondents for STs in the TL, Kurdish translators preferred to borrow from the other languages. The table also shows that 6% of the cases of borrowing are due to non-lexicalisation and culture-specific words/ expressions. For instance, عەلمانى (BT: secular) the word (BT: secular) is transcribed from Arabic for not being lexicalized in Kurdish, while ژەنەرال (BT: general) is transliterated from English since it is a culture-specific word and does not have one-to-one correspondence in the respective language. Similar to *Sbeiy* media texts, 1% of the cases of borrowing shows that non-standardisation affects translators' choices in relation to source of their borrowing, e.g., borrowing the pronoun Ankara.

The analysis in this sub-section has revealed that despite the fact that the percentages show that the cases of borrowing by *Kurdistani-i-New* is higher than those by *Sbeiy*, the translator's voice is considered to be more prominent in the texts translated and published by *Sbeiy* rather than *Kurdistani-i-New*. The majority of the cases of borrowing by *Kurdistan-i-New* is due to the historical and political situation of Kurdistan. This is considered to be of lesser motivation behind the cases attributed to the *Sbeiy* agency. Non-lexicalisation and non-standardisation played a significant role in the occurrence of this strategy by the two agencies as well. Nevertheless, they are considered to be of lesser motivation behind the occurrence of the respective strategy if compared to the motivations behind the rest of the cases by the two agencies.

#### 4.2.2.2 Shadow Media and the Strategy of Borrowing

The previous sub-section has established a comparison to show the extent to which the partisan media agencies are allowing translators' voices to inform their news outputs. This sub-section investigates the occurrence level of the percentages of borrowing cases in relation to the

translator's agency and the two selected Kurdish media agencies that are indirectly affiliated to the political parties in Kurdistan. The aim is to ascertain why a particular choice was made instead of others by the translators and/or publishers through a comparative analysis. Similar to the analysis of the previous sub-section, the investigation in this section reveals the extent to which these handlings are motivated by ideology, non-lexicalisation or non-standardisation.

Shadow Media Agencies	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
Xendan	153	29%
Rudaw	113	21%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>266</b>	<b>50%</b>

Table 4. 15: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Shadow media TTs

Table 4.15 reveals that 50 % of the cases belong to shadow media agencies. Of the total of 50% of shadow media representing cases of borrowing, 29% of the cases represent *Xendan* media agency, while 21% of the cases belong to *Rudaw* media agency. The percentages show that the cases of borrowing by *Xendan* is higher than those by *Rudaw*. Similar to the cases of borrowing in the texts translated by partisan media agencies, a high percentage of the cases of borrowing from the two shadow media agencies might be interpreted in relation to the ideology of the translators and the agencies they work for.

<b>Xendan</b>	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
Ambiguity	100	19%
Non-lexicalisation	35	7%
Non-standardisation	17	3%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>29%</b>

Table 4. 16: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Xendan media TTs

Table 4.16 shows that the data emerging from the study of *Xendan* media agency, which consists of 15 translated commentary articles, shows only 7% and 3% out of 29% of the cases of borrowing are due to the ST's non-lexicalisation and non-standardisation in Soraní Kurdish, respectively. The remaining cases of borrowing in the translated commentary articles by *Xendan*

media agency constitute 19%. They are borrowed from English, Arabic and French, while there are Kurdish correspondents for them in the TL.

<b>Rudaw</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
Ambiguity	66	12%
Non-lexicalisation	34	6%
Non-standardisation	13	2%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>21%</b>

Table 4. 17: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Rudaw media TTs

Likewise, table 4.17 shows that of the total of 15 translated commentary articles by *Rudaw* media agency, only 6% and 2% out of 21% of the cases of borrowing are due to the ST's non-lexicalisation and non-standardisation in Soranî Kurdish, respectively. The remaining cases of borrowing in the translated commentary articles by *Rudaw* media agency constitute 12%. They are borrowed from English, Arabic and French, while there are Kurdish correspondent for them in the TL.

Similar to the cases of borrowing in the texts translated by partisan media agencies, 19% and 12 % of the cases of borrowing from *Xendan* and *Rudaw*, respectively, raise questions in relation to the ideology of the translators and the agencies they work for.

<b>Xendan Representation</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
Ambiguity	100	19%
Translator's voice	52	10%
Historical + Political	48	9%
Non-lexicalisation	35	7%
Non-lexicalisation and Culture Specific	35	7%
Non-standardisation	17	3%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>29%</b>

Table 4. 18: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing representation in Xendan media TTs

Table 4.18 shows that of the total of 19% of the cases of borrowing, 10% of the cases represent translator's voice, while 9% of the cases show the impact of the historical and political

context of Kurdistan on the respective cases. Non-lexicalisation and culture specific words constitute 7% of the cases, while non-standardisation represents 3% of the cases.

<b>Rudaw Representation</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
Ambiguity	66	12%
Translator's voice	41	8%
Historical + Political	25	5%
Non-lexicalisation	34	6%
Non-lexicalisation and Culture Specific	34	6%
Non-standardisation	13	2%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>21%</b>

Table 4. 19: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing representation in Rudaw media TTs

Likewise, table 4.19 shows that of the total of 12% of the cases of borrowing, 8% of the cases represent translator's voice, while 5% of the cases shows the impact of the historical and political context of Kurdistan on the respective cases. Non-lexicalisation and culture specific constitute 6% of the cases, while non-standardisation represents 2% of the cases.

Accordingly, the investigation in the two sub-sections above has illustrated that translators' voices represent the highest frequency in the borrowings cases of the three media agencies *Sbeiy*, *Xendan* and *Rudaw*. However, 10% of the cases show the highest frequency in the borrowing cases of *Kurdistan-i-New* media agency and it represents the impact of the historical and political situation of Kurdistan on the respective cases. The findings largely indicate that both partisan and shadow media are informed by the translator's ideology and the ideology of the political parties to which the media agencies are aligned plays a significant role in their choices. The remaining cases of borrowings represent convergent rates in relation to non-lexicalisation and non-standardisation. Nevertheless, exploring the extent to which these percentages are associated with geopolitical events after the fall of Saddam's regime in 2003, and how they affect the TT narratives requires an analysis of the dynamics resulted from the use of this strategy over the four years (see the following section).

### 4.3 Chronological Distribution of the Borrowing Strategies

The outcome of the aggregated data of the comparative study in the section above has revealed the way the borrowing strategy is implicated in divergent ideologies through investigating the relationships between the occurrence percentage of the respective strategy, the policy of the publication agencies and the political group to which they directly or indirectly belong. This section investigates the dynamics resulted from the use of this strategy throughout the four years in which the selected commentary articles of the corpus of this study were written. The comparative chronology of the occurrence of the strategy of borrowing from 2011 to 2014 reveals the regular pattern of a temporal model of the four years.

Percentage of Translation Strategies				
Borrowing	2011	2012	2013	2014
	14%	24%	26%	36%
Grand Total	100%			

Table 4. 20: Distribution of borrowing strategies according to publication date




Chart 4. 3: Distribution of borrowing strategies according to publication date

Table 4.20 and chart 3 reveal how borrowing strategies are distributed in each particular year. It shows that the use of the respective strategy represents the lowest frequency in 2011, and then escalation with a convergent rate in 2012 and 2013, comprising 14%, 24% and 26% of the cases of borrowing, respectively. However, the percentage become very interesting in

2014 when borrowing rises to 36%. This indicates that the tendency of using such strategy may increase through time if compared to its use in the previous years.

Borrowing	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
<b>2011</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>14%</b>
Historical + Political	35	7%
Translator's voice	28	5%
Non-lexicalisation and Culture Specific	9	2%
Non-Standardisation	5	1%
<b>2012</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>24%</b>
Historical + Political	48	9%
Translator's voice	40	8%
Non-lexicalisation and Culture Specific	28	5%
Non-Standardisation	12	2%
<b>2013</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>26%</b>
Translator's voice	61	11%
Non-lexicalisation and Culture Specific	38	7%
Historical + Political	30	6%
Non-Standardisation	7	1%
<b>2014</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>36%</b>
Translator's voice	75	14%
Non-lexicalisation and Culture Specific	51	10%
Historical + Political	46	9%
Non-Standardisation	19	4%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>532</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 4. 21: Distribution of borrowing strategies according to publication date




Chart 4. 4: Distribution of borrowing strategies according to publication date

Table 4.21 and chart 4.4 reveal that the geopolitical environment of Kurdistan played a significant role in the first two years accounting for 7% and 9% of the cases of borrowing in 2011 and 2012, respectively. Nevertheless, this equation changed in the following next two years when the translator's agency became more prominent compared to the previous years. The translator's voice constitutes 11% to 14% of the cases of borrowing in 2013 and 2014, respectively. These percentages represent the highest motivations behind the use of the respective strategy throughout the four years. This might be indicative that the tendency to use such a strategy might be more relative to the translator's voice through time if compared to its use in 2011, and 2012. This study will now turn to investigate the occurrence percentage in relation to the types of media agencies throughout time in order to interpret them on that in this regard as well.

<b>Borrowing</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
<b>2011</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>14%</b>
Shadow Media	46	9%
Partisan Media	31	6%
<b>2012</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>24%</b>
Partisan Media	90	17%
Shadow Media	38	7%
<b>2013</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>26%</b>
Partisan Media	71	13%
Shadow Media	65	12%
<b>2014</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>36%</b>
Shadow Media	117	22%
Partisan Media	74	14%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>532</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 4. 22: Distribution of borrowing strategies according to publication date by media agencies




Chart 4. 5: Distribution of borrowing strategies according to publication date by media agencies

Table 4.22 and chart 4.5 show the relationship between the percentage of the occurrence of borrowing cases and the media agencies within the four years. They show that in 2012 and 2013, a high frequency of the borrowing strategy was used by partisan media agencies while shadow media constituted the lowest frequency. Nevertheless, the use of the respective strategy by shadow media agencies represent high rates in 2011 and 2014.

#### 4.4 Translational Norms and Stylistic Reframing in Media Translation

The previous sections explored the use of the translational strategy that has the highest frequency among the reframing strategies used in the translation of media texts into Kurdish. The outcomes also are interpreted along those lines. This section discusses what translation behaviours the findings and observations of the above contrastive data analysis on the stylistic and lexical levels indicate. Thereafter, it turns to the theoretical approaches to norms proposed by Toury (1995/2012) and Chesterman (1997/2000) and translational stylistic shifts proposed by van Leuven-Zwart' approach (1989, 1990a), expounded in chapter two, in order to discuss the norms and lexical choices in this newly-generated corpus of English-Kurdish media translation.



In line with these approaches and with the help of CNA, the existing relationship between the STs and the TTs on the stylistic level is defined along with the impact and motivations behind the way the STs are reframed within the target socio-political context. The study observed the translator's voice (agency) and answered the key questions raised in this study on the translator's adoption of borrowing strategy during the process of translation. As established textual patterns, the outcomes have shown that the cases of borrowing in this study served diverse positions and played a significant role in producing patterns of structural and rhetorical features in the course of ideological communication and manipulation. Based on the socio-cognitive observation, patterns of lexical borrowing are described in terms of Chesterman's relation norms. They defined the translator's role more as an ideological mediator, and less as a communicator, for optimising the communication needs of the various socio-political contexts and parties involved at a macro-level (see subsections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2).

Power relations, however, constitute a significant device in the description of the expectancy norms in this study. The high frequencies of the historical and political conditioning factors as well as the translator's agency largely indicate the translator's tendency towards "risk avoidance" (Pym 2008). To a certain extent, the Kurdish translators played it safe and avoided risk by presenting what media agencies can be responsible for. As exemplified in the subsection 4.2.2, the majority of the cases that represent the translator's voice is associated with the policy of the political party to which the media agencies are aligned. In this way, the translators did not tend to take on ideological and communicative risk only in their own name. Although a number of cases indicated the efforts of the translators to give voice to their own constituencies, the product of the translator's decision-making process is, however, largely identified by the dominant ideologies within the four media institutions (4.2.2).

Along with Toury's (1995/2012) law of interference and Pym's (2008) propositions, these patterns can further be interpreted as manipulative stylistic shifts resulting from the geographical and socio-political status of Kurdistan. They reveal the conditioning factors that reflect the position of the TTs as opposed to the STs as well as within the receiving culture. On the one hand, they indicate the phenomena pertaining to the make-up of the source text reframed in the target text and show the involvement of the socio-cultural and political constraints and the social conditions of the two languages in the translation process. On the other hand, this

outcome shows contradicts Baker's complete universality with its reliance on sociocultural and political variables. One of those factors is the situation of the target language as opposed to the source language. While only a few cases are due to non-lexicalisation and non-standardised language (tables 4.7 and 4.21), the socio-political factors diachronically affected the translator's lexical choices in relation to the majority of the borrowing strategies. In addition, the majority of the cases of borrowings are from English (table 4.2), which is considered a more prestigious culture than Arabic, Turkish and Persian due to the geopolitical milieu of Kurdistan (see subsection 1.1.1 and 4.2.1 for more details).

This, therefore, reveals that the tendency in relation to the law of interference in this study is partly due to the power relations and the prestige of the cultures and languages in question. CNA has identified that borrowing strategies are partly dominated and influenced by the predominant traditions in the target language and culture, socio-political and ideological factors, power relations within and between cultures. The outcomes are explored in relation to the type of ambiguity and two prevailing types of ideological factors were distinguished. The corpus analysis in this study shows that 69% of the cases of borrowing between the years 2011 and 2014 are either due to the historical and political factors or the translator's agency (translator's voice) (see section 4.2.1). In terms of directness of translation, the analysis shows that 31% cases of borrowing are directly borrowed from Arabic, while 57% of the cases are directly or indirectly borrowed from English. The indirect borrowing of English loanwords through Arabic, Persian and Turkish made these languages to be intermediates between English and Kurdish. This might be due to the historical and current geopolitical situation of Kurdistan, respectively. The analysis has revealed that the geographical and political situation of Kurdistan has its own impact in relation to the use of this strategy. The high-frequency borrowed forms produced by the translator's agency in this study, however, indicates that Kurdish translators' decisions are established via the social and ideological values of the target community in favour of the current political parties with which the media agencies are aligned.

As for preliminary norms, section 4.1 shows that the factors that determine the selection of texts to be translated in Kurdish media in general and in Kurdish newspapers in particular is not a random procedure. The publication agencies select particular types of texts to be translated

purposefully and they are translated to serve a certain goal. This will be further investigated in the chapter five and six.

As textual-linguistic norms, thus, the high-frequency borrowed forms are of nouns and they led to stylistic shifts in the translation of media texts into Kurdish. The borrowing strategy, therefore, is the preferred strategy which leads to stylistic shifts in Kurdish media translation since it entails direct and/or indirect transference of a given SL lexical item into the TL. The analysis has shown that there is an interplay between the practices of borrowing in Kurdish and the geopolitical environment of Kurdistan. While the percentages show that non-lexicalisation is not the high-frequency factor behind the use of such strategy, translators' agency plays a significant role in this respective. This indicates that translators manipulate their power to use borrowing strategy in order to give voice to their own and/or the institution they belong to.

**Chapter Five**  
**Translation in Practice II:**  
**Reframing Strategies and Lexical Shifts in Kurdish Media**  
**Translation**

**5.0 Introduction**

The analysis presented in the previous chapter has shown that the ideology of the translators and major newspapers agencies plays a significant role in the stylistic shifts on the lexical level in Kurdish media translation. These next two chapters continue to investigate the way in which similar ideologies shapes Kurdish translation processes, through the analysis of the shifts on the level of meaning in the corpus of collected translations. This chapter discusses the translators' lexical choices with regard to the reframing strategies of deletion and addition in the translation of English commentary articles into Kurdish from two perspectives, at word level and above word level. The choices include: parts of speech, names, acronyms and abbreviations, expressions, sentences and paragraphs. In doing so, it explores the extent to which shifts on the level of meaning are driven by ideology in Kurdish geopolitical journalistic texts. The study argues that the reframing strategies of deletion and addition leading to semantic shifts tend toward the manipulation of ST messages for ideological purposes rather than mistranslations, simplification, explicitations, non-lexicalisation, or the non-standardisation of Kurdish.

The investigation of the two reframing strategies of deletion and addition has a two-pronged approach in this chapter. In the first stage, this study examines those cases in which each of the deletion strategies and addition strategies has been used alone. The second part of the analysis includes those cases in which the two strategies are used as one combined reframing strategy, i.e., substitution. In other words, it examines the action of replacing the STs with TTs of different values and meaning. The chapter, therefore, compares and investigates the ST and TT segments in order to reveal what type of deviation occurred in the use of these two strategies, as one combined strategy and as two different strategies. The effect of the use of these reframing strategies in the TTs is considerable for the target readership. Given that the articles are available online, on the one hand those who know English can refer to the original texts if they are

suspicious about the content of the translated TTs. On the other hand, for those who do not read English, their comprehension of the translated articles would be different from that of readers of the original written by the author.

Based on the outcomes of the collected data of the comparative study, this chapter thus aims at the identifying the reframing strategies of deletion and addition as the prevalent translation strategies that lead to ideological shifts on the semantic level in Kurdish media translation. This, in turn, will reveal the role of translators in assenting or dissenting to the narratives elaborated in the STs and the extent to which they make modifications to the STs so as to undermine the narratives dominating and/or disapproving the target society. The chapter also focuses on the role of the four Kurdish media agencies, translators, and socio-political factors in the occurrence of such lexical choices when translated from English into Kurdish. However, the outcomes of the cases in relation to the text-selection policy of the Kurdish media agencies will be explored in the following chapter 6.

## **5.1 Deletion Strategy in Kurdish Media Translation**

This section addresses the way ideology leads translation in relation to the cases of omission and their impact on the meaning transference between English and Kurdish in the translation of geopolitical commentary articles. This study argues for the employment of this strategy against the so-called universal features of translation including non-lexicalisation and simplifications<sup>43</sup>. To do so, it investigates the types of shifts that resulted from the use of the translational strategy that involves the deletion of the ST features in the TTs, both at word level and above word level.

The corpus was analysed on the level of lexical choice to categorise the most prevailing translation strategies used in the translation of the English commentary articles into Kurdish. In the previous chapter, table 4.1 and chart 4.1 show that the use of deletion strategies is the second highest frequency after the use of the strategies of borrowing. Deletion or omission strategies represent 21% of the overall 1087 cases in the corpus of this study. This strategy occurs when

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<sup>43</sup> See subsection 2.5.2

features take place in the ST and are simply not presented in the TT. Generally, it might be used for words or expressions which are not lexicalised in the target language, or cases which their deletions do ‘not harm’ in some contexts (Baker 2011a, p.42), i.e., they will be redundant in the TTs if translated. However, table 5.1 below shows that 98% of the cases of deletion occurred in the corpus of this study while there are TT counterparts for them in the TL.

Deletion	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
Lexicalised	219	98%
Not-lexicalised	4	2%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>223</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 5. 1: Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion in the TTs

The non-lexicalised cases constitute 2%, which consist of only four cases. Interestingly enough, according to Hasanpoor (1999), two of the identified cases of non-lexicalisation in the corpus of this study are those that are normally compensated for by well-established loanwords in Kurdish. They are *democratic* and *strategic* (see section 4.2.1). The remaining cases of non-lexicalisation are acronyms, comprising two cases. They were placed next to their ST full forms in the source texts. However, the acronyms were not presented in the TTs while their full forms were translated into their counterparts in the TL. This result can have different interpretations in relation to its significance in terms of the impact it can have in the TL. According to Lewis (1985/2004, p. 265), the reason behind the use of this kind of strategy, here, might be “to reduce the attention to translation that is sustained in the original”. On the one hand, this motive seems to be relevant because acronyms are often borrowed and written in English letters in the target language. The Kurdish translators, thus, might intend not to borrow from the STs to reduce foreignisation<sup>44</sup> in the TTs. On the other hand, as this study has shown that the frequency of using borrowing strategies is higher than the use of deletion strategies in the corpus of this study; this reason seems unlikely (See table 4.1 of the previous chapter). The third interpretation, thus, might be the agency of the translators who considered the deletion of the acronyms did not affect the meaning transference since the full forms of the two acronyms were translated into their counterparts in the TL.

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<sup>44</sup> strangeness

Deletion	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
Lexical Shift	209	94%
No Shift	14	6%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>223</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 5. 2 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion in the TTs




Chart 5. 1: Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion in the TTs

Table 5.2 and chart 5.1 show that only 6% of the cases did ‘not harm’ when omitted in some contexts, while the majority of the cases affected meaning transfer from the STs to the TTs, comprising 94% of all cases of deletion in the corpus of this study. These deleted items that affected meaning in the corpus of this study are referred to as lexical shifts. They constitute a significant percentage in relation to the text-type of the articles used in the corpus of this study. Since the articles include information transfer of opinion on the geopolitical facts, the majority of the ST choices function as keywords in terms of sustaining these views and assessments and affecting the overall textual meaning. On the semantic level, thus, the majority of the shifts resulted from the use of this strategy, both at word level and above word level, can have ideological interpretations shaping the manipulation of the translator and the impact they can have in the TL. Their occurrence in the translated texts affects specifying and/or generalising information and reflects the translator’s resistance and acceptance toward the narratives elaborated in the STs.

In this way, the deletion of the expression *those who confront death*<sup>45</sup>, which was placed next to the word *peshmerga* in the ST, might not affect the meaning transfer from the ST into TT. This is because the word *peshmerga* is a Kurdish culture specific word and does not need explanation in the respective language. Beside, both *those who confront death* and *peshmerga* have similar meaning, i.e., it would be unnecessary information in the TT if it was translated. This kind of reframing thus can be interpreted as a translator's tendency toward simplification within the TT by shortening the target sentence and transferring only the relevant and familiar concept. Nevertheless, the deletion of the word *acting-* in the below given example affected the meaning transfer from the ST into the TT since it altered the meaning from *acting-minister* to *minister*.

**ST:** Besides being prime minister, he made himself *acting* minister of defense, minister of the interior and national security adviser.

**TT:** لهگهڵ ئهوشدا بوونی و مکو سهروك و وزیران بردی بهرمو بهكارهینانی دهسته لاتنهکانی و مکو وهزیری بهرگری و ناوختو و راویژکاری ئهمنی قهومی به رههایی

**BT:** Besides, being a prime minister made him to use his authorities as *minister of defense*, minister of the interior and the considerable national security adviser.

While the position of Minister of Defense, which was approved on 21 December 2010<sup>46</sup>, was left vacant in the Iraqi cabinet, the former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki served as the acting defense minister and not minister then. The ST was written and translated into Kurdish in 2014. Although the ST presented a negative view by using the expression *he made himself* (and not he was elected) to narrate the way he ruled while he was in power, the deletion in the TT provided a stronger interpretive frame. Reframing *acting-minister* as *minister* promoted competing narratives in relation to legitimacy of the government in terms of holding several governmental posts at the same time by the one who had the absolute power. This might be interpreted as the translator's attempt to provoke the target readers to reconsider their decisions regarding the narratives that are presented in the target society then. Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite political figure, had participated in the 2014 parliamentary election despite accusations that he has used the judiciary to silence and imprison political rivals and had "suffered shrinking

<sup>45</sup> See AE. 45 and AKX.45 of the corpus of this study.

<sup>46</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nouri\\_al-Maliki](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nouri_al-Maliki)



support from Sunnis and Kurds<sup>47</sup>. Likewise, when the word *Kurdish* was used to modify the word *jihadist* in the ST and the word *outlawed* was used to describe the status of the *Kurdistan Workers' Party* (PKK) as a political organization in Turkey in the ST, they were simply not presented in the TTs. These alterations have a significant impact on the meaning transference between the STs and the TTs. They might be interpreted in relation to the translators' role in opposing the narratives elaborated in the STs.

<b>Deletion Lexical Shift</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
Above word level	134	60%
At word level	75	34%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>94%</b>

Table 5. 3: Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion in the TTs

Table 5.3 shows that the cases of deleted items resulted in shifts on the semantic level occurred at both word level and above word level in the corpus of this study. They have a significant implication in shaping the ideology of the translator in terms of sustaining or challenging the narratives elaborated in the STs.

<b>Lexical Shift At Word Level</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
Nouns	32	14%
Adjectives	30	13%
Adverbs	7	3%
Acronyms and Abbreviations	3	1%
Verbs	2	1%
Pluralisation S	1	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>34%</b>
<b>of Grand Total</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>94%</b>

Table 5. 4: Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion at word level in the TTs

At word level, table 5.4 shows that nouns and adjectives represent the first and second highest frequencies of the total 34% of the cases of lexical shifts. They account for 14% and 13%, of the cases, respectively. These parts of speech functioned as key material in relation to

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<sup>47</sup> <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11733715>

the type of information presented by the ST author in the original text. Their omissions resulted in transferring less specific information than the ST did, as we see in the following example.

**ST:** When the *air* campaign began last spring, he was on the verge of massacring the opposition in the *rebel* stronghold of Benghazi.

**TT:** كاتيك بهاري رابردو هيرشهكان دهستيان پيكرد، قهزافي لهوپيري ئهجامداني رهمكوژييمكدا  
بو دژي ئوپوزسيون له شاري بنغازي.

**BT:** When last spring *the campaigns* began, Gaddafi was at the extreme of his massacring operation against opposition in *the city* of Benghazi.

The omission of noun *air*, which functioned as a modifier within the noun phrase *the air campaign*, provided general information and did not specify the type of the campaign that took place then. Likewise, the deletion of the noun *rebel*, which also functioned as a modifier within the adverbial phrase *in the rebel stronghold of Benghazi*, provided a general information and did not specify the kind of the city that was about to be massacred. Meanwhile, it specifies the political allegiance of those in the city, and so positions them differently. According to Klaudy and Károly (2005, p. 15), these kinds of transference result in implicitations in the translated products as “meaningful lexical elements of the SL text are dropped in the TL text”. This becomes more apparent in the omission cases of adjectives and adverbs since the authors used them to describe and specify the type of information they wanted to transfer. In the example below, the deletions of the adjectives *moral* and *strategic* in the ST’s article headline raised ambiguity in the TT in terms of the kind of failure since it is not specified.

**ST:** Obama’s *Moral* and *Strategic* Failure on ISIS

**TT:** شکستی ئوباما بهرامپهر داعش

**BT:** Obama’s Failure on ISIS

Headlines represent a unique text-type. While they appear on the front page, they condense the stories in a minimum number of words that attract the reader to the stories the writers want to accentuate in the texts (Reah, 1998, p. 13). Thus, the deletion of the two adjectives in the TT affected the meaning transference in a particularly significant way because they function as key words in specifying the topic of the whole text. There is the possibility of the omission of unknown or not widely known words in the TL since the TT readers may reject and not read the articles with “mysterious” headlines. Therefore, it is undeniable that there is the tendency to simplify the wording of headlines in the TTs, when there are unfamiliar words

and expressions. However, the TT correspondents of the two adjectives *moral* and *strategy* are known and widely used in the TL. As such, their omissions might be interpreted in relation to the translator's agency and the way the translation agencies and newspapers allow ideology to inform their news output and translation policies.

Table 5.4 shows that adverbs are the third highest frequency after nouns and adjectives, constituting 3% of the total 33% of deletion cases at word level. Similar to adjectives, adverbs play a significant role in relation to the author's decision in presenting the ST information. However, while adjectives specified the information, adverbs specified the way they were presented by the author in the ST. Therefore, their omissions affects the reframing of the STs in the TTs, as we see in the following example.

ST: But what if Islamists *just* use religion *cynically* to gain political support?  
 TT: بەلام ئەي چي ئەگەر ئىسلامىيەت ئاين بەکار بەھنن بۆ بەدەستەننەن پالەشتى سىياسى؟  
 BT: But what if Islamists use religion to gain political support?

The adverbs *just* and *cynically* are used in the ST to question the way religion will be used to gain political support. Their deletions in the TT altered the way the question was presented in the ST and resulted in presenting a more general question and less critical in the TT.

Acronyms and abbreviations represent only 1% of the 33% of the cases of deletion at word level. Nevertheless, they affect meaning transfer from the STs into the TTs and result in presenting more general information in the TTs if compared to their STs. For instance, the deletion of the acronym *HE*, which stands for His Excellency, in “HE Massoud Barzani” affected the way the author presented *Massoud Barzani* who holds a high position in the Kurdistan regional government in the TT. The deletion here might be interpreted in terms of the translator's mediation and the news agency's policy (See section 6.4.1 of the next chapter). The remaining cases that affected meaning transfer from the STs to the TTs include only one case of omission from each of the verbs, and pluralisation form *-s*. As percentage rates, they do not constitute significant percentages in relation to the total. However, they had a significant impacts on the meaning transfer from the ST into the TT since they functioned as key elements in the STs in terms of presenting the interpretation of the ST authors.

ST: So what can Ankara do? *Invade*?

TT: بۆیه ئهنگهره دهتوانیته چی بکات؟

BT: So what can Ankara do?

The example above shows that when the ST author questioned the options Turkey had and what can Ankara do in relation to what was happening in western/Syrian Kurdistan in the below given example, he used the verb *invade* to specify the possibility he wanted to focus on in his article. The omission of such verb in the TT altered the question to have a more general implication.

Lexical Shift Above Word Level	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
Expression and Names	73	33%
Sentences	46	21%
Paragraphs	15	7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>60%</b>
<b>of Grand Total</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>94%</b>

Table 5. 5 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion above word level in the TTs

This inference is more prominent above word level since the omission extends not only to expressions but to sentences and paragraphs as well. Being a set of words that is complete in itself, both sentences and paragraphs fulfil a narrative function in the ST. Their omissions, usually, might be due to the length of the texts or the modification to the ST meaning transfer in favour of the policy of the media agencies. As strategies, they are, however, more interpretable from an ideological view in the corpus of this study due to their effect in translation distortion rather than the length of the texts. Their omissions thus might have a significant impact on the meaning transference between the STs and the TTs, not only in terms of altering the ST messages, but also in relation to the focus of the ST themes. Since they include a group of key words, their omissions had a greater effect in the TTs as a whole representation of the ST information. According to Iser (1972, p. 282), sentences do not only include solely a statement “but aims at something beyond what is actually says”. This is consistent with the texts used in this study since sentences within commentary articles usually contain assessments of the facts that authors wants to present. Table 5.5 shows that while expressions constitute 33% of the cases of deletion, sentence and paragraph deletions account for 21% and 7% of the total 60% respectively. The analysis, therefore, shows that the omissions of sentences and paragraphs in the TL texts constitute the second and third highest frequencies, respectively, after the

omissions of expressions above word level. The omission of the sentence *and [the Iraqi government] is now calling on Assad to step down* in the example below affected the complete meaning the author wanted to deliver.

**ST:** The Iraqi government recently reversed its support for Syrian President Bashar Assad amid the ongoing unrest in Syria, *and is now calling on Assad to step down*.

**TT:** حکومەتی عێراق ھاوکات لەگەڵ پەشتیویەکانی سوریایەم دوایانە پشتیوانی خۆی بۆ بەشار ئەسەدی سەرۆکی سوریایەم وەستاندووە

**BT:** The Iraqi government, amid the ongoing unrest in Syria, recently has stopped its support for Syrian President Bashar Assad.

The TT indicates that the Iraqi government has only cancelled his support without mentioning other verbal or non-verbal activity. This caused implicitation in terms of the kind of support the Syrian President Bashar Assad received from the Iraqi government. Likewise, two whole sentences of the paragraph below are not presented in the TT.

**ST:** *The supporters of the new Kurdish strategy are of the opinion that the Oslo negotiations conducted between MIT and PKK representatives in Europe were mismanaged and failed. It is also true that the PKK spoiled the Oslo talks and thwarted the government's peaceful approach by waging violent attacks last July in the midst of negotiations.*

**TT:** N/A

The paragraph contains the reference and more detailed information about the topic already introduced in the title of the article. It was written in the penultimate paragraph of the commentary article entitled, *New Kurdish strategy reveals divisions within government*. Therefore, one cannot argue that the translator failed to recognise the significance of this paragraph. However, it is rather interpretable from the translator's ideology in terms of disseminating or dissenting the narratives detailed in the STs in proportion to the narrative they accept or oppose. According to Falkenhayner (2014, p. 75), "commentary articles do not present issues in isolation, but in their structure, they judge and position them in connection with other issues of importance, or ones receiving coverage, at the same time". This is occasionally consistent with the articles used in the corpus of this study. Therefore, the use of each of the words, expressions, sentences and paragraphs constitute significant vehicles in presenting such issues in the STs, their omissions affect the textual meaning of the translated commentary articles.

The deleted expressions affected the meaning transference of the ST messages in the TTs. They include various phrases such as verb phrases, noun phrases, adjective phrases and adverb phrases, as we see in the following examples.

**ST:** Mr Erdogan *appears to* have abandoned, for the moment, his declared long-term intention to visit Gaza

**TT:** ئەمردۆگان لەئێستادا وازی لە بڕیاری سەردانی غەزە هێناوە کە ماوەیهکە دەیهوێت بیکات

**BT:** Erdogan, for the moment, has abandoned his decision to visit Gaza, which recently he wants to do it.

The omission of the phrasal verb *appears to* in the TT affected the meaning transfer from ST to the TT in relation to the ST author's certainty about Mr Erdogan's cancellation to visit Gaza. The TT narrated the act of cancellation explicitly while the ST did not specified or confirmed the message. The inference of the TT, therefore, is different from that of the ST. As a shift, it can be discussed in relation to stylistic shifts, nevertheless the geopolitical status of Kurdistan and its relation to Turkey, in particular the policy of current Turkish government might indicate other interpretations. This text is translated by the Sbei news agency to which it is directly aligned to the Gorran party, known as the opposition party in Kurdistan. The translator's policy seems to reflect the same policy of the agency in disapproving of Turkish political policy. The deletions of the title *Mr* and the phrasal verb *appears to* indicate the translator's attitude toward the Turkish policy by accentuating the conflict between Turkey and the Palestinian authority through the Turkish president's decision<sup>48</sup>. The example below shows that the omission of adverb phrases created a similar impact on reframing the ST narratives in the TTs.

**ST:** ISTANBUL — If it weren't for *Tuesday's* helicopter crash *on Mount Sinjar*, what would I have written about the plight of the Yazidis?

**TT:** ئەستەنبۆڵ - ئەگەر کارەساتی ئەو هەلیکۆپتەرە روی ئەدایا، ئاخۆ دەبو چیم بنوسیایا دەربارەی بارودۆخی ئێزیدیەکان؟

**BT:** ISTANBUL — If it weren't for the helicopter crash, what would I have written about the condition of the Yazidis?

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<sup>48</sup> The relation between the translator's lexical choices and the policy of the Kurdish media news agencies will further be investigated in the following chapter (chapter 6).

The non-presentation of the ST expressions *Tuesday's* and *on Mount Sinjar* in the TT resulted in a shift from presenting specific information to a rather general one in terms of time and place of the event. Again this might be interpreted in relation to stylistic norms or simplification, however, the possibility of the translator's ideological attempt towards accentuating the condition of the Yazidis is more prominent. This is due to the fact that the translator not only deleted these two adverbial features, which describe the specific accident which happened to the author while visiting this mountain, but also all the other features relating to the same accident with the aim of accentuating the whole Yazidis trauma while attacked by ISIS. Likewise, the omission of the prepositional phrase *for America* also modified the presentation of the ST's information in the TT in the example below.

**ST:** Iraq was such a bitter experience *for America* that *we* prefer never to speak of it again.

**TT:** عێراق ئێزموونێکی هێنده تالە وابەباش دەزانم که جاریکی تر قسه‌ی لێبارمیهوه نه‌که‌ین

**BT:** Iraq was such a bitter experience that I prefer never to speak of it again

However, the use of this strategy here with the substitution of the pronoun *we* with *I* led to the personalisation of the ST information. Thus, the translational strategies used specified the information by the shift in register, i.e., the *bitter experience* is made to refer only to the narrator who is from America and not to America as a country.

The analysis of the use of the reframing strategy of deletion, in this section, has shown that a high percentage of the cases led to semantic shifts in the TTs, with only a small percentage of the use of this strategy did not affect meaning transfer between the STs and TTs. The low percentage of the cases of deletion in this study, in essence, is consistent with what Baker refers to as the cases that do 'no harm' and what Nida calls redundant features if translated. According to Baker (2011a, p. 42), since they are "not vital enough to the development of the [texts]"<sup>49</sup> to justify distracting the reader with lengthy explanations, translators can and often do simply omit translating the word or expression in question". Likewise, Nida (1964) considers that the use of this strategy sometimes does not have an impact on meaning transference between the STs and the TTs due to their relation to the language preferences. However, the analysis in this study also revealed that the high percentage of the choice of deletion strategy resulted in shifts on the

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<sup>49</sup> The pluralisation -s is added

semantic level. The impact of the use of this strategy on the meaning transference from the STs to the TTs, both at word level and above word level, resulted in both the specification and generalization of the ST and TT messages and changed the ideological drive of the texts. In this sense, the omission strategy provided a mechanism through which translators became ideologically participants in the reframing process of the STs in the TTs.

## 5.2 Substitution Strategy in Kurdish Media

The previous section has shown that strategies of deletion can enable the translator to alter the key messages of the texts and provide a different reading of the STs in the TTs, both at word level and above. This section will develop the question of the translator's agency further by considering the impact of the use of substitution in translation. The study addresses this question because of the frequency of substitution (see table 5.6) and because of its potential impact in informing the translation. It argues that the use of this reframing strategy resulted from ideological manipulation rather than mistranslation or non-lexicalisation in the TTs.

Substitution occurs when the translation combines omission and addition strategies. In other words, the ST elements are deleted in the TTs and other non-ST elements are added instead. In terms of the frequency of their occurrences in the TTs, this study reveals that of the strategies used in translating media commentary articles, there are 201 cases of substitution which constitute 18% of the total of 1087 cases in the corpus of this study (Table and chart 4.1 in the previous chapter).

<b>Deletion + Addition (Substitution)</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
Lexical Shift	175	87%
Stylistic Shift	26	13%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 5. 6 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of substitution in the TTs

Table 5.6 shows the type of shifts this strategy engendered in the target texts. 87% of the cases represent lexical shifts, with only 13% causing no shift on the semantic level of the TT. The occurrence of 13% of the cases of substitutions might be interpreted in terms of either domestication or explicitations (explanation). The translators' decision are more interpretable





جۆن کیری، وهزیری دهرهوهی ئهمریکا، گهرانهوهی ههزرهکانی سوپای ولاتهکهی بهدوورزانی  
**BT:** John Kerry, Secretary of State of America, ruled out [the possibility of] *returning his country's army*

However, this might not be a very productive motivation since the expression “*American boots*” is presented between two quotation marks in the ST. This indicates that the author presented John Kerry’s quote directly. Direct quotes are usually used to focus precisely on the point one wants to make. Since it was substituted with the expression *his country's army*, the TT reader could not know exactly what the ST author wished to address.

Substitution Stylistic Shifts	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
At word level	13	6%
Above word level	13	6%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>13%</b>

Table 5. 7 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of substitution in the TTs

Thus, there are cases of substitution that represent stylistic shifts both at word level and above word level (Table 5.7). Comprising 13% of the cases, they do not constitute a significant percentage in relation to the total percentage of the cases of substitution. However, this result can have its significance in terms of the impact it can have in the TTs, in particular in terms of domestication, as it is shown in the following example.

**ST:** America **was** on the ground with tens of thousands of troops to act as *that well-armed midwife*.  
**TT:** ئهمرو ئهمریکا له مهیدانهکهیه و دهیان ههزار سهرباز له گۆرهبانهکهدا ئامادهن بۆ نهوهی که  
پشتیوانی و چاودیری عێراق بکهن  
**BT:** Today, America **is** on the ground with tens of thousands of troops *to support and monitor/watch Iraq*

Domestication, here, can be defined as the strategy of minimising the foreignness of the ST in the language being translated to and providing a more intelligible rendition to the TT readers. For instance, the ST expression *well-armed midwife* was substituted with the TT expression پشتیوانی و چاودیری عێراق (BT: support and monitor Iraq). The reason might be due to the minimisation of the strangeness of the foreign text for the target language readers, since the word *midwife* has different connotation in the TT. Although it carries similar meaning in terms of preparing women for the delivery of new life, Kurdish midwives are not educated and trained

and their job, thus, is not part of a successfully completed midwifery education programme that is recognised in the country. Therefore, it would not have the same impact on the TT reader if it was translated literally but rather a rather a strange and awkward meaning.

Substitution Lexical Shift	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
At word level	108	54%
Above word level	67	33%
<b>Total</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>87%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 5. 8 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of substitution in the TTs

The majority of substitutions, which constitutes 87% of the cases, led to lexical shifts in the corpus of this study (Table 5.6). While 54% of the cases of substitution represent lexical shifts at word level, 33% of the cases of lexical shifts occurred above word level (Table 5.8). However, the cases do not always reflect the use of one-to-one correspondence from English into Kurdish.

Substitution Lexical Shift at Word Level	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
Nouns	59	29%
Verbs	21	10%
Adjectives	14	7%
Adverbs	4	2%
conjunctions	3	1%
Acronyms and Abbreviations	3	1%
Prepositions	2	1%
Possessive S	1	0%
Pronouns	1	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>54%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>87%</b>

Table 5. 9 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of substitution at word level in the TTs

At word level, table 5.9 shows that nouns represent the highest frequency among the elements affecting meaning transfer from the STs to the TTs. In the example below, the translator might substitute the noun *Hawks* with *نەندامانی کۆنگرێس* (BT: Members of Congress or congressmen) in the TT to transfer a close meaning of ST.

**ST:** *Hawks* are right that Iraq could be a catastrophe.

**TT:** *نەندامانی کۆنگرێس راستدەگەن کە بۆی هەیه بێتە کارەسات*

**BT:** *Members of Congress* are right that it could be a catastrophe.

This might be due to the fact that the word *Hawks* is not lexicalised in the TL and not familiar to the TT readers if it was transcribed. The words *congress* and *congressman* are familiar to the Kurdish readership as culture-specific loanwords. However, they have not the same meaning of *Hawks*. While *Hawk* is used to describe a politician who believes in using military force, i.e., it is opposite to *Dove*, the expression *Member of Congress* or the word *congressman* refers to a member to the US House of Representatives in general. Thus, the ST word is used to describe a specific member of congressmen and not the whole membership. The use of substitution affected the meaning transfer from specific to general one. Such general reframing of the ST narrative in the TT might imply the translator's agreement with the Hawks' agenda since s/he translated it in that way more than once. Likewise, the ST noun *government* was substituted with the TT noun رژیم (BT: regime) in the example below, while there is a TT correspondence for it in the TL. The substitution between them affected meaning transfer from the ST to the TT.

**ST:** the Iranian *government*

**TT:** رژیم تیران

**BT:** the Iranian *regime*

This shift might be interpreted from the translator's ideology since it indicated disapproval of the Iranian state because the use of substitution, here, resulted in specifying what type of government Iran has. i.e., a regime. This is due to the fact that the word *government* refers usually to a group of people who elected to govern a country or a state whereas *regime* is used to a government that was not elected fairly or that is disapproved for some other reason.

Verbs represent the second highest frequency among the elements affecting meaning transfer from the STs to the TTs at word level. They constitute 10% of the cases of substitution in the corpus of this study (Table 5.9). Similar to the strategy of noun substitution, their occurrence affected meaning transfer from general to specific and the other way around as well.

**ST:** Turkey *downgraded* relations after Israel rejected a sound, American-mediated deal to close the book on Israel's ill-fated assault on a Gaza aid flotilla that killed eight Turks and one Turkish-American.

**TT:** تورکیا په یوه هندیه کانی **پچړاند** دواى نه وه ی ئیسرائیل هیچ وه لامیکى نه یو، رولى ناوېزیوانى  
 نه مریکا بو بیدهنگبون له هیرشى ئیسرائیل بو سمر که شتییه کی یار ممتی بو غمززه که تییدا هشت هاوالتی  
 تورکی، که په کیکیان (نهمریکی-تورکی) بو کوژران

**BT:** Turkey *ended/ broke off* relations after Israel rejected a sound, American-mediated deal to be silent on Israel's assault on a Gaza aid flotilla that killed eight Turks and one Turkish-American.

The substitution of the ST verb *downgraded* with the TT verb **پچړاند** (BT: *ended/ broke off*) resulted in specifying the type of relationship more between the two countries in the TT. The use of *downgraded* in the ST shows Turkey reduced its relations with Israel to a lower grade, rank, or level of importance. The ST message, therefore, did not clearly address that the relations between Turkey and Israel ended, while the TT conveyed the opposite. The substitution affected the meaning transfer from giving specific information to a more specific one and gave rise to a different reframing that might be interpreted through the translator's agency. In a similar manner, the ST verb *plundered* was substituted by the TT **کونترول کرد** (BT: *controlled*) in the example given below.

**ST:** Kurds *plundered* bases deserted by the Iraqi army in Kirkuk,

**TT:** هاوکات کوردەکان نهو بنکه سەربازیانەى سوپای عیراقیان **کونترول کرد** که له شارى کەرکوک  
 چۆلکران

**BT:** Meanwhile the Kurds *controlled* those Iraqi army bases that were deserted in the Kirkuk city...

Nevertheless, since the verb *plunder* refers to the act of taking goods typically by using force in a time of war or civil disorder, it is different from the verb *control* that carries a more general, and legitimate meaning. The substitution, therefore, affects the meaning transfer from giving specific information to general information. This, in turn, presented a positive implication in the TT and enabled the translator to present responses to the Kurdish actions in a more positive light.

Table 5.9 shows that 7% of the cases of the cases of substitution in the corpus of this study are adjectives. They also play a significant role in terms of giving specific and general information in the STs and the TTs. For instance, the substitution of the ST adjective *unexpected* in the noun phrase *an unexpected development* with the TT adjective **به گهشه سەندنیکی مەترسیدار** (a *frightening/ alarming* development) affected the meaning transfer in terms of specifying the type of development Kurds made in the Kurdish region of Syria.

**ST:** The Turkish side sees this as an '*unexpected* development' and has started taking steps to stop this becoming *a deepening problem* for Turkey," Zeyrek said.

**TT:** توركيا نهم بارودۆخه به گهشهسهندننكى مهترسيدار [...] بهپي قسهكانى رۆژنامه نووسينكى تورك تېدهگات و چهند ههنگاوئى ناوه بۆ نهوى نهو بارودۆخه ئىستاي رۆژناوای كوردستان نهپته هوى قولبوونهوى زياترى كيشهى كورد له توركيا

**BT:** According to a Turkish journalist [...] Turkey considers this situation as *a frightening/ alarming* development and has started taking some steps in order not to let the current situation in western Kurdistan *deepens the problem of Kurds more* in Turkey

Interestingly enough, the example above shows that the ST adjective *deepening* in the noun phrase *a deepening problem* was turned into a TT verb قولبوونهوى (BT: deepen), while the TT phrase ى كورد (BT: of Kurd) substituted its place in the TT phrase كيشهى كورد (BT: problem of Kurd). As explained earlier in this section, the change of form features in terms of parts of speech between the two languages is not inexplicable since each of English and Kurdish has different word and syntactic structure to convey the semantic meaning. Nevertheless, since the TT expression *problem of Kurds* replaced the ST phrase *a deepening problem*, it alters ST meaning to a point of particularism.

Adverbs constitute 2% of the cases of substitution in the corpus of this study. Since they specified the way information was presented by the author in the ST, their replacement with the TT adverbs with different meanings resulted in lexical shifts in the TTs.

**ST:** In the past year, the reformist edge of the AKP has *dramatically waned*.

**TT:** سالى رابردوو AKP له چه مكي چاكسازى به تهواويى پاشه كشه يکرد

**BT:** In the past year, AKP has *completely withdrawn* from the idea of reformation.

The replacement of the ST adverb *dramatically* with the TT adverb به تهواويى (BT: completely) modified the ST message in the below given example. This had a major impact on the message transfer as the adverb was added to the meaning of the ST verb *waned*. Since the verb was also replaced by the TT پاشه كشه يکرد (BT: withdrawn), it, in turn, modified the message transference as well. The TT message, in essence, spelled out the role of the AKP more clearly than the ST message. Likewise, the substitution of the ST adverb *However* with the TT adverb بهدا/خهوه (BT: unfortunately) in the below given modified the ST message transfer in a way that it seemed the ST author expressed his sentiment regarding what happened.

**ST:** *However*, Kurdish journalists Soran Mama Hama and Sardasht Osman were not so lucky; they were gunned down for writing about corruption by the political class and local governments

**TT:** *بەدا/خەڵوە* رۆژنامه‌نوسان سۆرانی مامەحمە و سەردەشت عوسمان ئێ بەختیان نەبو و لەسەر نوسین دەریارە ی گەندەلی لە لایەن دەسەلات و حکومەتی کوردیەرە، بە گۆلە کوژران.

**BT:** *Unfortunately*, journalists Soran Mama Hama and Sardasht Osman were not that lucky; for writing about corruption by Kurdish governments and authority they were gunned down

Table 5.9 shows that each of conjunctions, acronyms and abbreviations, and prepositions constitute 1% of the cases of substitution in the corpus of this study. Since conjunctions and prepositions function as key words in connecting words or group of words and showing the relationship between ideas, they play a significant role in the semantic transference between the STs and TTs, as we see in the following examples. For example, while the ST conjunction *as* was replaced with the TT conjunction و (BT: and) and determiner هەر (BT: any) in the example given below, the focus on one country turned into more than a country.

**ST:** At least 50 percent of the people in some way trusted this government, for various reasons. One of the most important was religion. When they realize that this government isn't so different from the old regimes, they will lose their faith in religious people, civilian politics and Turkey *as* a country.

**TT:** بە لایەنی کەمەوێ لەسەدا پەنجای هەولاتیان بە هەر شتوێک بێت بە هۆکاری جیاواز جیاواز متمانەی بەم حکومەتە هەبوو. یەکێک لە هەرە کاریگەرترین ئێ هۆکارانە ئاین بوو. کاتێک بۆیان رون دەبینێوێ کە ئێم حکومەتەش زۆر جیاوازتر نییە لە رژێمە کۆنەکە، ئێوا بڕوای خۆیان لە دەست دەدەن بەرامبەر بە کەسانی ئاینی، سیاسەتی مەدەنیانە و تورکیاش و هەر ولاتی.

**BT:** At least 50 percent of the people in some way trusted this government, for various reasons. One of the most important was religion. When they realize that this government isn't so different from the old regimes, they will lose their faith in religious people, civilian politics and Turkey *and any* country.

The TT message, thus, differs from the ST in the way it generalized how people will lose their faith in not only Turkey as a country, but also any other country in which its rule based on religion. In the same way, the replacement of the ST preposition *to* with the TT preposition *لە* (BT: by), shown below, modified the ST message which did not specify the performer of the game-changing power in the ST. However, the use of the preposition *by* in the TT indicates that the player of the game-changing power in Iraq is the American military.

**ST:** However, such reasoning imputes too much game-changing power *to* the American military and belittles the importance of local Iraqi actors and factors.

**TT:** هەرچەندە، ئەم جۆرە هەڵسەنگاندنە نامازە بە گۆرانئێکی زۆری یاریبەکە لە لایەن سوپای ئەمەریکاوە و کەمبۆنەوهی گرانگی ئەکتەرو فاکتەرە ناوخۆییەکانی عێراق دەکات.

**BT:** However, such evaluation signifies to a great/ major change of the game *by* the American military and belittles the importance of local Iraqi actors and factors.

The above analysis has shown that strategies of substitution impact meaning transference between the STs and TTs at word level. A high frequency of substitution resulted in alteration on semantic level and brought about both specialization and generalization of the ST and TT key messages on the part of the translators. The study is now turning to the remaining cases of substitution at word level, those of acronyms and abbreviations, pronouns and possessive –s, and investigating the way that substitution at this level informs the message that is being transmitted. Although they do not constitute a significant percentage in terms of their occurrence, they can be regarded as important features since they have their own impact on the meaning transfer from the STs to the TTs. They represent a convergent rate in relation to their occurrence in the corpus of this study, each comprising 1% of the cases of substitution.

Substitution Lexical Shift above Word Level	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
Expressions	50	25%
Sentences	11	5%
Headlines	4	2%
Paragraphs	2	1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>33%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>87%</b>

Table 5. 10 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of substitution above word level in the TTs

Similar to the cases of the deletion strategy, the impact of the cases of substitution is more perceptible above word level as there is a greater expectation of their ability to affect the overall transfer between the STs and the TTs. Expressions represent the majority in the corpus of this study, comprising 25% of all cases of the substitutions above word level (Table 5.10). In the example below, the TT expression *پارتێکی کوردی پۆژنلوا* (BT: a western Kurdish party) replaced the ST *in northern Syria of a Kurdish group*. Similarly, the ST expression *Kurdish separatists* was substituted by the Kurdish party's name *پارتی کرێکاران کوردستان* (BT: the Kurdistan worker's party) in the TT.



**ST:** Concerns are surfacing in Turkey about the growing influence *in northern Syria of a Kurdish group* linked to *Kurdish separatists* fighting Ankara

**TT:** نینگەرانییهکی ئاشکرا دیاره به سیاسهتی حکومتهی ئهمنقارهوه دهربارهی زیادیوونی کاریگریی پارتیکی کوردی پوژئاوا که پیوهندی همه به پارتی کریکارانی کوردستان که لهگهل ئهمنقارهوه له شهردان

**BT:** Obvious Concerns are surfacing in Ankara government's policy about the growing influence of *a western Kurdish party* which has a link with *the Kurdistan worker's party* that is in war with Ankara.

In both of the cases, the TTs gave information that is more specific than the ST's. This result can have two interpretations in relation to the impact it can have in the TTs. On the one hand, this denotes that the two cases of substitution might have occurred due to the translator's and TT reader's knowledge and familiarity regarding the Kurdish parties in the region. On the other hand, the effect of the two cases of substitution is substantial since it did not leave any room for speculation regarding the Kurdish groups, which is opposite to what the ST author did in the ST. According to table 5.10, substitution is also used in the cases of handling sentences, headlines and paragraphs. The substitution of sentences constitutes the second highest frequency after expressions, while headlines and paragraphs represent 2% and 1% of the cases of substitution, respectively. Interestingly enough, these types of substitution affected meaning transfer between the STs and the TTs in relation to the transference of the general and specific information as well. For example, the ST headline *Iraq's Factional Chaos Threatens to Disrupt a Kurdish Haven* was substituted with the Kurdish headline دکتور بهرهم سالح: ههموو کوردنیک دهولهتی (BT: Dr Barham Salih: Every Kurd yearns for an independent homeland). The TT headline started with a quote by a Kurdish political figure who is a member of the one of the political parties. The quote is mentioned in the middle of the ST article and is turned into a headline of the TT. The headline substitution, here, might be due to the impact of the quote on the TT readers as headlines are considered a significant element to attract readers. Nevertheless, since the quote is uttered by a member of one of the political parties, it raises questions regarding the ideology of the Kurdish publication agency and its translators (See chapter 6).

The choice of substitution strategy, in this section, shows the types of shifts which occurred in the TTs, which are semantic and stylistic shifts. However, the analysis showed that the highest percentage of the use of this strategy led to lexical shifts rather than stylistic. The use of this strategy impacted the meaning transference from the STs to the TTs, both at word level and above word level and resulted in both the specification and generalization of the ST

and TT messages. This, in turn, revealed the way translators dissociated themselves from the immediate narratives elaborated by the author through altering and/or opposing aspects of the immediate narratives they translate. This will further be explained in chapter 6.

### 5.3 Addition Strategy in Kurdish Media Translation

The previous section has shown that strategies of substitution can function as a significant mechanism through which translators became potential participants in reframing the key messages of the texts and providing a different reading of the STs in the TTs. This section will develop the question of translator's agency further by considering the impact of the use of the strategy of addition in translation. It investigates the cases of addition in relation to their impact on the meaning transference between the STs and TTs. Table 4.1 and chart 4.1 of the previous chapter reveal that addition has the fourth highest frequency among the strategies used in the TTs, comprising only 9% of the 1087 cases of translational strategies. This result has a significant impact on the meaning transfer between the STs and TTs, although it might not constitute a significant percentage in relation to the total percentage of the translational strategies in the corpus of this study.

<b>Addition</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
No shift	54	52%
Lexical Shift	49	48%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 5. 11 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of addition in the TTs

<b>Addition</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
No Shifts at semantic level		
At word level	37	36%
Above word level	17	17%
<b>Total</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>52%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 5. 12 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of addition in the TTs

Table 5.11 shows that 52% of the 103 cases of addition did not result in shifts on the semantic levels between the STs and TTs. They occurred both at word level and above word

level. The majority of the cases of addition occurred at word level accounting for 36% of the 52% of the cases of addition (Table 5.12). Nida (1964, p. 227) has argued that the use of addition can be a technique of adjustment in the process of translating to produce good counterparts due to the ST implicitation, the grammatical restructuring in the TT, and the TT categories which do not exist in the SL. Thus, their addition in the corpus of this study might be due to the syntactic and structural differences between English and Kurdish and/ or the unfamiliarity of the ST messages if translated literally. For instance, the addition of *پێژنامه* (BT: newspaper) next to the names *گاردیان* (The Guardian) and *ۆل ستریت ژورنأل* (BT: The Wall Street Journal) in the TL can be classified as involving the use of explicitation strategy. Table 5.12 shows that 17% of the cases of addition can have similar impact above word level, as we see in the following example.

**ST:** Ukraine remains a mess, with few people sure of what to do or when to do it.

**BT:** ئۆكرانیا به شێواوی ماوتیهوه، لهگهڵ ئهوهی چهند كهسێكی كهم دانیان لهوهی چی بکهن لهسههر  
 ئهم كێشهیهوه كهی بیکهن.

**TT:** Ukraine remains a mess, with few people sure of what to do *about this problem* or when to do it.

The addition of *لهسههر ئهم كێشهیه* (BT: about this problem/ issue) in the TT might be due to the transference of the ST message as clear as possible. In other words, the literal translation of the ST sentence might lead the ST message to be incomplete in the TT due to the missing features in the TT structure.

Table 5. 13: Frequency and percentage of the cases of addition in the TTs

<b>Addition</b> Shifts on semantic Level	<b>Frequency of</b> <b>Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of</b> <b>Translation Strategies</b>
At word level	27	26%
Above word level	22	21%
<b>Total</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>48%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100%</b>

Of the total of the cases of addition, table 5.11 shows that 48% of the cases resulted in shifts on semantic level. Although this percentage does not constitute a significant percentage in relation to the overall translational strategies identified in the corpus of this study, it does in

terms of its impact on the meaning transfer between the STs and TTs. They also occurred both at word level and above word level. Table 5.13 above shows that the majority of the cases of addition occurred at word level accounting for 26% of the 48% of the cases of addition.

Lexical Shift At word level	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
Nouns	15	15%
Adjectives	4	4%
Adverbs	2	2%
Conjunctions	2	2%
Verbs	2	2%
Article	1	1%
Pluralisation S	1	1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>26%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>48%</b>

Table 5. 14 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of addition at word level in the TTs

At word level, table 5.14 shows that nouns constitute the majority of the cases of addition that affected meaning transfer between the STs and TTs, comprising 15% of the 26% of the cases of addition. For instance, the addition of the noun *رژیم* (BT: regime) next to the names Saddam Hussein, Qaddafi, and Assad in the TTs while they were not referred to as such in the STs affected the meaning transfer between the STs and TTs. Despite the fact that the STs used these names to refer to the time and the governing body of the nations they ruled, they used neither *government* nor *regime* to describe them. Nevertheless, the addition of the noun *رژیم* (BT: regime) in the TTs next to these names specified the type of governments they rule (d) since *regime* usually used to describe a government that is an authoritarian and not fairly elected by people. This, in turn, shows the position of the translator towards the respective names.

While adjectives have the second highest frequency accounting for 4% of the cases, each of adverbs, conjunctions and verbs constitutes only 2% out of the 26% of the total cases at word level. The addition cases had significant impacts in relation to the positions of the translators and the semantic changes occurred in the TTs, as we see in the following examples.

**ST:** Aleppo, in Syria, with its treasures of civilization and beauty buried by the explosives dropped from Bashar al-Assad's planes.

**TT:** حلب له سوريا كه به هممو گه ههرو شارستانی و جوانیهكانی له ریگه ی ناپالمو  
بۆمهكانی فرۆكهكانی بهشار ئهسهه به زینهوویی نێژرا

**BT:** Aleppo, in Syria, with its treasures of civilization and beauty buried *alive* by the napalm and bombs of Bashar al-Assad's planes

The addition of به زندهایی (BT: alive) to describe how the city was destroyed by Bashar al-Assad's planes in the TT affected the meaning. The reason might be due to the powerful meaning of expression *buried alive* since it is classified as a very cruel method of execution.

**ST:** Then the "process" started to slow down.

**TT:** دواتر پروسه که سستییه کی بهرچاوی به مخوره بینی

**BT:** Then the process started to slow down *exceedingly*.

Likewise, the addition of the adverb بهرچاو (BT: exceedingly) in the TT described how the "peace process" between Erdoğan, president of Turkey, and Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) started to slow down, while it was not specified in the ST. The impact of such an addition will be revealed if the immediate narrative (the texts above) is encoded within the larger narrative. The ST immediate narrative followed by a paragraph describing how Ocalan's<sup>50</sup> letter created hopes for peace process and PKK forced the Turkish government to rush a legal package through the parliament, while the Turkish government started to accuse the PKK of just pretending to withdraw militants from Turkish territory. The addition of the adverb بهرچاو (BT: exceedingly), thus, indicates the positive accentuation of the role of PKK in the peace process and this, in turn, indicates the translator's mediation.

Similarly, the addition of the conjunction و (BT: and) in the TT expression جیهانی عربی و (BT: the Arab *and* Muslim world) affected the meaning transfer between the ST and the TT. The ST noun phrase *the Arab-Muslim world* used to refer to the world of Arab Muslim nation while the TT expression *the Arab and Muslim world* might refer to the Arab nation world and other Muslim nation worlds such as Turkish, Persian, and so forth. Since the verb is a key member of a class of words that function as the main elements of predicates, that typically express an action or a relation between two things, its addition or deletion has a significant impact on meaning transference between the STs and TTs. For example, the addition of the verb باس (BT: talk about) in the TT alters the ST message in the example below. While the ST pointed

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<sup>50</sup> The PKK's founding leader who is imprisoned for life on an island south of Istanbul.

out that Obama sent more U.S. advisers to Iraq, the TT showed that he talks about sending more U.S. advisers which indicates that it is not certain yet:

**ST:** As President Obama *dispatches* more U.S. advisers to help Iraqis defeat the Islamic State, or ISIS, ...

**TT:** ههروهك چۆن سهروك ئوباما يو تيكشاندى داعش باس لهئارنى پىپورى ئهميرىكى دهكات بو عىراق،

**BT:** As President Obama *talks about* dispatching more U.S. advisers to defeat ISIS,

While table 5.14 shows that each of definite article and pluralisation –s constitute the least frequency at word level, table 5.15 shows that sentences and clauses present similar frequency above word level. They all affected the meaning transfer from the STs to the TTs. For example, pluralising the noun *opposition* in the TT while it was used to describe only one oppositional political party in the ST alters the ST message since there is more than one oppositional political party in Kurdistan. The ST narrates the tolerance of the two major rival Kurdish parties, i.e., PDK and PUK, towards the fast-rising opposition party, i.e., the Gorran movement, in the elections of Kurdistan. According to Baker (2006, p. 107), different ways of framing the same narrative support competing narratives with significant inferences for different parties to the conflict. This is consistent with the translator's reframing of the ST noun *opposition* in the TT by the addition of pluralisation –s because it created a different implication for the readers and political parties.

Lexical Shift Above word level	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
Expressions	16	16%
Sentences and clauses	6	6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>21%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>48%</b>

Table 5. 15 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of addition above word level in the TTs

Above word level, table 5.15 shows that expressions constitute 16% of the cases of addition. They were added both in the TTs and some of the headlines and engendered shifts on the semantic level. The implication of the use of this strategy above word level, thus, enables us to draw a clearer picture of the positioning of translators and might embed them in concrete

ideology. For example, adding the expression *PKK و دمرنه هێنانی ناوی* (BT: and excluding PKK's name) next to the translation of the headline *The Politics of Terrorism Lists* in the TT impacted the meaning transference between the ST and the TT. The TT headline *PKK سیاسهتەکانی لیستی* (BT: The Politics of Terrorism Lists and excluding PKK's Name) is more indicative of the nature of the article. Besides, since it reveals information on issues related to a Kurdish political party, it might have a significant impact on the TT readers. Table 5.15 shows that the addition of sentences and clauses in the TT affect meaning transference between the STs and TTs as well. They constitute 6% of the cases of addition at word level. The added TT clause is not a complete sentence in the text given below, however, it widely affected the ST message since it indicated that the *Kurdish issue has been emerged by the complex situations of the Middle East*. Therefore, the TT transferred another message with the ST ones.

**ST:** The Kurdish problem is one of the complex ethnic problems in the Middle East.

**TT:** پرسى كورد يەكێكه لەو كێشه نەتەوەییانەى كە بەهۆى دۆخى ئالۆزى خۆرەهەلاتى ناوەراستەوه  
سەرپهێنداره

**BT:** Kurdish issue/question is one of the nationalist problems *which has been emerged by the complex situations of the Middle East*

This section has demonstrated the interplay between the translators' ideology and the use of the strategy of addition in reframing the ST narratives in the TTs. The analysis of the use of the addition strategy, in this section, reveals that while 52% of the cases did not affect meaning transfer between the STs and TTs, 42% of the cases led to semantic shifts in the TTs, which is a significant percentage. 52% of the cases showed that an addition strategy was used as a technique to make the TT message explicit and spell out information that might be implicit in the TTs. This, in effect, is consistent with Chesterman's compensation strategy and Nida's explicitation strategy. According to Chesterman, "addition can be a sufficient justification for a compensation strategy", which may, in turn, function retrospectively. In other words, the translators' choice to offset meanings lost or changed at earlier points in their translation results in "a compensatory change" here (Chesterman 1997, pp. 115-116). Likewise, Nida (1964, p.227) considers explicitation as a form of addition that exists in the translation product. However, the addition strategy did not always involve explicitation in the corpus of this study. The analysis evidently revealed that the choice of an addition strategy resulted in shifts on the semantic level as well. Although the analysis showed that the highest percentage of the use of this strategy caused no harm on semantic level, 48% of the cases led to lexical shifts both at

word level and above word level. This percentage cannot be regarded as mistranslation or incorrect translation since they were not outcomes of co-textual neglect and their addition makes sense in the TTs

They resulted in both the specification and generalization reframing of the ST key-messages in the TTs. Such reframing reflects and questions the narratives the translators met and shapes their behaviour in relation to the choices they made in terms of distributing or opposing the narratives elaborated in the STs.

#### 5.4 Translational Reframing Strategies between Mistranslations and Ideological Choices

The three previous sections have shown the hierarchy of functional translation strategies along with their impact on reframing the ST key-messages in the TTs in the translation of geopolitical commentary articles into Kurdish. The analysis has begun from the high frequency strategy of deletion, substitution, and addition, respectively. This section seeks to further investigate the way the translational choices identified in the corpus define the translators' positioning in terms of their linguistic challenges and contributions to the immediate narratives that shape our world.

Table 5.16 and chart 5.3 below show that the proportion of the use of cases of omission, addition and the majority cases of substitution led to lexical shifts in the corpus of this study and are not outcomes of co-textual neglect and their addition makes sense in the TTs.

Translational Strategies	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
<b>Deletion</b> Makes Sense	<b>223</b>	<b>42%</b>
	223	42%
<b>Substitution (Deletion+ Addition)</b>  Makes Sense Mistranslation	<b>201</b>	<b>38%</b>
	192	36%
	9	2%
<b>Addition</b> Makes Sense	<b>103</b>	<b>20%</b>
	103	20%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>527</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 5. 16 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in the TTs






Chart 5. 2: Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in the TTs

Table 5.16 and chart 5.2 show that only few cases of substitution do not make sense in the TTs, comprising 2% of the cases. This percentage does not constitute a significant percentage in relation to the 37% of the cases of substitution and the overall 527 cases of deletion, addition and substitution in the corpus of this study. For instance, the substitution of the ST noun *carnage* with the TT noun قهقهه (BT: cage) affected meaning transfer between the ST and the TT in the following example.

**ST:** The *carnage* might be seen as regrettable but acceptable if the bad guys were losing.

**TT:** نمر قهقهه ره لهوانمیه پهشیمانی لهدوا بیت، به لام جیگای قبولکردنه کاتیک نمر دیکتاتورانه دمدورین

**BT:** This *cage* might be followed by regret but it is acceptable when those dictators were

The TT message نمر قهقهه ره لهوانمیه پهشیمانی لهدوا بیت (BT: This cage might be followed by regret) appeared awkward if compared to the ST message *The carnage might be seen as regrettable*. However, it works and makes sense at textual level in the TT due to its coherent relation to the rest of the text in the TT. The TT message was preceded by a narrative describing Hosni Mubarak as a dictator in his courtroom cage and followed by another narrative indicating that this courtroom cage did not work for Gaddafi. It therefore, cannot be referred to as mistranslation since the TT makes sense. Nevertheless, the substitution of ST *gunfire* with the expression گولله زینو (BT: live bullet/ an animate bullet) in the TT might be considered as

mistranslation since the TT expression does not have any sematic connotation in the target culture. In a similar manner, table and chart 4.1 of the previous chapter shows that the cases of literal translation, which constitute only 1% of the overall of 1087 cases in the corpus of this study, might also result in mistranslation due to their inability to decipher the TT elements into meaningful messages, as we can see in the following example.

**ST:** Turkish foreign policy used to be a lot more *low-key* than this

**TT:** جاران سیاسه‌تی دهره‌هی تورکیا کلینکی زۆر لهماه نزمتر بوو،

**BT:** Before, Turkish foreign policy was a lot *lower key* than this

The ST adjective *low-key* translated word for word in the TT as an adjective نزمتر (BT: lower) and a noun کلین (BT: Key) without conveying the sense of the original whole. The ST adjective *low-key* has a figurative meaning. However, the TT did not only fail in conveying such meaning but also in decoding the TT features into a meaningful message. According to the meaning-oriented assessment criteria proposed in chapter two, the percentage of the cases of literal translation and 2% of the cases of substitution are identified as mistranslated cases (Halliday 1978, Reiss and Vermeer 1984; Nord 1997). Consistent with Halliday's SFL, the translator failed in recognizing how the ST language worked and what social purpose it served. Thus, this led to the literal translation without transferring the sense the ST wanted to convey. In addition, according to Reiss and Vermeer' Skopos theory, the translation solutions are interpreted as mistranslation since the achievability of the brief is based on the target culture and ST is only part of the brief. In other words, regardless of the TT's inconsistency with the ST message, since the TT messages are not meaningful in the target-culture receivers, they are regarded as mistranslation, i.e., errors. However, the incidence of mistranslated cases is not a statistically significant percentage in relation to the overall of 1087 cases in the corpus of this study. This is indicative that the majority of the cases involve issues other than the translators' failure to achieve the function of meaning rendition, i.e., ideology.

The analysis in this chapter has illustrated the role of ideology in shaping Kurdish translation and translators' decisions on the level of lexical choices. Following CNA approach, the findings revealed that there is interplay between translator's selective appropriation and ideology. Translators' choices affected the immediate narratives elaborated in the texts being

translated on the semantic levels. The study investigated the translator's lexico-grammatical choices in relation to the use of the reframing strategies of omission and addition, as one combined strategy and as two different strategies. The analysis has shown that the strategies of omission were the highest frequency, while the strategies of addition constituted the least frequency in terms of both occurrence and meaning alteration between the STs and TTs. However, both had the second highest frequency in terms of both occurrence and meaning alteration when the translation combined them, i.e. substitution. All three strategies occurred both at word level and above word level. They had different impacts on the meaning transference from the STs to the TTs, both at word level and above word level. They resulted in both the specification and generalization of the key-messages while reframing the STs in the TTs. This, in turn, revealed the way translators distance themselves from the narrative position of the author by shifting and/or opposing aspects of the narratives they translate. The alterations illustrated the interaction between ascendancy and opposition, which is an aspect of translators' behaviour this study is keen to accentuate. Nevertheless, since this study considers the role of ideology in the translation of geopolitical commentary articles, these strategies need to be investigated further in relation to the way they change the ideological drive of the texts and the contributions they make to the purpose of the TT. The majority of the illustrative cases of translational strategies in the corpus of this study can be interpreted in relation to the translator's agency since s/he is the performer of the act of translation in the first place. However, it is significant to view the use of strategies of omission, substitution, and addition in terms of the policy of the four selected agencies in this study. They could have been explicated in relation to the policy of the publishers and their direct and indirect affiliation to the political Kurdish parties. This, in turn, may demonstrate the way translators associated with the meta narratives in the society through patterns of ideologically motivated shifts. This question will be the focus of the following chapter.

## **Chapter Six**

### **Translation in Practice III:**

#### **Reframing Strategies and Political Stance in Kurdish Media Translation**

##### **6.0 Introduction**

This chapter builds on the categorised analysis of the functional translation strategies identified in the previous chapter which demonstrated that the ideology of the translator plays a significant role in the interplay between ascendancy and resistance in reframing the ST immediate narratives in the TTs, both at word level and above word level. This chapter further scrutinises the way that translations identified in the corpus are framed by the ideology and power relations of the political parties to which the newspapers agencies are aligned. The aim is to explore the way these newspaper agencies, acting as forms of patronage in Lefevere's sense, try to regulate the relationship between the narrative system and other systems, which together build up a society. These patrons count on their translators to bring media translated texts and the required narrative systems in line with their ideology. The study thus investigates this through a comparative analysis of the use of strategies of deletion, substitution and addition by the four-selected media agencies in the corpus of this study.

The analysis will open by examining the percentages of alterations occasioned by these strategies, before exploring the implications of them, and whether they are linked to the political parties to which the newspaper agencies are allied. In doing so, it will reveal the extent to which translation strategies and newspapers are allowing and/or motivating ideology to inform their news outputs and translation policies in terms of reframing the ST key-messages in the TTs in the translation of geopolitical commentary articles into Kurdish. The inference is considered significant since the source texts transmit their writers' opinions and assessments of the geopolitical facts related to the Middle East, in general, and the Kurdish political context, in particular. These findings, in turn, will show stances in terms of the contributions these strategies make to the intents of the TTs and the way they adjust the ideological drive of the meta narratives. Based on the outcomes of the collected data of the comparative study, this chapter thus attempts to find answers to the questions raised in the corpus of this study regarding

the role of ideology, arguing that political ideology plays a significant role in the occurrence of lexical shifts in Kurdish media translation.

## **6.1 Kurdish Media Agencies and Translation Reframing Strategies**

This section investigates the existing correlations between the ideology of the Kurdish media agencies and the translators' ideological decisions in relation to the reframing strategies of deletion, substitution and addition in the corpus of this study. The investigation of the percentages of the occurrence of the strategies along with their impact is of twofold significance. The study establishes a comparative study of the use of the strategies by different media agencies holding different perspectives on political and ideological issues.

As explained in chapter three and four, the TTs used in the corpus of this study were translated by various Kurdish translators and published by four Kurdish media agencies between 2011 and 2014. The media agencies are *Sbeiy*, *Kurdistan-i-Nwe*, *Xendan*, and *Rudaw*. They are regarded as media affiliated parties in Kurdistan. *Sbeiy* and *Kurdistan-i-New* media agencies belong directly to the *Change Movement* (Gorran party) and *Patriotic Union of Kurdistan* (PUK), respectively. Therefore, this study describes them as partisan media agencies (See section 4.1.1 of chapter 4). Meanwhile, *Xendan* and *Rudaw* media agencies belong indirectly to the *Patriotic Union of Kurdistan* and *Kurdistan Democratic Party* (KDP). They are thus referred to as shadow media in this study (See section 4.1.2 of chapter 4). Since the selected media agencies in this study directly or indirectly belong to the current major political parties in Kurdistan, these strategies need to be investigated in relation to the ideology of the respective media and their translators in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

Table 5.16 and chart 5.3 of the previous chapter show that only 2% of the total of 527 cases in this study represent substitution due the translators' failure to achieve the function of meaning rendition in the TTs regardless of their inconsistency with the ST messages. The remaining cases, irrespective of the impact of the prior geopolitical situation of Kurdistan (see section 4.2.1), raise questions in relation to the current ideology of the Kurdish translators and the media agencies they translate for. Therefore, it is important to further investigate the reframing strategies of deletion, substitution and addition in relation to the four selected Kurdish media agencies in terms of quantity, quality and chronology. The study argues that there is a

strong relationship between the translator's decision and the policy of the political parties to which the four media agencies are associated, in particular in the translation of the ST author's opinion and assessment of the geopolitical facts related to the Kurdish political context.

Types of Kurdish Media Agencies	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
Partisan Media	279	53%
Shadow Media	248	47%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>527</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 6. 1 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in Kurdish media TTs




Chart 6. 1 : Frequency and percentage of the total three translation strategies in Kurdish media TTs

Of the 527 cases of the translation strategies identified in the corpus of this study, table and chart 6.1 show that 53 % of the cases represent partisan media agencies while 47 % belongs to shadow media agencies. These percentages are significant in relation to the ideological manipulation of the translation of the geopolitical texts in the current socio-political contexts. With only 6% of differences, they indicate that both partisan and shadow media agencies include a high rate of reframing strategies that tend towards meaning alteration in particular directions. In other words, this suggests that both partisan and shadow media reframe news for ideological purposes. Nevertheless, revealing such indications requires an extensive qualitative scrutiny of the percentages of each of the three reframing strategies of deletion, substitution and addition in relation to the two types of publication agencies, which are partisan and shadow media. The study argues against the extent to which these practices are equally used by the key

agencies selected in the corpus of this study. The following sub-sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2, therefore, develop this analysis in detail. They provide opportunities to investigate relevant manipulated linguistic methods for the exploration of particular aspects such as stance and power relations in the translation of the texts by the four different media agencies. In particular, the quantitative analysis allows for a more comprehensive account of the variations in translation choices due to ideology than a case study approach, focussed on a small sample of representative translators, would have offered. The findings, in turn, reveal a more nuanced understanding of the translator's role as an ideological mediator in translating media discourse between different ideologies and the policies of media agencies. The strategies they used show the contributions made to the ideological drive in the TTs and the political parties to which the news agencies are affiliated.

### 6.1.1 Partisan Media and Translational Reframing Strategies

The analysis above explained the relationship between the selected Kurdish media agencies and the aggregate percentage of translation reframing strategies and how these affected meaning transference in the corpus of this study. This sub-section builds on the analysis of the way ideology and power relation can be used to twist translations in favour of the dominant powers to which the media agencies are directly affiliated. It investigates the different extents to which the translations produced by the key newspapers impact meaning transfer and reflect their domestic policies and agendas. This, in turn, reveals where the translator's interventional subjectivity potentially is most telling.

Partisan Media	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
Kurdistan-i-Nwe	151	29%
Sbeiy	128	24%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>279</b>	<b>53%</b>

Table 6. 2 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in partisan media TTs

Of the total of 53% of partisan representing cases of translation strategies, table 6.2 shows that 24% of the cases represent *Sbeiy* media agency, while 29% of the cases belong to *Kurdistan-i-Nwe* media agency.

Sbeiy Media Agency	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
<b>Deletion</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>11%</b>
Lexical Shift	56	11%
No Shift	2	0%
<b>Deletion + Addition</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>9%</b>
Lexical Shift	45	9%
Stylistic Shift	4	1%
<b>Addition</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>4%</b>
Lexical Shift	11	2%
No Shift	10	2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>24%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>279</b>	<b>53%</b>

Table 6. 3 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in Sbeiy media TTs

The corpus drawn from *Sbeiy* media agency consists of 15 translated commentary articles. Out of 24% of the cases of translation strategies in the respective corpus, table 6.3 shows that 11%, 9%, and 4% represent deletion, substitution and addition, respectively. The results reveal that the use of both deletion and substitution strategies resulted in high frequencies of shifts on semantic level, while the use of addition strategies did not constitute a significant percentage in relation to the total cases. Given that *Sbeiy* media agency belongs to the political *Gorran* movement, a large number of translation strategies used in the published translated texts by such agency reflect the policy of the same party as well. As a political movement, *Gorran* started as a sustainable opposition in the Kurdish parliament in order to deal with issues which are more related to domestic affairs in the Kurdish region. For instance, since this movement is often in competition with *KDP* and *PUK* (the two major ruling parties), the translation strategies used in the corpus of this study played a significant role in the meaning transference between the STs and the TTs in relation to the issues related to these Kurdish parties. It is, therefore, important to examine the cases in relation to the ideology of the agency prior to the employment of the translators who work for such agency. This, in turn, might reveal the translator's interventional subjectivity in opposing the narratives elaborated in the STs and supporting the policy of the party to which the media agency aligned, as we see in the following examples.

**ST:** Officially, they were both living on *modest* government salaries

**TT:** به فەرمی هەردوکیان موچەخۆری حکومەتن

**BT:** Officially, both are government's employees



The shift highlighted in the back translation above rejected the existing ideology encoded in the narrative elaborated in the ST. Since the ST adjective *modest* in the expression *modest government salaries* was used to describe the amount of the salary drawn by Barzani's sons, the leader of the *PDK*, its non-presentation in the TT affected the reframing of the ST narrative in the TT. The ST raises questions regarding the source of the huge amount of money they spent while they were both living on modest government salaries. However, the TT indicated clearly that they were spending huge amounts of money, which were all from the government's money. It is important to bear in mind that this translated message constitutes part of the translated commentary article about *PDK*'s rule in Kurdistan. This includes a number of similar reframing strategies with comparable impact. These textual changes affect the meta narratives of the TT in terms of presenting more criticism towards the reign of the *PDK*. The article was written and translated in June 2013, i.e., three months prior to the Kurdistan parliamentary election in September 2013. As stated by Baker (2007, p. 156), the reframing strategies that alter the immediate narrative and affect the larger narratives "allow us to see [the] translational choices not merely as linguistic challenges but as contributing directly to the narratives that shape our social world" (p.156). The TT, therefore, might be interpreted in relation to a promotion of a particular political point of view of corruption. In other words, the activity of accentuating corruption supports or provides active encouragement for the propaganda purposes in favour of the party to which *Sbeiy* media agency is affiliated. Likewise, the *PUK* was described as *one of the two major Kurdish political movements* in an article published in 2014. However, such information is rejected and omitted in the TT. The reason might refer to the results of the parliamentary election in 2013 in Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region. Since the *Gorran* movement came in the second position after *PDK* and pushed *PUK* into the third position in the election, the ST message was opposed in the TT. This opposition could, therefore, be an outcome of the policy of the party to which the media agency is directly aligned. While these kinds of omission might be interpreted in terms of the familiarity of the information for Kurdish readers, the cases of substitution and addition may offer themselves to a different interpretation. In the cases of substitution, the translator not only deleted the ST items, but also added different features in the TTs that affected the message transference between the STs and TTs. Besides, the cases of addition introduced features in the TTs that were not present in the STs, as we see in the following examples.

**ST:** The KDP and its historical *rival*, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK),

**TT:** پارتی و دوژمنه میژویه که به کێتییه،

**BT:** The KDP and its historical *enemy* that is the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK),

The substitution of the ST noun *rival* with the TT noun دوژمن (BT: enemy) affected meaning transfer since rival and enemy are not synonymous. *Rival* was used in the sense of *competitors* here as it was used to describe the two Kurdish political parties. In addition, it has its counterparts in Kurdish on the semantic level. Both *rival* and *competitor* can be used for a party that tries to lead the other one without causing harm or producing hostility. They are usually used in media campaigns and even smear campaigns at times among the parties. However, in the case of *enemy*, the opponents do not hesitate in causing harm to each other, such as armed campaigns. Besides, *rivals* or *competitors* are usually used to refer to people or groups that belong to the same business, sport activity or nature of job. However, in being enemies, this condition is not necessary. This substitution thus altered the ST message regarding the two Kurdish political parties from being competitors to enemies. Similarly, the addition of the TT adjective توتالیتاری (BT: totalitarian) to the translation of ST noun *regime* in the TT affected meaning transference from the ST to the TT. The ST noun *regime* was used to compare Massoud Barzani's ruling to that of the Arab spring in the ST. However, the TT دسه لاتی توتالیتاری (BT: totalitarian regime/ authority) might convey a stronger criticism than the ST did, as *totalitarian* relates usually to a system of government that is centralized and dictatorial and requires complete subservience to the state. Interestingly enough, the ST author described Massoud Barzani as an *authoritarian* ruler beforehand. However, the translator preferred not to borrow the same adjective from English and add in the new sentence. There is a difference between the two adjectives. *Authoritarianism* differs from *totalitarianism* in that social and economic institutions exist that are not under the government's control, and totalitarian implies a stronger critique.

The analysis above has shown that the different reframing of the ST narratives in the TTs had different implications on the respective parties and the Kurdish target readership. The attitudes of ST authors, who represented western and international views, of both the *PDK* and *PUK* before and after the Kurdistan parliamentary election in 2013 and the existent relationships between the two parties were altered while reframed in the TTs. These alterations, in turn, might

serve as references for the opposition movement in order to ascertain the doubt raised about the two parties.

Kurdistan-i-New Media Agency	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
<b>Deletion</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>13%</b>
Lexical Shift	65	12%
No Shift	4	1%
<b>Deletion + Addition</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>11%</b>
Lexical Shift	46	9%
Stylistic Shift	12	2%
<b>Addition</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>5%</b>
No Shift	14	3%
Lexical Shift	10	2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>29%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>279</b>	<b>53%</b>

Table 6. 4 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in Kurdistan-i-New media TTs

Table 6.4 shows that the corpus drawn from the *Kurdistan-i-New* media agency, which consists of 15 translated commentary articles, reveals 13%, 11%, and 5% out of 29% of the cases of translation strategies representing deletion, substitution and addition, respectively. Similar to the *Sbeiy* agency, cases of deletion and substitution that resulted in lexical shifts constitute high frequencies while addition represents the least frequency. Nevertheless, the three strategies have significant implications in terms of highlighting issues related to the competing parties in the texts translated by this news agency. For instance, the deletion of the word *HE*, which stands for *His Excellency*, in the TT might be interpreted in terms of the agency's policy since it is used in the ST to define Massoud Barzani who holds a high position in the Kurdistan regional government and a leader of *PUK's* historical rival, *PDK*. In a similar manner, the following example shows that the strategies of substitution used in the respective corpus can reflect a similar policy.

**ST:** Iraq's Factional Chaos Threatens to Disrupt a Kurdish Haven

**TT:** دكتور بهرهم صالح: ههموو كوردێك دموكراتى سه‌ربه‌خۆى ده‌وێت

**BT:** Dr Barham Salih: Every Kurd yearns for an independent homeland,



downplay the senior opposition party affair or show the high degree of political maturity and tolerance of the two ruling parties in the area.

The analysis illustrated in this sub-section has shown that translation can be considered in its own right to frame political stances for domestic purposes by the translators who argue in favour of the media agencies that are directly affiliated to a specific political party. The most frequent strategies used by the partisan media agencies are deletion and substitution, while addition constituted the least. Nevertheless, the three strategies played significant role in relation to the policy of the agencies. They can effectively be exploited by the translators in reframing the narratives elaborated in the STs which could remain concealed from direct observation by the majority of the readers. In this way, target readers who can read both the STs and the TTs might consider translators' choices as a thorny issue surrounding the question of his/her ideology while rendering particular geopolitical knowledge via these publication agencies.

### 6.1.2 Shadow Media and Translational Reframing Strategies

Building on this previous section's analysis of the partisan media's use of deletion and substitution to reframe translations, this section will analyse the strategies most frequently used by the shadow media agencies. This will enable a comparative analysis of the extent to which the different agencies allow political ideology to inform their media output. This next sub-section analyses the strategies most frequently used by the shadow media agencies, arguing that they are not to be ideologically positions as partisan media. The aim is to reveal to what extent these agencies allow political ideology to inform their media output and translation policies while compared to the partisan media agencies.

Shadow Media	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
Xendan	152	29%
Rudaw	96	18%
<b>Total</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>47%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>527</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 6. 5 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in Shadow media TTs

Of the total of 47% of cases of translation strategies used by the shadow media agencies, table 6.5 shows that 18% of the cases represent *Rudaw* media agency, while 29% of the cases belong to *Xendan* media agency.

Rudaw Media Agency	Frequency of Translation Strategies	Percentage of Translation Strategies
<b>Deletion</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>9%</b>
Lexical Shift	39	7%
No Shift	6	1%
<b>Deletion + Addition</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>7%</b>
Lexical Shift	34	6%
Stylistic Shift	4	1%
<b>Addition</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>2%</b>
Lexical Shift	8	2%
No Shift	5	1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>18%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>47%</b>

Table 6. 6 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in Rudaw media TTs

Table 6.6 shows that the corpus drawn from *Rudaw* media agency, which consists of 15 translated commentary articles, shows 9%, 7%, and 2% out of 18% of the cases of translation strategies represent deletion, substitution and addition, respectively. Similar to the partisan media agencies, high frequencies of deletion and substitution resulted in shifts on semantic level, while addition constituted the least frequency. Although *Rudaw* is indirectly affiliated to the *PDK*, the majority of the translational strategies used in the translated texts led to the semantic shifts in the geopolitical texts in favour of the respective party. The ST narratives regarding *KDP* and its members are reframed in the TTs positively. For instance, the omission of the ST expression *or the KDP* in the below example conveyed a different message in the TT.

**ST:** KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani has also suggested that the only door of hope for Iraqi Kurds – *or the KDP* -- is Turkey.

**TT:** هەر بۆیەشە سەرۆکی حکومەتی هەریەکێ کوردستان بەم دواییانە گوتی بۆ کوردانی عێراق هیچ دەهراگایەکێ ئومێد نییه تورکیا نەبێت.

**BT:** Thus, The president of the government of Kurdistan region has lately said that for Iraqi Kurds the only door of hope is Turkey.

The omission, which resulted in the alteration highlighted in the back translation, might be interpreted in terms of the rejection of the existing ideology of the narrative elaborated in the

ST. The ST indicated that the prime minister of *KRG* has suggested that the only chance for Kurdish interest or the *KDP* is Turkey. Nevertheless, the expression *or the KDP* was not presented in the TT. The occurrence of this omission might be due to the prime ministers' affiliation to the *PDK*; he is an active *PDK* political figure. Thus, the TT message reflected the neutrality of the prime minister who only works in the favour of Kurdish interest and not the party he belongs to. The cases of substitution used reflect the same policy as well. For instance, the substitution of the ST expression with the TT in the below given example altered the ST message and resulted a different one in the TT.

**ST:** Most of the Kurdish Islamist fighters came from Islamist strongholds *inside the province of Sulaimaniyah, close to the Iranian border.*

**TT:** زۆریهێ ئهوانه خهڵکی ناوچه زۆر ئیسلامیهکانی ژێر دهسهلاتی بهکیتی نیشتمانی کوردستان و هیزه نهمنیهکانی بهکیتی لهو ناوچانه کۆنترۆڵ دهکهن

**BT:** Most of those are from the more Islamic areas *under the PUK control and PUK security forces are in control in those areas/ are controlling those areas.*

The TT message conveyed a more specific message in relation to the location and those who are in control of it. This substitution might be interpreted in terms of the ideology of the party's affiliated agency. Since the article presented geopolitical information about the threat of al-Qaeda and its affiliated Islamic parties to Iraqi Kurdistan, the TT message might be expounded as an attempt to accentuate the incapability of *PUK*, the *PDK*'s rival, in controlling Islamist strongholds in Kurdistan. The strategy of addition also played a significant role in such ideological reflections. Similar to the substitution case above, the addition of the TT expression *گورران و* (BT: Gorran and) in the following headline affected the ST message in the TT.

**ST:** Trying to Overturn the Game Board in Kurdistan

**TT:** گورران و ههڵگیرانهی نهختهی یارییهکه له کوردستان

**BT:** *Gorran and* Trying to Overturn the Game Board in Kurdistan

The examples illustrates above are headlines of an English commentary article that was published and translated into Kurdish in 2011 by the *Rudaw* media agency. After winning the parliamentary election in 2009 and 2010, the *Gorran* movement called for the resignation of the Cabinet and the suspension of the Kurdistan Regional Government during the protests in

Kurdistan in 2011<sup>52</sup>. The term *game* is considered one of the key concepts of criticism in media coverage of politics. The addition of the name of *Gorran* next to such term, therefore, may boost public interest in the content of the article. This type of reframing in the TT headline condensed the negative role of the respective party in the events occurring in 2011 in a minimum number of words. According to Aalberg et al. (2012, p. 165-166), to impact readers can be via framing politics as strategic “games”, based on the assumption that such framing may have negative consequences for democracy. The examples above have shown that the use of the three translational strategies led to different reframings of the ST narratives in the TTs. The semantic alteration occurred reflected the policy of the party of which the *Rudaw* media agency is indirectly aligned.

<b>Xendan Media Agency</b>	<b>Frequency of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>
<b>Deletion + Addition</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>11%</b>
Lexical Shift	50	9%
Stylistic Shift	6	1%
<b>Deletion</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>10%</b>
Lexical Shift	49	9%
No Shift	2	0%
<b>Addition</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>9%</b>
No Shift	25	5%
Lexical Shift	20	4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>29%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>47%</b>

Table 6. 7 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in Xendan media TTs

Table 6.7 shows the translation strategies used in the 15 texts from the corpus which come from *Xendan*, the final media agency. Out of 18% of the cases of translation strategies, the table reveals that 10%, 11%, and 9% represent deletion, substitution and addition, respectively. The cases of substitution and deletion that resulted in semantic shifts show a similarly high frequency (9%), while the cases of addition constitute the least frequency (4%) in the respective types of shifts. The results constitute a significant percentage in relation to the

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<sup>52</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Movement\\_for\\_Change](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Movement_for_Change)



rest of the strategies used by the other three selected media agencies in the corpus of this study. Similar to the *Rudaw* media agency, *Xendan* is a media which is indirectly affiliated. It is indirectly affiliated to the *PUK* and the majority of the translational strategies used in the translated texts in order to reframe the ST geopolitical issues in favour of the respective party. For instance, the non-presentation of the ST noun *figurehead* in the TT adopted a more generalised translation in the example given below.

**ST:** Kurds have served since Saddam's fall as Iraq's *figurehead president* and as foreign minister,

**TT:** لهدوای رووخانی سەدام حسینەوه، کوردەکان پۆستی *سەرۆک کۆمار* و وزیر  
دەرەوهی عێراقیان بەریوەبردووه

**BT:** After the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the Kurds have run the posts of Iraq's *president* and foreign minister,

The ST *figurehead* is used as a modifier to describe the Kurdish figure who served as an Iraqi president after the fall of Saddam Hussein, i.e., Jalal Talabani, the PUK leading Kurdish politician and the then president of Iraq. Since the noun *figurehead* indicates a nominal leader or head without real power, its omission in the TT might have ideological interpretation. Since *Xendan* news agency is considered to be an indirectly *PUK* affiliated media, it discards the messages which downplay the respective party and its members. Interestingly enough, the opposite can be true when the political members belong to the party's rivals, i.e., *PDK* or Gorran movement. For instance, the example below is the translation of the ST expression *one option* into the TT *تاکه ریگه چاره* (BT: *the only option*).

**ST:** He said *one option* was to get Masoud Barzani, president of Iraq's Kurdistan region, to exert more influence over these groups or for Ankara

**TT:** دەلێت: *تاکه ریگه چاره* بەدەست تورکیاوه ئەویە که داوای هاوکاریی له مەسعود بارزانی  
سەرۆکی هەریمی کوردستان بکات

**BT:** [He] said *the only option/ solution* in the hand of Turkey is to ask help from the president of Kurdistan region, Masoud Barzani,

It can be argued that given that the Kurdish president is a *PDK* leader and *Xendan* is indirectly affiliated to *PUK*, the agency might attempt to downplay the role of the Kurdish president by showing that his assistance is the only available one and might not be an important one among alternatives. Similar to the other selected three agencies in the corpus of this study,

the strategies used by the *Xendan* media agency, consequently, gave comparable results in terms of percentage and implication.




Chart 6. 2 : Frequency and percentage of the three translation strategies in Kurdish media TTs

The analysis illustrated in this section has shown that the choice of general and specific rendering of meaning in Kurdish media translations resulted from the use of three translation strategies, which are deletion, substitution, and addition. The choices are non-obligatory because the ST features and messages have their TT counterparts in the TL. The rendition, therefore, engendered different reframings of the ST narratives in the TTs and might reflect the ideology of both the translators and the agencies they work for. Chart 6.2 shows that the percentages indicate that deletion and substitution constitute high frequencies in both partisan and shadow media, while addition represents the least frequency. Meanwhile, it also reveals that the aggregate percentages of the three reframing strategies used by the partisan media are higher than those by the shadow media. Such percentages constitute significant patterns with regard to the ideological manipulation of the translation of geopolitical texts by the current socio-political framework. It is indicative that the geopolitical narratives can be framed in different ways by different news agencies to promote competing narratives, with important inferences for different political parties in the conflict. The power relations in Kurdistan bring their political ideology into play by different means such as partisan and shadow media to reinforce their position. The media agencies are, therefore, considered biased devices for allowing political ideology to inform their outputs by certain translation strategies and the

translators play the role of mediators and negotiators in translating media discourse between different ideologies and policies of media agencies.

## **6.2 Chronological Distribution of the Translational Strategies**

The previous section investigated the percentage of functional translational strategies in relation to the policy of the publication agencies and the political blocs to which they directly or indirectly belong. This section investigates the dynamic shifts resulting from these translational strategies through time alongside their relationship to the geopolitical events which occurred in the area. The comparative chronology of the occurrence of the strategies determines when reframing the narratives elaborated in the STs resulted in alterations on a semantic level. This, in turn, reveals the regular pattern of a temporal model over four years. The corpus employed in this study contains geopolitical commentary articles from 2011 to 2014. The number of STs and TTs included in the corpus are not regularly circulated according to their publication date. The selection of the texts and their translation are not consistent among the four years. The choice, however, is not casual, nor premeditated. On the one hand, it is related to the availability of the STs and their TTs from 2011 to 2014 (see chapter three). On the other hand, the significant geopolitical issues in the Middle East throughout these years became more prominent. The region has experienced both periods of relative peace and tolerance and periods of conflict related to different countries' domestic and foreign affairs. At the end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011, a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests, riots, and civil wars began and spread throughout the Middle Eastern countries and had ended by mid-2012. Following the US withdrawal from Iraq, tensions between Iraqi Kurdistan and the central Iraqi government escalated through 2011-2012 on the issues of power sharing, oil production and territorial control. The outcomes of the parliamentary election in 2013 in Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region led to the *Gorran* movement emerging as a more powerful political opposition party, winning the second position after the PDK and pushing the PUK into the third position in the election. With ISIS capturing the Northern Iraqi cities and carrying out raids on the Kurdish region in 2014, the US launched a humanitarian mission. This led to the publication of a large number of articles. The perceptions of these biases, possibly exacerbated by different media effect, have generated more coverage of reporting than any other news topic, and have led to a proliferation of media commentary articles. However, the availability of the

Kurdish translation of such commentary articles depends on the policy of the selected media agency in the corpus of this study. This is the main reason behind the inconsistency between the published STs and TTs in this corpus. Nevertheless, this inconsistency should not be a problem in observing the distribution of translation strategies used over the period of four years. To deal with the issue, the grand total percentage of each translation strategy used in the four years is identified and analysed comparatively with the aim to reveal the development of interesting patterns throughout the four years.

<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>Grand Total</b>
Deletion	14%	31%	22%	32%	100%
Deletion +Addition Substitution	17%	26%	24%	33%	100%
Addition	12%	22%	12%	54%	100%
Literal Translation	38%	25%	13%	25%	100%

Table 6. 8 : Distribution of translation strategies according to publication date

Table 6.8 reveals how the translation strategies are disseminated in each particular year. It shows that the use of a deletion strategy represents a convergent rate in 2012 and 2014, comprising 31% and 32% of the cases of deletion, respectively. The use of deletion from 2011 to 2012 shows a huge increase from 14% to 31% and begins to decline in 2013 to 22%. However, the percentage becomes very interesting in 2014 when deletion rises to 32%. One might think that the tendency to use such a strategy was significant in these two years if compared to its use in 2011 and 2013. This might be due to the media coverage of penetrating Kurdish related issues during these two years. Likewise, substitution is shown to have been a common practice in 2014, while its practice was the least frequent in 2011. The use of substitution strategies from 2011 to 2012 shows an increase from 17% to 26% and begins to decline in 2013 to 24%. Addition, like deletion and substitution, shows the highest frequency in 2014 and lowest frequency in 2011. The use of an addition strategy from 2011 to 2012 shows an upsurge from 12% to 22% and begins to decline again in 2013 to 12%. Literal translation is

the least frequently used translation strategy that led to shifts on a semantic level, and has the highest frequency in 2011, convergent rate in 2012 and 2014, and least frequency in 2013.

The observations reveal several interesting patterns throughout the four years. On the one hand, the percentages of the three strategies of deletion, substitution and addition indicate that they all have the highest frequency in 2014. The three strategies show consistency in relation to rises and falls over the years. Regardless of their varying degree of percentages, they are all shown to have been common practices in 2014, 2012, 2013 and then 2011, respectively. On the other hand, the decline of use of literal translation that resulted in mistranslation in 2014 into 25% while it was 38% in 2011 indicates that the shifts proliferation might have occurred due to ideological attempts rather than translators' failure in the transference of the ST messages. In addition, this might be interpreted in terms of the inevitability of the use of the three strategies, which are deletion, substitution and addition, in the translation of geopolitical commentary articles. Translating geopolitical topics in general and Kurdish topics in particular might not be possible without the use of these three strategies, on a limited basis, due to the nature of the article's text type, target readership, and the Kurdish media agencies in question. As illustrated earlier, commentary articles have an informative purpose since they transfer opinions and assessments of facts. They, therefore, contain features that function as key elements in the transference of such options and assessments. Since the possibility of their omissions and substitutions cannot be interpreted in terms of mistranslation or translation error, they reveal significant tendencies towards ideology. The target readership plays a significant role and might influence the choices of that the translators make. Since the selected Kurdish media agencies in this study reflect different ideology, so do their readerships. Therefore, these choices might be interpreted in relation to the target reader's satisfaction as well.

<b>Percentage of Translation Strategies</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>Grand Total</b>
Partisan Media	9%	17%	10%	17%	53%
Shadow Media	6%	10%	11%	20%	17%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>21%</b>	<b>37%</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 6. 9 : The use of translation strategies according to publication date by media agencies




Chart 6. 3 : The use of translation strategies according to publication date by media agencies

Table 6.9 and chart 6.3 show the percentage of translation strategies by the agencies within the four years. They show that in 2011 and 2012, a high frequency of translation strategies was used by partisan media agencies while shadow media constitute the lowest frequency. Nevertheless, the use of translation strategies by both partisan and shadow media agencies represent a convergent rate in 2013. In 2014, although the use of these translation strategies was increased by both of the agencies, the table shows the highest percentage of the use of such strategies refers to the shadow media agencies in the respective year. Interestingly as exemplified in the previous sections, these percentages can be interpreted in terms of handling the events that occurred throughout the Middle East, in general, and domestic affairs related to the political parties in Kurdistan between 2011 and 2012, in particular. In other words, the narratives reframed in the TTs about the post third parliamentary events<sup>53</sup>, i.e., the wave of demonstration in Kurdistan against the Kurdish government and the tension between the Iraqi central government and Kurdistan. In 2013, the majority of the functional translational strategies

<sup>53</sup> <http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?l=12&p=229>

“To date there have been four region-wide parliaments, following elections in 1992, 2005, 2009, and 2013. In 2009 the Kurdistan National Assembly was renamed the Kurdistan Parliament.”

might reflect, to a greater or lesser extent, reframing the narratives of the pre- and post-fourth parliamentary election elaborated in the STs. However, the mainstream of the translated texts in 2014 demonstrated geopolitical conflict after the ISIS attack to the area. Thus, the majority of the strategies used for reframing and accentuating the narratives expatiated in the STs in favour of the Kurdish issues rather than the political parties in the area in 2014, as we see in the following example.

**ST:** The Kurdish problem is one of the complex ethnic problems in the Middle East, which produces even nearly half a century earlier than the Palestinian issue. The so-called Kurdish question is Kurdish demands host government recognize *their minority status*, expanding its national rights, allowing its autonomy or independence.

**TT:** پرسى كورد يه كێشه لهو كێشه نهتهو ميبانهى كه به ههوى دۆخى ئالۆزى خۆر هه لاتی ناوهراستهوه  
 سهريههلاوه، نهه كێشهيه نزيكهى نيو سهده له كێشهى فلهستين كونتره و پيى دهوتریت مهسهلهى كورد، نهوهش  
 خۆى لهوهدا دمبينتتهوه كه كورد داوا له حكومهتێكێكى دهكات دان به *ناسنامهكهياندا* *بئین* و پانتایی مافه  
 ..نهتهو ميبهكانيان زياد بکهن و ريگهه ئۆتۆنۆمى يان سهريههخوييان پي بدن

**BT:** Kurdish problem/issue is one of the national problems that have emerged from complex situation of the Middle East. This problem is nearly half a century earlier than the Palestinian issue and it is known as Kurdish question/issue. This reflects in the way Kurdish demands host government to recognize *their identity*, expanding its national rights, allowing its autonomy or independence.

The substitution of the expression *their minority status* with *ناسنامهكهياندا* (BT: their identity) deviated from the ST frame space. Such deviation can be expounded in relation to the translator's opposition to the narratives elaborated in the ST. The author of the ST used the noun *minority* to describe the Kurdish population which is estimated to be around "40 million" (Murinson 2010, p. 100). The translator rejected using the term that is usually used to describe a number that considered less than half the whole number. As a stateless nation, the Kurdish population is considered the majority if compared to the Palestinian population which is estimated at no more than 11 million<sup>54</sup>.

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<sup>54</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian\\_people](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_people)

The analysis in this section has revealed dynamic shifts resulted from the translational strategies alongside their relationships to the geopolitical events and the media agencies through time. As individual strategies, deletion, substitution and addition have the highest frequency in 2014 and the lowest frequency in 2011 while literal translation constitutes the highest frequency in 2011 and second lowest frequency in 2014 after 2013. This indicates the escalation in ideological motivation behind the use of the respective translational strategies. Both the topics of the articles and the type of agencies played a significant role in the rises and falls of the percentages of these strategies throughout the four years. The high percentages of the translational strategies in 2011, 2012, and 2013 played a significant role in favour of the political parties directly and indirectly. However, the majority of the translational strategies used to handle the geopolitical events related to the Kurdish question by accentuating or opposing the narratives elaborated in the STs in that regard.

### **6.3 Translational Norms and Semantic Shifts in Media Translation**

The previous sections described certain translational strategies that have high frequencies in relation to the ideological shifts which occurred on the semantic level among the strategies used in the translation of media texts into Kurdish from 2011-2014. The outcomes are interpreted in that regard as well. This section discusses which translation behaviours the findings and observations of the above contrastive data analysis on the lexical levels indicate. As chapter two discussed the concept of translation norms and ideological shifts along with CNA approach (Toury 1995/2012; Chesterman 1997/2000; Baker 2006, 2007; van Dijk 1998a; 2006 Fairclough 1992, 1993, 1995), this section deliberates the manifestation of those norms and their implications in the translation of English-Kurdish media translation on the basis of the observations of the lexical choices.

Consistent with these approaches, this study observes and describes the translator's decisions within the geopolitical contexts in relation to their adoption of the reframing strategies of deletion, substitution and addition during the process of translation. The aim is to answer the questions raised in the course of this study related to the role of ideology in the translation of geopolitical texts. This study argued that the preferred reframing strategies of deletion and



addition are ideologically driven to produce semantic shifts in Kurdish media translation in favour of the current Kurdish political parties.

As established in chapter three, the TTs of this corpus are accepted translations in Kurdish culture and published by four different Kurdish media agencies. This indicates that the TTs are accepted according to the norms of Kurdish culture and the expectancies of these Kurdish media agencies and their TT readership. The outcomes reveal that the Kurdish media agencies in question play a significant role as the ultimate “norm authority” (Chesterman 2000, p. 67). They have the authority to select and accept certain translated articles and/or certain parts of the texts and reject others. However, it is both the translators and the agencies that illustrate and finalise acceptable translations. From the perspective of Chesterman’s process norms, the translators involved in the negotiation of socio-political representations operate as ideological mediators. Their decisions reflected the textual changes in the TTs that are informed by the ideology and power relation of the political parties to which the selected media agencies are allied. This leads to what is called expectancy norms by Chesterman. The high frequency of the use of these strategies by the Kurdish publications’ and translators’ agency in this study indicate that Kurdish translators’ decisions led to a preference for adapting the ST knowledge in support of certain political powers in Kurdistan. Consistent with Chesterman’s expectancy norms, the three identified strategies, similar to a borrowing strategy, in this study are partly dominated and influenced by the predominant tradition and scenes in the target language and culture, ideological factors, power relations within and between cultures. Thus, the corpus analysis in this study shows that the majority of the cases of deletion, addition and substitution did not lead to mistranslation, explicitations or simplification in the TTs, but rather semantic shifts that might be interpreted from an ideological perspective, current political factors and/or the translator’s ideology.

As for preliminary norms, section 5.4 of the previous chapter shows that the factors that might determine the use of these three translation strategies in Kurdish newspapers are not a random practice. The publication agencies select particular types of texts to be translated purposefully and these strategies are used to serve a certain goal. As textual-linguistic norms, the high-frequency use of the three strategies led to lexical shifts in the translation of media texts into Kurdish. This type of norm constitutes part of operational norms and process norms.

Deletion and substitution strategies, therefore, are the preferred strategies that lead to lexical shifts in Kurdish media translation. However, since the percentages and analysis show that translators' failure is not the high-frequency factor behind the use of such strategies, the ideology of Kurdish media translators' agency plays a significant role in this respect. This indicates translation might be manipulated by the use of these strategies in order to reflect different voices.

#### **6.4 Translation Behaviour, Patrons and Reframing Political Conflict**

The analysis above has explored the outcomes and observations of contrastive data analysis on the lexical levels. This section draws conclusions in relation to Lefevere's patronage (1992b) and Baker's (2006, 2007) narrative theory with the aim of further describing the ideological leanings of the media agencies.

When publishers employed translators, they expected them to render according to their collective agreement (Lefevere 1992b). They may not officially state that this has to be done, but there is an informal collective agreement (Pym, p. 70). As also stated by Baker (2007, 2010), in any positioning discourse, the translator adopts a certain position using certain linguistic operations. Such positioning defines his/her socio-political role. Like her examples, the TT lexico-grammatical choices in the corpus of this study revealed various ways in which translators highlight, undermine or adjust disputed aspects of the narratives encoded in the source texts. The translated texts in this study can be seen as apparatuses used to frame political issues in favour of the current Kurdish political parties (patrons). After the fall of Saddam's regime, political parties manipulate media news agencies in Iraqi Kurdistan to reflect the domestic political conflict. Thus, the mode of translation in these Kurdish newspaper agencies involves a transmission of instances of political alignments into the discussion of such political dispute. As patronages, they allowed the extra-linguistic constraints to inform their outlets. The ideological affiliations of these media agencies (patrons) affected the choice of the texts and their narratives and brought them with line with their own ideologies.

The textual indicators that led to the semantic changes in the immediate narratives by patterns of the reframing strategies in the given socio-political context altered the meta-narrative drive of the whole text as well. For instance in the appendix AKR.46, the translator positioned him/herself<sup>55</sup> in the context of the domestic political conflict by the employment of a range of reframing strategies that express their stances towards the narratives elaborated in the STs. The article is about al-Qaeda threat to Iraqi Kurdistan. It is translated and published by the Rudaw news agencies which is considered an indirectly KDP affiliated media. The textual indicators that led to the semantic changes in the immediate narratives by the reframing strategies of substitution on regular basis in the given socio-political context altered the meta-narrative drive of the whole text against the KDP's rival, i.e., PUK. The shifts in the immediate TT narratives highlighted al-Qaeda threat at some provinces and pointed to them as places under the control of the PUK. In the ST, the location was implicit, even ambiguous. Thus, one possible explanation for this modification in the meta-narrative is that these shifts were more common in discourses related to the target society and the parties to which the media agencies are aligned. Hence, the translation of geopolitical discourse plays a major role in the reproduction of ideologies and contributes to certain discourses as promoted by different social groups.

Nevertheless, when it comes to the issues relation to the neighbouring countries of Kurdistan, this transmission is always accompanied by the work of support or resisting ideas elaborated in the STs of the historical context of the alignment. For instance in the appendices AKS.6, AKR.48 and AKK.23, the translators placed themselves in the Kurdish context. The appendix (AKS.1) is a commentary article about Turkey's role of Leadership in the Middle East after the Arab spring. The textual indexes, which led to the semantic changes in the immediate narratives related to the Kurdish issues in Turkey by patterns of the strategies of substitution and addition, altered the meta-narrative drive of the whole text. The TT seems positively addressing the Kurdish related topics, such as translating Kurdish *guerrilla attacks* into چالاکی گریلا (BT: guerrilla activity). Meanwhile, it negatively refers to the authority of the countries to which Kurdistan is part of today, such as translating *the Iranian government* into رژیمی تیران

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<sup>55</sup> The translated text is published under anonymous name.

(BT: the Iranian regime), and *the rule of Saddam Hussein* as حوکمی رژیمی سه‌ددام (BT: the rule of Saddam Hussein's regime).

This ultimately leads to the fact that media translation in Kurdistan is an institutional operation and mutual process of norm organisation practice in geopolitical contexts. The media agencies and newspapers in Iraqi Kurdistan allow ideology to inform their news output and translation policies. Translators manipulate the STs to favour or undermine the dominant narratives in the target society and/or reframing the ST to motivate the reader to reconsider his/her position regarding these dominant narratives. When the institutions employ translators, they anticipate that they follow their collective policy, even if they do not officially stating that this behaviour has to be performed. Cutting across the analysis, what will emerge from the discussion is that translators, like all social actors, engage with the narrative world in which they are embedded in a variety of ways. Kurdish political power relations, to which the media agencies are aligned, repeatedly invoked media narratives to portray and promote particular geopolitical political issues in favour of certain goals.

## Conclusions

In the contemporary globalised society, translations inevitably involve cultural, ideological and political manipulations and question the motivations on the part of the translator (Lefevere, 1992; Baker 2006; Sieoni 1998; Yannakopoulou 2008). Today, translation in general and political translation in particular has received worldwide attention and its theoretical knowledge has profoundly improved. In line with the growing attention to ideology and the advance of media translation, political discourse has also received great attention within the field of translation studies and thus it has been extensively researched. Nevertheless, there is a scarcity of research on online media translation (Schäffner and Bassnett 2010), in particular the role and impact of socio-political mediation on textual and extra-textual levels in journalistic texts. Media journalistic translation has vastly contributed to the diffusion of ideological and geopolitical knowledge in the world. It is not only a worldwide practice that society has undertaken, but also it is a form of effective power relations exploited by particular powers and institutions. Today, journalistic translators resort to various strategies to reinforce or compromise particular aspects of the narratives they mediate, explicitly or implicitly. These reframing strategies allow them to dissociate themselves from the narrative position of the author or alternatively, to be responsive to it. From this consideration, this study primarily set out to investigate translation mediation by groups of translators who belong to different Kurdish publication agencies and perform translation for the general public from English into Kurdish. In doing so, the study uncovered the potential of geopolitical ideology to reposition translation between modernity and identity as the twentieth century times out.

The thesis outlines the strategies used in the translation of geopolitical journalistic texts in Kurdistan by adopting the concepts and theories of CNA and Chesterman's norms (1997) within the framework of descriptive translation studies. At a macro-level, the process of media translation is manifested as an institutionalised norm-governed social practice with various mediators and performers involved in socio-political representations. At a micro-level, the combination of comparative parallel textual methods is adapted and employed to explore the textual deviations informed by the macro-level contextual constructions with an insight into the role of translation in discursive structure. Upon preliminary investigation, it is been realised that media translation in Kurdistan is published by media agencies who are directly or indirectly

aligned to the current political parties in Kurdistan. Therefore, the corpus of this study included translated texts from both types of the media at a convergence rate, including 30 translated texts alongside their 30 source texts from each (see section 3.2 and 4.1). As a result of this finding during the course of this exploration, the focus of the study has shifted onto investigating not only the impact of the socio-ideological norms but also the political power relations determining translators performing geopolitical journalistic translation into Kurdish and the role of their stance and voice in the translations they produce.

Translation manipulations occur in the process of text production, and translators are considered as active agents in shaping ideology in the TTs (Schäffner, 2003). The product is, therefore, considered a significant device for providing an insight into norm governing translation processes and translators' choices. The notion of Chesterman's norms (1997) helped in explaining the reason behind the occurrence of the wide range of manipulations in this study. Through this prism, the investigation in this study explored ideological mediation and manipulation in Kurdish media translation by investigating a corpus of translated geopolitical commentary articles at the level of lexico-grammatical choices, both semantically and stylistically. These aspects are considered significant criteria for revealing different patterns of behaviour on the part of the translators. As part of this process, quantitative analysis is used as a means to provide supporting evidence for qualitative analytical approach. The qualitative analysis of the choices made by the translators showed that most of the manipulations were made due to the socio-political and geographical status of Kurdistan and the political ideology of the Kurdish media agencies rather than linguistic and cultural differences between the two languages. However, a few manipulations did not show a specific reason to be applied and therefore they are regarded as mistranslation. These outcomes accordingly offer new insight into translational behaviour in a non-western context where geopolitical translation has become a significant zone for an academic activity to reflect on and engage in domestic politics as well as to inform contemporary translation studies. In order to provide a clear line of perspective on how the present study develops an understanding of translation studies and its related fields, the following paragraphs are devoted to further highlighting the major original contributions of the present study.

Based on the theory of Chesterman's norms (1997) and a CNA approach, the data analysis has provided patterns of textual markers and references to the relationship between the English texts and their Kurdish translations in the corpus of this study. It revealed that a number of lexico-grammatical elements in the Kurdish texts are different from those in the English texts semantically and stylistically. They are, thus, referred to as shifts. These translational shifts show the specific roles that translation tends to play in mediating between the ST narratives and target group communities. From a CNA perspective, these roles manifest themselves as power-mediated knowledge transfer between the STs and the target group communities depending on which group holds more discursive power in specific contextual models. On the one hand, the translations appear to be based on the ST form and content by maintaining an original sense of the ST representations, semantically and stylistically, as a demonstration of the professional norms. In other words, the translators take the source-oriented side to disseminate the dominant knowledge to the target community. On the other hand, the translations also seem to manifest empathy with the target community. They are motivated by the need to form target-compatible context models by adapting the source text knowledge into the target-group knowledge structure. The expectancy norms, here, predominate due to the macro-level power relations. Both forms of norm-regulated knowledge transference are highly reinforced in translational behaviour by the power relations and ideological factors involved at the front of geopolitical and intercultural communication.

In this way, the non-concrete concepts of power relations and ideology involved in the CNA approach become apparent and aptly operative when situated in the framework of the model of Chesterman's (1997) translation norms mediated by knowledge transfer from the socio-cognitive and narrative perspectives. The critical narrative approach to media translation thus serves particularly well in revealing and explaining the conditional features that help to maintain and reconstruct the existing translation norms. In order to explain this further, it is significant to this study to look into norm reconstruction from a bottom-up approach where the autonomy that translators are gaining has more potential to recontextualise the original discourse within the institutional contexts. Moreover, the (re)construction of translation norms through translators' lexico-grammatical choices leads to the idea that norms can be not only internalised into translators' intellectual constructs but also externalised as a socially-adaptive entity open to change ( see sub-section 6.2). In order to present a broadened and balanced view

of geopolitical translation in Kurdish media, a range of the metanarratives has been analysed to reveal the building of Kurdish political representations over the different eras in the post autonomous region in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1992. Emphasis is placed on the cognitive and socio-cultural dimensions that the geopolitical metanarratives have in facilitating the formation of Kurdish socio-political representations.

On the stylistic level, the patterns of the reframing strategy of borrowing constitute a significant parameter for the exploration of the way the historical and current socio-political ideology has driven media translation in Kurdistan as explored in chapter 4. The study concluded that the translator used many loanwords that significantly manipulated the text more than all other strategies in the corpus of this study. They are regarded as stylistic re-writings that involve a re-version of the original in the field of media translation. Nevertheless, the study challenges Lefevere's view to assign these shifts to only his atheistic manipulations (poetic) of the translation due to the significant role of socio-political translational norms in their existence. Indubitably, the status of Sorani Kurdish in some cases in the present study could be revealed as the motive behind such manipulation. The very low percentage of non-lexicalisation in and non-standardisation of Sorani Kurdish showed the translators' recreation of the form of the STs (see subsection 4.2.1). Nevertheless, the majority of the cases are driven by the historical and current socio-political status of Kurdistan and the Kurdish media agencies (see chapter 1). Like nineteenth century translations of Irish literature that, for example, helped build a sense of Irish nationhood in resistance to British colonial domination (Tymoczko 2000), manipulative stylistic translation in Kurdistan engages with discourses of nationalism, preceding the era of the autonomous region in Iraqi Kurdistan. Despite the geographical area of Kurdistan and its direct contact with four countries of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria, the investigation in this study has shown that a large range of the cases of borrowing is from English. From the geopolitical perspective, this might be due to the division of this area among the four countries mentioned above that led to build a sense of Kurdish nationalism in the past. It does so by considering English culture as more prestigious than Arabic, Turkish and Persian cultures pre-and post the autonomous region. Being a local language of the northern part of the modern Iraq after WWI, Sorani Kurdish is also affected by the impact of Arabic as an official and prestigious cultural language of the Islamic world. The same reason led to borrowing from Arabic being the second highest percentage after English in the corpus of this study. However, being largely driven by



nationalist aspirations, borrowing from English and the European languages directly was more motivational than Arabic (Abdulla 1980) (see subsection 4.2.1). Moreover, the Kurdish media in the post-autonomous region in Kurdistan also had an immense role in the translator's reusing, producing and borrowing words that reflect the ideological policy of the media agencies, which are run by the political parties directly or indirectly. The ideology of the translator (translator's own voice) in some cases of the present study could be revealed. However, the very high percentage of the cases showed that they mostly tried to recreate the forms of the STs that go with the policy of the Kurdish media agencies (see subsection 4.2.2).

On the semantic level, likewise, this study explored translations of the selected geopolitical journalistic texts in the corpus that are shaped by the ideology of the current political powers to which the news agencies and newspapers are aligned. The presence of manipulation at such a level and the high percentage of omission and addition in the present study suggested that these two strategies are among the basic manipulation strategies. The reframing strategies of deletion and addition, as one combined strategy (substitution) and as two independent strategies, constitute significant parameters for the exploration of the semantic shifts elaborated in the TT narratives while compared to their STs by presenting a wide range of examples. They revealed the significant interplay between the texts translated by the four selected Kurdish media agencies in the corpus of this study, their relation to the selection-policy of translating certain geopolitical articles and the political parties to which the news agencies are directly or indirectly related to.

The research illustrated in this study has shown that translation can be considered in its own right to frame political stances for domestic purposes by the translators who argue in favour of the views of the media agencies that are directly affiliated to a specific political party. The outcomes revealed that the most frequent strategies used by both the partisan and shadow media are deletion and substitution, while addition constituted the lowest number. However, they are all perceived to have socio-political and ideological implication in favour of the political parties in conflict. The study also exposed that these strategies can meritoriously be manipulated to reframe the narratives elaborated in the STs by the translators who could remain obscure from direct observation by the majority of the readers. The translation choices, in general, might contain a combination of respect for target readers' expectations and the adoption of the habitual

repertoire of translation. From the readership perspective<sup>56</sup>, however, this may lead to suspicion and uncertainty regarding the question of the translator's neutrality rendering a particular geopolitical field of knowledge.

The findings and observations of the comparative analysis also investigated the ways that all the strategies occurred both at word level and above word level with different impacts on the style and meaning transference from the STs to the TTs. The majority of the shifts occasioned include nouns and then adjectives which had significant impact on the transference of the key messages into the TTs. Stylistically, on the one hand, this study explored the way that a large number of the cases of borrowings are more politically motivated by the current political status of Kurdistan rather than depending on a rational ideology. This study therefore argues against Hasanpoor's (1999, p. 40) declaration that translations might enrich the language with the adoption of new loans for today's translation, especially in the absence of Kurdish language policy and standardisation<sup>57</sup>. On the semantic level, on the other hand, shifts in the key patterns of nouns and adjectives resulted in both the specification and generalization of the ST key-messages while reframed in the TTs and they altered the ideological drive of the texts at a macro-level. This, in turn, revealed the way translators distance themselves from the meta narrative position of the author by shifting and/or opposing aspects of the immediate narratives they translate. The alterations illustrate the interaction between ascendancy and opposition that accentuate the non-neutrality of both the translators' and the agencies' policy of translation in relation to the contributions they made to the purpose in the TT. Finally, in terms of the relationship between subject and setting, selection decisions and the manipulation of source and target text may reveal media translation actors' ideology and identity: what they believe in, or who they feel they are (in terms of voice and stance). Or they may deliberately debate or contest issues of ideology and identity.

Following mostly theoretical aspects of manipulation, now some applied works are compared to the findings of the present study. This study is consistent with Lefevere's (1992)

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<sup>56</sup> Especially those readers who read both the STs and the TTs

<sup>57</sup> "The authorities, especially the Kurdish Academy, have decided not to have any specific language policy in Iraqi Kurdistan with respect to declaring an official language for the region or granting linguistic rights to Kurdish varieties with fewer speakers" (Sheyholislami 2012, p. 117).

and Herman's (1985) opinion in that translated geopolitical texts in Kurdistan are a "re-written" version altered for particular ideologies. Re-writing a text, culturally, politically or ideologically in the Kurdish media inevitably involve a process of alteration known as "manipulation" in translation studies. This manipulation can be seen from a socio-political perspective. Ideology is embedded within translation, because ideology is often coded in the linguistic expression and active process of transferring ideas across cultures (Toury, 2012). The factors accounting for this are the control, supervision and manipulation operating at the level of the translation process. Linguistically, the translator's decision-making about addition, omission selection, and the placement of words is a process composed of historical determinations and the socio-political milieu surrounding him or her (Álvarez & Vidal, 1996; Munday, 2012). Ultimately this study helps to provide an answer as to how politics and geography draw themselves at the centre to undermine linguistic and cultural identity at the periphery by creating artificial realms with boundaries fixed regardless of the indigenous language and cultures (cf Bamgbose 1991; Phillipson 1992; Ngugiwa 1993; de Beaugrande 2005).

Ultimately, some major conclusions around the data set and modelling aspect of this study can be drawn. The initial assumption was that there would be greater differentiation between the partisan and shadow media agencies in relation to ideological choices, but the evidence points to a rather convergence of practice. Interestingly enough, although the data analysis revealed that the reframing strategies are not equally used by the four selected media agencies, nevertheless, the differences did not show a huge difference. The study showed that the partisan media included more manipulative strategies than the shadow media. This, however, constitutes a normal indication since these media agencies in Kurdistan have publically announced themselves as partisan newspaper agencies. Nevertheless, the low rate of differences between the partisan and shadow media regarding the manipulation of the strategies might amount to an unusual outcome. As explained in chapter six, the frequency of each of the reframing strategies used by the shadow media are a few percentage points lower than that of the partisan media (chart 6.2). Having claiming to be independent from political bias, the percentages of reframing strategies of deletion, substitution and addition by the shadow media lead to have different interpretations of their autonomy. In this way, the conclusion around the data set indicates that there is not as much of a differentiation between partisan and shadow media in terms of ideological manipulation that one might have expected in the case of Iraqi

Kurdistan's media context. This suggests that there is mileage in further study of the role the (mass) media plays in disseminating socio-political ideology to the public. As highlighted by Schäffner (2012, p. 103) "the mass media play a significant role in communicating politics to the general public", and that "media produce texts within their own media institutions". Thus it would add an important dimension to the study of political translation by investigating whether there is any media mediation involved in the presentation of the final version of political/ and or geopolitical translation, and to what extent this might have an influence on the practice of ideology in media translation in the Kurdish and/or other contexts.

Other outcome of this research which can enable further studies is the triangulating methodological approach of this study. The current study gives an inclusive picture of the products of geopolitical translation in Kurdistan. However, much of the assumptions in relation to the decision making process of Kurdish geopolitical translation can be further reinforced by the empirical data stemming from larger corpora on the actual operation of translation practice. The same methodology used in this study, moreover, can be applied to other genres and periods with different or similar samples for future related studies. Based on the discussion and limitations of the present thesis future research can be proposed. The model of triangulating the approaches can be applied to other data sets and scholars can use it to further other projects, in particular in relation to lesser-spoken languages. Some other conclusions can be offered on the theoretical side, once it is granted that shifts are indeed unlimited in linguistic and ideological aspects, translation theory can use big data sets to determine how richly ideology is limited and unlimited in social and cultural aspects. On the practical side, the training of novel translators could be improved by drawing their attention to selective bilingual large-corpus data.

In sum, today, the state authorities and associations are, directly or indirectly, the new patrons of media outlets and they are very important in the construction of (geo) political ideologies. The efforts of translation to enlarge and enrich a media system makes it an influential tool for the introduction of new aesthetics and trends as well as the ideology implied in them. The triangulating method employed in this study could therefore be used as a way in which translation studies can explore ideological manipulations of different types of patronage-affiliated institutions. Its new form of line with the comments allows us to analyse the extent to which these ideological mediations are taken critically in the opening up by combining the

micro-textual analysis and the macro-contextual analysis. The economic and ideological processes related to translation phenomena are fundamental for the understanding of the media translation system. Since media translators are usually employed by the patronage-affiliated institutions, they follow the same policy. Their textual choices thus revealed the extent to which media translation were affected by extra textual factors. From this prism, media translated texts can be explored either as a battlefield or a meeting place of ideological conflict, which engender ideological mediation.

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## Appendices

### Appendix A.

#### A.1

<http://www.todayszaman.com/news-333011-gorran-movement-and-the-future-of-iraqi-kurdistan-the-emerging-crisis-in-northern-iraq-by-othman-ali-.html>

#### **Gorran movement and the future of Iraqi Kurdistan: the emerging crisis in Northern Iraq by Othman Ali\***

December 03, 2013, Tuesday/ 16:39:00

Unless something occurs that fundamentally changes the political landscape of Iraqi Kurdistan, all current indications point to Gorran (the Movement for Change) becoming a dominant force in the politics of the area for decades to come.

It appears that Turkey has not fully realized this fact, and the country needs to give the matter its due significance. We will address the historical roots of Gorran, its current policy on the deadlock in attempts to form a government after September elections in the Kurdistan region, and reflect on Turkish policy regarding the regional Kurdish government in Iraq.

##### Historical roots

In June 1975 in Damascus, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) was formed as a party out of three small leftist groups: The Marxist-Leninist Komelâh, the Pro-Talabani General Line and the Kurdistan Socialist Movement. In its first communiqué, the PUK ascribed the collapse of the Kurdish revolt in 1975 to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Mullah Mustafa Barzani's incompetence and feudalist leadership. Despite its many ups and downs, the PUK dominated the Kurdish resistance and provided dynamic leadership for Iraqi Kurds during the last four decades. Jalal Talabani, the ailing Iraqi president and the founder of PUK, was the party's main asset.

##### The recent PUK debacle

After the demise of the Eastern bloc, PUK turned itself into a social democratic party. In practice, however, it remains to large extent an authoritarian party. Besides, the party's senior leaders' sons grew from children to adults, and the leadership began to focus on empowering and enriching their family members. By doing so, the PUK failed to differentiate itself from its more established competitor (the KDP) and lost much of its reason for being.

Talabani's crippling stroke several months ago further deepened the PUK crisis. After Talabani's stroke, senior leaders spent more time promoting themselves in Tehran, Washington and Baghdad than they spent on laying out a platform to better the lives of their own constituents. Like Mao Zedong's widow, Iraq's first lady Hero Ibrahim has developed a craving for power and is using every means possible to raise herself and her two sons to positions of power in the PUK.

##### The emergence of Gorran

In 2009, Nawshirwan Mustafa, a veteran politician who was a co-founder of PUK and a close aide of Talabani, felt that the aging Iraqi president was leading PUK to its demise by pursuing a policy subservient to Massoud Barzani's KDP and realized that reform within PUK was not attainable. Being a veteran fighter, and intellectual with leftist tendencies whose image remains untainted by corruption, Mustafa managed to take a big chunk of the PUK's fighters and leaders with him when he split from the party and formed the Gorran movement. According to many specialists, the formation of Gorran in 2009 "has already shaken the political landscape in Kurdish areas" (The BBC, Mar. 6, 2010).

The movement, which is popular among KRG youth, attracts support by OFFERING a new option in Kurdistan, and uprooting rampant corruption is one of Gorran's main objectives, according to a report

from Al Arabiya News. Besides, Gorran supporters told the Economist in February 2011 that “the KDP and PUK have done a poor job of promoting the Kurds' interests at the federal parliament in Baghdad.” In 2011 the Gorran movement called for the resignation of the Cabinet and the start of a “Kurdish spring” to challenge the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). During the protests, which started on Feb. 17 of that year and lasted for three months in Kurdistan, dozens were killed or wounded. The KDP and Barzani were the main targets of the mass protests. There was a split within the Kurdish leadership about how to deal with the demonstrations. Eventually, external pressure, especially from the US and Iran, forced PUK to end the protests. For numerous reasons, the uprising failed to SPREAD to KDP-dominated regions and, consequently, the Gorran movement had to temporarily abandon its plan for a general uprising.

Gorran: Either I play or I spoil the game

Local analysts have come up with a variety of scenarios as the KRG tries to form a government. The first involves a very broad coalition, in which all political parties PARTICIPATE. Other scenarios envision the KDP forming a government with one of the two runners-up in the elections -- either PUK or the Gorran movement. In another scenario, the KDP could form a coalition that involves both the PUK and one or two of the Islamic groups.

The last two scenarios seem the most probable. Should Nechirvan Barzani fail to form a government or exclude Gorran, there is a strong likelihood that the region will relapse into the civil war of the 1990s.

Although the KDP was able TO WIN most of the seats in the Kurdistan Parliament, it is facing a serious problem in forming a government. The KDP has made encouraging statements about a broad-based coalition. Its spokesperson, Jafar Eminki, has announced that his party supports that plan. But at the same time he said the KDP wouldn't let any conditions be forced upon it.

An article published on niqash.org on Oct. 24, 2013, quoted Borhan Yassin, a senior lecturer at Lund University, as saying, “Winning seats in an election is vastly different from capacity to work and negotiate within a political environment.” The article continued: “Official results confirm the KDP won 38 seats and the Change movement, also known as Gorran, won 24. The PUK's SHARE of seats in the local 111-seat parliament fell to 18, while the two main Islamic parties, which have also been in opposition, won 16 together.”

Gorran's leaders have issued several serious warnings that if they are excluded, they will resort to any means necessary, including taking to the streets to start protests throughout Kurdistan. The KDP takes this seriously, but will have difficulty meeting Gorran's conditions.

Conscious of its newly gained power as the second party in the region, Gorran's top leaders have put many conditions on their PARTICIPATION in the next government. These include actively participating in drawing up the government agenda, transparency (especially with regard to oil revenue, which so far has been a thorny issue in the region) and ending corruption. Having won the most votes in Sulaymaniyah and a majority on the provincial council, Gorran wants to replace the current pro-PUK mayor, who has been illegally maintained in power for a decade. The election results have already plunged Sulaymaniyah into a series of assassinations that pose a serious security challenge for Kurdish officials.

Gorran leaders have made it very clear that unless their demands are met, they are willing and able to wreck the whole political process in the region, even possibly breaking Sulaymaniyah province off from the KRG. Corruption, however, is too deeply entrenched, and there are powerful lobbies within the KDP and PUK that will work to prevent any serious reform.

For these reasons, the Kurdish administration in Northern Iraq faces a serious challenge in DEALING with Gorran's either-I-play-or-I-spoil-the-game tactic.

Turkey's foreign policy can help

Turkey has a lot of economic and security stakes in the Kurdistan region and can't afford to see it destabilized. Civil war or chaotic conditions in the region would put another burden on Turkey's relations with its neighbors, already complicated by the Syria crisis. In addition to the loss of huge business INVESTMENTS and a multibillion dollar market, instability here would create a political vacuum that could be exploited by the PKK, and could lead to massacres of Turkmens. It was good to see Barzani in

Diyarbakir standing side by side with the Turkish prime minister, but it would have been better to have convinced Barzani to bring the other Kurdish leader along to that symbolic and historic meeting. That would have preempted the accusation that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is using Barzani as a pawn to counter Öcalan's influence.

Turkey has a lot of resources at its disposal to influence the direction of events. First and foremost, Turkey has managed to cultivate a strategic alliance with the most active player in the region: the KDP. This alliance needs to be effectively utilized to persuade the KDP to be more forthcoming in accommodating the opposition's demand for the formation of a genuine coalition government that will serve everybody's interests, including Turkey's. An unstable neighbor is no good for Turkey, and Syria is a case in point.

Turkey also needs to reckon with the fact that Gorran is an emerging power in the Kurdish scene and has the means to wreak havoc on the KDP and Turkey's interests. Turkey's close ties with the KDP have so far forced Gorran to look to Iran for support. Therefore, Turkish policymakers have to build bridges with Kurdish opposition groups, especially Gorran, which look like they'll be around for some decades to come. This could be done in many ways, including direct talks with Gorran and showing impartiality in internal Kurdish politics. Turkey may also need to use nongovernmental organizations to channel the needed expertise to enable the Kurdish groups to form a coalition government and avert a crisis.

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<http://sbeiy.com/Detail.aspx?id=26481&LinkID=60>

### بزوتنه‌وه‌ی گۆران و داهاوتی کوردستانی عێراق: سه‌ره‌لدانی ته‌نگه‌ له باکوری عێراق

د. عوسمان علی

له ئینگلیز بیه‌وه: سه‌باح حسین

ئه‌گه‌ر شتێک رویدات که گۆرانیکی جه‌وه‌ری له نه‌خشه‌ی سیاسی کوردستانی عێراقدا بکات، ئه‌وا هه‌مو ئاماژەکان له‌ئێستادا هه‌ما بۆ بزوتنه‌وه‌ی گۆران ئه‌مکن که بپێته‌ هه‌یزکی باڵاده‌ست له‌ سیاسه‌تی ناوچه‌که‌دا بۆ چه‌ندین ده‌یه‌ی داهاوت.

وا ده‌رده‌که‌وت که تورکیا به‌ته‌واوی ئاگاداری ئه‌م راستیه‌ی نه‌یه‌، پێوسته‌ی تورکیا گرنگیه‌کی زیاتر به‌م بابته‌ به‌دات. ئه‌مه‌ لێزه‌دا ئاماژه‌ به‌ ره‌گه‌ڕێشه‌ی میژوویی بزوتنه‌وه‌ی گۆران ده‌که‌ین، سیاسه‌تی ئێستای له‌ دۆخی چه‌قه‌به‌ستوی هه‌مه‌لێکان بۆ پیکه‌ینه‌انی حکومه‌ت له‌ پاش هه‌ڵبژاردنه‌کانی مانگی نو‌ له‌ هه‌رمێی کوردستاندا و هه‌روه‌ها تێرمانی له‌ سیاسه‌تی تورکیا به‌بایه‌خدا به‌ حکومه‌تی هه‌رمێی کوردی له‌ عێراقدا.

ره‌گه‌ڕێشه‌ی میژوویی:

له‌ مانگی حه‌وتی 1975 له‌ دیمه‌شق، یه‌کێتی نێشه‌مانی کوردستان له‌ سه‌ی گروپی بچوکی چه‌په‌وه‌ وه‌ک حه‌یزیک دامه‌زرا: کۆمه‌له‌ی مارکسی-لێنینی، خه‌تی گشتی لایه‌نگه‌ری تاله‌بانی و بزوتنه‌وه‌ی سۆسیالیستی کوردستان. له‌ یه‌که‌م به‌یاننامه‌ی خۆیدا، یه‌کێتی نسکۆی شۆرشێ کوردی له‌ ساڵی 1975 دایه‌ پال پارتی دیموکراتی کوردستان و بێتوانایی مه‌لا مسته‌فا و سه‌روک هۆزه‌ ده‌ره‌به‌گه‌کان. سه‌ره‌رای هه‌مو ئه‌و شکست و سه‌رکه‌وتنه‌ی که توشی هاته‌وه‌، یه‌کێتی باڵاده‌ست بو له‌ هه‌یزی به‌رگری کوردیدا، توانیوه‌تی سه‌رکه‌رده‌یه‌کی چالاک به‌ر هه‌مبھه‌ینیت بۆ کوردانی عێراق له‌ چوار ده‌یه‌ی رابردودا. جه‌لال تاله‌بانی، دامه‌زرێنه‌ری یه‌کێتی و سه‌روکی نه‌خۆشکه‌وتوی عێراق، هه‌میشه‌ سه‌رچاوه‌ی هه‌یزی سه‌رمکی بو له‌ حه‌یز به‌که‌یدا.

پاشه‌کشه‌ی ئه‌م دوایه‌ی یه‌کێتی:

پاش روخانی بلوکی رۆژ هه‌لات، یه‌کێتی به‌رنامه‌ی خۆی گۆری بۆ حه‌یزیک سۆسیال دیموکرات، له‌گه‌ڵ ئه‌وه‌شدا له‌ پراکتیزدا تا راده‌یه‌کی زۆر وه‌ک حه‌یزیک سه‌رکه‌وتنه‌ر ماوته‌وه‌، زیاد له‌موش، کۆری سه‌رکه‌رده‌ی بالاکانی یه‌کێتی ئێستا گه‌وره‌ بون، سه‌رکه‌رده‌کان ده‌ستیانکردوه‌ به‌ پێدانی سه‌رومت و سامان و ده‌سه‌لات به‌ ئه‌ندامانی خه‌زانه‌کانیان. به‌ کردنی ئه‌م کاره‌ یه‌کێتی شکستی هه‌یناوه‌ له‌ جیاوازیکردن له‌نیوان خۆی و رکابه‌ره‌ هاوچه‌رخه‌که‌یدا که پارته‌یه‌ و زۆریه‌ی هۆکاره‌کانی له‌ده‌ستداوه‌ بۆ مانه‌وه‌ی خۆی.

ئه‌و جه‌لده‌ی ده‌ماغه‌ی که چه‌ند مانگیك پێشتر تاله‌بانی توشی بو کێشه‌کانی یه‌کێتی قوڵتر کردوه‌وه‌. پاش نه‌خۆشیه‌که‌ی تاله‌بانی، سه‌رکه‌رده‌ی بالاکانی حه‌یز به‌که‌ کاتیک زۆرترین برده‌وته‌ سه‌ر له‌ خۆبرده‌ پێشه‌وه‌یان له‌ تاران، واشنتن و به‌غدا زیاد له‌و کاته‌ی که برده‌یانه‌ته‌سه‌ر له‌ خسته‌ه‌رووی پلاتفۆرمیک بۆ باشت‌کردی ژبانی لایه‌نگه‌ر ماکان. هه‌روه‌ک ئه‌که‌ی ماوتسی تۆنگ، خانی یه‌که‌می عێراقیش "هه‌یرو ئیبراهیم" ناره‌زوی خۆی ده‌رخستوه‌ بۆ گرته‌ده‌سته‌ی ده‌سه‌لات و به‌کاره‌ینانی هه‌مو هۆکارێکی گونجاو بۆ به‌رزکردنه‌وه‌ی خۆی و

کورەکانی بۆ یۆستە بالاکانی ناو یەکی تی.

دەر کهوتنی بز و تنه‌وهی گوران:

له سالی 2009، نهو شپږوان مستعفا، که سیاسیهکی شار مزایه و دامهزینهری هاوبهشی پهکیتی و هاوکاریکی نزیکې تالهبانی بو، وای ههست نهکرد که سهر وکه بتمهمنهکهی عراق، پهکیتی بهرو نهمان دبات به کردنی به پاشکوی سیاسهتی پارتي دیموکراتی کوردستانی مسعود بارزانی و بوی رون بوهوه که نهجامدانی ریفورم لخواوخی پهکیتیدا ناهینزیتهدی. وهک شوړشگریکی دیرینی لښاتو و روشنبیریکی چپي لهمازینه که هیشتا ناو و ونهی لهکمدار نهکراوه به گندهلویهوه، نهوشپروان توانی بهشیکي زوری پېشمهرگهان و سهرکردهکاني پهکیتی لهمازل خوی بیات کاتیک که بزوتنهوهی گورانی دامهز راند. بهگوزیهی بؤچونی بهشیکي زور له پېسپوران، دامهزاندنی گوران له سالی 2009دا، "پېشوخت نهخشهی سیاسی له همریمی کوردستاندا هیناومه لمرزین"، (BBC 6/3/2010)

بزووتنه‌وه كه له لهنځو گنجانې همرمى كوردستاندا بڼاوبانگه، بهردوام سمرنجي لايئنگري زياتر بهلاى خويدا رادمكشيت به پيشكهشكردنې بزاره نو له كوردستاندا، نهشهسهغندي بنبرگردني گندهلې يميكه له نامانجه سمرميكمانى گوران، نهمه بهگويزه راپورتيكي كهناى هوالى العربية. سمرراى نهمش، لايئنگرانى گوران له مانگى 2011د به "economist" يان راگيانده كه "پارتى و يميكتى كارى كمپيانكروه بو بمرژومندييهكانى كرد له نهمجومي نوينمرانى عيراقى فيدرال".

له سالى 2011د بزوتنهوى گوران بانگوازي دست لهكاركشانوهى حكومت و سمرهلدانى "بههارى كوردى"يان كرد بو تاندان له حكومتي همرمى كوردستان. لهسروبهندى خوپيشاندانهكاندا، كه له 17ى شوباتى همان سالدا دهستى پيكردو بو ماوهى سه مانگ بهردوامى همبو له كوردستاندا، چمندين كس كوژران و برينداركران، پارتى و بارزانى نامانجي سمرمكى زورهى خوپيشندان بو، لهوكاتهدا ناكوكييهك همبو لهنځوان بمرپرسمكانى كوردا سبارت بهچونيمتى ماملهكردن لكمل خوپيشانداندا. له گوټايدا، گوشاره دهرميكمكان، بتاييمتى لهلايين نهمريكا و ئيرانهوه، زوريان بو يميكتى هنبا كه گوټايى به خوپيشاندانهكان بهننيت. بههوى چمندين هوكارمه، راپرينهكه سمركهوتو نمبو لهوى بگاته ناوچهكانى ژير دهسلاتى پارتى. لهكوټايدا، بزوتنهوى گوران پيويست بو بو ماويمكى كاتى دهستبردارى يلانهكى بيت بو راپرينيكي سمرناسرى.

گوران: یان یاری ئەکەم یان یارییەکە تێکە دەم

شروع ۾ ٺاهڻ واري ٻنهي پارٽين جي وچ ۾ ٻه ڏينهن جي عرصي ۾ ٻه ڀيرا ٿيڻ گهرجن ٿا. ٻنهي پارٽين جي وچ ۾ ٻه ڏينهن جي عرصي ۾ ٻه ڀيرا ٿيڻ گهرجن ٿا. ٻنهي پارٽين جي وچ ۾ ٻه ڏينهن جي عرصي ۾ ٻه ڀيرا ٿيڻ گهرجن ٿا.

دو سيارپوکه‌ی کوتايی زياتر قابيلي رودان. نيا پيوسته ننجيرفان بارزانی شکسته‌نيت له پيکه‌ينانی حکومتدا ياخود گوران دور بختوه، گر بمانه‌يک به هنر همه که رنگه هر تمه که بگر نته ه بو دؤخی شری ناوخی ی سالانی نه ده‌کان.

هەر چهنده پارتی دیموکراتی کوردستان توانی زۆربەیی کورسییەکانی پەرلەمانی کوردستان بە دەستبەھێنێت، بە لایم روبەر وی کشیەییکی جدی بووتمو لە ینگەهانی حکومەتدا. پارتی چەندین بەیاننامەی ھاندەرانی بڵاو کردوتمووە دەر یارەی ھاوپەیمانی بنگەفر او ان وتەبیزی پارتی، جە عەفر نیمیکی، ئەموی راگەباندووە کە حیزبەکەمی پشتیوانی ئەو پلانی دیمکات، بە لایم لە ھەمانکاتدا وتی؛ پارتی هیچ مەرجیک قبول ناکات بە زۆر بێ سەینێر یت بەسەریدا.

له مالىپىرى [niqash.org](http://niqash.org) له 2013/10/24 بابهتیک بلأوکروتموه که وتیمان له بورهان یاسین، که وانمیژی پلېمالایه له زانکوی لوند، وک دملی؛ "بدهستېننای کورسی له هیلزاردنېکا زور جیاوازه له توانای کارکردن و گفتوگوکردن له ژبنګېهکی سیاسى دا"، له درېهې بابهتکهدا هاتوه، "ننجامه رسمیهکان دوپاتى دمکنهوه که پارتى 38 کورسى، گوران 24 کورسى، پشکى یکتى له 111 کورسیهکى پهرلمانى ناوخو دابهزیوه بۇ 18 کورسى، له کاتیکدا دو حیزبه نیسلامییه سمرمیکهکه، که له ئوپوزسیوندا بون، 16 کورسبان بدهستېنناه.

سەر کر دماکانی گۆران چەندین ناگاداری توندیان بلاوکر دموه که نهگەر بیت و بهشار بیان پینهکرت، ئهوا پنا دمه بهر هەر ریگیایه که پتویست بکات، لهوانهش چونه سەر شهقامهکان بو خۆپیشاندا سەر تاسه ری له کوردستاندا. پارتی ئهمه ی به جدی وەرگرتوه، به لام کێشه ی روبهر وونه ی مەرجهکانی گۆرانی دهیت.

[illegible]

سەرکردەکانی گۆران ئومێدان بە ئاشکرا خستەوتەر و کە ئه‌گه‌ر بێت و داواکارییه‌کانیان جێبه‌جێ نه‌کړیت، ئه‌یان نه‌یت و ئه‌شتوان سهر له‌به‌ری پرۆسه‌ی سیاسیه‌ی هه‌رێم تکیه‌پێک بدن، ته‌نانه‌ت به‌شیوهمه‌کی گونجاو ده‌توان پاریزگای سلیمانی دابهرن له‌ حکومه‌تی هه‌رێمی کوردستان گه‌ندمه‌ی، به‌هه‌ر شویه‌ک بێت، زۆر به‌قوڵی به‌رگری ئه‌ندمکریت و لۆبی کردنه‌کی به‌هه‌ر هه‌یه‌ له‌ناو به‌کته‌ی و

پارتیدا بۆ رێگریکردن له رودانی هەر ریفۆرمێکی جدی. لهبەر ئەم هۆکارانه، ئیداره‌ی کوردی له باکووری عێراق روبه‌روی ته‌حده‌یه‌کی ترسناک بوته‌وه له چۆنیه‌تی مامه‌لمه‌کردنی له‌گه‌ڵ تاکتیکی (یان یاری ئەکه‌م یان تێکی دهمه‌م) ی گۆران. سیاسه‌تی دهره‌وه‌ی تورکیا ده‌توانێت هاوکار بێت

تورکیا ژماره‌یه‌کی زۆر پایه‌ی پته‌وی ئابوری و ئەمنی هه‌یه له هه‌ریه‌می کوردستان دا بۆیه ناتوانی بیینی پشێوی تێیکه‌وی. شه‌ری ناوخوا و دۆخی فه‌زه‌وه‌ی له هه‌ریه‌مه‌که‌دا باریکی گرانی تر نه‌خاته سه‌ر شانی په‌یوه‌نده‌یه‌کانی تورکیا له‌گه‌ڵ دراوسێکانیدا، که پشێوه‌خت به‌هۆی کێشه‌کانی سووریاوه ئالۆزی تێکه‌وته. سه‌رباری له‌ده‌ستدانی وه‌به‌ره‌ینانی بازرگانی گه‌وره و بلوینه‌ها دۆلاری بازار، دۆخی نا‌ئارامی ئێره بۆشاییه‌کی سیاسي وه‌ها دروست نه‌کات که PKK نه‌توانی به قازانجی خۆی به‌کاری به‌هێنێت، هه‌روه‌ها سه‌ربکێشه‌یت بۆ کوشتارگه‌ی تورکه‌مانه‌کان. بیینی بارزانی شتیکی زۆرباش بو له دیاربه‌که‌ر که شانه‌شانی سه‌روک وه‌زیرانی تورکیا وه‌ستا بو، به‌لام ئەمه‌ باشتر ده‌بو ئەکه‌ر بارزانی قایل به‌کرایه سه‌رکرده کورده‌کانی تریشی به‌ردایه له‌گه‌ڵ خۆیدا بۆ ئەو کۆبوونه‌وه سیمبولی و می‌ژویه. ئەمه‌ ئەو تۆمه‌تانه‌ی ئەسه‌ریه‌وه که سه‌روک وه‌زیران مه‌جه‌ب ته‌یبه ئه‌ردوگان بارزانی وه‌ک داشیک به‌کارده‌هێنێت دژ به‌ده‌سه‌لاته‌کانی ئۆجه‌لان.

تورکیا ژماره‌یه‌کی زۆر سه‌رچاوه‌ی داها‌تی هه‌یه که له‌ژێر ده‌سه‌لاته‌یه‌ بۆ کاریگه‌ریدانان له‌سه‌ر رێه‌وه‌ی روداوکه‌کان، به‌که‌م و به‌ر له‌هه‌ر شتیکی، تورکیا توانیوه‌یه‌تی گه‌شه‌دات به‌ هاو‌په‌یمانه‌یه‌یه‌کی ستراتیجی له‌گه‌ڵ هه‌ره چالاکترین یاریکه‌ری ناوچه‌که‌دا، که پارتیه. ئەم هاو‌په‌یمانه‌یه‌ پێویستی به‌وه‌یه به‌شێوه‌یه‌کی کاریگه‌ر سو‌دی لێبێنرێت بۆ رازیکردنی پارتی که له داها‌تو‌دا زیاتر هاو‌کاری داوا‌کاریه‌کانی ئۆپۆزیسیۆن بێت سه‌باره‌ت به‌ پێکه‌ینانی ه‌کومه‌تێکی په‌که‌رتوی راسته‌قینه به‌شێوه‌یه‌که که له خه‌مه‌تی هه‌مو لایه‌که‌دا بێت، به‌ تورکیا‌شه‌وه. دراوسێه‌یه‌کی ناسه‌قامگیر باش نییه بۆ تورکیا، سو‌ریا که‌یه‌یه‌که جیگه‌ی ئاماژه بۆ کردنه. هه‌روه‌ها تورکیا پێویسته ره‌چاوی ئەو راستیه‌یه‌ بکات که گۆران هێزێکی به‌رچاوه له مه‌شه‌ه‌دی روداوکه‌کانی کورده‌دا و هۆکاریشی هه‌یه بۆ تۆڵه‌سهندنه‌وه‌یه‌کی وێرانکه‌ر له به‌رژوه‌نده‌یه‌کانی پارتی و تورکیا... که‌واته، دا‌ریژه‌رانی سیاسه‌تی تورکیا پێویسته چهن‌دین پر‌دی په‌یوه‌ندی بنیات نه‌ین له‌گه‌ڵ حیزبه ئۆپۆزیسیۆنه کورده‌یه‌کاندا، به‌تایه‌یه‌تی بزوتنه‌وه‌ی گۆران، که پێده‌چێت بۆ چهن‌دین ده‌یه‌ی داها‌تو له ناوچه‌که‌دا بونیان هه‌یه‌یت. ئەم په‌یوه‌نده‌یه‌ ده‌که‌رێت له چهن‌دین رێگاوه ئه‌نجام به‌درێت، له‌وانه‌ش له رێگای گه‌فتوگۆی راسته‌وه‌خۆوه هه‌روه‌ها پێشاندانی بێ‌لایه‌نی له سیاسه‌تی ناوخوای کورده‌دا. رهن‌گه‌ تورکیا پێویستی به‌ به‌کاره‌ینانی رێخه‌راوه نا‌ه‌وکه‌یه‌کان هه‌یه‌یت بۆ ئا‌سته‌کردنی کارامه‌یی پێویست بۆ رێگه‌پێدان به‌ حیزبه کورده‌یه‌کان بۆ پێکه‌ینانی ه‌کومه‌تێکی په‌که‌رتو و به‌لاوه‌مانی کێشه‌کان. سه‌رچاوه: توده‌ی زه‌مان

A.2

<http://sbeiy.com/Detail.aspx?id=28614&LinkID=60>

[http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed\\_the-real-impact-of-gorran-change-movement-in-kr-by-sardar-aziz-329382.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_the-real-impact-of-gorran-change-movement-in-kr-by-sardar-aziz-329382.html)

\*The real impact of Gorran (Change) Movement in KRG by Sardar Aziz

کاریگه‌ری راسته‌قینه‌ی بزوتنه‌وه‌ی گۆران له ه‌کومه‌تی هه‌ریه‌می کوردستاندا

A.3

<https://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail.action.jsessionid=L-iMvlj0STTZYmvGM8HnqvNy?newsId=323926&columnistId=90>

## Historic importance of Gorran's Ankara visit

HASAN KANBOLAT

August 19, 2013, Monday

Both the public and private sectors cooperate closely with the party in power and those who are close to them. And in order to avoid criticisms and reactions from the ruling party, they stay away from the opposition. An Ankara-based think tank, the Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM), does not do this. Without making any distinction between the ruling and opposition parties, it holds meetings with both sides and publishes the opinions and views of dissidents as well. To this end, Movement for Change, also known as Gorran, the main opposition party in Iraqi Kurdistan, visited Ankara on Aug. 13-16, where they co-organized a workshop with ORSAM on Aug. 13 called "Political Developments in the Iraqi Kurdistan Authority and the Future of the Relations between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds."

Founded in 2009, Gorran brought new dimensions to the political life of Iraqi Kurdistan. It emerged and

matured as an intellectual movement, finally becoming a party supported by Iraqi and Kurdish diaspora intellectuals. It sends messages of democratization, budget transparency, administrative reforms, dealing with corruption and enhancement of civil society to the Kurdish people. It rejected the idea of basing its political action on tribal identity. Members even rejected signaling their tribal affiliation in their names. Furthermore, Gorran created a research center affiliated with the party organization. Nearly 90 percent of working people receive salaries from the state in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have enterprises and factories. They are able to distribute MONEY to the voters. In such an environment, Gorran did not want to be part of the establishment in Erbil or Baghdad. They did not go after a huge number of votes despite their strong voter base.

In 2009, little was known about Gorran. There was no solid information except from some prominent figures who parted ways with the PUK. The Noşirvan Mustafa-led Gorran movement, based in Sulaymaniyya, contributed to a decline in support for the Masoud Barzani - Jalal Talabani alliance from 90 percent to 53 percent. In the parliamentary and presidential elections held on July 25, 2009 in Iraqi Kurdistan, the party came second after the KDP-PUK alliance. They caused a big surprise by receiving 23.62 percent of the vote. Currently, Gorran has eight of a total 325 seats in the Iraqi parliament and 25 of a total 100 in the Iraqi Kurdistan parliament.

In Iraqi Kurdistan, a constitution was adopted by the parliament in 2009, however, a referendum should also be held for its entrance into effect. Gorran asks for a referendum after additional amendments to the constitution and pays special attention to relations with Turkey, which they do not see as an alien country. They say that the Turkmen population should have a position of deputy presidency in Iraqi Kurdistan. To this end, they strongly support the settlement process in Turkey. If Ankara successfully completes the settlement process, they believe that peace will be rebuilt with Turkey's assistance. Iraq is in a state of chaos. In July alone, 3,000 were killed in terror attacks. Iraqi Kurdistan is an OASIS of stability and security in Iraq. For this reason, Gorran believes that Iraqi Kurdistan is on the edge of instability. They believe that only Turkey could protect them from any potential collapse and turmoil. Gorran's Iraqi Parliament Deputy and Group Chair Dr. Latif Muhammad said: "We have had so many bad days in Iraq that we have barely saved our spirit, let alone our culture." Turkey continues to make peace with itself. If Mevlana Jelaluddin Rumi's "Mesnevi" is being translated into the Kurdish language in a conservative city such as Konya, where Kurdish people do not even constitute 10 percent of the population, this means that bold and irreversible steps have been taken. Politics sometimes works against the interests of the people. Without political interference, peoples, religions and sects may exist together. For this reason, we need to build confidence in the Middle East first. An unsaid or unexpressed view cannot be tested. We need to investigate what lies behind opinions. New dynamics that pay attention to confidence building will emerge in the Middle East. And Gorran is one of the most important new dynamics.

<http://sbei.com/Detail.aspx?id=23213&LinkID=60>

حهسەن كانبۇلات  
لەئینگلیزییەوه: بېشوان جەلال  
سەردانە گەرنە مێژووییەكەى گۆران بۆ ئەنقەرە

هەردو كەرتى تايبەت و گشتىيى له نزيكەوه هاريكاري حيزبى دەسەلات و ئەوانەى لەوانەوه نزيكن دەكەن .

هاوكات بۆ ئەمەى بەر رەخنەو كاردانەهەى حيزبى دەسەلات نەكەون، خۆيان لە ئۆپۆزسيۆن دورە پەريز دەگرن. سەنتەريكى لێكۆلێنەهەى وەك (سەنتەرى لێكۆلێنەهەى ستراتيگى خۆرەهەلاتى ناوەراست) كە بە (ORSAM) ناسراوه، پرسیكى لەو جۆره ناخاتەرو، بەجئ ئەمەى بەر اووردكاريەك بكات لە نتيوان حيزبى دەسەلات و ئۆپۆزسيۆندا. ئەم سەنتەرە، كۆبونەهەى لەگەڵ هەردولايەن كردوو هاوكات بېرو بۆچونى هەردولای خستۆتەرو. لەم سەرو بەندەدا بزوتنەهەى گۆران كە پارتى سەرەكى ئۆپۆزسيۆنە لە كوردستانى عێراق، لە 13 بۆ 16 ى ئەم مانگەدا سەردانى ئەنقەرەى كرد. لەوئ هاوئ لەگەڵ سەنتەرى (ORSAM) دا ورك شۆپيكيان سازكرد لەژێر ناوێشانى "گەشەى سياسى لە حكومەرانى كوردستانى عێراق و داهاوتى پەيوەندى نتيوان توركياو كوردانى عێراق."

بزوتنەهەى گۆران كە لە سالى 2009 مە دامەزراوه، رەهەندىكى نوێى خستە نتيو كايەى ژيانى سياسى كوردستانى عێراقەوه. هاوكات ئەم بزوتنەهەى وەك بزوتنەهەى فكريش دەرکەوتەوه، بەيبيەى دواچار ئەم بزوتنەهەى لەلایەن زۆريەك لە رەهەندى عێراقى و كوردیەوه پالېشتى لێدەكرێت. ئەم بزوتنەهەى كۆمەلەىك پەيامى ديموكراتيزەكردنى بە هاوالاتيانى كورد گەياندەوه، لەوانە شەفافىيەت لە



بودجه، چاكسازى ئىدارىي، له پيومانيدا به گەندەلى و گەشەسەندى كۆمەلگەي مەدەنىيە. ئۇ بزووتەنەيە ئۇ ئابدىيە رەتدەكتەمە كه لەسەر بىنەمەي خەلەكى شوناسى سىياسى خۆى دابەمزىنەت. ئەندامانى ئۇ حيز به تەنەت ئوموش رەتدەكتەمە كه پاشكۆى ناوى خەلەكى به ناوكانيانەمە هەيت. زىاد لەمەش گۆران سەنتەرىكى تۆيزەنەي له پيومانيدا به رىخستى حيز بەكەيەمە پىكەيتاوه. نزىكەي لەسەدا 90 ى ئۇ خەلەكانەي كاردەكەن مۆچە لەحكومەتى هەرىمى كوردستان وەرەگەرن. پارتى ديموكراتى كوردستان و يەكەيتى نيشتمانى كوردستان خاومنى پروژەو كارگەكان. دوتوانن پارە بىهخەش بەدەنگەران. له دۆخىكى لەو چەشەدا گۆران نەيوستەو بىنەت به بەشەك له دەسەلات هەم له هەولێر و هەم بەغدايش، نەمە سەرەراي نەوەي كه ژمارەيكى زۆر دەنگى هەنابو و خاومنى پىكەيەكى جەماومەرى بهەيزبو.

له سالى 2009دا، كەم شەت دەربارەي گۆران دەزانرا. زانبارەيكى ديار لەبەردەستەدا نەبو تەنەا ئۇە نەيت كه چەند كەسەيكى ديار لەناو يەكەيتى نيشتمانى كوردستان جيايەو. ئەم بزووتەنەيە كه بەر اىرەيمەي نەوشىروان مستەفا له شارى سلێمانى دامەزرا، بوە هۆى نەوەي كه رێژەي پالەشتى له هاوپەيمانىي نىوان مەسعود بارزاني و جەلال تالەباني 90% مە دابەزىت بو 53%. له هەولێر اردنە سەرۆكايەتى و پەرلەمانىەكەي 25 ى 7 ى 2009 ى كوردستانى عێراقدا، ئەم بزووتەنەيە لەوای هاوپەيمانىي پارتى و يەكەيتەمە بوە دوهم براوەي هەولێر اردنەكان و رێژەي 23.62% ى دەنگەرانى بەدەستەينا. له نيشتەدا گۆران لەكۆى 325 كورسى خاومنى هەشت كورسى پەرلەمانى عێراقە و، هاوكات خاومنى 25 كورسىە لەكۆى 100 كورسى له پەرلەمانى كوردستانى عێراقدا.

له كوردستانى عێراقدا، له سالى 2009 دا لەلایەن پەرلەمانەو پروژەيەيكى دەستور نامەدەراوە كه بخرێتە ريفراندۆمەو. بەلام گۆران داواي ئۇە دەكەت كه دوبارە ئۇ دەستورە له پەرلەمان هەموار بکەیتەو ئىنجا بخرێتە ريفراندۆمەو. كه تێیدا گۆران دىمۆيت گەرنەيكەي تايبەت بەریت به پيومانديەكان لەگەڵ توركيدا. ئۇوان دەيانەويت كه پۆستى بالا لەهەرىم بەریت به نەتەمەكانى تری هەرىم لەناوياندا نەتەمەي توركمان. لەم سەرۆبەندەدا پالەشتىەكى بەهیزی سەقامگيرى سىياسى دەكەت لەگەڵ توركيدا. ئۇوان پىيانوايە گەر ئەنقەرە به شۆمەيكى سەرکەوتو ئۇ پرۆسەيە سەربەخت، ئۇوا نەشتىي بو جارىكى دى لەو وڵاتەدا بنیاتدەنرێتەو. عێراق وڵاتیکە پر له قەيران. بەتەنەا له مانگی تەموزدا، 3000 كەس بەهۆي هێرشە تیرۆرستىەكانەو كۆزراون. كوردستانى عێراق تاكه شۆينە له عێراقدا كه ناسايش تێیدا بەرقەرارىيت. دكتور لەتيف، ئەندامى پەرلەمانى عێراق لەسەر لیستى گۆران وتى "ئێمە له عێراقدا رۆژگارى زۆر ناخۆشمان بەسەرد، كه زۆر زەحمەت بو گيانمان بپاريزين چ جاي كەلتور."

هەندەكجار سىياسەت به پىچەوانەي خواستى خەلەكەو كاردەكەت. بەي دەستبەردانى سىياسەتیش، خەلەكان و ئابنەكان و ئابنزاكان رەنگە پىكەمە هەلەكەن. لەبەر ئەم هۆكارە ئێمە پىوستە يەكەمەن شەت مەتەنە لەروژەلاتى ناوەرەستەا بنیات بنين. وتەي نەكراو و نەبىستراو ناتوانرێت تاقىبەریتەو. پىوستە لىكۆلینەو بەكەين چ شەتیک له پشت بىروراكانەو. داينەمىكى نوئ كه گەرنەي دەدات به بىناکردنى مەتەنە لەروژەلاتى ناوەرەستەا دەرکەوتون، گۆران يەكەكە له گەرنەترين داينەمىكىە نوينەكان.

سەرچاوه: تودەي زەمان

#### A.4

<http://derstandard.at/1373512476213/Barzani-will-nicht-gehen>

#### Massud Barzani will nicht gehen

GUDRUN HARRER

12. Juli 2013, 15:20

Der kurdische Regionalpräsident weigert sich zurückzutreten, obwohl das irakische Wahlrecht nur zwei Amtsperioden vorsieht. Ein Staatsoberhaupt, das nicht zu mächtig ist und dessen Amtsperioden begrenzt sind: Das steht auf dem Programmzettel von Ländern, die sich auf den Weg zur Demokratie machen, im Nahen Osten oder anderswo. Es gibt Länder – oder in unserem Fall "Bundesländer", denn die Rede ist vom kurdischen Autonomiegebiet im Nordirak –, die bewältigen die Transition zu einem neuen System besser als andere. Umso trauriger ist es, wenn der Eindruck entsteht, dass auf halbem Weg kehrt gemacht wird. Die Begründung ist immer die gleiche: Die Umstände verlangen es. Kurz gesagt: Der kurdische Regionalpräsident Massud Barzani hat es sich anders überlegt und will doch nicht nach zwei Amtsperioden im August 2013 abtreten, wie es das derzeitige Wahlrecht vorsieht. Die 2009 vom Parlament verabschiedete, allerdings nie ratifizierte kurdische Regionalverfassung würde ihm ab ihrem Inkrafttreten noch eine Wiederwahl gestatten. Mit dem Hinweis darauf, dass an der Verfassung weiter gearbeitet werden muss, hat das kurdische Regionalparlament in Erbil seine eigene Legislaturperiode um ein paar Monate verlängert, die von Barzani allerdings gleich bis 19. August 2015. Und wer weiß, wie viele weitere Amtsperioden für den Präsidenten die Verfassung dann vorsehen wird. Barzani wird im August 67 Jahre alt, da geht sich schon noch etwas aus. Die Parlamentssitzung, in der die Verschiebungen beschlossen wurden, fand schon am 30. Juni statt und endete in einer mittleren

Prügelei, Fäuste und Wasserflaschen flogen. Die Oppositionsparteien, die ja im Prinzip auch wollen, dass das Wahlrecht noch einmal überholt wird, fühlten sich vom nicht mehr so mächtigen wie früher, aber immer noch übermächtigen Block der zwei traditionellen Kurdenparteien KDP (Kurdische Demokratische Partei) und PUK (Patriotische Union Kurdistans) überrollt, die alles, was sie wollen, mit ihrer Mehrheit durchboxen. Genereller Ärger besteht auch bei der parlamentarischen Opposition, weil Barzani die Frage, ob er seine eigene Amtsverlängerung unterschreiben würde, mit Kleingruppen und Kräften außerhalb des Parlaments zu diskutieren gedachte, um besser auf die „öffentliche Meinung“ eingehen zu können: Bei dem klientelistischen Netzwerk der KDP und der Barzanis läuft das nur auf eine Machtkonsolidierung hinaus, außerhalb des Parlaments, das an Bedeutung verliert. Es hat 2005 den Präsidenten noch gewählt, 2009 gab es bereits eine Volkswahl. Eine der Fragen, die die Juristen beschäftigt, ist deshalb, ob das Parlament überhaupt das Recht hat, die Amtszeit des Präsidenten zu verlängern. Auf Meta-Ebene ist das Argument für solche Manöver natürlich immer die Stabilität, die Oppositionsparteien verweisen jedoch auf Korruption und Nepotismus in Kurdistan, die die zarten demokratischen Strukturen in ihren Anfängen erstickt. Der Protest dagegen hat ja auch die stärkste Oppositionspartei, die PUK-Abspaltung Gorran (Wechsel), hervorgebracht. Die anderen kurdischen Parteien im Parlament sind – bis auf die der ethnischen und religiösen Minderheiten – meist islamistisch (und haben auch lautstark den Sturz des Muslimbruders Mohammed Morsi in Ägypten beklagt). Die PUK ist durch den Ausfall ihres Führers – des irakischen Staatspräsidenten Jalal Talabani, der seit Dezember 2012 nach einem schweren Schlaganfall in Deutschland in einem Krankenhaus liegt – geschwächt, sie hat den KDP-Wünschen nichts entgegenzusetzen. Die Zukunftsfähigkeit der PUK, die ja eine KDP-Abspaltung ist, wird von manchen Beobachtern angezweifelt. Der starke Mann der PUK ist momentan eine Frau: Talabanis Gattin Hero Ibrahim Ahmed. Auch Talabanis Sohn Qubad wurde aus Washington zurückgerufen. Gegen diese Übermacht der Familie in der PUK wendet sich der frühere kurdische Premier der kurdischen Regionalregierung, Barham Salih, der international gut vernetzt ist. Barzani – der auch unter den syrischen Kurden vermittelt und die nordirakischen Beziehungen zu Ankara gut managt – absolvierte soeben einen Europa-Trip. Vorher war er jedoch zum ersten Mal seit drei Jahren in Bagdad, ein Versuch, das zuletzt dramatisch schlechte Verhältnis zur Regierung in Bagdad, namentlich zum irakischen Premier Nuri al-Maliki, zu reparieren (der seinerseits vorher nach Erbil kam). Einmal mehr wurde beschlossen, die großen kurdisch-arabischen Fragen bald anzugehen: das Management der Ölressourcen in der Kurdenregion, wobei die Kurden volle Autonomie beanspruchen. Neuer Ärger könnte durch die neue Pipeline der Kurden an die türkische Grenze entstehen, wenn sich Erbil und Bagdad nicht bald einigen. Der größte Brocken bleibt die Zukunft der Stadt Kirkuk und der zwischen Kurden und Arabern umstrittenen Gebiete, für die die irakische Verfassung von 2005 ein Referendum vorsah, das nie stattfand. Maliki ist nicht weniger als Barzani ein Machtmensch: Vonseiten der Kurden musste er sich seit 2010 immer wieder Vergleiche mit Saddam Hussein gefallen lassen. Er selbst muss sich übrigens mit keinem irakischen Präsidenten herumschlagen: erstens ist das Amt verfassungsmäßig eher schwach, zweitens ist, wie bereits gesagt, Talabani ausgefallen. Der sunnitische Vizepräsident Tarik al-Hashimi ist wegen Terrorismusbeihilfe zum Tod verurteilt und lebt in der Türkei, bleibt ein schiitischer Vizepräsident, Khodair al-Khozaie, von dem man wenig hört. (Gudrun Harrer, derStandard.at, 12.7.2013) [derstandard.at/1373512476213/Barzani-will-nicht-gehen](http://derstandard.at/1373512476213/Barzani-will-nicht-gehen)

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## بارزانی نایه‌وێت کورسی ده‌سه‌لات به‌جێبه‌نێت

ه‌اره‌ر  
سه‌به‌ی

گودرون  
له‌ئه‌لمانییه‌وه:

سه‌روکی هه‌ریمی کوردستان ریگه‌نادات ده‌سه‌لات ده‌ستاو ده‌ست بکات، نه‌گه‌رچی به‌پیتی یاسای هه‌لبژاردنی عێراق هه‌یج که‌سێک ناتوانیت له‌دو خول زیاتر له‌پۆستی سه‌روکایه‌تی دا به‌مێنێته‌وه.



لهو وڵاتانهدا بهنازاسته‌ی دیموکراسی به‌ریوه‌ن سه‌روک هه‌مو ده‌سه‌لاتیکه‌ی نییه‌و مۆله‌تی مانه‌وه‌ی له‌پۆستی سه‌روکه‌یه‌تیدا دیاریکراوه. دیاره‌ نه‌مه‌ له‌روژه‌لاتی ناوه‌راسته‌یش دا به‌یره‌و ده‌کړ. به‌لام جاروبار وڵاتیک، یاخود هه‌ریمیک هه‌یه‌ به‌ره‌و دواوه‌ هه‌نگاو ده‌نی. وه‌ک له‌بایه‌تی نه‌م بایسه‌دا ناماژه‌ی پیده‌که‌ین هه‌ریمی نۆتۆنۆمی کورده‌کان له‌باکوری عێراق دا پاشه‌کشه‌ی دیموکراسی ده‌بینن. مایه‌ی نیکه‌رانیه‌ نه‌و هه‌ریمه‌ له‌نیوه‌ی رینگای به‌ره‌و دیموکراسییه‌و دا بوه‌ستی و بۆ دواوه‌ بگه‌ڕێته‌وه‌، بیاتوی ده‌سه‌لات و سسته‌مه‌که‌یش بۆ هه‌یشتنه‌وه‌ی سه‌روک وه‌کو هه‌مو جاریک بریتیه‌ له‌م رسته‌یه‌: بارودۆخه‌که‌وا ده‌خوازی.

به‌کورتی مه‌سه‌ود بارزانی سه‌روکی هه‌ریمی کوردستانی عێراق دوا‌ی دو‌ خول سه‌روکبون نایه‌ویت ده‌سته‌بردار‌ی ده‌سه‌لات بیت و له‌ ناب‌ی 2013 دا واز به‌یئیت.

وه‌ک یاسای هه‌ل‌ئ‌ژاردنی هه‌ریم له‌نیستادا دیاره‌، نه‌و یاسایه‌ له‌ 2009 دا له‌لایه‌ن په‌رله‌مانه‌وه‌ په‌سه‌ند کراوه‌ و ده‌ستوریک بۆ هه‌ریم دانراوه‌، ده‌ستوریک ده‌بوا‌یه‌ هه‌موار بک‌رێته‌وه‌و کاری تیدا بک‌ریت، به‌لگه‌یان بۆ خۆ کاندیدک‌ردنه‌وه‌ی بارزانی نه‌وه‌یه‌ نه‌و ده‌ستوره‌ تاکو‌ نیستا‌ هیچ کاریکی تیدا نه‌ک‌راوه‌. په‌رله‌مانی هه‌لوێر له‌پێناو کارکردن له‌و ره‌ش‌نۆسی ده‌ستوره‌دا هه‌م خولی یاسادانانی خۆی بۆ چه‌ند مانگیک و هه‌م سه‌روکبونی بارزانی تاوه‌کو 19 ی ناب‌ی 2015 درێژ ک‌رده‌وه‌.

ک‌ی ده‌زانی بارزانی چه‌ندین خولی دیکه‌یش هه‌ر سه‌روک ده‌بی و ده‌ستکاریکردنی ده‌ستور تا‌ چ سالیکی نه‌و به‌سه‌روک ده‌هێل‌ته‌وه‌! بارزانی له‌مانگی ناب‌دا ته‌مه‌نی ده‌گاته‌ 67 سالان و جارێ به‌به‌ریه‌وه‌ ماوه‌ گه‌لێک سالانی تریش هه‌ر سه‌روک بیت.

له‌کۆبونه‌وه‌ی 30 ی حوزه‌یران - ی په‌رله‌مان دا و نه‌وساته‌ی تیا‌یدا ده‌سه‌لاتی په‌رله‌مان و سه‌روکی هه‌ریم تیا‌یدا درێژکرانه‌وه‌ پێک‌دادان و شه‌ره‌بوکس رویاندا و بوتله‌ناو وه‌ک فرفرۆکه‌ به‌ناسمانه‌وه‌بون. پارت‌ه‌کانی نۆپۆزیسیۆن نه‌گه‌رچی نه‌وانیش ده‌یان‌ه‌ویت هه‌ریم ده‌ستوریکه‌ی هه‌بی و هه‌ل‌ئ‌ژاردن به‌یاسا بیت، نۆپۆزیسیۆن نه‌یده‌و‌یست به‌ناماده‌بونی خۆیان یاسای له‌و‌جۆره‌ له‌لایه‌ن فراکسیۆنی هه‌ردو‌ حیزبی پارتی و یه‌ک‌تییه‌وه‌ تیا‌یه‌ر‌ئ‌ن‌رین. نه‌گه‌رچی پارتی دیموکراتی کوردستان و یه‌ک‌تییی نیشتمانی کوردستان لاوازیبون و نه‌و هه‌زێ جارانی په‌رله‌مانیان نییه‌. به‌لام هه‌یشتا‌ هه‌زی نه‌وه‌یان هه‌بو نه‌و یاسایانه‌ له‌په‌رله‌مان دا تیا‌یه‌ر‌ئ‌ن‌.

لایه‌نه‌کانی نۆپۆزیسیۆن ناماژه‌به‌بونی گه‌نده‌لی و ده‌سه‌لاتی تاکه‌ به‌مه‌اله‌ له‌کوردستان دا ده‌که‌ن و نایانه‌ویت به‌و هۆیان‌ه‌وه‌ دیموکراسیه‌ ساواکه‌ی هه‌ریم بخنکیت. ناره‌زایی ده‌ر‌بر‌ین دژی گه‌نده‌لی و ده‌سه‌لاتی یه‌ک خیزان له‌کوردستانی عێراق دا بویه‌ هۆی به‌هه‌زیبونی - بزوتنه‌وه‌ی گۆران - له‌و هه‌ریمه‌دا. گۆران به‌توندی دژی نه‌و سسته‌مه‌ی هه‌ریمه‌و به‌هه‌زترین فراکسیۆنی نۆپۆزیسیۆنه‌ له‌په‌رله‌مان دا. گۆران ریک‌خراویکه‌ که‌سانیک دایانه‌مه‌زاندوه‌ پێشتر یه‌ک‌تییی نیشتمانی کوردستان بون. گروپه‌ نه‌ت‌نیک‌ی و نیسلا‌می‌ه‌کانی دیکه‌به‌ر‌یت‌ین له‌و لایه‌نه‌ی له‌په‌رله‌مانی کوردستان دا بونه‌ته‌ نۆپۆزیسیۆن و هه‌ندیک‌یان په‌روشی روخانی حکومه‌تی محمه‌د موریسی - ن له‌میسر.

یه‌ک‌تییی (پی یو که‌ی) دوا‌ی دیارنه‌مانی جه‌لال تاله‌بانی سه‌رکۆماری عێراق به‌هۆی نه‌خۆشی زه‌بری میشک له‌کانونی یه‌که‌می 2012 دا و ناچاربونی چونه‌ نه‌خۆشخانه‌یه‌ک له‌ئه‌لمانییا دا لاواز بو‌هو مل بۆ هه‌مو خواستیکی پارتی ده‌دات و هیچ به‌ره‌هه‌ئ‌ستکارییه‌ک نیشان نادات. توانای یه‌ک‌تییی له‌دا‌هاتودا جیگه‌ی پرسیاره‌!

که‌سی یه‌که‌م و به‌هه‌زی یه‌ک‌تییی دوا‌ی جه‌لال تاله‌بانی له‌نیستادا بریتیه‌ له‌هه‌زیو‌ نیبراهیم نه‌حمه‌دی هاوسه‌ری تاله‌بانی قوبادی کوری تاله‌بانیش له‌وا‌شینگ‌تۆنه‌وه‌ گه‌ر‌ئ‌ن‌راوه‌ته‌وه‌ وڵات . له‌به‌رانه‌یه‌ر نه‌م بالاده‌ستییه‌ی خیزانی تاله‌بانی له‌ناو یه‌ک‌تییی دا دک‌تۆر به‌ره‌م سالج - ی سه‌ره‌ک وه‌زیرانی پێشوی حکومه‌تی هه‌ریم هه‌یه‌، سالج خاوه‌نی تۆریکی به‌هه‌زی به‌یوه‌ندیه‌ نیوده‌وله‌تیه‌کانه‌.

سه‌رچاوه‌ :دێر ستاندارد

26/07/2013

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شکست حزب جلال طالبانی در انتخابات پارلمانی کردستان عراق

در رده دوم جنبش اعتراضی تغییر با بیش از 500 هزار رای قرار دارد که بنا دارد این بار در حکمرانی کردستان عراق نقش داشته باشد. رده دومی که تا قبل از این به اتحادیه میهنی کردستان عراق به رهبری جلال طالبانی اختصاص داشت اما به نظر می رسد با شروع بیماری طالبانی دوران افول سیاسی اتحادیه میهنی کردستان عراق نیز شروع شده است.

روز شنبه چهارمین دوره انتخابات پارلمانی کردستان عراق در سه استانی شمالی عراق برگزار - **گروه بین الملل** شد. اگرچه کمیسیون برگزاری انتخابات اعلام کرده است که تا چند روز دیگر نتایج را بطور رسمی اعلام خواهد کرد اما نتایج غیر رسمی حاکی است که حزب دمکرات کردستان عراق توانسته است با بدست آوردن 800 هزار رای برنده بیشترین رای باشد اگرچه این حزب نیز نتوانسته است که اکثریت اراء را بدست بیاورد. در انتخابات این دوره 2 میلیون و 800 هزار رای دهنده واجد شرایط رای دادن بودند.

به گزارش **بولتن نیوز**، در رده دوم جنبش اعتراضی تغییر با بیش از 500 هزار رای قرار دارد که بنا دارد این بار در حکمرانی کردستان عراق نقش داشته باشد. رده دومی که تا قبل از این به اتحادیه میهنی کردستان عراق به رهبری جلال طالبانی اختصاص داشت اما به نظر می رسد با شروع بیماری طالبانی دوران افول سیاسی اتحادیه میهنی کردستان عراق نیز شروع شده است.

در طول چند ماه گذشته سران این حزب بیشتر از اینکه درصدد بازپایی حزب باشند مشغول اختلافات داخلی بودند و اخبار غیر رسمی از درون این حزب حاکی است که یکی از سران این حزب بنام دکتر برهم صالح درصدد تاسیس حزب مستقلی است که اگر این اتفاق روی دهد یکی از بزرگترین احزاب سیاسی کردستان عراق در سی سال گذشته در استانه تجزیه کامل قرار خواهد گرفت. سخنان دکتر برهم صالح در خصوص سخت بودن باقی ماندن با سایر هم حزبی هایش این شک و گمان را تشدید کرده است.

علیرغم افول سیاسی اتحادیه میهنی کردستان عراق جنبش تغییر نشان داد که در چهار سال گذشته توانسته است در استان سلیمانیه گوی سبقت را کاملاً از اتحادیه میهنی و حزب دمکرات کردستان برپاید و در استان اربیل نیز نزدیک به 30 هزار رای به آرای خود اضافه کرده است. بدین ترتیب می توان انتظار داشت که دوران جدید این حزب که چندان سر سازگاری با حزب دمکرات کردستان عراق ندارد شروع شده است و آنها با هجمه گسترده خود در 4 سال گذشته در خصوص فساد در حکومت اقلیم، اکنون مسئول ریشه کن کردن این فساد خواهند بود اما آیا می توانند در مسند حاکمیت محبوب باقی بمانند؟ آیا این تغییر بالانس سیاسی در کردستان عراق حکومت اقلیم کردستان عراق را مسئولیت پذیرتر خواهد کرد؟

یکی دیگر از نکات این انتخابات پیروزی حزب دمکرات کردستان عراق می باشد که براساس اراء کنونی که اگر تایید شود 40 کرسی پارلمان را بدست خواهد آورد و بدین ترتیب مامور تشکیل کابینه جدید خواهد شد. اما علیرغم این پیروزی حزب دمکرات کردستان عراق نیز بعنوان یکی از ریشه دارترین احزاب سیاسی کردستان عراق که عقبه ملا مصطفی بارزانی را بر مسند خود می بیند دیگر حزب اکثریت نیست و در هیچ شرایطی نمی تواند به تنهایی کابینه را تشکیل بدهد و هم پیمان استراتژیکش نیز دیگر از قدرت سابق برخوردار نیست.

همانگونه که **بولتن نیوز** پیش بینی کرده بود این بار در کردستان عراق تقسیم قدرت در نتیجه انتخابات اتفاق افتاد و قدرت در این منطقه می رود در بین تمام احزاب منطقه ساری و جاری شود که بخش اعظمی از این قدرت به احزاب جدید التاسیس بر می گردد و این نشان از پایان حاکمیت مطلق احزاب کلاسیک کردی بر کردستان عراق می باشد.

با تقسیم قدرت در کردستان عراق عملاً تشکیل کابینه نیز براحتی عملی نخواهد شد حزب دمکرات کردستان عراق مجبور از هم پیمانی با اپوزیسیون خواهد شد اپوزیسیونی که در چهار سال گذشته قدرت گرفتن این حزب را هدف گرفته بود.

بهر روی این انتخابات نیز تمام شد و احزاب سیاسی کردستان عراق هرکدام جایگاه خود را در میان مردم به روشنی دریافتند. در کنار این پایان یکی از عمده نگرانی های قبل از انتخابات عدم تسلیم قدرت به شیوه مسالمت آمیز در صورت شکست احزاب حاکم بود که با توجه به قبول شکست از سوی اتحادیه میهنی کردستان عراق می توان گفت کردستان عراق یک گام دیگر نیز رو به جلو برداشت و خاطرات جنگ های داخلی فرسنگ ها از خاطره و ذهن مردم منطقه دورتر شد.

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پێگه كوردستان رێمی كانی سیاسی یه پارتی له كریهه و هلت كۆتایه شێ بژاردنه هه مده رحاله هه ت رینورمه گه كان، بژاردنه كۆتایه بیهات نی لگه له و بتركه ده ب و دا ل كخه ناوله خۆیان یه ج یگه و كان لات داره سه ده پارتی شكهستی كاتی له كه به و و مه ده كان بژاردنه هه جامدانی ده له به رانی یه ج یگه ق بول كرنی به له لامه ه، هاشد ت یانه كی به ش یوه به لات سه ده س تكررنی س تاو ده ده به به نزه ئاماده دا هه كوردستان رێمی كانه به لای بن ت وانه یه وه كوردستانه یه ش ت یمانی كی تی به ن لایه له شكهستی دوركه یادت رز و زیادت ر ناوخو نگی جه كانی ر یه یه میده و و مه ی شه ورم به ناوه ی دی كه ن گاو یه کی و مه و ته

## A.6

[http://www.pukmedia.com/KS\\_Direje.aspx?Jimare=29888](http://www.pukmedia.com/KS_Direje.aspx?Jimare=29888)

پینچ بنهما بۆ عێراق  
16/6/2014 20:41:00

پهرتووێی عێراق و سوریا نهوهی به كۆتا گه یاند كه سه پیندر ابو به سر رۆژه لاتی ناوه راستدا كه روادوێکی زۆر مه زنه و ئیمشه و لك ویلا مه ته یه كگر توو مه كان ده بی چۆن وه لایمی ئه مه به دینه وه.

نزیكه ی دوو ههفته ده بیته له عێراق گه راومه ته وه، پینچ بنهما مێشكیمان سه رقال كر دوو. یه كه میان بۆ ئه مه به كه له عێراقدا نه گوزهری كه "دوژمنی دوژمنه كه م دوژمنه" نهك دۆست. جگه له كورد كهی دیکه دۆستمان نین له ناوچه یه دا، نه سه ركرده سوننه كان و نه شیعه كانی له گه ل خواست و به هاكانی ئیمه دا نین. گروپه جیهادییه سوننی و به عسی و هۆزه چه كدار مه كان كه پالیشتی سه ندنه وهی ده سه لات ده كه ن له حكومه تی عێراقی له موصل پشنگیری له عێراقی دیموكراسی فرمی ناكهن، عێراقی كه هه یچی بۆمان نه هینشتو و نه مه تاو كه یار مه تی پشنگه ش بكهن. هه ره ها سه روك وه زیرانی شیعه ی عێراق (نوری مالیکی) خۆشی تا ئیستا نه سه لماندوه كه پشتیوانی عێراقی فرمی بی. له یه كه م رۆژی ده ستبه كار بوو نه مه كار بۆ دامه زاندنی شیعه كان ده كات له پۆسته نه مینییه هه ستیار مه كان و وه لانی سیاسی و خلكی سوننه و پشنگیری دارایی بۆ دامه زراوه شیعه یه كان. بۆیه نه توانین بڵێن مالیکی به مانای وشه گه مژه بوو. له گه ل ئه مه شدا بوونی و كه سه روك وه زیران بردی به ره م به كار هینانی ده سه لات مه كانی و كه وه زیری به رگری و ناوخو و رادوێكاری ئه مانی قومی به ره هایی و هاوڕێكانی ده ستیان گرتوه به سه ر بانگی ناو مند و وه زیری داراییدا.

مالیکی ئه مه به یه كان هه لێزێت، یان ئه مه تا ده سه لاتێکی تایه فگه ر جیه جیه كات یان ئه مه تا فرمی قبو ل كات، سه ر مه جم تایه فگه ر هه لێزارد و له مه شدا هه یچی پشنگه شی ئیمه نه كر دوو تا پاداشتی به دینه وه.

دووم بنهما: پرسیاریکی گرنه م له لا دروست بوو كه ئه بی له به ر رۆشنا یی به هاری عه رمی وه لاهه كه ی به دینه وه. بۆچی باشت رین ناوچه كان ئه وانن كه نه مریكا كه مترین ده ستی تۆم راداون، و لك تونس و كوردستان؟

وه لام: باوهر ئه كه ی یان نا ئه مه هه یچی په یوه ندی به مه وه نییه كه ئیمه چی بكهن و هه لێزاردنی ئیمه چییه. عه رب و كورد به ریکاری خۆیان هه به، وه هۆكاری ئه وهی بۆچی تونس و كوردستان دور گه یه کی به ر قه رار و شیوا یان به ده سه تپه ناوه كه چی دڵنا یی ته وای نییه، ئه مه به كه هه زه سیاسییه ده سه لاتدار مه كان یان له كۆتاییدا هه ولی جیه جیه كرنی بنهما ی (كه س برا وه و كه س دۆرا وه نییه) یان داوه.

دوو هه زه سه ر مه کییه ریا به مه کی كوردستان نهك ته نه نا كۆكیه كانی نێوان یان و له نا به لكو رێگه خۆشكهر یوون بۆ هه لێزاردنی دیموكراسیا نه كه له م دوواییانه دا پارت ه تۆپوز سیو نه كانی به ره هه لێكشانێکی خه را برد و وایكرد كه لایه نه تۆپوز سیو نه كانی به له سه ر بنهما ی دژه گه ندلی کاریان ده كرد بۆ یه كه م جار به شدار بوون له حكومه تا. وه تونسیش دوا ی كیشمه كیشی ناوخوی و خۆپه رانیکی زۆر رێگه چاره یه كان دۆزیه وه تا هاو سه نگی نێوان تایه فیه یه كان و ئیسلامیه یه كان رابگرن و هاو رابن له سه ر پشكه متخا و ترین ده ستوور له مێژوی جیهانی عه رمیدا و تا ئیستا ش کاری پێده كرن. له به ره نه وه پیموایه كه رۆژه لاتی ناوهر است ته نه نا ئه كه ته خه ند ده خاته سه ر لێوت كه نه م خه ندیه سه رتا له خۆیا نه وه ده ست پێكات، ئه مه ش ئه بی پێكه وه ئا شت ببه وه ئینجا رو نه دات. سوننه و شیعه كان چه كیان له ئیمه ناوێت به لكو راست یان لیمان ئه ویت، ئیستا سه ده ی بیستویه كه و زۆر یه كان هینتا شه ری ئه وه ئه كه ن كه كێ جینشینی راسته قینه ی پێغه مبه ر محمه ده كه له سه ده ی حه وتا ژیاوه. ئه مه ئه بیته كۆتای پێ به یتریت له به خاتری خۆیان و مه نداله كان یان تاو كه دا هاتو یه كیان هه بیته.

سه نه م بنهما: له وانه یه ئێران و فه رمانده ی سوپا به هه زه كه ی قودس (قاسم سوله یمان) زۆر زه ركه نه بن، چونكه ئه وه ئێران بوو كه عێراقیه شیعه یه هاو په یمانه كانی پێكه نه كرد به بۆمبی تایه یته كه به هه زیوه زۆرێك سه ربازی ئه مریکی گه یانان له ده ستدا و به ریندار بوون. خواستی ئێران بوو كه ئیمه له عێراق به رۆین، ئه وه ئێران بوو كه مالیکی دڵناكر ده وه به وه ی به هه یج جۆرێك پیمان له گه ل هه زه كانی ئه مریكا مۆر نه كات تاو كه هه زه كانه مان له عێراق به شتویه کی یاسایی به یزنه وه، ئێران و یه ستی كه هه ژ موونی خۆی له ناوچه كدا ده ر بخت. زۆر چا كه سوله یمان، نه م ده سه گوله با هه ر بۆ ئه وه بی، ئیستا هه زه كانه تان به ر فراوانتر كر دوو له سوریا و لو بنان و عێراق وه هه زه كانی ئیمه ش گه را نه وه ماله وه، كه واته رۆژیکی خۆش بۆ ئه وه.

به لام هینتا له سه ر مه كه كه پالیشتی ئه په یماننامه یه بین كه رێگری له ئێران ده كات له به ده ستپه نانی چه کی ئه و می، كه واته ئه بی زۆر ناگدار بین له وه ی چه ندێك یار مه تی دوژمنه سوننه كانی ئێران نه دین. به لام به وه ی ئه نا بولقانه ی له سه ر ئێران و هه زه كانی و هه ره ها هه زه بولاش له سوریا و لو بنان و عێراق له شه ردان، كه واته باشت ره بڵێن قازانجی ئه مریكایه.

چوارم: کیشی سهرکردایه تیکردن.

له عیراق سهردانێ کهرکوکم کرد، نهی شارهێ که بۆ ماوهیهکی دورودریژه کورد و عهرهب و تورکمانهکان کیشیهانه لهرسری. پینج سأل لهرموهر که لهوی بووم که کهرکوک پیسترین مهیدانی شهر بو، بهلام نهسجار میان ریگهوبانی تازهی قیرتاو و پارکی نوێ و نابوورییهکی گهشهسهندوم بینی، که تیایدا پارێزگاریکی کورد (نهمههین عومهر کهریم) جاریکی دیکه و له مانگی نیساندا و له ههلیژاردنیکێ دادپهروهرا نهدا ههلیژیردایهوه و کورسی زیاتریشی بهدمست ههنا بههوی نهوهی که جگه له کورد کهمه نهتهو مانی وک عهرهب و تورکمانهکان دهنگیان پیندا.

دکتور نهمههین که پزشکی نهشتهرگهری مینشکه و ماوهی ۳۳ سأل له نهمریکا کاری کردوه پینش گهرانهوهی بۆ عیراق له ۲۰۰۹دا، وتی "جهختمان له باشتهرکردنی ریگهوبان و هاتوچو و نهخوشخانه و خویندنگهکان کردوهتهوه"، وه زیادکردنی کارمبا له ۴ کاتژمیر له رۆژیکدا بۆ نزیکی ۲۴ کاتژمیر. ههروهه پینی وتم "خهلکی کهرکوک بیزاربوون له سیاست و بهگشتی کردنی گرفتهکان و شۆرنههونهوه بۆ وردهکاری داواکارییهکانی خهلک. ئیمه متمانه و بروای عهرهب و تورکمانهکانمان بهدمستهپناهوه تاوهکو کوردیک پارێزگاریان بی، نهوان ههست نهکهن که ئیمه جیاکاری ناکهین و نهوه بۆ یهکم جار ه که لهم ههلیژاردنهدا تورکمان و عهرهب دهنگیان به کورددا".

لهم کیشمهکیشیهی دواپیدا کورد کونترۆلی سهربازی نهوای کهرکوکێ کرد، بهلام نهتوانم پینان بلنیم که نهگهر مالیکی عیراقی بهی شیهویه بهی ژیهههردایه که دکتور نهمههین کردویهتی نهوه ههرگیز نهی بیسهروبهریهی نیستا دروست نهدهوه، کهواته گهر سهرکردهیهکی باش و شیاو ههینی نهوه خهلکی نهتوانن پینکهوه بژین.

کوتا بنهما نهویه که له کاتیکدا هیچ کام له کارمکتهره سهرمکییهکانی عیراق جگه له کورد کهس ریزی بههاکانی ئیمه ناگریت. ئایا کهس هیه بۆ بههاکانی ئیمه بجهنگی تاوهکو عیراقیکی سهقامگیر ههینی که ههرشه نههیت بۆسهرمان؟ وه نهگهر واقیعهانه تماشای بکهین، نهوه کینه که نهی ئیمه یارمهتی بههین؟

وهلامهکه ههشتا بۆم روون نییه و تاوهکو بۆم رونههیتهوه نیگهرانییهکانم بهردوام نهبن لهرسهر ههر دهستیهوردانیک.

سهرچاوه/ نیویۆرک تایمز

نوسینی/ توماس فریدمان

وههگیرانی له ئینگلیزیهوه/ دارا کهریم مهحمود / خویندکاری ماستهری زمان لهههریتانیا

## A.7

<http://www.faceiraq.com/inews.php?id=2904098>

<http://www.xendan.org/arabic/drejaa.aspx?jmara=574>

عادل عبد المهدي: طالباني قاوم مرضه، كما قاوم اعداءه

خندان PM:11:34:19/07/2014

خندان – اكد القيادي في المجلس الاعلى الاسلامي الدكتور عادل عبد المهدي، ان الرئيس جلال طالباني، "من كبار القادة والزعماء، واكثرهم خبرة ومعروفية داخلية وخارجية، شامخ مقاوم للاستبداد والظلم، متفائل صلب في اوقات الشدة، لا يعرف اليأس، مدافع صلب عن حقوق كردستان والعراق، بالبندقية.. والرسالة.. والخطابة.. وفي المفاهيم والبناءات النظرية والتنظيمية".

وقال عبد المهدي في مقال له بعنوان (طالباني قاوم مرضه، كما قاوم اعداءه) ان الرئيس طالباني، لا يكل ولا يتعب، مؤسسة ومشروع كامل بذاته.. يجيد الكردية والعربية والفارسية والانكليزية وبعض التركية والفرنسية.. اديب، حافظ لكثير من القرآن والشعر (خصوصاً الجواهري) والروايات والنوادر والنكات، وقارئ ممتاز، ويحتفظ اينما كان بمكتبة زاخرة.. كريم نفس وباسط يد، لا يرد طلباً، متسامح عند الحاجة وحازم عند الضرورة".

واشار عبد المهدي الى ان الرئيس طالباني " يدير الاجتماعات والمؤتمرات ببراعة، يجمع الفرقاء والمختلفين، ليخرجوا موحدتي الكلمة والصف، دوره مركزي في تطور القضية الكردية والعراقية على حد سواء.. وان اختياره لرئاسة الجمهورية، وتمتعه بمحبوبة الشعب ليست امراً مستغرباً لرجل مثله، يمتلك هذه المواصفات والامكانيات.. فوصفته المرجعية العليا بـ(صمام الامان)".

<http://www.xendan.org/drejaWtar.aspx?NusarID=79&Jmara=185>

تالەبانی بەرەنگاری نەخۆشیەکەیی بوو، وەك چۆن بەرەنگاری دوژمنەکانی بوو

عادل عەبدول مەهدی

عادل عەبدول مەهدی

له 17 ی کانوونی یەكەمی سالی 2012 داو نزیکی كاتژمێر 7:30 خولەکی ئیوارە سەرۆك پەيوەندی پێوە كردم، پاش ئەوەی چاوی كەوت بە نوری مالیکی، داوای لێكردم كە رۆژی دواتر چاوم پێی بكەوێت بۆ تاووتوێكردنی باسیکی گەنگ. پاشان رۆژی دواتر دكتور بەرھەم بەیانی زوو تەلەفونی بۆ كردم و پێی راگەیاند كە سەرۆك توشی جەلتەیی مێشك بوو و گوازاراوتەو بۆ نەخۆشخانە. چووم بۆ ئەو و بینیم كە سەرۆك بەتەواوی لە كۆمادایە. پاش كەمێك تێیكی پزیشکی ئێرانی و ئەلمانی هاتن، دواتریش وڵاتانی دیکە داوایانكرد كە تیمی پزیشکی بنێرن. له 20 ی هەمان مانگدا بڕیاردارا كە سەرۆك تالەبانی رەوانەیی ئەلمانیا بكەیت، تاوەكو چاو بە فایلی پزیشکی ئەودا بخشینرێتەو بەو پێیەیی پشتریش لەوێ چارەسەری بۆ ئەنجامداربوو كاتیك عەمار حەكیم سەردانی سەرۆکی كرد، سەری برده لای سەریەو و دەستێكرد بە خوێندنی ئەم ئایەتەیی قورئانی پیرۆز "واژا مرچت فهو یشفین.. والژی یمیتتی یم یحیی.. والژی اگمە ان یغفر لی خگینتی یوم الدین". كاتیكیش چاوم كەوت بە قوبادی كۆری، پێی ووتین "نێگەرەن مەین، باوكم بەهێزە و بەئاسانی خۆی بەدەستەو نادات". مام جەلال هەمیشە بەخێندە بوو و هاوشانی هەمووان وەستاوتەو، هیوام وایە خەدای گەرە پەرم بەم بەندەییە بکات، لای خۆیەو بواری پزیشکی سەردەم کاری خۆی كرد، وە خێزان و خانەوادەكەیی و خۆشەویستانی پالێستیکی گەرەیی بوون لەو ماوەیدا، هەر وەك سەرۆكیش بەرەنگاری نەخۆشیەكەیی بوو، وە خۆی بەدەستەو نەدا، تا ئەو كاتەیی بە ساغ و سەلامەتی گەراییەو لای كەسوكار و نیشتمانیەكەیی.

مام جەلال تێكۆشان و شۆرشەكەیی لە تەمەنیکی زومە دەستێنكرد، بۆیە پێی دەلێن "مام" لەبەر ئەوەی ووتە و كردەوێكەیی گەرە و بەنرخن. تالەبانی یەكێكە لە گەرە سەركردەو پێشواكان. لە هەمووانیش بە ئەزمونتر و ناسراوترە لەناوێو و دەروەیی وڵاتدا. ئەم پیاوێو وەك قەلایەك وایو لەبەردەم سەتم و داپلۆسیندا. كەسیکی گەشبین بوو لە كاتە دژوارەكاندا، هەرگیز مانای كۆلەندانی نەزانێو، بەرگریكاریکی بەتوانابوو لە مافی نەتەوێكەیی لە كوردستان و عێراقیشدا، بەزەبیری چەك و نامە و ووتارەكانی و رێكخستە بەهێزەكەیی. هەرگیز چۆك نادات و هیلاك نابێت، خۆی لەخۆیدا پڕۆژە و دامەزراوەیەكی تەواو.. زمانەكانی كوردی و عەرەبی و فارسی و ئینگلیزی و كەمێك تورکی و فەرنسێش دەزانیت، كەسیکی رۆشنبیرە، زۆرێك لە قورئانی پیرۆز و شیعری لەبەرە (بەتایبەت ئەوانەیی جەواھیری)، هەر وەك حەزی بە نوكتە و چیرۆك و بەسەرھاتەیی، خوێنەرێکی زۆر باشیشە. كەسیکی بەبەزەبی و دەست و دل باشە، هەرگیز داوا رەمت ناكاتەو، لەكاتی پێویستدا لێبوردەیی و لە تەنگەندا جەدبە. زۆر لێھاتووانە كۆنەرە و كۆبوونەوێكەیی بەرێو دەبات، جودا و لێكجایبوونەوێكەیی، تاوەكو بیانكاتە هاورا و هاودەنگ و یەكەریز. رۆلێکی سەرمەیی هەبوو لە پێشكەوتنی باسی

كوردى و عىراقىدا. ھەلبۇزاردىنېشى ۈك سەرۆك كۆمار و خوشەويستى گەلەكەى بۇى شىتىكى سەرسور ھىنەن نىيە، ھەموو ئەم خەسلەت و توانايانەى تىدايە.

پىرۇزىيى لە گەلى عىراق دەكەم بىيۆنەى گەرانەى سەرۆك كۆمارەو. پىرۇزىيى لە خانەوادەكەى لە كوردستان و برايانى يەككىتى نىشتىمانى دەكەم. ۈە ئەر ووشانە دەلىمەو كە لە شىعرەكەى جەواھىرىدا ھاتوۈە "باقى و اعمارۇ الگەاھ قصارۇ" ، واتە: "ماۋىت و تەمەنى دىكتاتورەكانىش كورتە"

نوسىنى: عادل عبدالمەدى  
ۈەرگىرانى: رەۋا مەحمود

## English Appendix (AE)

### AE.1

[http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/opinion/turkeys-leadership.html?\\_r=2&adxnnl=1&ref=opinion&adxnnlx=1346482876-LalzbdT+6mC3HtTbBrcgkA](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/opinion/turkeys-leadership.html?_r=2&adxnnl=1&ref=opinion&adxnnlx=1346482876-LalzbdT+6mC3HtTbBrcgkA)

New York Times

Editorial

Published: September 20, 2011

### Turkey's Leadership

The Arab Spring tour taken this month by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey demonstrated the good and the bad of *his increasingly confident leadership*.

The Muslim world needs *democratic role models*. On his visits to Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, the Turkish leader, who leads *the Islam-rooted Justice and Development Party*, made *a strong and very welcome case* that Islam and democracy are compatible. "Turkey is 99 percent Muslim, yet it is a democratic *secular* state where all religions are equal," he said in Tunisia where voters next month will elect their first constituent assembly since the ouster of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali.

But *Mr.* Erdogan's increasingly shrill denunciations of Israel are a danger to the region *as well as* to Turkey. During his visit to Egypt — where anti-Israeli protests have become violent — he called Israel "*the West's spoiled child*." He needs to stop playing for the applause lines and weigh the full consequences of his words.

There is a lot about Turkey that deserves to be emulated. Over the last nine years, *Mr.* Erdogan's party has unleashed the energies of Turkey's entrepreneurs, asserted civilian control of the once-dominant army and enacted human rights *reforms*. He also has a worrying authoritarian side and important choices to make *as Turkey moves to replace its army-drafted Constitution with one that is fully democratic*.

*Mr.* Erdogan is playing a particularly dangerous game with Israel. There is no question that dealing with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel can be frustrating. Turkey *downgraded* relations after Israel rejected a sound, American-mediated deal to close the book on Israel's ill-fated assault on a Gaza aid flotilla that killed eight Turks and one *Turkish-American*.

But *Mr.* Erdogan has dangerously upped the ante — and put the United States, a NATO ally, in a particularly difficult spot — with his threat to send warships into the Mediterranean Sea to escort Turkish shipping. If both sides aren't careful, things could spiral out of control. At a minimum, *Mr.* Erdogan is risking *his country's substantial trade with Israel*.

President Obama has worked hard to cultivate *Mr.* Erdogan but hasn't spared the tough talk in private, including about the Turkish leader's previous efforts to cozy up to Iran. And *Mr.* Erdogan has recently agreed to station *radar* in Turkey *as part of NATO's American-designed missile defense system* to protect the region from Iran. *Mr.* Obama also privately urged him to cut ties with President Bashar al-Assad of Syria. *Mr.* Erdogan has said he no longer believes in *Mr.* Assad. He now needs to use Turkey's economic leverage and impose sanctions on *Mr.* Assad and his cronies.

As the chief of a major Muslim democracy, *Mr. Erdogan can legitimately claim a leadership role*. He needs to do so responsibly.

### AE.2



[http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/is-iraq-the-model-for-the-mideast-after-all/2011/10/06/gIOPaZeYL\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/is-iraq-the-model-for-the-mideast-after-all/2011/10/06/gIOPaZeYL_story.html)

The Washington Post  
Jackson Diehl  
Deputy Editorial Page Editor  
By Jackson Diehl, Published: October 10, 2011

## Is Iraq the *model* for the Mideast after all?

In Syria, *elite army units* are *bloodily* assaulting a now-armed resistance. *Supporters of dictator Bashar al-Assad* are being picked off in targeted assassinations while *opposition* activists are tortured to death. Western countries stand fecklessly by as Russia and China veto action by the U.N. Security Council. At least 2,900 dead have been counted — and the carnage may be just getting started.

I could write a column about all of this. But I'd like to propose, instead, that we think again about the war in Iraq.

With U.S. troops less than three months away from withdrawal, *that mission* is now generally regarded in Washington as, at best, a waste of American lives and resources, and at worst a monumental folly — and that's among the Republican presidential *candidates*. But the misnamed Arab Spring, which has turned from a euphoric winter in Tunisia and Egypt to a savage summer in Libya, Yemen and Syria, casts Iraq in a different light.

It turns out that *the end of autocracy in the Arab Middle East*, unlike in Central Europe or Asia, will not happen peacefully. People power isn't working. Dictators such as Assad, Moammar Gaddafi and Yemen's Ali Abdullah Saleh, backed by mountains of weapons and armies bound to them by tribe or sect, prefer to fight to the death rather than quietly yield. Despite seeing Hosni Mubarak in his courtroom cage — or maybe because of it — they don't shrink from crimes against humanity.

The *carnage* might be seen as regrettable but acceptable if the bad guys were losing. But with the notable exception of Gaddafi, they are not. Assad has been written off by most of the West's intelligence services, but his tanks and artillery are proving more than a match for the ragtag groups of army defectors in towns such as Homs and Rastan. Saleh was nearly killed by a bomb, but on his return after three months in a Saudi hospital, forces commanded by his son still held the presidential palace in Sanaa.

Gaddafi, of course, is losing, though still at large — thanks to the military intervention by NATO. When *the air campaign began* last spring, he was on the verge of massacring the opposition in the rebel stronghold of Benghazi. *Western planes and drones* proved just enough to tip the *balance* against him. But Libya was the limit for the Obama administration, Britain and France: There will be no such *operation* in Syria or Yemen, goes the constant refrain.

This means that the bloodshed in those countries could drag on indefinitely, and grow steadily worse. Tribal war, and the anarchy of nearby Somalia, beckons for Yemen. In Syria we could see, at worst, a repeat of the history of Lebanon: sectarian war, interspersed with interventions by neighbors and transnational operations by terrorists.

This brings us back to Iraq. As *former Bush administration strategist Meghan O'Sullivan* recently wrote in The Post, Iraq has fallen well short of both American and Iraqi expectations. The pain and cost of that war are some of the reasons the United States and its allies have sworn off intervention in Syria and why the Obama administration made a half-hearted effort in Libya.

Iraq, however, looks a lot like what Syria, and much of the rest of the Arab Middle East, might hope to be. Its vicious dictator and his family are gone, as is the rule by a sectarian minority that required perpetual repression. *The quasi-civil war* that raged five years ago is dormant, and Iraq's multiple sects manage their differences through democratic votes and sometimes excruciating but workable negotiations. *Though spectacular attacks still win headlines*, fewer people have died violently this year in Iraq than in *Mexico* — or Syria.

Just as significantly, Iraq remains an ally of the United States, an enemy of al-Qaeda and a force for

relative good in the Middle East. It is buying \$12 billion in U.S. weapons and has requested that an American training force remain in the country next year. It recently helped get two U.S. citizens out of prison in Iran.

All of this happened because the United States invaded the country. Saddam Hussein demonstrated how he could handle a homegrown, Arab Spring-style rebellion when he used helicopter gunships to slaughter masses of Shiites in 1991. Even had his regime somehow crumbled, without the presence of U.S. troops nothing would have stopped Iraq from spiralling into the bottomless sectarian conflict that now threatens Syria.

The Arab Spring, in short, is making the invasion of Iraq look more worthy — and necessary — than it did a year ago. Before another year has passed, Syrians may well find themselves wishing that it had happened to them.

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### AE.3

[http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/averting-a-civil-war-in-syria/2011/09/27/gIQA0Qoy2K\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/averting-a-civil-war-in-syria/2011/09/27/gIQA0Qoy2K_story.html)

The Washington Post

By Editorial

Published: September 28, 2011

### Averting a civil war in Syria

FOR MONTHS the United States and its allies have grappled with *how to respond* to a mass movement of peaceful protests in Syria and *the government's despicably* violent response to them. *Too slowly*, the Obama administration has moved from urging *dictator* Bashar al-Assad to implement reforms to imposing sanctions and calling for him to step down, while seemingly embracing a strategy of “leading from behind.” Now it appears the administration and other outside powers could soon be faced with a very different situation: war between *Mr.* Assad's dwindling forces and a *rebel army* made up of military defectors and volunteers. That would require a stronger, quicker and more forward-leading U.S. response.

A number of news reports in the past week have cited diplomats and Syrian sources as saying that armed resistance to *Mr.* Assad's assaults on the population has begun to appear — including in the central towns of Homs and Rastan (where heavy fighting was reported Tuesday) and near the Turkish and Iraqi borders. The New York Times quoted an unnamed U.S. official as estimating there had been 10,000 defections from the *Army and security forces*, and that several hundred of these had joined one of two rival movements — the Free Syrian Army and Free Officers Movement.

*The appearance of such forces is not to be welcomed*, even by those hoping for an end to the Assad regime. Violence will push extremists to the forefront, justify even more brutal repression by the government and possibly transform what has been a broad *pro-democracy movement* into a sectarian war. Fighting could spread to Syria's neighbors, including Lebanon and Iraq, and invite intervention — covert or otherwise — by outside powers, beginning with Iran. But as a State Department spokesman pointed out Monday, the incipient rebel movements are an inevitable “act of self-preservation” against “a regime that continue[s] to use violence against innocent, peaceful demonstrators.”

*The administration is right* to hold *Mr.* Assad responsible for provoking civil war, but the question is what can be done about it. There are some obvious first steps, including urging the organized Syrian *opposition*, which recently formed a national council, to reject violence at an upcoming meeting in Istanbul. Syria's neighbors should seek to choke off arms supplies to the regime — as Turkey is doing. Some fighting might be averted if safe zones for Syrians fleeing government persecution were established along the borders, either with Turkey or Iraq.

In the end, the only way to avert a Syrian civil war may be for **Mr.** Assad's regime to collapse. Having ruled out armed intervention of its own, the outside world can't force this outcome; but the United States could drop its back-seat approach and lead a more aggressive effort to raise the pressure on **Mr.** Assad. The administration can press Russia, China and **the Arab League** to endorse tougher sanctions, and urge Turkey to break with the regime and provide protection for refugees. It would be far easier for the United States to act energetically now than to deal with the crisis that a real civil war would create.

<http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/ByaniArticleDetail.aspx?id=1230>

#### AE.4

<http://www.metrowestdailynews.com/opinions/editorials/x633533894/Editorial-Obama-needs-to-speak-out-on-Syria>

The Metro Daily star

Aug. 13, 2011 at 12:01 AM

**Editorial: Obama needs to speak out on Syria**

Read more: <http://www.metrowestdailynews.com/opinions/editorials/x633533894/Editorial-Obama-needs-to-speak-out-on-Syria#ixzz25FNEuZnl>

As they have almost every Friday since March, following weekly prayers, Syrians poured out of their mosques and into the streets, calling for a litany of reforms in their repressive government.

Just as predictably, Syrian security forces went after the demonstrators with clubs, tear gas and **gunfire**. It is estimated that over 700 civilians have been killed in so-far-futile efforts to end the protests, with the crowds' specific grievances becoming crystallized into just one: Syrian President Bashar Assad has to go.

His brutal tactics against his own people, despite protests from his neighbors and **the Arab League**, have **basically** forfeited his claim to rule. He may quell this protest, as the family during 40 years of rule has suppressed other protests, but there will be another and another until he finally goes. It would be better for the country and save much **bloodshed** if he left now.

Conspicuously absent from the calls for Assad's departure is the Obama administration. The White House, probably goaded by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, edges ever closer to it, but in such a nuanced way that it could lead the Syrian government to believe that President Barack Obama is not **serious** about Assad stepping down.

At the end of the week, the White House came the closest yet, with spokesman Jay Carney saying what has been self-evident for the past five months, that Syria "would be a much better place without him."

Carney told reporters on Air Force One: "We believe that President Assad's **opportunity** to lead the transition has passed." Assad, aside from empty promises about **reform** that he has made before and then quickly abandoned once the crisis has passed, has made it clear that there is not going to be a transition. Obama should unambiguously demand that Assad step down and for his own safety go into exile.

#### AE.5

<http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2011/Oct-07/150629-no-syria-wont-plunge-iraq-into-war.ashx#axzz1aOYvjSc0>

The Daily Star/ Commentary

October 07, 2011 12:48 AM

By Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi

**No Syria Wont Plunge Iraq into War**

Read more: <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2011/Oct-07/150629-no-syria-wont-plunge-iraq-into-war.ashx#ixzz259cTFwxc>

The Iraqi government recently reversed its support for Syrian President Bashar Assad amid the ongoing unrest in Syria, **and is now calling on Assad to step down**. However, it is true that many Iraqi Shiites **deeply fear** the possible consequences of **an overthrow of the Alawite-dominated regime in Damascus**.

Specifically, the Shiites' concern is that hard-line Sunnis might come to power **next door** and embolden Iraqi Sunnis, reigniting sectarian violence and civil war in Iraq. As one anonymous, senior Iraqi Shiite politician put it to Reuters: "Change in Syria will cause major problems for Iraq. **They [Sunnis] will incite the western [Sunni] part of Iraq.**" **However, are these anxieties justified?**

In a word: No. To understand why, it is necessary to examine the question of what was primarily responsible for the dramatic drop in violence in Iraq from 2007 onward.

The prevailing orthodoxy affirms that the increase in the number of U.S. troops and **the introduction of a counter-insurgency strategy** as part of **the "surge"** were the key factors behind the weakening of Al-Qaeda and the Sunni turn against the militant group. However, **such reasoning imputes too much game-changing power to the American military** and belittles the importance of local Iraqi **actors** and **factors**. In fact, Sunni insurgents began to turn against hard-line militants because by late 2006 they had realized that they were losing the sectarian civil war in and **around Baghdad** against Shiite **militias**. At the time these were protected by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

It is a truism that a key reason for the swelling of the ranks of the Sunni insurgency after 2003 was the de facto transformation of the de-Baathification process into a "de-Sunnification" process. This was most flagrant in the disbanding of the old, Sunni-dominated Iraqi military by L. Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority. In hindsight, it is easy to point the finger solely at Bremer for this grave mistake. Yet as **The Independent journalist Patrick Cockburn has noted, Bremer was backed and encouraged in his decision by Shiite and Kurdish politicians who were eager to fill the ranks of the new Iraqi security forces with their own militiamen.**

Nevertheless, de-Sunnification alone cannot account for the manner in which the Sunni insurgency gained recruits and strength. In any war, no side commences hostilities if it does not feel that there is a good **chance** of defeating the enemy. In this case, a key premise behind the insurgency was that the Sunnis were in the majority and could thus either subdue or wipe out Shiites in a sectarian civil war.

The "Sunni-majority" delusion was well illustrated prior to the invasion, when Sunni Arabs frequently accused outside **demographers** of under-representing their numbers. Those accusations were not mere rhetoric. The propagation of this false perception among Sunnis was partly the result of propaganda put out by Saddam Hussein's regime, and partly the consequence of a sense of disconnect from the majority Shiite population, created by 70 years of Sunni minority rule.

**Having launched repeated attacks on the Shiites, causing large numbers of casualties, the Sunni insurgency was able to provoke the Shiite militias into retaliation.** This gave rise to a full-blown sectarian civil war in 2006 centered on Baghdad. The main aim of both sides was to seize control of the mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods in the capital and cleanse them of the rival sect.

Owing to numerical advantage and backing from the central government, the **Shiite militias** largely succeeded in clearing the mixed neighborhoods of Sunnis. This forced the Sunni insurgents to retreat into the few remaining Sunni-majority strongholds of the city, such as Yarmuk, or flee the country to Jordan and Syria. In the latter two countries, Nir Rosen, an investigative journalist and **reporter**, interviewed numerous Sunni insurgent leaders who admitted that they had lost the battle against the **Shiite militias** in Baghdad.

Hence, the sectarian civil war subsided throughout 2007 and 2008 for the same reason wars generally end: namely, one side had mostly lost its will to fight. Fearing further losses at the hands of **the Shiite militias** and the central government, large numbers of Sunnis realized, at around the time the surge began, that the only feasible option was to cooperate with coalition troops and Iraqi security forces against the likes of Al-Qaeda. This led to the rapid strengthening of the Anbar Awakening and the birth of the Sons of Iraq movement.

Maliki would go on to reel in the **Shiite militias**, such as Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army. The prime minister realized that the remaining Sunni insurgency posed no existential threat to his government, opening the way for him to consolidate his power base by cracking down on Shiite militants based in the south and around Baghdad.

The risk of another sectarian civil war in Iraq on account of turmoil in Syria is very low indeed. Having witnessed the disastrous outcome for Sunnis of the sectarian civil war in 2006, the Sunni Arabs of Iraq generally appreciate that they cannot afford to take on Shiites in another conflict. For most of those in the

community, the concern is not to return to minority rule. It is to survive and adapt to the reality that Iraq's Shiite majority is leading the country's political process.

Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and an intern at the Middle East Forum. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR. A version of this article appeared in the print edition of The Daily Star on October 07, 2011, on page 7.

## AE.6

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkish-pm-sets-out-on-mission-to-become-leader-of-arab-world-2353684.html>

The Independent

BY PATRICK COCKBURN

TUESDAY 13 SEPTEMBER 2011

### **Turkish PM sets out on mission to become leader of Arab world Erdogan tours revolutionary countries as he looks *to build power***

BY PATRICK COCKBURN TUESDAY 13 SEPTEMBER 2011

The Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan, arrived in Egypt yesterday at the start of a three-nation tour as Turkey toughens its stance towards Israel and seeks to become the predominant power among Muslim states in the Middle East and North Africa.

After Egypt, **Mr** Erdogan will visit Tunisia and Libya to show Turkey's support for both countries after the overthrow of long-standing police states in the Arab Spring. Turkey's strong, democratic and mildly Islamic regime makes it a *model* for new governments in all three countries.

**Mr** Erdogan's assertive and critical attitude towards Israel, until recently a close ally of Turkey, makes him attractive to the Arab world. In Cairo, the burning down of the Israeli embassy last weekend was the latest incident marking the hostility *at street level* between post-Mubarak Egyptians and Israel.

At the same time, the perception among Arab states that President Barack Obama has failed to help the Palestinians, while lending Israel his total support, has diminished US popularity and influence in the region.

**Mr** Erdogan said in an interview before leaving for Cairo that he had seen "grounds for war" against Israel last year after nine Turks had been killed by Israeli *commandos* on the Turkish aid ship Mavi Marmara bound for Gaza, but had "decided to act with patience". He hinted that in future the Turkish navy would protect any Turkish aid flotilla going to Gaza.

"Turkey will get most of what it wants if it does not overplay its hand," said one *commentator*. Turkey has already imposed sanctions on Israel in retaliation for the aid-boat raid, but according to his aides **Mr** Erdogan appears to have abandoned, for the moment, his declared long-term intention to visit Gaza.

Turkey has benefited from the Arab Spring because it is likely to be in tune with new democratic governments, even when it had good relations with their predecessors.

The country can also move to fill a vacuum since most of the more powerful Arab states, such as Egypt and Syria, are weaker than they were before their governments were overthrown. Iraq has never recovered from *the rule of Saddam Hussein* and the violence that followed.

In sharp contrast to Iran, Turkey has few *serious enemies*. It has sought to mediate over Iran's nuclear programme between *the Iranian government*, which it regards with suspicion, and the US and Europeans. The two countries also have a common foe in the shape of festering Kurdish insurgencies which engage in persistent guerrilla attacks. An attack by Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) guerrillas in Hakkani Province in eastern Turkey overnight killed five people, including two security men.

The PKK has killed about 50 Turkish security personnel in recent weeks since it ended its ceasefire earlier in the year. Although **Mr** Erdogan has brought the Turkish army under civilian control, his government does not want to look weak in any confrontation with the PKK.

It is putting pressure on the Iraqi Kurdish President, Massoud Barzani, **to isolate the PKK from its mountain strongholds inside Iraq**. **Mr Barzani**, who would like Turkey as a counter-balance to Baghdad, has demanded in recent days that the PKK and the Kurdish guerrilla movement in Iran give up armed resistance.

Turkey has been playing an increasingly influential role in Iraqi politics because it is able to mediate between different parties, sects and ethnic groups. It also plays a growing commercial role: Turkish companies have even won **contracts** to collect the rubbish in Baghdad and Basra.

In Syria, **Mr** Erdogan has criticised President Bashar al-Assad's repression of protests, probably calculating that his regime is not going to survive, at least in its present form. Similarly in Libya, Turkey was at first slow to break with **Colonel** Muammar Gaddafi, but when it did so, it advanced \$300m to the **rebels** at a time when they were short of money. Turkey was heavily involved in construction in Libya.

Overall, the isolation of Israel, the democratic uprisings in the Arab world, the weakness of the Arab states, and the diminished strength of the US in the region have all worked to Turkey's advantage.

Its influence is growing throughout the region but it is a long way from being in control of events.

## AE.7

[http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\\_East/MID-04-170613.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MID-04-170613.html)

Asia Times 17/06/2013

By Derek Monroe

### Family rule taints Kurdistan's rise

A haze hangs low over the city of Erbil. Automotive exhaust and dry sand envelop the area, forming an opaque mixture that sunshine struggles to penetrate. The capital of northern Iraq's Kurdistan Autonomous Region, Erbil operates as a de facto independent state, with its own legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Its soldiers wear their uniforms with pride, sporting a tricolor symbol of their country sewn on to them. Meanwhile, Erbil has total control of its external and internal regional borders, just as any sovereign state would.

As a result, Erbil is separate from Iraq, and from that country's contentious and often deadly politics in Baghdad. "Separation is a **necessary** step, as our representatives have only 90 seats in Iraq's parliament [out of 700 plus]. Thus we have absolutely no voice in what is going on," said Abdullah, who owns a travel agency in downtown Erbil. "They often say we will give you money for this and this, but we want you to do this and that," he added. "We, the Kurds, find this unacceptable, as so many people have died so things will not be the same as before anymore."

The sentiment Abdullah expresses prevails among Kurds who are now, for the first time in history, living in a state they can call their own. As the newest petro-state, Kurdistan has enjoyed an unprecedented level of political and economic stability since the end of the first Gulf War in 1991. And for the first time, the Iraqi Kurds' economic fortunes are on an upward trend, especially in comparison with their co-patriots in neighboring countries, as a sea of oil revenue has lifted most economic boats.

Yet not all is well in Kurdistan, due in part to the dominant presence of one ruling family. **Descended** from a political dynasty that has built a power base over centuries of fighting, regional president Massoud Barzani has blossomed into an authoritarian ruler not unlike many whose **regimes** are now crumbling from the internal pressures of the Arab Spring.

#### Organized corruption

Throughout Erbil, portraits of Barzani adorn the walls of offices and shops. That is not to say that Barzani's cult of personality is as force-fed as Saddam Hussein's often was in Iraq. The Barzani clan has tremendous popularity in the area of **its political base** in northern Iraq, and people feel a **genuine reverence** for Massoud, whose father led uprisings against Hussein in the 1960s and 1970s.

However, the cracks in the family's image are accentuated by **political dissent**, and the official story of the ruling Kurdish Democratic Party's (KDP) road to power has often been challenged. "The people were the



ones who first fought in the city and defeated Hussein's troops in 1991's revolution," said Adar, who runs a small hotel downtown. "The Peshmerga [*militia*] came down two days later from the mountains after it was all over and claimed the power. This is the truth that many people in *Erbil* are afraid to speak of," he said.

The fear to speak out is real, as KDP has both *limited tolerance* for criticism and a long memory. In December 2005, Kamal Qadir, an Austrian *scholar*, was arrested and sentenced to 30 years in prison for a series of articles criticizing the Barzanis' hold on the economy and power. He was released a year later after prolonged action to free him by *Amnesty International* and the Austrian government.

*However*, Kurdish journalists Soran Mama Hama and Sardasht Osman were not so lucky; they were gunned down for writing about corruption by the political class and local governments. Demands for thorough and transparent investigations were met by Kurdish authorities maneuvering to blame others for the deaths; to this day both cases remain unsolved. Even a brief expression of criticism toward the Barzanis, such as one anonymous caller's comments on a television call-in program, resulted in a bombing of the studio the very next day. As usual, the perpetrators were never found.

One of the most sensitive subjects is the Barzanis' involvement in the economy of the newly rich oil state. While Massoud Barzani's personal wealth is estimated to be in the range of US\$2 billion, the exact amount of the family's involvement is unknown due to Kurdistan's murky legal environment and a web of offshore cross-ownership entities. While the Barzanis often repudiate any reporting that follows the trail of money, such as a 2010 exposure by the newspaper *Rozhnama* that accused them of benefiting from illegal oil smuggling, the personal behavior of some family members leads to more questions than answers.

For example, in 2012, Mansur Barzani, the son of Massoud, **lost over \$3.2 million in a Dubai casino** during the elder Barzani's *official* state visit. Meanwhile the other son, Masrour, **purchased a \$10 million home in the US state of Virginia**. Officially, they were both living on *modest* government salaries - with Masrour heading the security and intelligence services, which are not shy to use deadly force to squash *protests* they find *intolerable*, as was demonstrated in 2011 in Erbil, *Halabja*, and Sulaymaniyah.

The family's influence permeates the ruling class through a steady supply of official perks and status symbols. The symbol of the KDP *elite* has become a fleet of white sport utility vehicles that ply the pot-holed streets of Erbil at high speeds, unconcerned about pedestrians or other vehicles. Official and unofficial oil revenues streaming into governmental and party coffers compound a growing resentment over widespread corruption and mismanagement.

Signs of extreme poverty compete with these images of imported luxury goods. The contrast is easily visible at the grand bazaar in front of Erbil's famous citadel. Women carrying small children sell chewing gum to passersby in order to retain what remains of their dignity. "Life is very hard here," said a woman holding a toddler. She declined to give her name as she approached me. "You wouldn't know it because you are not from here. But believe me, every day of my life is bitter."

The KDP and its historical *rival*, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have created interlocking *mechanisms* of power distribution and execution that put both of them in the driver's seat at the same time. The balance is often altered slightly in favor of one or the other party, depending on the individual at the helm. In the Barzani *clan's* case, the money trail reinforces ancient *tribal* allegiances and connections, making a de-facto "democratic" Barzani dynasty possible.

The dysfunction of organized corruption is most visible in economic sphere. "The Barzanis and [**current Iraqi President Jalal**] Talabani's PUK own most of the lucrative *businesses* in Kurdistan. Mobile phones, big shopping **malls**, non-transparent oil deals. No one exactly knows where the oil income goes," said Ari, editor of Austria-based publication *E Kurd.net*. The degree of rapacity at the expense of the public interest is often taken to grotesque proportions. ***In one example, a party-dominated cell phone company made huge profits by charging enormous sums for SIM cards, even when cell phone reception didn't work.***

### A state of *schizophrenia*

Large amounts of petro-dollars coming into the economy are increasingly resulting not only in a growing divide between rich and poor, but also a national state of *schizophrenia* with curious contradictions. "Having a look at the hospitals and their services, which are very poor, one cannot help but say 'where does the oil income go?'" said Ari. "Despite exporting over 150,000 barrels per day, Kurdistan is still importing over 80% of the fuel it needs from Iraq, Iran, and Turkey."

The Barzanis tout break-neck land development and new construction as a monument to Kurdish independence, with new **malls**, shops, public buildings, and homes popping up everywhere. The mass construction along the "100-Meter" ring road in Erbil is creating a Nevada-like environment of gated hamlets for educated elites and expatriate foreigners. It is widely understood that any major building project has to have some type of business connection with the Barzanis, who are pivotal to the permitting process. Their involvement decides whether the construction will be a commercial success or an utter failure.

The rapid construction of this new Kurdistan results in architectural curiosities. The micro-climate of the West is often replicated in mass real estate offerings that have nothing to do with social and economic realities on the ground. Colonies like Royal City, English Village, American Village, and others, along with the wholesale import of fast-food restaurants, have absolutely nothing to do with local culture or people. This disconnect also extends to parts of government. For example, the foreign affairs office is conveniently located next to a foreign settlement called Italian City, thus making the trip downtown to witness the uncomfortable truth unnecessary.

According to the 2012 report on Erbil from Associates for International Research, Inc, "The distance from the center to the outermost ring [100m Street] is approximately 2.5 miles [four kilometers]. However, there is little need for expatriates to venture into the center of town, since most expatriate shopping outlets and housing compounds are located along or near 100m Street, or the outer ring. The Ainkawa neighborhood, or Christian quarter, is located in the north of the city."

As one Western NGO worker who preferred to remain anonymous commented, "This is the effect of globalization, parachuted by nuts and bolts into Iraq, and is as magical as Walt Disney's or Universal Studios' version of life in that part of the world. All that is missing is Ali Baba and The 40 Thieves, but even this can be arranged."

Many Kurds sigh in resignation that this is a symbol of the Barzanis' rule and expect it to continue without interruption. This is one possibility, but others are harder to predict.

A member of parliament in Iraq's ruling party recently accused the Kurds of seeking to partition Iraq along ethnic lines and warned that the government in Baghdad would not tolerate it. Many Kurds are increasingly seeing themselves as caught between a rock (their government) and a hard place (Baghdad). "Prime Minister [Nuri al-] Maliki is a little Saddam. He will not stop in getting all of Iraq's lands together as before. He will also come here, but he knows that Kurds will fight hard. We have no other choice," said Adar, who works at the grand bazaar in the center of Erbil.

It would be a stretch to think that Western governments remain unaware of Kurdistan's power dynamics. Many of them have consulates in Erbil, where developments are constantly being monitored and reported on. Yet the race to profit from oil and tap a growing consumer market pushes other considerations - such as human rights and the application of democratic principles - into not even the backseat, but as far back as the trunk of a speeding car with Kurdish license plates. The ultimate tolls on this highway to prosperity will be paid not by the driver but by its passengers, the Kurds, with growing evidence that the final destination is different from what had been advertised.

Derek Monroe is a contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus.



(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus.)

## AE.8

[http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/emre-uslu/corrupt-politics\\_334346.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/emre-uslu/corrupt-politics_334346.html)

Today Zaman

By EMRE USLU

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December 18, 2013, Wednesday

### Corrupt politics

A decade ago the **Justice and Development Party (AKP)** government came to power largely because people were fed up with the corruption in the country.

In fact, back in 2002 the **AKP** officials promised people that they would fight against three things: corruption, restrictions on freedom, and poverty (yolsuzluk, yasaklar, yoksulluk). People largely voted for the **AKP** because they thought that the *party* would root out corruption.

For the first few years, the **AKP** government took effective measures to end corruption in low-level state *offices*. Ten years ago it was a very common for traffic police to be heavily involved in corruption. Many low-ranking officers were taking bribes, etc.

What the **AKP** government achieved was ending the visible corruption among the lower ranking officers. Because of this success, many people thought that the **AKP** government was successfully fighting against corruption.

However, those who deal with government officials in higher-ranking positions knew that corruption was still continuing and even worsened.

The police *operation* against the relatives of some ministers and high-ranking public officials proved that the **AKP** government did not keep its promise to fight corruption.

One could posit three major impacts of the *operation*.

First, it will be a big blow for the **AKP** government in the eyes of its constituencies. It has tarnished the *positive* image of the **AKP** ministers and the government. From now on, no conservative will be able to defend their party by arguing that this government ended corruption in the country.

Given that these officials are known for their piety, conservatives won't easily forgive such behavior. Thus, one could imagine that the **AKP** government will lose some votes in the upcoming election.

Internationally, the *operation* revealed that Turkey has become one of Iran's money-laundering stations. As the West was trying to tighten international sanctions against Iran, a state-owned bank was used to get around the sanctions. It has been claimed that a hundred billion dollars of Iranian money was laundered in Turkey and pumped into the world market, which if true would be a big blow for Turkey's international image.

Economically, the *operation* will harm the construction sector, a leading sector of the Turkish economy. If in fact it is proven that well-known businessman are part of the circle of corruption, the construction companies will take a severe hit. That would seriously harm the government, too.

The deepest impact of this *operation* is the social impact. At least 50 percent of the people in some way trusted this government, for various reasons. One of the most important was religion. When they realize that this government isn't so different from the old regimes, they will lose their faith in religious people, civilian politics and *Turkey as a country*.

It has been claimed that there is a video footage of a minister taking a bribe of \$1.5 million. Once it is proved that a minister, a so-called respectable man, took a bribe, this country will be pulled down to the level Third World countries in Latin America and Africa. Will the government easily overcome this shock?

No, not very easily. By firing five police captains conducting the *operation*, the government tried to bury this case as quickly as possible and make the public forget about it. The information that has been shared with the public is so dramatic, however, that it won't be put out of their minds so easily.

Who will be able to forget the image of a minister taking a bribe of \$1.5 million?

## AE.9

<http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/baghdad-erbil-crisis-kr-g-financial-oil.html#>

Al-Monitor

Denise Natali is a columnist

February 28, 2014- Al Monitor

### **Iraqi oil dispute reveals KRG vulnerability**

The ongoing tit for tat between Baghdad and Erbil over oil-export rights and revenues has escalated over the past two weeks, leading to the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) most *serious* banking crisis since 1991. In the absence of an agreement, Baghdad has withheld part of the KRG's revenues, resulting in non-payment of some civil servant salaries for two to three months, including the Peshmerga forces and the Oil Protection Force that guards international oil company (IOC) installations. KRG President Massoud Barzani has responded harshly by equating Baghdad's actions to a "declaration of war on the people of Kurdistan" while claiming the ability to pay salaries from KRG funds

Despite employing nationalist rhetoric, staging anti-Maliki protests, blaming the United States for a lack of support and pressing IOCs for payments, the KRG's efforts to leverage Baghdad and independently export oil remain ineffective. Alongside ongoing legal, political and *technical* obstacles, the KRG's key ally and energy partner, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is facing his own domestic crisis and an uncertain political future. In the absence of a legal transit route or viable *alternative* revenue source, and with mounting criticism by local populations and investor confidence to sustain, Erbil will be hard-pressed to compromise with Baghdad. If not, the landlocked region risks undermining the economic and political gains it has made thus far while leaving its population and key institutions vulnerable to social, political and financial instability.

Until now, few believed that Baghdad would go so far as to withhold the KRG budget as a *retaliatory* measure. Although the Iraqi government and KRG have been disputing payments since 2005, the KRG has continued to receive its expanding annual budget from Baghdad. In 2013, the region was allocated about \$13 billion to administer three provinces, relatively more than other oil-producing provinces in Iraq. Nor did Baghdad effectively thwart the KRG's energy sector development. Its "blacklist" against IOCs working in the Kurdistan Region has hardly deterred oil majors from signing contracts with the KRG and exploiting hydrocarbons.

It was only when the KRG crossed Baghdad's red line by attempting to circumvent state sovereignty and export oil unofficially to Turkey that Iraqi officials fully utilized their revenue card. The current crisis also imploded in response to Baghdad's 2014 draft budget, competing claims by other oil-producing provinces for greater decentralization and revenues and the KRG's opaque financial demands. It has now become part of campaign politics as both Barzani and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki use the oil and budget issues to affirm their authority and nationalist credentials and cut the best deal possible before the April elections.

Indeed, the crisis has heightened criticism by Kurds of the Iraqi government. Many blame Maliki for withholding revenues, arguing that the Kurds are victims of Baghdad once again. Yet local populations also argue that the crisis is due to in part to the KRG's mismanagement of funds and lack of transparency

in financial affairs. One parliamentarian from the Gorran movement stated that as the KRG has been selling oil for years, it should be able to pay six months of salaries based on its oil revenues. Similarly, the head of the Kurdistan Central Bank, Edehem Karim Derwish, stated that the crisis is not simply an issue of Baghdad refusing to send money to the KRG. Rather, Baghdad is withholding cash flows to Erbil because the KRG is withholding clear information regarding its oil shipments and revenues. Worse still, the KRG has made no plans for financial emergencies. While Baghdad has \$80 million in reserves in its state banks, the public banks in the Kurdistan Region have nothing.

The crisis has also spilled over into the KRG's energy sector, particularly as it relates to security *operations* and the Oil Protection Force. The KRG's Ministry of Natural Resources has indicated that KRG security forces remain proactive in defending the region and there is no discussion of the protection force leaving its posts; however, it has warned IOCs to remain vigilant at rig sites. The ministry has also given IOCs the option of (re-) hiring their own private security guards — a retrenchment from a 2011 edict demanding all IOCs release most of their international security personnel and employ only the KRG's Oil Protection Force.

Securing revenues also has created tensions between the Ministry of Natural Resources and some IOCs. According to a *local Western oil company* representative, the ministry is pressing IOCs to pay their outstanding Oil Protection Force bills by March 1, 2014. In a recent meeting with IOCs to discuss the financial crisis, Minister of Natural Resources Ashti Hawrami criticized those IOCs — including key oil majors — for not paying their protection force bills and indicated that nonpayment would not be tolerated. Thus far, only about 5-10% of IOCs have currently paid, and the total payments could be about \$150 million.

Some KRG officials and individuals have stated their intentions to use additional cards to pressure the Iraqi government. They initially threatened to obstruct parliamentary politics in Baghdad, decrease water supplies to Arab farmers from KRG dams, block Kirkuk oil from being transported to Turkey and declare independence. Baghdad immediately responded by threatening to close the airspace in the Kurdistan Region, blocking all flights to and from Erbil and Sulaimaniyah.

Despite these tactics and threats, it seems likely — or imperative — that both sides will negotiate an agreement before the election — although it would be a short-term deal at best. Even then, the crisis has reinforced the vulnerability of the KRG and its dependence on Baghdad. With over 60% of the population dependent on the KRG for salaries and even more on social welfare benefits, and a government still unformed nearly six months after regional elections, the KRG may have to rethink its energy, political and financial strategies moving forward. One essential step is to create *transparent* institutions to manage the region's energy wealth, particularly a sovereign wealth fund for future generations. Failure to do so will have greater repercussions on local populations, economic and energy sector development and domestic stability.

Read more: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/baghdad-erbil-crisis-krg-financial-oil.html##ixzz3H51YsBsT>

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## AE.10

[http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/isis-recruits-kurdish-youth-creating-a-potential-new-risk-in-a-peaceful-part-of-iraq/2014/06/23/2961ea2e-defd-4123-8e31-c908f583c5de\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/isis-recruits-kurdish-youth-creating-a-potential-new-risk-in-a-peaceful-part-of-iraq/2014/06/23/2961ea2e-defd-4123-8e31-c908f583c5de_story.html)

The Washington Post

By Abigail Hauslohner June 24 2014

### ISIS recruits Kurdish youths, creating a potential new risk in a peaceful part of Iraq

HALABJA, Iraq — This town near the Iranian border has long been a *symbol* of Kurdish resistance, and it is best known as the site of a gruesome chemical-weapons attack by Saddam Hussein in 1988.

These days, residents say, it is increasingly known for something else — although few want to talk about

Kurdish authorities say a small contingent of Kurdish youths — around 150 in all, about a third of whom are from Halabja — has in recent months joined *the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria* (ISIS), which has seized a vast swath of Iraqi territory.

The young men's allegiance to the extremist *militant* group represents a potential danger for the Kurds, **who share the jihadists' resentment of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Shiite-dominated government but are wary of the extremists now massed on the edge of their territory.** The Kurds have hoped to keep their largely autonomous region in northern Iraq from being entangled in the country's increasingly bloody conflict.

Some Kurdish intelligence officials fear that with ISIS's gains, more local youths will join the *jihadists* and that the *radical* ideology could creep beyond Arab Iraq and into Iraqi Kurdistan, which has so far remained an *oasis* of calm and order.

The presence of Kurdish fighters in the extremist *militant* group highlights how effectively ISIS's *recruitment* efforts are reaching disenfranchised youths across Iraq's ethnic divide. **Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims, like the insurgents, but have their own language and culture.**

A top local intelligence official in Halabja, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the news media, said ISIS is already operating "cells" inside the town, appealing to bored and underemployed young people to join their fight.

Most of the 52 local men and boys who have left Halabja in the past year and a half to fight in Syria have been recruited by ISIS, he said.

One local man, Mariwan Hallabji, has become an ISIS *commander* and currently serves on a front line against Kurdish pesh merga security forces outside the city of Kirkuk, the official said.

"How do we *guarantee* that when they're done fighting the Shiites, they don't start waging a war against the Kurds?" the intelligence official said.

A little over a decade ago, Islamist *radicals* allegedly tied to al-Qaeda had a base here and fought against the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), **one of the two major Kurdish political movements**, before U.S. forces bombed the Islamists' bases during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Halabja, although relatively far from the front line between Iraqi Kurdistan and ISIS-held territory, is particularly vulnerable to losing its sons to the *radical* group, local officials and residents said.

The town lacks jobs and educational opportunities and has a history of *militant* resistance to the Arab government in Baghdad, residents said. Almost every family has a “martyr,” either from the Kurds’ struggle for independence or from the chemical weapons attack in 1988 that killed thousands. **Hussein’s forces attacked the town because of its sympathy for Iran during the Iran-Iraq war.**

The situation has deteriorated since Maliki’s government, in a dispute with the Kurdistan Regional Government, slashed the Kurds’ budget six months ago, halting the payment of salaries to many workers.

“People here are graduating from *high school*, and they think they have no future,” the intelligence official said. In the Western world, depressed teenagers commit suicide, he added. “People here join ISIS — which is also basically suicide.”

### **The path to radicalism**

“Z,” whose name is being withheld at the request of his family, would seem an unlikely recruit for ISIS, which has enforced a brutal interpretation of Islamic law, executing hundreds of Shiites and others in its bid to establish an Islamic *caliphate* that spans Iraq and Syria.

“He had a motorbike. He had a girlfriend. He had lots of friends,” Z’s brother-in-law **said with a bitter laugh one recent night, as the family sat on the hard, thinly carpeted floor of their modest living room.**

But Z’s family think he was enticed by the extremists’ slick *social media* campaign and by local recruiters.

Photos on Z’s sister’s cellphone show a grinning 16-year-old boy with *a fluffy black “faux-hawk,”* the latest hairstyle craze.

His family said Z was not especially religious and was never particularly interested in going to the mosque. But in mid-May, he suddenly left Halabja with his best friend to join ISIS in Syria, his relatives said. “In one week, he changed completely,” his brother-in-law said.

After last week’s rapid ISIS advance into Iraq, Z is now with fellow *militants* in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, the family said. In a few phone calls, he has told his family that he was “following the teachings of the Koran,” they said.

Two intelligence officials, as well as residents of Halabja, said Kurdish authorities have allowed young people such as Z to leave the region, in part because they think it is safer without them.

“They want them out of here. They don’t want the bomb to explode in their hands,” said a second intelligence official, who also spoke on the condition of anonymity.

In one recent instance, the bomb nearly did go off.

In late May, a young Kurdish man from Halabja who had recently returned from fighting with ISIS in Syria was apprehended by local security forces as he tried to enter a Shiite shrine in the Kurdish city of Sulaymaniyah, carrying a backpack containing *explosives*, officials said.

### **A salvage mission**

Friends and relatives of a few other young men who have returned say the authorities have sought to put them through a lengthy reverse-conditioning process to persuade them to abandon their *radical* beliefs. Then the men are heavily monitored.

“Those who come back are taken through a very intense process to ensure that they have left those thoughts behind,” said Fazil Basharati, a Halabja local and former member of parliament from the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

Relatives of young men who are either fighting with ISIS or have left the group and returned said that Kurdish security forces have ordered them not to speak about their family members’ ties to the group because it draws attention to the issue.

“They don’t let them talk about it,” said a 24-year-old man in Halabja who grew up with the Kurdish member of ISIS who tried to blow up the shrine in Sulaymaniyah. The 24-year-old man, who did not want to give his name, said two of his other neighbors had joined the extremist group in Syria, only to be captured and returned by Turkish Kurds who are fighting with Syrian insurgents *opposed* to ISIS. The man said one of his cousins was killed fighting in Syria four months ago.

Z’s brother-in-law recently implored the 16-year-old over the phone to return to his mother and sister. “I said, ‘What if someone tries to harass them?’ He told me: ‘We have plenty of ISIS people in Halabja to stop them.’ ”

## AE.11

<http://www.danielpipes.org/14486/turkey-isis>

The Washington Times  
By Daniel Pipes  
June 18, 2014

### Turkish Support for ISIS

*N.B. Washington Times title: "Turkey's support for ISIS Islamist terrorists. Aiding jihadists could put Ankara at odds with Iran"*

The battle in Iraq consists of "*Turkish-backed* Sunni *jihadis* rebelling against an Iranian-backed Shi'ite-oriented central government," I wrote in a recent article.

Some readers question that the Republic of Turkey has supported the "*Islamic State in Iraq and Syria*," the main Sunni group fighting in Iraq. They point to ISIS attacks on Turkish interests, within Turkey, along its border with Syria, and in Mosul and a successful recent meeting of the Turkish and Iranian presidents. Good points, but they can be explained.

First, *ISIS is willing to accept Turkish support* even while seeing the Islamist prime minister and his countrymen as *kafirs (infidels)* who need to be shown true Islam.

Second, the presidential visit took place on one level while the fighting in Syria and Iraq took place on quite another; the two can occur simultaneously. *Turkish-Iranian rivalry is on the rise* and, as the distinguished Turkish journalist *Burak Bekdil* notes in the current issue of the Middle East Quarterly:

Recent years have often seen official language from the two countries about prospering bilateral trade and common anti-Israeli ideological *solidarity*. But mostly out of sight have been indications of rivalry, distrust, and mutual *sectarian* suspicion between the two Muslim countries.

Ankara may deny helping ISIS, but the evidence for this is overwhelming. "As we have the longest border with Syria," writes Orhan Kemal Cengiz, *a Turkish newspaper columnist*, "Turkey's support was vital for the jihadists in getting in and out of the country." Indeed, the ISIS strongholds not *coincidentally* cluster close to Turkey's frontiers.

Kurds, academic experts and the Syrian opposition agree that Syrians, Turks (estimated to number 3,000), and foreign fighters (especially Saudis but also a fair number of Westerners) have crossed the Turkish-Syrian border at will, often to join ISIS. What Turkish journalist Kadri Gursel calls a "two-way jihadist highway," has no bothersome border checks and sometimes involves the active assistance of Turkish intelligence services. *CNN* even broadcast a video on "The secret jihadi smuggling route through Turkey."

Actually, the Turks offered far more than an easy border crossing: they provided the bulk of ISIS' funds, *logistics*, training and arms. Turkish residents near the Syrian border tell of Turkish *ambulances* going to Kurdish-ISIS battle zones and then evacuating ISIS casualties to Turkish hospitals. *Indeed*, a sensational photograph has surfaced showing ISIS *commander* Abu Muhammad in a hospital bed receiving treatment for battle wounds in Hatay State Hospital in April 2014.

One Turkish *opposition* politician estimates that Turkey has paid \$800 million to ISIS for oil shipments. Another politician released information about active duty Turkish soldiers training ISIS members. Critics note that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has met three times with someone, Yasin al-Qadi, who has close ties to ISIS and has funded it.

Why the Turkish support for *wild-eyed extremists*? Because Ankara wants to eliminate two Syrian polities, the Assad regime in Damascus and Rojava (the emerging Kurdish state) in the northeast.

Regarding the Assad regime: "Thinking that jihadists would ensure a quick fall for the Assad regime in Syria, Turkey, no matter how vehemently *officials* deny it, supported the jihadists," writes Cengiz, "at first along with Western and some Arab countries and later in spite of their warnings."

**Regarding Rojava: Rojava's leadership being aligned with the PKK, the (formerly) terrorist Kurdish group based in Turkey, the authoritative Turkish journalist Amberin Zaman has little doubt "that until recently, Turkey was allowing jihadist fighters to move unhindered across its borders" to fight the Kurds.**

More broadly, as the Turkish analyst Mustafa Akyol notes, *Ankara* thought "anybody who fought al-Assad was a good guy and also harbored an "ideological uneasiness with accepting that Islamists can do terrible things." This has led, he acknowledges, to "some blindness" toward violent jihadists. Indeed, ISIS is so popular in Turkey that others publicly copy its logo.

**In the face of this support, the online newspaper Al-Monitor calls on Turkey to close its border to ISIS while Rojava threatened Ankara with "dire consequences" unless Turkish aid ceases.**

In conclusion, Turkish leaders are finding Syria a double quagmire, what with Assad still in power and the Kurdish entity growing stronger. In reaction, they have cooperated with even the most extreme, retrograde and vicious elements, such as ISIS. But this support opened a second front in Iraq which, in turn, brings the clash of the Middle East's two titans, Turkey and Iran, closer to realization.



Mr. Pipes (DanielPipes.org) is president of the Middle East Forum. © 2014 by Daniel Pipes. All rights reserved.

## AE.12

<http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/09/09/kurdistan-kurds-independence-peshmerga-isis-islamic-state-iraq-column/15360241/>

USA Today

David A.andelman 7:48 p.m.

EDT September 9, 2014

### Kurds deserve independence: Column

#### Our allies are culturally and economically ready for their own country.

Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga fighters hold their position Tuesday east of Mosul in their ongoing battles with ISIS terrorists.(Photo: JM Lopez, AFP/Getty Images)

Our slow march to an ISIS strategy ends, for now, with President Obama's speech tonight. But *as the details of his plans trickle out*, there is still room for *some* new thinking. Holding Iraq together with training, foreign aid and diplomatic pressure has been tried and failed. Perhaps it is time to turn elsewhere. Our last and best hope of turning the tide against the Islamist thugs could be the powerful and motivated Kurdish people, especially [their valiant army, the peshmerga](#).

Forget having to train or advise *these Kurdish warriors*. All the peshmerga really needs *to turn into the true steel tip of the sword* are the right hardware and some assurance that the *endgame* will involve an independent Kurdistan. If we lose sight of [this reality](#), the United States and the West have lost before the battle is joined. You can bet that the pathetic Iraqi army, backed by a new but shaky government, will make zero headway against the Islamic State. We'll be in for years of violence and turmoil spreading across the region and, all too quickly, to our shores.

#### Wrong reasons

*Officially*, Obama sent U.S. warplanes into action to drive ISIS forces from the [Mosul dam](#) while protecting Iraqi religious minorities and protecting the [Kurdish capital of Irbil](#). All good reasons for intervention.

The right reason would have been to help the Kurds achieve [independence](#). That we took any initiative on behalf of the Kurds was because it furthered our own misguided goal. For years and at a cost of [thousands of lives](#), we have sought to hold together a dysfunctional Iraqi nation to which few Kurds have any [real loyalty](#) and for which they would hardly lay down their lives.

They would lay down their lives, however, for a [free Kurdistan](#), something that was snatched from their grasp nearly a century ago by the Treaty of Versailles [ending World War I](#). Redrawing the map of the Ottoman Empire, the peacemakers created Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and *an opening for Israel*, but left out Kurdistan. Instead, they [scattered 30 million to 40 million](#) ethnically, religiously and culturally homogeneous people across a handful of countries.

Today, the Kurds understand what it takes to build a viable *nation* and have the gumption and will to defend it. Given the means and authority, the Kurds have every right to become the Israel of the Muslim



Middle East. And they won't even ask for a handout. Plenty of oil and a vibrant commercial class assure them of a [solid economic foundation](#).

### **Real Islamic democracy**

Imagine helping a true Islamic democracy emerge in the heart of the Middle East, something we tried desperately to do in Iraq at the cost of so many American lives. And yet it is now right in front of us, ripe for the taking, if only we abandon the fiction of a united, democratic Iraq. Coupled with an Israeli-style "[right of return](#)," the Kurds could become a free and vibrant nation, without taking a sliver of territory from the countries where millions of *their brethren* live today.

Moreover, they have their [forces where they are needed](#), in the vast stretches of northern Syria and Iraq where ISIS is so firmly planted. Given the right incentive, we might also find that the [Kurds of Syria](#) are worthy and vital opponents both of the Assad regime and of ISIS terrorists. The [Kurds of Turkey](#) are equally appropriate allies, if we can persuade our NATO ally, Turkey, to part with them. And why not? They are only a distraction in that nation. There's also no love lost between the [Kurds of Iran](#) and the mullahs of Tehran, yet both seem prepared to face down the Sunnis of ISIS at any cost.

America, with all its diplomatic and military muscle, should do no less — help the Kurds finally reach the goal they have *earned*, many of them with their lives. Perhaps we can right a century-old wrong while giving Obama's ISIS strategy a real chance to succeed.

*David A. Andelman, editor in chief of World Policy Journal, is a member of the Board of Contributors of USA TODAY and author of [A Shattered Peace: Versailles 1919 and the Price We Pay Today](#).*

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### **AE.13**

<http://time.com/3103537/kurds-iraq-erbil-barzani-isis/>

Times

WORLD IRAQ

Jay Newton-Small @JNSmall

Aug. 12, 2014

### **Kurds Welcome U.S. Help in Iraq, But Remember History of Betrayal**

A brief history of the Kurdish/U.S. relationship shows why

For a few hours, the city of Erbil was in a state of panic. Word came that Gwar, just 30 minutes from the Kurdish capital, had been taken by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Kurds and ex-pats alike were packing up, trying to book airline tickets or, in a worse case scenario, preparing to drive to Turkey. But then American war planes swooped in and began bombing and President Obama pledged to defend Erbil.

Kurds breathed a sigh of relief. "The most important development was the decision by the United States to save lives," says Hoshyar Zebari, a former Iraqi foreign minister and a prominent Kurd. "U.S. help is deeply appreciated." Dr. Fuad Hussein, chief of staff to Kurdish President Masoud Barzani, welcomed

the UN resolution condemning ISIS, and praised coalition forces for their technical and humanitarian assistance. **He noted that** the U.S. had co-ordinated tactical efforts with Peshmerga forces, **allowing the Kurdish fighters to prepare to go on the offensive.** “We used to say Kurds don’t have any friends but the mountains. But that doesn’t ring true anymore,” **he said.**

That said, many Kurds still carry lingering worries that the U.S. will **betray** them once again. “There’s a history of contact and betrayal with the U.S. and the Kurds where the U.S. made contact and helped but never jumped in with both feet,” says Quil Lawrence, author of *The Invisible Nation: How the Kurds’ Quest for Statehood Is Shaping Iraq and the Middle East*, and a correspondent with NPR. “**The Kurds have been very frustrated with a lot of the stages long the way,**” **he says.** “But **certainly** these airstrikes would restore some of that trust. I feel **like I’ve had many Kurds quote Churchill to me in the past week: ‘Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing... after they have exhausted all other possibilities.’**”

**Finally,** it seems, the U.S. has exhausted all other possibilities in Iraq and all **that’s left is to rely upon** the Kurds. It’s only taken a century.

Nearly a hundred years ago, the Kurdish rebel leader Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji carried around in his pocket a copy of Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points, so inspired was he by American self-determination. And yet it would be the Americans who would help deny the Kurds the same right at nearly every turn. Two years after Wilson delivered that speech, the Allies agreed to an independent Kurdistan in the 1920 Treaty of Sevres. But by 1923, in the Treaty of Lausanne that recognized Kemal Attaturk’s Turkey, the international community abandoned the Kurds and the **referendum** promised in the Treaty of Sevres was never realized. Thus began the Kurdish struggle for independence.

After several thwarted attempts to break away from Iraq, the Kurds finally got their first indirect aid from the U.S. in the early 1970s, more thanks to the Shah of Iran than anything else. In 1972, Iraq aligned with the Soviet Union and the Shah pushed the U.S. to arm the Kurds by selling them Soviet weapons seized in Egypt. By 1974, the Kurds were in open rebellion led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, of the same tribe Barzanji was from. But by 1975, Iran and Iraq made peace under the Algiers Accords. Iranian support for the Kurdish uprising abruptly came to a halt and the rebellion collapsed.

Barzani fled to Iran and then America, where he died in 1979, the same year of the Iranian Revolution, where yet again U.S. allegiances shifted. And, yet, again, the Kurds were the unwitting victim.

Towards the end of the First Gulf War, the Kurds saw a window for independence. Encouraged by the Americans, they rose up against Hussein for the third time. Hussein sent in the army and rolled over the Kurds, slaughtering thousands of villagers as they passed through. More than 1.5 million Kurds fled through the mountains to Turkey. American troops and arms never materialized, though they eventually sent in air support, which helped the Kurds push Hussein back to Kirkuk. In order to protect the Kurds, a no-fly zone was formed that lasted nearly a decade, until the Second Gulf War.

By the time the Turks refused America passage for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Kurds were in a position to offer themselves as a viable alternative. Fighting side-by-side with American special forces, the Kurds believed that their day had finally come: independence **couldn’t be far away.** But in the aftermath of the invasion, the Kurds were taken aback when the U.S. tried to disarm them and insisted they join the new government. **Warily,** they did so, but Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has not been the partner they’d hoped for.

Maliki warned repeatedly that the Kurds did not have the authority to drill and export their own oil, and that empowering them would lead to the end of Iraq. By late 2011 some 60,000 Kurdish peshmerga and Iraqi forces were at a stand off near Kirkuk over the oil dispute. But, then, in 2013, Fallujah fell to Sunni extremists and then in the summer of 2014, Mosul and Tikrit fell to ISIS. The Iraqi Army retreated back to Baghdad. The Kurds took full control of Kirkuk and its refinery.

But U.S. refusal to equip the Kurds, and Baghdad's refusal to share U.S. arms with the peshmerga, left Kurdish forces weakened, low on ammunition and unable to defend a 600-mile border. ISIS advanced within 30 minutes of the Kurdish capital of Erbil as panicked Kurds and foreign workers began packing and fleeing to the airport or *north towards Turkey*. Last week, the U.S. stepped in and bombed ISIS and President Obama pledged to defend Erbil. For the first time ever, the U.S. said it would directly arm Kurdish troops. It's not exactly self-determination — but it's a start.

#### AE.14

<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/world/middleeast/iraq-alissa-j-rubin-a-times-correspondent-recounts-fatal-helicopter-crash-in-kurdistan.html? r=0>

The New York Times

#### On a Helicopter, Going Down: Inside a Lethal Crash in Iraq

By ALISSA J. RUBINAUG. 16, 2014

*Alissa J. Rubin, a veteran Times foreign correspondent, was injured on Tuesday in a helicopter crash in Kurdistan and dictated the following article from her hospital bed in Istanbul, where she was evacuated from Iraq. She **suffered broken** bones and a fractured skull but was in stable condition, and was scheduled to be taken by air to the United States on Sunday.*

ISTANBUL — If it weren't for [Tuesday's helicopter crash on Mount Sinjar](#), what would I have written about the plight of the Yazidis?

I would have started, I guess, with this mountain that everybody is talking about, *to which the Yazidis have fled*. It's hard to overstate the size of this mountain, which is such a sacred place to the Yazidis, and the place they went to escape the *terror* that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria has been inflicting on them. It's really more of a range than an individual mountain — 60 miles long, 5,000 feet high — and it *is no wonder the relief operation, which riveted much of the world, posed such challenges*.

Then I would have written about our pilot, Maj. Gen. Majid Ahmed Saadi, a *veteran* Iraqi Arab *officer* helping the Kurds rescue the Yazidis. Adam Ferguson, our photographer, and I were waiting all day at the Kurdish military base in Fishkhabour, Iraq, for a helicopter to take us to Mount Sinjar. General Majid came in from his first run up the mountain with a full load of Yazidi refugees, and a British television journalist said to him, "Why are you taking such risks overloading your helicopter like that?"

He just said, "I checked my numbers, I checked the weight, and it was possible to do it."

Also waiting with us was a Yazidi member of Parliament, Vian Dakhil, whose heart-rending speech in the Iraqi Parliament on Aug. 5 really touched people. She seemed very together, very organized (*although she was inexplicably wearing high heels*), and, of course, passionate about her people's plight.

When we finally got in the helicopter, it was 3:45 p.m., not a lot of daylight left. I had a seat on a load of bread, behind one of the door gunners. Otherwise, there were no seats, no seatbelts; it was the kind of flight the United States military would never have allowed.

The helicopter was full of bread, and **probably** bullets, too: bread for the Yazidis and bullets for the base of Kurdish pesh merga fighters on top of the mountain.

The pilot really made a big impression. **You know**, the Yazidis feel so betrayed by the Arab neighbors they had lived among for so many years; they all turned on the Yazidis when ISIS came. Many of the atrocities were carried out not by the militants but by their own neighbors.

Yet here was **General Majid**, an Iraqi Arab himself, **who was taking off from his own job — he was in charge of training for the Iraqi air force** — to help these people.

He told me it was the most important thing he had done in his life, the most **significant** thing he had done in his 35 years of flying.

It was as if it gave his whole life meaning; he was especially moved by all the Yazidi children.

The top priority was to get food up there. There were many places where there had been no airdrops of food at all, so these drops by the Kurdish authorities were really important.

When we were nearing the top of the mountain, people were gathered already. I remember one mother holding her son by the hand on one side, her daughter on the other, and they were trying to stay upright in the downdraft from the rotors so they could push forward to climb aboard. **And they did make it on.**

One older woman's face sticks in my mind; it was very rough and tremendously sad.

We were on the ground only about 10 minutes. The Yazidis were battered. Some older people were barefoot, legs swollen from walking; others were just totally dehydrated; and children sunburned. The kids — a lot of them — were crying, afraid and confused, and others were silent, just frightened.

When we landed, it was almost scary, with people thronging to get to us. All these people just wanting to get onto the helicopter and off this mountain. And I'm sure most of them had never seen a helicopter up close. One woman's legs were so swollen she had to be carried in a sling by several men.

So many climbed into the helicopter, coming up the rear loading ramp, the crew couldn't get the ramp closed. So they had to reopen it and make people get off.

When they tried to take off, they couldn't and had to set the helicopter back down.

Then there was this sad moment: They pulled this woman and her two children off the helicopter. They were crying. The mother was quite thin.

**The pilot was just so moved by all this. He wanted to help all these people, especially the children.**

Then General Majid took off. But you could see he was going to use the downward slope of the mountain to aid in the takeoff, until he could build up enough lift. The nose of the helicopter was pointing downhill as the flight started.

I felt the helicopter hit something; later, someone said it was a rock. I thought the pilot would right it, but then I saw the ground come up. I didn't know what would happen, but I knew it was bad.

Later, someone told me the co-pilot shut off the fuel when they lost control, which made us stall. Otherwise, it might have caught fire and exploded.

When we went down, I thought, all right, we're on a mountain, it'll slide a long way before it stops. Stuff fell on me; I didn't know if they were people or things. Then Ms. Dakhil landed on top of me.

Everyone was groaning. There were no screams, but everyone was groaning. Adam was great. He dragged me out of the helicopter, as I couldn't possibly walk. Adam wrapped his scarf around my head to stop the bleeding.

A pesh merga soldier took off his kaffiyeh and wrapped my arms together so that they wouldn't flap around. I thought it was really sweet at the time, but then I realized how sensible it was: He was immobilizing my arms because both my wrists were broken.

Just before dark, a rescue helicopter came.

Several people picked me up and carried me aboard in a very inexperienced fashion; that really hurt, unfortunately. I heard myself groan like everybody else. At that moment, it just hurt so much. But then I thought, that's good. At least I'm alive.

I bet a lot of them are not.

How is the pilot? *Did he make it?* He just wanted to help.

About 25 Yazidis, as well as five crew members, five Kurdish politicians and four Western journalists, were aboard the Mi-17, a Russian-made transport helicopter. Nearly all were wounded, although none as seriously as **Ms. Rubin**. **Ms. Dakhil** was also evacuated to Istanbul, with both legs and several ribs broken.

The only person to die in the crash was the pilot, General Majid.

## AE.15

<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/opinion/freud-and-the-middle-east.html>

The New York Times

### Freud and the Middle East

NOV. 11, 2014

Thomas L. Friedman

ABU DHABI, United Arab Emirates — When trying to make sense of the Middle East, one of the most important rules to keep in mind is this: What politicians here tell you in private is usually irrelevant. What matters most, and what explains their behavior more times than not, is what they say in public in their own language to their own people. As President Obama *dispatches* more U.S. advisers to help Iraqis defeat the Islamic State, or ISIS, it is vital that we listen carefully to what the key players are saying in public in their own language about each other and their own aspirations.

For instance, the Middle East Media Research Institute, or *Memri*, recently posted an excerpt from an interview given by Mohammad Sadeq al-Hosseini, a former adviser to Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, which aired on Mayadeen TV on Sept. 24, in which he pointed out that Shiite Iran, through its surrogates, has taken de facto control over four Arab capitals: Beirut, through the Shiite militia Hezbollah; Damascus, through the Shiite/Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad; Baghdad, through the Shiite-led government there; and — while few in the West were paying attention — Sana, where the pro-

Iranian-Yemeni-Shiite offshoot sect, the Houthi, recently swept into the capital of Yemen and are now dominating the Sunnis.

As Hosseini said of Iran and its allies: “We in the axis of resistance are the new sultans of the Mediterranean and the Gulf. We in *Tehran*, Damascus, [Hezbollah’s] southern suburb of Beirut, Baghdad and Sana will shape the map of the region. We are the new sultans of the Red Sea as well.” And he also said, for good measure, that Saudi Arabia was “a tribe on the verge of extinction.” We might not hear this stuff, but Sunni Arabs do, especially now when the United States and Iran might end their 35-year-old cold war and reach a deal that would allow Iran a “peaceful” *nuclear* energy program. It helps explain something else you might have missed: Sunni militants burst into a Saudi Shiite village, al-Dalwah, on Nov. 3 and gunned down five Saudi Shiites at a religious event.

Well, at least Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is in the modern world. No, wait, what is the name that Erdogan insists be put on the newest bridge he’s building across the Bosphorus? Answer: the Yavuz Sultan Selim bridge. Selim I was the Sunni Turkish sultan who, in 1514, beat back the Persian Shiite empire of his day, called the Safavids. Turkey’s Alevi minority, a Shiite offshoot sect whose ancestors faced Selim’s wrath, have protested the name of the bridge.

They know it didn’t come out of a hat. According to *Britannica*, Selim I was the Ottoman sultan (1512-20) who extended the empire to Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, “and raised the Ottomans to leadership of the Muslim world.” He then turned eastward and took on the Safavid Shiite dynasty in Iran, which posed a “political and ideological threat” to the hegemony of Ottoman Sunni Islam. Selim was the first Turkish leader to claim to be both sultan of the Ottoman Empire and caliph of all Muslims.

Vice President Joe Biden did not misspeak when he accused Turkey of facilitating the entry of ISIS *fighters* into Syria. Just as there is a little bit of West Bank “Jewish settler” in almost every Israeli, there is a little bit of the caliphate dream in almost every Sunni. Some Turkish analysts suspect Erdogan does not dream of building pluralistic democracy in Iraq and Syria, but rather a modern Sunni caliphate — not led by ISIS but by himself. Until then, he clearly prefers ISIS on his border than an independent Kurdistan.

As Shadi Hamid, a fellow at the Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, put it in an Atlantic article entitled “The Roots of the Islamic State’s Appeal”: “ISIS draws on, and draws strength from, ideas that have broad resonance among Muslim-majority populations. They may not agree with ISIS’s interpretation of the *caliphate*, but the notion of a caliphate — the historical political *entity* governed by *Islamic law* and tradition — is a powerful one.”

In fact, though, notes the Middle East scholar Joseph Braude, most Arab Sunnis in Egypt, the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula in the late 19th century “were quite opposed to the [Turkish-run] caliphate they had experienced, which they saw as a kind of occupying force.” It was the 20th century Sunni Islamist groups, particularly *the Muslim Brotherhood*, that revived the idea, idealizing the caliphate as a response to their region’s weakness and decline “and inserting it into mainstream religious discourse.”

In sum, there are so many conflicting dreams and nightmares playing out among our Middle East allies in the war on ISIS that Freud would not have been able to keep them straight. If you listen closely, of those dreams, ours — “pluralistic democracy” — is not high on the list. We need to protect the islands of decency out here — Jordan, Kurdistan, Lebanon, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Oman — from ISIS, in hopes that their best examples might one day spread. But I am skeptical that our fractious allies, with all their different dreams, can agree on new power-sharing arrangements for Iraq or Syria, even if ISIS is defeated.

## AE.16

[http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/29/opinion/friedman-there-be-dragons.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/29/opinion/friedman-there-be-dragons.html?_r=0)

The New York Times

## There Be Dragons

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Published: February 28, 2012 200 Comments

In medieval times, areas known to be dangerous or uncharted were often labeled on maps with the warning: “Beware, here be dragons.” That is surely how mapmakers would be labeling the whole Middle East *today*.

After the onset of the Arab awakenings, it was reasonable to be, *at worst, agnostic* and, at best, hopeful about the prospect of these countries making the difficult transition from *autocracy* to *democracy*. But recently, looking honestly at the region, one has to conclude that the prospects for *stable* transitions to democracy anytime soon are dimming. It is too early to give up hope, but it is not too early to start worrying.

Lord knows it is not because of the bravery of the Arab youth, and many ordinary citizens, who set off *these awakenings*, in search of dignity, *justice* and freedom. No, it is because the staying power and mendacity of the entrenched old guards and old ideas in these countries is much deeper than most people realize and the frailty or absence of democratic institutions, *traditions* and examples much greater.

“There is a saying that inside every fat man is a thin man dying to get out,” notes Michael Mandelbaum, the foreign policy expert at Johns **Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies**. “We also tend to believe that inside every *autocracy* is a *democracy* dying to get out, but that might not be true in the Middle East.”

It was true in Eastern Europe in 1989, *added Mandelbaum*, but there are two big differences between Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Many Eastern European countries had a recent *liberal* past to fall back on — after the artificially imposed Soviet *communism* was removed. And Eastern Europe also had a compelling *model and magnet for free-market democracy* right next door: the European Union. Most of **the Arab-Muslim** world has neither, so when the iron lid of *autocracy* comes off they fall back, not on *liberalism*, but Islamism, sectarianism, tribalism or military rule.

To be sure, we have to remember how long it took America to build its own liberal political order and what freaks that has made us today. Almost four years ago, we elected a black man, whose name was Barack, whose grandfather was a Muslim, to lead us out of our worst economic crisis in a century. We’re now considering replacing him with a *Mormon*, and it all seems totally normal. But that normality took more than 200 years and a civil war to develop.

The Arabs and Afghans are in their first decade. You see in Syria how quickly the regime turned the democracy push there into a sectarian war. Remember, the *opposition* in Syria began as a largely peaceful, grass-roots, pan-Syrian movement for *democratic* change. But it was deliberately met by President Bashar al-Assad with murder and sectarian venom. He wanted to make the conflict about his Alawite minority versus the country’s Sunni Muslim majority as a way of discrediting the opposition and holding his base.

As Peter Harling and Sarah Birke, experts on the Middle East who have been in Syria, wrote in a recent essay: “Rather than reform, the regime’s default setting has been to push society to the brink. As soon as protests started ... state media showed staged footage of arms being found in a mosque in Dara’a, the southern city where protests first broke out, and warned that a sit-in in Homs ... was an attempt to erect a mini-caliphate. This manipulation of Syrians meant the regime was confident that the threat of civil war would force citizens and outside players alike to agree on preserving the existing power structure as the only bulwark against collapse.”

You see the same kind of manipulation of emotions in Afghanistan. U.S. troops accidentally burned some Korans, and President Obama apologized. Afghans nevertheless went on a weeklong rampage, killing innocent Americans in response — and no Afghan leader, even our allies, dared to stand up and say: “Wait, this is wrong. Every week in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq, Muslim suicide bombers kill other



Muslims — holy people created in the image of God — and there’s barely a peep. Yet the accidental burning of holy books by Americans sparks outbursts and killings. What does our reaction say about us?” They need to have that conversation.

In Egypt, every day it becomes clearer that the Army has used the Tahrir uprising to get rid of its main long-term rival for succession — President Hosni Mubarak’s more reform-minded son, Gamal. Now, having gotten rid of both father and son, the Army is showing its real hand by prosecuting American, European and Egyptian democracy workers for allegedly working with “foreign agents” — the C.I.A., Israel and the Jewish **lobby** — to destabilize Egypt. This is a patently fraudulent charge, but one meant to undermine the democrats demanding that the Army step aside.

The Arab/Muslim awakening phase is over. Now we are deep into the counter-revolutionary phase, as the dead hands of the past try to strangle the future. I am ready to consider any ideas of how we in the West can help the forces of democracy and decency win. But, ultimately, this is their fight. They have to own it, and I just hope it doesn’t end — as it often does in the land of dragons — with extremists going all the way and the moderates just going away.

A version of this op-ed appeared in print on February 29, 2012, on page A27 of the New York edition with the headline: There Be Dragons.

## AE.17

<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/akp-is-too-turkish--not-too-islamic-.aspx?pageID=449&nID=12724&NewsCatID=411>

The Hurriyet Daily News

### AKP is too Turkish – not too Islamic

February/01/2012

MUSTAFA AKYOL

From a *liberal* perspective, the past Turkish decade has largely been a pleasant one. The Turkish military, which has ousted four elected governments since 1960, has been gradually pushed to where it should be in any *democracy*.

Systemic human rights abuses, such as torture and summary executions, have disappeared. Reforms encouraged by the [European Union](#) have expanded the rights of Kurds, Christians, women and basically all minority groups. Meanwhile, the Turkish economy has boomed, creating more jobs and more prosperity.

The Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has been in power since 2002, deserves a lot of credit for this transformation. No wonder Turkey’s liberal intellectuals, who had long been calling for democratic reforms, have by and large supported the AKP. That is also why the Kemalists, the sworn enemies of the AKP, have labeled the liberals as “traitors” who “sold” themselves to the AKP. (In Turkey, liberalism and Kemalism have always been conflicting political lines; Kemalism venerates the authoritarian state, liberalism criticizes it.)

However, in the past year, the reformist edge of the AKP *has dramatically waned*. The “Kurdish opening,” which promised a liberal and peaceful solution to the country’s decades-old conflict with the [Kurdistan Workers’ Party](#) (PKK), was replaced by a more hawkish policy of “counter-terrorism.” Various journalists were arrested for “propaganda on behalf of terrorism,” with indictments that would not be considered serious in most democratic countries. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s intolerance to criticism continued, with “insult” cases opened against even friendly journalists.

Therefore, the current widespread opinion among many Turkish liberals, and even some *conservatives*, is that the AKP is not a promising party anymore. Rather, the governing party is criticized for its increasingly authoritarian style, and even for creating its own authoritarian establishment.

*I agree with most of these liberal criticisms against the AKP.* I, too, feel less enthusiastic about “New



Turkey” and its potential to becoming a truly liberal democracy.

However, there is a crucial point to note: Almost none of the problems that we see today in the AKP stem from its “Islamism,” as Kemalists and some Westerners think. In fact, the AKP’s transformation to post-Islamism remains genuine, as the party promotes nothing more “Islamic” than a secular state that has respect to religion. Moreover, in its approach to Turkey’s non-Muslims, the AKP is still more liberal than the Kemalist nationalists.

The real problem lies in not the “Islamism” of the AKP, but its “Turkishness” – i.e., the problems that it inherited from Turkey’s political culture: an over-powerful leader, a love affair with conspiracy theories, an obsession with “honor” that limits freedom of speech and a concept of “terrorism” that criminalizes even ideas. These are the standard troubles that Turkish governments, let them be Kemalist or center-right, have displayed for many decades. The AKP is only proving that it too is not free from these negative *Ankara* traditions.

*That is why some of the Islamic critics of the AKP are blaming the party these days for being “Ankara-ized.” One of them is Faruk Ünsal, the head of Mazlumder, an Islamic Human Rights Organization, who gave a long interview to daily Taraf two weeks ago. “The AKP transformed the bureaucracy to some extent,” he said, “but the bureaucracy transformed them, too, and they met at a midpoint.” He went on to criticize all the illiberal tendencies of the AKP from a Muslim point of view.*

The *next* big question is whether the AKP will be stuck in this new equilibrium, or whether it will have the wisdom to shake and renew itself, curb its own temptation to unlimited power and revive its reformist agenda. We will see. And we will push as well.

February/01/2012

## AE.18

<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/opinion/sunday/thomas-friedman-5-principles-for-iraq.html>

The New York Times

### *5 Principles for Iraq*

JUNE 14, 2014- OP-ED COLUMNIST

**Thomas L. Friedman**

THE disintegration of Iraq and Syria is upending an order that has defined the Middle East *for a century*. It is a huge event, and we as a country need to think very carefully about how to respond. Having just returned from Iraq two weeks ago, my own thinking is guided by five principles, and the first is that, in Iraq today, **my enemy’s enemy is my enemy**. Other than the Kurds, we have no friends in this fight. Neither Sunni nor Shiite leaders spearheading the war in Iraq today share our values.

The Sunni *jihadists*, Baathists and tribal militiamen who have led the takeover of Mosul from the Iraqi government are not supporters of a democratic, pluralistic Iraq, the only Iraq we have any interest in abetting. And Iraq’s Shiite prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, has proved himself not to be a friend of a democratic, pluralistic Iraq either. From Day 1, he has used his office to install Shiites in key security posts, drive out Sunni politicians and generals and direct money to Shiite communities. In a word, Maliki has been a total jerk. Besides being prime minister, he made himself *acting* minister of defense, minister of the interior and *national* security adviser, and his cronies also control the Central Bank and the *Finance Ministry*.

Maliki had a choice — to rule in a sectarian way or in an inclusive way — and he chose sectarianism. We owe him nothing.

The second principle for me derives from the most important question we need to answer from the Arab Spring. **Why is it that the two states doing the best are those that America has had the least to do with: Tunisia and the semiautonomous Kurdistan region of Iraq?**

Answer: Believe it or not, it's not all about what we do and the choices we make. Arabs and Kurds have agency, too. And the reason that both Tunisia and Kurdistan have built islands of decency, still frail to be sure, is because the major contending political forces in each place eventually opted for the principle of "no victor, no vanquished."

The two major rival parties in Kurdistan not only buried the hatchet between them but paved the way for *democratic* elections that recently brought a fast-rising *opposition party*, that ran on an anti-corruption platform, into government for the first time. And Tunisia, after much internal struggle and bloodshed, found a way to balance the aspirations of *secularists* and Islamists and agree on the most progressive Constitution in the history of the Arab world.

Hence my rule: The Middle East only puts a smile on your face when it starts with them — when they take ownership of reconciliation. Please spare me another dose of: It is all about whom we train and arm. Sunnis and Shiites don't need guns from us. They need the truth. It is the early 21st century, and too many of them are still fighting over who is the rightful heir to the Prophet Muhammad from the 7th century. It has to stop — for them, and for their kids, to have any future.

Principle No. 3: Maybe Iran, and its wily Revolutionary Guards Quds Force commander, Gen. Qassem Suleimani, aren't so smart after all. It was Iran that armed its Iraqi Shiite allies with the specially shaped bombs that killed and wounded many American soldiers. Iran wanted us out. It was Iran that pressured Maliki into not signing an agreement with the U.S. to give our troops legal cover to stay in Iraq. Iran wanted to be the regional hegemon. Well, Suleimani: "This Bud's for you." Now your forces are overextended in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, and ours are back home. Have a nice day.

We still want to forge a nuclear deal that prevents Iran from developing a bomb, so we have to be careful about how much we aid Iran's Sunni foes. But with Iran still under sanctions and its forces and Hezbollah's now fighting in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, well, let's just say: advantage America.

Fourth: Leadership matters. While in Iraq, I visited Kirkuk, a city that has long been hotly contested between Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen. When I was there five years ago, it **was a hellish war zone**. This time I found new paved roads, parks and a flourishing economy and a Kurdish governor, Najimaddin Omar Karim, who was just re-elected in April in a fair election and won more seats thanks to votes from the minority Arabs and Turkmen.

"We focused on [improving] roads, terrible traffic, hospitals, dirty schools," and increasing electricity from four hours a day to nearly 24 hours, said Dr. Karim, a neurosurgeon who had worked in America for 33 years before returning to Iraq in 2009. "People were tired of politics and maximalism. We [earned] the confidence and good feelings of Arabs and Turkmen toward a Kurdish governor. They feel like we don't discriminate. This election was the first time Turkmen and Arabs voted for a Kurd."

In the recent chaos, the Kurds have now taken full military control of Kirkuk, but I can tell you this: Had Maliki governed Iraq like Karim governed Kirkuk, we would not have this mess today. With the right leadership, people there can live together.

Finally, while none of the main actors in Iraq, other than Kurds, are fighting for our values, is anyone there even fighting for our interests: a minimally stable Iraq that doesn't threaten us? And whom we can

realistically help? The answers still aren't clear to me, and, until they are, I'd be very wary about intervening.

## AE.19

<http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/article/Friedman-Iraq-s-best-hope-may-be-in-young-Kurds-5526692.php>

### Friedman: Iraq's best hope may be in young Kurds

Thomas Friedman says that in the long run our values as taught at the American University of Iraq could triumph where our power failed.

By Thomas L. Friedman June 3, 2014 Updated: June 3, 2014 10:01pm

SULAIMANI, Iraq - I am a sucker for commencements, but this one filled me with many different emotions.

As Dina Dara took the stage - the student speaker and valedictorian of the 2014 graduating class of the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani, in Kurdistan - the sun was just setting, turning Azmar Mountain in the background into a reddish-brown curtain. The class was about 70 percent Kurds, with the rest coming from every corner, religion and tribe of Iraq. Parents bursting with pride had driven up from Basra and Baghdad, dressed in their finest to see their kids get their American-style college degrees. Three Kurdish TV stations carried the ceremony live.

"It has been quite a journey," Dara, who's going on to graduate school at Tufts, told her classmates. (Since the university opened in 2007, all the valedictorians have been Iraqi women.) "We went through a whole different experience living in the dorms. This evening .. we are armed with two things: first, the highly valued American education that makes us as competent and qualified as the rest of the students in the world. And, second, the empowerment of a liberal arts education." As we "exercise critical thinking techniques that have been the core of our education here, and as we try to move beyond the traditional conventions, beyond what others suggest, we may struggle. But isn't this how nations are built?"

Sitting near Dara (I was the commencement speaker), I thought: This is how the Iraq story was supposed to end but hasn't, not yet. Kurdistan remains the unsung success story of the Iraq War, one thing that U.S. veterans can take pride in having helped to create - first by protecting the Kurds from **Saddam Hussein** with a no-fly zone and second by toppling Saddam, who had tried to wipe out the Kurds with **poison gas** in 1988.

But it was the Kurds who used the window of freedom we opened for them to overcome internal divisions, start to reform their once **Sopranos-like politics** and create a vibrant economy that is now throwing up skyscrapers and colleges in major towns of Erbil and Sulaimani. Everywhere I've gone here, I've met "reverse immigrants," Kurds who've come back to their homeland in northeastern Iraq because of all the opportunities.

Kurdistan represents everything that has not happened in **Shiite-dominated Baghdad and the Sunni regions of Iraq**, where Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has behaved like a visionless, pro-Shiite sectarian chief and violence remains rife. Maliki was "our guy." So you could say that we left two big "gifts" behind in Iraq: an American-installed autocrat and an American university that is teaching the values of

inclusiveness that Maliki doesn't practice. In the long run, after Maliki is gone, we can still hope - as partially happened in Vietnam - that our values will triumph where our power failed. It's still a long shot, but that's clearly what the American University students are hoping.

Bery Hoshier, 20, a female engineering student, told me: "People graduating here feel they can make a change. They come here as people bounded by social conventions, and they leave as individuals with values that they implement in their lives. We all believe that we can be future leaders. (Iraq) is not over. We are just getting started. We are building from scratch. It is going to take time."

Karwan Gaznay, 24, a Kurd, told me he grew up on books about Saddam: "Now we have this American education. I did not know who Thomas Jefferson was. I did not know who James Madison was. So when the government is doing something wrong, now we can say: 'This is wrong. I have been educated.' ... I ran for student president, and Arab guys voted for me. We are living as a family in the university. I am not pessimistic about Iraq. We can work together if we want to."

As student president, Gaznay persuaded the Kurdish government to create a special ID card for Sunni and Shiite AUIS students to use to easily pass through checkpoints that protect this region from the rest of Iraq. Isa Mohamed, 22, a Shiite from Baghdad, told me this was why he supported Gaznay: "Any Arab (AUIS) student can now go through all the checkpoints and airports" in Kurdistan without difficulties.

Mewan Nahro, 23, put it all in perspective: "My dad was in the mountains as a Pesh Merga (Kurdish guerrilla) fighter in the '80s and '90s, and now (our family) has gone from him in the mountains to me here at an American University and getting to say what I want."

Yes, this is an elite school, and Kurdistan is an island of decency in a still-roiling sea. But the power of example is a funny thing. You never know how it can spread. More American universities, please - not just drones.

## AE.20

<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/opinion/friedman-egypt-at-the-edge.html? r=1&>

The New York Times

### Egypt at the Edge

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Published: July 9, 2013 201 Comments

In every civil war there is a moment before all hell breaks loose when there is still a chance to prevent a total descent into the abyss. Egypt is at that moment.

he Muslim holy month of Ramadan starts this week, and it can't come too soon. One can only hope that the traditional time for getting family and friends together will provide a moment for all the actors in Egypt to reflect on how badly they've behaved — all sides — and opt for the only sensible pathway forward: national reconciliation. I was a student at the American University in Cairo in the early 1970s and have been a regular visitor since. I've never witnessed the depth of hatred that has infected Egypt in recent months: *Muslim Brotherhood activists* throwing a young opponent off a roof; *anti-Islamist activists* on Twitter praising *the Egyptian army* for mercilessly gunning down supporters of the

Brotherhood in prayer. In the wake of all this violent turmoil, it is no longer who *rules* Egypt that it is at stake. It is Egypt that is at stake. This is an existential crisis.

Can Egypt hold together and move forward as a unified country or will it be torn asunder by its own people, like Syria? Nothing is more important in the Middle East today, because when the stability of modern Egypt is at stake — *sitting as it does astride the Suez Canal, the linchpin of any Arab peace with Israel and knitting together North Africa, Africa and the Middle East* — the stability of the whole region is at stake.

I appreciate the anger of non-Islamist, secular and liberal Egyptians with *President* Mohamed Morsi. He never would have become president without their votes, but, once in office, instead of being inclusive, at every turn he grabbed for more power. With Egypt's economy in a tailspin, I also appreciate the impatience of many Egyptians with Morsi's rule. But in the Arab world's long transition to *democracy*, something valuable was lost when the military ousted Morsi's government and did not wait for the Egyptian people to do it in October's parliamentary elections or the presidential elections three years down the road. It gives the Muslim Brothers a perfect excuse not to reflect on their mistakes and change, which is an essential ingredient for Egypt to build a stable political center.

But Egypt's non-Islamists, secular and liberal groups need to get their act together, too. The Egyptian opposition has been great at mobilizing protests but incapable of coalescing around a single leader's agenda, while the Brotherhood has been great at winning elections but incapable of governing.

So now there is only one way for Egypt to avoid the abyss: the military, the only authority in Egypt today, has to make clear that it ousted *the Muslim Brotherhood* for the purpose of a "reset," not for the purposes of "revenge" — for the purpose of starting over and getting the transition to democracy right this time, not for the purpose of eliminating the Brotherhood from politics. (It is not clear that the "interim constitution" issued Tuesday by Egypt's transitional government will give the Brotherhood a fair shot at contesting power. It bans parties based on religion, but that ban was in place under Hosni Mubarak, and the Brotherhood got around it by running as independents.) Egypt will not be stable if the Brotherhood is excluded.

Dalia Mogahed, *the C.E.O. of Mogahed Consulting and a longtime pollster in the Middle East*, remarked to me that the original 2011 revolution that overthrew Mubarak was mounted by "young people, leftists, liberals, Islamists, united for a better future. The division was between those revolutionaries and the status quo. The revolution wasn't owned by the secularists or the liberals or the Islamists. That's why it worked." Democracy in Egypt "only has a chance when revolutionaries again see the status quo as their enemy, not each other."

She is right: Muslim Brothers can kill more secularists; the military can kill more Muslim Brothers; but another decade of the status quo in Egypt will kill them all. The country will be a human development disaster. With the absence of a true party of reform — that blends respect for religion with a strategy of modernization as the great 19th-century Egyptian reformers did — Egyptians today are being forced to choose not a better way, but between bad ideas.

The Brotherhood posits that "Islam is the answer." The military favors a return to the deep state of old. But more religion alone is not the answer for Egypt today and while the military-dominated deep state may provide law and order and keep Islamists down, it can't provide the kind of fresh thinking and educational, entrepreneurial, social and legal reforms needed to empower and unleash Egypt's considerable human talent and brainpower. In truth, the 2002 U.N. Arab Human Development Report is the answer, which, by the way, was mostly written by Egyptian scholars. It called on Egyptians to focus

on building a politics that can overcome their debilitating deficits of freedom, education and women's empowerment. That is the pathway Egypt needs to pursue — not Mubarakism, Morsi-ism or military rule — and the job of Egypt's friends now is not to cut off aid and censure, but to help it gradually but steadily find that moderate path.

A version of this op-ed appears in print on July 10, 2013, on page A23 of the New York edition with the headline: Egypt At

## AE.21

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/opinion/friedman-syria-is-iraq.html>

The New York Times

OP-ED COLUMNIST

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Published: July 24, 2012 171 Comments

### Syria Is Iraq

Lord knows I am rooting for the opposition forces in Syria to quickly prevail on their own and turn out to be as democratically inclined as we hope. But the *chances* of this best-of-all-possible outcomes is low. That's because Syria is a lot like Iraq. Indeed, Syria is Iraq's twin — a multisectarian, minority-ruled dictatorship that was held together by an iron fist under Baathist ideology. And, for me, the lesson of Iraq is quite simple: You can't go from Saddam to Switzerland without getting stuck in Hobbes — a war of all against all — unless you have a well-armed external midwife, whom everyone on the ground both fears and trusts to manage the transition. In Iraq, that was America. The kind of low-cost, remote-*control*, U.S./NATO midwifery that ousted *Qaddafi* and gave birth to a new Libya is not likely to be repeated in Syria. Syria is harder. Syria is Iraq.

**And Iraq was such a bitter experience for America that we prefer never to speak of it again.** But Iraq is relevant here. The only reason Iraq has any chance for a decent outcome today is because America *was* on the ground with tens of thousands of troops to act as that **well-armed midwife**, reasonably trusted and certainly feared by all sides, to manage Iraq's transition to more *consensual* politics. My gut tells me that Syria will require the same to have the same chance.

But because I absolutely would not advocate U.S. intervention on the ground in Syria or anywhere in the Arab world again — and the U.S. public would not support it — I find myself hoping my analysis is wrong and that *Syrians* will surprise us by finding their own way, with just arms and diplomatic assistance, to a better political future. I know columnists are supposed to pound the table and declaim what is necessary. But when you believe that what is necessary, an outside midwife for Syria, is impossible, you need to say so. I think those who have been advocating a more activist U.S. intervention in Syria — and excoriating President Obama for not leading that — are not being realistic about what it would take to create a decent outcome.

**Why? In the Middle East, the alternative to bad is not always good. It can be worse. I am awed at the bravery of those Syrian rebels who started this uprising, peacefully, without any arms, against a regime that plays by what I call Hama Rules, which are no rules at all. The Assad regime deliberately killed demonstrators to turn this conflict into a sectarian struggle between the ruling minority Alawite sect, led by the Assad clan, and the country's majority of Sunni Muslims. That's**

why the opposite of the Assad dictatorship could be the breakup of Syria — as the Alawites retreat to their coastal redoubt — and a permanent civil war.

There are two things that could divert us from that outcome. One is the Iraq alternative, where America went in and decapitated the Saddam regime, occupied the country and forcibly changed it from a minority Sunni-led dictatorship to a majority Shiite-led democracy. Because of both U.S. incompetence and the nature of Iraq, this U.S. intervention triggered a civil war in which all the parties in Iraq — Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds — tested the new balance of power, inflicting enormous casualties on each other and leading, tragically, to ethnic cleansing that rearranged the country into more homogeneous blocks of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds.

But the U.S. presence in Iraq contained that civil war and ethnic cleansing from spreading to neighboring states. And once that civil war burned itself out — and all sides were exhausted and more separated — the U.S. successfully brokered a new constitution and power-sharing deal in Iraq, with the Shiites enjoying majority rule, the Sunnis out of power but not powerless, and the Kurds securing semi-autonomy. The cost of this transition in lives and money was huge, and even today Iraq is not a stable or healthy democracy. But it has a chance, and it's now up to Iraqis.

Since it is highly unlikely that an armed, feared and trusted midwife will dare enter the fray in Syria, the rebels on the ground there will have to do it themselves. Given Syria's fractured society, that will not be easy — unless there is a surprise. A surprise would be the disparate Syrian opposition groups congealing into a united political front — maybe with the help of U.S., Turkish and Saudi intelligence officers on the ground — and this new front reaching out to moderate Alawites and Christians who supported the Assads out of fear and agreeing to build a new order together that protects majority and minority rights. It would be wonderful to see the tyrannical Assad- Russia-Iran-Hezbollah axis replaced by a democratizing Syria, not a chaotic Syria.

But color me dubious. The 20 percent of Syrians who are pro-Assad Alawites or Christians will be terrified of the new Sunni Muslim majority, with its Muslim Brotherhood component, and this Sunni Muslim majority has suffered such brutality from this regime that reconciliation will be difficult, especially with each passing day of bloodshed. Without an external midwife or a Syrian Mandela, the fires of conflict could burn for a long time. I hope I am surprised.

**AE.22**

<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/new-wars-possible-new-borders-too.aspx?PageID=238&NID=35379&NewsCatID=409>

The Hurriyet daily News

Sub Categories: » HOMEPAGE / OPINION/ **MURAT YETKİN**

November/24/2012

### **New wars possible, new borders too**

Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan warned about a sectarian and *ethnic*-based civil war in Iraq on Nov. 22 and pointed to energy wars as the main motivation behind it. The next day, Iraq's Shiite-origin Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, sent a strong “Not if you trigger it” reply to Erdoğan, only to be snubbed as “delusional” by the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Almost simultaneously, al-Maliki released a photo



showing the deployment of Iraqi troops to Tuzhurmatu in order to face Kurds *piling up* along the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) borders, despite still being part of Iraq on paper.

It is surely about energy resources. There are still untapped oil and natural gas beds in the KRG territory, for which the energy giants of the world - from Exxon and Chevron of the United States to Total of France and Gazprom of Russia (Turkish companies too) - have sealed deals with the KRG President Massoud Barzani in Arbil. Despite the strong protests of al-Maliki in Baghdad and *disapproving lip service from Washington*, D.C., they are not taking any steps back. Al-Maliki knows that if Kurds manage to sell their oil and gas via NATO member Turkey without interference from Arabs, Russians and Iranians, that would mean a *de-facto* change in Iraqi borders and sovereignty, if not de jure.

*But has there been* any conflict in Iraq or generally in the greater Middle East in the last hundred years which was not related to energy interests?

Iraq itself, as a country, is one of *the end results* of the First World War, an outcome of sharing the oil fields of Mesopotamia and the Basra basin as carved out of the dismantling of the Turkish Empire, thanks to the British Empire. That was the first generation of energy wars in the region.

The second generation was during the 1950-60s. Because of the Balance of Terror between the U.S. and the Soviet Union - the Cold War - it was not in the form of wars between the countries. One exception is *Arab countries' attempts to finish off Israel*, which ended with a wider and stronger Israel each time. The rest were in the *form* of regime changes, civil wars and coup d'états in countries like Iran, Iraq, Syria and Egypt. That wave came to an end with the big oil crisis of 1973.

The third generation started with the Iran-Iraq war, right after the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and came to an end in 2003 with *the fall of Saddam Hussein*, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq with the help of the Kurds.

Now there are the pains of a fourth generation dictated by the needs of energy giants to get the marginal benefit of old-world resources before the end of the oil era, which is estimated to come within a few decades.

What is happening in Iraq, Syria, Iran and Israel could be part of that, a hundred years after the start of it. Whenever there have been energy fights, there has been either regime or border changes, or both, in this part of the world. And there is no reason to believe that this time it is going to be different.

November/24/2012

## AE.23

<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ocalan-raises-the-bar-in-turkeys-kurdish-bid.aspx?pageID=517&nID=54570&NewsCatID=409>

The Hurriyet daily News

September/17/2013- MURAT YETKİN

### **Öcalan raises the bar in Turkey's Kurdish bid**

The third round of dialogue between the Turkish government and the *outlawed* Kurdistan Workers' Party (*PKK*) started less than a year ago when Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan decided to send Hakan Fidan, the head of the Turkish intelligence service (*MİT*), to the *PKK's* founding leader, who is imprisoned for life on İmralı island south of Istanbul.



**In the following months**, not only Fidan but MPs from the Peace and Democracy Party (**BDP**), which share the same grassroots as the PKK, paid **10** visits (the latest one on Sept. 15) to Öcalan **in prison** – all of them since January this year.

Öcalan's letter hinting at an end to the PKK's 30-year armed campaign, Erdoğan's calling the dialogue a "peace process" and the beginning of the withdrawal of militants from Turkish territory created hopes for a **political solution** to Turkey's **chronic** Kurdish problem.

Then the "process" started to **slow down**. The PKK started to force the government to rush a legal package through Parliament before the summer recess in July, and the government started to accuse the PKK of just pretending to withdraw militants while actually going after new recruits. The tone escalated mutually as the PKK, especially at the headquarters in the Kandil mountains **of the Kurdish autonomous region in Iraq**, began threatening the government with a restart of actions before eventually announcing the halt of their withdrawal earlier this month.

Erdoğan announced last week that he was to announce a "democratization package" this week, while the Prime Minister's Office denied media reports saying that the draft of the package was first shown to Öcalan before being made public.

The last **BDP** visit to Öcalan took place under such circumstances. The outcome is a statement by Öcalan asking to see more people in prison, not just the **BDP**, but civil society representatives and journalists. And it was impossible not to observe that he insistently used the word "negotiations" instead of "**dialogue**" and said his demands had to be met for the continuation of the process.

What had changed in less than a year to cause Öcalan, in his prison cell, to raise the bar in his dealings with the government?

There are a few reasons. The first is the Syria factor. The PKK's Syria wing, the **PYD**, has successfully distanced itself both from the forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad and from the Free Syrian Army (**FSA**) fighting against them. It carried out its own program to take Kurdish-populated Syrian towns along the border under its control and for that, mainly fought against al-Nusra, the Syria branch of al-Qaeda.

Taking advantage of an end to security operations, thanks to the "**process**," the PKK endorsed its presence in Turkey, especially in the Kurdish-populated southeast, as Turkey approaches critical local elections in March 2014. Knowing that Erdoğan doesn't want any bloodshed before the elections, Öcalan might have thought that he has an upper hand and that it is time to raise the bar.

Now the content of the Turkish government's "**democratization package**" is more important than, say three months before. Will it suggest the lowering of the 10 percent election threshold, enable obligatory education in Kurdish or merely give what Öcalan wants so that he can have better communications and control over his organization and turn his prison cell into his new headquarters?

## **AE.24**

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/04/world/middleeast/anxious-turning-point-for-kurds-in-iraq.html>

The New York Times

By TIM ARANGO

Published: January 3, 2012

***Iraq's Factional Chaos Threatens to Disrupt a Kurdish Haven***

ERBIL, Iraq — For the Kurds here in this ancient city, the rewards of war are numerous and obvious. Construction *cranes* rise from the cityscape. Highway medians are green with shrubbery. A glittering shopping mall with an indoor ice skating rink stands as a totem of American-style consumerism. The only blast walls in sight are those that protect the regional parliament, *decorated by sunflowers painted in muted shades of yellow*.

Among Iraqis, the Kurds *benefited* the most from the war, and now may have the most to lose if the political chaos that followed the departure of American forces metastasizes into civil war.

“Are we worried? Yes, we are worried,” said Barham A. Salih, the prime minister of the Kurdish regional government. “Our national interest as Kurds lies in a democratic, federal, peaceful Iraq. We still have a long way to go before we get there.”

The end of the American military role *here* is an anxious turning point for the Kurds, who were protected by the United States for 20 years, beginning after the Persian Gulf war of 1991, with a humanitarian *operation* and no-fly zone that halted Saddam Hussein’s killing machine. Now, the consolidation of power by Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki evokes painful memories of Kurdish suffering at the hands of a powerful central government in Baghdad. It also places the Kurds in the delicate position of acting as peacemakers between warring Shiite and Sunni Arab factions, a battle in which their own future is at stake.

“Every Kurd yearns for an independent homeland, no doubt,” Mr. Salih said. “But we have also accepted living as part of a democratic, peaceful, federal Iraq. If this hope vanishes, I don’t think the Kurds will be willing to risk what we have.”

The current crisis, which politicians say has brought the country to the brink of civil war, erupted almost two weeks ago, just as the *last* American troops were leaving. Mr. Maliki’s government issued an arrest warrant for Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, the top Sunni politician, accusing him of running an assassination squad. Mr. Hashimi fled north, to the semiautonomous *Kurdish* region, to escape arrest. Mr. Maliki, a Shiite, warned the Kurds that there would be “problems” if they did not turn over Mr. Hashimi.

The Kurds, who have no intention of complying with Mr. Maliki’s demand, were not happy about being dragged into the dispute between Sunnis and Shiites. “We are not part of the problem,” insisted Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdish regional government.

But with the future of postwar Iraq *hanging in the balance*, they cannot avoid being part of the solution. American diplomats, whose influence is vastly diminished here since the American military withdrawal, have called on a Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani, who is president of Iraq, to convene a meeting of Iraq’s leadership.

But so far there is no agreement even on where the meeting should be held: the Kurds say it should be in the north while Mr. Maliki is pushing for Baghdad.

A unity government formed last year at the initiative of the Kurds, which included meaningful roles for all three of Iraq’s main factions, is now teetering. Mr. Maliki has threatened to form a new government controlled by the Shiite majority that would effectively marginalize the Sunnis. To do so, he would need the support of the Kurds in Parliament, an unlikely prospect.

“This would be the most dangerous step,” Mr. Barzani said in an interview at his *sprawling* palace outside Erbil, *surrounded by snow-tipped mountains that have served as the terrain for generations*

*of guerrilla fighters.* “It has to be a partnership between the Shias, the Sunnis and the Kurds. Anything contrary to that would be disastrous.”

**Mr. Salih**, the prime minister, said a Shiite-Kurdish alliance that shut out the Sunnis would mean “the end of Iraq as we know it.”

Depriving the Sunnis, who dominated under Mr. Hussein’s government, of a political voice would be likely to revitalize the Sunni insurgency, which is already showing new signs of life. Four days after the American withdrawal, coordinated bombings in Baghdad killed at least 63 people, the deadliest attack there in more than a year.

The Kurds have no great love for the Sunnis. Even though **the Kurds are mostly Sunni Muslims** themselves, it was the Sunni-Arab government of **Mr. Hussein** that was accused of committing genocide against the Kurds. But they would rather have the Sunni Arabs safely ensconced in a power-sharing government rather than risk renewed violence and instability.

Kurdistan, long a bastion of tolerance and a haven for the aggrieved and oppressed of all stripes, has lately become a sanctuary for Sunnis. Mr. Hashimi remains encamped at Mr. Talabani’s guesthouse in the hills outside Sulaimaniya, where he said he alternated wearing the two suits he packed for a trip he thought would last two days.

Sunni leaders from Diyala Province, a mixed region that has sought greater autonomy from the central government, have also fled to Kurdistan after a crackdown by state security forces.

The Kurds have deep *emotional* ties to the United States, and in many ways they subscribe to the vision of *the pluralistic society* the Americans tried to construct here.

Mr. Salih lived in Washington for years; *his daughter attended Princeton and his son Columbia*. He was close to the writer Christopher Hitchens, who wrote a book on *the Kurdish cause*. Explaining the view of the Sunni elite that leadership is their birthright, Mr. Salih likens them to “the **WASPs** of the United States.”

*Objects that in Baghdad would offend the religious and invite terrorists are abundant here.* Christmas trees were on display at the mall and elsewhere. An American school openly flies an American flag, and not behind blast walls and checkpoints and razor wire. Not a single American soldier died in this region.

“If you ask most Kurds, they will say that America’s military left Iraq too soon,” **Mr. Salih said.**

Kurdish leaders believe in federalism and support the efforts of other provinces, like Diyala and Anbar, both with Sunni majorities, to gain autonomy, a status Mr. Maliki opposes as a threat to Shiite dominance. While most Kurds ultimately wish for their own state, a move toward independence carries the risk of provoking a regional war with Iran, Turkey and Syria, countries with their own substantial Kurdish minorities. These countries would be likely to view an assertion of statehood by Iraqi Kurds as a provocation.

For now at least, the Kurds see their best hope in maintaining their autonomy within a united Iraq.

“If Iraq ends up being broken apart, it’s not because the Kurds wanted it,” said Dr. Najmaldin Karim, an American citizen from Silver Spring, Md., who is now the governor of Kirkuk, a city divided by Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen. “It’s because the others couldn’t get along.”

## AE.25

<http://www.socialistinternational.org/viewArticle.cfm?ArticleID=2224>

### THE KURDISH PEOPLE

#### **SI Committee on Kurdish People in Sulaimaniya**

12 APRIL 2013

The **SI** Committee on the Kurdish People, established by the Council following a decision by the **Congress**, held its first meeting in Sulaimaniya, **on Friday** 12 April 2013. It was hosted by the **SI** member Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, PUK, and brought together participants from more than twenty Kurdish political parties and organisations from Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. (List of Participants)

At the opening of the **meeting**, the **SI** Secretary General Luis Ayala paid tribute to HE Jalal Talabani, President of Iraq, **PUK** leader and an **SI** Vice-President, with whom he had discussed the holding of this meeting. Talabani's **absence** was strongly felt and during the discussions participants joined Ayala in wishing President Talabani a speedy recovery.

Luis Ayala went on to express satisfaction that this Committee was now a reality. The politics and **agendas** of the various Kurdish parties throughout the region were varied, he said, but the cause was the same: rights, freedoms, democracy, and solidarity. Human rights could not be trampled on and they needed to be for all, not just for some. He underlined the firm commitment of the Socialist International in this regard. Commenting on the wave of change underway in the Middle East, he said this was the time for politics and **dialogue**. Kurds in Iraq had come a long way in gaining rights and freedoms for their people since the fall of Saddam Hussein ten years before, but important issues remained. Intimidation by Baghdad over Kirkuk was unacceptable, Article 140 of the constitution needed to be implemented and democracy needed to be respected. He referred to the grave situation in Syria and looked forward to hearing first hand from our Kurdish friends there on recent developments, and from our members from the BDP on the latest initiatives in Turkey, an issue at the center of concerns of Kurdish people everywhere. The situation in Iran regarding the Kurdish population could not be more urgent today than it has been for years and he hoped that headway could be made there soon. He reiterated that they could count on the solidarity of the Socialist International and its members worldwide.

Mala Bakhtiar, Head of the Political Bureau of the **PUK**, warmly welcomed all participants on behalf of his party. He hailed this initiative of the Socialist International and expressed thanks to the Secretary General. Until now, he said, Kurds in the Middle East have been voiceless, divided and friendless. With this new Committee he hoped it would bring people together and provide a sanctuary for their cause. After a long struggle the **PUK** had gained full membership in the SI and he wished the same for other Kurdish parties. There were many changes in the Middle East, Bakhtiar said, and many people struggling for a better life. The time was over for governments to dictate to the people and democracy was now moving forward in the region. Resolving the cause of the Kurdish people in all four parts of Kurdistan was key to achieving peace and democracy in the Middle East, he said, and the role of the Socialist International would be crucial in bringing a greater understanding of this issue to all corners of the world. He was pleased that with this new Committee there was a platform for setting a strategy among the Kurdish political parties. He hoped in the future other parties of Kurdistan will also convene in peace and freedom.

In open and frank discussions, all the parties present took part in the debates, describing their respective positions and viewpoints. All participants enthusiastically welcomed the convening of this meeting, calling it a historic moment. There were strong expressions of recognition and gratitude to the SI for its

long record in supporting the Kurdish cause and for this re-launching of its commitment to achieving justice for the Kurdish people and moving forward their agenda for rights and freedoms. The Committee should be an open forum, bringing together Kurdish parties committed to the achievement of those goals in a democratic framework. It was stressed that all Kurdish parties needed to be supportive of each other and should meet more often. The changing environment in the Middle East and the many crises in existence required that the Kurds be united and have a common strategy. This committee was seen as a welcome first step in that direction.

In regard to Iraq, on the 10th anniversary of the liberation of the Kurdish people from Saddam Hussein's dictatorial regime, it was noted that although there was democracy, peace and stability in the Kurdish region, problems with the national government remained. There was the status of the province of Kirkuk, which was administratively under the control of Baghdad, there was the outstanding problem of the lack of implementation of Article 140 of the constitution which affected Kirkuk and was a violation of the rights of the Kurdish people; there were matters relating to the national budget, issues with the parliament in Baghdad, and the increasing danger of sectarianism and terrorism. The situation of Kirkuk was of particular concern, where Baghdad's build-up of military presence on the borders was seen as attempts at intimidation and increasing control. It was pointed out that the Governing Council of Kirkuk was the same as it had been since 2005, as Baghdad has consistently refused to allow new elections. The SI Secretary General, in a statement to the press after the meeting, underlined that nothing less than the withdrawal of troops, the proper implementation of Article 140 of the constitution and the holding of free and fair elections was acceptable.

Participants from the Kurdish parties from Iran reported that the repression and suffering of the Kurdish population in that country continues. The obligation of the international community to keep up the pressure for recognising their rights without delay was underlined and it was hoped that through this SI Committee, international public awareness could be focused on their plight. The parties there were encouraged to intensify their cooperation with each other and work together in unity, and in this sense there was a particular appeal to the PDKI and the KDP who participate in the work of the SI.

The Committee heard from the BDP of Turkey that the new process underway with the Turkish government was seen as a chance for finding a peaceful solution. It was still in its early stages, but there was cause for optimism and they were looking forward to drawing up a new legal framework for the Kurds. They wanted democratic autonomy, maintaining good relations with other parts of Kurdistan. The importance of support from the international community for the success of these talks was underlined, as they were seen as crucial for the whole region. A signal from the international community to the Turkish government in support of the peace process was considered useful.

The situation of the Kurds in Syria had reached a unique phase and they were today fighting alongside the rebels, against the Assad regime. The Kurdish participants from Syria reported that they were working together, and for the first time they have areas secured under their control. They were seeking a federal system within Syria and asked for backing and help in this endeavour. There was concern expressed about what type of regime would replace that of Assad, particularly if it would be a fundamentalist one. The US and Europe were perceived as not acting decisively enough in helping the opposition to bring an end to the Assad regime for the same reason. They appealed to the SI for global support in keeping up international pressure on the opposition to recognise now the rights of the Kurds in Syria. It was considered important not to let happen in Syria what had happened in Iraq, in that everyone let the regime fall first and left the Kurdish issue to be sorted out later.

With the changes sweeping across the Middle East in the 'Arab Spring', the Kurdish populations were also mobilised to gain their rights and freedoms. Rather than armed conflict, theirs should be a civil struggle, and dialogue for peace should never cease. Another area of importance that was included in the

discussions was the role of women. Political parties and institutions of the Kurdish people should increase their representation of women, as our political family was committed to gender equality and the empowerment of women.

Following the decision by the SI Council that committees would elect their own chairs and vice-chairs, and after consultations among the Kurdish member parties of the SI, a proposal was put forward. Mala Bakhtiar from the PUK was elected as Chair of the Committee, with Nazmi Gur from the BDP Turkey and Loghman Ahmedi from the PDKI Iran as Vice-chairs, understanding that a process is open between the PDKI and the KDP of Iran for increased cooperation and unity.

It was confirmed that the SI Committee on the Kurdish People should constitute a platform for the Kurdish members of the SI along with other invited parties, like on this occasion, which included guest parties represented in the Kurdistan Parliament-Iraq and other parties following consultations, and in agreement with the hosts. The Committee will meet periodically and report regularly to the Council of the SI, working within the structures of the Socialist International and in accordance with its policies.

The meeting also agreed that the Socialist International would organise an international conference on the Kurdish people late in the year, at the headquarters of one of the international institutions with which the SI cooperates and has a recognised status.

In the days immediately prior to these discussions in Sulaimaniya, the SI Secretary General held a series of meetings. These included with the Head of the Political Bureau of the SI member PUK, Mala Bakhtiar; the President of the Iraqi Kurdish Parliament, Arsalan Baiz; the Governor of Kirkuk, Najmaddin Karim; and the General Secretary of the Ministry of Peshmerga and Spokesman for the General Command of the KRG, Jabar Yawar Manda. The SI Secretary General also held a special meeting with HE Massoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Regional Government and leader of the KDP Iraq, on the current situation in the region and relations with the national government in Baghdad.

## AE.26

<http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/05/05/iraq-m05.html>

### **Iraq election sets stage for protracted civil strife**

By Jean Shaoul

5 May 2014

Iraqis went to the polls on Wednesday to elect a new parliament and government under conditions of a virtual civil war, terrorist bombings and sectarian tensions stoked by all the political factions and their external backers, who are fighting for control over Iraq's vast energy resources.

Iraq has the fifth largest oil reserves in the world and is the second largest producer among the *OPEC* nations, having just passed Iran and trailing only Saudi Arabia.

The government deployed troops and security forces, with Peshmerga forces patrolling the Kurdish autonomous zone in the north of the country, and enforced a curfew and ban on traffic in the *capital* Baghdad, in an effort to prevent car bombs and suicide attacks from deterring voters from going to the polling stations.

In the run up to the elections, there have been at least 40 attacks, with bombs targeting electoral rallies in *Baghdad, Khanaqin and Diyala*. On April 28, the day when Iraq's security forces voted, seven polling stations were attacked in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Anbar province, Salahuddin province, and Mosul, with a loss of more than 50 lives. The *Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)*, an al-Qaeda affiliate, has claimed responsibility for many of the attacks.

Only 70 percent of polling stations in insecure areas of Anbar Province, parts of which are controlled by

Sunni Islamist, tribal and al-Qaeda *militias*, were open, while other polling stations in the insecure areas of Baghdad, Mosul and Diyala were closed.

This is the first general election since the US and its allies withdrew from Iraq at the end of 2011 after failing to secure a *guarantee* of legal *immunity* for the remaining US troops. The Iraqi people were left to deal with the bitter legacy of a criminal war to topple the Saddam Hussein regime and a nearly nine-year military occupation that destroyed Iraq's basic infrastructure.

The result is soaring unrest over unemployment, poverty, lack of basic services such as electricity, clean water and freedom from flooding, corruption, and a rising tide of violence that has claimed more than 2,000 lives in the first three months of this year, and 750 lives in April alone.

Far from anticipating any improvement in their conditions, both voters and commentators believe that the elections are unlikely to resolve the severe political and social crisis that is the legacy of 35 years of war and *imperialist* intervention. *On the contrary, there is open speculation that these elections might be the last under a nominally unified state.*

Iraq's complicated proportional representation system means that the official results are not expected till mid-May. With more than 9,000 candidates from numerous electoral alliances on the ballot for 328 parliamentary seats, no one party is expected to win an outright majority. While Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki continues to dominate his Shi'ite-based State of Law coalition, the remaining Shi'ite, Sunni and Kurdish parties and alliances have splintered and formed new alliances and blocs.

There have been numerous allegations of foul play in the electoral *process*. According to Ayad Allawi, a former prime minister and leader of the Iraqiya List, which won the most seats in parliament in 2010, 38 candidates from his political bloc were barred from running in the elections. The Electoral *Commission* claimed that it had disqualified 34 candidates from all parties.

All the political factions and cliques have played the sectarian card. Not one of them has addressed the dreadful economic and social conditions facing the vast majority of the population, even as oil production and revenues increase. According to *the Economist Intelligence Unit*, the draft Iraqi budget for 2014 "anticipates average exports of 3.4m barrels/day (b/d), up 1m *b/d* from the previous year."

The mounting poverty is the direct result of al-Maliki's government, installed under the US occupation, which has promoted free market policies and introduced legislation outlawing the organisation of workers and unions to fight for higher wages and better conditions.

While al-Maliki's bloc is expected to win the highest number of votes, he will need to form some kind of coalition to gain an overall majority in parliament and a third term *in office*. This will entail a *process* of political horse-trading that could take months. But even this is not assured, as the bloc which won the highest vote total in the 2010 elections, Allawi's Iraqiya List, was unable to form a government, giving way after seven months to a coalition led by al-Maliki.

Al-Maliki has played the role of the strongman, claiming that he is the only one capable of uniting Iraq. The very opposite is the case. Taking his lead from the US occupation, his government has stoked the sectarian tensions between the majority Shi'ites and minority Sunnis, who live predominantly in the west of the country, to rally Shi'ite support in advance of the elections. He has purged leading Sunni politicians, cracked down on the population, branding all protests the work of al-Qaeda, and accused Saudi Arabia of funding the militias.

Following the arrest of a prominent Sunni politician, the killing of his brother and five bodyguards, and the breakup of a year-long protest camp, civil war has been raging in Anbar Province for four months between government forces and tribal, local and Sunni Islamist militias who oppose both the government and each other.

According to *the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)*, this new "Iraqi insurgency" comprises at least 12 major organizations and possibly up to 40 distinct groups. It estimates that less than 10 percent are non-Iraqi foreign insurgents, a fact that both Baghdad and Washington downplay.

But as a result of the fighting, more than 400,000 Iraqis have been forced to flee their homes, while the Anbar *capital*, Ramadi, remains contested and Fallujah is under the control of insurgents.

The supposed threat from al-Qaeda, however, is very much the product of Washington and its regional

allies' sponsorship of **Sunni Islamist militias** in neighboring Syria, including ISIS and al-Nusra, to topple the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, as part of its wider project of isolating Iran and curtailing the influence of Russia and China in the Middle East.

The Obama administration, with supreme *cynicism*, is using the threat of al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq as a pretext to arm the al-Maliki government and thus control Iraq and its resources. At the same time, it is boosting its teams of specialists working under *contract* to the Iraqi government to provide security, military training, and intelligence analysis, as well as commercial, energy and construction projects. While Secretary of State John Kerry ruled out putting "*American boots*" on the ground, he has delegated the task to the Pentagon's sub-contractors, which, according to figures cited by the *Wall Street Journal*, numbered more than 12,500 in January 2013.

Tensions have also risen between the al-Maliki regime and the Kurdistan Regional Government, which has sought to export oil directly, cutting Baghdad out of any share of the proceeds, prompting fears of outright secession. Such is the bitter factional rivalry that conflicts over borders and rights to oil and gas wealth threaten to break out into civil war there too.

Al-Maliki has consolidated power into his own hands, holding four positions simultaneously—prime minister, defence minister, interior minister and head of national security—putting 930,000 security personnel at his disposal. This was ostensibly because he could not get parliamentary approval for appointees to those cabinet positions. He also has the judiciary under his thumb. As a result, he was able to use the courts to overturn a law introduced by parliament that would have prevented him for running for a third term.

Eleven years after the US invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iraq has a tyrannical government with the third highest execution rate in the world. *Human Rights Watch* in its 2013 Report Iraq: a Broken Justice System, described the al-Maliki government as using "draconian measures against opposition politicians, detainees, demonstrators and journalists, effectively squeezing the space for independent civil society and political freedoms ... the Iraqi people today face a government that is slipping further into authoritarianism and doing little to make them safer."

Weeks before the elections, the cabinet endorsed a "National Safety" bill, which defines a "state of emergency" and gives near-absolute powers to the Prime Minister to determine what constitutes an emergency, prompting widespread fears that the government could use the law to eliminate its opponents.

The conflicts instigated in Iraq by Washington, Britain, France and their regional allies are creating the conditions for the break-up of the country and a far wider conflagration that will embroil not just Iraq, but Syria, Lebanon and the Gulf petro-states.

## AE.27

<http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/turkey-eyes-syrian-crisis-through-lens-of-kurdish-stability>

### Turkey eyes Syrian crisis through lens of Kurdish *stability*

Maria Fantappie

March 23, 2012

Read more: <http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/turkey-eyes-syrian-crisis-through-lens-of-kurdish-stability#ixzz3K4hicHVP>

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Turkey appears to be keeping all options open for intervening in Syria - even arming the *opposition*. But *Ankara's* failure to monitor the development of the Kurdish issue in Syria, and Bashar Al Assad's struggle for power, have left room for others to instil their *agendas* there.

In Syria's Kurdish-populated areas, the *Turkish* Kurdistan Workers' Party, the PKK, is expanding its military front against Turkey. Leaders in Iraqi Kurdistan are stretching their political influence and campaigning for the establishment of a Kurdish region in Syria.



The PKK and Iraqi Kurdish *agendas* in Syria could open a Pandora's box of the Kurdish issue in Turkey, furthering Kurdish demands for autonomy and bolstering armed struggle. Turkey is in a state of alarm. It is using all means to influence the situation in Syria to avoid a domestic crisis of its own.

Turkey sees the Kurdish question as the most important threat to its stability. Kurds account for nearly 20 per cent of the Turkish population, and their demands range from the recognition of Kurdish cultural rights to the secession of the Kurdish-populated areas from the Turkish state. Since 2007, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan sought to mitigate this question by granting Kurds some cultural rights, yet still preventing them from attaining significant autonomy and combating separatism.

Turkey saw the fall of the Assad regime as an opportunity to influence Syria's Kurds. Turkey had hoped to oversee negotiations on the Kurdish issue by hosting the Syrian National Council *on its soil*. Ideally, after Mr Al Assad fell, Kurdish rights would be recognised within "the unity of the Syrian state". Thus, Syria's Kurds would be prevented from gaining any form of *autonomy*, the PKK's branch in Syria - the Democratic Union Party (*PYD*) - would be undermined, and Turkey's own Kurdish separatist movement would not be further inflamed. Turkey was relying on the Iraqi Kurds to *leverage* the Syrian Kurdish parties to accept negotiations.

But Turkey's strategy backfired. Mr Al Assad has not fallen as Turkey wished. The Iraqi Kurds are pushing for their own *agenda* and Mr Al Assad is fighting back by allowing the PKK free rein in Syria. The Syrian National Council failed to attract and retain Kurdish members. In January, Kurdish parties withdrew their membership from *the Syrian opposition*, and 11 of them eventually gathered in the Kurdish National Council *under the Iraqi Kurdish umbrella*. The Syrian National Council was left with only a few Kurdish members and without *legitimacy* to form the basis of negotiations.

Under the auspices of the Kurdish National Council, the Iraqi Kurds have expanded their political grip over the Syrian Kurdish parties. Although Kurdish demands in Syria were previously limited to decentralisation, the Kurdish National Council's executive body is calling for a higher degree of *autonomy* - applying the Iraqi *vision* of a Kurdish region to Syria.

As the Syrian crisis drags on, the Iraqi Kurds are empowering the Kurdish National Council as the sole representative of Kurdish demands. The Iraqi Kurds are aware that any political entity aspiring to govern Syria in the near future would need the Kurds in order to establish itself as a *legitimate* power. The council may raise the stakes and deal only with a counterpart that will accept its demands for a large degree of *autonomy*.

The PKK is also furthering its agenda and has found in Mr Al Assad a willing ally to consolidate and expand its military front across the Syrian frontier. In the past few months, the party has had carte blanche to conduct its activities in the northwest Syrian district of Afrin, *in Aleppo*. From Afrin, the *PYD* is expanding east and opening new offices in the Syrian-Turkish border cities of Ras Al Ayn and Ayn Al Arab. The PKK may now use the expansion of its Syrian branch to establish a military front that stretches from western Syria to eastern Iraq.

The escalation of the Syrian crisis into a long-term civil conflict provides the best opportunity for the PKK in particular to consolidate its influence and proliferate within Syria. As the Assad regime persists in its struggle to hold onto power, it could grant even more leeway to the PYD as its anchor for maintaining control of the northern Syrian Kurdish areas. If the armed conflict engulfs the Kurdish areas, it could help the PYD grow roots in the region. Being the only Syrian Kurdish party to bear weapons, the PYD could try to gain *legitimacy* as the protector of Kurdish civilians.

Turkey has tried to step into the Syrian crisis under the guise of an international front. But so far support for intervention, both military and humanitarian, has been met with resistance.

Therefore, a newly empowered Syrian National Council could be Turkey's best route to penetrate Syria and reinstate some degree of control over the Kurdish issue.

The Syrian National Council is now opening a military bureau, which should be in charge of organising the Free Syrian Army against the regime. Through this body, Turkey could attempt to channel the support of the Free Syrian Army, secure its loyalty in keeping the northern Syrian provinces under control, and halt the military advancement of the **PKK**.

Turkey might also hope to recast the Syrian National Council as the sole legitimate *opposition* body in

Syria, in order to bring the Kurdish members back into its fold, and regain oversight of negotiations on the Kurdish issue in Syria.

Channelling armed support through the Syrian National Council might serve Turkey's interest in stemming the **PKK** and Iraqi Kurdish agendas. But instead of helping the Syrian revolution to achieve the regime's downfall, Turkey risks plunging Syria into an extended domestic conflict.

Maria Fantappie is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut

## AE.28

[http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/22/america\\_needs\\_a\\_kurdish\\_policy](http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/22/america_needs_a_kurdish_policy)

Shadow Government

### **America needs a Kurdish policy**

BY John Hannah

MARCH 22, 2012 - 11:30 AM

Among the Iraq-related anniversaries to consider, here's one more: Twenty-one years ago this week, millions of Iraqi Kurds set flight for the desolate, snow-capped mountains bordering Turkey and Iran, frantically seeking to escape the advancing armies of Saddam Hussein. Fresh off his humiliating defeat in the first Gulf War, Saddam had quickly trained his guns on wiping out all internal **opposition** to his tyrannical rule.

Where the Kurds were concerned, his purpose seemed clear. Saddam aimed to eliminate once and for all the persistent challenge this proud, irrepressible minority had long posed to his dictatorship. **Genocide** was on tap, the completion of a job begun in 1988, when Iraqi forces razed thousands of Kurdish villages, murdered their inhabitants, and rained chemical weapons down on the innocent men, women and children of a town called Halabja.

Now, with their backs literally to the wall, freezing to death on a barren mountainside, facing Saddam's full **vengeance**, the Kurds' destruction seemed nigh.

Until, that is: America. Said. No. Working with a small group of allies, the United States, quite simply, saved the Kurds. Saddam's army was ordered to stand down or face renewed hostilities. U.S. ground forces deployed to northern Iraq and organized one of history's greatest humanitarian rescues, Operation Provide Comfort. A no-fly zone was established over Kurdistan, which U.S. aircraft **patrolled** until 2003, when America finally settled its score with Saddam for good, liberating almost 30 million people from his republic of fear, including **the long-suffering** Kurds.

***It's a story of deliverance and American leadership well worth recalling, especially this year.*** For the first time in a generation, Iraq's Kurds find themselves without direct American protection. President Obama's decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq has once again left the Kurds **largely alone**. While no longer confronting Saddam's terror, the long shadow of their anguished history remains, as do unresolved tensions not only with Iraq's majority Arabs, but with powerful neighbors in Iran, Syria and Turkey struggling with disadvantaged Kurdish minorities of their own.

It's a mix of fear, loathing and foreign meddling that, left untended, could easily lead to conflict and even war -- both inside Iraq and, perhaps, regionally. That, indeed, would be tragic -- for the often-betrayed Kurds, to be sure, but also for the prestige and long-term interests of their main benefactor, the United States.

Say what you will about the American project in Iraq, its application in Kurdistan was well down the path toward success. As happened in Germany, Japan and South Korea after World War II, a few decades of intense American engagement had begun working wonders for the Kurds. Excellent security -- indeed, not a single U.S. combat death in areas under Kurdish control. A booming economy with growing levels of foreign investment. And an emerging **democracy** that, while far from **perfect**, has seen real **opposition** parties emerge, as well as a burgeoning civil society and media. Yes, corruption, lack of accountability, and uneven development remain **serious problems**. But certainly no worse than, say, South Korea circa

the 1970s, at a similar point in that country's experience under America's wing.

Properly nourished, Iraqi Kurdistan has all the makings of a U.S. strategic asset. Iraq's Arabs may have been profoundly ambivalent about a continued role for American troops. But not the Kurds, whose leaders loudly proclaimed their desire for a permanent U.S. presence, and whose population of some 5 million is overwhelmingly pro-American. Sharing borders with Iran and Syria, Kurdistan could play a vital role in U.S. strategy to combat the serious threats now emanating from those anti-American regimes. Kurdish security and intelligence forces are competent and battle-hardened, and after years of cooperation have built up excellent working relations with their U.S. counterparts, including in fighting Al Qaeda. And sitting atop 40-50 billion barrels of oil, Kurdistan is poised to become one of the world's largest petroleum producers, a major contributor to global energy security.

Confident in its U.S. backing, Kurdistan could serve as both engine and anchor for the rest of Iraq's *democratic* development. But America's precipitous retreat has left behind a dangerous vacuum, a potential breeding ground for destructive acts of self-help that could easily spiral out of control. That vacuum urgently needs to be filled by a concerted American strategy to define a new, "special" relationship with Iraq's Kurds. Making clear that Kurdistan's well-being within a truly federal Iraq is a high U.S. *priority* could serve both to deter potential aggressors while encouraging Kurdish restraint, patience and cooperation in dealing with the turmoil of Baghdad's day-to-day politics.

When *Kurdish President Masoud Barzani* visits Washington next month, the Obama administration would be well advised to use the opportunity to establish a new Joint Commission on U.S.-Kurdish relations to oversee the bilateral relationship, composed of high-level officials from both sides. America's consulate in Kurdistan should be led by a senior foreign service officer of ambassadorial rank, perhaps seconded by a retired *general*. Under the rubric of U.S. security assistance for Iraq, programs for equipping and training Kurdish security and intelligence services should be established, including robust channels for information sharing and other cooperative efforts. A joint initiative to expand dramatically American investment in Kurdistan needs to be launched, with a focus on expediting the region's emergence as a reliable energy exporter to Western markets. Technical assistance should be provided to support Kurdish efforts to battle corruption, strengthen the rule of law, and ensure human rights.

More than two decades after saving Iraq's Kurds from annihilation, it's time for America to institutionalize a long-term strategic relationship with them -- one that understands that a secure and prosperous Kurdistan, confident in its ties to the world's sole superpower, can be a boon to U.S. interests, and a force for stability and *modernism* throughout Iraq and the broader Middle East.

AE.29

[http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/gokhan-bacik/the-political-geography-of-the-kurds\\_278235.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/gokhan-bacik/the-political-geography-of-the-kurds_278235.html)

### The political geography of the Kurds

GÖKHAN BACIK

April 22, 2012, Sunday

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has changed Turkey's position vis-à-vis the Kurds dramatically. Maliki's grand ambition is to *geopolitically* realign Iraq with its historical Shiite ideology, alongside Iran. Such a strategy, although criticized by some countries such as Turkey, is not totally baseless. The Shiites have a clear majority in Iraq. More, the US-led Western intervention destroyed the Iraqi state and nation and opened the way to the present-day sectarianism.

Even though Maliki's strategy is fraught with danger in the long term with regards to Iraqi unity, it forces Turkey towards a more *realistic* approach to the Kurdish problem. For example, Turkey has now realized that its prime interests in the region require strong cooperation with the Kurds in Iraq. Although Turkey will not take any action that would further disrupt Iraqi unity, it will not hesitate to deepen its *engagement* with the Kurdish region despite the resistance from Baghdad. *Ankara's* cooperation with

Massoud Barzani, the leader of the Iraqi Kurdish Autonomous Region, will indeed reduce regional pressures on Turkey. But is that enough to overcome the Kurdish problem itself?

Before venturing to answer, one should analyze the political geography of the Kurds. Today, Kurds live in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. None of these countries has developed an efficient strategy to incorporate them as equal citizens. Thus, with regard to the Kurdish issue, all these states have failed. However, more critical is the political stratification of the Kurds. In general, Kurds have long been categorized as either traditional or *modern*. For instance, the Naqshbandi, an Islamic religious order, was very influential among Turkey's Kurds but was almost devastated by the Kemalist regime, particularly after the 1960 coup. If Kemalism had an ounce of *sociological* wisdom, it would not have brought its struggle with Islam to the Kurdish regions of Turkey.

The differentiation that produced the labels "traditional" and "*modern*" was more *sociological* in kind, linked to Islam and urbanization, respectively. As expected, the traditional Kurdish base, strongly linked to Islam, was characteristically silent on political issues. So it was from the *modern* group, the urban Kurds of *Turkey*, that the first generation of Kurdish nationalists emerged. These urban Kurds, no longer part of their traditional setting, took to *nationalism* instantly. Paradoxically, this recourse voiced itself in leftist and *secular* jargon, that being its only option thanks to the political poverty in Turkey on the Kurdish issue of *conservative* and right-wing politicians alike. Unlike in Turkey, Kurdish *nationalism* in Iraq was championed by *Barzani-like traditional religious groups*. Therefore, the Kurdish political geography has two major *models*: Kurdish *nationalism* through the traditional elites (the Barzani *model*) and Kurdish *nationalism* through the *secular* elites (the Öcalan *model*).

The foregoing tableau presents a serious question to Turkey: Who will persuade the Kurds in Turkey to move away from the Öcalan *model*? So far, the struggle in this matter has been in the domain of the Turkish security apparatus. Additionally, the Turkish state includes no Kurdish organization, nor does it offer any Kurdish *alternative*. Governors, military officers and other public figures have limited roles in such issues. *Like many others, the Turkish state, as a Weberian machine*, stops at 4 p.m., but life in all its complexity goes on. In other words, Turkey has failed to generate an *alternative model* to counterbalance the Öcalan *model*. Thus, despite its inner problems (such as authoritarianism, corruption and even terrorism), the Öcalan *model* has a virtual monopoly of influence on the Kurds of Turkey. There is no other model.

That is why it is not surprising to observe that in today's Qamishli, a northern Kurdish city in Syria, Kurds are not divided over being pro- or anti-Assad. They are divided over being pro- or anti-Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

So what is the answer? The answer is "no." Turkey, including the *conservatives* and the Kemalists, has no political or social capacity to solve the Kurdish problem and will not have it unless it does something revolutionary to produce that capacity.

### AE.30

[http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/lale-kemal/new-kurdish-strategy-reveals-divisions-within-government\\_276171.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/lale-kemal/new-kurdish-strategy-reveals-divisions-within-government_276171.html)

Today Zaman

#### New Kurdish strategy reveals divisions within government

LALE KEMAL

April 02, 2012, Monday

Confusing remarks being made lately by senior government officials over *a much-debated controversial strategy*, presented *as Turkey's new Kurdish and terrorism plan*, have shown that a divergence of opinion exists among government members over the country's future Kurdish policy.

Hüseyin Çelik, spokesperson for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and *one of the deputy heads of the party*, ruled out the existence of a new plan during an interview with a TV channel. He, at the same time, *confirmed* that some elements of the plan have already been in force and that it

was not new.

Some Turkish journalists -- including me -- ran a story on March 22, quoting an unnamed senior bureaucrat who disclosed a package of new measures in Turkey's strategy in the fight against terrorism while addressing the Kurdish question. This senior bureaucrat said the new strategy is being adopted now by the government.

In short, the new strategy excludes the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) from any future talks that will be held to find a peaceful solution to end terrorism. It, instead, envisages the pro-Kurdish and democratically elected Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) acting as a legitimate interlocutor of the state in any negotiations aimed at solving the Kurdish and PKK problem peacefully. Hence, the new plan abandons any possible repetition of the famous Oslo peace talks that took place between PKK representatives and senior officials of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT).

Only Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has confirmed the plan, two days after it was published in the dailies, *when he stated, "The fight against the PKK will continue while negotiations to solve the Kurdish question will be held with its [the PKK's] political extension [the BDP] in Parliament."* However, he urged the BDP to end its ties with the PKK.

Except for Erdoğan, nobody from within the government made any comments on the press reports of a new Kurdish strategy until March 29. That day -- six days after we, some journalists, ran the strategy -- Çelik told Habertürk TV channel that there was no new strategy.

He said: "I asked all of the related ministers -- i.e., Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay, *in charge of the Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security (KDGM), tasked to gather intelligence information on PKK activities and contribute to an effective fight against the terrorist organization*, as well as Interior Minister İdris Naim Şahin -- about the new plan. They all denied its existence. I am the spokesperson of the party, and I do not know about the new plan either."

Çelik, instead, blamed the journalists who covered the story *quoting their source for making up a story on what he called an alleged new strategy*. He, however, contradicted himself when he stated that Turkey has already been implementing a plan that includes some elements of the new strategy. This includes a *resumption* of the fight against the PKK, mainly in the Kurdish-dominated southeastern parts of Turkey, where *the organization's bases are continuing to be destroyed through operations* since summer of last year.

Turkey has, since *then*, come under criticism for returning to its security-first policies after the collapse of the Kurdish opening process initiated in 2009 by the government and *which was aimed at finding a peaceful settlement to the terrorism problem*.

*Prime Minister Erdoğan's confirmation of the new strategy, which the dailies ran recently, and Çelik's remarks that none of the related ministers were aware of it have, in the meantime, revealed a divergence of opinion within the government over the new Kurdish strategy.*

I had found out that a small team within the government, which included Erdoğan, finalized a road map to *tackle* the Kurdish and PKK problems. Among this small team was the senior bureaucrat who talked to us, as well as AK Party Deputy Yalçın Akdoğan, who was a former advisor to Erdoğan, as well as Interior Minister Şahin. Although Çelik denied that Şahin knew about the plan, it was his ministry that was already enforcing the new strategy, which is based on fighting the PKK while implementing *democratic* reforms in a wider sense. But the plan neglects to address specific Kurdish demands, such as gaining the right to learn Kurdish as a second language in schools.

Another group within the government is led by Deputy Prime Minister Atalay, who initiated the 2009 *Kurdish opening process* when he was interior minister *but which is dead now*, and this group has reportedly been opposing the new Kurdish strategy because it puts too much emphasis on security policies. Hakan Fidan, undersecretary of MİT, is included in the Atalay team.

*The supporters of the new Kurdish strategy are of the opinion that the Oslo negotiations conducted between MİT and PKK representatives in Europe were mismanaged and failed. It is also true that the PKK spoiled the Oslo talks and thwarted the government's peaceful approach by waging violent attacks last July in the midst of negotiations.*

The team led by Erdoğan, not Atalay, is now understood to have put their stamp on the new Kurdish strategy that is underway. This is because the government has given *priority* to the security policies which the Atalay team has been opposing.

### AE.31

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-16/kurds-may-lead-the-way-for-the-arab-spring-meghan-l-o-sullivan.html>

### **Kurds May Lead the Way for the Arab Spring:**

By Meghan L. O'Sullivan Jun 16, 2011 5:01 AM GMT

As change sweeps the Middle East, euphoria has slowly given way to anxiety that the tumult will benefit extremist religious groups with anti-Western or anti- *modernization agendas*.

Optimists *rightly* point to several dynamics that may curb the influence of such groups, such as the *secular* nature of many of the forces that have dislodged old regimes and the relative lack of public support that extremists have thus far garnered.

Yet few have focused on another development that could help promote moderation in the region: **the tentative**, but growing, role of the region's Kurdish population.

Policy makers in the U.S. and Europe need to set aside their traditional way of viewing the world exclusively as a collection of nation-states; recognize the possibilities and risks behind Kurdish empowerment; and craft a strategy to encourage this pro-Western population to gain more influence in the region without provoking a backlash.

The history of the Kurds in the Middle East is a seemingly endless *tale* of oppression, thwarted ambitions and tragedy. Totalling more than 30 million, the Kurds of the Middle East -- who are overwhelmingly Muslim and *ethnically* distinct from Arabs, Persians and Turks -- have long fought for autonomy from hostile governments or even outright independence.

The hardships of the Kurds of Iraq are perhaps the most infamous, involving *genocidal* chemical attacks by Saddam Hussein in the 1980s. Next door in Syria, about 2 million Kurds have struggled to preserve their *ethnic* identity against laws banning their language, and other government acts to force assimilation. (Many had long been denied Syrian citizenship, effectively rendering them stateless, until early April when President Bashar al-Assad granted nationality to 300,000 in an effort to shore up his teetering government.)

### Across the Region

Turkey's approximately 15 million Kurds, a small minority of which have waged *a terrorist campaign* against the government, claim a history of rebellion, open war and forced relocation by the Turkish military. Iran's more than 5 million Kurds enjoy more linguistic rights than in other countries, but also have clashed violently with the state.

For all their historic suffering, a series of developments may now be changing the fortune of the Kurds in fundamental ways. The Kurds in Iraq, who gained effective autonomy after the 1991 gulf war, have reaped tremendous benefits from *Saddam Hussein's fall* in 2003 and the subsequent efforts to build a new political system. Kurdish parties now wield significant power in Baghdad, having been a key coalition partner of every government. A Kurd, Jalal Talabani, has been president of Iraq since 2005.

### Retaining Autonomy

The Kurds maintain a high degree of political and cultural autonomy under the Kurdistan Regional

Government in the north of Iraq. Although they must address issues of governance and participatory politics to maintain their momentum, their economy is booming, and any visitor to the Kurdish region of Iraq will be impressed by the public investment, infrastructure projects and new *businesses* visible at every turn.

Other Kurdish gains across the region are more tentative, but have the potential to be equally significant. In Turkey, Kurds may be on the cusp of the most promising moment in decades to address their grievances. This week's election brought a solid victory for the ruling pro-Islamist Justice and Development Party, or AKP. Even so, the AKP will need to find parliamentary partners in order to reach a two-thirds majority necessary to enact the sort of constitutional *reforms* it seeks.

Turkey's main Kurdish party, the BDP, and Kurdish independents are most likely to serve this role, giving the country's Kurds the opportunity and the leverage to resolve many of the outstanding issues related to their place in society. They have already made clear their desire for the end of military *operations* in the Kurdish areas of the southeast and for more political *autonomy*.

Depending on what happens in Syria, new opportunities may also arise for the Kurds there. Should the Assad regime fall, a political arrangement based on power-sharing among Syria's *ethnic* and religious communities -- much like that in post- Saddam Iraq -- would give the Kurds a real place **at the table**.

#### Potential for Conflict

**Admittedly**, rising Kurdish influence also brings the possibility of further complications and even conflict. Kurds of the Middle East may decide to take advantage of the changes in the region to push for a separate state, the Kurdistan that has long been the focal point of so much Kurdish song and poetry. A push in this direction wouldn't be surprising, given the hardships endured by the Kurds and their desire to be free of the vagaries of Baghdad, Damascus and Ankara.

Alternatively, political sophistication may come with this new power, as has been the case among Iraq's Kurds. Many of them appreciate the gains that can be realized in the context of a democratic Iraq and have weighed them favorably against the potential costs of provoking regional powers that will oppose a separate Kurdish state.

#### A Globalization Strategy

Rather than feeding new clamoring for a Kurdish state, an increase in influence may lead the region's Kurds to adopt a "globalization" strategy. This approach would acknowledge the waning importance of state borders around the globe and focus on building strong cultural and economic links -- and maybe ultimately institutions -- that span political boundaries. Working toward a "virtual" Kurdistan, the Kurds of a transformed Middle East might realize many of their aspirations without incurring the ire of the region's larger powers.

The U.S. and its allies should favor this outcome, not simply because it would be good for the Kurds, but because it would be good for their own interests. Kurds, perhaps because of their dark history at the hands of extremists, tend to be moderates. While many are devout Muslims, they are more likely to favor *secular* government.

They are among the most pro-American populations in the Middle East, having either watched or benefited from the American-led no-fly zone over northern Iraq for more than a decade. And, if the Kurds of Iraq are any indication, they are also entrepreneurial and welcoming of U.S. and Western investment.

#### Allies for U.S.

**A region where the Kurds play a role in the national politics of Iraq, Syria and Turkey and possibly carry significant economic weight as a collective group will almost certainly be more moderate and conducive to American interests than the Middle East that many see on the horizon.** And if the gains of Kurds in Iraq, Turkey and Syria were to encourage Iran's Kurds to agitate against the regime in



Tehran, all the better.

All this argues for Barack Obama's administration to incorporate a Kurdish angle into its new Middle East strategy. First, the U.S. should continue to encourage the resolution of outstanding issues between Baghdad and the Kurds of Iraq. In particular, a formalized law on sharing oil revenue will help cement the Kurds in the framework of Iraq by ensuring them of a portion of the country's vast resources.

#### The Next Syria

Second, the U.S. can be an advocate for a post-Assad political arrangement in Syria that gives some political power to each of the country's many communities; this will be good for all Syrians, not only the Kurdish ones. While Assad might prove capable of staying in power for weeks or even months, he is likely to be added to the list of leaders unseated by the Arab Spring.

When this day comes, Syria and the region will greatly benefit from any efforts made today to map out a transitional political order. Unlike in Yemen, where the U.S. had a long relationship with a president, America isn't the likely broker in Syria. But its close ally, Turkey, is -- and should be encouraged to work in this direction.

Third, the U.S. should quietly encourage the new government in Turkey to treat its Kurdish minority generously, making such treatment a focal point in the rich and complex bilateral relationship. **Turkish Prime Minister** Recep Tayyip Erdogan has in the past recognized the need to address the Kurdish "problem." The U.S. should support rejuvenated efforts to find an acceptable solution on an amnesty for Kurdish militants, to establish the right of Kurds to be educated in their own language, and to provide greater **autonomy** for the Kurdish region of Turkey.

#### New Regional Dynamics

Finally, the U.S. can use its good relationships with the Kurds in Iraq to counsel **pragmatism** as they assess the new regional dynamics. **Because of their advanced development, the Kurds of Iraq will play a leadership role for the community at large.** The U.S. should continue to dissuade them from over-reaching and claiming a Kurdish state.

Difficulties in forging a new strategy for the fast-changing Middle East are compounded by the tendency of analysts to look at the world exclusively in terms of nation-states, rather than considering subnational and transnational forces. But if policy makers take a less traditional view, they might see an opportunity to empower one of the region's more moderate, pro-American populations in a way that helps the Kurds, Western interests and freedom and prosperity in the Middle East.

(Meghan L. O'Sullivan, a professor at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is a Bloomberg View columnist. The opinions expressed are her own.)

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#### AE.32

[http://www.thecommentator.com/article/490/kurdistan can be a model for democracy in a troubled region](http://www.thecommentator.com/article/490/kurdistan%20can%20be%20a%20model%20for%20democracy%20in%20a%20troubled%20region)  
<http://www.xendan.org/drejaWtar.aspx?NusarID=672&Jmara=3852>  
<http://www.iii.co.uk/investment/detail?code=cotn:GKP.L&display=discussion&id=8804109&action=detail&emoticons=on>

Kurdistan can be a *model* for democracy in a troubled region

Were it not for the first Gulf War, Saddam would have wiped the Kurds off the map. Why doesn't the UN



recognise his violence as **genocide**?

Robert Halfon MP

On 1 October 2011 13:05

After the Iraq war, it was often argued that the Middle East wasn't "ready for democracy". *The Guardian* for example implied this about Iraq in 2003. But this is a nonsensical *argument*, as it seems to suggest that some people **because of their background are not entitled** to democracy, and the example of Kurdistan shows all too clearly how wrong this is.

*The removal of Saddam Hussein* not only saved the Kurds from being destroyed by *genocide*, but also brought about an independent, democratic and *free nation* in the shape of Kurdistan.

*As Vice-Chair of the All-Party Group for Kurdistan, I have visited twice*, and have seen firsthand the evidence of *genocide*. Despite regional instability, autonomous Kurdistan was established in 2003. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) makes its own laws, controls its own army, and decides its own pace of economic development. In contrast to most other parts of Iraq, KRG is relatively terrorist-free.

Ultimately, a democracy can be judged by its respect for property rights, religious tolerance, the rule of law, equality towards women, equal access to education, a free press, and a vigorous political *opposition*.

It's worth looking at how far Kurdistan fulfills some of these criteria:

## PROPERTY RIGHTS

The draft Kurdistan constitution (it's still a draft) includes several articles concerning the protection of minority, political and property rights. In Ankawa, the main Christian town in Erbil governorate, there is even special heritage protection for the property **owned by the local community**.

## RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE

The Kurdish regional parliament has now *officially* recognised the rights of other minorities such as Turkmen, and Assyrians, and these are reflected in the electoral system. In fact, Kurdistan is one of the only safe-havens for Christians and Jews in the region.

Whilst Christians are being murdered and persecuted across Iraq and Iran, in Kurdistan they are welcomed. The Kurdish President has even invited Christian refugees to take up safe haven in his region.

## THE RULE OF LAW

Crime is very low compared to neighbouring Iraq, and the UK has helped the Kurdish Police authorities to build forensic skills, rather than relying on the traditional "confession-based" policing. The Kurdish judiciary are independent, and have defended the right of free assembly during the Arab Spring.

## WOMEN'S RIGHTS

On women's rights, the Kurdistan Parliament has recently passed tough laws against domestic violence. This made female genital mutilation, forced marriage, and child labour all criminal offences for the first time.

### **FREE ACCESS TO EDUCATION**

As the Kurdish economy is booming, universities too are flourishing, and **despite some set-backs there is a real focus on improving education**. Illiteracy has fallen from **thirty-seven to just sixteen percent** since 2003, and is now at about the same level as London in 2011.

Kurdistan is a country that has learnt from the past, rather than living in it. Had Saddam stayed in power, it is likely that at some point, the rest of Kurdistan would have been covered with **nerve gas** - were it not for the first Iraq war and the creation of the Kurdish Safe Havens in 1991-2. (Saddam's henchmen pledged to "bury them with bulldozers".)

Some perpetrators of the **genocide** are even thought to be living in Europe, possibly even in England, having claimed asylum. Inexplicably, the **genocide** of the Kurds is not recognised as a **genocide** by the International Community, most notably the United Nations.

For justice to be done, the UN must fully recognise the murder of the Kurds for the **genocide** that it was. The Arab Spring shows that the Middle East is ready for democracy. Of course, it doesn't mean that it will happen all at once, and there will be many upsets along the way. But the people of the Middle East are no different to anyone else. They want bread, but they want freedom also.

I will be making this case at Party Conference, alongside Nicholas Soames MP, Nadhim Zahawi MP, David Gardner, and Ms Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, the Kurdish High Representative to the UK. We will be at the Derby Suite of the Midland Hotel, Monday 2nd October, at 1pm. I very much hope to see you there.

**Robert Halfon is the Member of Parliament for the UK Constituency of Harlow. He blogs at [roberthalfon.blogspot.com](http://roberthalfon.blogspot.com) and you can follow him on Twitter, too.**

### **AE.33**

<http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/7482663/here-comes-qatar/>

The Strange Power of Qatar  
Hugh Eakin  
Here comes Qatar

**Suddenly, the tiny Gulf emirate is the Middle East's superpower**

**Hugh Eakin** 17 December 2011

Suddenly, the tiny Gulf emirate is the Middle East's superpower

In late October, **Syrian state television** aired a **17-minute documentary** unmasking what it said was the real force behind the country's seven-month-old revolt: the tiny Persian Gulf emirate of Qatar. **'The**

**name of Qatar surfaces once a disaster or conflict breaks out in the Arab and Muslim world,'** the programme begins. 'Qatar intervenes in major and minor issues, seeking to wield influence by backing rebel and extremist movements as well as armed Islamic groups.' Along with sowing 'sedition' everywhere from Egypt and Tunisia to Sudan and Yemen, Qatar had been 'financing and arming the rebel movements in eastern Libya.' **Now the super-rich Gulf nation was 'defaming' Syria,** as part of an aggressive scheme to create a 'new Middle East'.

Such extravagant **claims** might be written off as the ravings of an increasingly desperate leadership in Damascus. After all, *this is a regime that has accused Al Jazeera*, Qatar's government-backed news network, of fabricating the Syrian uprising by building vast 'cinematic replicas' of Syrian cities in the Qatari desert. And there is little about Qatar — a hereditary monarchy jutting off from Saudi Arabia in the most conservative corner of the Middle East — that would seem to make it a likely instigator of popular revolution or *Islamist rebellion*.

But with *the Arab League's* recent announcement of sanctions against Syria — a remarkable step orchestrated in no small part by Qatar, which now chairs the League — it is hard not to see a glimpse of reality in the Syrian movie. Indeed, the emirate has been far from a mere bystander in the Arab upheavals of 2011. While Al Jazeera has bombarded Middle Eastern homes with pictures of the revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, an influential Qatar-based Egyptian cleric, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, has stirred up support for the Islamist parties that — as elections in Tunisia and Egypt now dramatically affirm — stand to gain most from their outcome. At the same time, Qatar has breathed new political life into regional bodies like the Saudi-dominated Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League, while engaging in background diplomacy for groups like Hamas and the Taleban. (Both have reportedly been considering setting up permanent bases in Qatar in recent months — something particularly irksome to the Syrian government, whose ties to Hamas's Damascus-based leadership have meanwhile unravelled.) Nor has the Qatari government shied from robust military intervention: it fought alongside Nato in Libya's rebellion, while simultaneously (and much less publicly) joining the Saudi-led forces that helped crush Bahrain's. The Libyan effort has been particularly eye-catching. From the outset, Qatar was the most prominent Arab supporter of the Nato mission, sending fighter planes as well as its own special forces to train the rag-tag Libyan militias. But it also flouted the UN arms embargo, providing, as the *Wall Street Journal* recently reported, some 20,000 tons of weapons through at least 18 separate arms shipments to specific rebel leaders. It is hard to overestimate the effect of these shipments, which some Nato powers were squeamish about and which may well have been decisive in the more important ground war against the Gaddafi regime.

For a country less than half the size of Belgium and whose own armed forces, by one count, are the second smallest in the Middle East, such entanglements have at times left even Gulf specialists scratching their heads. All the more so given that Qatar is blessed with a rare combination of attributes

that seem to have immunised it from political upheaval. It doesn't have any aggrieved job-seekers to speak of (though most of its population consists of migrant workers with few rights); with huge **gas reserves** and a dominant position in the world LNG market, it can offer virtually guaranteed employment to its 225,000 citizens and the highest living standard (measured by share of GDP) in the world. It also lacks a sizable population of Shia that might expose it to the sectarian tensions inflaming neighbours like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia — it is overwhelmingly Sunni.

Doha, Qatar's shopping-mall-and-hotel-strewn capital, is hardly the kind of place you might expect grand political ideas to ferment. Civil organisations are almost nonexistent, and according to recent polling data, Qatari youth have the least interest in democracy of any of their Arab cohort. Aside from the hugely successful Al Jazeera network, Doha's distinguishing features include camel racing and some large US military bases discreetly tucked away in the desert; its reputation for bland affluence and western-friendly stability (it has been run by the same family since the 19th century) have made it the kind of place where the World Trade Organisation likes to have meetings and Fifa has decided (in 2022) to hold a World Cup.

But Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, its emir, has a habit of defying expectations. Almost from the moment he took power in 1995 (not coincidentally, by deposing his father), Sheikh Hamad has **engaged** in an astute game of pro-action in a neighbourhood where stasis had become something of a chronic ailment. Thus he established low-level relations with Israel, built a billion-dollar air base for the US, and — without any pressure from below — announced a raft of political reforms, including new rights for women, the writing of a new constitution and plans for an elected legislature (now promised for 2013). All of which has sat extremely well with Washington and Europe, while leaving largely intact the country's deeper grounding in the emirati system, ***sharia law and Wahhabi Islam***.

Meanwhile, with the launch of Al Jazeera — an Arab network unafraid to criticise Arab governments — the emir got instant street cred across the Middle East along with a potent form of soft power for Qatar itself. (A glance at WikiLeaks **cables** from almost any Arab country will suffice to show this.) Equally important, the network solidified Qatar's ties to more **radical** groups, providing air time to Islamic militants and other political actors in conflicts ranging from Afghanistan to Lebanon, and turning Sheikh Qaradawi, the exiled cleric, into one of the most-watched television personalities in the Middle East.

With such pro-western and pro-Islamic credentials, the emir was laying the ground for a high-velocity plunge into regional diplomacy, where Qatar has quickly gained status as the country that talks to the US and Iran, ***Israeli opposition leader*** Tzipi Livni and Hamas leader Khaled Mishal. And since there is plenty of gas revenue pouring in, there is always the option of 'throwing money at the problem — all sides of it' as one Gulf analyst puts it. When the Qataris persuaded Hezbollah to end an 18-month stand-off with pro-western Lebanese factions in 2008, they could leverage hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to South Lebanon.

From the Qatari perspective, then, the 2011 uprisings have been rife with opportunity: a chance to show

off Qatar's democratic and diplomatic bona-fides to the international community while at the same time ensuring that its own interests are looked after. Nowhere has this been more evident than in Libya, where a great deal of Qatar's far-reaching support for the rebels has not gone to the National Transition Council itself but directly to Libyan Islamists with ties to Doha. But it has also been apparent in Egypt, where, days after the fall of Mubarak, Qaradawi addressed hundreds of thousands in Tahrir Square; and in Qatar's energetic efforts this autumn to buttress Arab backing for Hamas.

Clearly Qatar understands that *the Muslim Brotherhood* and its offshoots may emerge as the next big political force in the region; if **Assad falls, religious parties linked to Syria's Sunni majority may take over in Damascus** as well. It is also true that these movements have long been backed by the Gulf states and are most likely to adopt policies that are congenial to Qatar and its immediate neighbours. It is worth noting, for example, that shortly after Gulf forces crossed into Bahrain to prop up the Sunni regime there, Sheikh Qaradawi declared the uprising 'sectarian' rather than popular, thus giving religious backing to the brutal government crackdown on protestors.

Of course the intervention in Bahrain shows the pitfalls of Qatar's high-profile embrace of Arab revolutionaries. But even there, criticism has been muted by the bold coverage of Al Jazeera English, the Qatari network's English language offshoot, **which caters mostly to an elite international audience** and, unlike the Arabic channel, has largely avoided the charge of selective reporting. If Qatar can continue to play this double part with such panache, it may well position the anti-democratic Gulf region as one of the key beneficiaries of the popular revolutions that have swept the Arab world.

This article first appeared in the print edition of The Spectator magazine, dated **December 17, 2011**

#### **AE.34**

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/24/us-syria-crisis-turkey-kurds-idUSBRE86N12W20120724>

#### **Syrian Kurdish moves ring alarm bells in Turkey**

Recommend

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By Daren Butler

ISTANBUL | Tue Jul 24, 2012 11:58am EDT

(Reuters) - Concerns are surfacing in Turkey about the growing influence in northern Syria of a Kurdish group linked to Kurdish separatists fighting Ankara, something Turkey fears may further complicate efforts to solve its intractable Kurdish problem.

Syria's Kurdish areas have been largely spared the worst of the violence in the 16-month-old revolt against President Bashar al-Assad, and Syrian Kurds see a chance to attain the freedoms enjoyed by their ethnic kin in neighboring northern Iraq.

Pictures of Kurdish flags flying over buildings and being waved by Kurds in northern Syria have attracted wide coverage in Turkish media and prompted commentators to mull the possibility that Kurds

could carve out an independent state there.

Kurdish opposition figures say Assad's forces pulled out of areas of Hassaka and Aleppo provinces, leaving control of them to the Democratic Union Party (PYD) - linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) which has fought a 28-year separatist conflict in Turkey in which more than 40,000 people have died.

"In some places, the Syrian regime handed over power to the PYD (Democratic Union Party) and withdrew," Abdelbasset Seida, head of the opposition Syrian National Council (SNC), said after meeting Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu on Monday.

The Syrian towns of Amuda, Derik, Kobani and Afrin have been reported to be under PYD control. The reports could not be confirmed due to Syrian restrictions on media access.

The assertion of control by the PYD, which denies any association with the PKK, has led to squabbles and even armed clashes with the other main Kurdish political group, the Kurdish National Council, and other Syrian rebel factions.

Syrian opposition figures have accused the PYD of acting as enforcers for Assad, putting down demonstrations in Kurdish areas and assassinating anti-Assad activists, most notably Mashaal Tammo, a charismatic Kurdish leader. He was killed last year as he organized an anti-Assad political coalition.

Assad's father, the late Hafez al-Assad, for years sheltered PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan before the threat of a Turkish invasion in 1998 forced him to send Ocalan abroad, where Turkish agents eventually captured him and brought him back to Turkey.

As Turkish-Syrian relations improved, Bashar al-Assad cooperated with Ankara by cracking down on PKK elements hunkered down in Syria, but those ties disintegrated last year after Assad deployed military forces to crush popular unrest.

#### 'SYRIAN NATIONAL FABRIC'

Turkish officials have not expressed concerns publicly about the PYD's influence. A foreign ministry official said Davutoglu warned the SNC about risks of sectarian conflict or civil war.

Deputy Prime Minister Besir Atalay played down the Syrian Kurdish issue when asked by reporters on Tuesday whether he was concerned by the raising of Kurdish flags and if he was concerned that a Kurdish state could be established.

"We do not have such a concern," he said, rejecting the idea that Kurds were now in control. "In some small places there have been flag incidents, but there is no such thing (as the Kurds being in control)."

Seida, a Kurd, emphasized the national unity of Syria, where Kurds make up around one million of the 21 million population.

"We have given the necessary orders so that no flag is raised apart from the flag of Syrian independence. The Kurds are a part of the Syrian national fabric," he said.

But Ankara had been unpleasantly surprised by Syrian Kurdish support for the PKK-linked PYD, according to Deniz Zeyrek of the Turkish liberal daily Radikal.

"The Turkish side sees this as an 'unexpected development' and has started taking steps to stop this becoming a deepening problem for Turkey," Zeyrek said.

He said one option was to get Masoud Barzani, president of Iraq's Kurdistan region, to exert more influence over these groups or for Ankara, now among the states calling for Assad's removal, to cultivate ties with Syrian Kurdish leaders.

Turkey has recently established closer relations with Barzani and the Kurdish regional government as it looks to build on growing business and energy stakes in northern Iraq.

More than 7,000 Syrians have fled growing economic hardship and instability for Iraq's Kurdistan, which has been autonomous since 1991 with its own provincial government and armed forces, but relies on the Baghdad central government for its budget.

Meanwhile, the Turkish opposition is playing on fears of Kurdish independence in Syria.

"Now a new Kurdistan is coming. Syrian Kurdistan is on the doorstep," Muharrem Ince, a leading member of the main opposition Republican People's Party, told reporters.

During his 10 years in power, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has thrust through reforms, mainly to increase the scope for Kurdish broadcasting and teaching, designed to address the grievances of a minority of some 12 million people.

However, inspired by the example of northern Iraq, many Turkish Kurdish politicians are pushing for political autonomy.

Turkish academic Ihsan Dagi said Turkey needed to clarify its position on the Kurdish problem, having sent "mixed signals" by holding talks with the PKK while enforcing security policies.

"Are you ready for a Kurdish state?" he wrote in the Turkish daily Zaman, saying an autonomous Kurdish administration would take shape in Syria if Assad fell and that even an independent "Western Kurdistan" was possible.

"Kurdish geopolitics are being reshaped in the region. A 'Greater Kurdistan' is no longer just a dream for many Kurds. You may look and find the 'first independent Kurdish state' emerging in an unexpected place - Syria," Dagi said.

(Additional reporting by Erika Solomon in Beirut and Tulay Karadeniz in Ankara; Editing by Mark Heinrich)

WORLD TURKEY SYRIA MIDDLE EAST TURMOIL

## AE.35

<http://www.xendan.org/drejaWtar.aspx?NusarID=704&Jmara=5199>

<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/17/world/middleeast/from-irans-inner-circle-a-pragmatic-victor.html>

From Inner Circle of Iran, a *Pragmatic* Victor

Hassan Rowhani's political life has been spent at the center of Iran's conservative establishment.  
By THOMAS ERDBRINK Published: June 16, 2013

TEHRAN — As Iranians responded to the victory of the cleric Hassan Rowhani in the country's presidential race over the weekend by erupting into street parties not seen in many years, it almost seemed as if some sort of **reformist revolution** could be under way.

Across the country, drivers honked horns, men danced to pop music and women clapped, celebrating Mr. Rowhani's campaign pledges to bring more freedom and better relations with the outside world.

But Mr. Rowhani, 64, is no renegade **reformist**, voted in while Iran's leaders were not paying attention. Instead, his political life has been spent at the center of Iran's **conservative** establishment, from well before Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini [led the Islamic Revolution in the 1970s](#). And analysts say that Mr. Rowhani's first **priority** will be mediating the disturbed relationship between that leadership and Iran's citizens, not carrying out major change.

Even his nickname — “*the diplomat sheik*” — is testament to his role as a **pragmatist** seeking conciliation for the Islamic leadership. Whether in dealing with protesting students, the aftermath of devastating earthquakes or, in his stint as nuclear negotiator, working to ease international pressure as Iran moved forward with its nuclear program, Mr. Rowhani has worked to find practical ways to help advance the leadership's goals.

Though he is widely seen as a cautious **realist**, his first leap into Iran's inner circle as a young man was rooted in risk. In one of his memoirs, Mr. Rowhani describes a perilous journey he took as an 18-year-old seminary student, sneaking across the border into Iraq to meet Ayatollah Khomeini in exile.

At one point, he recounts, a smuggler told him to immediately take off his **turban**, in order to be less visible inside their car. More **dogmatic** Shiite Muslim clerics would have ignored such a request, but the young Mr. Rowhani did not hesitate and quickly removed his white turban.

“We arrived safely, and that is what mattered,” Mr. Rowhani wrote.

In the memoir, he argues that ideology must never stand in the way of advancement. In 1979, during the last months of Ayatollah Khomeini's exile, Mr. Rowhani was part of his entourage in France. “There some people spread leaflets saying Iran must **stop buying** weapons from the United States, in order not to support their weapons industry,” he wrote. “But I argued that we must not deprive ourselves of **modern** weapon technology just because it is American.”

While the Iranian leadership considers Islam the basis for all policy, Mr. Rowhani comes from a wing of the clerical establishment that finds Islam to be a more **dynamic** than **rigid code**. The thesis he wrote to obtain his doctorate in constitutional law in 1997 from Glasgow Caledonian University in Scotland, [according to his personal Web site](#), was on “the **flexibility** of *Shariah*; Islamic **law**.”

His own **pragmatic flexibility** in the face of ideology was on display in 2003, when Mr. Rowhani visited



the [earthquake struck-region of Bam](#) while serving as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. Despite the tensions with the United States, Iran had allowed Americans to set up an emergency hospital, and Mr. Rowhani made it a point to visit it and take photographs with American doctors.

*His memoirs and several other books describe a life as an integral part of the fabric of Iran's political establishment, forming friendships at an early age with other clerics bound for positions of power and influence within the Islamic republic.*

Mr. Rowhani has described a train journey in 1967 that only in hindsight would seem momentous. Along that trip, he befriended a **fellow Shiite cleric** who is now the influential head of the *office* of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Also on that train was a cleric who would turn out to become the national prosecutor. Another influential friend from the pre-revolution years was Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president whose endorsement helped ease Mr. Rowhani's road to the presidency.

It is a snapshot in the life of a man set to become an insider in Iran's small circle of power.

Because of his dedication to political Islam and *influential* connections, Mr. Rowhani's star rose quickly. He was the deputy leader of the Iran-Iraq war effort in the 1980s, served in Iran's Parliament for 20 years, and for 16 years was in charge of the daily management of the security council, one of the country's most influential agencies. He is currently the head of the [Center for Strategic Research](#) in Tehran, which advises both Mr. Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Khamenei.

"His lifelong career shows he has been at the heart of Iranian politics and his goal is to serve the Islamic republic of Iran," said Ali Shakouri-Rad, a *reformist* politician. "The very fact he is elected shows that he is very much accepted by our establishment."

On Sunday, in Mr. Rowhani's first major speech since becoming president-elect, that focus was already on display. He warned that the country's many problems would not be solved overnight, and said he would enter talks with the governing establishment of clerics and commanders for advice.

"He is the right man for the job," said Soroush Farhadian, 31, a political editor at the reformist newspaper Bahar. "He is a *modern* cleric, and a diplomat, which is useful in foreign and domestic politics."

The diplomat sheik played a key role in [Iran's voluntary suspension of uranium enrichment](#) in 2004, which Western powers responded to by asking for more concessions from Iran.

In Iran, the move is now regarded as a failure, and in the years since, the Iranian leadership has taken a much harder negotiating line.

In his book “[National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy](#),” on his position as the chief nuclear negotiator from 2003 until 2005, Mr. Rowhani defended himself, arguing that all critical advances in the nuclear program were made during the suspension. “We dealt both with increasing outside pressures and the need to make consensus within the country,” he wrote.

*During the recent election, Mr. Rowhani argued that it was again time to change tactics in the nuclear program and reduce international pressure on Iran.*

*The nuclear case, he wrote in his book, has turned into the most complicated negotiations Iran has ever held.*

*“It is good for centrifuges to operate,” he said in a campaign video, “but it is also important that the country operates as well, and that the wheels of industry are turning.”*

On Sunday, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman told reporters that there would be no change *in nuclear policy*. *But reformists led by former President Mohammad Khatami, who backed Mr. Rowhani in the election, say it is time for a new approach.*

*“The election result shows that people want a change in the nuclear policy,” Mr. Shakouri-Rad said. “Now we will wait and see what Mr. Rowhani will do.”*

A version of this article appears in print on June 17, 2013, on page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: From Inner Circle of Iran, a Pragmatic Victor.

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[http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter\\_opinion.php?id=435](http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=435)  
<http://www.xendan.org/drejaWtar.aspx?NusarID=643&Jmara=3690>

Newsletter Monday September 5, 2011  
Eli Avidar

### **Turkey doesn't deserve an apology**

Long before the Palmer report was released, initial leaks made it clear why Turkey was demanding an apology from Israel and *trying to forestall* the report's publication. Even then, everyone understood that the Palmer report's committee had unequivocally accepted Israel's position that the naval blockade of Gaza is legal. The report even established that Turkey had done too little to stop *extremists* aboard the Mavi Marmara from setting sail in the first place. Turkey understood that once the report was published they would have no chance of squeezing an apology out of Israel, so instead they launched *a diplomatic offensive*. Israel commendably withstood the pressure. There was nothing to apologize for.

Turkey should be satisfied with the fact that the U.N. Palmer Commission gave their country a pass by disregarding its government's relationship with *the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation*, as well as that organization's role in the election of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Still, the bottom line is obvious. Despite some criticism of IDF conduct, the report takes Israel's side. It's difficult to describe how humiliating this is for Ankara. For the past few months, Turkey has been *proclaiming* in

every international forum that Israel violated international law. In light of this comeuppance, it is no surprise that Erdogan chose to declare *our ambassador* in Ankara a persona non grata.

Some have *proposed* that despite the fact that Israel's position was *justified*, it would have been better to end the crisis with an apology, if only for the sake of broader geopolitical considerations. This would have constituted a grave mistake. No apology would have ended the crisis. Turkey demanded that we lift our blockade on Gaza, a step that would have earned Erdogan the status of Leader of the Arab World. This would have come at the expense of Israel's citizens, who would have then found themselves under an even greater threat of missile and *terror attacks*. The analysts who continually harped about Israel's need to ingratiate itself with Turkey are the very same people who helped Turkey *paint itself into a corner*.

The best way to improve relations with Turkey, using language that Middle Easterners understand, is to exact a heavy diplomatic price. Israel must *attack the portion of the Palmer* report that downplays Turkey's responsibility in the flotilla crisis, as well as make it clear to the world that Erdogan's government has a *negative* influence on the Middle East. We must make it clear that Turkey is not a stabilizing *force* in the region or part of the solution. Rather, it is a provocateur that undermines stability. *Expelling the Israeli ambassador from Ankara* is a move that will likely hurt Turkey in the end. Erdogan could learn a lesson from Oman and Morocco, both nations that hosted international conferences and leaders from all over the world in the 1990's, but disappeared from the diplomatic map after severing ties with Israel in 2000. Likewise, Turkey is a former key player that has been taken over by radical, irresponsible ideology. Not only has Turkey failed in its efforts to join the European Union, but its latest steps are pushing it further away from moderate Muslim states and closer to extremists like Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas. The deterioration of its relations with Israel is tantamount to a *public* confession that this is, in fact, the case.

In Ankara's view, no counterweight currently exists in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan and certainly not in the Gulf states. The rejuvenated Arab world views Erdogan as an impulsive leader in the cast of Moammar Gadhafi. The loss of its alliance with Syria and the latter's weakening are liable to cause the long-forgotten Kurds to rise up and force Turkey to deal with its internal problems before it can continue to sow chaos *internationally*.

Israel must shift from a policy of absorbing blows to taking the diplomatic offensive. While the most natural thing for Israelis to do is wait out the storm, in the Middle East, diplomacy doesn't work that way. Relations with Turkey will improve only once Israel realizes that the current crisis is exacting too high an international price and condemning it to isolation and irrelevance in the region.

The Palmer report has shed light on the extremism and isolation Erdogan has brought to Turkey. Only continued diplomatic pressure will propel Ankara to change direction and, in the long run, restore its former friendly relations with Israel.

Eli Avidar is currently the managing director of the Israel Diamond Institute Group and a former official in the Foreign Ministry.

## AE.37

<http://www.opednews.com/articles/Could-a-state-for-Greater-by-Pepe-Escobar-120903-623.html>

### Could a state for Greater Kurdistan be on the horizon?

By Pepe Escobar (about the author)

Cross-posted from Al Jazeera

As the Middle East is being remapped, *this may be the Kurds' last shot at having their own state*.

The current remapping of the Middle East could possibly see the creation of a Greater Kurdistan state [AFP]

Millions of Kurds, observing the meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Tehran last week, must have thought: "What about us? What about our non-aligned nation to be? We should be there."

*Maybe next time..."*

It may be just possible that Kurds -- which themselves admit their notoriety for internal squabble -- are finally getting their act together; after all, history may be dictating, roughly a century after World War I and its aftermath, which dealt a big blow to Kurds. This is the last chance for the emergence of a Greater Kurdistan.

After the two Syrian Kurdish parties made a deal -- sealed by Iraqi Kurdistan President Masoud Barzani -- to jointly run *northeast Syria*, Kurdish parties in Iran are also coming together.

Meanwhile, *Ankara* behaves like a bunch of headless chickens.

Kurds are carefully paying attention to how Ankara decided to *boycott NAM* -- even though Turkish President Abdullah Gul was personally invited by Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Egypt's President Mohammed Morsi proposed a Syria contact group -- Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran -- to try to solve the Syrian tragedy.

This means that Egypt -- under a *Muslim Brotherhood* president -- privileges mediation for a civil war inside a fellow Arab country, while Turkey sticks to a color-blind regime change strategy, which would only be possible with a NATO no-fly zone (*it won't happen*).

So the pressing question for the Kurds becomes how to profit from Ankara's each and every move.

And the winner is... Israel

Not even Turkish public opinion knows what exactly are the contours of Ankara's policy for Syria -- apart from regime change. President Gul *claims* that Damascus weaponizes PKK guerrillas (there's absolutely no evidence), and that would be a casus belli.

Damascus for its part does not want a war with Turkey.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu -- he of the defunct "zero problems with our neighbors" doctrine -- is still toeing the line that the country could not accept more than 100,000 Syrian refugees (there are already 70,000 and counting); in this case, some fuzzy "safe haven" would have to be installed in Syrian territory. This Thursday, Ankara will press the complexities of the refugee crisis at a ministerial-level meeting at the UN.

Ankara has insistently accused both Damascus and Tehran of supporting PKK guerrillas active in Anatolia and the porous border areas. Yet at the same time, Ankara has developed a quite secretive narrative; Turkey, once again, is aligned with Israel's strategy (the Mavi Marmara incident is now water under the bridge).

Tel Aviv avidly bets on Ankara becoming the hegemonic regional power in the -- still hazy -- event of a post-Assad Syria. *As Israel has been deeply infiltrated in Iraqi Kurdistan for years, with very good connections -- the Mossad uses it as an operational base against Syria and Iran -- this will be manipulated as a bargaining chip to seduce Ankara.*

Meanwhile, in Syria, the red, green and yellow Kurdish flag is now flying in places like Girke Lege -- only 35 kilometres from the Iraqi border and only 15 kilometres from the Turkish border. Over 3 million Syrian Kurds now see an ideal opening to revert the official Ba'ath Party Arabisation policy.

The Kurdish PYD (Democratic Union Party) President Salah Muslim vehemently denies that there was a tacit agreement with the Bashar al-Assad government. But in fact there was; as long as Syrian Kurds don't attack Damascus forces, they can do whatever they want in *Western/Syrian Kurdistan*, which by now is *assuming the contours of a an autonomous region*.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, by the way, has already delivered the message to Ankara; even in a post-Assad Syria, this should be seen as a fact on the ground. *And it happens to dovetail with Israel's charm offensive among Kurds -- emphasising what would be their common agenda.*

**So what can Ankara do? *Invade?* Kurdish blowback is bound to be devastating.**

Despite official rumblings, Turkish options for invading *Western/Syrian Kurdistan* are not exactly stellar. The Turkish army's morale is low -- after the purge of several ranking Kemalists. Over 60 *generals* are in jail, accused of plotting a coup -- and lower-ranking officials may even try it again. Alevites

and Kurdish conscripts will refuse to fight an AKP-incited war. And the Turkish economy -- not to mention tourism -- will inevitably go down the drain.

### **Is there a leader in the house?**

One can imagine whether Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Barzani's political scheming will be enough for him to embrace *the Angel of History*, and rise to the occasion.

He certainly sees a Greater Kurdistan independent from Arabs, Persians and Turks. But for that to happen in a grand scale he would have to conduct himself as a unifier -- not only sharing power inside Iraqi Kurdistan but also managing conflicting Kurdish aspirations in Syria, Iran and Turkey. This implies a visionary streak plus tremendous diplomatic skills.

What's certain is that Washington and Tel Aviv are *on board*; this implies that Brussels sooner or later will follow. BRICS members Russia and China are not exactly against it. There are two possibilities here. A Greater Kurdistan forged as a model for the Middle East -- in terms of a secular, dynamic, progressive entity respectful of religious minorities. Or yet another Western stooge.

A major *geopolitical* volcano is erupting. Ankara certainly has not analyzed the blowback of weaponising Syrian Sunnis just for the weapons to find their way back into Turkey to be used by the PKK against Ankara itself.

This anti-*imperialist* analysis may be very useful to understand the Kurdish dynamic. But there's still much more to it.

Jeremy Salt, professor of History and Politics of the Middle East at Bilkent University, Ankara, and author of *The Unmaking of the Middle East*, in a conversation with La Stampa's world news editor Claudio Gallo, neatly summarised it:

"In 1918 the imperial powers divided the Middle East in a certain way that suited their interests at the time. They are now remapping it again -- and again to suit their interests. It is not coincidental that this programme dovetails with Israel's own long-term strategic planning. Russia and China are fully aware of what is going on, which is why the present situation can be seen as a 21st century extension of the 'Eastern question' or of the 'Great Game' between Russia and Britain."

Make no mistake; each day makes it more likely that an unintended -- or rather intended -- consequence of this Great Game remix will be the emergence of Greater Kurdistan.

**Pepe Escobar is the roving correspondent for Asia Times. His regular column, "The Roving Eye," is widely read. He is an analyst for the online news channel Real News. He argues that the world has become fragmented into "stans" -- we are now living (more...)**

**The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of this website or its editors.**

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<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/opinion/sunday/nicholas-kristof-the-blame-for-iraq-is-shared.html>

**SundayReview | Op-Ed Columnist**

**The New York Times JUNE 13, 2014**

**Nicholas Kristof**

**Obama, McCain and Maliki**

**The Blame for Iraq Is Shared**

THE debacle in Iraq isn't President Obama's fault. It's not the Republicans' fault. *Both bear some responsibility*, but, overwhelmingly, it's the fault of the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki.

Some on the left suggest that President George W. Bush is at fault because he invaded Iraq in the first place. **Senator** John McCain argues that the White House bears such responsibility that President Obama should replace his national security team.

Let's remember that Iraq isn't a political prop. It's a country whose 33 million people are on the edge of a precipice. Iraq is driven primarily by its own dynamic, and unfortunately, there are more problems in international relations *than there are solutions*.

The debate about who lost Iraq is an echo of the equally foolish debate in the mid-20th century about "who lost China." China wasn't ours to lose then, and Iraq isn't ours to lose today.

The Democratic narrative is that President Bush started the cascade of dominoes. The problem with that logic is that Obama administration officials were boasting just a couple of years ago about how peaceful and successful Iraq had become because of their fine work. At a minimum, they catastrophically misjudged the trend.

The Republican line is that by pulling out the last American troops in **December** 2011, President Obama allowed *gains* to evaporate and a hopeful *story* to unravel. Well, that's conceivable, but unlikely. And Prime Minister Maliki seemed uncomfortable with the kind of reasonable status of forces agreement **that** would have enabled American troops to remain.

Where Obama does bear some responsibility is in Syria, the staging area for the current mayhem in Iraq. In retrospect, Obama erred when he vetoed the proposal by then-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and **Gen.** David Petraeus to **arm moderates** in Syria.

No one can know if that would have succeeded. But it is clear that Obama's policy, to the extent there was one, failed. Activists say that 160,000 have died in Syria, and President Bashar al-Assad has recovered momentum. In the absence of foreign support, some frustrated Syrian rebels quit units led by *moderate* commanders and joined the extremists, simply because then they *would be better paid* and better armed.

The upshot was that extremist forces, particularly ISIS, for the Islamic State for Iraq and Syria, gained strength and established safe havens in northern Syria. ISIS used these bases to assault *northern* Iraq in the last few days.

What happened next was stunning: ISIS, with some 4,000 fighters, routed an Iraq Army that has more than 200,000 active-duty soldiers. Several *divisions* disintegrated.

That's where Prime Minister Maliki comes in, for this is a political, not military, *story*. For several years, Maliki has systematically marginalized Sunnis, weakened Sunni Awakening militias that had been a bulwark against extremists, and undermined the professionalism of the armed forces. Some Sunnis so feared their own government that they accepted ISIS as the lesser of two evils.

So Maliki created his own nemesis and ignored danger signs, blindly proceeding without wanting to **hear the truth**. In all this, **he echoes Saddam Hussein**.

In 2002, in the Saddam era, I published a searing anti-Saddam column while I was in Iraq. A *senior* government official summoned me to his *office* in Baghdad, as a portrait of Saddam stared down at us, and began a threatening tirade. It became apparent that this official hadn't actually read the full column, so I *nervously* asked my Iraqi interpreter to read it to him in Arabic.

I was paying my interpreter a hefty daily rate, and, for financial reasons, he didn't want to see me expelled or jailed. So, in rendering my column into Arabic, he skipped whole paragraphs and turned it into mush. Deflated, the government official let me off with a stern warning, and I was reminded of how megalomaniac regimes mislead themselves. In the same way, Maliki probably had no idea that his Army was crumbling.

As the United States debates what to do, let's remember Maliki's central role in all this. *Hawks* are right that Iraq could be a catastrophe. We could see the establishment of a terrorist caliphate, untold deaths, soaring oil prices, more global terrorism.

In that context, *hawks* favor American airstrikes. But such strikes also create risks, especially if our intelligence there is rusty. And while airstrikes might be necessary to slow ISIS, they're not sufficient.

The crucial step, and the one we should apply diplomatic pressure to try to achieve, is for Maliki to step back and share power with Sunnis while accepting decentralization of government.

If Maliki does all that, it may still be possible to save Iraq. Without that, airstrikes would be a further waste in a land in which we've already squandered far, far too much.

I invite you to comment on this column on my blog, On the Ground. Please also join me on Facebook and Google+, watch my YouTube videos and follow me on Twitter.

A version of this op-ed appears in print on June 15, 2014, on page SR11 of the New York edition with the headline: Obama, McCain and Maliki. Order Reprints|Today's Paper|Subscribe

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### Why did ISIL agree to give up the hostages?

EMRE USLU September 21, 2014, Sunday

The "hostage crisis" between Turkey and the Islamic State in Iraq and »»

The "hostage crisis" between Turkey and *the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant* (ISIL) is one of the most mysterious and bizarre "crises" that any nation could face. When the Turkish Consulate General in Mosul was seized and 49 people -- including Turkish *diplomats* and security personal -- were taken by ISIL, many people asked **why the consulate hadn't been evacuated**.

Conflicting statements were released; after that, then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan confidently stated that Turkey would take the hostages with ease, as if they were not in the hand of the most brutal terrorists. Many people believed that it was a political saga that both *the Justice and Development Party (AKP)* government and ISIL had agreed upon rather than a real hostage-taking.

Although ISIL had the Turkish *diplomats* in its hands, they were treated as if they were not hostages. For instance, the Turkish consul was allowed to use his cellphone during his captivity of more than 100 days. ISIL is not a stupid organization which does not know that an electronic *signal* could be used as intelligence to reveal where the hostages are. In order for ISIL to allow the Turkish *diplomat* to use his

cellphone, it must have had a guarantee that Turkey would not conduct an *operation* to rescue the hostages.

Like its beginning, the hostage-taking saga ended in a bizarre way. ISIL released the Turkish hostages, but left many unanswered questions behind it.

A retired American *diplomat* friend of mine raised the following questions:

“It was good news indeed that the Turkish hostages were released, but the circumstances, as reported in the Turkish press, do not ring true. No shots were fired, no military pressure was applied, and no *ransom* paid. Why, then, did ISIL agree to give up the hostages? There must have been a quid pro quo. The assumption among some of the *bloggers* here is that Turkey agreed to something that ISIL wanted, like a guarantee not to engage in offensive *operations* against the 'Islamic State'.”

These are some of the questions that remain unanswered. At this stage no one, except a few people who negotiated with ISIL, can answer these questions.

More importantly, I don't think the Turkish press -- and especially the pro-government media outlets -- will give us accurate *background* information about the negotiation *process*.

It is a typical tendency of Turkish media outlets that under such circumstances, they run heroic stories, most of them fabricated with barely any truth in them. *Thus, I tend to read the Turkish press with caution these days. It would take years for the Turkish press to write true stories about events like this.*

It is not a new phenomenon to the Turkish media. We know it from the Abdullah Öcalan *case*. When Öcalan was brought to Turkey, we read many heroic stories about how he had been captured. Similarly, we read stories how other Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) militants such as Şemdin Sakık were brought to Turkey.

In order to understand what has really happened between Turkey and ISIL, the pro-government Turkish media is the least reliable source of information. I prefer to follow the news from opposition media outlets and pro-ISIL Internet sites.

Tevhidhaber.net, a pro-ISIL website that openly and freely publicizes in Turkey -- which is another bizarre fact, that the Turkish authorities are shutting down Twitter and YouTube and closing Twitter *accounts* which criticize the government but allow ISIL to freely propagate in and *recruit* from Turkey -- stated that Turkey had guaranteed not to join the international coalition against ISIL.

As a security expert, I will make some guesses about the possibilities of what Turkey might have promised to ISIL to get the hostages back.

First, as the ISIL *website* claimed, some form of guarantee to not join the coalition against ISIL. Another possibility is to give ISIL a promise to delay possible international *operations* inside Syria to allow it to gain some time and more territory. If these are not possible, Turkey may even offer to play an intermediary role *between the West and ISIL* to end the violence.

Second, Turkey may provide strategic information to ISIL to defeat its enemies in Syria and Iraq. In fact, when ISIL was pushed back in Iraq, it launched offensives against the PKK/Democratic Union Party (PYD) stronghold Kobane and seized some strategic locations. Without information such as strategic intelligence about the locations of PYD units and powerful weaponry, it would have been difficult for ISIL to win against the trained PKK militants.



Third, instead of giving direct aid to ISIL, Turkey might have given aid in the form of economic, armament or intelligence help to the pro-ISIL tribal leaders who facilitated the negotiations.

AE.40

<http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119803/kobane-syria-will-fall-islamic-state-and-its-turkeys-fault>

Turkey, October 12, 2014

### Shame on Turkey for Choosing *the Islamic State* Over the Kurds

By Bernard-Henri Levy

Kobane will fall.  
In a matter of hours.  
Or perhaps days.

But the Syrian city will fall, a victim of the cynical reckoning of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who, by refusing to act and leaving his powerful army stationed along the border with Syria, just a few kilometers from the already martyred city, seems to have chosen Daesh, *otherwise known as the Islamic State*, over the Kurds.

Kobane will be a victim of the double game of Turkey, which, after having let pass every *jihadi* in the region and closing its eyes to the heavy weaponry that Daesh's forwarders had been sending *for weeks* toward the besieged city and that is now being used to shell it, shuts everything down, blocks everything, **plays the innocent** while immobilizing not only its own troops but also the ten thousand Kurdish volunteers who have come forward in Turkey to try **to save Kobane**.

The outsize miracle of the resistance of Kobane, which so far has succeeded, without resources and against unheard of violence, in delaying the advance of *the religious zealots*, cannot last much longer now. The fall of the city and the hoisting of the black flag of the *Caliphate* not only in the eastern and southern quarters but now over the last heights of a place that henceforth will be powerfully *symbolic*, will be a catastrophe the full extent of which has not yet been appreciated, and certainly not everywhere.

It will be a catastrophe for the combatants both male and female who for weeks have been struggling with unbelievable courage against better-armed units that will make them pay very dearly indeed for their audacity.

It will be a catastrophe for the city itself, where Daesh will not be content, as it has been before, to enslave the women, behead the leaders, or forcibly convert the practitioners of minority religions, but that will assume its place in the long and terrible list of martyred cities of recent decades: *Guernica* pulverized by the aircraft of *the Condor Legion*; *Coventry* razed *by the Heinkels of the Luftwaffe*; *Stalingrad* and its million dead; *Sarajevo*, which escaped with its life, but at the price of eleven thousand dead during a thousand-day siege; Grozny, in *Chechnya*, ground into a ghost town by Putin's rabble; Aleppo, in Syria, with its treasures of civilization and beauty *buried* by the explosives dropped from Bashar al-Assad's planes; and now Kobane, the existence of which was unknown to most of us until recently but that it is about to become an *urbicide*.

It will be a catastrophe, beyond Kobane proper, for *secular* Kurdistan, the incarnation (if one exists) of the values of moderation and *law* that the *diplomats* state as their wish for the Islamic world, and whose Peshmerga, moreover, are the only ones to have taken literally the global order to mobilize against the Daesh hordes and to fight, face to face on the front line against a self-proclaimed state that threatens, as we have been amply warned, not just Kurdistan, but humanity itself.

Because Kobane is not only a *symbol* but a key, its fall will be a catastrophe, finally, for the coalition of which it is the forward outpost, a coalition that will now see the barbarians of Daesh carve out a wide swath of ground several hundreds of kilometers long adjacent to the Turkish border—a considerable tactical and strategic advantage.

To prevent this disaster we have not only very little time but, above all, paltry means.

The coalition may decide to intensify its strikes, but how does one strike from the air when the battle is being waged hand to hand, street by street, house by house on the outskirts of the city?

The coalition may choose to deliver arms. Even without Turkish assistance, it has the *logistical* ability to do so. And if it does not do so—if it does not resolve to reestablish a measure of balance between the *jihadists* who have brought in heavy artillery, sophisticated *rocket* launchers, and tanks taken from the arsenals of Mosul and Tabah, while the Kurds are armed only with Kalashnikovs, *DFDS* machine guns, and a few mortars, the citizens of the world still have the freedom to do what we did not so long ago for little Bosnia, which, like Kurdish Kobane, was defending us by defending itself—but what we lack is time. Time is required to organize an airlift of weapons to a besieged population caught in a vise, and time is what we do not have.

At this late hour, there is only one way to save what remains of Kobane, and that way is Turkey.

Erdogan, whose judgment has been clouded by his obsessional fear of seeing an embryonic Kurdish state created just outside his borders, must be reminded—once again—that Daesh is no less his enemy and that it is for Turkey that the bell tolls in Kobane.

He must be made to understand that if his increasingly *authoritarian* and benighted regime, one that strays ever farther from the *secular* foundations of Kemalism, is to preserve its *chance* to forge the economic *partnerships* with Europe (and eventually, the political *partnerships*) to which Turkey's elites aspire and that the country sorely needs, that *chance* passes through Kobane and its defense: That *chance* depends on the aid delivered to the heroines and the heroes of the beleaguered city.

But we have to go even further and tell Erdogan, formally or informally, that the battle against Daesh is the moment of truth, the now or never, for the alliances and the system of *collective* security that was established in the region in the aftermath of the second world war, a system in which Turkey is more than an ordinary member, having become its eastern pillar when it joined NATO in 1952.

In 1991, Turkey only reluctantly joined in *operations* to support the civilian population of northern Iraq.

On March 1, 2003, Turkey's Grand National Assembly, in a vote that cast a long shadow over the country's relations with its allies, voted against allowing 62,000 American troops to pass through Turkey on their way to Baghdad or to be based in Turkey.

If Turkey stands down a third time—if Kobane becomes the name of yet another Turkish *default*, this one inexcusable—its future in *NATO* is in doubt.

The emissaries of President Barack Obama who have just arrived in **Ankara** should make this very clear.

French President François Hollande, who has given Turkey many signs of friendship, should assume the role of spokesman for France's partners by informing Erdogan that Kobane is a rampart for Europe.

Here, as at the siege of Madrid, the world must declare, "They shall not pass."

Translated from the French by Steven B. Kennedy.

Bernard-Henri Levy is the author of *La Guerre Sans L'Aimer* and *Left in Dark Times: A Stand Against the New Barbarism*.

#### AE.41

<http://www.eneews163.com/2014/09/02/china-supports-multiple-independent-kurdish-problem-more-in-the-interests-of-54394.html>

EN NEWS 163

International NEWS site

China supports multiple independent Kurdish problem more in the interests of Core Tip : Experts say , how to deal with the Kurdish issue , on China's diplomacy is a new topic. With China in particular, the interests of the **Iraqi** Kurdish region is growing in the Kurdish region , and how we safeguard interests overseas and in the country between the central government and Kurdish maintain the delicate balance of increasing difficulty .

#### ***China must face the Kurdish issue***

Recent times, " **Islamic State** " massive attack on the Iraqi Kurdish region, the international community launched a large rescue this end, lead to the Kurdish people's sympathy. But soon came the three Chinese engineers were kidnapped in the Kurdish region of southeastern Turkey, news, letting people suspiciously: Why **PKK** targeted the Chinese people? Regardless of the answer, the Kurdish issue continues to heat up will be a new **challenge** for China in the Middle East had to face.

Kurdish problem is one of the **complex ethnic problems in the Middle East**, which produces even nearly half a century earlier than the Palestinian issue. The so-called Kurdish question is Kurdish demands **host** government recognize **their minority status**, expanding its national rights, allowing its autonomy or independence. Kurds living in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria Shikoku junction of " Kurdistan " is the Middle East's fourth largest nation, a total of about 30 million .

Kurdish problems in the First World War, when the Allies had once promised Kurdish independent state, after being abandoned oppose Turkey, Kurdistan was divided into four this purpose. For a long time, Kurdish ethnic identity is not recognized **in some countries**, suffer discrimination, economic and social development behind. So far failed to effectively solve the Kurdish issue has become a major **source** of instability in the countries and regions.

Kurds have faced several times in the history of a rare opportunity. A **war** was their best opportunity to seek independent , but was missed. 1991 and 2003 two Americans waged the war in Iraq has become a

turning point in the fate of the *Iraqi* Kurds . In recent years , the Middle East into a big turmoil , *geopolitical* order and national geographic territory facing redistricting , Kurdish ushered in a new strategic opportunities. 2011 outbreak of the " Arab Spring" has actually evolved into a " Kurdish Spring ."

In Syria, the Kurdish armed disarray establish control of the reservoir area, and the establishment of a " provisional self- government" , like the year of the Iraqi Kurds as to achieve a de facto autonomy. In Turkey, the Kurdish issue in this past century taboo has been broken. The first Kurdish political party with the name" Kurdistan Democratic Party" get legal approval. Internal conflict in Iraq war intensified, in fact, the situation evoked Kurdish separatist centuries of independence ambitions. In recent days the first joint United States and Europe and other countries to provide weapons directly to Yikuerde who is regarded as an important signal of Western policy might turn. At present, more and more people believe in the reality of the current chaos and upheaval regional political order in Iraq , the Kurdish independent state may no longer be a dream.

How to deal with the Kurdish issue , on China's diplomacy is a new topic. Specific *challenges* related to four aspects : First, the Iraqi Kurds may be an independent nation , will be a direct challenge to the relationship between China and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of China and relevant countries. Second, with China in particular, the interests of the Iraqi Kurdish region is growing in the Kurdish region , and how we safeguard interests overseas and in the country between the central government and Kurdish maintain the delicate balance of increasing difficulty . Third, as a permanent member of the Security Council and the major developing country , China is not only responsible for the international humanitarian, protection of minority rights, while the major security issues involved in the Middle East can not stand idly by. Four Middle Eastern countries due to individual western frontier problem for me to make irresponsible remarks , many Chinese netizens hope to show government support for Kurdish fight back , which also pose some of our diplomatic pressure of public opinion . In short , although the Kurdish problem is very difficult, but the issue is related to China's interests and national security , a matter of regional security and stability , a matter of international law and international moral norms , the Chinese do not have much room to maneuver, must face to deal with. ( The author is a researcher at the Chinese Academy of West Africa )

Original link: <http://war.163.com/14/0902/08/A54GK9S400014OVF.html>

This entry was posted in Military on September 2, 2014.

## AE.42

<http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/08/09/why-u-s-should-help-the-kurds/>

August 9th, 2014

11:39 AM ET

### Why U.S. should help the Kurds

Watch "Fareed Zakaria GPS," this Sunday at 10 a.m. and 1 p.m. ET on CNN

By Fareed Zakaria

The situation in Iraq today is perilous, but also chaotic and confusing. Should the United States do more to help the communities under threat of destruction? If it does intervene for humanitarian reasons here,

then why not in a place like Syria, which has seen many terrible atrocities and massacres as well? How should we think through the issue?

I have been cautious about urging the United States to get back into Iraq, but I believe that in the current circumstances, the Obama administration should intervene more forcefully and ambitiously, use air power, offer training support and weaponry if needed.

Why?

The humanitarian crisis unfolding in Iraq is terrible enough. But sometimes, as in Syria, it is unclear whether U.S. military intervention could really help matters, whether there's a clear plan that would work. In Iraq now there is such a path, one that also offers the strategic rationale for U.S. action.

What is now at stake in Iraq is crucial to U.S. interests – the survival of the Kurdish region in that country.

Since 1991, for 23 years, the United States has protected the Kurds of Iraq from being attacked and destroyed as a community. In that period, the Kurds have built up a *modern*, increasingly *liberal*, pro-Western and pro-American oasis **in the Middle East**.

The largely autonomous Kurdish region of Iraq has become an open, cosmopolitan, forward-looking place with a booming economy – *construction cranes*, *car dealerships* and *fast food chains* sprout up every day.

The American University in Sulaimani is a place marked by a modern educational outlook and open dialog. Kurdish leaders have been responsible in their efforts to *secure* their future – not declaring independence, working to end Kurdish terrorism in Turkey, supporting humanitarian efforts for Syrian refugees. They have been a force for stability in a region in chaos.

One of the lessons of American foreign policy over the last six decades has been that interventions work when the locals are led by popular, legitimate leaders and they want to fight for their cause. Think of South Korea compared with South Vietnam – they don't work when the locals simply will not fight.

The Kurds want to fight for their freedom, for their independence. They have a strong, well-trained army. Their leaders are popular and legitimate, they have been close allies of the United States. Now they urgently need America's help. The Obama administration should answer their call.

**Post by: CNN's Jason Mikes**

**Topics: GPS Show • Iraq**

**AE.43**

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2014/06/16/iraqi-kurdistan-set-to-become-an-independent-world-oil-power/>

Energy 6/16/2014 @ 2:43AM 16,108 views

Christopher Helman

**Iraqi Kurdistan Set To Become an Independent World Oil Power**

Last Thursday, after ISIS forces captured Mosul and Kurdish fighters had moved into Kirkuk, I wrote a piece about how the Kurdish Regional Government might end up being the “unlikely losers” in the ensuing chaos. *Its peshmerga forces were in danger of being stretched thin*. Its two renegade tankers full of oil had no buyers. Surely, it seemed last Thursday, that President Obama would never dream of allowing Baghdad (and especially the Green Zone) to come under ISIS attack. Wouldn’t the U.S. prop up Maliki and ensure the survival of Iraqi federalism?

No. That article was wrong. As numerous readers were all too happy to point out. The Kurd forces appear to be comfortably holding their territory. The Baghdad airport is reportedly under attack. ISIS *militias* have brutally machine gunned hundreds of government forces. The U.S. government is evacuating diplomats from the Green Zone (a la the fall of Saigon). Iran is said to have sent Revolutionary Guard forces to Baghdad. Obama has urged Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to sort it all out diplomatically.

*Iraq was an artificial state to begin with*, its borders drawn by British *bureaucrats* with no regard to tribal territories. The consensus now, especially among Kurdish people, is that this “Iraq” will soon cease to exist altogether.

The Kurdish region is blessed with an estimated 45 billion barrels of oil, **more than Libya**. Exxon, Chevron CVX +0.7%, Total and many others have invested *billions* there to explore and drill virgin fields in concessions doled out by the Kurdish Regional Government. The KRG had not had any control over the supergiant Kirkuk field, which produced more than 650,000 barrels per day at its peak more than a decade ago. Like all mature fields in Iraq, Kirkuk was under the purview of the oil ministry in Baghdad, which contracted last year with **BP** to start rehabbing the field. The Kurds opposed the **BP** deal. With or without Kirkuk, the Kurdish region could readily sustain 400,000 barrels per day of oil production.

Baghdad’s *control* over Kirkuk may well be history now that Kurd forces are at long last in *control* of Kirkuk and have no intention of leaving. Writing on Twitter TWTR -11.08%, Fanar Haddad, of the Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore, wrote: “Is it just me or has Kirkuk, an issue of massive complexity & contention & the possible source of a future war, been solved overnight?”

After the events of the last few days it seems the Kurds can now, at last, make their own rules. So what does that mean for those tankers full of Kurdish crude? The ones loaded in Turkey, which have drawn *condemnation* from Baghdad, which called the shipments illegal and threatened legal action against anyone who dared to buy them? They are reportedly still floating off the coasts of Malta and Morocco. With Kurdish independence appearing to grow closer every day, perhaps this will be the week when the world’s oil buyers put aside any concern of being blacklisted by Baghdad, and step up to buy them.

When it happens it will open the floodgates for Kurdish exports, and initiate a flood of cash to the Kurdish Regional Government, which is now moving inexorably closer to becoming an independent state, and a major world oil power.

**AE.44**

<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/war-against-isis-us-strategy-in-tatters-as-militants-march-on-9789230.html>

Patrick Cockburn

Sunday 12 October 2014

## War against Isis: US air strategy in tatters as militants march on

America's plans to fight *Islamic State* are in ruins as *the militant group's fighters* come close to capturing Kobani and have inflicted a heavy defeat on the Iraqi army west of Baghdad

The US-led air attacks launched against *Islamic State* (also known as Isis) **on 8 August** in Iraq and **23 September** in Syria have not worked. President Obama's plan to "degrade and destroy" Islamic State has not even begun to achieve success. In both Syria and Iraq, Isis is expanding its control rather than contracting.

Isis reinforcements have been rushing towards Kobani in the past few days to ensure that they win a decisive victory over the Syrian Kurdish town's remaining defenders. *The group is willing to take heavy casualties in street fighting and from air attacks in order to add to the string of victories it has won in the four months since its forces captured Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq, on 10 June. Part of the strength of the fundamentalist movement is a sense that there is something inevitable and divinely inspired about its victories, whether it is against superior numbers in Mosul or US airpower at Kobani.*

In the face of a likely Isis victory at Kobani, senior US officials have been trying to explain away the failure to save the Syrian Kurds in the town, probably Isis's toughest *opponents* in Syria. *"Our focus in Syria is in degrading the capacity of [Isis] at its core to project power, to command itself, to sustain itself, to resource itself,"* said US Deputy National Security Adviser Tony Blinken, *in a typical piece of waffle designed to mask defeat.* "The tragic reality is that in the course of doing that there are going to be places like Kobani where we may or may not be able to fight effectively."

Unfortunately for the US, Kobani isn't the only place air strikes are failing to stop Isis. In an offensive in Iraq launched on 2 October but little reported in the outside world, Isis has captured almost all the cities and towns it did not already hold in Anbar province, a vast area in western Iraq that makes up a quarter of the country. It has captured Hit, Kubaisa and Ramadi, the provincial capital, which it had long fought for. Other cities, towns and bases on or close to the Euphrates River west of Baghdad fell in a few days, often after little resistance by the Iraqi Army which showed itself to be as dysfunctional as in the past, even when backed by US air strikes.

Today, only the city of Haditha and two bases, Al-Assad military base near Hit, and Camp Mazrah outside Fallujah, are still in Iraqi government hands. Joel Wing, in his study – "Iraq's Security Forces Collapse as The Islamic State Takes Control of Most of Anbar Province" – concludes: "This was a huge victory as it gives the insurgents virtual control over Anbar and poses a serious threat to western Baghdad".

The battle for Anbar, which was at the heart of the Sunni rebellion against the US occupation after 2003, is almost over and has ended with a decisive victory for Isis. It took large parts of Anbar in January and government counter-attacks failed dismally with some 5,000 casualties in the first six months of the year. About half the province's 1.5 million population has fled and become refugees. The next Isis target may be the Sunni enclaves in western Baghdad, starting with Abu Ghraib on the outskirts but leading right to the centre of the capital.

The Iraqi government and its foreign allies are drawing comfort, there having been some advances against Isis in the centre and north of the country. But north and north-east of Baghdad the successes have not been won by the Iraqi army but by highly sectarian Shia militias which do not distinguish between Isis and the rest of the Sunni population. They speak openly of getting rid of Sunni in mixed provinces such as Diyala where they have advanced. The result is that Sunni in Iraq have no alternative

but to stick with Isis or flee, if they want to survive. The same is true north-west of Mosul on the border with Syria, where Iraqi Kurdish forces, aided by US air attacks, have retaken the important border crossing of Rabia, but only one Sunni Arab remained in the town. Ethnic and sectarian cleansing has become the norm in the war in both Iraq and Syria

The US's failure to save Kobani, if it falls, will be a political as well as military disaster. Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the loss of the beleaguered town are even more significant than the inability so far of air strikes to stop Isis taking 40 per cent of it. At the start of the bombing in Syria, President Obama boasted of putting together a coalition of Sunni powers such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to oppose Isis, but these all have different agendas to the US in which destroying IS is not the first priority. The Sunni Arab monarchies may not like Isis, which threatens the political status quo, but, as one Iraqi observer put it, "they like the fact that Isis creates more problems for the Shia than it does for them".

Of the countries supposedly uniting against Isis, by the far most important is Turkey because it shares a 510-mile border with Syria across which rebels of all sorts, including Isis and Jabhat al-Nusra, have previously passed with ease. This year the Turks have tightened border security, but since its successes in the summer Isis no longer needs sanctuary, supplies and volunteers from outside to the degree it once did.

In the course of the past week it has become clear that Turkey considers the Syrian Kurd political and military organisations, the PYD and YPG, as posing a greater threat to it than the Islamic fundamentalists. Moreover, the PYD is the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has been fighting for Kurdish self-rule in Turkey since 1984.

Ever since Syrian government forces withdrew from the Syrian Kurdish enclaves or *cantons* on the border with Turkey in July 2012, Ankara has feared the impact of self-governing Syrian Kurds on its own 15 million-strong Kurdish population.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan would prefer Isis to control Kobani, not the PYD. When five PYD members, who had been fighting Isis at Kobani, were picked up by the Turkish army as they crossed the border last week they were denounced as "separatist terrorists".

Turkey is demanding a high price from the US for its co-operation in attacking Isis, such as a Turkish-controlled buffer zone inside Syria where Syrian refugees are to live and anti-Assad rebels are to be trained. Mr Erdogan would like a no-fly zone which will also be directed against the government in Damascus since Isis has no air force. If implemented the plan would mean Turkey, backed by the US, would enter the Syrian civil war on the side of the rebels, *though the anti-Assad forces are dominated by Isis and Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliate.*

It is worth keeping in mind that Turkey's actions in Syria since 2011 have been a self-defeating blend of hubris and miscalculation. At the start of the uprising, it could have held the *t* between the government and its *opponents*. Instead, it supported the militarisation of the *crisis*, backed the *jihadis* and assumed Assad would soon be defeated. This did not happen and what had been a popular uprising became dominated by sectarian warlords who flourished in conditions created by Turkey. Mr Erdogan is assuming he can disregard the rage of the Turkish Kurds at what they see as his complicity with Isis against the Syrian Kurds. *This fury is already deep, with 33 dead, and is likely to get a great deal worse if Kobani falls.*



Why doesn't **Ankara** worry more about the collapse of the peace process with the PKK that has maintained a ceasefire since 2013? It may believe that the PKK is too heavily involved in fighting Isis in Syria that it cannot go back to war with the government in Turkey. On the other hand, if Turkey does join the civil war in Syria against Assad, a crucial ally of Iran, then Iranian leaders have said that "Turkey will pay a price". This probably means that Iran will covertly support an armed Kurdish insurgency in Turkey. Saddam Hussein made a somewhat similar mistake to Mr Erdogan when he invaded Iran in 1980, thus leading Iran to reignite the Kurdish rebellion that Baghdad had crushed through an agreement with the Shah in 1975. Turkish military intervention in Syria might not end the war there, but it may well spread the fighting to Turkey

## AE.45

<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/13/iraq-security-kurds-idUKL5N0OT36U20140613>

### **Kurds realise dream as Baghdad loses grip on north Iraq**

ARBIL, Iraq, June 14 Fri Jun 13, 2014 11:04pm BST

**Poets wrote songs about it for generations. Guerrilla fighters holed up in the mountains trained for it for decades.** But in the end, when a Kurdish army finally took control of Kirkuk, they realised the dream of their forefathers within hours, without having to fire a shot.

The collapse of Baghdad's **control** of northern Iraq in the face of an onslaught by **Sunni insurgents** has allowed Kurds to take the historic **capital** they regard as their Jerusalem, and suddenly put them closer than ever to their immortal goal: an independent state of their own. After Sunni insurgents from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant seized Iraq's biggest northern city Mosul and rampaged towards the capital Baghdad, Kurdish fighters wasted no time in mobilising.

They seized full **control** of Kirkuk - and tracts of land besides. In all, they expanded the territory they control by as much as 40 percent, without having to fight a single battle.

The new territory includes vast oil deposits the Kurdish people regard as their national birthright and foundation for the prosperity of a future independent homeland.

Kurds **plundered** bases deserted by the Iraqi army in Kirkuk, making off with everything from guns to air-conditioning units, armoured vehicles and mattresses **in a frenzy reminiscent of the scenes that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.**

For now, Kurdish officials are still weighing their options for next steps, but they have made clear that the settlement that held Iraq together as a state has been torn up.

"We have entered a new era in Iraq that is completely different than before Mosul," Fuad Hussein, chief of staff to Kurdish regional **President Masoud Barzani**, told Reuters. "We will see how we are going to deal with this new Iraq."

The 30 million Kurds - the world's largest stateless nation, divided between Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey - have sought a state of their own since the mapmakers of the modern Middle East denied them one last century.

Since Saddam's fall, Iraq's 4 million Kurds have come the closest: ruling themselves in a prosperous and comparatively peaceful autonomous region of three remote mountainous provinces under a settlement that awards them a fixed 17 percent of Iraq's total oil wealth, sent from Baghdad.

That has provided enough of a windfall to turn the regional capital Arbil into a boomtown, even as Baghdad remained an unreconstructed war zone **strewn with rubbish, barbed wire and concrete blast walls.**

Kurds have served since Saddam's fall as **Iraq's figurehead president** and as foreign minister, and Kurdish political parties have acted as kingmakers in Baghdad, helping to give the Shi'ite-led government an appearance of inclusivity.

But disputes remained unresolved over the authority to issue oil exploration rights, and over the territorial boundaries of the autonomous region - *demarcated between government troops and Kurdish forces by an often tense green line*."

Kurds argued that much of the disputed territory, including Kirkuk itself, had been illegally *Arabised* in ethnic cleansing campaigns by Saddam, who pushed out Kurds and settled Arabs, to ensure control over the land and the oil beneath it.

Now, the government troops are gone, and the Kurdish forces, known as peshmerga, or *those who confront death*", have effectively resolved the main disputes in the Kurds' favour.

"All these areas are going to be incorporated into the region," said Jabbar Yawar, *Secretary General* of the Kurdish Ministry of Peshmerga. "Currently our border is with ISIL, it is not with the Iraqi government".

#### NOTHING TO OFFER

The *priority* for now, Kurdish officials say, is to insulate the region from the violent fallout in the rest of Iraq.

Officials in Kurdistan say they anticipated this week's assault by ISIL fighters as long as a year ago, and warned Baghdad to no avail.

They built up their own defences by creating a security belt stretching more than 1,000 km (600 miles) from the Iranian border all the way to Syria - skirting around Mosul, a city of 2 million people they appear to have no intention of fighting for.

The Kurds "don't particularly care about Mosul," said a former U.S. official in Iraq. "They are going to expand further below the green line, and a lot of it is going to be oil-related territory."

In the days after Mosul fell, some in Baghdad suggested the peshmerga could come to the Iraqi government's aid and retake the city, an hour's drive from Arbil, on Baghdad's behalf.

The Kurds say they received no *formal* request for help from in Baghdad. But even if Baghdad were to ask, it no longer has much to offer the Kurds in return for the favour, since the Kurds have already taken prizes like Kirkuk for themselves.

#### KURD-ARAB WAR?

Emma Sky, a former political advisor to the U.S. military in Iraq, said some of Iraq's Kurdish leaders may have been waiting all along for the governing system in Baghdad to fall apart, helping to keep Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in power while betting that Iraq would crumble around him.

"On the Kurd side, some leaders calculated that Kurdish independence would come out of the collapse of Iraq - and that Maliki was the person most likely to destroy Iraq. For them, independence is so close," she said.

However, that also creates a risk that the Kurds could find themselves at war with ISIL - dragging them into the sort of violence they have so far avoided for more than a decade.

The disputed areas, including Kirkuk itself, are still home to many Sunni Arabs. Some may accept Kurdish rule if it brings peace, but some may look to ISIL for support that the Iraqi army failed to give.

"The risk, of course, is that ISIL presents itself as the defender of the Sunnis in the (disputed areas) - and starts a fight with Kurds, marking the start of Arab-Kurd war," said Sky.

But for Kurdish officials, the risk of a new conflict with the insurgents was clearly worth taking.

"Everyone is worried, but this is a big chance for us," said a source in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on condition of anonymity. "ISIL gave us in two weeks what Maliki has not given us in eight years." (Additional reporting by Ned Parker; Editing by Peter Graff)

#### AE.46

<http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/syria-war-brings-al-qaeda-kurdistan.html>

## Syria war brings al-Qaeda threat to Iraqi Kurdistan

WASHINGTON — Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani has asked the Kurdish government to form a committee to investigate Kurdish *jihadists* going to Syria for jihad. The **KRG** is facing the same problem as other European countries: Jihad in Syria has not only brought al-Qaeda to Europe's doorstep but also to that of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, as *shown by an attack in Erbil on Sept. 26*.

**There were reports indicating that several Kurdish Islamist fighters were recruited in mosques in the province of Sulaimaniyah.** The Kurdish fighters of the People's Protection Units (YPG) captured several Kurds from Iraqi Kurdistan in Syria, and in July Kurdish TV broadcast an interview with three captured Kurdish Islamic fighters. **Most of the Kurdish Islamist fighters came from Islamist strongholds inside the province of Sulaimaniyah, close to the Iranian border.**

**The city of Halabja located in Sulaimaniyah province has been the historical stronghold of Kurdish Islamists since the 1960s. The first Kurdish Islamic party, the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK), was created in Halabja and declared a holy war against the Iraqi government in 1987 in response to the genocidal Anfal campaign. However, the movement splintered as a result of the IMK joining the Kurdish government, and several Kurdish jihadist groups emerged that controlled parts of Halabja.**

**In March 2003, a joint US special force and Kurdish fighters dislodged fighters of the Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-Islam, which fled to Iran and has since been mostly operating outside the official Kurdistan Region of Iraq.**

Since then, most Islamic Kurdish parties have operated inside the system and become more moderate, trying to achieve their goals through political means. But the war in Syria has provided more opportunities for **Kurdish youths** to refocus on an armed jihad and join groups **such as the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).**

One of the legal Islamic Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG), tried to disassociate themselves from jihad, although their members sympathize with jihad in Syria.

Momen Zellmi, a Kurdish journalist based in Sulaimaniyah, who wrote an article for the Kurdistan Tribune about Kurdish jihadists in Syria, told Al-Monitor, "The people of Halabja have struggled against injustices, tyrants and despotism from early history."

"So, I believe right now, while the people of this city — especially the youths — see the violence by [Syrian President Bashar al-] Assad against his people, they want to help the poor Syrian people in Syria by jihad against the Assad regime," he said.

For the first time on Nov. 18, Kurdish security forces arrested a **Kurdish jihadist** at the airport of Sulaimaniyah returning from Turkey. Sheikh Lahur Jangi, head of the anti-terror force confirmed that Kurds have traveled to Syria to fight against the Syrian regime.

**"These young Kurds are trained in advance and some of them are even trained to commit suicide. We are doing our best to obtain information about these terrorist groups, not only in Kurdistan but also in Syria," said Lahur Jangi. One of the government's countermeasures is banning the funerals of slain Kurdish jihadists who died in Syria and whose families want to bury them in their hometowns. Moreover, the KRG Ministry of Endowment in Iraqi Kurdistan has ordered imams and preachers in the region to advise young people not to go for jihad.**

Although there are tensions and competition between *the Kurdish nationalist political parties* over power-sharing in the Iraqi Kurdistan government and over control of Kurdish territory in Syria, al-Qaeda-affiliated groups do not make any distinction between the different Kurdish parties from either Iraq, Turkey or Syria and see them as a threat.

Suicide bombings and attacks targeting Kurds have taken place not only in Iraq but also in Syria. Moreover, Kurdish nationalist parties have fought jihadist and Islamist groups in Iraq, Syria and Turkey and also fought against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In a video statement released by ISIS in Sorani, Kurdish fighter Abu-Haris al-Kurdi said, "With these

guns, we will return to [Iraqi] Kurdistan, and we will kill all of the members of the KDP [Kurdistan Democratic Party], PUK [Patriotic Union of Kurdistan] and [KRG] security forces [ruling KRG parties].”

Two Kurds, Abu al-Maqdisi al-Kurdi and Shakar Faye Hama Ameen, were involved in an ISIS attack on Dec 4 against the Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Kirkuk. Moreover, some say Kurds were also involved in the attack in Erbil on Sept. 26.

Zagros Hiwa, a spokesman for the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), the executive political council of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), told Al-Monitor that the Kurdish movement in Turkey has a long history of struggle against Islamist groups in Turkey. Moreover, he accused the Turkish government of supporting jihadist groups against Kurds in Syria.

Hiwa said that the KRG might have turned a blind eye to the practices of jihadist groups in the Kurdish areas of Syria and the recruitment of Kurdish youths in Iraq. “Or it may have miscalculated the danger of this trend. But the attacks in Erbil and Kirkuk showed that these groups show no mercy to any people or any political group.”

“Any attack on the Kurdish people in South Kurdistan [Iraqi Kurdistan] by jihadist groups is an attack against the KCK, too. KCK strongly condemns any abuse of Islam for political interest and is ready to take the necessary measures in this regard, as it has already done so during its 40-year struggle,” Hiwa concluded.

## AE.47

<http://rudaw.net/english/opinion/29082013?keyword=&isArchive=True>

### Murky Chemicals and the Assad Regime

By DAVID ROMANO 29/8/2013

Opinion

Murky Chemicals and the Assad Regime

By DAVID ROMANO 29/8/2013

Murky Chemicals and the Assad Regime

column

Photos and video footage from the chemical weapons attack on the southern suburbs of Damascus August 21 offer the world another *heart wrenching glimpse* into Syria today. **With some six hundred civilians casualties** from the chemical attack, this one seems impossible to shrug away. Given President Obama’s Syrian “red line” statement of last year, sacred post-World War One international conventions against chemical weapons use and the United Nation’s recently adopted (2005) “Responsibility to Protect” *doctrine*, America’s and the international community’s credibility seems to be at stake.

Feeling like we need to do something and knowing what to do are two very different things, however. To begin with, it’s not completely clear who was responsible for the attack – no matter how certain American, British and French officials try to appear on television. Skeptics, along with the Assad regime, Russia and Iran, ask why the Assad regime would resort to chemical weapons now, when the war has finally begun to go in its favour? Why risk Western intervention in a war you are winning? Why use the weapons when U.N. inspectors are in the country, and why use them near Damascus only some 5 kilometers away from where the inspectors are staying?

If the regime is not responsible for the attack, however, that only leaves one of the many rebel groups fighting it (*assuming we agree to avoid absurd scenarios, such foreign spy agencies with chemically armed mortar teams running around Damascus undetected*). I don’t doubt that some of the Syrian *opposition* groups are ruthless and *immoral* enough to do such a thing to their own people *in a sympathetic Damascus suburb under rebel control*. Given their recent losses on the battlefield and growing desperation, Syrian rebels clearly have a strong incentive to attract Western intervention one way or another. In May 2013 Carla Del Ponte, a U.N. investigator in Syria, even suggested that Syrian rebels may have used limited amounts of Sarin gas in some attacks.

For this latest attack, however, **opposition** fighters would have had to get their hands on much more significant amounts of **nerve agent gas**, and they would have had to launch the **operation** undetected and without any defectors confessing to the whole dastardly enterprise. This simply sounds too unlikely, especially given that there has not been a single report of rebels seizing any significant chemical weapons caches from the Assad regime during the course of this war – and a number of intelligence agencies have been monitoring the regime’s chemical stockpiles very closely for just such an eventuality.

All of which takes us back to the Assad regime. Of course the Assad **regime would rather not get** bombed by the United States and other Western countries, and a chemical weapons attack like this one, with large numbers of civilian casualties, almost forces Washington’s hand. We should not, however, equate every incident with perfect intent. Accidents happen, especially in **the fog** of war. A **rogue** chemical weapons unit commander, including Bashar Assad’s younger brother Maher, is one possibility. I don’t see it as particularly likely, however, given that Maher should not be considered any less rational than his elder brother. These sorts of units are also tightly controlled by the regime. Yet at the time of this writing, the evidence that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry seems about to present the world involves an intercepted phone call from a high Syrian official to a chemical weapons unit in Damascus under the control Maher. In the call, the **panicked** regime official apparently seeks more details about the unit’s chemical attack.

The most likely explanation has the Syrian government mounting a chemical attack that was simply much more effective than originally intended. Since **May** 2013, in fact, Western intelligence agencies publically stated their belief that the Assad regime has been using chemical weapons on a limited scale. It was not in the White House’s interest to admit this, since they had no desire to be forced over Mr. Obama’s red line into a meaningful Syrian intervention. The evidence was just too clear to deny, however, so the United States fudged its red line by claiming that the chemical weapons had been used in such a limited way by the regime that real intervention in the war was not merited.

It also makes good sense for Damascus to make limited use of chemical weapons, provided Mr. Assad thinks he can get away with it. The weapons terrorize civilian populations supportive of the rebels. At the first mention of a possible chemical attack on civilian areas, rebel fighters have a tendency to abandon their posts in order to go check on their families. The recently attacked suburbs south of Damascus endured as a real headache to the Assad regime, which needed to maintain control of the city at all costs. Yet assault after assault over the past year had failed to dislodge rebels from these suburbs. The regime also appeared to have gotten away with previous, limited chemical weapons attacks elsewhere in the country. Given the extent to which Mr. Assad’s forces shell rebel-held civilian areas with conventional weapons, we should not assume any real **moral** compunction against weapons of mass destruction. So last week the order was probably given to mount a limited chemical attack, and a local unit commander of the Syrian army let fly with a few too many chemically-laden shells, or displayed a bit too much accuracy, or both. Hence the intercepted, **panicked phone** call from headquarters.

If my analysis here is correct, however, that still leaves the question of what to do about it. The U.N. Security Council will remain deadlocked on the issue, thanks to a Russian and Chinese veto. Sending in some stealth bombers and a salvo of cruise missiles despite that hardly seems likely to end the Assad regime or the misery in Syria, and doing so without a real strategic plan or more clarity about what actually happened last week would be rash. American voters also seem to have little appetite for the kind of effort that a more sustained military intervention would require, especially when the Syrian **opposition** includes so many Islamist extremists. All of which means that Assad may just get away with this latest atrocity, again.

David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since August 2010. He is the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and author of *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement* (2006, Cambridge University Press).

Comments

## AE.48

<http://rudaw.net/english/opinion/22082013?keyword=&isArchive=True>

### Turkey's Gambles

By DAVID ROMANO 22/8/2013

column

Just a few years ago, **Turkey received toasts from all across the Middle East** and the West. Foreign Minister Davutoglu's "Zero problems with neighbours" policy looked like a revolutionary sea change in Turkey's position and role in the region. Prime Minister Erdogan basked in accolades in every Arab city he visited, from Beirut to Rabat. As relations with Israel deteriorated, Turkish leaders warned the Jewish state that it would find itself more isolated than ever.

An activist foreign policy carries risks which are all too apparent now, however. *By pronouncing* its positions clearly and forcefully on every issue, from *which Arab Spring dictators should fall* and which should remain in power to how Israel should deal with the Gaza strip, Ankara seems to have made itself enemies even faster than it made friends. Turkish foreign policy used to be a lot more *low key* than this, filled with the usual cautious diplomatic platitudes and avoiding any entanglements beyond its membership in NATO. Now I suspect that career diplomats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs *cringe* every time Mr. Erdogan lays his hands on a microphone.

In a region experiencing such fast paced changes and developments, the wisest players keep their cards close to their chests. Ever since he tamed the Turkish army and deep state, however, Prime Minister Erdogan looks more and more like a reckless, overconfident gambler. **He threw his cards down and bet half the house on Egypt's Morsi**, the Syrian opposition, Palestinian Hamas and Iraqi Sunni parties. As his losses accumulate, the Turkish business and diplomatic community begins to wonder if they will be forced to cover his bets.

So far **Mr. Erdogan's** only successful wagers appear to be some of those he made on the Kurds. The Kurdistan Regional Government has emerged as one of the few neighbours Turkey has zero problems with, at least for the moment. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) agreed to a roadmap to peace with Ankara, although this may still fall apart if the Turkish government fails to respond to a PKK withdrawal with democratic reforms. Even Syrian Kurds refused to be provoked by Turkish support for radical Islamist groups attacking them, insisting that they desired nothing more than cordial relations with their northern neighbour.

What then will Mr. Erdogan and his government do as their foreign policy losses, combined with increasing difficulties at home, accumulate? The prudent thing to do would be to take the gains on their Kurdish bets and nurture them carefully. The reckless thing to do would involve gambling ever more actively and throwing more good money after bad on the lost bets. Such a strategy would likely include squandering the Kurdish bets, and then blaming the West and Israel when everything at home and abroad collapses. From some of his latest speeches, including one a few days ago in which he blamed Israel for the anti-Morsi coup in Egypt, I suspect Mr. Erdogan to be leaning towards the latter strategy.

For a country once known as a pillar of stability and caution in the region, the change could not be more striking.

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## AE.49

<http://rudaw.net/english/opinion/26092013?keyword=&isArchive=True>

Opinion

**An Escape Tunnel from "Democracy"**



By DAVID ROMANO 26/9/2013

I was going to write this week's column on the recent election in *Iraqi Kurdistan*. Like many people, I was heartened to see an election day with few problems, high participation and some surprises. With some political parties still a bit divided in their reaction to the election and official, final results still pending, however, I think I will wait a bit longer before commenting more.

Instead, I would like to talk about a recent event in Turkey, where elections and the rule of law supposedly enjoy a much longer history. Turkish news outlets reported that on September 25th, some 18 imprisoned Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) members "escaped from a prison in the eastern province of Bingol via a tunnel." Most readers in Turkey probably read with interest about how the prisoners apparently spent around a year secretly digging their escape tunnel, which was 80-meters long and ended outside the outer walls of the prison in a waste-water canal. Prison authorities were unable to find soil left over from digging the tunnel or shovels and other tools needed to dig such a tunnel, and they lost the tracks of the prisoners shortly after the tunnel's exit. The escape seems to include many good elements for an action drama, in fact.

What people should really focus on, however, is Turkish Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin's statement on the matter: "We learned that 18 inmates, 14 of which were arrested and four convicted, have escaped." The Justice Minister seems to be saying that of the 18 inmates, only four were convicted of any crime. Ten were arrested at some time in the past, but had yet to be convicted of any crime. The last four, apparently, had never been arrested or formally charged with any crime whatsoever. For at least a year, they therefore languished in this prison without any due legal process.

Perhaps I misunderstand the Justice Minister's statement. Somehow I don't think so, however. The pattern in Turkey simply remains too common (and according to many accounts, has worsened significantly under Prime Minister Erdogan's tenure). People imprisoned without charge, or arrested and imprisoned for years as they await a trial and the chance to defend themselves. The people in question seem to mostly be opponents of Mr. Erdogan's government, and a disproportionate number of them Kurdish. A government that can do this to some people can do it to anyone.

Over the years, I met many Turkish officials who appear very fond of repeating that "Turkey is a country of the rule of law." If the law permits this sort of thing, they make a complete mockery of the spirit of the rule of law.

Prime Minister Erdogan promised to present a significant democratic reform package to the public by the end of September. For months now, his people have been mysteriously crafting the package behind closed doors, without the input of others. But time is running out for democratic reform, especially as the PKK begins to wonder if the "roadmap to peace" the government offered is really genuine. Although Kurdish leaders publicly focus on their demand for "mother tongue education" and similar minority rights in the reform package, I for one will be more interested to see if administrative detention without charge and arrest without trial continue to enjoy legal sanction in Turkey's "rule of law."

In the meantime, hopefully the prisoners who never enjoyed the luxury of a trial make good on their escape.

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**AE.50**

<http://rudaw.net/english/opinion/12072013>

*Secularism* and Islamism

By DAVID ROMANO 12/7/2013  
column

Yesterday I heard America's National Public Radio quote Tariq Ramadan, an Oxford University professor of Islamic studies and grandson of the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Dr. Ramadan lamented the recent events in Egypt, stating something along the lines of "Islamists and *secularists* must learn to live together and accept each other" (I can't find a transcript of his exact words, but this was the gist of it if memory serves me faithfully). This probably strikes people as a very reasonable view, akin to "we must learn to make peace, not war."

Secular and Islamist co-existence, however, is a contradiction in terms. Islamists, by definition, engage in politics in order to insert religion into the realm of public policy. If this were not their objective, they would simply be religiously devout politicians in some other political party. Also by definition, *secularists* believe in not allowing religion to dictate public policy. We might just as well wish for the *Klu Klux Klan* and African Americans to get along.

Some readers may, at this point, exclaim "Wait! There are many different kinds of Islamists, as well as different sorts of *secularism*!" As far as I can tell, however, there are only really two kinds of Islamists—the patient, "*play* by the rules" kind, and the impatient, "take power by any *means*" kind. Of course there are many, many different *interpretations* of Islam and Islamic law and varying levels of *enthusiasm* for imposing religious rules throughout a society. In both kinds of Islamism, however, the same basic *logic* applies: a view that religion enjoins what is right and forbids what is wrong, and that these things should be translated into public policy one way or the other.

Islamists, by definition, engage in politics in order to insert religion into the realm of public policy.

In Islam, alcohol, blasphemy, adultery and usury, among other things, are *wrong*. Some Islamists may therefore enact forthright bans on such practices, as in Iran and Saudi Arabia, while others take a more indirect approach, as in Turkey. Since Turkey's constitution mandates secular politics, the Justice and Development Party's (*AKP*) approach has been to increasingly curtail alcohol as part of a public health campaign, outlaw blasphemy and adultery as part of public morality campaign (they have been stymied on the adultery issue to date), and spout *conspiracy* theories and vague threats against the "interest rate lobby". Turkey under the *AKP* thus travels to the same general destination of "life dictated by religion and those who interpret it" as Iran and Saudi Arabia, but does so on a slower, more circuitous train.

The mirror image of such an outlook comes in the form of a French style approach to secularism, or "laïcité." In this understanding, religion is subservient to the state, and politics even dictates and constrains religion. Kemalism in Turkey adopted such an approach when it trained and licensed all imams in the country according to state-sanctioned *doctrine*, outlawed the wearing of veils in public institutions and forbade public officials from growing beards, for instance. This is the kind of secularism that sparked so much resentment amongst Islamists, and which Prime Minister Erdogan referred to when he recently proclaimed "They humiliated our values for years. They despised our beliefs, ignored our choices, desires, demands and expectations." Islamism, including Mr. Erdogan's patient brand of Islamism, bears a remarkable similarity to this kind of *secularism* in that both seek to impose one group's values on the other. They can not coexist.

What of American-style *secularism*, however? In the American understanding, *secularism* means a separation of church (or mosque) and state, with neither subservient to the other. Just as the state should not mandate or favor certain religions or *interpretations* of religious *doctrine*, religion should not serve as a determiner of public policy. Although this separation faces constant *challenges* in the United States, the *principle* seems clear enough: politics dirties religion, and religion wrecks politics. Surely political parties of socially conservative Muslims, as opposed to Islamists, could coexist with this kind of *secularism*? When I spoke to *AKP* deputies about this in 2008 and 2009, they told me that they very much support *secularism* in this American sense of the term. I wish I could believe them. Perhaps if they had not organized their political party on the ashes of the banned Islamist Refah party, if they had not made its Sunni Islamic nature so central, I could. Millions of protestors in Turkey no longer seem to believe them either, just as a good number of the millions who protested in Egypt no longer believe the



Muslim Brotherhood.

***But what if Islamists just use religion cynically to gain political support? What if they don't believe in a heavenly mandate at all, and are quite ready to compromise on every issue?***

Even American-style **secularism** and moderate Islamism are not equivalent or compatible, unfortunately. One promises to leave people alone when it comes to their beliefs and their lifestyles (although even these promises sometimes face problems, as the Christian conservative component of the American Republican Party attests to). The other believes itself to have a mandate from God. Fulfilling God's Will does not easily lend itself to compromise, sharing political power or staying out of people's daily lives, no matter how "moderate" your **tactics** are. Who would want to compromise on their vision of the Divine Will? That's one reason the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt sparked so much opposition in such a short time, and why Turkey's **AKP** looks more and more like the Muslim Brotherhood every year.

But what if Islamists just use religion **cynically** to gain political support? What if they don't believe in a heavenly mandate at all, and are quite ready to compromise on every issue? In this case, they formed a religiously-based political party for mainly strategic reasons rather than any deeply held convictions. Perhaps there's more hope for coexistence with **secularists** in such a scenario, although many people who vote for such "Islamist" leaders might not accept many compromises before they vote for a different, less moderate Islamist pretender. These kinds of Islamist leaders would also have to be cynics and liars before they even entered politics, which hardly inspires confidence...

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**AE.51**

<http://rudaw.net/english/opinion/10052013>

### **Does the Kurdistan Region Have Alternatives to Turkey?**

By Wladimir van Wilgenburg 10/5/2013

Column

Could a change in government in neighboring Syria offer Iraq's autonomous and landlocked Kurdistan Region an **alternative to** dependence on Turkey for oil and gas exports? According to Middle East expert Ruba Husari, it can, especially if Syrian Kurds also succeed in gaining autonomy in the future.

In an article for the Carnegie Middle East Center, she suggested that an alignment of interests between the Kurds of Syria and Iraq could offer the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) an alternative to dependence on Turkey as an oil-gas corridor.

***But this seems unlikely.***

Husari suggests that the "degree of autonomy that a new regime emerging in Syria would be able to grant Syrian Kurds -- as well as the latter's ability to carve out an autonomous region within the new state -- will determine whether Iraq's Kurds will be able to free themselves from the pressures of **Ankara** and Baghdad and establish a direct export route for their hydrocarbons via Syrian Kurdish territory."

However, Syria's own Kurdish areas contain oil and gas, but will themselves be dependent for exports on either Turkey, Syria's future government or the KRG -- more specifically on the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which controls the border near the Kurdish areas of Syria.

Some analysts think the Syrian Kurds have this access, but this is not the case.

Often analysts forget the fact that Kurds -- *including* Syrian Kurds -- are landlocked and therefore always dependent on others not only for gas and oil exports, but also for imports. Moreover, the current tensions between the KDP and Kurdistan Workers Party (**PKK**) could make cooperation between Syrian Kurds and Iraqi Kurds difficult in the future. The oil industry knows the PKK-affiliated Democratic Union Party (PYD) controls most of Syria's Kurdish areas.

At an oil forum in Washington DC last month, KRG energy minister Ashti Hawrami made clear that for the Kurdistan Region there is no *alternative* to Turkey. He said exports were possible through Iran and Syria, "But we infinitely prefer dealing with Turkey, for several advantages: first of all, the infrastructure -- more or less ready. The corridor is already being used for oil supply," he said.

KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani has also suggested that the only door of hope for Iraqi Kurds -- *or the KDP* -- is Turkey.

The Iraqi Kurds cannot simply fly out oil and gas; they need pipelines. And those pipelines are the *guarantee* of possibly more independence or autonomy in the future. But for this, they need cooperation with one of their neighbors.

**AE.52**

<http://old.rudaw.net/english/science/columnists/5329.html>

### *The Politics of Terrorism Lists*

18/10/2012 05:35:00By DAVID ROMANO

The U.S. State Department just removed The People's Mujahideen, or Mojahedin-e Khalq (**MEK**), from its list of designated terrorist organizations. The MEK was responsible for thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of attacks on Iranian civilians over the years. The most infamous attacks occurred on June 28 and August 30, 1981, when the MEK set off bombs that between them killed some seventy high ranking Iranian officials, including Iran's chief justice, its newly elected Prime Minister, its newly elected President, four cabinet members and twenty-seven members of the Majlis (Iranian parliament). During the Iran-Iraq war, the MEK invaded Iran along with Saddam Hussein's army, using weapons and hardware supplied by the Ba'athist regime to fight Iranians. In 1991, the MEK helped Saddam suppress the uprisings in Kurdistan and the Shiite *south of Iraq*.

Perhaps the **MEK** has changed since then. I admit that I haven't seen much about their activities of late, besides rumours of their involvement in various Israeli and American covert operations in Iran and the difficulties faced by their cadres in Camp Ashraf in Iraq since 2003. While in Geneva in 2011 I also spoke at length with several MEK members manning a protest *tent outside the U.N. headquarters* there, although that's hardly the best way to get a good idea about whether or not they should still be considered a "terrorist organization."

It's usually frustratingly difficult, in fact, ever to get accurate, up to date facts about insurgent groups' tactics. Unless the groups in question are vicious and callous enough to freely admit that they intentionally target civilians (Al Qaeda, Hamas, Ansar al-Sunnah and similar groups come to mind here), academics like myself are left poring over unreliable reports and attacks for which no one claimed responsibility. Even the MEK attacks of 1981 that killed so many Iranian civilian government officials were neither claimed nor *denied* by the MEK (*the perpetrators of the June 28 and August 30 attacks were both MEK members, however*).

In the end it probably doesn't matter much whether academics believe a group deserves to be on a terror list or not. I think we all know why the United States removed the MEK from the list: Relations with the regime in Iran have hit an all time low, and the Americans no longer seem to hold out much hope for U.S.-Iranian negotiations. This, combined with a robust **MEK lobbying** campaign of American *senators*, *congressmen* and government officials, means that the enemy of America's enemy is now America's friend -- no matter how much *civilian* blood it has on its hands. The MEK no doubt offered the Americans

a lot of help with intelligence gathering and covert activities as well. The mullahs in Teheran, in turn, will see vindications for their conspiracy theories about the Americans' true intentions. It's not a conspiracy theory, after all, if they really are out to get you.

The political nature of terror lists – whether of the United States, the European Union, Canada or other countries – cheapens them immensely. Turkey's Prime Minister decries the “terrorist **PKK**” [**Kurdistan Workers' Party**] just before he heads off to the airport to welcome the latest Hamas visitor for lunch. Iranian leaders rail against the evils of the MEK at the same time as they wire money to Islamic **Jihad** in Palestine and a whole bevy of groups in Iraq and Afghanistan.

If groups could really get off terror lists by turning away from terrorist tactics, the PKK would have been removed from Western lists for *at least a time* after 1999. PKK leaders even changed its name to **KADEK** and Kongra-Gel in 2002 and 2003, in the vain hope of encouraging others to recognize their withdrawal from armed operations, their change in tactics and their call for negotiations. It probably would not have mattered if the PKK even metamorphosed into a bunch of blind boy (and girl) scouts, however. As long as their friends in Ankara insist so much that the PKK remain on the terror list, the Americans will keep it there no matter what the organization does or doesn't do (*as for the Iranians, what they insist on no longer matters in Washington*).

Armed insurgent groups thus seem to have few incentives to stop engaging in terrorism, since that's not what really gets them onto or off of the terror lists. Little wonder then that so many fail to *reform* themselves.

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## AE.53

<http://old.rudaw.net/english/science/columnists/4052.html>

### A Shroud Over the Arab Spring

13/10/2011 03:25:00By DAVID ROMANO  
THURSDAY COLUMN

In Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, the overthrow of dictators brought great joy and high expectations. It also brought widespread intolerance out into the open, it seems. Synagogues in Tunisia were attacked, a Libyan Jew returning to the country saw armed men prevent him from cleaning a decrepit synagogue in Tripoli, and now Egyptian Copts face increasing violence from both street thugs and the army itself.

One might feel tempted to blame all this on decades of authoritarian rule. When a population lives under repression and lies for years on end, removing the cauldron's cover allows some unpleasant, repressed and ugly tendencies to boil over at first. You can't expect instant *liberalism* and tolerance the day after a dictator's demise. The French revolution, after all, saw a reign of terror before the advent of fraternity, liberty, and equality.

If this serves as an adequate rationalization of the past week's ugly events in Cairo and elsewhere, what then of Iraqi Kurds' emergence from Saddam's iron fist in 1991? Even when civil war broke out between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (**KDP**) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (**PUK**) in 1994, Christians, Yezidis, Kakaiis, Turkmen and Arabs in Kurdistan remained a secure, accepted part of society. No angry mobs threatened their houses of worship, their schools or their homes.

When the rest of Iraq was freed from Saddam's rule twelve years later, however, the position of Christians and Yezidis came under almost immediate attack. Rumors rolled through Baghdad's streets that Iraqi Jews, *robbed of their possessions and expelled sixty years ago*, were now coming back to nefariously buy up land. While the Iraqi government and Iraqi society at large failed to protect the Christians in particular, radical Islamists killed and bombed them out of neighborhood after neighborhood.

"A large part of the reason why modern Kurdistan is much more tolerant of its minorities comes from the secularism of its leading political parties"

When it comes to tolerance and popular acceptance of minorities, political Islamists in particular seem to have an increasingly poor record. Religious minorities didn't fare so well in Europe either, of course, until the separation of Church and state (remember the Inquisition in Spain, for example?). As the grip of religious Jews over politics in Israel strengthens, we also see the emergence of hate crimes against non-Jews, such as the arson attack on a mosque in the Galilee region. The rise of political Hinduism brought a similar phenomena to parts of India. Even in Turkey, the rise of the AKP has seen a concurrent increase in attacks on immodestly dressed women, Christians (including a prominent Armenian writer) and others deemed "*immoral*."

It seems that religion and politics just don't mix very well. A large part of the reason why modern Kurdistan is much more tolerant of its minorities comes from the *secularism* of its leading political parties. While the politicians are often believing, practicing Muslims, they don't take their religion into the political sphere very much or *wear it on their sleeve*. This is in contrast to much of the Arab world, where the leading *opposition* groups nowadays tend to be Islamists, and ruling governments compete with them by trying to be even more Islamic.

But why would anyone would want to sully the sacredness of religion by forcing it into the dirtiness of politics? Many *theologians* also completely reject the notion that Islam is an inherently political religion. For example, if Islam were so necessarily political, why would the most basic political question – leadership succession after Mohammad's death – have been left unanswered? This most basic of political issues created the split between Sunnis and Shiites and a lot of violence over the years.

Europe only put an end to its bloody wars pitting Catholics against Protestants by pushing religion out of the political sphere. Judging by some of the recent events in Egypt and elsewhere, the example was lost on much of the Arab world. While most of the world fully accepts basic *liberal* principles of civic equality between all religious groups and freedom of religion, we see the oldest and largest Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, incapable of simply condemning the recent slaughter of Coptic Christian demonstrators.

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## AE.54

<http://rudaw.net/english/opinion/20032014>

### **Putin Announces His Support for a Unified Kurdish State**

By DAVID ROMANO 20/3/2014  
column

Now that I have readers' attention, I have to admit that Vladimir Putin did not in fact announce his support for a unified Kurdish state. Our world remains too full of double standards for that. What Putin actually said was that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, "The Russian nation became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders."

With some 27 million Russians living outside of Russia, which includes places as far away as the Americas and Western Europe, Putin is right that the Russian nation in 1991 became "one of the biggest to be divided by borders." If we're talking about the number of people cut off from a state of their own by the vicissitudes of borders, however, they're not the biggest one. With some thirty to forty million people and no state of their own anywhere, the Kurds hold that dubious honor. After the Ukraine secured its independence in 1991, the Kurds became the world's largest stateless nation.

Given the snap referendum in Crimea and this week's even quicker annexation of Crimea by Russia, Mr. Putin appears to be a fervent believer in the right to national self-determination. The majority ethnic Russian population of Crimea yearned to become part of a Russian state, you see, and Mr. Putin felt obliged to fulfill the Crimeans' wishes. Attaching Crimea to the Ukraine in 1954 was a historical mistake,

according to the Russians, and it seems such mistakes should be rectified.

I know most Kurds like seeing this kind of thing play out internationally. They reason that the less sacred the world's established borders become, the better. The more people talk about rights of national self-determination, the greater the chance that the international community will finally recognize as much for the Kurds, they believe. The injustice of the post-World War One drawing of political borders can also be rectified, they hope. Crimea, South Sudan, East Timor, Kosovo – it's all music to Kurdish ears. There's a discordant note in the music, however: it's the cacophony of double standards and hypocrisy the world over. When it comes to Syria, for instance, Mr. Putin holds state sovereignty and non-interference sacred. The Syrian Kurds can hold all the referendums and local elections they like, and not one of the world powers – including Russian lovers of self-determination – will so much as recognize their efforts. The United States and its Western European allies were all for Kosovars' self-determination and the creation of the Republic of Kosovo, and it couldn't have mattered less to them that the whole enterprise violated Serbian law. They even bombed Serbia while its main patron and ally – Russia – was still too weak to do much about it. Now that it's one of their friends losing territory, however, suddenly arguments like “this is totally in violation of Ukrainian law!” are supposed to matter.

If any part of Kurdistan ever finds itself poised to declare its independence, therefore, they had best not rely too much on norms, principles or precedents. Only nations with powerful friends or enough power of their own benefit from these hypocrisies.

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**AE.55**

<http://old.rudaw.net/english/science/columnists/3457.html>

### ***Trying to Overturn the Game Board in Kurdistan***

By DAVID ROMANO  
THURSDAY COLUMN  
10/02/2011 06:32:00

The resort to violence only finds justification when a political system remains closed to any other attempts at change. Even then, non-violent protests and civil disobedience are generally preferable to armed resistance. Few doubt that the Tunisian and Egyptian political systems were completely closed in every meaningful sense of the word. This in turn justified the mass protests that erupted in both countries, and the international sympathy they garnered.

The Gorran Party's recent talk of replicating the Tunisian example in Kurdistan, however, amounts to crying wolf. As my fellow columnists for this newspaper correctly pointed out, Gorran participated in the last elections, which were declared free and fair by international observers, and accepted the results. In other words, the political system in Iraqi Kurdistan, despite its many shortcomings, still allows room for the legal, institutionalized pursuit of change. If the Tunisians and Egyptians had been so lucky, they wouldn't have needed to take to the streets by the millions.

To turn suddenly around and demand the dissolution of the Kurdistan Regional Government and Parliament strikes most people as petty. Gorran is acting like a child who overturns the game board when he starts to lose. It complains that Gorran people were not given any posts in KRG institutions. Since the current KRG government is not a minority *coalition* government,



why should they have expected any *appointments*? After Gorran forsook Kurdish national goals in Baghdad by quitting the Kurdistan Alliance (*a unified bloc formed to press Kurdistan's objectives vis-a-vis political groups in the rest of Iraq*), they should count themselves lucky that anyone still speaks to them at all. At a time when Iraqi Kurdistan still faces serious threats from outside, it also strikes many Kurdistanis as the height of folly to try to bring down the government through non-institutionalized means.

What makes this whole incident all the more depressing is that, lost in Gorran's overdone histrionics, are some very *legitimate* complaints against the KRG. Nawshirwan Mustafa is correct when he points out that a great many key institutions in the KRG, from the peshmerga and asayish to various not-so-non-governmental organizations (also known as 'fake *NGOs*', or GONGOs – government organized non-governmental organizations), remain under KDP and PUK party *control* rather than that of the government. Corruption still runs rampant, as does nepotism. Most, although thankfully not all, media outlets are party controlled (of course this includes Wusha Corporation, the Gorran Party's media company). Services, including education and health care, still need a lot more improvement – the kind of advances that are less likely to occur when corruption keeps society from running as efficiently as it could.

Most countries in the world face problems more similar to those of Kurdistan than Egypt or Tunisia – partly open, partly *liberal* political systems where incumbent political parties enjoy all kinds of unfair advantages. Such systems are not the closed, deeply authoritarian political environments that spawned protest in Tunisia and Egypt. The proper response in such a context would be to exercise one's right to free speech (Wusha Corporation and its *KNN* television channel are very useful to Gorran in this *case*) and work hard to compete in the next elections, rather than demanding that the current game be overturned. We're all anxiously waiting for Gorran to develop the political maturity to realize as much.

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## AE.56

<http://old.rudaw.net/english/science/columnists/4271.html>

*Ankara's* Glass House and the French *Genocide* Bill  
29/12/2011 05:21:00By DAVID ROMANO

### THURSDAY COLUMN

Last week (December 22) France's lower house of parliament overwhelmingly passed a law that would make it illegal and punishable to deny publically any genocide recognized as such by French law. This in effect refers to the two *genocides* currently recognized by French law: the Holocaust that Germany's Third Reich perpetrated against mostly Jews, and the mass killings of mostly Armenians (but also other Christians) by the Ottomans in 1915.

*Ankara* immediately branded the French bill "an attack on freedom of expression and historical inquiry," and its ruling and opposition parties jointly denounced it as a "grave, unacceptable and historic mistake." Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan added that the bill is "politics based on racism, discrimination, xenophobia." A Turkish protester in Paris expressed the view of many when he told Reuters "I don't understand why France wants to *censor* my freedom of expression."

This is particularly rich coming from *Ankara*. According to the International Press Institute, Turkey jails more journalists than any other country in the world, including Iran and China. Laws against

“insulting Turkishness,” or “insulting the military”, the Prime Minister, the “organs of the state,” the “memory of Atatürk” and any number of other sacred cows, frequently get invoked to prosecute and imprison people in Turkey who dare claim an Armenian *genocide* did occur, or that Kurds were massacred on numerous occasions, or that Atatürk was an authoritarian leader.

Other laws, such as various “anti-terror” statutes, are so broadly worded that Turkish authorities can and often do arrest almost anyone they want, any time they want. The European *Commissioner* for Human Rights recently complained about a great many vague statutes that effectively kill freedom of expression in Turkey, including a law that “provides for imprisonment ranging from one to three years for a person who makes propaganda in favour of a criminal organisation or its aims” [italics in the original report of the Commissioner]. This means that if you want to establish a historic nature and culture site around an ancient city like Hasankeyf (instead of a dam to flood the place like the current government is doing), and the PKK has this as one of its aims as well, you could technically be arrested for **terrorism**.

Just the definition of terrorism in Turkey’s “Anti-Terror” law remains so broad, even after it was amended in 2006, that people face prosecution for even saying that a Kurdish minority exists in Turkey. The Turkish definition: “**Terrorism** is any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, *secular* and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, *oppression* or threat.” Columnists like myself could face problems for just pointing out obvious problems with such a definition of terrorism, should a Turkish prosecutor want to argue that our intent was to harm Turkey’s anti-terror struggle. One can be held responsible for such “crimes” even if they were done unintentionally, by word or deed. Many intellectuals and public figures who claim that a Kurdish minority exists in Turkey found themselves in court and in prison.

Despite all this, the Turks are right to throw rocks at the French genocide law and French glass houses of self-righteousness. Remember the Battle of Algiers? Or shall we recall Vichy France and the eagerness with which French officials helped the Nazis round up Jews for extermination? Or perhaps Charles De Gaulle’s attempt to recast the French experience under German occupation as one of unrelenting partisan resistance rather than collaboration?. That the latest French genocide bill, passed just before new elections, caters to France’s sizeable Armenian diaspora is no secret to anyone. What the French parliament just did will also hurt any chances for a sincere, necessary and open discussion of what the Ottomans did to their Christian minorities as their empire collapsed. Many liberal Turks (including the most prominent remaining Armenian citizens of Turkey) criticized the French law for precisely this reason. In the process, Turks also have a right to talk about the many Muslims massacred by Russian forces and Armenian irregulars in the area at the time. Kurds will also be reminded of the prominent role that Kurdish tribes working for the Ottomans played in the massacres of eastern Anatolia’s Christians.

In the process, governments should leave such history to society and the historians and limit themselves to condemning, rather than forbidding, points of view they don’t like. If someone wants to deny the *Holocaust*, to claim the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia never happened, to minimize the Armenian genocide, or to argue that rebellious Iraqi Kurds deserved the Anfal ethnic cleansings, I for one would rather hear their point of view (and in many cases, know more quickly that they are anti-Semitic, Islamophobic, racist or fascist).

The Turks should save a few rocks for their own glass house, however, and take a hard look at Turkey’s much more severe restrictions on freedom of expression. At least in France, one can walk around today and fearlessly talk about French government misdeeds in Algeria, in Vietnam, in the Pacific or as far back as the Vendée massacres of 1794. When anyone can do the same kind of thing in Turkey without fear, Prime Minister Erdogan and his government can legitimately complain about “attacks on freedom of expression and historical inquiry.”

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AE.57

<http://rudaw.net/english/opinion/17102014>

## **Turkey can not have its Kurdish cake and eat it too**

By DAVID ROMANO 17/10/2014

Since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Ankara has demanded that the Kurds within the new state's borders remain loyal and obedient. Their identity was of course denied and authorities mounted a ceaseless campaign of forced assimilation to their preferred language, customs and history. State ideologues maintained that everyone in Turkey was Turkish, insisting that "Turkish" referred to their citizenship and not their ethnicity. Nonetheless, the mandated language, history and cultural practices of "Turkish citizens" looked very much like that of ethnic Turks. A number of Kurdish revolts were then dismissed as the banditry of a people "who just refuses to accept civilization and the benefits the state wants to bring them."

At the same time, the Turkish public and Turkish state authorities kept the fate of non-citizen fellow Turks, whether in Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Germany or elsewhere, close to their hearts. While they appeared curiously uncaring about the situation of many of their own "so called citizens" who spoke languages other than Turkish at home, leaders in Ankara ceaselessly spoke up for Turkic minorities across the world. When in the 1960s and 70s Greek Cypriot militias and death squads threatened the Turkish minority in Cyprus, the Turkish public and state authorities demanded that something be done. In 1974 they finally sent a massive invasion force to the aid of the Turkish Cypriots and took over one third of Cyprus, where Turkish troops remain to this day.

The insurgency of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which began in earnest in 1984, eventually forced a change in official policy towards the Kurds, however. It grew increasingly difficult to fight the PKK while maintaining that Kurds do not exist in Turkey. If Turkey had no Kurds, the word "Kurdistan" in the PKK name should not have caused so many conniptions in Ankara. By 1991, Turkey finally admitted that there were indeed Kurds in the country (in fact they consist of up to twenty per cent of the population).

The capture and imprisonment of the PKK's leader in the late 1990s brought a lull in the PKK insurgency, but by 2005 the insurgency resumed. It was thus under the watch of Prime Minister Erdogan and his Sunni Muslim Justice and Development Party (AKP) that Ankara looked for additional ways to end the violence. Erdogan offered limited Kurdish language rights and some other reforms, including limited Kurdish broadcasting and Kurdish language publications. He publically recognized the existence of his "Kurdish brothers" and promised to make the Kurds feel like equal citizens. A peace process begun in 2007 held a lot of promise, but when the first group of PKK fighters disarmed and arrived at the Turkish-Iraqi border, the throng of Kurdish supporters (some of the "so called citizens" of Turkey) waiting to welcome them embarrassed the government so much it backed out of the whole process and started arresting the Kurds again. A few years later Mr. Erdogan announced another big push for peace, and in March 2013 the PKK agreed to stop its insurgency and withdraw its fighters from Turkey to Iraqi Kurdistan. They withdrew in return for unspecified government commitments to further the peace process. Unfortunately, Mr. Erdogan's government appeared more interested in achieving a peace process than actually achieving peace. None of the Kurdish demands were met. Instead thousands of non-violent Kurdish journalists, civil society activists, student leaders and politicians were arrested and imprisoned (where many are still awaiting charges).

It is at this point in the story that ISIS launched its biggest offensive against the Syrian Kurdish canton of Kobane, which sits right on the Turkish border. Kobane is not, however, equivalent for the Kurds to what Northern Cyprus was for Turks. It is instead much more dear, as Kurds never really recognized the imposed border that separates Kobane from Kurdish towns like Suruc on the Turkish side of the line – they have close kin and friends on both sides.

Yet somehow the same state that demands Kurdish loyalty and assures Kurds that they are equal citizens blockades Kobane even as its residents are attacked. The city's defenders run short of ammunition for their light weapons, their backs pushed right up to the border by the most bloodthirsty, heavily armed band of terrorists the world has ever seen. The Kurds do not even ask for Turkish military intervention as occurred in Cyprus, but rather only permission to supply and relieve their brethren themselves. Ankara refuses, however,



as its Prime Minister claims that the PKK he supposedly entered into a peace process with in 2013 is “the same” as ISIS. For good measure Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister this week ridiculed the month-long heroic fight of Kobane’s Kurds against a much better supplied Jihadi force, a force that in a few days in June sent half the Iraqi Army scurrying to Baghdad.

As Kurdish demonstrations now rock cities across Turkey, leaders in Ankara and some of the Turkish public appear bewildered, wondering why the Kurds are so angry. They have yet to understand that they can not have their cake – in this case loyal Kurdish citizens at peace with Ankara – and simultaneously try to feed it to hungry Jihadis. If Mr. Erdogan insists on treating the Kurds as his greatest enemy, even in the midst of his vaunted “peace process,” then that is precisely what they will be.

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**AE.58**

<http://rudaw.net/english/opinion/04092014?keyword=&isArchive=True>

### **A Risk Averse Leader of the Free World**

By DAVID ROMANO 4/9/2014

Although Kurds, Shiites and many others in Iraq never regretted the 2003 American invasion, most Americans do. From many Americans’ point of view, the younger President Bush turned out to be reckless, squandering vast sums of the country’s blood and treasure on risky, ill-prepared and mendaciously justified undertakings. While the toppling of Saddam turned out to be easier than most people expected, the occupation of Iraq cost Americans much too much for far too little in return.

It was thus an America tired of war that elected Mr. Obama in 2008. It should come as no surprise that Mr. Obama was elected on a platform promising to focus on domestic rather than foreign policy problems. The slogan “Yes we can!” was certainly not meant to apply to any new ventures abroad. It should also probably come as no surprise that in contrast to his predecessor, Mr. Obama also appears exceedingly risk averse in foreign policy. Whether the issue is Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Russia’s advances in the Ukraine, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the civil war in Syria or just about anything else, the new president seems to prefer cautious non-committal to decisive engagement or action.

As I have written in previous columns, the rise and recent advances of the Islamic State (IS) demonstrate this tendency in the White House very well. Initially Mr. Obama dismissed the IS as a two-bit junior varsity regional problem. When the IS captured Mosul and much of Western Iraq in June the Americans seemed to be caught with their pants almost as far down as the Iraqi Army’s. When the Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga faced their own surprise humiliation at the hands of IS in early August, again the Americans appeared too hesitant and unsure about what course of action they would take. Only when Erbil itself seemed to be under threat and tens of thousands of Yezidi civilians had already been on Mount Shengal five days did the American President decide to say something and act.

The action he chose was “limited air strikes to protect American personnel in Iraq and the civilians on Mount Shengal.” This was combined with a promise not to send American troops into Iraq. The arming and resupply of the Kurds fighting the IS would only occur with Baghdad’s approval and collusion. Throughout August, Mr. Obama’s apparent position remained that the IS was the problem of others in the region, stating that “We’re not the Iraqi military, we’re not even the Iraqi air force,” and “I am the commander in chief of the United States armed forces, and Iraq is gonna have to ultimately provide for its own security.” Most recently, the President added that regarding the Islamic State, “I don’t want to put the cart before the horse. We don’t have a strategy yet.”

In other words, while President Obama reassesses the IS and attempts to devise a strategy, he continues with his non-committal cautious policies, adding relatively small tweaks to the status quo foreign policy only when forced to do so. The caution instinct seems to run so deep that the President even promised not to send troops back to Iraq and admitted to not having a strategy to defeat the Islamic State.

But why would anyone enter a contest by placing limits on what they can do, and then publically admit that

they have no idea what to do? America may not need to send significant numbers of troops into Iraq or Syria, but surely there is no need to tell its enemies that it will not do so under any circumstances? Likewise, can the public admission of lacking a strategy inspire confidence in American allies battling the IS Jihadis as we speak? What if instead of looking indecisive, Mr. Obama threatened both the IS and others that he will back allies like the Kurds one hundred per cent, without limit or conditions? At the same time, he could privately tell the Kurds what they actually have to do in the short term to receive unrestrained American assistance in this war.

Cautious diplomacy and minor tweaks to the status quo foreign policy can not possibly be the right answer to every single challenge facing the United States. Leaders that turn out to be too risk averse may endanger their country and its interests just as much, or more than, reckless ones.

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## **AE.59**

<http://rudaw.net/english/opinion/07082014>

### **Obama's Moral and Strategic Failure on ISIS**

By DAVID ROMANO 7/8/2014

column

Few conflicts offer the moral and strategic clarity that the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS) now provides. Polarized camps can and do endlessly argue in support of Israeli or Palestinian viewpoints, resulting in a lot of international chatter but little of substance. Ukraine remains a mess, with few people sure of what to do or when to do it. Syria gave the West the unenviable choice of either the Assad devil or the Jihadi demons, with decision makers in Washington and elsewhere appearing paralyzed by their lack of options. Sub-Saharan African conflicts appeared so chaotic and far away they never made it onto the strategic radar screen, although the world still feels guilty (when it remembers) for inaction in places like Rwanda, Darfur and the Congo.

In contrast to other international problems, the ISIS villain offers the world, and the United States in particular, a refreshingly unambiguous imperative. Thanks to the statements and on-line videos that ISIS terrorists post themselves, no one doubts what they are about: Executing captives and unarmed civilians, including children; beheading those whose religious beliefs differ from their nihilistic Salafi extremism; raping women taken as booty; random drive by shootings of civilians; pedophilia (I am not sure how else to describe the forcible marriage of captured underage girls); blowing up the religious shrines and ancient cultural heritage of others; suicide bombings targeting random innocents; destabilizing the region and replacing existing states with an Islamic Caliphate, starting with Syria and Iraq but now moving onto Lebanon, Jordan and Gaza and soon the rest; expanding the "struggle" to encompass as much of the world as possible.

As if all this were not enough, ISIS butchers now bring the threat of genocide to the devastated cityscapes and barren countrysides they stalk. I do not mean this in the tripe way the word has been thrown about so often, every time a few hundred innocents of the same group get killed -- but rather in the very real sense of the physical extermination of an entire people, with their survivors scattered. Mosul's Christian population is no more, ethnically cleansed in June from a city they inhabited for almost 2000 years. Since ISIS overran the nearby city of Shengal a few days ago, the Yezidi population has been looking at the threat of genocide as well. Some half of the world's 400,000 Yezidis, an old religion that predates Christianity and Islam, are now displaced and on the run from ISIS. As I write this, some ten thousand Yezidi civilians are trapped on a mountain top in 45 degree heat, with their old and young expiring first as ISIS terrorists surround the base. The last big Christian town in Iraq, Qaraqosh, may have just fallen to ISIS as I write this.

In short, ISIS makes al-Qaeda look like a bunch of boy scouts, which probably explains why al-Qaeda disowned them. But whereas al-Qaeda was more of an idea and a loose franchise of like-minded, disparate Jihadis, ISIS is much more than that. The militants of the Islamic State (as they now call themselves) are organized into an almost regular army, with a state that incorporates a good deal of Syria and Iraq. They are

flush with cash and now American weapons captured from the fleeing Iraqi army. The group's recent and lightning-quick series of military conquests is convincing Arab Sunnis with few other options that ISIS is a viable, serious player, and no one in this region wants to stand with the wrong team. Analysts who watch these things are calling ISIS' advance "a calamity hitherto unimaginable." It is likely today's most serious threat to the entire region.

Despite the rare confluence of moral and strategic imperatives to respond, the United States, Europe and other countries appear almost blasé about the whole thing. It does not even make the front page of major newspapers. U.S. President Obama last made a public statement about Iraq on June 19th, despite being the leader of a state with both a strong interest and moral obligation to respond to ISIS' actions in Iraq.

Those analysts, journalists and academics looking at the issue appear to have reached a very rare consensus on what needs to be done: Arm and support the secular, pro-Western Kurds currently standing up to ISIS. With their budget cut off by Baghdad since January and no military resupply to speak of, the Iraqi Kurds are outgunned by the new American hardware and supplies ISIS captured in June. Syrian Kurds have moved to help them confront the ISIS advance, but they have received even less support than the Kurds in Iraq (if that is possible) and have been fighting ISIS in Syria for two years.

Yet somehow President Obama cannot be moved to say anything or do anything. His Republican rivals seem little better, either not comprehending what is happening or not wishing to remind anyone about their 2003 invasion. Mr. Obama's avoidance and neglect of pressing issues in Iraq, a headache he never wanted to deal with, has left policy to bureaucratic apparachniks in the State Department. Their priority appears to be insisting that they were not wrong for unconditionally backing Nuri al-Maliki all these years. Instead of confronting genocide and a mortal threat to just about everyone, they prioritize maintaining the "territorial integrity" of a state that now exists in name only. They claim to be "monitoring events closely" and they insist that all military and financial aid to the Kurds must go through Baghdad, knowing full well that this really means doing nothing.

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## AE.60

<http://rudaw.net/english/opinion/091020141>

### **The Truth About Kobane**

By DAVID ROMANO 9/10/2014

Writing in the Guardian this week, columnist David Graeber compares the plight of Syria's Kurds and the besieged town of Kobane to the Spanish Civil War: "Amid the Syrian war zone a democratic experiment is being stamped into the ground by ISIS. That the wider world is unaware is a scandal."

Just as Spanish revolutionaries empowered women and fielded female combatants, so too do the People's Protection Units (YPG) of the Syrian Kurds. The lightly armed YPG partisans now fight house to house against much more heavily armed fascists of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS). They fight to protect their land and an attempt at local democratic governance – an attempt that provided refuge to and empowered not just Kurds, but Turkmen, Christians, Arabs and others. The main political party directing the YPG forces in Syrian Kurdistan is the Democratic Union Party (PYD). Like the Spanish and many other revolutionaries, the PYD are of course not angels, and they stand accused of shutting out rival Kurdish parties promoted by Turkey, the United States and the Iraqi Kurds. They have strong organic links to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

Nonetheless, the Syrian Kurds have not attacked anyone but the Islamists trying to take over their lands. They have not even asked for a Kurdish state or secession from Syria. Rather, they proclaimed local self-government in the three cantons of Kobane, Cizre and Afrin. The three cantons emerged as tolerant, somewhat democratic islands amidst the grim maelstrom that is the Syrian civil war. By the PYD's own rules, all the administrations must have male and female leaders and include all the ethnic and religious groups of the area within their decision making structures.

Yet since they established their autonomous cantons in 2012, the United States, Europe and even most independent “progressives” of the world seem to have studiously ignored the Syrian Kurds. Graeber also asks, “If there is a parallel today to Franco’s superficially devout, murderous Falangists, who would it be but ISIS? If there is a parallel to the Mujeres Libres of Spain, who could it be but the courageous women defending the barricades in Kobane? Is the world – and this time most scandalously of all, the international left – really going to be complicit in letting history repeat itself?”

That seems to be the intent of many, judging by the deceptions that government officials in Washington and Ankara keep trying to peddle to us. They say they are “arming moderate Syrian rebels,” yet many of the “moderates” they are arming appear only a bit less Islamist than ISIS. If the secular Syrian Kurds want arms, on the other hand, they are told by Washington and Ankara that they must drop their demands for autonomy, local government and Kurdish and other minority rights. No doubt this will make them “moderate” so they can join the fight to replace an Allawi Arab dictatorship with a Sunni Arab one.

When the United States began its bombing campaign in Syria, it appeared to be targeting ISIS everywhere except where they were besieging the Syrian Kurds. ISIS drove its captured Iraqi and Syrian tanks around Kobane with impunity, even though armor can be easily targeted by Western aircraft. News reporters just across the border in Turkey filmed the whole thing, at least until Turkish soldiers tear gassed them out of the area. When finally U.S. aircraft targeted ISIS around Kobane this week, as the city began to fall to the Jihadi onslaught, the public was told that Turkey had asked the Americans to do something to help the besieged city.

In all likelihood the Americans finally decided to do something contrary to Turkey’s wishes. In Kobane ISIS is about to win yet another major victory, and this will not make Mr. Obama’s campaign look good. They likely just told the Turks they could pretend they had asked them. If Ankara really wanted ISIS forces around Kobane targeted, they could have done so themselves as they watched the Jihadis just a few hundred meters away from the border. A few artillery rounds could have done wonders, or Ankara could have allowed Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga to transit through Turkey and reinforce Kobane in much the same way PYD fighters helped in Iraq recently. There are much better options to help Kobane, in other words, than an embargo or Turkish ground troops setting up a buffer zone. The buffer zone would likely be designed to squash Kurdish autonomy in Syria more than anything else.

Yet Ankara claims that it opposes ISIS, even as the organization recruits in Turkey, transits through Turkey and sells its smuggled oil through Turkey. Every year hundreds of Kurds get imprisoned in Turkey for smuggling cigarettes across the mountains on the Iranian and Iraqi borders, yet we do not hear of any ISIS smugglers getting caught on the flat terrain of the Syrian-Turkish border. Instead Turkey prevents food and water from being sent to Kobane’s defenders, at the same time that it pretends it does not wish to see Kobane fall.

In March 2013, the PKK also ended its fight with Ankara and entered into peace negotiations with the government. Yet last week President Erdogan said that for Turkey, the terrorists of ISIS and the PKK “are the same.” If only that were true – Kurdish fighters might be better supplied and not prevented from crossing into Syria to defend Kobane.

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## Kurdish Appendix (AK)

Texts translated by Sbeiy Media Agency= AKS

Texts translated by Kurdistan-i-Nwe Media Agency= AKK

Texts translated by Xendan Media Agency= AKX

Texts translated by Rudaw Media Agency= AKR

### AKS.1

<http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/ByaniArticleDetail.aspx?id=1218>

#### سەرکردایەتی تورک

لە ئینگلیزییەوه: کاروان حەیدەری

سەردانەکانی بەهاری عەرەب لە لایەن رەجەب تەیب ئەردۆگانی سەرۆک وەزیرانی تورکیا لەم مانگەدا دوو ڕۆی باش و خراپی سەرکردایەتیکردنی پیشان دا.

جیهانی ئیسلامی پێویستی بە رۆڵی مۆدێلیکی دیموکراسی هەیە. لە سەردانەکانیدا بۆ میسر و لیبیا و تونس، سەرۆکی تورکیا کە سەرکردایەتی پارتی ئیسلامی داد و گەشەپێدان دەکات، کەسێکی بەهیزی وروژاند بەوهی کە ئیسلام و دیموکراسی لەگەڵ یەکتریدا گونجاو ن. لە تونس، کە تێیدا مانگی داهاو دەنگدەرانی نوێنەرایەتییهکی دەستوری بۆ خۆیان هەڵدەبژێرن بۆ یەکەم جار دوا و دەمرنانی زەینلعابدين، ئەردۆگان وتی: "تورکیا 99% ی موسڵمانە، بەلام هێشتا دەولەتێکی دیموکراسی ئەلمانیهی کە تێیدا هەموو ئایینەکان یەکسانن".

بەلام رەخنە بەردەوامە توندەکانی ئەردۆگان لە ئیسرائیل مەترسیدارن بۆ ناوچەکە و تورکیا خۆشی. لەکاتی سەردانەکەیدا بۆ میسر، ئەو شۆنەیی خۆپیشاندانەکان دژی ئیسرائیل رویان لە توندووتیژی کردووە، ئەردۆگان ئیسرائیلی بە "مەدالی خەڵەتێندرەوی خۆڕاوا" نایبرد. پێویستە ئەردۆگان لەم جۆرە لێدوانانە بوەستی و بێر لە دەرهەجی قەسەکانی خۆی بکاتەوه.

زۆر شت هەیە دەربارەی تورکیا کە پێویستە هەمووشتە لەسەر بکەیت. لە ماوهی نۆ سالی رابردوودا، ئەردۆگان دەستی سەرمايەدارە تورکییەکانی ئازاد کردووە، حوکمی مەدەنی لەجباتی سوپاسالاری چەسپاند و ریفۆرمی فامەکانی مەروفی ئەنجامدا. هەروەها لایەنی مەترسیداری بۆلەدهستی و هەلبژاردنی گرنگی هەیە ئەنجامی بەدات لە کاتییدا **تورکیا بەرەو جیگرتەوهی دەستوری دارنێراوی سوپایی دەروات بە دەستورێکی تەواو دیموکراسییەوه**.

بەرێز ئەردۆگان یارییهکی مەترسیدار لەگەڵ ئیسرائیلیدا دەکات. گومان لەوهدا نییه کە مامەڵەکردن لەگەڵ بنیامین ناتانیاهوی سەرۆک وەزیرانی ئیسرائیل دەکرێت بێزارکەر بێت. تورکیا پەيوەندییهکانی پێچاند دواي ئەوهی ئیسرائیل هیچ وەلامێکی نەبوو، رۆڵی نوابژیوانی ئەمەریکا بۆ بێدەنگبون لە هێرشێ ئیسرائیل بۆ سەر کەشتییهکی یارمەتی بۆ غەزە کە تێیدا هەشت هاوڵاتی تورکی، کە یەکیکیان (ئەمەریکی-تورکی) بوو کوژران.

بەلام ئەردۆگان باریکی مەترسیداری هێناوێتە کایهوه و ئەمەریکای هاوپییمانی ناتوی خستۆتە دۆخێکی زەحمەتەوه، سەرەرای هەڕەشەکانی بۆ ناردنی کەشتی سەربازی بۆ دەریای ناوەراست بۆ پارێزگاری لە گەشتیگەلی تورکی. ئەگەر هەردوولا وریا نەبن، ئەوا بارەکه لەدەست دەردەچێت. بەلای کەمەوه، بەرێز ئەردۆگان بازرگانیهی گەورەکی لەگەڵ ئیسرائیلیدا دەخاتە مەترسییهوه.

سەرۆک ئۆباما هەوڵی جدی داوه بۆ هێوژکردنەوهی ئەردۆگان، بەلام نەگەشتۆتە کۆبونەوهیهکی تایبەتی توند لەسەر ئەم بابەتە و هەروەها هەوڵەکانی پێشوی سەرکردەکانی تورک بۆ نزیکبونەوه لە ئێران. بەم دواییانەش ئەردۆگان بەوه رازی بوو کە راداریک لەناو خاکی تورکیا جیگیر بکەیت وەک بەشێک لە موشەکی بەرگری ئەمەریکی ناتو بە مەبەستی پارێزگاری

ناوچەكە لە ھەر ھەژشەكی ئێران. ئوباما بەتایبەت داوای لە ئەردوگان کرد بۆ پچراندنی پەیماننامەکان لەگەڵ بەشار ئەسەدی سەرۆکی سوریا. ئەردوگان ئەوەی راگەیاندووە کە چیدی باوەڕی بە ئەسەد نەماوە. پێویستە ئێستا تورکیا ھیزی ئابوری خۆی بۆ سەپاندنی گەمارۆ بەسەر ئەسەد و دارووستەکانیدا بسەپێنێ.

وەکو سەرکردەیکە دیاری دیموکراسیەتی ئیسلامی، ئەردوگان دەتوانێت رۆڵی سەرکردایەتی بەسەلمێنێت. بەلام پێویستە بەشێوەیکە بەرپرسیارانە ئەو مامەڵەیە بکات.

سەرچاوە: نیۆرک تایمز

Wednesday, September 21, 2011

AKS.2

<http://www.sbeiy.com/Detail.aspx?id=45&LinkID=60>

لە میدیاکانەو

نایا داوی ھەموو شتێک عێراق مۆدیلێکە بۆ خۆرھەلاتی ناوھراست

جاکسن دیل

لە ئینگلیزییەو: کاروان ھەیدەری

لە سوریا، سوپای حکومەت ھێرش دەکاتە سەر بەرھەڵستییەکی سوپایی تازە دروستبو. پشتیوانانی بەشار ئەسەد لە ئامانجە کوشتارییەکاندا دەسنیشان دەکەن لە کاتیگدا چالاکی ئۆپۆزیسیۆن بە ئازاردان روبەروی مەرگ دەکەن. ولاتی خۆراوا بێدەنگ و ستاون لە ئاست بەکارھێنانی مافی قیتو دژی بریارەکە ئێنجومەنی ئاسایشی نەتەو یەکگرتووەکان لە لایەن روسیاو چینەو. بەلای کەمەو 2900 ھاوڵاتی کوژراو و پێدەچیت ئەم رەشە کوژییە سەرەتای دەستپێکردنی بێت.

من دەتوانم وتاریکی ئەواو لەسەر ئەم بابەتە بنوسم. بەلام ھەزدەکەم لەجباتی ئەو جارێکێت بێر لە شەری عێراق بکەن. لە کاتیگدا ئەنھا سێ مانگی ماوە بۆ کشانەو سوپای ئەمەریکا لە عێراق، لە ئێستادا مێشەکە بەشێوەیکە گشتی لە ئەمەریکا بە بەغیرۆدانێ ژیان و سەرچاوەی ئەمەریکییەکان دەدرێتە قەڵەم، لەمۆش خراپتر بریارێکی گەورە شیتانە، ئەمۆش لەواو کاندیدە کۆماری خاوەکانی سەرۆکایەتی بەدی دەکەیت. بەلام، بەھاری عەرەبی بە ھەلە ناوبرا، کە لە زستانێکی دلخۆشکەری تۆنس و میسر گۆرا بۆ ھاوینیکی سەخت لە لیبیا، یەمەن و سوریا، عێراق دەخاتە رێژ رۆشایی باریکی جیاوازیو.

پێدەچیت کۆتایی ھێنان بە ئۆتوکراسی لە خۆرھەلاتی ناوھراستدا، بە پێچەوانەی ناوھراستی ئەوروپا و ئاسیا، بەشێوەیکە ئاستیانە نەبێت. دەسەلاتی خەڵک نیش ناكات. دیکتاتۆرەکانی وەکو ئەسەد، موعەمەر قەزافی و عەلی عەبدولسەلح یەمەن کە بەھۆی شاخێک لە چەمک و ھێز پشیمان قایمە کە لە لایەن ھۆزو عەشیرەتەکانەو بۆیان داوین دەکەیت، دیمەنێ ئاوەکو مردن شەر بکەن لەجباتی ئەوەی بەبێ دەنگی دەست ھەلگەن. سەرەرای بێینی حوسنی موبارەک لە قەفەزی دادگادا، یان لەوانەیە بەھۆی ئەو، سێ ناکنەو لە تاوانەکانیان دژی موقایەتی.

ئەو قەفەزە لەوانە بەشیمانی لەواو بێت، بەلام جیگای قبوڵکردنە کاتیگ ئەو دیکتاتۆرانە دەدۆزێن. بەلام کاتیگ دەروانییە قەزافی، ئەم شتە راست دەرنایەت. لە لایەن زۆرییە دەزگا ھەواڵگرییەکانی خۆراواو، ئەسەد سەراوەتەو، بەلام تانگ و تۆپەکانی بەھێزترن لەم گروپە کەمانە ریزەکانی سوپایان جێپێشتو لە شارەکانی وەکو حوس و رەستەن. عەلی عەبدولسەلح کە بەھۆی بۆمبەکەو لە مەرگ نزیک بویەو، داوی بەسەردنی سێ مانگ لە نەخۆشخانەیکە سعودیە گەراوە، ھێزەکانی کە لەلایەن کۆرەیاوە سەرپەرشتی دەکەیت ھێشتا لە کۆشکی سەرۆکایەتی لە سەنعا زالن.

بێگومان قەزافی بەشێوەیکە گشتی دۆراندویتی، سوپاس بۆ دەستپێکردنی سەربازی لە لایەن ناتووە. کاتیگ بەھاری رابردو ھێرشەکان دەستیان پێکرد، قەزافی لەوێری ئێنجامدانی رەشەکوژییەکاندا بو دژی ئۆپۆزیسیۆن لە شاری بنگازی. فرۆکەکانی خۆراواو بالانسی ھێرشەکانی قەزافی پاراستو. بەلام لیبیا سنوردار بو بۆ ئیدارە ئوباماو بەریتانیو فرەنسا، ھێچ ئۆپەراسیۆنیکی لەم جۆرە لە سوریا و یەمەن رونادات.

ئەمە مانای ئەوەیە خۆپێشتن لەو ولاتاندا دەکەیت بەشێوەیکە خراپتر پەرە بسێنێت. شەری ھۆزگەرای و پەشتوپیەکانی سۆمەل و ئەو یەمەن پێشان دەدەن. لە سوریا دەکەیت مێژوی دۆباری لوبنان بێینی، شەری تایەفی ھاوکات لەگەڵ دەستپێکردنی درواسیکان و کردووە تیرۆستیەکان. ئەمە بۆ عێراق دەمانگێرێتەو. ھەر وەکو بەرپرسی پێشوی ستراتیژییەکانی ئیدارە بۆش بەم دواییانە لە واشنتن پۆست نوسیویەتی، عێراق لەچاوی پێشبینیەکانی ئەمەریکاو عێراقیەکانیشتا شکستی ھیناوە. ئازارو تێچووەکانی ئەم جەنگە ھۆکاریگەلیکن کە ئەمەریکاو ھاوپەیمانەکانی بریاریانداوە دەستپێکردنی سەربازی لە سوریا ئێنجام نەدەن و ئیدارەکی ئوباما شەری ھەلگەن بۆ لیبیا دەستەگەر.

ھەرچەندە عێراق ئەو ولاتە کە سوریاو زۆریک لە ولاتە عەرەبییەکانی خۆرھەلاتی ناوھراست ھوادەخوازن ھاوشێوەی بن. دیکتاتۆرە درندەکو خانەوادەیکە لەبەر چاوە و بون، ھەر وەکو دەسەلاتەیکە کە لە لایەن ھۆزێکی کەمینیو بەرەوامی بە سەرکۆتکارییەکانی دەدا. نێچە شەریکە پێنج سەل لەمەبەر وەکو نۆستو وایە ھۆزو تیرە جیاوازیەکانی عێراق حۆمە جیاوازییەکانیان لەریگە دەنگدانێ دیموکراسی و ھەندێک جاریش لەریگە دانوستانی قورس و زەحمەتەو. ھەرچەندە ھێشتا ھێزە لەناکاوەکان سەردیری ھەواڵەکانیان داگیر کردو، خەڵکانیکی کەمتر بەشێوەیکە توندوتیز لە عێراقدا لەناوچوون بە بەراورد لەگەڵ مەسکۆ یان سوریا.

ئەوێ گەنە ئەوەیە کە عێراق بە ھاوپەیمانی ئەمەریکا و دۆزمنی ئەلقاعیدە ھێزێکی باش بۆ خۆرھەلاتی ناوھراست دەمێنێتەو. ئەو ولاتە سەرقالی کرینی چەکە لە ئەمەریکا کە بابی 12 ملیار دۆلارە و داوی کردو ھێزێکی مەشق پێکردنی ئەمەریکا سالی داھاتو لە عێراقدا بێنێتەو. بەم دواییانە عێراق یارمەتی ئازادکردنی دو ھاوڵاتی ئەمەریکیدا لە بەندینخانە ئێران.

ھەموو ئەو شتانە لە ئێنجامی داگیرکردنی ولاتەکەو رویدا لە لایەن ئەمەریکاوە. سەدام حسین ئەوەی نیشادا چۆن توانی مەلەکی بەرپەریت،



لەشیوهی سەرھەڵدانەکانی بەھاری عەرەبی کاتێک ھێلیکۆتەرە پرچمەکانی بۆ سەركوتکردنی ھاوڵاتیانی شیعە لە ساڵی 1991. لەگەڵ ھەموو ئەمانەشدا رژێمەکە شەكسیت ھێنا، بەی بونی ھیزەکانی ئەمریکا ھێچ شتێک نەیدەتوانی عێراق لە شەری قوڵی تایەفی و مەزھەبی رزگار بکات، وەك ئەوەی ئێستا ھەرش لە سوریا دەکات. بەکورتی، بەھاری عەرەبی زیاتر گەواھی و پێویستی داگیرکردنی عێراق دەخاتەر و بە ھەرورد لەگەڵ سالێک لەمەوبەر. پێش ئەوەی سالێکی تر تێپەڕێت، سوریاکان ھەست بەوە دەکەن کە ئەوەی لە عێراقدا ھەیە بەسەر ئێوانیش ھاتبێ.

سەرچاوە: واشنتن پۆست

Wednesday, October 12, 201

AKS.3

<http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/ByaniArticleDetail.aspx?id=1230>

بەرگری لە شەری ناوخۆ لە سوریا

واشنتن پۆست

ه ئینگلیزییە: کاروان ھەبەری

بۆ ماوەی چەند مانگێک ولایەتە یەكگرتووەكان و ھاوێمەکانی لە مەلانی بون، کە چۆن بتوانن وەلامی خۆپیشاندانە جەماوەرییە ناھێڵەکانی سوریاو بەرپرچە توندوتیژەکانی رژێم بدەن. ئیدارەکی ئوباما بەشیوەکی زۆر لەسەر خۆ ھەوڵی داوە بۆ ناچارکردنی بەشار ئەسەد بۆ ئەنجامدانی چاکی بە سەپاندنی گەمارۆ و داوا لێکردنی بۆ بەجێھێشتنی دەسلەت، لە کاتێکدا ئیدارەکی سەرقالی سیاسەتی "پێشروەیکردن لە داوای"یە. پێدەچێت ئێستا ئیدارەکی ئوباما ھێزە دەسلەتدارەکانی تری دەرەو لە ماوەیەکی نزیکدا توشی چەند زەحمەتیەکی بن: ئێش شەڕ لەنێوان ھێزە پاشەکشەرەکانی ئەسەد سوپای چەكدارەكان کە پێکھاتون لە جیاوێمەکانی سوپای حکومەت و خۆپەشەکان، ئەمە پێویستی بە وەلامی بەھێزتر، خێراتر و دەستپێشخەرییەکی زیاتری ئەمریکا ھەیە.

ژمارەیک لە راپۆرتە ھاواییەکانی ھەفتەی رابردو ئاماژەیان بە لێدوانی چەند دیپلومات و سەرچاوەیەکی سوری کردووە کە بەرھەستە چەكدارانە دژی سەركشییەکانی ئەسەد بۆ سەر دانێشتوان خەریکە دەرەو، وەكو لە شارۆچكەكانی ھەمس و راستان (کە شەریکی قورسی لە رۆژی سێشەممە تێدا رودا) ھەروەھا نزیک سنوری تورکیا و سوریاش. رۆژنامەی نیویرک تایمز لە زاری بەرپرسیکی ئەسەد ئاماژە بەوە دەکات، کە تائێستا نزیکەی 10,000 سەرباز لە ھیزەکانی ئاسایش جابوئەو، ھەروەھا چەند سەد کەسێک لەوانە پەیمەندیان بە ھەریەکیک لە دوو بزوتمە چەكدارەکانی سوپای ئازادی سوریاو بزوتمەو ئەسەدانی ئازاد کردووە.

دەركەوتنی ئەم ھیزانە جێگای پێشوازی لێکردن نییە، ئەنەمە لە لایەن ئەو کەسانەش کە بە ھێوای کۆتایی ھاتنی رژێمەکە ئەسەد، توندوتیژی کەسانی توندرو دەھێنێتە ریزی پێشەو، سەركوتکاری درندەنی زیاتر لە لایەن حکومەتە دەخولقێنێت و ئەوەی بە بزوتمەوێکی پرۆ-دیموکراسی ناسراوە دەگۆرێت بۆ شەری تابی. ھەری شەریک لە سوریا، دەكریت بگوازێتەو بۆ ولاتی دراوسێ وەكو لوبنان و عێراق، ئەمەش دەستبەردانی دەرەکی بەدوای خۆیدا دەھێنێت، پێش ھەموشیان ئێران، بەلام وەك راپۆرتێکی وەزارەتی دەرەو ئەمریکا رۆژی دوو شەممە ئاماژە بە، بزوتمە چەكدارەکانی تازە سەرھەڵدارەكان وەكو وەلام دانەوێکە "بۆ خۆپاراستن لە توندوتیژی بەردەوامەکانی رژێمی سوریا بەرھەمەری خەلکی بێتاوان و خۆپیشاندانە ناھێڵەکان."

ئیدارەکی ئوباما کاریکی راست و دروست دەکات کاتێک ئەسەد بە بەرپرسی ھەلگیرسانی شەری ناوخۆ دەداتە قەڵەم، بەلام پرسیارەکی ئەوەیە کە دەتوانرێت چی بکەیت سەبارەت بە شتێکی وەھا. چەند ھەنگاویکی سەرھەستی ئاشکرا ھەن، وەكو فشار خستەسەر ئۆپۆزیسیونی سوریا، کە بەم دواپیانە ئەنجامی نێشتەمانی پێکھێنا، بۆ رەتکردنەو توندوتیژی لە کۆبونەو داھاتو لە ئەستەنبول. پێویستە ولاتە دراوسێکانی سوریا ھاوکاری سەربازی بۆ رژێم بۆستێن، ھەروەكو تورکیا دەیکات. لەوانە ھەندێک لەو شەرانە رێگەیان لێبگرێت ئەگەر چەند ناوچەیکە ئارام بۆ ئەو سوریانی لە ترسی رژێم ریان کردووە بەدریژی سەركوتەکانی تورکیا یان عێراق داھێن بکەیت.

لە کۆتاییدا، لەوانە ھەتھا رێگە بۆ رەندانی شەری ناوخۆ بریتی بێت لە روخانی رژێمەکە ئەسەد. دەستبەردانی سەربازی لە لایەن جیھانی دەرەکی ئەم ئامانجە بەدە ھەنێت، بەلام ولایەتە یەكگرتووەكان دەتوانن سیاسەتی دەستپێکردن لە پشەو واز لێبھێنێت و ھەوڵی توندتر بختەگەر بۆ فشارخستە سەر ئەسەد. ئیدارەکی دەتوانن فشار بختەسەر روسیا، چین و جامیعی عەرەبی بۆ سەپاندنی گەمارۆی قورس، ھەروەھا تورکیا ناچار بکات پەیمەندی لەگەڵ رژێمەکەدا بپەڕێنێت و پارێزگاری بۆ ئاوارەكان داھێن بکات. زۆر ئاسانتر دەبێت بۆ ئەمریکا کە ئێستا بەجەدی مامەڵە خۆی بکات لەوەی مامەڵە لەگەڵ ئەو قەیرانەدا بکات کە شەریکی ناوخۆی توند دروستی دەکات.

سەرچاوە: واشنتن پۆست

Thursday, September 29, 2011

AKS.4

<http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/ByaniArticleDetail.aspx?id=1168>

پێویستە ئوباما بەرێشکۆی لەسەر سوریا قسە بکات

میترو ویت دەلی نیوز

لە ئینگلیزییە: والی شێخ عەلی

ھەینی رابردووش وەك زۆربە ھەرزۆری ھەینیەکانی دوا مانگی ئازار، ھاوڵاتیانی سوریا پاش نوێژی جومعە لەمژگەتەکانەو

بەمەبەستى داواكارى زنجىرىمىڭ رېفورم لەھكۆمەتە سەركۆتەكەر مەكەيان، رۇئانە سەر شەقامەكان.

كۆمەت ۋەك چاۋەروان دەكرا ھىزە ئەمىنىيەكانى سوريە بەكۆتەك و گازى فرمىسكىز و گوللەى زىندو روبەروى خۇشباشەندەران بونەو.

ژمارەى ئەو كەسانەى لەمىيانەى ھەولە نەزۆكەكان بۇ كۆتايىيەنن بىنارەزايەكان، كۆزراون بەزىاتەر لە 700 كەسى مەدەنى دەخەملەندىرەت، ئەو شەپۆلە نارەزايەى كە داواكارىيەكانىيان تەنھا لەمەك شتدا گەللە بوە ئەوئىش ئەمەى: "سەركۆى سوريە بەشار ئەسەد پىۋىستە بىروا."

تاكىكە درنەمەكانى ئەسەد لەمژى گەلمەكەى خۇى سەربارى نارەزايى ۋلاتانى دراوسى و كۆمەلەى ۋلاتانى عەربى، بەشپۆمەكى جەوھەرى، مافى فەرمەنرەو بىكرەنى لە ئەسەد سەندوتەو.

ئەو رەنگە بىتوانىت ئەم نارەزايە سەركۆت بكات، خىزانى ئەسەد لەمەو 40 سال فەرمەنرەو بىدا چەندىن نارەزايى تىرى سەركۆتەدو، بەلام ئەم نارەزايەش سەركۆت بكات، نارەزايى تىر سەر ھەلەدەت تا لەمۆتايىدا ناچار دەبىت دەسەلات چۆل بكات، بۇيە ئەگەر ئىستا ئەسەد ۋاز لە دەسەلات بەيىت ئەو بۇ ۋلاتەكە و رېگرتن لە لاۋاى خوين، باشتر دەبىت.

لەمىدارمەكى ئوبامادا ئەبونى داواكارى راشكاو بۇ ئەوئى ئەسەد ۋاز لەدەسەلات بەيىت، بەدىمەكرەت، ھاوكات پىدەچىت ئىستا لەھەمو كاتىك زىاتەر كۆشكى سىي لەلايەن ھىلارى كلنتون ۋەزىرى دەرەو، لەمژى ئەسەد ھاندرايىت، بەلام جىاۋازىيەكى ئەوتوى لەگەل ھەولۆستەكانى پىشوداۋ بەشپۆمەكە رەنگە ھكۆمەتى سوريە بگاتە ئەو بىروايەى كە ئوباما جەدى نىيە لەسەر ئەوئى كە پىۋىستە ئەسەد ۋاز لە دەسەلات بەيىت.

لەمۆتايى ھەفتەى رابردودا ھەلۆئىستى كۆشكى سىي لەمژى سوريە گەمىشتە قۇناغىك كە تانىستا پىي نەگەمىشتە، ئەوئىش لەرەنگەى جەى گارنى ۋەتەنپەيە بو كە لىندونىكى بەلگەنەوئىست و گرىنگ بو سەبارەت بەيىنچ مانگى رابردو.

گارنى رايگەمەند كە سوريە: "بەئى ئەسەد شۆيىنكى زۆر باشتر دەبو."

گارنى لەنەكەى يەكەمى ھىزە ئاسمانىيەكانى سەركۆكەمەى ئەمەرىكاۋە بەپەيامنەرانى ۋت: "ئىمە پىمان ۋايە چانسى سەركۆ بەشار ئەسەد بۇ سەركۆدەيتەردى گۆرانكارى بەسەرچو."

ئەسەد سەربارى ئەوئى كە چەند بەللىنكى پوچى رېفورمى دا كە ئەوانىشى جىيەچىنەكرد، رون و ئاشكرايە كەھەنگاۋ بەرەو گۆرانكارى نانىت.

كەۋاتە پىۋىستە ئوباما بەشپۆمەكى رون و ئاشكرا داۋا لە ئەسەد بكات ۋاز لە دەسەلات بەيىت و لەپىناۋ سەلامەتى خۇشدا روبكاتە تارۋگە.

سەرچاۋە: مېترۇ ۋىست دەبلى نىوز

Sunday, August 14, 2011

## AKS.5

<http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/ByaniArticleDetail.aspx?id=1240>

نەخىر، سوريە عىراق توشى شەر ناكات

ئەمەن جەۋاد تەمىمى

لە ئىگىز يىپە: كارۋان ھىدەرى

ھكۆمەتى عىراق ھاۋكات لەگەل پەشپۆمەكانى سوريە بەم دۋايانە پىشتىۋانى خۇى بۇ بەشار ئەسەدى سەركۆى سوريە ۋەستەندە. ھەرچەندە، ئەو رەستە كە زۆرىك لە شىيەكانى عىراق بەشپۆمەكى قۇل ترسىان لە دەرەنجامە پىشپىنى كراۋەكانى روخانى رۇئىمى زالبۇى شىيە مەزھەب لە دىمەشق ھەيە.

بەشپۆمەكى سەركەى، ترسى شىيە لە سۈننە تۈندەرەۋەكانە كە لەۋانەيە دەسەلات لە ۋلاتەدا بىگرنەدەست و سۈننەكان ھان بەدەن و تۈندۈتۈرى و شەرى ناۋخو لە عىراقدا بەرپا بەكەن. ھەروەكە يەكەك لە سىياسەتمەدارە شىيەكان، كە ئەپۋىست ناۋى خۇى ئاشكرا بكات بۇ رۋىتەز ۋتى: "گۆران لە سوريە دەبىتە ھۇى كىشە بۇ عىراق، سۈنەكان دەست بەسەر بەشى خۇراۋى ۋلاتەدا دەرگەن"، بەلام ناپا ئەم شتەنە پاساۋ ھەلەدەرگەن؟

ئەگەر بەيەك ۋشە ۋلامى ئەمە بەدەنەۋە ئەو دەللىين: نەخىر. بۇ تىگەمىشتەن لەمەش، پىۋىستە لە پىرسىارە بىكۆلنەۋە كەچى ۋى كىرد دۋى سالى 2007 داگەننىكى بەرچاۋ لە تۈندۈتۈرى لە عىراقدا روبەدات.

بىرۋچۈنى گەشتى نامازە بەۋە دەكات كە زىادەۋى ژمارەى ھىزەكانى ئەمەرىكا و سەرمەى دەستپىكرەنى سترانپىيەنى دژە تىرۋر ۋەك بەشپەك لە "مەترسىيەكە" ھۆكارى سەركەى بون لە پىشت بىيەزكەردى ئەلقەمەدو ھەلگەرانەۋى سۈنەكان دژى گروپە چەكدارىيەكە. ھەرچەندە، ئەم جۈرە ھەلەسەنگەندە نامازە بە گۆراننىكى زۆرى يارىيەكە لە لاىەن سوپاى ئەمەرىكاۋە و كەمبۈنەۋى گرىنگى ئەكەتەر ۋاكتەرە ناۋخۇيەكانى عىراق دەكات. لەراستىدا، چەكدارە سۈنەكان رۋى خۇيان دژى ملىشيا تۈندەرەۋەكان ۋەرگىزا، چۈنكە پىش كۆتايى 2006 دىرەكان بەمەكرەبو كە لەشەرى تايەفى دژى ملىشيا شىيەكان لە بەغدا بەرەو دۆراندەن دەرچون. لەم كاتەدا، ئەۋان لە لاىەن نۋرى مالىكى سەركۆ ۋەزىرانەۋە پاراسنتيان لىدەكرا.

دەۋرەت ھۆكارى سەركەى لە پەرمەندەنى تۈندۈتۈرىيەكانى سۈننە دۋى 2003 بىرتى بو لە پىرۋسەى لاپردى ئەندامانى رۇئىمى بەسەى پىشۋ لە ھكۆمەت بەرەو پىرۋسەى لاپردى سۈنەكان لە ھكۆمەتى تازە. ئەمەش زىاتەر لە ھەولە ئاشكراكانى پۇل بىرەمەرى سەركۆى دەسەلاتى كاتى ھاۋپەمەنەن لە عىراق بۇ نەھىشتى سوپاى عىراقى سۈننەى كۆن ھەستى پىكرا. بە تىرۋانەن لەمە، دەۋانەن بەئاسانى پىچەمان بۇ بىرەمەرى دىرژ بەكەن بە ئەنجامدانى ئەو ھەلە كۈشەدەيە. بەلام، ھەروەكە رۇۋنامەۋىسى سەربەخۇ، پاترىك كۆكىزەن تىيىنى كىردە، بىرەمەرى لە بىرەمەكاندا لە لاىەن سىياسەتمەدارە شىيەۋ كوردەكان پالېشتى لىدەكرا كە دەپۋىست ھىزە سوپاىيەكانى نۋىي عىراق بە سەربازەكانى خۇيان پىر بەكەنەۋە.

ھەرچەندە، پىرۋسەى لادانى سۈننە بە تەنپا ھۆكارىك ئەۋى لە بەھىزبۈنى تۈندۈتۈرى و مەترسىيەكانى سۈننە. لە ھەمو شەرىكەدا، ھىچ لاىەننىك كىردەۋى دۆمكارىيەنە ئەنجام نادات ئەگەر دلىنا نەبىت چانسىكى باشى نىيە بۇ شكاندى دۆمەكەى. لەم ھالەتەدا، دەۋايە سۈنەكان زۆرىنە بونايە بۇ ئەۋى بۆۋان شكىست بە شىيەكان بەيىن لە شەرىكى تايەفى ناۋخۇدا.

بىرۋەكەى "زۆرىنەى سۈننە" پىش داگىرەردى عىراق زىادەۋى پىۋەكراۋ، كاتىك زۆرچار عەربە سۈنەكان دىمۆگرافەرە بىيانەكانىيان بە كەم ھەزمەردى سۈنەكان تاۋانبار دەكرد. ئەم تاۋباركەردانە تەنھا رەمخەمگراۋە ئەۋىن. تىگەمىشتى ھەلەى ئەم بابەتە لەۋا سۈنەكان بەشپەكى بەھۋى



پروپاگاندەكانى رژیى سەدام حەسەنە بو، بەشىكى تریشى لەبەر دەرەنجامى ھەستەردن بە جیاخوایى لە زۆرىنى شیعە بو بەھۆى حوکمی 70 سالی سوننەى كەمىنە.

ھێرشى بەردوام بۆ سەر شیعەكان و كەوتنەھۆى قوربانیەكى زۆر بەم ھۆیە، بو ھۆى سەرھەڵدانى بەرپەرچى ملیشیا شیعەكان. ئەمە تەقینەھۆى شەرى ناوھۆى لە 2006دا بەدوای ھۆیدا ھینا لە ناوھەراستى شارى بەغدا. ئامانجى ھەردوکیان بریتی بو لە دەستبەسەرکرتنى ناوچە شیعە - سوننە تیکەلمەكانى پایتەخت و پاكرەنەمیان لە لایەنەكەى تر.

بەھۆى زۆرى ژمارەیان و پالیشتیکردنیان لە لایەن حەكۆمەتە، ملیشیا شیعەكان توانیان ناوچە تیکەلمەكان لە سوننە پاك بکەنەو. ئەمە وای لە گروپە سوننەكان کرد لە ھەندىك لە ناوچە سوننە زۆرىنە نیشینەكان خۆیان رێك بەخەنە، وەكو یەرموک، یان بەرمو ئەردەن و سوریا رایان کرد. لەم دو وڵاتەدا، نیر رۆژن، رۆژنامەنوس و رېپۆرتەر لیکۆلەر لەگەڵ ژمارەیکى زۆر لە سەرکردە چەكدارییەكانى سوننە چاوپێكەوتنى ئەنجامدا كە دانیان بەویدا نا ئێوان شەرەكەیان دژی ملیشیا شیعەكان دۆراننەو لە بەغدا.

لەبەر ئەوە، شەرى مەزھەبى ناوھۆى عێراق بەدەرزایی سالیەكانى 2007 بۆ 2008 بەھۆى ھەمان ھۆکارە بەشیویمەكى گشتى كۆتایی پێھات: بەشیویمەكى رۆنتر، لایەنىك خواستەكانى بۆ شەركردن لەدەستدا. بەھۆى ترسیان لە تێچۆنى زۆرتر لەسەر دەستى شیعەكان و حەكۆمەتى ناوھەندى، بەشىكى زۆر لە سوننەكان دركیان بەوەكرد كە تەنھا رێگە بریتیە لە ھاوکاریکردنى ھێزەكانى ھاوپەیمانیان و ھێزەكانى ئاسایشى عێراق دژی ئەلقەبەدە. ئەمە بو ھۆى بەھێزبونى سەحەوى ئەنبیارو دروستبونى رۆلەكانى بزوتنەھۆى عێراق.

مالكى بەردوام دەبێت لە پشكەردن لە ملیشیا شیعەكانى وەكو سوپای مەھدى سەر بە موقتەدا سەدر. سەرۆك وەزیران ھەستى بەوە كردە كە پاشماوەى مەترسییەكانى سوننە ھەمەشە نییە لەسەر حەكۆمەتەكەى، ئەمەش رێگای بۆ خۆش دەكات بۆ بەكارھێنانى دەسەلاتەكەى بەمەبەستى شەكستپێنەكانى ملیشیا شیعەكانى باشورو دەورووبەرى بەغدا.

مەترسى شەرىكى ترى تايەفى لە عێراق لەژێر رۆشنایی پەشیویمەكانى سوریا ئەگەرێكى لاوازە. بە تێروانى لە دەرەنجامە كارساتیارەكان بۆ سوننە لە شەرە ناوھۆیەكانى 2006، ھەمە سوننەكانى عێراق سوپاسگوزارن بەھۆى ناتوانن لەشەرىكى ترى ناوھۆدا بەسەر شیعەكاندا زال بن. بۆ زۆرى كۆمەلگە، بێرۆكەى گەرانەھۆى حوکمی كەمىنە بونى ئەماو. ئەمەش بۆ قبۆلەردنى ئەو واقیعیە كە شیعەى زۆرىنە لە عێراقدا پڕۆسەى سیاسى وڵاتەكە بەرپۆ دەبات.

سەرچاوە: دەیلی ستارى لوبنانى

Wednesday, October 12, 2011

AKS.6

<http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/ByaniArticleDetail.aspx?id=1207>

سەرۆك وەزیرانى توركیا لە ھەولێ ئەوھادیە كە ببێت بە پێشواى جیھانى ھەربى

پاتریك كوكبۆرن  
لە ئینگلیزییەو: سەبەى

نەردۆگان گەشتى ئەو وڵاتانە دەكات كە شۆرشیان تیا نەنجام درا و ھەول دەدات

دوینی 2011/9/12 سەرۆك وەزیرانى توركیا و رەجەب تەیب ئەردۆگان گەشتە میسر لە سەردانیك كە سێ وڵات دەگرێتەو، ئەمەش لە كاتێكدا كە توركیا ھەلۆیستى خۆى بەرامبەر ئیسرائیل توندتر دەكات و ھەول دەدات كە ببێت بە ھیزی سەركەى لە ناو وڵاتە موسڵمانەكان لە رۆژھەلاتى ناوھەراست و باكوری ئەفریقا.

دوای میسر، ئەردۆگان سەردانى ھەردو وڵاتى تونس و لیبیا دەكات بۆ نیشاندانى ھاویشتى توركیا بۆ ئەو وڵاتانە دوای ئەوەى توانیان حەكۆمەتە پۆلیسیە درێژخایەنەكانیان بڕوخێن لە بەھارى ھەربەدا. رژیى بە ھیزی ئیستای توركیای دیموكراتى و نیمچە ئیسلامى دەكرئ مۆدیلیك بیت بۆ حەكۆمەتى ھەرسى وڵاتەكە.

ھەلۆیستى توند و رەخنەمیزی ئەردۆگان لەسەر ئیسرائیل كە ھەتا ئەم دواییە ھاوپەیمانیكى نزیكى توركیا بو نزیكى دەخاتەو لە جیھانى ھەربى. سوتاندنى بالۆزخانەى ئیسرائیل لە قاھیرە لە كۆتایی ھەفتەى رابردو دوا روداو بو كە ئاستى دوژمنایەتى نێوان میسر پاش موبارەك و ئیسرائیل نیشان دەدات. ھاوكات لەگەڵ ئەمەدا بێرۆچونى بۆلە جیھانى ھەربەدا ئەویمە كە سەرۆك ئوباما ھیچ یارمەتییەكى فەلسەفینەكانى ئەدا لە كاتێكدا پشكگیری ئەواى ئیسرائیلی كرد، ئەمەش بو ھۆى لاوازبونى رۆلى وڵاتە پەكگرتوكانى ئەمەریكا لە ناوچەكە.

لە چاوپێكەوتنێكدا پش بەرێكەوتنى بەرمو میسر، ئەردۆگان گوتى كە پارسال لە كاتى كوشنتى نو كەسى توركى لە سەر كەشتى "مافى مەرمەرە" كە یارمەتى بار كەردو بۆ غەزە لە سەر دەستى كۆمەندۆى ئیسرائیل "دەكرا بنەمایەك بیت بۆ جەنگ لەگەڵ ئیسرائیل"، بەلام بیریاری دا كە ئارامتر رەفتار بكات، لە ھەمان كاتدا ئامارەى بەوە كرد كە ھیزی دەریایی توركى پارێزگارى ھەر كەشتیەكى یارمەتى مرقانەى توركى دەكات كە بەرمو غەزە بڕوات لە داھاتویدا.

بە پێى قەسەى كۆمىنتاتۆرىك "توركیا دەكریت زۆرى بە ئەوەى كە دەپەیت بە دەستى پەننیت ئەگەر زیادەزۆرى نەكات لە یاریكردن بە دەستەكەى". توركیا ماویمەكە سزای سەپاندو بە سەر ئیسرائیلدا لە ئەنجامى ھێرشكردنە سەر كەشتیەكە، بەلام بەپێى قەسەى ھاوکارەكانى، ئەردۆگان لەئێستادا وازى لە بیریاری سەردانى غەزە ھیناو كە ماویمەكە دەپەیت بێكات. توركیا لە بەھارى ھەربى قازانجى كردو، چونكە لەوانەى لەگەڵ حەكۆمەتە

دیموکراتیک نوښه‌ګان گونجاو بڼه، همتا ته‌ګر پموندی باشی هېوښت له‌ګڼل حکومت‌ه‌ګانې پښتو. هېروها تورکیا ده‌ګریت له‌ بوشاییه پر بکات‌ه‌ ګه له‌ نه‌نجامی بېه‌نیزبونی ولاتانی به‌ هیزی وه‌ګ میسر و سوریا دروست بوه و غیراقیش همتا ئیستا نه‌یتوانیوه له‌ ده‌ر نه‌نجامه‌ګانې حوکمی رژیمې سمدام و له‌ توندوتیزبیه‌ پاش روخانی له‌ رژیمه‌ رویدا هلمېستېه‌وه.

به‌پېچلوانی ئیران، تورکیا دوژمنی جدی که‌من، هېروها له‌ کاتی قهرانه‌ګه‌ پروګرامی وزه‌ی نه‌تومی ئیران، تورکیا ویستی ناوېزی بکات له‌ نښان رژیمې ئیران، که‌ به‌ ګومان‌ه‌وه لږی ده‌روانی و ویلاته‌ یه‌ګر توه‌ګانې نه‌میریکا و نه‌وروپیه‌ګان. هېرو ولاتی تورکیا و ئیران دوژمنیکی هاوېشیان هیه، نه‌ویش یاخپونه‌ کوردیه‌ګانه‌ که‌ به‌ به‌رمو‌امی چالاکي ګریلایی نه‌نجام ده‌دن. له‌ هېرشیکدا که‌ له‌لایه‌ن ګریلاګانې پارتي کرکیارانی کوردستان PKK له‌ ناوچه‌ی هه‌ګاری له‌ روژ ه‌لانی تورکیا نه‌نجام درا، 5 کس کوژران که‌ دوانیان له‌ هیزمکانی ناسایش بون.

له‌چېنه‌ هفت‌ه‌ی رابردودا ګریلاګانې PKK نزیکه‌ی 50 که‌سیان له‌ هیزمکانی ناسایشی تورکیا کوشته‌ دواي نه‌وه‌ی که‌ ناګرېستیان کوتایی پې هینا. نه‌ګرچی نه‌ردوګان توانی سوپای تورکیا بخت‌ه‌ ژیر کوټروټلی ده‌سه‌لانی مه‌دمیه‌وه به‌لام حکومت‌ه‌ګه‌ی نایه‌وښت به‌ هېچ جوړنک به‌ لاواز ده‌ر بک‌ه‌وښت له‌ هېر به‌رمه‌نګاریه‌ګ له‌ګڼل PKK، به‌لکو فشار دمخاته‌ سېر سړوکی هېرمی کوردستانی عیراق، مسعود بارزانی بۇ تاکست‌ه‌وه‌ی PKK له‌ چپاګانې کوردستانی عیراق. به‌ریز بارزانی که‌ تورکیای ده‌وښت وه‌ګ هاوسه‌نګیکه‌ له‌ به‌رامبه‌ر به‌غدادا، له‌م روژانه‌ی رابردو داواي له‌ په‌که‌ه‌ و پړاک کرد که‌ واز له‌ به‌رمه‌نګاری چکه‌دارانه‌ به‌نښن.

تورکیا توانیوېم‌تی روټیکي به‌هیز بګیرئ له‌ ګورمه‌پانی سیاسي عیراقدا، چونکه‌ ده‌ګریت ناوېزی بکات له‌ نښان لایه‌نه‌ جپاوازمکان و مه‌ز هیه‌ جپاوازمکان و ګروپه‌ نه‌زادیبه‌ (نه‌ت‌ه‌وه‌) جپاوازمکان، هېروها روټیکي نابوری ګهورش ده‌ګیرئ به‌ رادیه‌ګ که‌ کومپانیای تورکی کوټراکتی کوکرده‌وه‌ی زبلی به‌غدا و به‌سره‌شیان ده‌سته‌به‌ر کرد‌ه‌وه‌.

نه‌ردوګان رمخنه‌ی له‌ سړوکی سوریا به‌شار نه‌لنسه‌د ګرت له‌ سېر سړوکرده‌نې خوپیشاندانه‌ګان، که‌ پېده‌چي نه‌ردوګان پېی وابښت رژیمه‌ګه‌ی زرګاری نابښت لای که‌م له‌ سېر شپوازی ئیستای. به‌هه‌مان شپوه‌ له‌ لیبیا، تورکیا له‌ سهرمتادا زور له‌سېر خوبو له‌مخو جپاکرده‌وه‌ له‌ کوټونیل مو‌عه‌مه‌ر قزاقی، به‌لام کاتی که‌ خوی جپاکرده‌وه‌ په‌کسېر 300 ملیون ډولاری پښک‌ش به‌ شوړشګیرمکان کرد له‌م کاته‌دا که‌ پېویستیان به‌ پاره‌ بو. تورکیا روټلی ګهوری هیه‌وه‌ له‌ که‌رتی بېناسازی له‌ لیبیا.

به‌ګشتی تاکست‌ه‌وه‌ی ئیسرائیل و راپه‌رینه‌ دیموکراتیکه‌ګانې جپه‌انی عهرمې و لاوازیو روټلی نه‌میریکا له‌ ناوچه‌که‌ هه‌مو له‌ به‌ر ژموندی تورکیا بون. هېزمو‌نی له‌ ناوچه‌ګدا له‌ زیادبوندايه‌، به‌لام هېشتا دوره‌ له‌وه‌ی کوټروټلی روداو‌ه‌ګانې له‌ ده‌ست بښت. سهرچاوه‌: ئیندپېنډنټ

Wednesday, September 14, 2011

AKS.7

<http://sbeiy.com/Detail.aspx?id=20964&LinkID=60>

حوکمی بنه‌ماله‌ کوردستان به‌ره‌وه‌ هه‌ل‌دیرده‌بات

18/06/2013

دیریک مؤنرو

له‌ ئینگلیز بیه‌وه‌: خالیدی حاجی نه‌حه‌مه‌د

تعموم‌زیکي نزم شاری هه‌ولنری تعنیه‌وه‌، لم‌نکی وشک ناوچه‌ګه‌ی داېوشپوه‌ که‌ تیشکی خورمه‌ که‌ له‌ هه‌ولدايه‌ درې پښدات. هه‌ولنری پایته‌ختی هېرمی کوردستانی عیراق زیاتر وه‌ګ ده‌ول‌ه‌تیکي سهر به‌خو مامه‌له‌ ده‌ګات، که‌ خاوه‌ن هه‌رسې ده‌سه‌لانی یاسادانان و جپیه‌جیکردن و حوکمی یاسایی خویته‌ی. سهر بازمکانی به‌شنانازیوه‌ سېر رنگی نالای و ول‌ته‌که‌یان دورپوه‌ به‌ جلوبه‌ر ګه‌ګانیاندا. دیسانه‌وه‌ هه‌ولنر سهرجه‌می سنوره‌ ناوخوی و ده‌رمکیه‌ګانې له‌ژیر کوټروټل‌دایه‌.

ده‌رنجام هه‌ولنر سهر به‌خویه‌ له‌ عیراق و له‌ سیاسه‌ت و کوشت و کوشته‌ری له‌ به‌غدا له‌ کایه‌دایه‌. (جپابونه‌وه‌ هه‌نګاو‌یکي ناچار بیه‌، له‌مکاتیکدا ئیمه‌ 59 نه‌ندامان له‌ 325 نه‌ندام پهرلمان له‌ به‌غدا هیه‌. بویه‌ ده‌نګمان به‌هېچ ناګات) ئمه‌ وته‌ی عه‌بدولایه‌ که‌ کومپانیایه‌کی هاټوچی هیه‌ له‌ ناوچه‌ر ګه‌ی هه‌ولنرا. (هه‌میشه‌ پیمان ده‌لن پارتان نه‌دینئ بۇ ئمه‌ و نه‌وه‌، له‌به‌رانه‌یریشدا ده‌بیت نه‌مه‌و ئه‌ومان بۇ بکه‌ن) دریزه‌ی پېده‌دات و ده‌ملیت: بۇ ئیمه‌ی کورد نه‌مه‌ قبول بڼه‌، له‌ کاتیکدا قوربانیه‌کی زورمان داوه‌ و ناګریت شته‌ګان وه‌ګ رابوردو به‌مېنیت‌ه‌وه‌.)

نه‌م هه‌ست و نه‌سته‌ی عه‌بدولای بالی کښاوه‌ به‌سېر زورنک له‌ کورده‌ګاندا، که‌ نه‌مرو بۇ په‌که‌مه‌ګار له‌ میژودا له‌ ول‌تیکدا ده‌ژین که‌ ده‌توانن به‌ هی خویانی بزائن. وه‌ګ تازمه‌ترین ول‌تی نه‌وتی له‌ جه‌نګی په‌که‌می که‌نداموه‌ کوردستان ناستیکي باشی له‌ سه‌قامگیري سیاسي و نابوری به‌خوه‌ بېنیه‌وه‌. بۇ په‌که‌مه‌ګار کورده‌ګانې عیراق، سامان و نابوریه‌که‌یان رو له‌ به‌ر ژبونیه‌وه‌، به‌تایبیت به‌ به‌ر اورد به‌ کورده‌ګانې دراوسینان. ده‌ریای نه‌وت، به‌لهمی نابوری هه‌ل‌پریوه‌.

له‌ګڼل نه‌مه‌دا هه‌موشتیک له‌ کوردستاندا پرشنگدار نیه‌، هوکارمه‌شی قورخکاری ده‌سه‌ل‌اته‌ له‌لایه‌ن ته‌نه‌ا بنه‌مالیه‌که‌وه‌. بارزانیه‌ګان که‌ ده‌سه‌ل‌اتیان ده‌ګریت‌ه‌وه‌ بۇ به‌رمه‌نګار بونه‌وه‌ی چکه‌داری دژ به‌ رژیمې عیراق، سړوکی هه‌ریم مسعود بارزانی بۇ ته‌ فسرمان‌ر موایه‌کی سته‌مه‌ګر، که‌ جپاوازیه‌کی

نیه لهی دمهسلاته تۆنالیپارانهی بههاری عهزمی روهرویان بۆتهوه.

گهذهلی به سیهستهکر او

له ههولیردا وینهی بارزانی دیواری فیرمانگه و دوکانهکانی داپۆشیوه، نهوه ناکه بلاین بارزانی ههولیشیه سهدام حسین بو له عیراقد. عهشیرتی بارزانی ریزی خۆیان ههیه له باکوری عیراقد، خهلیش ریز له مسعود دهگرن که باوکی له شهستهکان و حهفتاکانی سهدی رابوردودا سهکر دایهتی تیکۆشانی دژ به دهولتهی عیراق دهکرد.

ههچۆن بێت وینهی خیزانهکه روژ به روژ درزی زیاتر بهخۆوه دهبینیت. نهو چیرۆکه فیرمییهی پارتی دیموکراتی کوردستان له رینگای گرتتهدهستی دمهسلاته دهینهخشینیت بهر ههلهستهی دهکرت. (سهرمنا نهوه خهلیک بو که راپهرین و هیزهکانی سهدامیان بهزاند له راپهرینهکهی 1991دا. نهوه قسهی (نادار)ه که خاوهن ههتلیکی بهوکه له ناوشاردا. (پیشمهگره دو روژ دواتر له شاههکان دابهزین که ههمو شتیگ تهواو بوو) نهوه راستیهکه ههمو کهسهک دهبزانی، بهلام کهم کهم بویریت دهبریت.

ترس له رادهبرین زۆر شۆینی گرتتهوه. پارتی دیموکراتی کوردستان چیکلدانهیهکی بهوکه ههیه بۆ رهنه لێگرتن و له بهرانهیهیدا شتی لهسهر ناچیت. له کانونی یهکهمی 2005دا کهمالی سهید قادر، ماموستا له ولاتی نههسا، گیرا و 30 سال زیندانی بهسهردا سهپندرا، لهسهر زنجیره و تارنیک که رهنهی له قورخکردنی نابوری و دمهسلاته لهلایه بارزانیوه گرتبو. دواتر پاش سالیگ لهژیر قشاری نههستهی و دهولتهی نههسادا نازادکرا.

بهداخهوه روژنامههوسان سۆرانی مامهحهمه و سهردهشت عوسمان نهو بهختهیان نهو و لهسهر نوسین دهبرارهی گهذهلی لهلایه دمهسلاته و حکومهتی کوردیهوه، به گوله کوژران. دمهسلاتهی کوردی کهسانیکی تری تاونابارکردوه و تا نههروش راستیهکان نهزاناون. تهناوت رهنهیهک لهلایه کهسهکی نههسارهوه له بهرنامهیهکی تهلهفزیونی دا دژ به بارزانی بهسه بۆنهوی روژی داهاوو سهربانی کههالهکه بدریت بهر هاون. وه ههمو جاریکیش تاونابارکه نادۆزیتوه.

یهکێگ له بابته ههستیاریکان بهشاری بارزانییه له نابوری نهو ولاته نوئ نهوتیهدا، مهزمه دهکرت سامانی مسعود بارزانی گهیشتهیه 2 ملیارد دۆلار و بری پارو بهشاری خیزانهکهش له نابوری کوردستاندا نهزانوه. لهکاتیگدا بهواداچون بۆ نهو بابته بهرو دادگا دهیزیت و هک چۆن له 2010دا روژنامهی روژنامه درا به دادگا کاتیگ باسی له قازانجی بهمهالهی بارزانی کرد له به قاچاخ بردنی نهوت. بۆیه ههلهکهسهی تاکهکانی نهو خیزانه زیاتر پرسیار دهخولقینیت تا وهلام دهروهب. بۆ نمونه له 2012دا مهنسور بارزانی کۆری مسعود له شاری دوهی ..... لهکاتیگدا له گهل باوکی له گهشتیکی فیرمیدا بو. مهسروریش که کۆری گهوهی بارزانییه، ..... به فیرمی ههروکیان موچهخۆری حکومهتن و مهسرور سهروکی ناساپشی گهسته، که بهلاشیه ناساپیه هیز بهکار بهینیت بۆ سهروکترکردنی نهو نارهزایی و پرۆتیهستهی که پنیویه تهحهمولیان ناکریت. ههروهک له خۆپیشاندانهکانی ههولیر و سلیمانی له 2011دا بهینیمان.

پارتی و دوژمنه میژویهکهی که یهکیتیهیه، چهند میکانیزمیگ نالۆز و نههینیان بۆ دابهشکردنی دمهسلاته و فیرمانهرواییان گرتتهبهس که ههروکیانی له یهک کاتدا خستهته کۆرسی شۆیرهوه. ههندیکجار بارهکه بهلای یهکیاندا لاسهنگه که کهوتتهسهس نهوکهسهی سوکانهکهی بهدهسته له ههیهک لهی دو حیز بهدا. لای بارزانی دابهشکردنی پاره و دمهسلاته بهسهس نههدامان و لایهنگرانی خۆیاندا، (دیموکراتیهی) بارزانی لههتیه بهمهالهکهیدا رههساندوه.

بهمهالهی بارزانی و تالهبانی، زۆرتیرینی بازرگانی و بزسه رهونهقدار مهکانیان بهدهستهویه، وهک تهلهفون و مۆلهگهروه و بهر ههیه نهوتیهکان. (ههچ کهس نازانیت به دروستی پارهی نهوت بۆ کوئ دهروات) نهوه وتهی - ناریه که سهرونسهری سایتی (e kurd.net)ه له نههسا.

ولاتیگ له شیز و فرینیا

هاتتی پارهی زۆری نهوت بۆ ناو نابوری، نهک جیاوازی ههزار و دهولمههند زیاد دهکات، بهلکو شیز و فرینیا بهییهکی نیشتیمانی دروست دهکات. (گهر سههریکی نهخوشخانهکان و نهو خزمهتگوزاریانه بهکیت که تیبیدا پیشهکش دهکرت، که زۆر لاوازه کهس ناتوانیت نهو پرسیاره نهکات که پارهی نهوتهکه بۆ کوئ دهروات) نهههش ههس ناری دهلیت: لهکاتیگدا زیاتر له 150 ههزار بهرمیل نهوت دهردههینریت هیشتا کوردستان 80%ی بههزین له عیراق و ئیران و تۆرکیاوه هاورده دهکات.

دروستکردنی مۆل و بینا و خانوبهه که له زۆر شۆینهوه ههلهدهتۆقین، بهتایبهت بهدرژیایی شهقامه 100 مهتریهکهی ههولیر شینوازیگ له (نیفادی) لهخۆگرتوه بۆ نوخیه و بیانیهکان، شارهوه نیه لای کهس که پرۆژهیهکی گهوه مهرجی سههرکهتنیان بهسهراره به چۆنیتهی بهشاری کردنی کهسهکی بارزانی لهی پرۆژانهدا. نهو ههلهتۆقینه خیزایهی له شینوازی کۆلونی روژئاویدا بهخیزایی بهریویه ههچ بهیوهندهیهکی تۆرگانی نیه به بارو جۆری گۆزهران و ژبانی خهلیگ له نهزی واقیعدا. کارمهندیکی روژئاوایی له یهکێگ لههتۆکاندا دهلیت؛ نهوه گۆلبالیزمه که به بزمار و نهخته گهیهندارهته عیراق و ههندهی (ستودیۆکانی یونیفیرسال) و (والت دیزنی) سیحراویه لهم بهشهی دنیادا. نهوهی نوقسانه علمی بابا و چل دزمهیه که دهکرت نهوانیش بهدهست بهینریت. لای ههندئ له کوردهکان نهوه دهستهکهوتی بارزانییه و دهکرت درێژهی ههینیت و نهچریت. بهلام دیوهکهی تری قورسه قسهی لهسهر بهکرت و پینیهینی بهکرت. گومان نیه لهوهی ولاتانی روژئاوا ناگاداری دینامیکیتهی دمهسلاتهی کوردی نین. که زۆریکیان کونسولخانهیان له ههولیری پایتهخدا ههیه که له گهشه و روداو مهکانی ناگادار دهکرتین، بهلام هیشتا ههول بۆ قازانجی نهوت بالی بهسهس تیراوانین و سهرنجداندا کیشاوه که مافی مروق و بهرگهکانی تری دیموکراسیهت و نایبیت بهخزینه کوشنهکانی دواوه. نهو نرخی که سههینی بۆ بهدییهنانی ژمارهی به کوردی نوسراوی ئۆتۆمبیلێگ دهینت بدریت، شۆفیرمه نایدات بهلکو گهلی کورده. بۆیه زۆر ههیا ههیه بهوهی دوا مهنزله نهوه نیه که ریکلامی بۆ دهکرت.

## AKS.8

[http://sbei.com/\(X\(1\)S\(gl405dbjl3ghnjrwg4zdb2sg\)\)/Detail.aspx?id=26765&LinkID=60&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1](http://sbei.com/(X(1)S(gl405dbjl3ghnjrwg4zdb2sg))/Detail.aspx?id=26765&LinkID=60&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1)

گەندەلی سیاسی

نیمری ئۆسلو

21/12/2013

لە ئینگلیزییەوه: سەباح حەسێن

دەیهیک پێش ئێستا حکومەتی پارێی داد و گەشەپێدان (AKP) ھاتەسەر ھۆکەم بەزۆری لەبەرئەوه بو ھاوڵاتیان بیزار بوبون لە گەندەلی لە وڵاتدا.

لەرستیدا، لە سالی 2002دا بەرپرسەکانی AKP بەلێنپاندا بە ھاوڵاتیان کە ئەوان شەر دەکەن لە دژی سێ شت: گەندەلی، سنوردانان بۆ ئازادیەکان و ھەژاری. خەڵکانیکی زۆر کە دەنگیاندا بە AKP لەبەر ئەوه بو برۆیان وابو کە پارتەکە گەندەلی بنەڕ دەکات.

لە سالیەکانی سەرەتادا، حکومەتی AKP ھەنگاوی کاریگەری نا بۆ لەناوبردنی گەندەلی لە ئاستە نزمەکانی ئۆفیسەکانی دەولەتدا. دە سال لەمەوبەر زۆر ئاسایی بو بۆ پۆلیسیکی ھاتوچۆ کە بە شێوەیەکی لەرا دەبەدر تێوھەلگی لە گەندەلییەوه. زۆریک لە ئەفسەرە پلە نزمەکان بەرتیلیان وەر دەگرت... ھتە.

ئەوهی حکومەتەکە AKP بەدەستپێنا کۆتایی ھێنان بو بەر گەندەلییە ئاشکرایە کە لەنێوان ئەفسەرە پلە نزمەکاندا بو. بەھۆی ئەم سەرمەوتەوه، زۆریک لە ھاوڵاتیان واتیکەشتن، کە حکومەتەکە AKP سەرمەوتەوانە شەر لەدژی گەندەلی دەکات.

ھەرچۆنیک بێت، ئەوانە کە مامەلە دەکەن لەگەڵ بەرپرسەکانی حکومەتدا لە پلەبەلەکاندا دەیانزانی کە گەندەلی ھەر بەر دەوامە و تەنھەت خراپ تریش بوە.

ئۆپرەسیۆنەکانی پۆلیس لەدژی کەسە نزیکەکانی ھەندیک لەو وەزیر و بەرپرسە ناسراوانە کە لە پلەبەلەکاندا سەلماندی کە حکومەتەکە AKP نەیتوانیوە بەلێنەکە بباتەسەر لە دزایەتیکردنی گەندەلیدا.

رەنگە بۆئەزیت سێ کاریگەری گرنگ لەم ئۆپرەسیۆنەوه دیاری بکەیت.

یەکەم، ئەمە ئەبێتە ھەلایەکی گەورە بۆ حکومەتەکە AKP بە بەرچاوی لایەنگرەکانیەوه. بەشێوەیە کە وێنە پۆزەتیفەکە حکومەت و وەزیرەکانی AKP لەکەدار کردووە. لە ئێستادا، ھێچ پارێزگاریکەریک ناتوانێت بەرگری لە حیزبەکە بکات و بێت کەوا ئەم حکومەتە کۆتایی بە گەندەلی ھێناوە لە وڵاتدا.

راھاتون لەسەر ئەوهی، کە ئەم بەرپرسانە بەوه ناسراون کە لەخواترسن، پارێزگاریکەریکەریکان ھەروا بەئاسانی ناتوانن لەم جۆرە مامەلەکردنە ببورن. بەگۆرە ئەمە، ئەکرێت کەسێک پێشبینی ئەوه بکات کە حکومەتەکە AKP لە ھەلبژاردنەکانی داھاتودا ھەندیک دەنگ لەدەست دەدات.

پەموەندیدار بە دەروە تۆرکیا، ئۆپرەسیۆنەکە ئەوهی ئاشکەر کرد کە تۆرکیا بوە بە یەکنێک لە ویزگەکانی سپیکردنەوهی دراوەکانی ئێران. لەکاتییدا کە رۆژناو لە ھەولدا بو بۆ توندکردنی سزا ئێودەولەتیەکان لەسەر ئێران، کەچی بانگیکی مەری بەکار ھێنراوە بۆ پەرتکردنی ئەو سزایانە. وایلاووەتەوه کە سەدان بلیۆن دۆلار لە پارەکانی ئێران لە تۆرکیا سپیکردنەوه و ئێرەراون بۆ بازارەکانی جیھان، ئەگەر ئەمەش راست بێت ئەوا زیانیکی گەورە دەبێت بۆ وێنە تۆرکیا لە دونیای دەروەدا.

پەموەندیدار بە ئابوریەوه، ئۆپرەسیۆنەکە زیان لە کەرتی ئاوەدانکردنەوه دەدات، کە گرنگترین کەرتە لە ئابوری تۆرکیادا. لەرستیدا ئەگەر ئەوه ساخ بێتەوه کە پیاو بازارگەنە ھەروا بانگەکان بەشیکین لە بازەنە گەندەلییەکە، ئەوا کۆمپانیایەکانی ئاوەدانکردنەوه زیانیکی زۆریان بەردەکەوت، بەھەمان شێوە زەرەریکی کاریگەریش لە حکومەت دەدات.

بەھێزترین کاریگەری ئەم ئۆپرەسیۆنە کاریگەرییە کۆمەلایەتیەکەمەتی. بەلایەنی کەسەوه لەسەدا پەنجای ھاوڵاتیان بەھەر شێوەیە بێت بە ھۆکاری جیاواز جیاواز متمانە بەم حکومەتە ھەبوە. یەکنێک لە ھەرە کاریگەرترین ئەو ھۆکارانە ئاین بوە. کاتیک بۆیان رون دەبێتەوه کە ئەم حکومەتەش زۆر جیاوازتر نییە لە رژیە کۆنەکە، ئەوا برۆای خۆیان لەدەست دەدەن بەرەبەر بە کەسانی ئاینی، سیاسی مەدەنیانە و تۆرکیاش و ھەر وڵاتیەک.

وا بۆلایەتەوه کە گرەتەکی قیدیوی ھەو وەزیریک ملیۆن و نیویک دۆلار وەک بەرتیل وەر دەگرت. ھەرکاتیک ئەوه سەلمینرا کە وەزیریک، کە پیاویکی بەرێزی ناسراو، بەرتیلی وەر گرتووە، ئەم وڵاتە دادەبەزێت بۆ ئاستی وڵاتانی دونیای سنییم لە ئەمریکای لاتین و ئەفریقا. نایا حکومەت دەتوانێت بەئاسانی زال بێت بەسەر ئەم شوکەدا؟

نەخیز زۆر بەناسانی ناتوانیت. بە لەسەر کار لا بردنی 5 بەرژومبەری پۆلیس بۆ کۆتایی ھێنان بە ئۆپەراسیۆنەکە، حکومەت ھەولێدا ھەرچی زۆترە ئێمە کەیسە و ن بکات و وابکات کە رای گشتی لەبیریان بچیتەو. ئێمە زانیاریانە کە لەگەڵ رای گشتیدا بەشداری پێدەکریت زۆر دراماتیکیە، ھەرچۆنیک بیت، ھەروا بەناسانی ئێمە شتانیان لە بیر ناچیت.

کێ دمتوانیت وینە وەزیری بکات کە ملیۆن و نیویک دۆلار بە بەرتیل وەردەگریت؟

سەرچاوە: تۆدەیس زەمان

AKS.9

<http://sbei.com/Detail.aspx?id=29105&LinkID=60>

دینیس ناتالی: ناکۆکی لەسەر نەوتی عێراق لاوازی حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان ئاشکرا دەکات

2014/03/04

دینیس ناتالی

لە نینگلیزییەو: سبەیی

شەری دوایەنە بەردەوامی نیوان بەغدا و ھەولێر لەسەر ھاناردەکردن و داھاتی نەوت لە دو ھەفتە رابردودا گەشتۆتە ئاستیکی خراپتر، کە بوە بەھۆی جدیترین قەیرانی بانکی بۆ حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان لە سالی 1991و. لە ئاھامدیی ریکەوتنیکدا، بەغدا بەشیک لە داھاتی حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستانی راگرتو، لە ئەنجامدا بەشیک فەرمانبەران ماوەی دو بۆ سێ مانگە موچەیان پێنەدراو، لە ناویشاندا ھێزەکانی پێشمەرگە و ھیزی پاراستنی نەوت کە پاسەوانی کۆمپانیا نەوتیە نیودەولەتیەکان دەکەن. سەرۆکی ھەریمی کوردستان بە توندی وەلامی داوئەو ھەنگاوەکانی بەغدا بە "راگەیانندی شەڕ بەرامبەر بە خەڵکی کوردستان" بەرورد کردو، لە ھەمان کاتیشدا بانگەشەیی ئەوێ کرد کە دمتوانن موچە لە داھاتەکانی حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان بدەن.

ئێمە سەرەرای بەکارھێنایی دروشمی نەوتەویی، ریکەستنی خۆپیشاندانی دژ بە مالیکی، لۆمەکردنی ولایەتە پەکەر تومەکانی ئەمەریکا بۆ پشتیوانی ئەکردن و فشار خستەسەر کۆمپانیا نەوتیە نیودەولەتیەکان بۆ پێدانی پارە، ھەولەکانی حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان بەرامبەر بە بەغدا و ھەناردەکردنی سەر بەخۆیانە نەوت ھێشتا ناکاریگەر ماون. لەگەڵ بونی بەر بەستی یاسایی و سیاسی و تەکنیکی، ھاوپەیمانی سەرەکی وزە حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان، سەرۆک وەزیرانی تورکیا رەجەب تەیب ئەردوگان، خۆی رۆبەرو قەیرانی ناوخی و داھاتوێکی سیاسی نادیار بوئەو. لە ئاھامدیی رێگای گواستەوێ یاسایی یان سەرچاوەی داھاتی ئەلەترناتیف و لەگەڵ بەرفراوانی رەخنە دانیشتیوانی ناوچەکە و ھەولێر پاراستنی متمانە و مەبەر ھێنەر، ھەولێر دەکەوێتە ژێر فشاری زۆرەو تاکو بەرامبەر بەغدا سازش بکات. ئەگەر نا، ھەریمی کوردستان کە زیندانی جوگر افایە دەکەوێتە بەر مەترسی ھەر شەھێ لە دەستدانی ئەو دەستکەوتە ئابوری و سیاسیانە کە بە دەستی ھێناو، بەمەش ھەم دانیشتیوان و ھەمیش دامودەزگاکانی رۆبەرو ناسەقامگیری کۆمەلایەتی و سیاسی و دارایی دەبنەو.

تانیستا کەم کەس لەو باوەردان کە بەغدا تا ئێمە رادەبە بروت کە بودجە حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان بە تەواوی بېریت وەکو ئامرازیکی سزادان. ھەرچەند حکومەتی عێراق و حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان ناکۆکیان ھەو لەسەر پێدانی بودجە لە سالی ۲۰۰۵و، بەبەردەوامی حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان بوجە سالاھەتی زیادکردی خۆی لە بەغدادو پێگەشتو. لە سالی ۲۰۱۳دا ھەریم نزیکەیی (۱۳) ملیار دۆلاری بەرکەوتو بۆ بەرژومبەردنی سێ پارێزگا، کە بەرژومبەیک زیاترە لە پارێزگاکانی تری عێراق کە نەوت بەر ھەم دەھێنن. بەغدادیش کاریگەر ھەولێنەداو کە ریکەوتن لە پەرەپێدانی کەرتی وزە ھەریمی کوردستان. "لیستی رەش" بۆ ئەو کۆمپانیا نەوتیە نیودەولەتیانە لە ھەریمی کوردستان کار دەکەن ھێچ ھۆکار نەبوە بۆ سەلمێنەو کۆمپانیا سەرەکیەکانی نەوت لە ئیمزا کردنی گریبەست لەگەڵ حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان و سود وەرگرتن لە سەرچاوە سروشتیەکانی.

تەنیا ئەوکاتە کە حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان ھێلی سوری بەغدا تێپەراند بە ھەولێر بۆ پێشێلکردنی سەرەو عێراق بە ھەناردەکردنی نەوت بۆ تورکیا بەشێوەیکی نارسە، بەرپرسی عێراق بە تەواوی کارتی داھاتیان بەکارھێنا. ئێمە قەیرانی عێراق لە ئەنجامی رەشەو بودجە ۲۰۱۴، داواکاری ناکۆکی پارێزگا نەوت بەر ھەمەپێنەراکانی دیکە بۆ لایەکی و داھاتی زیاتر و داواکاری ئابوری دارایی حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان تەقەو. ئیستا ناکۆکیەکان بون بە بەشیک لە ھەلمەتی ھەلژاردن، چونکە ھەم بارزانی و ھەم سەرۆک وەزیرانی عێراق نوری مالیکی

پرسی نەوت و بودجه بەکار دەهێنن بۆ چەسپاندنی دەسەلاتیان و نەتەویەیی بونیان تاكو بگەن بە باشترین رێکەوتن بۆ خۆیان پێش ھەلبژاردنەکانی نێسان.

لە راستیدا، قەیرانەکە بوە بەھۆی زیادی بونی رەخنەیی کوردەکان لە حکومەتی عێراق. زۆر کەس لۆمەیی مالیکی دەکەن بۆ راگرتنی داھات و دەشلێن کە دیسان کوردەکان بون بە قوربانی دەستی بەغدا. لە ھەمانکاتدا دانیشتوانی ناوچەکە دەشلێن بەشیکی قەیرانە لە ئەنجامی خراپ ئیدارەکردنی داھات و نەبونی شفافیتە لە کاروباری گشتیدا لەلایەن حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستانەوە. پەرلەمانتاریکی بزوتنەوی گۆران رایگەیاند کە چەندین سالە حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان نەوت دەفرۆشیت و دەتوانیت بە داھاتی نەوت مودجەیی شەش مانگی فەرمانبەرانی بدات. بە ھەمان شێوە سەرۆکی بانکی ناوێندی کوردستان، ئەدھەم کەریم دەرویش، رایگەیاندووە کە قەیرانەکە ھەروا بە سادەیی بەھۆی رەتکردنەوی بەغدا نیە بۆ ناردنی پارە بۆ حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان. بەلکو بەغدا پارەیی حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستانی راگرتووە، چونکە حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان زانیاری روون نادات بە بەغدا لەسەر ھەناردەکردنی نەوت و داھاتەکانی. لەوش خراپتر، حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان هیچ پلانیکی دارایی نیە بۆ ھالەتە نائاساییەکان. لە کاتیگدا بەغدا خاموێ (۸۰) ملیار دۆلاری یەدەگە لە بانکەکانی دەوڵەتدا، بانکە گشتیەکانی حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان هیچ پارەیەکیان نیە.

ھەروەھا قەیرانەکە رەنگدانەوی ھەبوە بۆ سەر کەرتی وزەیی حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان، بە تاییبەت پەپۆست بە ئۆپەراسیۆنی ئەمەنی و ھیزی پاراستنی نەوت. وەزیری سامانە سروشتیەکانی حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان ئاماژەیی ھەبوە کردووە کە ھێزەکانی ئاسایش چالاکن لە بەرگری کردن لە ھەریم و هیچ گەتوگۆیەک لەسەر جێھێشتنی پێگەکانیان لەلایەن ھێزەکانەو لە ئارادا نیە. لەگەڵ ئەو شەدا ھۆشداریی داووە بە کۆمپانیا نەوتیە نیودەوڵەتیەکان کە وریابن لەو ناوچانەیی نەوت دەردەھێنن. وەزارەتی سامانە سروشتیەکان لەو بژاردەشی داووە بە کۆمپانیا نەوتیە نیودەوڵەتیەکان کە پاسەوانی ئەمەنی خۆیان سەرلەنۆن بگرەن، کە ئەمەش پاشەکشەیی لە داوایەکی سالی ۲۰۱۱ کە لە ھەموو کۆمپانیا نەوتیە نیودەوڵەتیەکان دەخواییت زۆربەیی کارمەندە نیودەوڵەتیەکانیان دوربەخەنەو و تەنیا ھیزی پاراستنی نەوتی حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان بەکاربھێنن.

بەدەستھێنانی داھات بو بەھۆی گرژی لەنێوان وەزارەتی سامانە سروشتیەکان و ھەندیک لە کۆمپانیا نەوتیە نیودەوڵەتیەکان. بە گۆیرەیی نوێنەری کۆمپانیای نەوتی لۆکالی ویستەرن، وەزارەتی سامانە سروشتیەکان تاوی ھێناوە بە کۆمپانیا نەوتیە نیودەوڵەتیەکان کە ۱ مارسی ۲۰۱۴ برە پارەیی نەروای پاراستنی نەوت بدەن بە وەزارەت. لە کۆبونەوێکی ئەم دواییەیی لەگەڵ کۆمپانیا نەوتیە نیودەوڵەتیەکان بۆ گەتوگۆکردن لەسەر قەیرانی دارایی، ئاشتیی ھەروامی وەزیری سامانە سروشتیەکان رەخنەیی لەو کۆمپانیانە گرتووە، لە ناویشیاندا کۆمپانیا سەرمکیەکان، کە بری پارەیی پاراستنی نەوتیان نەداو ھەروەک چۆن چاوپۆشی ناكریت لە نەدانی پارەکە. تائیسەت تەنیا ۱۰-۵%ی کۆمپانیا نەوتیە نیودەوڵەتیەکان پارەکانیان داووە و ئەو پەرش نزیكەیی (۱۵۰) ملیۆن دۆلارە.

چەند بەرپرسیکی حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان نیەتی بەکارھێنانی کارتی دیکەیان بەرامبەر بە حکومەتی عێراق نیشانداوە. لەوانەش سەرما ھەرشەیی وەستاندنی پەرلەمانیان لە بەغدا و کەمکردنەوی ئاوی بەنداوەکانی حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان بۆ جوتیارە عەرمیەکان و رێگەگرتن لە گواستەوێ نەوتی کەرکوک بۆ تورکیا و راگەیانندی سەربەخۆیی. دەستبەجی بەغدا بە ھەرشەیی داخستنی ھێلی ئاسمانی ھەریمی کوردستان وەلامی داھەو، بە راگرتنی ھەموو گەشتە ئاسمانیەکان بۆ سلیمانی و ھەولێر.

سەرمەرای ئەم تاکنیک و ھەرشانە، ئاماژەکان بەو ئاراستەیی-یان وا دەخوای-کە ھەردولا پێش ھەلبژاردن بگەنە رێکەوتن، ھەرچەندە لە باشترین ھالەتدا رێکەوتنێکی کاتی دەبێت. تەنەت لەو ھالەتەشدا، قەیرانە لاوازی حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان و پشت بەستنی بە بەغدا دەسەلمێنێت. لەگەڵ نزیكەیی ۶۰% دانیشتوان کە پشت دەبەستن بە مودجەیی حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان و ژمارەیی زیاتریش لەسەر سودمەندی خوشگوزەرائی و حکومەتیکی کە پاش شەش مانگ لە ھەلبژاردنەکانی ھەریمی کوردستان ھێشتا پێکنەھاتو، رەنگە پێویست بکات کە حکومەتی ھەریمی کوردستان دوبارە بیر لە ستراتیژی وزە و سیاسی و دارایی خۆی بۆ داھاتو بکات. ھەنگوێکی ریشەیی بریتیە لە بنیاتنانی دامەزراوەی شەفاف بۆ بەرپرسیارانی سامانی وزەیی ھەریم، بە تاییبەت بونی حسابی بۆجەیی سەرور بۆ نەوێکی داھاتو. شکست لە ئەنجامدانی ئەم کارەدا کاردانەوی خراپی گەورەتری دەبێت بۆ سەر دانیشتوانی ناوچەکە و گەشەیی کەرتی نابوری و وزە و سەقامگیری ناوخی.

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داعش گەنجى كورد بۆ ريزەكانى رادەكېشىت..

28/06/2014

ئەبىگەيل ھاوسلۇنير

مەترسىيەكى نوئ لەسەر بەشىكى ئارامى عىراق دروستدەكات

ھەلەبجە - عىراق- ئەم شارە نزيك لەسنورى ئيران ماوەيەكى دريژە بۆتە سيمبۆلى بەرگرى كوردى و لەدنيدا ناسراوہ كاتىك لەسالى  
1988 سەدام بە چەكى كيميائى بۆردومانى كرد.

ئەمىرۇزانە، وەك دانىشتوانانى دەلەين، تا بىت بە ديار دەيەكى تر دەناسرئەوہ، ديار دەيەك كەم لە دانىشتوانانى دەيانەويت قسەى لەسەر  
بەكن.

دەسلەلاتى كوردى دەلەيت گروپىكى بچوكى گەنجى كورد، نزيكەى 150 كەس، كە 30% لىيان دانىشتوى ھەلەبجەن، لەدوا مانگەكاندا  
چونەتە ناو ريزەكانى داعشەوہ كە بەشىكى خاكى عىراقى گرتوہ. ئەو گەنجانەى دەچنە ريزەكانى گروپە ميليتانته  
توندر موەكانەوہ مەترسىيەكى شاردرائوہ بۆ كوردەكان. كوردەكان ھيوادار بون ناوچەى ئوتتۇميان لەباكورى  
عىراق دورمەريز لەشەرى خوينائوى عىراق رابگرن.

چەند كارمەندىكى ھەوألگري كوردى ترسى خويان دەربرى كە ئەم پىنشەوچونەى داعش ھانى گەنجى تر بۆ جىھاد دەدات و نايدۇلۇژيە  
رادىكالەكان بەخشەيى بەرەو كوردستانى عىراق گوزەر دەكەن، ناوچەيەك تا ئەم ساتەش واحەيەكى ھىمن و  
ئارامە.

بونى شەركەرى كورد لەناو گروپە ميليتانته توندر موەكاندا نيشانى دەدات چۆن ھەولەكانى داعش بۆ كەسبكردى گەنج لەعىراقىكى  
دابهشكر اودا كارىگەرى خويان كردوہ.

بەرپرسيكى باألای ھەوألگري لەھەلەبجە، نەيوست ناوى بېریت، وتى داعش لەئىستادا "شانەى" چالاكى لەناو شارەكەدا ھەيمو داوا  
لەگەنجانى بىكار و بىزار دەكەن كاريان لەگەل بەكن. لەدریژەى قسەكانیدا بەرپرەكە وتى: زۆربەى ئەو 52  
پیاو و گەنجەى لەماوہى سأل و نیوى رابوردو ھەلەبجەيان بەجیھەشتوہ بۆ شەركردن لەسوريا لەلایەن داعشەوہ  
كەسب كرابون.

ھەر وەھا وتى: "يەكەك لەپیاوەكانى ناوچەكە، مەريوان ھەلەبجەيى، بۆتە كۆماندۆيەكى داعش و ئىستا لەبەرەى شەرە دژ بە ھیزەكانى  
پىشمەرگە و ئاسايش لەدەر موہى شارى كەركوك."

كارمەندى ھەوألگريەكە پرسارى كرد؛ "چۆن گەرەنتيمان ھەبىت كاتىك لەشەركردنى شیعەكان تەواو دەبن دەست بەشەركردنى  
كورد ناكەن؟"

نزیکەى دە ساڵ پێشتەر گروپىكى ئىسلامى رادىكالى پەيوەندار بە قاعىدە لێره بنکەىەکیان ھەبو و شەرى بەکىتى نىشتمانى کوردستانیان دەکرد، ئەم بنکەىە لەساڵى 2003 لەلایەن ھىزەکانى ئەمەریکاوە بۆمباران کرا.

لەشارى ھەلەبجە بواری کارکردن و خویندن کەمەو میژوی بەرھەڵستیکردنى حکومەتى عەرەبى بەغداى ھەيە، وەک دانىشتوێکەى شارەکە وتى: "نزیکەى ھەر مالىک شەھىدێکى ھەيە، شەھىدێک لەخەباتى کورد بۆ سەر بەخۆی یاخود شەھىدێک لەپەلاماردانى شارەکە بەچەکی کیمیاوى لە 1988 کە ھەزاران قوربانى لیکەوتەوہ."

دۆخەکە ئالۆزتر بوە لەوکاتەوہى حکومەتى مالىکى لەئاکامى ناکۆکى لەگەڵ حکومەتى ھەرىمى کوردستان بۆ ماوہى شەش مانگە بودجەى ھەرىمى بربوہ و موچەى فەرمانبەرانى راگرتوہ.

کارمەندى ھەوالگریەکە پێى وتە: "لێره خەلکى خویندىن بەلا تەواو دەکەن و بۆ ئابندە گەشبین نین، لەدنیای خۆرئاوا گەنجى گۆشەگیر خۆى دەکوژیت. لێره دەچنە ریزەکانى داعشەوہ، نەمیش لە بنەرمندا خۆکوشتە."

رینگە بەرمو رادىکالیزم

"ز"، لەسەر داواى خانەوادەکەى ناوئەکەى نائوسم، گەنجیک بو پێندەمچو بچیتە ناو داعشەوہ، رەوتیک کە لیکدانەوہى توندی بۆ یاساکانى ئىسلام ھەيە، سەدان شیعە و خەلکى تری کوشتوہ لەھەولدانیک بۆ دامەزراندنى خەلافەتى ئىسلامى کە سوریا و عێراق بەيەکەوہ ببەستیتەوہ.

زاواکەى "ز" وتى: "مۆتورسایکلى ھەبو، کچیکى دۆستى ھەبو، زۆر دۆستى تریشى ھەبو."

خانەوادەى "ز" وتیان کە کەمپینى سۆشیال میدیای توندروەکان و ئەندامە لۆکالیەکانى داعش کاربان لەسەر کردبو. وێنەى "ز" لەسەر مۆبایلى خوشکەکەى دەربەخات گەنجیکى تەمەن 16 ساڵ بە پۆشاکی مۆدێرن و دوا ستایلى قژى سەر.

خانەوادەى "ز" وتیان کە کورەکیان ئابنى نەبو و ھىچ کات لای گرنگ نەبوہ بۆ مەزگەوت بچیت. لەناوەرەستى مانگى مايسدا کتوپر لەگەڵ نزیکترین دۆستى ھەلەبجەى بەجێھێشت تا بچیتە ناو داعش لەسوریا، وەک زاواکیان وتى: "لەيەک ھەفتەدا - ز - بەتەواوى گۆرا."

پاشنەوہى لەھەفتەى پێشودا داعش لەعێراق ھاتە پێشەوہ، "ز" نىستا لەگەڵ ھاوڕێ میلیتانەکانى لە شارى موسلە، خانەوادەکەى پتیاں وتە. "ز" لەچەند پەيوەندیەکى تەلەفونیدا بە خانەوادەکەى وتوہ کە خەریکی فیربونی قورعانە.

دو کارمەندى ھەوالگری و چەند دانىشتوانیکى ھەلەبجەش وتیان دەسەلاتى کوردی رێگایان داوہ گەنجى وەک "ز" ناوچەکە بەجێھێلن، چونکە پتیاں وابوہ ناوچەکە بێئەوان ئارامترە.



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## پشتگیری تورکیا بۆ داعش

نوسینی: دانیال پېښ

2014/06/21

سەرۆکی فۆرمی خۆرهلانی ناوهراس The Middle East Forum

له وتاریکی پېشودا نوسیبوم: شەری عێراق شەری جیهادیسته سوننه یاخیبوهمانه دژ به حکومەتیکی ناوهندی شیعه که ئێران پشتگیری دهکات، چەند خۆنەریک چەند پرسباریکیان لی کردم، وەک: پشتگیری کۆماری تورکیا بۆ داعش که گەورەترین هیزی شەری سوننهیه له عێراق، هەروەها ئاماژەیان داو به پەلامارمەکانی داعش بۆ سەر بەرژموندیهکانی تورکیا لەناو تورکیا و بەدرێژی سەنوری له گەل سوریا و له موسڵ و کۆبونەوهیهکی سەرکەوتوی تازهی نێوان سەرۆکهکەکانی ئێران و تورکیا.

ئەمانە هەمویان خالی بههیزن، بهلام رونکرده ههیه بۆیان.

یهکەم: داعش ئێستاش پشتگیری تورکیا قبول دهکات، هەرچەندە سەیری سەرۆک وەزیرانی تورکیا و گروپهکهی وەک کافر دهکات، که پێوستیان بهوه ئیسلامی راستهقینهیان پێشان بدرێت.

دوهم: سەردانی سەرۆکهکان له یەک ئاستدا رویدا له کاتیکیدا شەری له سوریا و عێراق له ئاستی زۆر جیاوازتر رویناوه و دهکریت هەر دو له هەمان کاتدا روبەن. رکابەری تورکیا و ئێران لەسەر هیز و هەلسانەوهی خۆیانە، وەک رۆژنامەگەری ناواری تورکیا، Burak Bekdil، لەداو ژمارە وەرزی گوڤاری خۆرهلانی ناوهراسدا نوسیبویەتی: "لەم سالانە دوایدا زمانی فەرمی لەلایەن هەر دو وڵاتەوه سەبارەت بە گەشەپێدانی بازرگانی نێوانیان و تەزامونی ئایدیۆلۆژی دژ به ئیسرائیل بەکارهێنراوه، بهلام ئەوهی بەرچاو ناکەوێت رکابەری و بێتەمانی و گومانی مەزەهەبی هەر دو لایە له یەکتەر."

ئەنکەرە یارمەتیدانی داعش رەتدەکاتەوه، بهلام ئاماژەکانی یارمەتیدان زۆر زۆرن، وەک رۆژنامەنوسی تورکی ئۆرهان کەمال جەنگیز نوسیبویەتی: "نێمه سەنۆریکی هاوبەشی درێژمان له گەل سوریا ههیه، پشتگیری تورکیا بۆ هاوچۆکردنی جیهادیستهکان زۆر گرنگ بو." له واقیعدا بنکه بههیزمەکانی داعش له سوریا له سەنۆری تورکیاوه نزیک و ئەمه مەسەلهیهکی سوڤه نیه.

کوردەکان و ئۆپۆزیسیونی سوری و پەسپۆران هاویران که نزیکه 3.000 شەری تورک و بیانی (تایبەت سعودی و ژمارهیهک خۆرئاوایی) بەریگە سەنۆری تورکیاوه چۆنەته ناو سوریاوه بۆ چۆنه ناو ریزمەکانی داعشەوه، وەک رۆژنامەگەری تورکی، قەدری گۆرسڵ، وەسفی رێگە سەنۆری کردو: "هێلی خیرای دو سایدی جیهادیستهکان بۆ کۆنترۆلکردن بو و جاریش بو که دەزگای هەوالگری تورکیا چالاکانه یارمەتیانی داو". تەنانهت تەلفەزیونی CNN قیدۆیهکی لەسەر رێگە قاجاخی جیهادیستهکان پەخش کردو.

بەم نزیکانه نەک پەڕینهوهی سەنۆر، بەلکو تورکیا چەک و پارە و مەشقکردن و کارناسانی لوجیستیکی به هیزی سەرمەکی داعش داوه. کاتیکی شەری نێوان کوردەکان و داعش روودەدات له نزیک سەنۆر ئەمبولانسی تورکی سەنۆر دەبەزێنێت بۆ فریاکەوتن و گواستەوهی بریندارمەکانی داعش بۆ نەخۆشخانەکانی تورکیا. وێنەیهکی وروژێنەری کۆماندۆیهکی داعش، ئەبو محەمەد، له نەخۆشخانە حکومی هاتای تورکی که چاره وەرەگرێت له نیسانی 2014 بڵاویۆتەوه.

ئەبۇ محەممەد، كۆماندۇپەكى داعش، لە نەخۆشخانەى حكومى Hatay لە نىسانى 2014

بە مەزمەندەى سىياسەتمەدارىكى ئۆيۈزسىۋنى تۈركىيا، حكومەتى تۈركىيا 800 مىليۇن دۆلارى بە داعش داۋە بۇ ھەناردەكردنى نەوتى سۈربىي ژۇر دەسەلاتى داعش. سىياسەتمەدارىكى تۈركى زانىيارى بىلۈكردۈتەۋە لەسەر مەشق پىكردنى داعش لەلايىن سەربازە تۈركەكانەۋە. چەند چاۋدېرېك رايەنگەياندۈۋە كە سەۋك وەزىرائى تۈركىيا، رەجەب تەيىب ئەردۈگان، سى جار ياسىن ئەلقادى بىننىۋە كە لە داعش زۆر نىزىكە و يارمەتيدەرىكى داعشە .

تۈركىيا يارمەتى ئەم تىرۋرىستە تۈندىرەۋانە دەدات، چۈنكە وېستى ئەنقەرەيە دو لايەنى سىياسى لە سۈربىي لەناۋبەرىت، رەژىمى ئەسەد و رۇژناقا (دەۋلەتى كوردى كە لە دروستىۋىندايە) لە باكورى خۆرەلاتى سۈربىي.

ھەرچەندە تۈركىيا رەتيدەكانەۋە يارمەتى داعش بدات، ۋەك رۇژنامەگىر جەنگىز دەلەت: "لەسەرەتادا لە گەل ۋلاتانى خۆرئاۋا و چەند ۋلاتىكى عەربى و دواتر وئراى بەئاگاھىنانەۋەى تۈركىيا بەردەۋامە لە يارمەتيدانى داعش."

سۈربىي بۇ سەركردەكانى تۈركىيا بۆتە زەلەكاۋىك، ئەسەد ھېشتا لە دەسەلاتدايە و كيانە كوردىكەش گەشە دەكات و بەھىزتر دەپىت. لە ۋەلامى ئەم واقىعەدا سەركردەكانى تۈركىيا ھارىكارى رادىكالترىن و دېرەندەترىن گروپەكانى ۋەك داعش دەكەن. ئەم پىشتىگىرىكردنە بەرەى دۈمەى لە عىراق كوردۈتەۋە كە ئەمىش بەدەۋرى خۇى پىكدادانى دو عملاقى خۆرەلاتى ناۋەراستى نىزىك كوردۈتەۋە (تۈركىيا و ئىران).

رىكخراۋىكى خىرخوازى لە ئەستەنبۇل HISADER : لۇگۈى داعش بەكاردەھىننىت

سەرباۋە:

The Washington Times

AKS.12

<http://sbei.com/Detail.aspx?id=35278&LinkID=60>

كوردەكان شايستەى سەربەخۋىين

دەپد ئەندىلمان

لەئىنگىلىز يەۋە: مەلا فرمان

2014/09/17

سەۋك ئۇباما، لەگۈتارىكدا چاۋچىۋەى پلانى ستراتىجىيە لەسەرخۆكەى بۇ ئېستى بەرامبەر داعش ئاشكرا كرد. بەلام پىدەچىت ئەم پلانى زۆر وردەكارى و بىرۈكەى نوئى دىكە لەخۇ بگىرىت. ھەۋلەدان بۇ مانەۋەى عىراق بەيەكگرتۋى بە پىشتىۋانى مەشكردن و دەست لەپىشتەدانى دەرەكى و فشارى دىپلۇماسى لەزۈمەۋە تاقىكرۈۋەتەۋە شەكستىيەنناۋە. بۇيە كاتى ۋەرچەرخانىك ھاتۈە لەمبارەۋە. ئەم ۋەرچەرخانىك گەلەكى بە ھىز و نازاى ۋەك كوردى دەۋى، چۈنكە خاۋەن سوپايەكى (پىشەمەرگە) چاۋنەترەن، باشتىن ھىز و دوا ھىۋان بۇ تۈندىكردنى تەۋقى مى ئىسلامىيە تاۋانكارەكان. جگە لەمەش، پىشەمەرگە پىۋستى بە مەشق و رىنمايىكردن نىيە، ئەۋەى تەنھا پىشەمەرگە پىۋىستىيەتى كەرسەتى سەربازى و دلىنابونە لەدۋارۋژىك دروستىۋى كوردستانى سەربەخۇى لىيەكەۋىتەۋە. ئەگەر ئەمەرىكا و رۇژناۋا ئەم راستىيە لەبەرچاۋ نەگرن، دەبى چاۋەروانى دۆرانى پىشۈمخت بەكەن لەم شەرە. راستە

حکومەتییکی نوێ پشتیوانی ئەو سوپا بەستەزمانەیی عێراق دەکات، بەلام ئەمە حکومەتییکی لەرزۆکە، توانای پیشەرووی نێه دژ بە دەولەتی ئیسلامی. دەولەتیک ناوچەکە سالاڤتییکی زۆر توشی گێژمەنگ و تەنگەشەیی درێژخایەن دەکات و لەهەمو ناوچەکە بلأو دەبێتەوه، پاشان بە خێراییککی زۆریش دەگاتە کەناری دەریاکانمان.

## هۆکارە نادروستەکان

بەفەرەمی ئوباما فەرمانی دەستبەکاربونی هیزی ئاسمانی دەرکرد بۆ دورخستەوهی داعش لەبەنداری موسڵ، لەهەمان کاتیشدا ئەم هێرشە توانی کەمایەتیە ئابینیەکانی عێراق و هەولێری پایتەختی کورد بپارێزێت. هەمو ئەمانەش هۆکاری زۆر باشن بۆ بەشداریکردن و دەستخستە ناو بارودۆخەکە. بەلام لەراستیدا دەبو هۆکارە دروست و بنەرەتیەکە بۆ چۆنە ناوێ بەشداریکردن، پشتیوانیکردنی راشکاوێکی کورد بێت بۆ سەر بەخۆیی ئەک هۆکاری تر، هەر دەستپێشخەریەکی لەمبارەوه بەناوی کوردەوه بکرایا دەبو هۆی زوتر گەیشتن بە مەستەکانمان. سالاڤتیکە بۆ مانەوهی گەلیکی لەمەکترازاوی وەک عێراق بەیەکگرتویی هەزاران قوربانی دراوه، ئەو عێراقەیی جگە لەچەند کوردیک، کورد ئینتیمای بۆ نیو زحمەتیشە گیانی خۆیان بۆ بەخت بکەن.

کورد هەمیشە ئامادەیی گیان بەخشینە بۆ سەر بەخۆیی، نزیکەیی سەدەیک لەمەوبەر ئەو دەرڤەتی بۆیان رەخسا لەکۆتایی جەنگی جیهانی یەکم لەپەیمانی ڤیرسای (١) لەدەستیان دەر هیندرا: دواي هەلۆشاندنەوه و سەر لەنوێ نەخشەکێشانەوهی ئیمپراتۆریەتی عوسمانی بۆ چەند ولاتیکی وەک: عێراق، سوریا، لوبنان، ئوردن و کوردەوهی کەلێنیک بۆ ئیسرائیل، کوردستانیش فەرمانۆشکراو گەلیکی ٣٠ - ٤٠ ملیۆن کەسی وەک کورد، خاوەن یەک رەگەز و ئابین و کەلتۆری هاوشێوەی لەیەکچو بەسەر چەند ولاتیکدا دابەشکرا.

ئەمڕۆ، کورد تێدەگا چی پێویستە بۆ بونیادنانی کێانیکی زیندو، کە توانای مانەوهی بەرگری لەخۆکردنی هەبێت. لەروێ دەسەڵاتدار پێیەوه کورد توانا و مافی تەواوی هەیه هاوشێوەی ئیسرائیل لەناو موسولمانانی رۆژەهەلاتی ناوێراست دەرکەوێ. چۆنکە بونی نەوتییکی زۆر و چینیکی بازارگانی زیندو دەستەبەری نەمایەکی ئابوری پتەو دەکات، بۆیه لەم بوارەدا کورد پێویستی بە دەستیانکردنەوه لەکەس نیه.

## دیموکراسی ئیسلامی راستەقینە

وا دابنێ سیستمەییکی دیموکراتی ئیسلامی راستەقینە هاوشێوەی ئەو دیموکراتیەیی ئیمە لەعێراق دەمانهوی و بێسود ژیاوی زۆریک لەئەمەریکیان بۆ دانا، لەناوچەرگەیی رۆژەهەلاتی ناوێراستدا قابیلی ھاتنە بوئە. وێنای ئەم سیستمە ئیستای ریک لەبەر دەمانەوهی گەییو، بەی مەرچەیی واز لەخەیاڵی عێراقی بەکگرتو و دیموکرات بەیین، لەحییدا پشێبەستن بەستایی ئیسرائیلی "مافی گەرانەوه" (٢) بۆ کوردەکان دابین بکریت، کوردەکان بێ ئەوهی بەقەد پارچەییکی بچوک لەخاکێ ئەو ولاتانە بێن کە ملیۆنەها لەبرا ئابینیەکانیان تێیدا دەژین، دەبنە میلەتییکی ئازاد و زیندوی پرجۆلە، ئەو سیستمە دیموکراتیەش دەستە بەر دەبێت.

کوردەکان لەبەکوری سوریاو لەعێراق لەو شوێنەیی داعشی لێیو لەو ناوچە فراوانەیی پێویست دەکات، هیزیان هەیه. کوردەکانی سوریا توانا زیندویتی باشیان تێدایە لەیەک کاتدا بەرەرمەکانی رژیی ئەسەد و داعش دەکەن. کوردەکانی تورکیاش بە هەمان شێوه هاوپیەمانمان ئەگەر تورکیای هاوپیەمانمان لەناو هاوکاریان بێت، لەبەرچی نەکریت؟ خۆ ئەوان بەشیکن لەو ولاتە. لەنیوان مەلاکانی تاران و کوردەکانی ئێرانیش جۆریک لەخۆشەویستی هەیه هەردولایان بەهەر نرخیکی بێت ئامادەن بۆ لێدانی داعشە سونەکان.

بۆیه ئەمەریکا پێویستە بە تەواوی لەبواوی سەربازی و دیپلۆماسیەوه یارمەتی کورد بدات بۆ گەیشتن بەی ئامانجەیی کە شایانیانە و زۆریکیان گیانیان لەپێناودا بەخت کردو.

بە دور ناز اندرېت بەھۇى ئەم ستراتيجهى ئۇماباۋە دژ بە داعش ھەم ھەلەى سەدەىھەى رابردو راست بکرىتەۋە، ھەم دەرڧەتتەىش پرمەخسەت بۆ سەركەۋتتى كوردەكان.

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۱- پەيمانى ڧىرساى يەك بو لەو پېنج پەيمانىەى (۱-ڧىرساى، ۲- سانت گېرمەين - ۳- نيولاى ۴- تريانون ۵- سىڧەر ) دەربارەى شەرى جېھانى يەكەم بەسترا لەئىوان ئەلمانىاو ھاۋىپەيمانان. لەچەند مادەىھەى پەيمانى سىڧەردا پرسى كورد باسكراۋە، لەپەيمانى لوزان ھەمو ئەو بەلئىنانەى لەسىڧەر بە كورد درابون پېشلىكران. لە ۱۹۱۸/۱/۸ سەرۆكى ئەمەرىكا ویدرو وىلسون پاکیجىكى ۱۴ خالى بۆ كۇتايپھېنان بەشەرى جېھانى يەكەم لەكۇنگرىسى ئەمەرىكى خويئەۋە، لەخالى ۱۲ باس لەدىارىكردى مافى سەربەخۇبى ھەمو ئەو نەتەۋانە دەكات كە تورک نين و لەژىر كۇنترۇلى توركدان، كورد يەكەك بو لەو نەتەۋانە. (ۋەرگېر)

## ۲ - مافى گەرانەۋە "right to return"

ئەم چەمكە ئامازەىە بۆ سەرتاكانى ياساى نئودەۋلەتى لەئىو جارنامەى جېھانى مافەكانى مەرۆڧ و پەيمانى نئونەتەۋەبى بۆ مافەكانى مەدەنى و سىياسى، تئىيدا مافى گەرانەۋە و ھاتنەۋە بۆ ۋلاتى دايك دابىن دەكات. (ۋەرگېر).

سەرچاۋە: يو ئىس تودەى

AKS.13

<http://sbei.com/Detail.aspx?id=34481&LinkID=60>

كورد و ئەمەرىكا

جەى نئوتون سەۋل

لەئىنگلىز يەۋە: مەلا فرمان

2014/08/24

جەى نئوتون دەنوسىت "لەگەل ئەۋەى كوردەكان لەعئراق بەخىر ھاتنى ھاۋكارى ئەمەرىكا دەكەن، بەلام مېژوى ناپاكيش لەياد ناكەن."

كورتەپەك لە مېژوى پەيۋەندىەكانى كورد / ئەمەرىكا

گويىر نيو سەعات لەپايتەختى كوردانەۋە دورە، كاتى ھەۋالى گرتتى ئەم شارە لەلایەن داعشەۋە بۆۋەۋە، شارى ھەۋلىر بۆ چەند سەعاتىك شەۋا. خەللىكى زور كەۋتتە خويچانەۋە ھەۋلى زو دەر باز بونياندا چ لەرىگەى فرۆكەۋە بىت يان بە ئۆتەمبىل بەرەمە توركىا. بەلام دەستبەكار بونى فرۆكە جەنگىەكانى ئەمەرىكا و بەلئىدانى سەرۆك ئوباما بۆ داکۆكىكردن لەھەۋلىر بارودۆخەكەى ھىور كردهۋە.

بەمەش كوردەكان ھەناسەپەکی قولى پشودانیان دايمو. لەمبارەو ھۆشيار زيبارى وەزيرى دەروەى پيشوى عيراق دەلەيت "گرنگترین پيشكەوتن بربارمەى ئەمەريکايە کە بۆ پاراستنى ژيان، دايان". ھەروەھا دکتور فواد حوسين، بەرپرسي مەکتەبى مەسعود بارزاني، ھاوکارىەکانى ئەمەريکا، بربارەکانى نەتمو ەگرتوکان دژى داعش، ھاوکارىە مەزبى و تەکنیکەکانى ھاوپەيمانى بەرز نرخاند. پشتيوانىە سەربازىەکانى ئەمەريکاش بۆ پيشمەرگە ئەوەى سەلماند کە لەمەودا کورد بە تەنها چياکان دۆست و پشتيوانىان نە.

دەوترەيت، زۆرىک لەموردەكان مەترسى ئەوهميان ھەيە جارىکى تر وىلايەتە ەگرتوکانى ئەمەريکا ناپاکيان لەگەڵ بکات و پشتيان تيبکات. قويل لۆرانس، نوسەرى کتیبى مەلەتیکى نادیدەگىراو، پرسى دەولەتى کوردی چ فۆرمیکى داوہ بە عيراق و رۆژھەلاتى ناوہراست، دەلەيت " کورد و ئەمەريکا مێژوویەکیان لەپەيوەندى و پشت لیکردن پیکەو ھەيە، ئەمەريکا یارمەتى کوردانى داوہ، بەلام ھىچ کات وەک پيوست پشتيوانى تەواى نەکردو و دۆستى راستەقینەى نەبو". بەلام فرياکەوتنى ئەم جارەى ئەمەريکا و ناردنى فڕۆکە جەنگیەکان تارادەيەک متمانەى کورد بە ئەمەريکا دەگەرنننەو.

لەکوئابى و دواجار، نزیکەى سەدەيەکى خاياند تا ئەمەريکا ھەمو لایەن و ئەگەرەکانى تری لەعيراق تاقیکردوہ، گەيشتە ئەو بڕوايەى متمانە بە کورد بکات.

نزیکەى ۱۰۰ سأل لەمەوبەر سەرۆکى ياخيبيوى کورد شەيخ محمود بەرزنجى ھەميشە وینەيەک لە پاکچە ۱۴ خالەکەى وودرۆ ويلسۆنى (۱) لەگىرفاندا بو، شەيخ لەلایەن ئەمەريکايەکانەو بەھۆى ئەو نوسراوہو کەلکەلەى مافى چارەى خۆنوسىنى لا پەيدا بو. کەچى لەوکاتەو تا ئیستا ھەر کاتى ھەلکى و بۆ کورد رەخسايەت ئەمەريکا کوردی پشتگوختوہ. دو سأل دواى وتارەکەى ويلسۆن ھاوپەيمانان لەپەيمانى سەفەر رەزامەندبون لەسەر دامەزراندنى دەولەتى سەربەخۆى کوردستان. بەلام لە ۱۹۲۳ لەپەيمانى لۆزاندا دان بە تورکياى کەمال ئەتاتۆرکدا نراو کۆمەلگەى نيو دەولەتى پشتى لەکورد کرد و ھەر ريفراندمەى لەسەفەر بەلننپان دابو نەبو بە راستى. لێرەو خەباتى کورد بۆ سەربەخۆيى دەستى پیکرد.

دواى چەندین ھەولەدانى بپھودە بۆ جياونەو لەعيراق، بە ھاوکارى شای ئێران کوردەكان لە سەرەتای حەفتاکان ەکەم ھاوکارى ناراستەخۆى لەئەمەريکا وەرگرت. لە ۱۹۷۲ دواى بەستنى ھاوپەيمانى عيراق و ەکەيتى سۆفەيت، شای ئێران فشارى خستە سەر ئەمەريکا بۆ چەکارکردنى کوردەكان بە فڕۆشتنى ئەو چەکە روسیانەى لەمیسەر دەستى بەسەردا گىرابو. لە ۱۹۷۴ بە سەرکردایەتى مەلا مستەفای بارزان (بارزانى دەگەرتەو سەر بنەمالەى بەرزنجى) ۲ کورد لەشەریکى کراوہ و گەورەدا بو. بەلام لە ۱۹۷۵ لەئەنجامى ریککەوتنى جەزائىرى نێوان ئێران و ئێراق، ئێران ھەمو ھاوکارىەکى وستاند، بەمەش شۆرشى کورد شکستى ھینا. بارزانیى ئاوارەى ئێران بو، پاشان چوہ ئەمەريکاو لە ۱۹۷۹ ھەر لەوئ کۆچى دوايى کرد، لەھەمان سألدا شۆرشى ئێرانیش بەرپا بو، جارىکى تر ئەمەريکا بۆچونەکانى گۆرا و، ئەم جارەش کورد بو بە قوربانى بيمەبەست.

لەسەر و بەندى کوئابى شەپرى کەنداوى ەکەم کورد تروسکايەکى بۆ سەربەخۆيى بەدیکرد، بە پشتيوانى ئەمەريکا بۆ سێھەم جار دژى حوسين (سەدام حوسين) راپەرى. حوسين ھێرشى کردە سەر کورد و دەیان ھزار گوندنشینی کوشت، زياتر لە 1.5 ەک ملیۆن و نيو کورد لەشاخەکانەو گەيشتە تورکيا. ئەمەريکا جگە لەھاوکارى ئاسمانى، سوپا و سەربازانى نەجولاند. بەو پشتيوانىە ئاسمانیە کورد توانى سوپای سەدام حوسين تا کەرکوک ناچار بکات بکشیتەو. بۆ پاراستنى کوردەكان بربارى ناوچەى دژە فڕین درا، ئەم بربارە نزیکەى ەک دەيەى خاياند: تا شەپرى کەنداوى دوم بەردەوام بو.

له ۲۰۰۳ کاتنی تورکیا ریځای به سوپای ئهممیریکا نهدا لمتورکیاوه هئرش بکهنه سمر عیراق، کوردهکان ئامادهیی هاوکاری تمواویان دهربری، شانبهشانی هیزه تاییهتهکانی ئهممیریکا جهنگیرین. لیرموه کورد جاریکی تر پنیوابو روژی سمر بهخوی نزیك دهبیتهوه. بهلام هیندهی پینهچو، کوردهکان توشی سمر سورمان بون کاتنی ئهممیریکا ههولی چهکدامالینی کوردی داو داوای لیکردن بهشداری لهحکومتی نوی عیراق بکهن. زور به دو دلیموه ئهمهیان کرد، بهلام کورد به هیچ شیومیهک چاوهروانی سهرۆک وهزیریکی و مک نوری مالیکی نهدهکرد.

مالیکی چهند جاریک یهک لههواي یهک رایگمیانده که کورد مافی خاومنداریتی ههلهکهندی بیری نهوت و نارنده دهرموهیان نیه، چونکه لیرموه بههیز دهن و کوتایی بهم عیراقهی ئیستا دینن. لهکوتایی ۲۰۱۱ نزیکهی ۶۰ شهست ههزار پيشمهگرگی کورد و سوپای عیراق نزیك بیره نهوتهکانی کهرکوک له روبهروبو نهوهی یهکتر نزیك بونهوه. له ۲۰۱۳ فهلوجه کهوته دهست سونه توندرومهکان و پاشان لههوايینی ۲۰۱۴ موسل و تکریتیش کهوته دهست داعش. سوپای عیراق بهره و بهغدا پاشهکشهی کرد. کوردهکان کونترۆلی تهوای کهرکوک و پالوگمکهی کرد.

لهسهرمهتاوه، رهکردنهوهی هاوکاری سمربازی کورد لهلایهن ئهممیریکاو، رازینهبونی عیراق لهسهر دابهشکردنی چهکی ئهممیریکی بهسهر پيشمهگرگه، هاوکاری لاوازی هیزی پيشمهگرگه بو که نهتوانی لهبهرمیهکی ۶۰۰ میلیدا داکۆکی بکات. دوری داعشیش به ۳۰ سی خولهک له ههولیرموه بوه هوئی شلهژانی کورد و بیانیهکان و خو ئامادهکردن بو ههلاتن لهریگهی فرۆکهخانهوه بیت یان به تۆتومبیل بو تورکیا.

ههفتهی رابردو ئهممیریکا کهوته کار و بۆردومانی داعشی کرد، سهرۆک ئوباما بهلینی پاراستنی ههولیری دا. بو یهکههم جاریشه ئهممیریکا راستهوخو یارمندی سمربازی هیزی کورد بکات. راسته ئهم ههنگاوه پشتیوانی بریاردانی چارمنوس ناگیهینی - بهلام سهرمهتایهکه.

۱- له ۱۹۱۸/۱/۸ سهرۆکی ئهممیریکا ودرۆ ویلسونی پاکنجیکی ۱۴ خالی بو کوتایههینان به شهری جیهانی یهکههم لهکونگرێسی ئهممیریکی خویندهوه، لهخالی ۱۲ باس له دیاریکردنی مافی سمر بهخوی ههمو ئهو نهتموانه دهکات که تورک نین و لهژیر کونترۆلی تورکدان (وهرگیر).

۲- زانیاریهکی ههلهیه، هیچ پهیمهندیهکی خزماتی لهنیوان مهلا مستهفای بارزان و شیخی نهمردا نیهو لهیهک عهشیرهتیش نین، تهناست سمر به دو قوتابخانهی نایینی و مک قادری و نهقشهبندی جیاوازن (وهرگیر)

سهرچاوه: تایم

AKS.14

<http://sbei.com/Detail.aspx?id=34326&LinkId=60>

ههلیکۆپتەر مکهی چپای شهنغال

ئهلیسا جهی روبین

لهئینگلیزیهوه: مهلا فرمان

2014/08/19

خاتو نەلیسا جەي روبن، پەيامنیری دیرینی دەرەوی رۆژنامەي نیویۆرک تایمز، رۆژی سیشەمە لەو ھەلیکۆپتەرەي چپای شەنگال بریندار بوو. پاشان گۆنراوەتەرە بۆ ئەستەنبول و لەسەر تەختی نەخۆشخانە ئەم بابەتەي نوسیو. ئەگەرچی رانی شکاومو سەری درزی بردو، بەلام تەندروستی جیگیرمو باشە. ئیستاش بە نیازی گواستەمەي بۆ ئەمەریکا.

ئەستەنبول - ئەگەر کارمساتی ئەو ھەلیکۆپتەرە روی ئەدایا، ناخۆ دەبو چیم بنوسیایا دەربارەي بارودۆخی ئیزیدیەکان؟

پنموايە، بەو چپایە دەستم پێدەکرد کە ھەمو کەس دەربارەي دەدۆ، چپایەکە لەسەروی توانای باسکردنی مەرفەوہیە، شوینیکی زۆر پیرۆزە لای ئیزیدیەکان. ئەمانە وەک پەناگەیک بۆ دەرەزبون لەچنگی تیرۆری دەولەتی ئیسلامی لەعێراق و سوریا رویانکردە ئەو چپایە. چپایەک نزیکی پێنج ھزار مەتر بەرزو، ٦٠ میل درێژ.

پاشان دەربارەي فرۆکەوان جەنەرال ماجد ئەحمەد سەعدی (فرۆکەوانیکی دیرینی عەرەبە و ھاوکاری دەرەزبونی کوردە ئیزیدیەکانی دەکرد) دەمنوسی.

بۆ ئەوہی بچینە سەر چپای شەنگال، لەگەڵ وینەگرەکەمان ئادەم فەرگوسن و پەرلەمانتاری ئیزیدی قیان دەخیل بە درێژایی ئەو رۆژە لەبنکەي سوپای کوردەکان لەفیشخابور چاومروانی ھەلیکۆپتەرمان دەکرد، قیان ئەو پەرلەمانتاریە کە لە ٨/٥ بە قەسەکانی لەپەرلەمانی عێراق دلی ھەمو لایەکی ھەژاند. لەگەڵ ئەوہی پێلاوی پاژنەبەرز ی لەپێ بو، بەلام زۆر گورجوگۆل و زۆر بەورە و بە پەروش بو بۆ مەلەتەکەي.

فرۆکەکە ھات، زیاد لەتوانای خۆی ئیزیدی تێدا بو، جەنەرال ماجد لەفرۆکەکەي دابەزی. رۆژنامەنوسیکی تەلەفزیۆنی بەریتانی پێی گوت "بۆچی بە بارکردنی باری زیاد لەھەلیکۆپتەرە کە خۆت دەخەیتە مەترسیەو؟"

ماجد گوتی "ژمارەي نەفەرەکان و کیشم کۆنتڕۆل کردو، ئەو بارە دەتوانیت."

لەسەعات ٣:٤٥ پاشنیوێرۆ، ھیندەي رۆژ نەمابو، سواری ھەلیکۆپتەرەکە بوین، لەسەر ئەو تەنھا کورسیە کە لەپشتی دەرگاوانە چەکدارەکە بو دانیشتم، کورسیەکە پشێنی سەلامەتی نەبو، ئەم جۆرە فەریە ھەرگیز لەسوپای ئەمەریکیدا رێگەي پێنادری. فرۆکەکە پێ بو لەنان بۆ ئاوارەکان و تەقەمەنی بۆ پێشمەرگەکانی سەر شاخ.

دیاربو کارمساتی ئیزیدیەکان زۆر کاریگەریان کردبو سەر فرۆکەوانەکە: تۆ ئەزانی، ئیستا ھەستی ئیزیدیەکان چۆنە بەرامبەر ئەو خیانت و ناپاکیی ئەو عەرەبانە لێیان کردون کە چەندین سالا دراوسینیان. زۆر لەو کردموە قیزمون و درندانەي لەلایەن ئەو عەرەبانەو کراون نەک لەلایەن چەکدارەکانی داغشەو.

جەنەرال ماجدیش، فرۆکەوانیکی عەرەبی عێراقیە، بروانامەي فرۆکەوانی ھیزی ئاسمانی عێراقی ھەيە- لێرەي بۆ یارمەتیدانی ئەم خەڵکە... ئەو پێی گوتم، لەژیانی ٣٥ سالەي فرۆکەوانیمدا نەم کارە بە دیارترین و پیرۆزترین ئەک دەزانم. دیاربو دیمەنی منالی ئیزیدیەکان زۆر کاری تێکردبو.



خواردن پټويست ترين كمرستهو بگاته سمر چيا، زور شوين ئو كيسه خواردنانه پينهگيشنبو كه لهفروكهوه دمخرانه خوارموه. بويه ئو خواردنانه لهلاپن بمرپرسه كوردهكانهوه دمبردان زور گرنگ بون و دهگيشنبه ئو شوينانه.

كاتي نزيك سمر چيا كهوتينهوه، خهلكهكه همو كوينهوه. دپته بيرم، دايكېك كورمكه لسمر دهستېك و كچهكه لسمر دهستېكي تر هملگرتبو، همولي ئدا راست و قيت بومستيت و بپته سمرهوه، تا بگاته ناو فروكهكه. سيماي دموچاوي پيرمژنيك هينده شياوي و خهمباري لني نيشنبو، كاريگهري زور گهوهري كرده سمر هستم.

كاتي هملېكوپتيرهكه نيشتهوه، لهنزيكهوه، منالم دهپيني، دمرسا، دهگريان، لمبر كاريگهري گهرمي همتاو دموچاويان هملقرا بو، همدئ لمپيرمگان پنيان پتي بو، لمبر زور روښتن قاچيان ئاوسابو. ژنيك قاچي وا ئاوسابو به چمند پياويك لهناو بهتانيك بهچوار دهسته همليان گرتبو. همو ئيانويست زو سوازي كوپتيره ببن و لهچياكه رزگاريان بيت، دلنيام زوربهيان تانيستا ناوا لهنزيكهوه كوپتيريان نمپينهوه.

قمر مبالغي و پهلهمردني خهلك بو چونه ناو فروكهكه، وايگرد كه زياد لمباري خوي خهلك سوار بيت، بهو رادهيهي دهرگاي پشتهوه باش دانمخريت، قمر مبالغيكه به جورئ بو، ئو ژنه لاوازه دو مندالمكه بهدهستهوه بو لهفروكهكه رايانكيشايه خوارموه دهستيانكرد به گريان. تپيبنم دمكرد ئم رهوشه به تهاوي كاري كردبوه سمر فروكهوانهكه.

لهكاتي هستاندا بينيمان فروكهكه رويكرده لاي ديوه ليژمكه شاخهكه، رومو پيشهوه لار بوهوه.

هستم كرد فروكهكه بمر شتيك كموت، پاشان همدنيك كس پنيان گوتم لمبردنيكي گهوهري داوه.

پاشان يهكيني تر پني گوتم كه فروكهواني ياريدهدر بو ئهوهي فروكهكه گر نهمگريت و نهمقپتهوه، لهو كاتهي كونتروليان لهدستداوه مۆتورمكه كوژاندوتهوه.

كاتي بمرمو خوارموه چوين، پيم وابو لسمر چيايهكمين و همو شتيك باشه، فروكهكه زور بهسمر زمويدا خشا بهر لهوهي بومستيت. شتومهكي زور بهسمرمدا كهوتن، كه بينيم خاتو دمخيل بهسمرمدا كهوتوه. من نهمتواني بهپي بروم، ئادم مني دهركرده دمرهوه، به مليچكهكي سمرمي پيچا.

پيش دونيا تاريك بون هملېكوپتيريكي فرياكهوتن گهشت. چمند كهسنيك منيان هملگرت و خستميانه ناو فروكهكهوه، لمبرنموي به نهشارمزي همليان گرتم نازارم زور بو، گويم لهناهي خوم و نالهي ئهواني تر دهبو. نازارم يهكجار زور بو، بهلام پيم وابو مادام زيندوم زورم باشم.

فروكهوانهكه چونه؟ ئو نهمهي كرد؟ ئو دميويست يارمهتي بدات.

نزیكەى ۲۵ ئۆزىدى، پېنج لە تاقىمى فرۆكەكە، پېنج سىياسەتمەدارى كورد، چوار رۆژنامەنوسى رۆژئاواىى لەنئو ھەلىكۆتەمەرىكى گواستەنەوى روسى جۆرى مى- ۱۷ بوين، ھەمو برينداربون. ھىچيان ھەك خاتو روبين و دەخيل ھىلاك نەبون. ھەردوكيان بە مەبەستى چارەسەر گواستەنەوى بۆ نەستەنبول.

جەنەرال ماجد تەنھا كەس بو لەمى روداو ھەگيانى لەدەستدا.

وەرگێریش دەلێت "سلاو لە گيانى پېرۆرت و لەكارە مەرۆف دۆستانەكەت، ھىواى چاكبۆنەموش بۆ بريندارمەكان دەخوام."

سەرچاوە: نيوپۆرك تايمز

## AKS.15

<http://sbeiy.com/Detail.aspx?id=39066&LinkID=60>

فرۆيد و رۆژەلەتە ناوەراست

تۆماس فریدمان

لەئینگلیزییە: مەلا فرمان

ئەبوزەبى، ئیماراتى عەرەبى يەكگرتو "ئێرە ئەوەى سىياسىيەكان بە نەهێنى و دو بە دو دەیانەوئ پێت بۆن ھىچ گەنگىيەكى نە" ئەمە يەكەكە لەگەنگەرىن ئەو ياساينەى پێويستە پێشومخت بيزانى كاتى بتموئ ھەست لە رۆژەلەتە ناوەراست بەگريت و لێى تێگەى. بەلام لەم قسەنەى بە زمانى خۆيان و لەناو خەلكدا دەيەن دەتواندريت خويندەنە بۆ ناسينى رەفتار و ھەلسوكەوتى ئەم سىياسايانە بەگريت. ھەروەك چۆن سەرۆك ئۆباما بۆ تێكشاندنى داعش باس لەناو دنى پەسپۆرى ئەمەريكى دەكات بۆ عێراق، ئێمەش بە بايەخمەو گۆئ بۆ قسەكانى ئەو ياريكەرە گەنگانە دەگريەن كە بەزمانى خۆيان لەسەر يەك دەپۆلن و ھەريەكەش لەبۆچونى خۆيەو.

لەمبارەو، پەیمانگای رۆژەلەتە ناوەراست بۆ دىراساتى مېديا (مېمىرى)، لەم ماوەیە ھەندى لەقسەكانى موحەمەد سەدىق حوسەینی راویژكارى پێشوى سەرۆكى ئێران موحەمەد خاتەمى بەلاوكردەو كە لە چاوپێكەوتنێكدا لەگەڵ تەلەفیزیۆنى مەيادين لە ۲۰۱۴/۹/۲۴ گوتیوى. لەم بەرنامەيە ناوبراو بەراشكاوى ئامارە دەكات بە :

ئێران و شیعەى عەرەب

شیعەى ئێران لەرێگەى ھاوپەیمانەكانیەو تەوانیویەتى دەسەلات بەسەر چوار پایتەختى عەرەبدا بەگريت:

-بەيروت لەرێگەى حیزبولاو.

-دیمەشق لەرێگەى رژیمی عەلموئى بەشار ئەسەدەو.

-بەغدا لەرێگەى ئەو حەكۆمەتە شیعەيەى لەدەسەلاتدا.

-سەنعا لەرێگەى حوسەيەكانەو، لەم ماوەیدا تەوانیان چەنە ناو پایتەختى يەمەن و بەسەر سونەكاندا زالبەن.

ئێران و ھاوپەیمانەكانى بە نیازن، وەك حوسەینی دەلێت "ئێمە سولتانه نوپەكانى دەريای ناوەراست و كەنداوین و تەمورى سەرەكى بەرگەرىن، ئێمە لە تەهران، دیمەشق، كەنارى خواروى بەيروت، بەغداو سەنعا نەخشەى نوپى ناوچەكە دەكێشین، ئێمە سولتانه نوپەكانى دەريای سورین". دەربارەى شانیشى سەعۇدىش ئەم راویژكارە پێیوايە "ئەو خێلە نزیكى لەناوچونە."

راستە، ئەم شتانه لاى ئێمە وەك ئەو وایە گوێشمان لێنەبویت، بەلام لاى عەرەبى سونە بايەخى خۆى ھەمو بەجدى گۆي لێدەگرن. بەتایبەتى كاتێك ئەمەريكا و ئێران كۆتایى بە شەرى ساردى ۳۵ سالەى نێوانیان بەینن و ئەمەريكارىگە بە بەرنامە ناستیە ئەمەريكەى ئێران بەدات. ئەم شتانه دەمبە ھاوکارىيەك بۆ رەنگەردەوى ھۆكارى ھەندى لەم روداوانەى رەنگە لاى ھەندى كەس ديار نەبن: لە ۲۰۱۴-۱۱-۳ چەكدارە سونەكان ھەليانكوتايە سەر گوندی (ئەل دملواح) شیعەنشین لەسەویدیو بەھۆیەو ۵ كەس لەشیعەكان كوژران.

ئەردۆگان و خەونى خەلافەت

باشە، ئەگەر باس لەسەرۆك كۆمارى تورکیا، رەجەب تەيب ئەردۆگان بەگريت لەدونیای مۆدێرندا، دەبێت بوتريت "نا، چاوەوانیە"، و ئەم پرسیارە بەگريت:

ئەردۆگان چ ناویكى بۆ ئەو پرده ستراتیجیە تازمیە ھەلیژارد كە لەگەروى بۆسپۆروس دروستكر؟

وەلام: پردى باقوس سولتان سەلیم، سەلیمی ۱ ئەو سولتانه توركە سونەيە بو لە ۱۵۱۴ ئیمراتۆریەتى شیعەى فارسى (سەفەوى) تێكشكاند. لەناوانى ئەم پرده بە ناوى سەلیم كەمەپەتەيە عەلموپیەكانى تورکیا دژى وەستانەو. ئەوان دەزانن ئەم ناو ھەروا لەخۆو نەھاتو. بەپێى ئىسكۆپیدیای بەریتانى

(بریتانیکا)، سەلیم یەكەم سولتانی عوسمانی بو لە (۱۵۱۲-۲۰) قەلمەرەوی ئیمپراتۆرەكەى گەیانە سوریا، سعودیەو میسرو عوسمانیەكانی كرده سەر كردهی جیهانی ئیسلامی، پاشان رویكرده رۆژ هەلات و كۆنترۆلی شیعەى سەفەوی كرد لەئێران، ئەوكات ئێرانیهكان هەر شەهەكەى سیاسى و ئابوولۆجى گەورەبون بۆ سەر عوسمانى سونە موسولمان. سەلیم یەكەم سولتانی عوسمانیش بو كە وەك خەلیفەى ئیسلام و سولتانی عوسمانى خۆى ناساند.

جیگرى سەرۆك كۆمار جۆ بایدن هەلەى نەكرد كاتى توركىای تۆمەتبار كرد بە هاوكاریكردى جیهادیەكان لەچونیان بۆ ناو داعش لەسوریا، ئەمە رێك لەو دەجێت بونی چەند نیشتمەجیهكەى جولهكە لەكەنارى رۆژ ناوا وەك نەوێ هەموو جولهكەى لێبێت، یان خەوبینى هەندى لەئیسلامەكان بە خەلافەتى ئیسلامیەو وەك نەوێ ناوات و خەوێ هەموو سونەكان بێت. هەندى لەچاودێزانى سیاسى توركیا پێیانوايه نەردۆگان خەون بە دامەزراندنى سیستەمى فرە دیموکراتى لەعێراق و سوریا نابینێت، بەلكە خەون بە خەلافەتێكى مۆدێرنەى سوننە مەزھەبەو دەبینێت كە خۆى سەركرایەتى بكات نەك داعش. جگە لەمەش نەردۆگان دراوسێیەكەى وەك داعشى پێ باشترە لەسەر سونەرەكەى نەك كوردستانیكى سەر بەخۆ.

شادی ھەمید لەسەنتەرى بروكینگ بۆ سیاسەتى رۆژ هەلاتى ناوهراسەت، بابەتێكى لەئەنلەنتیک بڵاوكردۆتەو بەناو نیشانی (رەگەكانى بانگەوازی دەولەتى ئیسلامى)، "بیركردنەوێ داعش لەدروستى دەولەتى ئیسلامى زیاتر لەو شۆنەنەو وەرگرتوێ كە زۆرىنەى دانپشتوانەكەى موسولمانن. بەلام رەنگە بەشى لەموسولمانان لەگەڵ ئەو لێكدانەو تێگەشتنە نەمن كە داعش بۆ خەلافەتى ئیسلامى دەبكات و ھەمەتى. بەلام بیرۆكەى خەلافەتێك - كیانێكى سیاسى میژووى كە شەریعەتى ئیسلام و تەقەلیدی ئیسلامى ھوكمى بكات. بەھێزترینیانە.

ھەر لەبارەى بۆچونى عەرمى سونە بەرامبەر بە عوسمانیەكان شارەزا لە رۆژ هەلاتى ناوهراسەت جۆزیف براودە تێبینى كرده كە زۆرىنەى عەرمى سونە لەمیسەر، شام و نیمچە دورگەى عەرمى لەكۆتایى سەدەى ۱۹ بە ئەواوى دژى عوسمانیەكان بونەو بە ھێزێكى داگیركەریان زانیو. بەلام لەسەدەى ۲۰ دا گروپە ئیسلامیە سونەكان بەتایبەتى (نیخوان موسلمین) پێیانوابو دەولەتى خەلافەت وەلامدانەویمەكە بۆ لاوازی ناوچەكە بۆیە بیرۆكەى خەلافەتیان ژياندمو دواجار لەپەیمانى نابینى خۆیاندا دایانرشت.

بە كورتى، لەبیری ھاوپیمانەكانمان لەرۆژ هەلاتى ناوهراسەت دەربارەى شەركردن لەگەڵ داعش ئەومەندە خەون و خەپال و مۆتەكەى دژ بەیەك ھەن ئەگەر فرۆید لێزە بوایا دەستەوستان دەوستان لەناست تێگەشتن و چارەسەر كردن. ئەگەر لەنزیکەو گۆئ لەم خەوانە بگرین ئەوا بێگومان فرە دیموکراتى لەسەر دەوێ لیستەكەدا نیە. بۆیە ئێمە پێویستمان بەیوچە چەند دورگەىكەى لەبار و ئارامى وەك، ئوردن، لوبنان، كوردستان، ئەبوزەبى، دۆبەى، عومان لەشەرى داعش بپاریزین بەو ھېوایەى رۆژێك بێت لەناوچەكە نمونەیان زۆربێت. بەلام من گومانم ھەبە، ئەگەر داعشیش تێكشكێت، ھاوپیمانە دیموكراتەكانمان بە بونی ھەمو ئەو خەونە جۆراوجۆرانە بئوان لەگەڵ ئەو دابەشیونە نوێیەى ھێزەكان لەعێراق و سوریا رێككەون.

سەرچاوە: نیویۆرك تايمز

2014/11/16

AKK.16

<http://knwe.org/Direje.aspx?Cor=4&Besh=Witar&Jimare=12529>

ئەژدیھایان تێدایە! : فارژ مەلا رەھیم 2/3/2012

تۆماس فریدمان

لەسەدەكانى ناوهراسەتدا ئەو ناوچانەى بەمەترسیدار یاخود نەزانراو دەناسران، لەسەر نەخشە نیشانەى ئەژدیھایەکیان لەسەر دادەنا لەگەڵ ئاگادارکردنەوێهەك: «ئاگاداریه، ئەژدیھای تێدایە!». بێگومان بەو شێوەیەش نەخشەدانەران ھەموو خۆرەلاتى ناوهراسەت نیشانە دەكەن.

دواى سەرھەلدانى بەھارى عەرەبى، ماقول بوو بى یروا بوویتایەو لەچاكتىن باریشدا بەئومێد بوویتایە سەبارەت بەدیمەنى ئەم ولاتانە كە گۆرانكارى قورسیان دەكرد لەئۆتۆكراسییەو بۆ دیموكراسى، بەلام لەم دوايەدا ئەگەر بەراستى و دروستى تەماشای ناوچەكە بكەیت، دەیت بەگەیتە ئەو ئەنجامە كە بۆچوون لەسەر گۆران بەرەو دیموكراسى خەریكە تارێك و رەشبین دەیت. ھێشتا كاتى ئەو نەبە ئاومێد بیت، بەلام زووش نەبە بكەوێتە مەراق و دلەراوکیو. خوا دەزانێت كە بەھۆى ئازایەتى و بوێرى گەنجانى عەرەبەو نەبوو، یاخود زۆر لەھاوولانى ئاسایى كە ئەم رابوونە عەرەبیەیان دەستپێكرد، بۆ گەران بەدواى كەرامەت و عدالەت و ئازادیدا، نەخێر، لەبەرئەو بوو كە ئەم ھێزو درۆ و دەلەسەك پاسەوانە كۆنەكان و بیروكە كۆنەكانى ناو ئەم ولاتانە زۆر قوولترە لەوێ كە خەلك دركى پێكەن و لێ تێگەن و كەموكورتى و نەبوونى دەزگای دیموكراتى، تەداسیوون و نمونەكان زۆر زیاتر لەوێ تێگەن. «میشیل ماندلیووم»، پسپۆرى سیاسەتى دەرەكی خۆیەنگە «جۆن ھۆكینز» بۆ دیراساتى پێشكەوتووێ ئێودەولەتى، دەلێت: «مەسەلەىكە ھەبە دەلێت لەناو ھەر پیاویكى قەلەودا پیاویكى لاواز ھەبە كە بەپەرۆشە بێتە دەرەو. ئێمەش لەو پرواىەداين كە لەناو ھەر ئۆتۆكراسییەكدا دیموكراسییەك ھەبە كە بەپەرۆشە بێتە دەرەو و دەرەكەوێت، بەلام رەنگە ئەو لەخۆرەلاتى ناوهراسەتدا راست نەبێت».

ئەو ئەوروپايى خۆرھەلاتدا لە 1989 دا راست بوو، بەلام دوو جياوازىي گەرە لەنۆوان ئەوروپايى خۆرھەلاتو خۆرھەلاتى ناوھراستدا ھەيە. زۆر لەولاتانى خۆرھەلاتى ئەوروپا رابردوويەكى نزيكى ليبراليان ھەبوو پشنتى پى بېستىن - دواى نەمانى كۆمۆنىزمى سۆڧىتى - ھەرۈھە ئەوروپايى خۆرھەلات مۆڧىلىكى ناچارو موگناتىسكى بۆ ديموكراسىيى بازارى ئازاد لەپالدا بوو كە يەكپىتى ئەوروپايە. زۆرىي جىھانى عەرەب و ئىسلام ئەوانەيان نەبوو، بۆيە كاتىك سەرڧايە ئاسنىنەكەى ئۆتۆكراسىيى دەرئازىت، ھەموو بەپشنتدا دەرەون، نەك بۆ ليبرالىزم، بەلكو بۆ ئىسلامگەرایی و تايەفەگەرى و خىلگەرایی ياخود حوكمى سەرپازى.

دەرپىت ئىمە لەيادمان پىت ئەمريكا چەندى پىچو سىستەمە سىياسىيە ليبرالەكەى خۆى دابمەزىنپىت و ئەمروش ئىمەى كر دوو بە چ كەسانىكى نااسايى. چوار سال لەمەوېر ئىمە رەشپىستىكمان ھەلپازد كە ناوى باراك بوو، باپىرى موسلمان بوو، بۆئەوې پىشەنگمان پىت و دەرپازمان بكات لەخراپترىن قەيرانى ئابورى لەسەدەيەكدا. ئىستا ئىمە بىر لەو دەرەينەو بېگۆرىن بە (مۆرمەنىكى) مەسىحى، ئەوھش زۆر ئاسايى ديارە، بەلام ئەو ئاسايىبوونە پتر لە 200 سالو جەنگىكى ناوخۆى تىچو تا گەشەى كرد.

عەرەبەكان و ئەفغانەكان ھىشتا لە 10 سالى يەكەمياندان. دەرپىن كە چۆن لەسوريا رژىم بەپەلە ھەلەكانى ديموكراسى گۆرى بۆ شەرى تايەفى. لەيادتان نەچىت، ئۆپۆزسىۆنى سورياو بزوتنەوېيەكى تەواو ئاشتىخوازو جەماوهرى بۆ گۆرانى ديموكراتىي دەستپىنكر. بەلام بەشار ئەسەد بەكوشتن و ژەھرى تايەفى رووبەرووى بۆو. وېستى مەملەتەكە بخاتە سەر كەمىنە عەلەوييەكەى خۆى دزى زۆرىنە سوننە موسلمانەكان وەك رىگەيەك بۆ سوڧ كردن و لەكەداركردنى ئۆپۆزسىۆن و ھىشتنەوې بىنكەى خۆى. لەجياتى چاكسازى، رژىمەكە كەوتە بەكارھىنانى مېدياكانى بۆ قۆرخكردن و بەكارھىنانى ھەست و سۆزى سورپيەكان. ھەمان جۆر قۆرخكردن ئەفغانىستانىش ھەيە. بەرىكەوت سەرپازە ئەمريكىيەكان چەند قورئانلىكان سووتاند. سەرۆك ئۆباما داواى لىپوردنى كرد. ئەفغانەكان بەدزىايى يەك ھەفتە كەوتنە ئاواھەنەو و كوشتنى ئەمريكىيە پىتاوانەكان. ھىچ ئەفغانىيەك يان سەركرەيەكى ئەفغانى، بەوانەشەو كە ھاوپەيمانمان، نەيانوپرا ھەست و بلىن: «بەستىن، ئەو ھەلەيە». ھەموو ھەفتەيەك لەپاكستان و ئەفغانستان و عىراق خۆكوژە موسلمانەكان موسلمانى دىكە دەرەون، ھىچ جووقەيەكىش ناكىت! كەچى سووتاندنى كىتپە پىرۆزەكان لەلەين ئەمريكىيەكانەو كوشتن و ھەلچوونى لىدەكەوتنەو.

لەمىسر ھەموو رۆژىك ئاشكرا دەرپىت كە سوپا راپەرىنەكەى تەحرىرى بۆ رزگارپوون لەجىگرە دزىخايەنە سەرەكپەكەى - كورە رىڧۆرمخوازەكەى حوسنى موبارەك - جەمال، بەكاردىنپىت. ئىستا كە لەكەرەكەو باوكەكەش رزگاي بوو، سوپا كەوتنە نىشاندانى دەستە راستەقەينەكەى لەرىگەى تاوانباركردنى كارمەندانى ديموكراسىي ئەمريكايى و ئەوروپى و مىسىر، بەتۆمەتى كاركردن لەگەل دەرگا بىانييەكان (سى.ئە.ئە)، ئىسرائىل و لۇبى يەھودى بۆ تىكدان و ناارامكردنى مىسىر، ئەمە تۆمەتەكى ساختەيە، بەلام بۆ مەبەستى لەباربردنى داواكارپەكەى ديموكراتەكانە كە سوپا دەست لەكارەكان بىشپىتەو.

قۇناغى بەھارى عەرەبى-ئىسلامى كۆتايىھات. ئىستا لەقوولايى قۇناغى دزەشۆرش دابىن كە دەستە مردووەكانى رابردو ھەولى خنكاندى ئايندە دەدات. مەن ئامادەم بىر لەھەر بىرۆكەيەك بەمەو كە چۆن ئىمە لەخۆرئاوا يارمەتى ھىزەكانى ديموكراسى و كەرامەت بدەين سەرەكەوتن بەدەست بپىن. بەلام لەدواپىشدا، ئەمە شەرى خۇيانە. دەرپىت خۇيان خاوەنى بىن، مەن ھىوادارم كۆتايى نەپەت - وەك زۆر جار لەولاتى ئەزىھاكندا كۆتايى دپت - توندرەوكان ھەموو شتەكان دەرەندەست و ميانرەوكانىش دەرۆن و ديار نامىن.

لە نيۆيۆرك تاپمە-ئەو وەرگىراو

AKK.17

<http://knwe.org/Direje.aspx?Cor=4&Besh=Witar&Jimare=12100>

AKP، توركچىتى نەك ئىسلامچىتى و: فازل مەلا رەھىم

2012/2/3  
مستەفا ئەمكىول

لەگۆشەنىگاپەكى ليبرالەو، ئەم 10 سالەى پىشوى توركىا خۆشبوو. عەسكەرتارىيى توركىا كە چوار حوكمەتى ھەلپزىرداوى لە1960مە رووخاندو، بەرە بەرە خراپە ئەم پىگەيەى كە دىمپىت تىپىداپىت لەھەر ولاتىكى ديموكراسىدا.

پېشلىكرىنى بېلانى مافەكانى مرقۇف، ومكو ئىشكەنچىمى گوشبارانكرىنى بېمەلمو رەمەكىي، بىرەو نەمان چووه. ئۇ چاكسازىيانەى يەككىتىي ئوروپا ھانئەدات مافەكانى كوردو كرېستيانەكانو ژنانو ھەموو گرووپە كەمىنەكانى فراوان كرووه. لىم چوارچىو مەشدا ئابورىيى توركىا گەشەكرىدوو دەرەقتى كارو خۇشگوزەرانى زۆرتەر بووه.

AKP كە لە 2002 مە لەدەسە لاتىدايە شايانى متمانايە بۇ نەم گۆرانكارىيانە، مايەى سەرسورمان نىيە كە رووناكبىرە لىبرالە توركەكان كە لەمىژە پىشتىگرىيى ئۇ پارتەيان كرووهو لەزووه بانگەشەى چاكسازىيى دىموكراسىيى دەكەن. ھەر لەمەر ئەوشە كەمالىستەكان كە دوژمنى سونىدخۆرى ئۇ پارتەن لىبرالەكانىان بىناپاك و خۇفۇش ناودەرد. لەتوركىا لىبرالىزىم كەمالىزىم بەردەوام دوو ھىلى ناكۆك بوون، كەمالىزىم پىشتىگرىيى دەولەتى دەسەلاتخواز دەكاتو لىبرالىزىم رەخنەى لىدەگرىت.

لەگەل ئەوشدا سالى رابردوو AKP لەچەمكى چاكسازىيى بىتەوايى پاشەكشەكرىد. «كرانەو دىموكراسىيى بىرووى كورددا» كە مايەى ئومىدبوو بۇ چارەسەرى لىبرالىيانە ئاشتىيانەى مەملەتى درىژخايەكەى PKK گۆردرا بەسباسەتى شەرنەگىزى «دژە تىرۆر». چەندىن رۆژنامەنوس بىتەمتەى «پروپاگەندە بۇ تىرۆرىزىم» دەستىگرىكران. چاونەوشىنەكەى ئىردۆگان بۇ رەخنە ھەر بەردەوام بوو، لەگەل چەندىن دۆسىيى سووكايەتىيى كەدژى تەنەنت رۆژنامەنوسى دۆستى خۇشيان كرىدانەوه.

لەمەر ئەمانە، بۆچوونى بىلاو لەناو زۆر لەتوركە لىبرالەكانو تەنەنت ھەندىك لەمخافىزەكارەكانىشدا ئەومىيە كە AKP چىتر پارتىك نىيە ئومىدى چاكسازىيى لىكرىت. لەمىرى ئەوه، ئۇ پارتە رەخنەى ئاراستە دەكرىت بۇ ئۇ سىياسەتە دەسەلاتخوازىيەى كە روو لەھەلەكانەى تەنەنت بۇ دروستكرىنى دامەزراوه دەسەلاتخوازىيەكانى خۇى. مەن ھىچ بىرەوش نىم دەربارەى «توركىايى نوى» و تواناكانى كە بىتە دىموكراسىيەكى لىبرالى راسەتەقىنە.

لەگەل ئەوشدا، بابەتتىكى گرنگ ھەيە كە سەرنجى بەدىن: ھىچ لەم كىشانەى كە ئەمىرۆ لەم پارتەدا بەدىدەكەن لە «ئىسلامگەسرايى» ھە سەرمەلەدات وەك كەمالىستو خۇرئاوايىخوازەكان پىيانوايە، لەرەستىدا كىشە راستەقىنەكە برىتنى نىيە لەئىسلامچىتى، بەلكو لەتوركچىتنىيەكەىدايە. بەواتايەكى دىكە ئۇ كىشانەى لەكلتورىى توركىادا رۆچوون. سەركردەيەكى بالادەست ئاشقوبون بەبىردۆزى پىلانگىرانەوه خولايى شەرف كە ئازادىي رادەربىرەن سنووردادەكاتو چەكى «تىرۆرىزىم» كە تەنەنت بىرۆكەكانىش بەتاوان دادەنئىت. ئەمانە ئۇ گرەفتانەن كە ھۆكۈمەتانى توركىا كەمالىست بووبەن يان راستى-ناوئەند، چەندىن دىيەيە دەبىخەنەروو AKP . سەلمەندىشى كە لەم نەرىتە خراپانەى ئەنقەرە بەدەرنىيە.

پرسىارە گەورەكە ئەومىيە: ئاىا AKP لەم ھاوكىشە نوىيەدا دەچەقتىت، يان ھىندە ژىرىيى دەنۆنئىت كە خۇى نوى بكاتەوهو فرىودانى خۇى بۇ دەسەلاتى بىسنوور جەمگىرەكاتو ئەجىندايى چاكسازىيەكەى زىندوبكاتەوه؟ چاومەروان دەكەين و ھانىشى دەدەين .

لە Hurriet Daily News مە وەرىگىراو

AKK.18

<http://www.pukonline.net/%D9%87%DB%95%D9%88%D8%A7%DA%B5%DB%95%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%86/%D8%B9%DB%8E%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82/tom-friedman-%DA%86%DB%8C-%D9%84%DB%95%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%95%DB%8C-%D8%B9%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%88-%D8%AF-%D9%86%DB%95%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%AF%DB%95%DB%8C%D9%86-%DA%A9%DB%95%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%85-%DB%95/>

Thomas Friedman ۰۰۰ چى لەبارەى عىراق و د.نەجمەدىن كەرىم-ھەو دەلئىت

بەروار: حوزەيران 16, 2014

90: بىنراو

توماس فرىدمان گەورە رۆژنامە نوسى ئەمىرىكى لە يەككە لە نوسىنەكانى كە لە رۆژنامەى New York Times بىلاو بۆتەوه چەندىن زانىارى گرنگ بۇ نەمىرىكىەكان دەمخاتە روو كە لە چەند گەشتىكىدا بۇ عىراق بەدى كروە.

دەقى نوسىنەمەى بە كوردى:

پەرتىبونى عىراق و سوريا ئەمەى بە كۆتا گەياند كە سەپىندىراپو بەسەر رۆژھەلاتى ناومراستدا كە روداويكى زۆر مەزنە و ئىمەش وەك وىلايەتە يەكگرتووەكان دەپ چۆن وەلامى ئەمە بەدەينەمە.

نزيكەى دوو ھەفتە دەپت لە عىراق گەراومەتەمە، پىنج بەنما مەشكىمان سەرقال كەردووە. يەكەمیان بۆ ئەمەى كە لە عىراقدا ئەگوز مەى كە “دوژمەنى دوژمنەكەم دوژمنە” نەك دۆست. جگە لە كورد كەسى ديكە دۆستمان نين لەم ناوچەيدا، نە سەر كەردە سوننەكان و نە شيعەكانىش لەگەل خواست و بەھاكانى ئىمەدا نين. گروپە جىھادىيە سوننى و بەعسى و ھۆزە چەكدارەكان كە پالپىشتى سەندەمەى دەسلەت دەكەن لە حكومەتى عىراقى لە موصل پىشتىگىرى لە عىراقىكى ديموكراسى فرەپى ناكەن، عىراقىك كە ھىچى بۆمان نەھىشتووتەمە تاوكمو يارمەتى پىشتەكەش بكەين. ھەروەھا سەرۆك وەزىرائى شيعەى عىراق (نورى مالىكى) خۆشى تا ئىستا نەپسەلماندووە كە پىشتىوانى عىراقىكى فرەپى بى. لە يەكەم رۆژى دەستبەكاربوونەمە كار بۆ دامەزراندنى شيعەكان دەكات لە پۆستە ئەمەنيە ھەستىارەكان و ەلەلانى سىياسى و خەلكى سوننە و پىشتىگىرى دارايى بۆ دامەزراوە شيعەكان. بۆيە ئەتوانين بلەين مالىكى بە ماناى وشە گەمژە بوو. لەگەل ئەمەشدا بوونى وەكو سەرۆك وەزىران بردى بەرەم بەكار ھىنانى دەستەلاتەكانى وەكو وەزىرى بەرگى و ناوخو و راوژكارى ئەمەنى قەمى بە رەھايى و ھاورىكانىشى دەستيان گرتووە بەسەر بانكى ناومەند و وەزىرى دارايىدا.

مالىكى ئەبوابە يەكەيان ھەلبۇزىرەت، يان ئەمەتا دەسلەلاتىكى تايەفەگەرى جىيەجىيەكان يان ئەمەتا فرەپى قبولىكات، سەرمنجام تايەفەگەرى ھەلبۇزارد و لەمەشدا ھىچى پىشتەكەشى ئىمە نەكردووە تا پاداشتى بەدەينەمە.

دووم بەنما: پرسىارىكى گەرنەك لەلا دروست بوو كە ئەپى لەبەر رۆشناپى بەھارى عەرەبى وەلامەكەى بەدەينەمە. بۆچى باشترين ناوچەكان ئەمانەن كە ئەمەريكا كەمترين دەستى تىوەرەدان، وەك تونس و كوردستان؟

وەلام: باومر ئەكەى يان نا ئەمە ھىچ پەيوەندى بەمەوە نىيە كە ئىمە چى بكەين و ھەلبۇزاردنى ئىمە چىيە. عەرەب و كورد برىكارى خۇيان ھەيە، وە ھۆكارى ئەمەى بۆچى تونس و كوردستان دورگەيەكى بەرقەرار و شىاوپان بەدەستەينەو كەچى دۇنياپى تەواى نىيە، ئەمەى كە ھىزە سىياسىيە دەسلەلاتدارەكانيان لەكۆتايىدا ھەولە جىيەجىيەكەردنى بەنماى (كەس براو و كەس دۆراو نىيە)يان داو.

دوو ھىزە سەرەكەيە رەكەبەمەى كوردستان نەك تەنھا ناكۆكەكانى نىوانيان وەلانا بەلكو رىگاخۆشكەربوون بۆ ھەلبۇزاردنىكى ديموكراسىيە كە لەم دووايانەدا پارتە ئۆپۆزسيۆنەكانى بەرمە ھەلەكەشەنكى خىرا برد و واكەرد كە لايمە ئۆپۆزسيۆنەكانىش كە لەسەر بەنماى دژە گەندەلەى كارپان دەكەرد بۆ يەكەم جار بەشداربوون لە حكومەتدا. وە تونىش دواى كىشەمەكەشەكى ناوخويى و خوينەرزانىكى زۆر رىگەچارەيەكان دۆزىمە تا ھاوسەنگى نىوان تايەفەيەكان و ئىسلامىيەكان رابگەرن و ھاورابن لەسەر پىشتەكەتخاوتەرتين دەستوور لە مەژوى جىھانى عەرەبىدا و تا ئىستاش كارى پىدەكەرى. لەبەر ئەمە پىمەو كە رۆژھەلاتى ناومراست تەنھا ئەركەتە خەندە دەخاتە سەر لىوت كە ئەم خەندە سەرەتا لە خۆيانەمە دەست پىيەكات، ئەمەش ئەپى پىكەمە نەشت بىنەو ئىنجا روونەدات. سوننە و شيعەكان چەكەيان لە ئىمە ناوئەت بەلكو راستىيان لىمان ئەوئەت، ئىستا سەدەى بىستەيەكە و زۆرىكيان ھىشتا شەرى ئەمە ئەكەن كە كى جىنشەينى راستەقەينەى پىغەمبەر مەمەد كە لە سەدەى ھەوتە ژياو. ئەمە ئەپت كۆتايى پى بەپىرەت لەبەخاترى خۇيان و مەدالەكانيان تاوكمو داھاتوويەكان ھەپت.

سەيھەم بەنما: لەوانەپە ئىران و فەرماندەى سويا بەھىزەمەى قودس (قاسم سولەيمان) زۆر زىرەك نەين، چونكە ئەمە ئىران بوو كە عىراقىيە شيعىيە ھاوپەيمەنەكانى پىرچەك ئەكەرد بە بۆمبى تايەت كە بەھۆيە زۆرىك سەربازى ئەمەرىكى گىيانان لەدەستدا و برىنداربوون. خواستى ئىران بوو كە ئىمە لە عىراق برۆين، ئەمە ئىران بوو كە مالىكى دۇنياكەردەمە بەمەى بەھىچ جۆرىك پەيمان لەگەل ھىزەكانى ئەمەريكا مۆرنەكات تاوكمو ھىزەكانمان لە عىراق بەشۆمەيەكى ياساپى بەمىنەمە، ئىران وىستى كە ھىزەمەونى خوى لە ناوچەكەدا دەرەخت. زۆرچاكە سولەيمان، ئەم دەستە گولە با ھەر بۆ ئىو بى، ئىستا ھىزەكانتان بەرفراوانتر كەردووە لە سوريا و لوبنان و عىراق وە ھىزەكانى ئىمەش گەراومە مەلەمە، كەواتە رۆژىكى خۆش بۆ ئىو.

بەلام ھىشتا لەسەرمانە كە پالپىشتى ئەم پەيماننامەى بىن كە رىگەرى لە ئىران دەكات لە بەدەستەينەپانى چەكى ئەتۆمى، كەواتە ئەپى زۆر ناگادار بىن لەمەى چەندەك يارمەتى دوژمنە سوننەكانى ئىران ئەدەين. بەلام بەھۆى ئەم ئابلقانەى لەسەر ئىرانە و ھىزەكانى و ھەروەھا ھىزەبۆللەش لە سوريا و لوبنان و عىراق لە شەردان، كەواتە باشترە بلەين قازانجى ئەمەرىكەيە.

چوارەم: كىشەى سەر كەردايەتەكەردن.

لە عىراق سەردانى كەركوك كەرد، ئەم شارەى كە بۆ ماومەيەكى دورودرێژە كورد و عەرەب و توركمانەكان كىشەيانە لەسەرى. پىنج سأل لەمەمەبەر كە لەمى بووم كە كەركوك پىستەرتين مەيدانى شەرى بوو، بەلام ئەمجارەيان رىگەمەوانى تازەى قىرتا و پاركى نوئ و ئابوورىيەكى گەشەسەندوم بىنى، كە تىايدا پارىزگارنىكى كورد (نەجمەدين عومەر كەرىم) جارىكى ديكە و لە مانگى نىساندا و لە

هه‌لێژاردنێکی دادپەروەرانه‌دا هه‌لێژێردرایه‌وه و کورسی زیاتریشی بده‌ست هه‌نا به‌هۆی ئه‌وه‌ی که جگه‌ له‌ کورد که‌مه‌ نه‌مه‌وه‌کانی وه‌ک عه‌رب و تورکه‌مانه‌کان ده‌نگیان پێدا.

دکتۆر نه‌جمه‌دین که‌ پزیشکی نه‌شته‌رگه‌ری مێشکه‌ و ماوه‌ی ۳۳ ساڵ له‌ ئه‌مریکا کاری کردووه‌ پێش گه‌رانه‌وه‌ی بۆ عێراق له‌ ۲۰۰۹دا، وتی “جه‌ختمان له‌ باشته‌رکردنی رێگه‌بازان و هاتوچۆ و نه‌خۆشخانه‌ و خۆبێدنگه‌مان کردووه‌ته‌وه‌”، وه‌ زیاده‌کردنی کاره‌با له‌ ۴ کاتژمێر له‌ رۆژێکدا بۆ نزیکه‌ی ۲۴ کاتژمێر. هه‌روه‌ها پێی وتم “خه‌ڵکی که‌رکوک بێزاربوون له‌ سیاسه‌ت و به‌گه‌شتی کردنی گه‌رته‌مان و شۆرنه‌بونه‌وه‌ بۆ ورده‌کاری داواکارییه‌کانی خه‌ڵک. ئێمه‌ متمانە و بڕوای عه‌رب و تورکه‌مانه‌کانمان بده‌سته‌پێناه‌وه‌ تاوه‌کو کوردێک پارێزگاریان بێ، ئه‌وان هه‌ست ئه‌که‌ن که‌ ئێمه‌ جیاکاری ناکه‌ین و ئه‌مه‌ بۆ یه‌که‌م جاره‌ که‌ له‌م هه‌لێژاردنه‌دا تورکه‌مان و عه‌رب ده‌نگیان به‌ کورددا.”

له‌م کێشه‌یه‌که‌شێوی دواپیدا کورد کۆنترۆلی سه‌ربازی ته‌واوی که‌رکوکێ کرد، به‌لام ئه‌توانم پێتان بڵێم که‌ ئه‌گه‌ر مالیکی عێراقی به‌و شێوه‌یه‌ به‌ریوه‌بێردایه‌ که‌ دکتۆر نه‌جمه‌دین کردیه‌تی ئه‌وه‌ هه‌رگیز ئه‌و بێسه‌روبه‌ریه‌ی ئێستا دروست نه‌ده‌بوو، که‌واته‌ گه‌ر سه‌رکرده‌یه‌کی باش و شیاو هه‌بێ ئه‌وه‌ خه‌ڵکی ئه‌توانن پێکه‌وه‌ بژین.

کۆتا بنه‌ما ئه‌وه‌یه‌ که‌ له‌ کاتێکدا هه‌یج کام له‌ کاره‌کته‌ره‌ سه‌ره‌کییه‌کانی عێراق جگه‌ له‌ کورد که‌س رێزی به‌هاکانی ئێمه‌ ناگرێت. نایا که‌س هه‌یه‌ بۆ به‌هاکانی ئێمه‌ به‌جنگی تاوه‌کو عێراقی که‌ سه‌قامگیر هه‌بێ که‌ هه‌ر شئه‌ نه‌بێت بۆ سه‌رمان؟ وه‌ ئه‌گه‌ر واقیعه‌نه‌ ته‌ماشایا به‌که‌ین، ئه‌وه‌ کێیه‌ که‌ ئه‌بێ ئێمه‌ یارمه‌تی بده‌ین؟

وه‌لامه‌که‌ هه‌شتا بۆم روون نییه‌ و تاوه‌کو بۆم رۆنده‌بێته‌وه‌ نیگه‌رانییه‌کانم به‌رده‌وام ئه‌بن له‌سه‌ر هه‌ر ده‌ستیه‌ره‌دانێک.

**سه‌رچاوه‌: نیویۆرک تایمز**

نوسینی: تۆماس فریدمان

وه‌رگێڕانی له‌ ئینگلیزیه‌وه‌: دارا کریم محمود / خۆبێدنگاری ماسته‌ری زمان له‌ به‌ریتانی

**تۆماس فریدمان چی له‌باره‌ی عێراق و ده‌نه‌جمه‌دین که‌ریم-ه‌وه‌ ده‌لێت**

**AKK.19**

ترسی تورکیا له‌ به‌هێزبوونی پارتیه‌ کوردیه‌یه‌کانی رۆژئاوای کوردستان

05:57:25/07/2012

کۆبوونه‌وه‌یه‌کی جه‌ماوه‌ریی کورده‌کان له‌ شاری قامیشلۆ له‌ رۆژئاوای کوردستان - فۆتۆ: کۆریبس خه‌ندان-

نیگه‌رانییه‌کی ئاشکرا دیاره‌ به‌ سیاسه‌تی حکومه‌تی ئه‌نقهره‌وه‌ ده‌ربه‌ری زیاده‌بونی کاریگه‌ریی پارتییه‌ی کوردی رۆژئاوای که‌ په‌یوه‌ندی هه‌یه‌ به‌ پارتی کرێکارانی کوردستان که‌ له‌گه‌ڵ ئه‌نقهره‌دا له‌ شه‌ردان و له‌وه‌ ده‌ترسن که‌ ئه‌م بارودۆخه‌ بپێته‌ هۆی زیاتر قورسکردنی چاره‌سه‌ری کێشه‌ی کورد له‌ باکووری کوردستان.

له‌ماوه‌ی 16 مانگی رابردووی خۆپیشاندان و پێکادانه‌کانی دژی به‌شار ئه‌سه‌د، کوردانی رۆژئاوای به‌سه‌لامه‌تترین شێوه‌ پێیدا تێپه‌ریون و ئێستاش له‌و باوه‌رمان که‌ بواریک هه‌یه‌ بۆ بده‌سته‌پێانی سه‌ربه‌خۆیی و ئه‌زموونه‌کردنی ئه‌و سه‌ربه‌خۆیه‌یه‌ که‌ کورده‌کان له‌ هه‌ریه‌می کوردستانی عێراق هه‌یانه‌، ئێستاش وێنه‌کانی ئالای کوردستان و دانانی له‌سه‌ر ده‌زگا حکومه‌تییه‌کان و شه‌کانده‌نه‌وه‌ی له‌لایه‌ن کوردانی رۆژئاوایه‌ بووه‌ته‌ باسێکی گه‌رنگی میدیا تورکیه‌کان و وای له‌ چاودێرانی بارودۆخه‌که‌ کردووه‌ که‌ بڵێن ئه‌گه‌ری دروستبوونی هه‌ریه‌مییه‌ی سه‌ربه‌خۆ له‌ ناوچه‌یه‌دا هه‌یه‌، که‌سایه‌تییه‌کانی پارتیه‌ ئۆپۆزیسیۆنه‌ کورده‌کانی سووریا ده‌لێن، به‌شار ئه‌سه‌د هێزه‌کانی له‌ ناوچه‌کانی خه‌ڵب و خه‌سه‌که‌ که‌شاندووه‌ته‌وه‌

كۆنترۆلى ئۇ ئاۋچانەى بۇ پارتى يەككىتى ديموكراتى(پەيەدە) بەجىيەشتۈۋە، كە ئەمان بە بوونى پەيوەندى لەگەل پارتى كرېكارانى كوردستان نوزەند دەرگىن، ھەر بەپىي ھەۋالەكان شارەكانى كوبانى، عفرىن، دىرك، عاموودە، ئىستا لە ژىر كۆنترۆلى پارتى يەككىتى ديموكراتىدان.

پارتە سورىيە ئۆپۇزسىۋنەكان، پەيەدە بە ھاۋكارىي ھىزەكانى بەشار ئەسەد و ھەروەھا دامركاندەنەۋى خۇپىشاندەنەكانى رۇژئاۋا لە دژى ھەكۆمەتەكەى ئەسەد تۆمەتبار دەكەن، بەتايىبەنىش لە كوشتنى مەشەل تەمۇدا، كە كەسايەنىيەكى ناسراۋى رۇژئاۋاى كوردستان بوو، بەلام پەيەدە ھەموو ئەم ھەۋالانە بە ناراست لەقەلەم دەدات و رەتيدەكانەۋە ھىچ پەيوەندىيەكى بە (پەكەكە)شەۋە ھەبىت.

ھەرچەندە تائىستا بەشۋەيەكى رەسمى بەرپرسانى توركيا ھەلۋىستى خۇيان دەربارەى پەيەدە دەر نەبرىۋە، بەلام بەرپرسىكى ۋەزارەتى دەر مەۋى توركيا راىگەياند، كە داود ئۇغلۇ ۋەزىرى دەر مەۋى توركيا، ئەنجومەنى نىشتەمانى سورىاي لە ئەگەرى شەرى تايغەگەرى و ھەروەھا شەرى ناۋخۇ ئاگادار كوردوۋەتەۋە.

ھەروەھا بەشۋىر ئەتەلەى، جىگىرى سەرۋكى ئەنجومەنى ۋەزىرانى توركيا لە ۋەلامى ئۇ پەرسىيارەى "ئايا ترستان ھەيە لە بەرز كوردنەۋى ئالەى كوردستان ياخۇد راگەياندنى سەربەخۇيى لەم ناۋچانەدا؟"، راىگەياند: ئەمان بە ھىچ جۆرىك دوۋل نىن و ئەم ھەۋالانەى رەتەردەۋە كە گوايە كوردەكان كۆنترۆلى زۆربەى ناۋچەكانىان كوردىت و تى: "لە ھەندىك ناۋچەدا بوونىان ھەيە، بەلام كۆنترۆلى تەۋاۋەتەيىان نىيە."

عەبدولباست سەيدا، سەرۋكى ئەنجومەنى نىشتەمانى سورىا، راىگەياند، كە ئەمان رەنمەيى تەۋاۋىان دەر كوردوۋە كە نايىت بىجەگە لە ئالەى سورىاي ئازاد ھىچ ئالەيكە دىكە ھەلبىكرىت، چۈنكە كوردەكانىش بەشۋىكەن لە پىكەتەى خەلكى سورىا.

بەپىي قەسەكانى رۇژنامەنۋىسىكى تورك كە لە دەلى رادىكالدا بىلۋى كوردوۋە،: "ئەنقەرە زۆر سەرى سورماۋە لەم پىشتەگىرىيەى كە خەلكانى كوردى سورىا لە (پەكەكە)ى دەكەن"، ھەروەھا دەشلىت، كە توركيا ئەم بارودۇخە بە گەشەسەندىكى مەترسىدار تىدەگات و چەند ھەنگاۋىكى ناۋە بۇ ئەۋەى ئەم بارودۇخەى ئىستاي رۇژئاۋاى كوردستان نەبىتە ھۇى قولىۋونەۋەى زىاترى كىشەى كورد لە توركيا.

دەلىت: تاكە رىگەچارە بەدەست توركياۋە ئەۋەيە كە داۋاى ھاۋكارىي لە مەسعود بارزانى سەرۋكى ھەرىمى كوردستان بىكات بۇ ئەۋەى زىاتر فشار بخاتە سەر پارتە كوردىيەكانى رۇژئاۋا، يان ئەنقەرە داۋاى لابرەنى بەشار ئەسەد و ھەلى پتەكردنى پەيوەندىيى دات لەگەل پارتە كوردىيەكان.

بەپىي راپۇرتەكەى رۆيتەرز، توركيا لەم ماۋەيەى دوايىدا پەيوەندىيەكانى لەگەل بارزانى ۋەكۆمەتى ھەرىمدا بەرەۋىش بردوۋە ئىستا چاۋيان لەسەر بەرەۋىشبردنى بوارى بازىرگانى و وزمىە لەنئوانىياند.

پارتە ئۆپۇزسىۋنەكانى توركيا لەدوايىن پىشەتەكاندا قەسەى خۇيان ھەيە، بۆنەم مەبەستە موحەرەم ئىنجە، ئەندامى سەر كرايەتى پارتى گەلى كۆمارى (جەھەپە)راى گەياندوۋە: دەۋلەتتىكى نوۋى كوردى بەرئەۋە، دەۋلەتەكەش دەۋلەتى كوردستانى سورىايە.

ھەروەھا ئىحسان داگل، لىكۆلارنىكى بوارى توركيا راىگەياند: دەبىت توركيا لەم كاتەدا ھەلۋىستى خۇى لەسەر كىشەى كورد رۋونبەكانەۋە، بەم پىيەى چەندىن جار ھەلۋىستى جىۋاۋى دەربرىۋە، رۇژىك بەنەياز بوون لەگەل پەكەكە گەتۇگۇ بىكەن و رۇژىك سىياسەتتىكى شىۋە پۇلىسى ئەنجام داۋە. ھەروەھا لەمەيەى ئەم گۆشەيەى كە لە رۇژنامەى دەلى زەماندا نوۋسىۋوۋى "ئىۋە ئامادەن بۇ ھەرىمىكى كوردى؟" دەلىت ھەرىمىكى ئوتۇنۋى كوردى لە ناۋچەكەدا دروست دەبىت ئەگەر ئەسەد بىروۋخىت، ھەروەھا ئەگەرى رۇژئاۋاىكى سەربەخۇ بۇ كوردەكان لە ئارادايە.

لە نوۋسىنەكەشىدا دەلىت: "نەخشەى سىياسى كورد لە ناۋچەكەدا گۇراۋە، كوردستانىكى گەۋرە چىتر خەۋنىك نىيە بۇ زۆربەى كوردان"، دەشلىت "لەۋە دەچىت يەكەم ھەرىمى سەربەخۇ لە شۋىننىكى چاۋەروانەكراۋى ۋەكو سورىادا بىيىستىن."



له ئىنگلىز يېمە: ھەلۋىست ئىمومەر  
سەرچاۋە: رويىتەرز  
بۇ دەرىجىنى بۇچۇر نەكەنت، كلىك لىزە بىكە

AKK.20

<http://www.pukpb.org/so/news/1882/150/.html>

Jul 12, 2013

## نە موبارەك نە مۇرسى نە ھۆكۈمرانى سەربازى / تۆماس فرېدمان

لەمبىنى ھەممو جەنگىكى ناخۇدا، ساتىك يان ھەلۋىك ھەيە بۇ نەكەنتەنەۋ ھەلۋىرە، مىسر ئىستا بىم ساتەمۇختەدا تېپىر دەپىت.  
لەگەل ھاتنى مانكى رەمەزنى پىرۇز لەم ھەفتەمەدا، جەگەل نزاۋ پارانەۋە ھىچى تىرمان پىنكارىت بۇ گەرانەۋەى ئەم ژىانەى كە لىنى  
راھاتىۋىن لە مانكى رەمەزەندا بە كۆبۈنەۋە لەگەل خىزان و ھاورىيان بۇ ماۋىيەك كە بۈارى دەرمەخسان بۇ ھەر ھاورىۋەلەتتەيەكى  
مىسرى بەكارمەكانىدا بېچىتەمۇ ھەنگاۋ بەر مۇپىش بىتت بە ھەلۋىرەندى رىچكەى راست ھەلۋىرەيت، ئەمىش ناستەۋاى نىشتەمانىيە.  
خۇندكارىكى زانكۇى ئەمىرىكى بوم لە قاھىرە لە سەرمەتەى ھەفتەكاندا و گەشتىبارىكى بەردەۋامى ۋەلەتى مىسرم لەم ساتەۋە، تاننىستا  
رق و كىنەكى لەۋشۋەمىم نەدەۋە كە بەرۋكى مىسرى گىرەتتەى ھىندەى ئەم چەند مانگەى دۋاى، ۋەك فرىدانەۋەى گەنجانى ئەمىر  
لەلەيەن ئىخوان مۇسلىم لەسەربانى بالەخانەكان و ستاشكردنى ئەپارنى گروپى ئىخوان مۇسلىم لەسەر تۈپتەر لە بەرامبەر ئەم  
كارەى ھىزە چەكدارەكانى مىسر ئەنجامىدا بە تەقەكردنى بى بەزەمىيەن لە لەلەيەنگرانى ئىخوان مۇسلىم لەكەنى نۇزۇكردندا.  
دۋاى ئەم ھەممو پىشۋىيە تۈندۈتۈزۈپ، كەسەك نە گەرو لەسەر مىسر بىكەت، بەلۋكو مىسر خۋىيەتى، ئەم قەيرانەش لەراستىدا بوۋى  
ھەيە.

مىسر ئەتۈنەت ھەنگاۋبىتت ۋەك دەۋلەتتىكى يەكگرتۈۋ يان پارچە پارچە دەكرىت لەلەيەن گەلەكەيەۋە، ۋەك چۈن لە سورىا  
رۈدەدەت؟، ھىچ شەتتەكە خۇرەلەتى ناۋەراستدا ھىندە گەنگ نە لەم ساتەمۇختەدا، چۈنكە كاتىك سەقامگىرى مىسر لە مەھكەدا بىت،  
ئەۋا سەقامگىرى ھەممو ناۋچەكە لە مەھكەدا دەپىت.

مەن تۈرەۋىنى ئەلمەنى و لىپىر ئالىيەكانى مىسر پىدەزانم بەرامبەر بە مەھمەد مۇرسى، كە بەيى دەنگى ئەۋان نەدەۋەۋە سەرۋكى مىسر،  
بەلەم لەجىياتى ئەۋەى بىتتە كەسەكى گىشتىگر لە پەپىر مۇكرەندى ئەكەمەدا، دەسەلەتى زىاتىرە بەخۇى بەخۇى، ھەرۋە لەگەل رۈۋخانى  
ئابۋورى مىسر، ئەمانى ئارامىي لەلەيەن زۆرەك لە مىسرىيەكان بەرامبەر ھۆكۈمرانى مىسر پىدەزانم.

بەلەم لەم گۇرەنكارىيە دۈۋرۈ درىزەى جىھانى ئەمەبى بەرەم دىمۇكراتىيەت، شەتتە بۈۋى ئەمە كاتىك ھىزە سەربازىيەكانى مۇرسى-  
يان لە سەرۋەكەيتى دۈۋرەخستەۋە چاۋەروانى گەلى مىسرىيان ئەكرەد بۇئەۋەى لەرەگەى ھەلۋىرەندەكانى پەرلەمان لە تىشرىنى يەكەمەدا  
يان ھەلۋىرەندەكانى سەرۋەكەيتىيەۋە ئەم كارە بىكەن، ئەم شەتەى كە پاساۋىكى نەمەيەى دەدا بە گروپە مۇسۇلمانەكان تا بىر لە ھەلەكانىيان  
يان لە گۇرەنكارى نەكەنەۋە كە ئەمىش رەگەزى بىنەرمەتتە بۇ مىسر لەپىناۋ بۈنەدانى دەۋلەتتىكى سىياسى سەقامگىر.

بەلەم ئەلمەنى و لىپىر ئالىيەكانى مىسر پىۋىستىيان بەۋەيە پىكەۋە كارەكەن.

ئۆپۈزسىۋى مىسر گەۋرە بوۋ لە نازەزايەكانىدا، بەلەم ئەمەتۈنى كۆدەنگ بىت لەسەر بەرنامەى كارى يەك سەركردە، لەكەتتىدا  
ئىخوان سەركەتتىكى گەۋرەى لە ھەلۋىرەندەكاندا بەدەستەپنا بىئەۋەى بىتۈنەت ھۆكۈمرانى بىكەت.

لەبەرئەۋە مىسر تەنھا يەك رىگەى بەدەستەۋە ماۋە بۇئەۋەى خۇى بەدۈۋر بگىرەت لە ھەلۋىرە، ئەمىش ھىزى سەربازىيە، ئەم دەسەلەتە  
لە مىسر لەم ساتەمۇختەدا پىۋىستە ئامانچەكەى رۈۋىكەتەۋە لە درۈۋرەخستەۋەى گروپە ئىسلامىيەكان، ئەمىش دۈۋبارە پىكەنەۋەىيە  
نەك تۆلەسەندەۋە، ھەرۋە بەمەبەستى دۈۋبارە دەستپىكرەندەۋە و ھەنگاۋان بەرەم دىمۇكراتىيەت، نەك بەمەبەستى لەناۋىرەندى  
گروپى ئىخوان لە ژىانى سىياسى.

ئاشكرانىە ئەم دەستۈۋرەى كە رۆزى سى شەمەمە لەلەيەن ھۆكۈمەتى كاتىي مىسرمە دەرچۈۋە، ھەلۋىكى دادۈرەنە بەدەت بە ئىخوان بۇ  
گىرەندەستى دەسەلەت، ھەرۋە رىگرى بىكەت لە جەبەكان كە لەسەر بىنەماى ئابىنى نەبەن، ئەم رىگرىكرەندە لەسەردەمى ھوسنى

موبارەك- دا جىيەجىدەكرا، گوپى ئىخوان وەك لايەننىكى سەربەخۇ لە ھەلبۇزاردەكاندا سەركەوتتى بەدەستەپنا، مىسر سەقامگىر نابىت ئەگەر ئىخوان دور بخرىتەوہ .

دىالە موحاھىد ئامازەى بەوەكرد شۆرشى 2011 كە موبارەكى سەروكى پېشوى مىسر لەسەر كورسى دەسەلات لاپرد و لەلايەن گەنجانى مىسرەوہ، كە تىايدا چەپرو و لىبرال و ئىسلامىيەكان يەكيانگرت، دواروژىكى باشتى لى چاوەرواندەكرا، دابەشكردن لەننوان شۆرشگىران و دۆخى ئىستادا دەبىت، شۆرەشەكە لەلايەن عەلمانىيەكان يان ئىسلامىيەكان قورخ نەكرابوو، ھەرنەوش ھۆكارى سەركەوتتى بوو.

بەدەستەستى دىموكراتىيەت لە مىسر كاتىك فەراھەم دەبىت، ئەگەر شۆرشگىرەكان درك بەوە بكن ئەم دۆخەى ئىستادا دۆزەنيانە، نەك دۆزەنيانەى يەكتىرى بكن.

نايا ئەو راستەكەت، ئىخوان موسلمان رەنگە عەلمانى زىاتر بكوژن، ھەروەھا ھىزە چەكدارەكان دەتوانن ئىخوانەكان بكوژن، بەلام دەيەكى تر لەم دۆخەى ئىستادا دەتوانىت ھەردوولا بكوژىت، بەشۆبەش كارساتىكى مەوى لە وڵتادا روودەدات.

لەگەل نەبوونى پارتى راستەقىنە بۆ چاكسازىكردن لە وڵتادا كە رىز لە نابىن و ستراتىيەى نوڭەرى بگرت، ھەروەك چۆن چاكسازىخوانى مىسر لە سەدەى نۆزدەدا ئەنجامىندا، مىسرىيەكان ناچارنابن كە باشتىرەن رىگە ھەلبۇزىرن، بەلكو دەبىت خراپترەن چارەسەر ھەلبۇزىرن.

گروپى ئىخوان پېيوايە ئىسلام چارەسەر، بەلام ھىزە چەكدارەكان پىي باشە بگەرىتەوہ بۆ دەولەتتىكى قوڵ بەند، بەلام زۆرىنەى نابىن چارەسەر نىە بۆ دۆخى مىسر لەم دۆخەى ئىستادا، ھەروەھا دەولەتتىكى فەرمانىرواش بە دەسەلاتتىكى چەكدار كە ياساى بۆ دارىزەرايىت بۆ رىشەكەشكردى ئىسلامىيەكان وەك سەردەمى پېشوو، ناتوانىت چاكسازى ياساى و كۆمەلەيەتى و رۆشنىبرى دەستەبەر بكات و بوار بۆ توانا مەوى و توانستە عەقلىيەكانى مىسر فەراھەم بكات.

لەراستىدا راپۆرتى گەشەپەندانى مەوى عەربى سەر بە نەتەوہ يەكگرتووەكانى سالى 2002 چارەسەر، كە بەشكى زۆرى لەلايەن توڭزەرانى مىسرىيەوہ نوسراوتەوہ داوا لە مىسرىيەكان دەكات ھەولەكانيان چەكەنەوہ لەسەر بونىادانى ئەو سىياسەتانەى كە دەتوانىت بەسەر لاوازيەكانىدا زال بىت لە پەيرەموكردى ئازادى و خوڭندن و بەرپەشكردى ئافەت، ئەو ئەو رىچكەو ئاراستەيە كە مىسر پىويستى پىيەتى، نەك رىچكەى موبارەك، نە رىچكەى مەرسى، نە رىچكەى سەربازى.

ئەركى دۆستانى مىسرىش لەم سەتەدا گرتەوہى ھارىكارىيەكان نىە، بەلكو يارمەتيدانىيەتى ھەنگاو بە ھەنگاو تا چارەسەرىكى مامناوەند دەدۆزىتەوہ.

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AKK.21

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Jul 29, 2012

سوريا... عیراقە

ن: تۆماس فریدمان

خو دەزانىت لەناخەوہ ھىوادارو پەروشى ئەوم كە ئۇپۆزىسيۆن لە سوريا بە خىزايى و بەھەول و تىكۆشانى خوڭيان لەسەر پىي خوڭيان راوەستەن ھەروەكو ھىوا دارىشين بەشۆمەيەكى دىموكراسيانە لە مەيدانەكەدا دەربەكون . ھەرچەندە چانس و دەرفەتى ئەم دەرنەجامە زۆر لە ئاستىكى نەمدايە . لەسەرئەوہى سوريا زۆر لەعیراق دەچىت ، لە راستىدا سورياو عیراق دوانەيەكن دەولەتتىكى فرەمەزھەب و كەمىنەيەكى دىكتاتورى فەرمانىروايى دەكات و دەستىكى پۆلاين و لە ژىر ئایدۆلۆژيەتى بەعەدا كۆيكردەنەتەوہ و بۆخۆم وای دەبينم كە وانەى عیراق سادەيە. ناتوانىت لەھوكمى سەدامەوہ بچىت بۆ سىستەمى سويسرا بە بن ئەوہى لەمەيدانەكە روبرووى وەك پىي دەلین: "ھوبەر" بىيەوہ (جەنگى ھەمووان دژى ھەمووان) تەنھا ئەوە نەبىت كە پشٹیوانى لايەننىكى دەركى بەدەستەبەيىت كەباش بىت بۆ خۆپچەكەردن كە ھەموو ئەوانەى لەسەر گۆى زەوين لایى بترسن و متمانەى پىيەكن، ھەروەك لە قوناغى گواستەوہدا متمانەى پىيەكن . ئەوہ ئەمريكا بوو كە لايەنى پشٹیوانى دەركى بوو لەعیراق، بەدووريشى دەزانم كە ئەو جۆرە پشٹیوانىيەى وىلايەتە

یەكگرتووكان و ناتۆ كه تېچووېهكې كمې هېوو، ههروهه له دووروه نههكومي پېدهكرا و كۆتايي به رژيمي قهزافي هېنا و لېبيايهكې نوئ له دايك بوو ،له سوريا دوباره بېتهوه لهبهر نهوهی له سوريا نهكهكه قورستره ،سوريا عيراقه .

عيراق نهزمونئكي هينده تاله وابهباش دهرانم كه جاريكي تر قسهی لهبارميهوه نهكەين، بهلام ليرهدا پيموندی به بابتهكهوه ههيه ، نهگهر بۆ عيراق دهرفتهئيك ههيه بۆ بهديهئاني دهرنهجامئكي باش نهوه هۆكارو فەزلهكهی دهگهرتيموه بۆ نهوهی نهمرۆ نهمریکا لهمهيدانهكهيه و دهيان ههزار سهرباز له گورهمانهكهدا نامادمن بۆ نهوهی كه پشتيواني و چاوديري عيراق بكن و پر چهكي بكن كهتا راديهكي زۆر متمانهي پندهكرئيت و ههموو لايهنهكان سلی لئ نهكهنوه بۆنهوهی كه عيراق سياستهي خوی بگورئيت و سياستهي تهوافوقی پيمرو بکات لهو باومهدام و واههستهكههه كه سوريا پيوستى ههمان ههلموهرج ههيه بۆ نهوهی بهههمان دهرفته بهدهستهئيت.

بهلام لهبهرنهوهی من جاريكي تر پشتيواني ناکهم له دهستومردانی ويلايهته يهكگرتووكانی نهمریکاو نهجامدانی هيرشی زهميني له سوريا يان لهههر شونينكي تر لهجيهانی عهرمبيدا و رای گشتی نهمریکاش پشتيواني نهوه ناکات، هيوادارم لهشيردنهوکههدا ههلهبم، ياخی بووه سوريمكان توشی شۆك و سهرسورمانمان بكن لهري شيوازی تاييهت و بهچهكي خويان له پيناو بهديهئاني نايندهيهكي باشتر، تنهيا باسکردن له پشتيواني ديپلوماتی و چەك بهس نيه، بهلکو دهبيت باسی نهوهی پيوسته بۆ بارودۆخی ئيستاو قوناغی دواتر بخريتپيروو بهلام کاتيك دېته سهسر نهو بيرورايهی كه پشتيواني بيانی و دهرمکی پيوسته و دهبيت نهوه بوتريت كه نهو ههنگاره له سوريا کاريکی نهستهههه، بهبروای من نهوانهي داکۆکی له دهستومردانی نهمریکا نهكەن له سورياو به توندی رخنه له بارك نوباما دهگرن لهبهرنهوهی كه سهسرکرايهتي کردنی دهستومردانی سهربازی له سوريا رتهدهکاتهوه واقعي نين سهبارمت به پيداويستيهکاني بهديهئاني نهجامئكي باش و پوزمتيف.

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بگهريوه

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نهگهري روودانی شهري نوئ و دروستبوونی سنووری نوئ لهئارادايه

Nov 27, 2012

موراد يهتکين

رهجهب تهيب نهردۆگانی سهروك و مزيرانی تورکیا له ميانهي ووتاريکيدا له 22ی تشريني دوومهدا هوشداريدا لهبارهي نهگهري سهسر ههلهدانی شهريکی ناوخويی تائيفی و ئيتنيکی لهعيراقدا

ههروهك ناماژهی بهروودانی شهري ووزه و پالنهركماني پشتی نهو شهريهشدا. بۆ روژی دواتر، نوری مالکی سهروك و مزيرانی عيراق كه بهر مگهز شيعيه وهلاميکی توندی نهردۆگانی دايهوه بهناوی (نهگهر تۆ ههلهينهگير سيني) كه دواتر و مزيري دهرهوهی تورکیا نهو وهلامهي مالیکی به (خهيايی) وهسکرد.

لهههمان کاتيشدا، مالکی ونيهيهکی بلاوکردهوه، كه تيايدا بلاومپکردنی هيزمكاني سوپای عيراق لهناوچهی دوزخورماتوو دمخاتهروو، بۆ رووبهرووبونهوهی کوردهكان بهدریژايی سنورمكاني ههريمی کوردستان، كه لهئيتستادا بهتهنها لهسهسر کاغهم بهشينهكه لهعيراق.

گومان لهمهدانييه كه نهو شهريه لهسهسر سهرچاومكاني ووزميه. تائيتسا يهدهگيکی خهوتووی زۆری نهوت و گازی سروشتی لهههريمی کوردستان ههمن تا ئيتسا بهكار نههينراون، كهبههويهوه ههريهك له کومپانيا زبهلاحمكاني بواری ووزهی جيهانی وهك ئيكسۆن و شيرۆنی ويلايهته يهكگرتووكانی نهمریکا و توتالی فهرمنسی و گازپرومی روسی و کومپانيا تورکيهيکانيش چهند گرپهستیکيان لهشاری ههولير لهگهڵ مسعود بارزانی سهروکی ههريمی کوردستان ئيمزاکردوه، سهرباری نارهزايی بههيزی مالکی لهبهغدا و نيگهريانی واشنتۆن بهشينويهکی زارمکی لهو بارميهوه، بهلام نهوان هيچ ههنگاويکيان بۆ دواوه نهناوه.

مالکی نهوه زۆر باش دهزانيت، نهگهر بيت و کوردهكان بتوانن نهوت و گازمکيان لهريگهي تورکياوه بفروشن كه نهئداميکی ناتۆيه و دوور لهدهستپومردانی روسيا و ولاته عهرمبيهان و ئيران، نهوش مانای گورانکاری نهري واقيعه، نهویش گوريني سنور و سهرومري عيراقه، نهگهر بيت و نهو بهشينويهکی يهکسان حوکمی ياسا نهکات.

بەلەم پىرسىيار لىزمىدا ئەمەيە، ئايا لەمەۋەي سەد سالى رابردودا لەعيراق و بەشئومبەكى گىشتىش لەرۆژەلەتەي ناۋەر استدا هېچ مەملەتتەيەكى تر ھەبەۋە پەيۋەندى بەۋوزەۋە نەبەۋىت؟

عيراق، ۈك ۈلەتتەك، يەككەك بۈۋە لەكۆتە ھۆكارەكانى ھەلگىرساندى جەنگى جىھانى يەكەم، بەھۆي دابەشئومبەكى كىلگە نەۋتتەيەكان بەسەر ناۋچەكانى مېزۇپۇتاميا و ھەزرى بەسەر، ۈ دابىرەن و پارچە پارچە كەردى ئىمپىراتورىيەتى تۈركى كە لەلەيەن ئىمپىراتورىيەتى بەرئىتەيۋە نەجامدرا. ئەۋەش نەۋەي يەكەمى شەرى ۈۋزە بۈۋە لەناۋچەكەدا.

نەۋەي دوۋەمى شەركەكان كە لەنەۋان سالىنى (1950 – 1960) مەكان بۈۋە، ئەۋەش بۇ راگرتنى ھەۋسەنگى تىرۆر و تۆقاندەن بۈۋە لەنەۋان ۈلەيەتە يەكگرتتۈمەكانى ئەمەرىكا و يەككىتى سۆفەيت بۈۋە كە بە (جەنگى سارد) ناسرابۈۋە، كە قۇرمى جەنگى لەنەۋان ۈلەتەن ۈەر نەگرتتۈۋە، جگە لەشەرى ۈلەتەنى ەمەرىيە نەبەيت كە ھەۋلى لەناۋەردى تەۋاۋەتى ئىسرائىلىيان دەدا، كە ھەمۈۋە جارئىكىش بەئىسرائىلىيەك بەھىزتر و فراۋانتەر كۆتەيى دەھات، بەلەم ھەمۈۋە ئەۋانەي تر گۆرىنى رۇئىمەكانىيان بەشئومبەكى شەرى ناۋخۇ و كۆدەتەي سەربازى كۆتەيىيان دەھات ۈك لەھەرىيەك لەۋلەتەكانى ۈمكۆ ئىران، عيراق، سۈرىيا و مېسەر، ئەۋە شەپۇلە گۆرانكارىيەش لەسالى 1973 بە قەيرەننىكى گەۋرەي نەۋەت بەكۆتەيى ھات.

نەۋەي سىئەمەشى بەشەرى ئىران-عيراق دەستىدەكەت، راستەۋخۇ دۋاى سەرھەلەدى شۆرشى ئىسلامى لەعيراق، كە بەداگىر كەردى عيراق لەلەيەن ۈلەيەتە يەكگرتتۈمەكانى ئەمەرىكا بەيارمەتى كۆردەكان و بەرۈۋەخانى رۇئىمەكەي سەدام ھوسەين لەسالى 2003 كۆتەيى ھات.

لەئىستاشدا نەۋەي چۈارەم ئازارنىكى زۆر بەدەست پىر كەردەۋەي پىداۋىستىيەكانى زەلەزەلەكانى ۈۋزەۋە دەچىژن لەپىنەۋى دەستكەۋەتى قازانچىكى كەم لەسەر چاۋەكانى جىھانى كۆن، بەر لەكۆتەيى ھاتنى سەردەمى نەۋەت، كە ۈا دەخەلەندىرەت دۋاى چەند دەيەيەكى كەم كۆتەيى بىت .

نەۋەي لەعيراق، سۈرىيا، ئىران و ئىسرائىل رۈۋدەدەت، رەنگە بىنە بەشئەك لەۋ شەرى كە بەر لە سەد سالى دەستىيەكردۈۋە. ھەركەتتەك شەرى ۈۋزە ھەبەيت، ئەۋا لەۋ بەشەي جىھاندا يان گۆرانكارى لەدەسەلەت يان لە سەۋۈرەكان، ياخۇد لەھەردۈۋەكىان رۈۋدەدەت. ھېچ ھۆكارىكىش نىيە ۈات لىيەكەت بلىنى ئەمجارەيان جىۋاۋزتر دەبىت.

سەرچاۋە: ھورىيەت دەيلى نىۋز

ۈەرگىزەنى لەئىنگلىزىيەۋە: ەمر خدر

بەگەرىۋە

AKK.23

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Sep 19, 2013

نۆجەلەن داۋاكارىيەكانى زىاد دەكەت

/ مۇراد يەتكىن

خولى سىئەمەي گەتۈگۆكانى نەۋان ھۆكۈمەتى تۈركىيا و ھزبى كرىكارانى كوردستان دەستىيەكرد، كەمتر لە سالىك لەمەۋەيە كاتتەك سەۋەك ۈزىرانى تۈركىيا رەجەب تەيىب ئەردوغان بىرارىدا ھاكەن فېدان

سەۋەكى ئازانسى ھەۋالگىرى تۈركىيا ۈك نىزدراۋىك بىزىرەتە لای سەۋەكى ھزبى كرىكارانى كوردستان كە زىندانى ھەتە ھەتەيى بەسەردا سەپىنراۋە ۈ لە دۈرگەي نىمرالى لە شارى ئەستەمبۇل.

فیدان و ژمارەیکە لە ئەندامانی پەرلەمان لە حزبى ناشتى و دیموکراتى که جەماوەریکی بێفرەوانى هەیه هاوشنۆهێ حزبى پارتى کرێکارانى کوردستان سەردانى ئۆجەلانییان کرد که دوایین سەردانییان لە 15 ی ئەیلول بوو، ئێ سەردانە هەموویان لە مانگی کانونی دوومی ئەم سالی بوون.

پەیمای ئۆجەلان بۆ کۆتایی هێنان بە چالاکییە سەربازیەکانی حزبى کرێکارانى کوردستان که ماوهی 30 سالی درێژەى هەیه، و وەسفی ئەردوغان که ئەو گفتوگۆیانەى ناو نا پڕۆسەى ناشتى و پاشەکشەى چەکدارە کوردەکانى لە زەویەکانى تورکیا، هیوا و ئۆمیدیکی بەخشى که دۆزینەوهى چارەسەرى ئاشتییانە و کۆتایی هاتنى کێشەى کوردە لەم وڵاتە.

دواتر پڕۆسەکە سستییەکی بەرچاوى بەخۆوه بینی، و حزبى کرێکارانى کوردستان حکومەتى تورکیای ناچار کرد که بە رینگای یاسایی و لەڕێى پەرلەمانەوه و پێش پشووێ هاوینەى پەرلەمان لە مانگی تەمموز دا ئەو کارە بکات.

لەو کاتانەدا حکومەتى تورکیا حزبى کرێکارانى کوردستانى بەوه تۆمەتبار کرد که پاشەکشەکردنى چەکدارەکانى تەنها بە ڕووکەش بووه. و لە راستیدا چەکدارى نۆیى لە خۆگرتووه.

بەشێوەیکەى بەرچاواوا نایارکردنى هەردوو لایەنەکە دەستى پێکرد، لەکاتێکدا که حزبى کرێکارانى کوردستان لە بارەگاكانى خۆى و بەتایبەت لە جیای قەندیل لە کوردستان دەستى کرد بە هەرشەکردن لە حکومەتى تورکیا که جارىکى تر دەست دەکاتەوه بە کردەوه سەربازیەکانى پێش راگەیاندى هەلۆیستى کۆتایی دەربارەى پاشەکشەى یەكجارەکی.

هەفتەى پێشوو رەجەب تەیب ئەردوغان رایگەیاندا که بەنیازە کۆمەڵێک چاکسازی دیموکراسى راگەیهێنیت و لە لایەکی ترهوه نوسینگەى تاییەتى سەروک وەزیران ئەو راپۆرتانەى رەتیکردەوه که رەشەنوسى پڕۆژەکە درایبێتە ئۆجەلان پێش ئەوهى راگەیهێنیت.

سەردانەکەى حزبى ناشتى و دیموکراتیش لەو کاتانەدا بوو، لە ئەنجامیشدا ئۆجەلان لێدوانى دا و لە لێدوانەکەى دا تەنکیدی کردەوه که دیمۆنیت خەلکى زۆر لە زیندانەکەى دا ببینیت ئەک تەنها ئەندامانى ئەو حزبە بەلکو دیمۆنیت چالاکوانانى بواری مەدەنى و رێکخراوەکان و رۆژنامەنووسانیش ببینیت. هەرگیز نەکۆلى لەمەش ناکریت که چەند جارێک ئۆجەلان ووشەى دانۆستاندى بەکار هێناوه لە جیاتى دیاڵوگ، ووتى دەبییت داواکارییەکانم جیجەجی بکەیت بۆ ئەوهى پڕۆسەى ناشتى بە شێوەیکى رێک و پێک بەرپۆه بچیت.

باشە چى ڕوویدا لەماوهى کەمتر لە سالتیک هەتا داخوارییەکانى ئۆجەلان زۆرتر و بێفرەوانتر بین.

لێرەدا چەند هۆکارێک هەن، یەكەم سوریا چونکە بەلى حزبى کرێکارانى کوردستان لە سوریا که حزبى یەكێتى دیموکراتى یە بەشێوەیکەى سەرمەوتوو خۆى لەهەموو ئەو هێزەکانە دورخستۆتەوه که پشٹیوانى بەشار ئەسەد دەکەن هەروەها لە هێزەکانى ئۆپۆزیسیۆنیش که لەمێرى بەشار ئەسەد دەجەنگن، ئەجیندای تاییەتى خۆی پەیرۆ دەکات، هەتا دەست بگریت بەسەر ناوچه کوردنشینەکان دا لە سەر سنوور، هەروەها لەمێرى بەرهى نوسەرە جەنگى بەرپا کرد، که بەلى رێکخراوى قاعیدەیه لە سوریا و بەسوود وەرگرتن لە کۆتایی هێنان بە پڕۆسەى ئەمەنى، که دەگەرێتەوه بۆ پڕۆسەى ناشتى، پشٹیوانى حزبى کرێکارانى کوردستان کرا لە تورکیا بەتایبەت لە باشوورى رۆژئاوا که دانیشتوانەکەى کوردن. لەگەڵ نزیکبوونەوهى هەلبێژاردنەکانى تورکیا لە نازارى 2014 دا.

ئەردوغان دیمۆنیت پێش هەلبێژاردن خوین نەهێزیت، ئۆجەلانییش لەم ڕوایە دایە که کاتى زیاد کردنى داخوارییەکانیەتى.

پاکیزى چاکسازییەکانى تورکیا لە ئیستا دا لەهەموو کاتێک گەنگەرە نایا لە سەدا دەى سەققى هەلبێژاردن دەهێنێتە خوارەوه، نایا فێرکردن بە زمانى کوردى سەر دەگریت یان هەرچى ئۆجەلان دیمۆنیت پێى دەدریت بەشێوەیکەى دیمۆنیت زیندانەکەى بکاتە بارەگا نوێکەى و پەیمۆندییەکانى بێفرەوانتر دەبن و کۆنترۆلى رێکخراوەکەى دەکات.

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بگەرێوه

### دكتور بھرھم سآلح: ھەموو كوردنك دولەتى سەربەخۆى دەوئ

بۆ كوردەكان لە شارى دىرىنى ھەولير خەلاتەكانى جەنگ زۆرن و ڕوونە. كرىنەكانى بنیاتناھەو لەبەرزىدان. ناوەراستى شەقامە خىراكان بە دار و درمخت سەوزن. مۆلىكى بازاركردى مەزن كە لەناویدا يارىگايەكى خىزانى سەر سەھۆلى تىدايە ئامازىيەكە بۆ خزمەتگوزارى لەسەر ستايلى ئەمريكى. ئاكە ديوارى كۆنكرىتى دژى تەقینەو ئەو ديوارەيە كە پارلەمانى ھەريى كوردستان دەپارزىت.

لەنێوان عىراقىيەكاندا كوردەكان زۆرتريى زيانيان لە جەنگ بېنەو و ئىستا ڕىنگە خاوەنى زۆرتريى شت بن كە لەدەستى بەدەن ئەگەر ئەو بارگىزىيە سىياسىيەى كە بەدواى كشانەوئەى ھىزەكانى ئەمريكادا ھات بۆ شەرىكى ناوخۆيى تەشەنە بىسەنيت.

دكتور بھرھم سآلح، سەرۆك وەزىرانى حكومەتى ھەريى كوردستان دەلالت: " ئايا ئيمە نىگەرانيى؟ بەلى، ئيمە نىگەرانيى. بەرژموندى نىشتەمانى ئيمە وەكو كورد لە عىراقىكى ديموكراتى و فیدرالى و پىرناشتىدايە. ئيمە ھىشتا ڕىگايەكى دريژمان لەبەردەمدايە بۆ گەيشتن بەو."

كۆتايى ڕۆلى سەربازى ئەمريكى لىزە (ھەريى كوردستان) خالىكى وەرچەرخانى جىگاي نىگەرانيى بۆ كوردەكان كە بۆ ماوئەى 20 سآلە لەلايىن وىلايەتە يەكگرتووكانى ئەمريكاو پارىزاوون، سەرەتا لە دواى جەنگى كەنداوى فارس لە سالى 1991 لەريگاي ئۆپەراسيۆنىكى مۆبى و ھەريىكى دژفەرين كە كوشتوبى سەدام حسيى راگرت. ئىستا، بەھىزكردى دەسەلات لەلايىن نورى مالىكى سەرۆك وەزىرى عىراقو يادەوئەى ناخۆشى كۆژانەكانى كورد لەسەر دەستى حكومەتىكى ناوئەدى بەھىز لە بەغدا دەورۆژىننەو. ھەروەھا ئەو كوردەكان دەخاتە ھەلوئىستى ناسكى ئەوئەى وەكو ناوبژىوان لە نێوان گروپە جياوازەكانى شىعە و سوننەدا ڕۆل بېين كە شەرىكە و داھاتووى خودى خويان تىيدا لەژىر ھەرشەدايە.

دكتور بھرھم سآلح وتىشى: "بىگومان ھەموو كوردنك دولەتى كوردى سەربەخۆى دەوئ، بەلام ئيمە ئەوئەمان قىلكردوئە وەكو بەشىك لە عىراقىكى ديموكراتى، پىرناشتى و فیدرالىا بژىن. ئەگەر ئەم ھىوايە نەمىنيت، باوئەم وانىيە كوردەكان خوازىاربن ئەوئەى ھەمانە بىخەنە مەترسيەو."

ئەم قەيرانەى ئىستا، كە سىياسەتمەداران دەلالت عىراقى ھىناوئە كەنارى شەرىكى ناوخۆ، نزيكەى دوو ھەفتە لەمەوبەر سەريەلدا ھەر دواى ئەوئەى ھىزەكانى ئەمريكا كشانەو. حكومەتى مالىكى بىريارى دەستگىركردنى بۆ تارىق ھاشمى جىگىرى سەرۆك كۆمارى عىراق، دەرکرد كە بالاترين سىياسەتمەدارى سوننەيە و تۆمەتبارى كرد بەوئەى گروپىكى تىرۆركردن بەريوئەدەبات. ھاشمى بۆ باكور بۆ ھەريى نىمچە سەربەخۆ ھەلات تا لە دەستگىركردن ھەلئيت .

مالىكى، كە شىعەيە، ھۆشدارى دايە كوردەكان بەوئەى ئەگەر ھاشمى ڕادەستەكەنەو چەند "كيشەيەك" دروستدەبىت.

كوردەكان كە مەبەستىيان نىيە داواكارىيەكەي مالىكى جىيەجى بىكەن، دىلخوشىن بىمەي رابىكىشزىنە ناو ناكۆكى نىوان سوننە و شىعەكانەمە. مەسعود بارزانى، سەرۆكى ھەرىمى كوردستان، جەختەكاتەمە: "ئىمە بەشنىك نىن لە كىشەكان."

بەلام لەگەل ئەمەي داھاتووى عىراقى دواى جەنگ نادىارە، كوردەكان ناتوانن خۆيان دووربىخەنەمە لەمەي بەشنىكىن لە چارەسەر. دىپلوماتكارە ئەمرىكىيەكان، كە كارىگەرييان لەكاتى كشانەمەي سەربازى ئەمرىكاو زۆر كەمبۆتەمە داوايان لە جەلال تالەبانى، سەركردەي كورد و سەرۆك كۆمارى عىراق كوردووە كۆبونەمەيەكەي سەركردايەتى عىراق رىكبخت.

بەلام تائىستا تەنانەت ھىچ رىكەوتنىك نىيە لەسەر شوئىنى بەستى كۆبونەمەكە: كوردەكان دەلەين پىويستە لە باكور سازىكرىت لەكاتىكدا مالىكى جەختەكاتەمە لەمەي لە بەغدا بىت.

حكومەتتىكى ھاوبەش كە سالى پار بە دەستپىشخەرى كوردەكان دروستكرا و رۆلى گەنگى تىدايە بۇ ھەرسى پىكھاتە سەرمەكەيەكەي عىراق ئىستا لە ھەلۆشاندنەمەدايە. مالىكى ھەرشەي كرد حكومەتتىكى نوئى زۆرىنەي شىعە دروستىكات كە ئەمە سوننەكان پەراوێزدەخت. بۇ جىيەجىكرەنى ئەمە مالىكى پىويستى بەپايشتى كوردەكانە لە پارلەماندا و ئەمەش ئەگەرىكە رىگەي تىناچىت سەربگرىت.

بارزانى لە ميانەي دىمانەيەكدا لە كۆشكەكەي لە دەرمەي ھەولنر وتى: "ئەمە دەبىتە مەترسىدارترىن ھەنگا، پىويستە ھاوبەشپىيەك لەنىوان شىعە و سوننە و كوردەكاندا ھەبىت. ھەرشىك بەپىچەمانەي ئەمەمە كارەساتاوى دەبىت."

دكتور بەرھەم سالىح، وتى: "ھاوپەيمانىيەكەي نىوان شىعە و كورد كە سوننەكان بكاكە دەرمەمە وەكو ئەمەي ئىمە دەيزانىن ماناى واىە كۆتايى عىراقە."

بىيەشكرەنى سوننەكان، كە لە سەردەمى دەسەلاتى سەدام حەسەندا كۆنترۆلى دەسەلاتيان كەردبوو، لە دەسەلات رەنگە پاخيپوونى سوننى بىبۆزىننەمە كە لەمىژە ئامازەي ئەم بۆزانەمەيە لەئارادايە. دواى چوار رۆژ لە كشانەمەي ئەمرىكا زنجىرە تەقىنەمەيەك لە بەغدا لانىكەم (63) كەسى كۆشت و لەماوەي زياتر لە سالىكدا ئەمە خويناووتىر ھىرشە.

كوردەكان زۆر سوننەكانيان خۆشناوت، ھەرچەندە كوردەكان خۆيان موسولمانى سوننەن، چونكە ئەمە حكومەتە عەربە سوننىيەي سەدام حەسەن بوو كە تۆمەتباردەكرىت بە ئەنجامدانى جىنوسايد لەدژى كوردەكان، بەلام كوردەكان پىيان باشە عەربە سوننەكان لە حكومەتتىكدا لەسەر بنەماي دابەشكرەنى دەسەلات بەشداربن نەك مەترسى بىكەن و بۇ توندوتىزى و ناسەقامگىرى بگەرىنەمە.

كوردستان، كە بۇ ماوەيەكەي درىژە قەلاى لىبوردەمىيە و بەھەشتىكە بۇ چەوساومەكانى ھەموو پىكھاتەكان، بەم دوايانە بۆتە پەناگەيەك بۇ سوننەكان. ھاشمى لە شوئىنى ھەوانەمەي تالەبانى لە بەرزايىيەكانى دەرمەي شارى سلىمانى نىشتەجى بوو.

سەركردە سوننەكانى پارىزگەي دىالە، كە ناوچەيەكەي تىكەلە و ھەولیدا سەربەخۆيەكەي زياترى ھەبىت لە حكومەتى ناوەندى، دواى ھىرشىك لەلايەن ھىزەكانى ئاسايشى دەولەتەمە بۇ كوردستان ھەلاتن.

كوردەكان پەيوەندى قوولايان لەگەڵ ئەمەريكا دا ھەيە و بەزۆر رايگا بەشدارن لە ديمەنى ئەم كۆمەلگا پلوراليسىيەى ئەمەريكييەكان ھەولياندا لە عىراق دروستى بكەن .

دكتور بەرھەم سەلح بۆ چەندىن سەل لە واشىنتون ژيا و لە نووسەر كرىستوفەر ھىتچنز-ھوە نزيك بوو كە كىتەبىكى لەسەر كىشەى كورد نووسىوھ .

سەبارەت بە بۆچوونى نوخبەى سوننى عىراق بەھەى سەركرەيەتى مافى بۆماوھىي خۆيانە، دكتور بەرھەم سەلح دەيانچوونىت بە پرۆتستانتە ئەنگلوساكسونە سېي پېستەكانى ئەمەريكا .

لە مۆلەكە و لە شوينى تر دارى كرىسمس دانرابوون، و قوتابخانەيەكى ئەمەريكى بە كراوھىي نالايەكى ئەمەريكى بەرزكردۆتەو نەك لە پشت ديوارى كۆنكرىتى و خالى پشكنين و تەلى دركاويەو. تاكە سەربازىكى ئەمەريكى لەم ھەريەمە نەكوژران.

سەرۆكى حكومەتى ھەريەمى كوردستان وتى: "ئەگەر تۆ پرسىار لە زۆرينەى كوردەكان بكەيت، ئەوا دەلەين سوپاى ئەمەريكا عىراقى زۆر زوو بەجێھێشت."

سەركرەكانى كورد بىروايان بە فيدراليزم ھەيە و پشتگيرى لە ھەولەكانى پارىزگاكانى تر دەكەن وەكو دىالە و ئەنبار كە ھەردوو زۆرينەى دانىشتوانەكەى سوننين، تا سەربەخۆيى بەدبەھيەن و مالىكى وەكو ھەرشەيەك بۆسەر دەسەلاتى شيعى دژايەتى ئەم پرەوشەدەكات. لەكاتىكدا زۆربەى كوردەكان دواجار خۆزگە دەخوازن دەولەتى خويان ھەيەت، ھەنگاو رووھ و سەربەخۆيى مەترسى شەركى ناوچەيى لەگەڵ ئيران و توركيە و سوريادا دەوروزيەت كە لەم ولاتانەدا كەمىنەى كوردى گەورەيان تەدايە. ئەم دەولەتانە راگەياندى دەولەت لەلەين كوردەكانى عىراقەو وەكو تورەكرەن و بىزاركرەن دەبين.

لەنەكەم بۆ كاتى ئىستا كوردەكان باشترين ھىواى خويان لە درىزكرەنەو سەربەخۆيى خويان لە چوارچىوھى عىراقىكى يەكگرتودا دەبينەوھ .

نەجمەدين كەريەم، كە ئىستا پارىزگارى كەركوكە و رەگەزنامەى ئەمەريكى ھەيە و شارى كەركوك لەنويان كوردەكان و عەربەكان و توركمانەكاندا دابەشكرەو، دەلەيت: "ئەگەر عىراق دواجار دابەشكرەت ئەو بەھوى ئەوھو نەيە كوردەكان ئەمەيان دەوت، بەلكو بەھوى ئەوھو نەوانى تر ناتوانن پىكەوھ بژين."

وەرگيرانى لە ئینگليزبىھو: دانا تەيب مەنمى

سەرچاھ: نيويۆرك تايمز

AKK.25

<http://www.pukpb.org/so/news/1375/150/.html>



## كۆبونومەى كۆمىتەى كوردى لە رىخراوى سۆسىال نىشتەناسىۋال لە سلىمانى

كۆمىتەى ئىس ئاى تايىبەت بە گەلى كورد كە لەلايىن ئىنجومەنە دامەزراوە دواى بىرارىك لە لاىن كۆنگرەسە بەكەم كۆبونومەى خۇى لە 12 ى نىسانى 2013 لە سلىمانى كورد كۆنفرانسەكە لەلايىن ئىندامى ئىس ئاى يەكئىنى نىشتەمانى كوردستانە رىخرابوو (پى يوو كەى) كە بەشداربوانى زىاتەر لە 20 پارتى سىياسى و رىخراوى كوردى كوردستانى عىراق و ئىران و سورىا و توركىا بەيەكەمە كۆكرەبۆو.

لەسەرەتەى كۆنفرانسەكەدا , لويس ئايالا سكرتېرى گشتى ئىس ئاى سلاو رىزى خۇى ئارد بۆ تالەبەنى سەرۆك كۆمارى عىراق و سكرتېرى پى يوو كەى و جىگرى سەرۆكى ئىس ئاى كە لەگەل ئەودا مەسەلى بەستىن و سازکردنى ئەم كۆبونومەى ئاوتوئى كرىبوو.

غىابى تالەبەنى زۆر ەستى پىدەكرا و لەكاتى گەتوگۆكانىشدا بەشداربوان ەوشانى ئايالا ەيوئى زوو چاكبونەمىان بۆ سەرۆك تالەبەنى خواست. لويس ئايالا بە خۆشەلىيە ئەوەى خستەروو ئىستا ئەم كۆمىتەى بۆ تە راستەفەنىمەى راى گەياند سىياسەت و ئەجىندەى كارى بەشىكى زۆرى لە پارتە كوردىيەكان لەسەرەتەسى ناوچەكە بە بىرو بۆچونى جىاوە لەخۆدەگرئى ئەمە لەكاتىكدا خەبات ەوبەشە لە پىناو بەدەپەنەنى ماف و نازادى و دىموكراسى و ەمماەنگى كرىدى يەكترى.

مافەكانى مەوۇف نەبىت فەرەمۆش بكرئ و پىويستە بۆ ەمەوان فەرەمۆش نەك تەنەيا بۆ ەمەندىك . ئايالا پابەندبۆنى سۆسىاليست نىشتەناشەلىشى لەم رومەو دوىپاكرەدەو.

سەبارەت بە شەپۆلى گۆرانكارى كە لە خۆرەلاتى ناوەرەست بەرەوئە , لويس ئايالا ئاشكرائى كرى كاتى سىياسەت و دىالوگە. كورد لە عىراق خەباتى زۆرى كرىدە بۆ ئەوەى ماف و نازادىيەكانى خۇى بەدەست بىنئىت لەمكاتەوەى 10 سال لەمەوبەر رۆژىمى صەدام رومەو بەلام مەسەلە گەنگەكان وەك خۇى جىماون.

ەمرەشەكان سەبارەت بە كەركوك لە لاىن بەغدادە جىگەى قىوول ئەبەو , ماددەى 140 ى دەستور پىويست بوە جى بەجى بكرئ و دىموكراسىش رىزى لى بگىرئ.

ئايالا باسى لە دۆخى دژوارى سورىا كرىدە داواى كرىدە سەرەتە دۆستە كوردەكانى ئەوئى بۆچون و راى خۇيان لەسەر دوايىن گۆرانكارىيەكانى دۆخەكە دەربىر و ەواكات داواى لە ئىندامەكانمان لە بەدەيش كرىد بۆ ئەوەى دوايىن زانبارى لەسەر دەستپىشەريەكان لە توركىا خەنە روو كىشەيەك كە چەقى نىگەرانىيەكانى ەمەو كوردىكە لە ەمرەشەكانى بن.

دۆخەكە لە ئىران سەبارەت بە كوردەكان لەمانەى لە ئىستادا مەسەلەيكى پىر ئاوە نەبىت وەك چەندىن سال بەر لە ئىستا و ەيوئى خواست كە لەوئىش پىش كەوتن و ەنگاوى باش بەدى بىت . لويس ئايالا دوىپاى كرىدەو ئەوان پىشت بە ەمماەنگى ئىس ئاى و ئىندامەكانىان دەبەستىن لەسەرەتەسى جىهاندا.

مەلا بەختىار لىنەرساوى دەستەى كارگىزى مەكتەبى سىياسى يەكئىنى نىشتەمانى كوردستان بەناوى پارتەكەيەو بەگەرمى بەشداربوانى بەخىر ەننا و ئەم دەست پىشەريەى ئىس ئاى بەگەنگ و مەصفەرد و سىپاس و ستاشى خۆشى ئاراستەى سكرتېرى گشتى ئىس ئاى كرىد.

مەلا بەختىار راى گەياند ئا ئىستا كورد لە خۆرەلاتى ناوەرەست پىشت و پەنا بوە و دابەشكراو بوە بۆ دۆست بوە , ەمر وەك ەيوئى خواست ئەم كۆمىتە نويە ئەم گەلە يەكخات و بىتتە سەنگەرىكەش بۆ مەسەلەيكەيان.

دواى خەباتىكى دورودرئ يەكئىنى نىشتەمانى كوردستان ئەدامىتى ئەواى لە ئىس ئاى بەدەست ەننا و ەيوئى خواست پارتەكانى ترىش بەەمان شىوە ئەم دەستەوئە بىتتە بەشيان.

مەلا بەختىار راى گەياند لە خۆرەلاتى ناوەرەست گۆرانكارى زۆر رووبداو و زۆرەى گەلان خەبات دەكەن لەپىناو دەستەبەركردنى ژبانىكى باشتر . سەردەمى ئەم ەكۆمانەنە بەسەرچو كە دىكتاتوربەن لەگەل گەل و دىموكراسىدا و ئىستا ەنگاومەكان بەرمو پىش دەچن لە ناوچەكەدا . چارەسەركردنى مەسەلەى كورد لە ەمر چوار پارچەكەى كوردستان كەلى بەدەپەنەنى ئاشتى و دىموكراسىە لە خۆرەلاتى ناوەرەست راشى گەياند رۆلى ئىس ئاى گەنگ دەبىت بۆ بەدەپەنەنى لىك تىگەيشەننىكى فراوانتر لەم مەسەلەيە لەسەرەتەسى جىهاندا.

خۆشەلى خۆشى نىشاندا كە ئەم كۆمىتە نويە بىتتە سەكۆيەك ( پلاتفۆرم ) بۆ دانانى ستراتىزىك لە نۆ پارتە سىياسەيكەى كورد . ەيوئى خواست كە پارتە كوردىيەكان لە داھاتودا لە ئاشتى و نازادىدا كۆبىيەو .

لە گەتوگۆيەكى كراو و راشكوانەدا ەمەو پارتەكانى نامادەبو بەشدارى گەتوگۆكانىان كرىد راو بۆچونى خۆشان خستە روو . ەمەو بەشداربوان بە گەرمى پىشواز بىيان لەسازکردنى كۆبونومەكە كرىد و بە ساتىكى مۆزويان دابە قەلم.

بىرو بۆچون و راى پۆزەتەف و سىپاسگوزارى زۆر ئاراستەى ئىس ئاى كرا لەماى ئەم پىشتىوانى و پالپىشتەيە كە لە مەسەلەى كوردى كرىدە و بەمەش جارىكى تر پابەند بونى خۆى دوىپاكرەدەو بۆ بەدەپەنەنى دابەروەرى بۆ ەمەو گەلى كورد و ەنگاوان بەرمو بەدەپەنەنى ئامانجەكانىان لەدەستەبەركردنى ماف و نازادىيەكانىان . كۆمىتەكە دەبىتە مونتەدايەكى كراو كە ەمەو پارتە كوردىيەكان يەكخات كە پابەند بە بەدەپەنەنى ئەم ئامانجانە لە چوارچىوە پلانكى دىموكراسىيەدا . ئەوەش دوىپاكرەيەو كە ەمەو پارتە كوردىيەكان پىويستە پىشتىوانى يەكتر بن و زىاتەر يەكتر بىيىن و كۆبىيەو . گۆرانى دۆخەكە لە خۆرەلاتى ناوەرەست و بونى قەيرانەكان پىويست بوو كە كورد يەكئىت و ستراتىزىكى ەوابەشى ەمەيت . ئەم كۆمىتەيە بە يەكەم ەنگاوى پىشواى بىم ئاراستەيە دانرا.

سەبارەت بە عىراق , لە يادى 10 سالەى پەرسەى نازادى گەلى كورد لە دەستى دىكتاتورىيەتى رۆژىمى صەدام و ئامازە بەو كرا ەمرچەندە دىموكراسى و ئاشتى و نازادى لە ەرمى كوردستان بەرقەرار بوە بەلام كىشەكان لەگەل ەكۆمەنى ناوئەدا ماوتەو . دۆخى تايىبەتى كەركوك كە لەرووى نىدارىيەو لە ژىر كۆنترۆلى بەغداد دابە بەشەيەيكى روون پىشتگۆئ خستى جى بەجى كرىدى ماددەى 140 ى دەستور دەبىيىرئ كە پەيەندى بە كەركوكەكەو ەيە ئەمەش پىشئىل كرىدى مافەكانى گەلى كورد بوە , مەسەلەكانى پەيەست بە بودجەى نىشتەمانى و كىشەكانى پەلەمان لە بەغداد و پەرسەندى مەترسى تايەفى و تىرۆرىزم . دۆخى كەركوك بەتايىبەت جىگەى نىگەرەنىيە بەتايىبەت جىگەرەند و بونى ەيزى سەربازى لە سنورەكان بەدى دەكرئ كە وەك ەمرەشەيك و زىادكردى كۆنترۆلكردى ناوچەكە تەماشاش دەكرئ.

ئامازە بەو كرا كە ئىنجومەنى پارىزگەى كەركوك لە سالى 2005 وە وەك خۆى ماوتەو , لەكاتىكدا بەغداد سازكردى ەلپۇزاردنى نويى لەو شارە رەت كرىدەو . سكرتېرى گشتى ئىس ئاى لە لىدوانىكى رۆژنامەيىدا دواى كۆبونومەكە ئاشكرائى كرىد نەبىت ەيچ شتى كەمتر لەوە بكرئ ئەمەيش پاشەكشلى ەيز و جى بەجى كرىدى ئەواى ماددەى 140 ى دەستور و سازكردى ەلپۇزاردنىكى پاك و بىگەرد جىگەى قىوولكردى بوە.

نويەرانى پارتە سىياسەيكەى كورد لە ئىران ئامازەيان كرىد بەوچى چەساندەنەو نەھامەتيەكانى گەلى كورد لەم و لاتە درىزەى ەيە . ەمەلەكانى كۆمەلى نۆدەوئەتى بۆ ەيشتەمەى گۆشار تادان بە مافەكانىيانا بىرئ باسى لىوە كرا و ەمەوان ەيوئىان خواست لە رىگەى ئەم كۆمىتەيەو ەوشيارى

گشتی نۆپودولمەتی سەبارەت بە مافەکانی کورد زیاتر بێت . پارتە بەشداربوەکان داوایان لێکرا کە ھەماھەنگیەکان و کارکردن لەگەڵ یەکتری چڕ و پڕ بکەن و ھەوێش بە ھەمەیان لەم ڕۆژەدا داواکارییەکی تاییبەتیە کە پارتی دیموکراتی کوردستانی ئێران و پارتی دیموکراتی کوردستان بەشدارێ لە کاری ئێس ئای دەکەن .

کۆمیتەکە گۆشتی گرت لە بەدەمی ئێرانی کە پێشوازییەکە نوێ ئێستا لەوێ بەریوە لەگەڵ حکومەتی تورکیا کەبە دەرفەتێک دادەنێت بۆ دۆزینەوەی چارەسەرێکی نەشتێانە . تا ئێستاش لە قوناقی سەرئایدا بەلام ئومێدی باش بەدی دێت و ھەنگاو دەنێت بۆ دراستی چارچۆنیەکی قانونی نوێ بۆ کورد و داوای ئۆتۆنۆمی دیموکراتی دەکەن و پێوەندییان لەگەڵ بەشەکانی تری کوردستان باش بێت . گرنگی پشٹیوانی لە کۆمەڵی نۆپودولمەتی بۆ سەرخستنی ئەم گفتوگۆیانە بۆ ئێمە لێوێکرا و ھەم کارێکی گرنگ دانرا بۆ ئەوای ناوچەکە . نامۆمێک لە کۆمەڵی نۆپودولمەتی بۆ حکومەتی تورکیا لە پێناو پشٹیوانی کردن لە پێشوازییەکەدا . بە گرنگ و پڕبایەخ دانرا .

دۆخی کوردەکان لە سوریا گەشتۆتە قوناقێکی تاییبەت و ئەم ڕۆژە ھاوشانی ھێزە چەکارەکان شەڕ دەکەن دژ بە رژیمی ئەسەد . کوردەکانی سوریا بایسان لەمە کرد کە ھاوشانی یەکتر کار دەکەن و بەکەم جارە کە ناوچەکان کەوتنە ژێر کۆنترۆلی خۆیان . داوای سیستەمیکی فیدرالی دەکەن لە چوارچۆی سوریا و داوای پالێستی و پشٹیوانی ئەم ھەمەیان کرد .

نێگەرانیشتیان نیشاندا کە چ جۆرە رژیمیکی شۆینی ئەسەد بگرێتە بەتاییبەت ئەگەر رژیمیکی فەندامێنتالی بێت . ئەمریکا و ئەوروپا بەشێوەیەکی بەکەم کەمە کاریان نەکردووە لە پشٹیوانی کردنی ئۆپۆزیسیۆن تا کۆتای بە رژیمی ئەسەد بێن بۆ ھەمان مەبەست . داوایان لە ئێس ئای کرد کە کۆمەڵی جیھانی پێشکەش بکات تا گوشاری بەردەوام بکات سەر ئۆپۆزیسیۆن بۆ ئەوەی ئێستا دان بە مافەکانی کوردان بێن لە سوریا .

داوایان کرد رێگە بگیرێت لە سوریا ئەوە ڕوونەدات کە لە عێراق روویدا ، داوایان کرد ھەموو کار بۆ روخانی رژیم بکەن . لەگەڵ ئەم گۆرانکارییانە لە خۆرھەلاتی ناوەرەست ناوچەکە رادەمالی بەناوی بەھاری عەرەبی گەلی کوردیش ئامادەیی بۆ ئەوەی مافۆ ئازادییەکانی دەستەبەر بکات . ئەمە ناگۆکی چەکارێ بەلکو خەباتی مەدەنی و دیالۆگ بۆ ئاستی ھەمیشە بەردەوام بێت . مەسەلەییەکی تری گرنگ کە لە گفتوگۆکاندا بون رۆلی ژنان بوو . پارتە سیاسەتەکان و دامەزراندەکانی گەلی کورد پێویستە نوێنەرایەتی ژن تیایدا زیاد بێت و ھەم خێزانیکی سیاسیش پابەند بون لە یەکسانی رەگەزی و دەسەلات بەخشین بەژن .

دوای بریارەکی ئەنجومەنی ئێس ئای کە کۆمیتەکان سەرۆک و جێگری سەرۆکەکان ھەڵبژێری و دوای رۆژی لە ئێران پارتە سیاسەتەکانی ئەندامی ئێس ئای پێشیارێک خرایە روو . مەلا بەختیار لە یەکیەتی نیشتمانی کوردستان وەک سەرۆکی کۆمیتەکە ھەڵبژێردرا و ئەزەمی گۆر لە بەدەمی تورکیا و لوقمان ئەحمەدی لە پارتی دیموکراتی کوردستانی ئێران وەک جێگری سەرۆک ھەڵبژێردرا . بە تێگەیشتن لەوەی کە پێشوازییە کراوەیە لە ئێران ( پ د ک ئ ) و ( کەمە دی پی ئێران ) تا یەکەریزی بپاریزن و ھەماھەنگی یەکتر بکەن .

ئەمەش تەنھێکرایەو کە کۆمیتە ئێس ئای تاییبەت بە گەلی کورد پێویستە پلانفۆرمێک دروست بکات بۆ ئەندامی کورد لە ئێس ئای لەگەڵ پارتە بانگەێشت کراوەکان ، ھاوشێوەی ئەم ڕۆژەدا کە پارتی میوان لەخۆ بگرێت کە نوێنەریان لە پەرلەمانی کوردستانی عێراق ھەیە و دوای رۆژی پێش پارتەکانی تر و میوانەکان بەشدارێ بکەن .

کۆمیتەکە ناوێکی نوێ بەخۆی بەخستووە و راپۆرتی خۆی بە شێوەی بەردەوام و رێخراو بۆ ئێس ئای بەرز دەکاتەو کە لە چوارچۆی پێکھاتە سۆسیالیست نێتەر ئاشنال و بەگۆرەیی سیاسەتەکانی کار دەکات .

کۆبونەوێکە رێکەوت لەسەر ئەوەی کە ئێس ئای کۆنفرانسیکی نۆپودولمەتی سەبارەت بە گەلی کورد لە کۆتای ئەمسالدا رێکبەخات لە بارەگای دامەزراندەکانی نۆپودولمەتی کە ئێس ئای ھاوکاری دەکات و پێکھاتەکانی دانپێناروی ھەیە .

چەند رۆژێک بەر لە کۆبونەوێکە سکرێتێری گشتی ئێس ئای لە سلێمانی زنجیرەییەکی کۆبونەوێ کرد . لەوێش کۆبونەوێ لەگەڵ مەلا بەختیار لێرساوی دەستە کارگێری مەکتەبی سیاسی یەکیەتی نیشتمانی کوردستان و ئەسەلان بابز سەرۆکی پەرلەمانی کوردستان و ئەجمەدین کەرم پارتیزگاری کەروک و جەبار باوەر ئەمێندار ووتەبێژی و مەزەرتی پێشمەرگەیی حکومەتی ھەریە کوردستان . سکرێتێری گشتی ئێس ئای لەگەڵ مەسعود بارزانی سەرۆکی ھەریە کوردستان و سەرۆکی پارتی دیموکراتی کوردستان کۆبونەوێ بۆ گفتوگۆکردن سەبارەت بە دۆخی پێوەندییەکانی ھەریە و حکومەتی بەغداد .

دانا ھەمید

لە ئینگلیزییەو کەردویمەتی بە کوردی

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May 11, 2014

ھەڵبژاردنی عێراق رێگاخۆشدەکات بۆ درێژکردنەوێ شەڕی ناوێ/جین شائۆل

جین شائۆل\* عێراقیەکان رۆژی چوارشەممە رووان لە سەندوھەکانی دەنگدان کرد بۆ ھەڵبژاردنی پەرلەمان و حکومەتیکی نوێ ، لەژێر بارودۆخیکی جەنگی ناوێ و واقیعی و تەقینەوێ تیرۆریستی و بارگەری تایفەگەریدا بە پشٹیوانی و ھاندانی ھەموو لایەنە سیاسەتەکان و پشٹیوانە دەرمەیکەکانیان ، کە بۆ کۆنترۆڵکردنی سەرچاوە مەزەکانی وزە عێراق شەڕ دەکەن . عێراق خاوەنی پێنجەمین گەرمترین بەدەگی نەوتی جیھانە، و دووھەمین وڵاتی بەرھەمھێنی نەوتە لە رێکخراوی دەولەتانی ھەناردەکارانی نەوت

(نۆپىك) OPEC -، و بىمىدوالياپانە لەمىر ھەمىيەننى نەوتدا ئىترانى تېيەراند و ئىستا كىپرىكى لەگەل ەمرىستانى سەودىيەدا دەمات. لە ھەولەكدا بۇ دوورخستەنەوى ئەوى ئۆتۆمبىلى بۆمبىزىكر او و ھىزىشى خۆكوژى دەنگەران بترسىننىت و ساردیان بكتاھە لە چوون بۇ بىنكەكانى دەنگدان، ھكومتى عىراق ھىزەكانى سوپا و ئاسايشى خستە ھالەتى ئامادەباشىيەو، و ھىزەكانى پىشەمرگە ناوچەى سەربەخۆى ھەرمى كوردستانيان لە باكورى و لات پاراست، و قەدەغەكردى ھاتوچى كەسەكان و ئۆتۆمبىليان لە بەغدا سەپاند. لەمەوى بانگەشەى ھەلپژاردنەكاندا لانىكەم 40 ھىزىش بە بۆمب بۆسەر گرەبەوئەو جەمەورىيەكان لە شارەكانى بەغدا، خانەقەين، و دىالە رووياندا. لە رۆژى 28 ئىساندا، ئەو رۆژەى كاتى ھىزە ئەمىنيەكانى عىراق لە دەنگدانى تاييەدا دەنگياندا، ھىزىشكرايە سەر ھەوت بىنكەى دەنگدان لە پارىزەكانى بەغدا، كەركوك، ئەنبەر، سەلاحەدين، و موصل زياتر لە 50 قوربانى لىكەوتەو. دەولەتى ئىسلامى لە عىراق و شام (داعش) ISIS -، كە گروپىكى سەربە رىكخراوى قاعىدەيە، بەرپرسىيارىتى خۆى لە زۆربەى ھىزەشەكان راگەياند. تەنھا 70% ى وىستەگەكانى دەنگدان لە ناوچە ناھارامەكانى پارىزەكانى ئەنبەر، كە چەند بەشنىكى لەلایەن چەكدارانى سەربە ئىسلامىە سوننى مەزھەبەكان و خەلەكان و قاعىدەو كۆنترۆلكر او، كراو ەوون، لەمكاتىدا وىستەگەكانى دەنگدان لە ناوچە ناھارامەكانى پارىزەكانى بەغداو موصل و دىالە داخراوون.

ئەمە يەكەمىن ھەلپژاردنە لەمكاتى ئەمريكا و ھاوپەيمەنەكانى لە كۆتايى سالى 2011 دا لە عىراق كشانەو، دواى ئەوى شەكستىنەننە كە گارانى ھەسانەى ياسايى بۇ ئەو يەكە سەربازىيە ئەمريكايەى لە عىراق دەمەننەو سەنگەر بکەن. گەلى عىراق بە تەنھا مايەو بۇ چارەسەر كەردنى مېراتىيەى تالى جەنگىك بۇ رووخاندنى رۆژى سەدام ھوسەين و نزيكەى دە سال لە داگيركارى سەربازى كە ژىرخانى نابورى بىنەرتى عىراقى وىزانكر. ئەنجامەكەش برىتيە لە ھەلەشەنى ناسەقامگيرى سەبارەت بە بىن كاريى، ھەزارى، نەبوونى خەمەتگوزارىيە سەركەكانى وەكو كارمەا و ناوى پاك و رزگار بوون لە لافاو، گەندەلى، و تەمژمىكى ھەلەشەوى توندوتىژى و كە بۆتە ھوى گيان لەمەستدانى زياتر لە 200 ھەزار كەس لە سى مانگى يەكەمى ئەمسالدا، و 750 قوربانى بە تەنھا لە مانگى نىساندا.

بەدوور لە پىشەبىكردى ھىچ باشتربوونىك لە رەوشى ژياندا، ھەردو دەنگەران و چاودىرانى سىياسى باوەريان وابە كە پىناچىت ھەلپژاردنەكان قەيرانى سىياسى و كۆمەلەيەتى سەختى و لات، كە مېراتى زياتر لە 35 سال جەنگ و دەستىوەردانى ئىمپىريالىزمە، چارەسەركەت. سېستى ئالۆزى نوپەريەتى رۆژى عىراق ماناى وابە ھەتا ناھارامەتى مانگى نايار، پىشەبىنى ئەنجامە فەرمىيەكانى ھەلپژاردنە ناكريت. لەگەل ھەبوونى زياتر لە 90000 كاندىد لە ھاوپەيمەننىيە جياوازەكان بۇ برەنەوى 328 كورسى پەرلەمانى، پىشەبىنى ناكريت ھىچ لايەنىك زۆرىنەى رەھا بىتەو. لەمكاتىدا سەروك و مەزبان نورى مالىكى بەردەوامە لە كۆنترۆلكردى ھاوپەيمەنى دەولەتى ياساى شىعەى خۆى، لايەنەكان و ھاوپەيمەننىيەكانى دىكەى شىعە و سوننە و كورد دابەشبوون و ھاوپەيمەنى و لىستى دىكەيان دروستكردو. ژمارەيكى زۆر سكال و بانگەشەى ساختمەكارى لە پەرسەى ھەلپژاردندا ھەن. بېنى قەسەى ئەمەلاوى، سەروك و مەزبانى پىشەوتىرى عىراق و سەروكى لىستى عىراقى، كە زۆرىنەى كورسەكانى پەرلەمانى لە ھەلپژاردنى سالى 2010 دا برەو، 38 پالىيور او لە لىستەكەى لە بەشارىكردى لە ھەلپژاردنەكاندا دوورخراونەتەو. كۆمىيۆنى ھەلپژاردنەكانى عىراق ئىدىيەى ئەو دەمات كە 34 پالىيور او لە سەرجەم لىستەكان دوورخستەتەو. ھەموو لايەن و گروپە سىياسەىكان كاربان لەسەر كارتى تايەفەگەرىي كروو. ھىچ لىست و لايەنىك ئىشى لەسەر بارووخە نابورى و كۆمەلەيەتى مەترسىدارەكان نەكردو كە روبرووى زۆرىنەى زۆرى خەلكى عىراق دەبىتەو، ئەنەت لەمكاتىدا بەر ھەمەننىانى نەوت و داھاتەكان زىادى كروو.

بېنى يەكەى زانىارى نابورى (EIU)، كە دەزگايەكى لىكۆلنەوى سەربەخۆيە لەناو گروپى كۆمپانىيەكانى ئىكۆنومىست گروپدا، رەشەنوسى بۆدجەى ئەمسالى عىراق پىشەبىنى كروو زياتر لە (3.4) بەرمىل نەوت لە رۆژىك ھەناردەبكرىت، واتا زياتر لە يەك ملیون بەرمىل نەوتى ھەناردەكر او لە چاوسالى رابردو.

ھەزارى كە لەژىر داگيركارى ئەمريكادا راگيرابو، لە ئىستادا لە ھەلەشەندايە و ئەمەش لەئەنجامى راستەوخۆى سىياسەتەكانى ھكومتەكەى مالىكى-يەو كە پەرىدا بە سىياسەتەكانى بازارى نازاد و چەند ياسايەكى ھىنايە ناراو كە رىگرى دەمات رىكخراوكان و يەكئىنيەكانى كرىكاران شەرى مووچەى باشتى و رەوشى گوزەرانى باشتى بکەن.

لە كاتىدا پىشەبىنى دەكرىت لىستەكەى مالىكى بەرزترىن ژمارەى دەنگەكان بىتەو، مالىكى پىشەبىنى بە پىكەننىانى ھەندىك لە ھاوپەيمەنى ھەيە بۇ بەدەستەننى زۆرىنەى پەرلەمانى و خولى سەھەمى سەروك و مەزبان. ئەمەش پەرسەيكى دانوستانى سىياسى بەدواى خۆيدا دەھنىت كە رەنگە چەند مانگىك باخەننىت. بەلام ئەنەت ئەمەش جىگەى دلىباى نىيە، لەمەنەوى ئەو لىستەى زۆرىنەى دەنگەكانى لە ھەلپژاردنى سالى 2010 دا برەو (لىستى عىراقىەى ئەلاوى)، نەبىوانى ھكومتىك پىكەننىت و دواى ھەوت مانگ دەستەبەردارى مافى خۆى بوو بۇ ھاوپەيمەننىيەك بە سەروكايەتى مالىكى.

مالىكى رۆلى پياو بەھىزەكەى بىنيو چوئە بانگەشەى ئەو دەمات تەنھا ئەو لەئوانايدايە عىراق بە يەكئىنى بھلئەتەو. بەلام بارى تەوا پىچەوانەى ئەمە راستە. دواى ھەرگرتى سەرومى دەسەلات لە داگيركارى ئەمريكا، ھكومتەكەى مالىكى بۇ كۆكرەنەوى پىشەبىنى شىعەكان لە پىش ھەلپژاردنەكاندا، بارگىزى تايەفەگەرىي لە نىوان شىعە و كەمىنەى سوننەكاندا گەمەتر كە بەزورى لە رۆژناوى و لاتدا دەژىن. مالىكى دەستى كە بە پاكواكردى و سەركوتكردى سىياسەتەدارە گزەنگەكانى سوننەكان و خەلكى سوننە مەزھەب و ھەموو خۆپىشانەكانى بە كارى رىكخراوى قاعىدە لەقەلمەدا و ەمرىستانى سەودىيە بە پىشەبىكردى چەكدارەكان تۆمەتبار كەرد.

لەواى دەستگيركردى سىياسەتەدارىكى ديارى سوننى و كوشتنى براكەى و پىنج لە پاسەوانەكانى، و بلاو پىكردى كامپەكانى خۆپىشانەران كە ماوەى سالىكى خايند، شەرى ناوخو لە پارىزەكانى ئەنبەر بۇ ماوەى چوار مانگە لەئىوان ھىزەكانى ھكومتەكەى مالىكى و چەكدارانى خەلەكى، و چەكدارانى ئىسلامى ناوخو و سوننىيەكان كە ھاوكات شەرى ھەرىكە لە ھكومتى مالىكى و يەكتر دەكەن ھاتۆتە ناراو.

بېنى سەنتەرى لىكۆلنەوى سترانىز و نۆدەولەتى (CSIS) لە شارى واشنتن، ئەم "ياخىبوونە عىراقىيە" نۆيە لانىكەم لە 12 رىكخراوى سەركەى و ئەگەرى زياتر لە 40 گروپى جياواز پىكدىت. بېنى خەمەلەندى سەنتەركە كەمتر لە 10% ئەو گروپانە برىتىن لە ياخىبوونى ناغىراقى، ئەمەش راستەكە بەغدا و واشنتن كەم بايەخ لى دەروان.

بەلام وەكو دەرنەجامىكى شەركە زياتر لە 400000 ھەزار عىراقى ناچاركراون مأل و ھالى خۆيان بەجىيەنل، لەمكاتىدا رومادى، پايتەختى پارىزەكانى ئەنبەر، شەرى پىكدادانى تىدا بەردەوامە، شارى فەلوجە لەژىر دەسەلاتى ياخىبوواندايە.

بەلام ھەمەشەى دروستكر او ئەلقاعىدە وەكو بەشنىك لە پەرزە فراوانترەكەى بۇ پەرواىزخستى ئىران و لاوازكردى ھەزموونى روسا و چىن لە رۆژەلاتى ناوەرەستا، بەشنىكى زۆرى دەرنەجامى واشنتن و ھاوپەيمەننىيە ھەرىمەتەيكەننى كە سەنسى مىلشياكانى ئىسلامىە سوننىيەكان

دەكەن لە سوریاى دراوسى- لە نۆوانىشياندا داعش و بەرەى نوسرە- بۆ رووخاندنى بەشار ئەسەدى سەرۆكى سووریا. ئىدارەى ئوباما، بە رەشەبەبەىكى زۆرە، ھەرشەى ئەلھاقىدە و پاشكۆكانى بەكار دەھێنێت وەكو پاساویك بۆ چەكدار كەردنى ھۆكۆمەتەكەى مالىكى و بەوش كۆنترۆل كەردنى عىراق و سامانەكانى. ھاوكات ئىدارەى ئوباما گەشەدەدات بە تىمە پەسپۆرەكەى خۆى كە بە كۆنترەكت لەژێر دەسەلاتى ھۆكۆمەتى عىراقدا كاردەكەن بۆ ھەمەكەردنى ئاسايش، مەشقى سەربازى، و شىكارى ھەوالگەرى، ھەروەھا پرۆژەكانى بازارگانى و ووزە و ئاودەنكەردنەمە. لەكاتىدا جۆن كىرى، و مزىرى دەرمەوى ئەمرىكا، گەرانەمەوى ھێزەكانى سوپاى وڵاتەكەى بەدوورزانى، ئەو ئەركەكەى بە بەلێندەرە لاومەكەكانى پێناگۆن سەپاردووە، كە بەپەى ئەو ئامارانەى لەلایەن رۆژنامەى ۆل سترىت ژۆرنالەمە ئاماژەى پێكراوە لە مانگى كانوونى دوومى سالى 2013 دا زياتر بووە لە 12500 بەلێندەر.

ھەروەھا بارگەزىبەكان لەنۆوان رۆژى مالىكى و ھۆكۆمەتى ھەرىمى كوردستاندا زياتر بووە، كە ئەمەى دواى ھەولێداوە راستەوخۆ نەوت ھەناردە بكات و بەغدا لە پشكەكانى فرۆشتنى نەوت بێبەش بكات، و ترس و نەگەرانى جىابوونەمەوى كۆتايى لە ھۆكۆمەتى ئاوەندى بەغدا زياتر كەردووە. ئەم مەلەلانى دەمارگىرەى تالە لەسەر سنوورەكان و مافەكانى بەرھەمھێنان و فرۆشتنى سامانى نەوت و گاز، ئەمەندە بەھێزە كە خەرىكە لەمۆش تەشەنەدەسەنێت بۆ شەرى ناوخۆ.

مالىكى دەسەلاتى لەمەستى خۆیدا قۆرغكەردووە و لەھەمانكاتدا چار پۆست بەرپۆمەبەت: سەرۆك وەزىران، وەزارەتى بەرگەرى، وەزارەتى ناوخۆ و ھەروەھا سەرۆكى دەزگای ئاسايشى ناوخۆیە و 930000 كەرمەندى ئاسايش لەژێر دەسەلاتى ئەودا. ئەمەش بەشێوەىكى رووكەش لەسەر ئەمەى مالىكى نەتوانیوە رەزەمەندى پەرلەمان بەدەست بەنێت بۆ ئەو كەسانەى بۆ پەركەردنەمەوى ئەو پۆستانە دەستىنەشەراون. ھەروەھا مالىكى دەسەلاتى داومەرى لەژێر دەستدا. لەئەنجامدا، ئەو تەوانى ياساى پوچەلەكەتەمە كە لەلایەن پەرلەمانەمە پێشنيار كرابوو كە دەتوانى رێگەى لە مالىكى بكات بۆ جارى سەپمە لە پۆستەكەیدا بەنێتەمە.

پاڤزە سالى دواى داگیركارى ئەمرىكا و رووخاندنى رۆژى سەدام حوسەین، عىراق ھۆكۆمەتێكى دىكتاتۆرى ھەبە كە سەپمەن بەرزترین رێژەى لەسەپاردەنى ھەبە لەسەر ئاستى جیھانى. رێخەراوى ھیومان رایتس ۆچ لە راپۆرتى سالى 2013ى خۆیدا بە ئاوەنیشانى (عراق: سەستەمىكى داپەرەمەرى تێكشكاو) ھۆكۆمەتى مالىكى بە بەكارھێنانى "رێوشوونى دەرندە لەدژى سەپاسەمەدارانى ئۆپۆزىيۆن، دەستبەسەر كراوەكان، خۆپەشەندەران و رۆژنامەنووسان" وەسف كەردووە، و بەشێوەىكى كارگەر بوارى كۆمەلگای مەدەنى سەربەخۆ و ئازادى سەپاسەكانى بەرەسكەردتەمە... خەلكى عىراق ئەمەرو رۆبەرۆى ھۆكۆمەتێك دەبەمە كە زياتر بەرەمە تەكرەمەى دەروا و رێوشوونى كەمتر ئەنجامدەدات بۆ ئەمەى ژيان و مالى و ھالىان پارێزراوتر بكات.

چەند ھەفتەىك پێش ھەلەزارەكەكان، ھۆكۆمەتى عىراق رەشەنوسى پرۆژە ياساى "سەلامەتى نیشتمانى" پەسەندكرد، كە بەپەى ئەم پرۆژە ياساى دەسەلاتى رەگەیاندى "بارى ئاساى" و چەند دەسەلاتىكى نەك لە دەسەلاتى رەھا بە سەرۆك وەزىران دەبەخشیێت بۆ بێباردان لەمەوى چى مەترسە و پەتەبەستى بە رەگەیاندى بارى ئاساى، و بەوش ترس و نەگەرانى زۆرى بەرەكردتەمە كە ھۆكۆمەت رەنگە بئەوانێت ئەم ياساى بۆ سەركۆنەردنى نەبار و دۆزەمەكانى بەكاربەنێت.

ئەو كێشەنەى لەعەراقدە لەلایەن واشنتۆن، بەریتانیا، فەرنسە، و ھاوپەیمانێتە ھەرمەپەتەكانیانەمە وروژنەراون، بارودۆخ دەرخسەن بۆ داپەشەبونى عىراق و قەیرانێكى فراوانتر كە ئەك ھەم عىراق دەگەرتەمە، بەلكو سووریا و لوبنان و دەولەتە نەوتەكانى كەنداوىشى تێوەدەگەلێت.

\*پرۆفیسۆر جەن شائۆل: مامۆستا لە زانكۆى مانچەستەر

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تورکیا لە چاوەنەكەى كوردەووە سەپرى قەیرانى سووریا دەكات ... ماریا فانتاپى

4/6/2012

تورکیا پێدەچێت ھەموو بۆاردەكان بۆ دەستپۆردان لە سووریا بە كراوێى بەلێتەمە تەنەت بە پەچەكەردنى ئۆپۆزىيۆنیشەمە. شەكستى ئەنقەرە لە چاوەنەكەردنى پەرسەندەكانى پەرسى كورد لە سووریاو مەلەلانى بەشار ئەسەد بۆ مانەمە لە دەسەلات، رێگەیان بۆ لایەنەكانیتر خۆشكەردووە تا ئەجێندای خۆیان لەو وڵاتەدا پێدە بكەن.

لە ئاوەچە كوردنیشەكانى سووریا، پارتى كریكارانى كوردستان، پەكەكە، بەرەى سەربازى خۆى دژ بە تورکیا پەرمێدەدات. سەركەدەكانى كوردستانى عێراقیش پەرمە بە دەستپۆشەتووبى سەپاسى خۆیان دەدەن. ھەول بۆ دامەزراندنى ھەرمەپەتى كوردى دەدەن لە سووریا.

ئەجێنداكەى پەكەكەمە كوردانى عێراق دەتوانن مەسەلەى كورد لە تورکیا بەتەقینەمە، ئەوش بە زىادەردنى داواكانیان بۆ ئۆتۆنۆمى بەھێزكەردنى خەباتى چەكدارى. تورکیا لە بارى ئامادەباشیدا پەمە دەسەلاتدارانى ھەموو ھۆكارێك بە كار دەھێنن بۆ كارتێكەردن بە سەر بارودۆخى سووریا بە مەبەستى دوورخستەنەمە ھەم جۆرە قەیرانێك لە ناوخۆى وڵاتەكەیاندا.

تورکیا پەرسى كورد وەك سەركەپترین مەترسە بۆ سەر سەقامگیرى خۆى دەبێت. كورد نەزىكەى 20% دانیشتووانى تورکیا پێدەھێنن و داخوازبەكانیان لە پێدانى مافى كۆلتوربەمە دەست پێدەكەن ھەتا دەگەنە جىابوونەمە لە دەولەتى تورکیا. لەمەتى سالى 2007مە، سەرۆك وەزىران رەجەب تەیب ئەردوغان لە ھەولێ ساركەردنەمەى ئەم پەرسەدا بووە ئەمەش بە بەخشینی چەند مافىكى كۆلتورى بە كوردان، بەلام ھاوكات لە ھەولێ رێگرتن لە وەدەستەپەنانى ئۆتۆنۆمى بووە لە لایەن كوردو لە دژى جوداخوازیدا جەنگاوە.

تورکیا كەمەتى رۆژى ئەسەد بە دەرفەتێك دەزانێت بۆ دروستكەردنى كارگەرى لە سەر كوردى سووریا. تورکیا ھېوادار بوو بئەوانێت لە رێى

میاندار یکردنی ئنجومەنی نیشتمانی سوریا چاودێری دانوستانەکانی پرسی کوردی بکات. ئەمقەرە ئومێدەوارە کە لە باشترین حالتدا پاش رووخانی رژیمی ئێسەد، مافەکانی کورد لە چوارچێوەی "پەنگرتووی دەولەتی سوریا" دانی پێدا بنێت. بەمشێوەیە کوردانی سوریا لە وەدەستەپێنانی هەموو جوهرە ئۆتۆنۆمیەکی بێبەش دەکێژێ و لقی پەکهە کە لە سوریا، واتە پارتی یەکی نیشتمانی، لاواز دەکێژێ و بزاڤی جوداخوازی تورکیاش زیاتر گۆر ناگیرێت. تورکیا پشتی بە کوردانی عێراق بەستبوو کە نفوزیان بە سەر پارتە کوردییەکانی سوریا بەکاربێنن بۆ رازیکردنیان بە پەسەندکردنی دانوستانەکان .

بەلام ستراتیژییەکی تورکیا دەرنجامی پێچەوانەی لێکەوتەو. رژێمەکی ئێسەد هێشتا نەروخواه وەک ئەوەی تورکیا ئاواتەخواز بوو. کوردی عێراقیش لە هەولێر بۆ جێبەجێکردنی ئەجینداکانی خۆیان و لە لایەکی تریشەوە بەشار ئێسەد وەک وەلامدانەویەکی دەستی پەکهەکی لە سوریا ناوەلا کردووە .

ئنجومەنی نیشتمانی سوریا شکستی هێناوە لە راکێشان و هێشتنەوی ئەندامانی کورد لە لای خۆیدا. لە مانگی کانونی دوهمدا، پارتە کوردییەکان ئەندامێتی خۆیان لە ئنجومەنەکی هەلیساردو بانز میان ئنجومەنی نیشتمانی کوردیان بێکەنا بە پشنگیری کوردی عێراق. لە ئاکامدا، تەنها ژمارەیکی کەم لە ئەندامانی کورد لە ئنجومەنی نیشتمانی سوریا دا ماوەتەموو ئنجومەنەکی شەریعیتی خۆی لە دەستداوە بۆ سازدانی دانوستانەکان .

کوردی عێراق لە چوارچێوەی ئنجومەنی نیشتمانی کورد بێگهی سیاسی خۆیان لە کایەیی سیاسەتی کوردی سوریا دا پەرەپێداوە. هەرچەندە پێشتر داواکارییەکانی کورد لە سوریا لە چوارچێوەی لامرکەزبێتدا قەتئیس کرابوون، بەلام دەستەیی جێبەجێکاری ئنجومەنی نیشتمانی کورد لە سوریا داوای رژێمیەکی بەرزی ئۆتۆنۆمی دەکات و ئەمەش چەسپاندنی مۆدێلی هەریمی کوردییە لە سوریا وەک ئەوەی لە عێراقدا هەیە .

لەگەڵ بەر دەوامی قەیرانی سوریا، کوردی عێراق سەرقالی بەهێزکردنی ئنجومەنی نیشتمانی کوردن وەک تاقە نوێنەری داواکانی کورد لە وڵاتەدا. کوردانی عێراق لەو ئاگادارن کە هەر دەسەلاتێکی تازە کە بێهێت لە نایندەییکی نزیکیا حوکمی سوریا بکات پێویستی بە کورد دەبێت بۆ ئەوەی خۆی وەک هێزێکی شەری بناسێت. ئنجومەنە کوردییەکی لەوانیە ناستی داواکان زیاتر بکاتو تەنیا لەگەڵ ئەو لایەندا مامەلە بکات کە داواکانی سەبارەت بە ئۆتۆنۆمیەکی بەرفراوان پەسەند دەکات .

پەکهەش بەر دەوامە لە بەر دەوێش بردنی ئەجیندای خۆی و ئێسەد بە هاوڕێمانیکی نامادە دەبێت بۆ پتەوکردن و پەرەپێدانی بەرە سەربازییەکی لەسەر سنور. لە چەند مانگی رابردوودا، پەکهە دەستی بە تەواوتی ناوەلا بوو بۆ ئەجیادانی چالاکییەکانی خۆی لە ناوچەیی عفرین لە باکووری خۆرناوای سوریا. لە عفرینەو، پارتی یەکی دیموکراتی سەر بە پەکهە سنوری خۆی بەرەو رۆژ هەلات پەرەپێداوە بارەگای تازەیی لە شارەکانی رەفس ئەلعین و عەین ئەلعین مەب کردووەتەو لە سەر سنوری سوریا لەگەڵ تورکیا. رەنگە پەکهە ئیستای بەرفراوانبوونی لقه سورییەکی خۆی بە کار بێنێت بۆ دامەزراندنی بەرەیی سەربازی کە لە رۆژ ناوای سوریاوە دەستبەدەکانو هەتا رۆژ هەلاتی عێراق درێژ دەبێتەو .

هەلەکشانی ئەنگەرەیی سوریا بەرەو شەریکی ناوخوازی درێژخایەن باشترین دەرفەت بۆ پەکهە دەڕەمخسێت بۆ ئەوەی نفوزی خۆی پتەو بکاتو دەست بە گەشەکردن بکات لە ناو سوریا. لە کاتێکدا ئێسەد لە مەملانێدا بە پارتی پاراستنی دەسەلاتی خۆی، لەوانیە دەسەلاتی زیاتر بێخەشێتە پارتی یەکی دیموکراتی وەک ئامرازێ سەرەکی بۆ کۆنترۆڵکردنی ناوچە کوردنشینەکان لە باکووری سوریا. ئەگەر شەری چەکداریش ناوچە کوردییەکان بێتەتەو، ئەوا یارمەتی پارتی یەکی دیموکراتی دەدات بۆ داکوتانی رەگوریشەیی خۆی لە ناوچەکاندا. وەک تاکە پارتی کوردی کە توانای هەلگرێتی چەکی هەیە، پارتی یەکی دیموکراتی دەتوانێت شەری عییت بەدەست بێنێت وەک پارێزەری کورده مەدەنییەکان .

تورکیا هەولێداوە لە ژێر دەمامکی بەرەیی نۆدەوڵەتیەو دەست لە قەیرانی سوریا دا وەرەدات. بەلام هەتا ئەم ساتەش مەسەلەیی پشنگیری بۆ دەستبەردانی سەربازی یان مەرویی رۆبەری بەرەنگاربونەوێ زۆر بووەتەو. بۆیە بەهێزکردنی ئنجومەنی نیشتمانی سوریا دەکێژێت باشترین رێگا بێت بۆ تورکیا بۆ چوونە نیو سوریاو کۆنترۆڵکردنی رژێمی پرسی کورد .

ئێستا ئنجومەنی نیشتمانی سوریا مەکتەبیکی سەربازی دەکاتەو کە بەرەرس دەبێت لە رێکخستنی هێزەکانی سوپای سوریا ئازاد لە دژی رژێمەکی ئێسەد. لە رێی ئەم دەستەییەو، تورکیا دەتوانێت یارمەتی سوپای سوریا ئازاد بەدات و ئەمەکارێ ئەو سوپایە بەدەست بێنێت بۆ کۆنترۆڵکردنی پارێزگاکانی باکووری سوریاو رێگاش لە پێشکەوتنە سەربازییەکانی پەکهە بگرێت .

تورکیا رەنگە هیوادار بێت کە بتوانی ئنجومەنی نیشتمانی سوریا وەک تاقە گروپی شەری ئۆپۆزیسیون لە سوریا بختە بەرچاو تاوەکو ئەندامە کوردهکان بگرێتەو ژێر رکیفی خۆی و سەرپەرشتی دانوستانەکانی سەر پرسی کورد بکات لە سوریا .

یارمەتیدانی سەربازی لە رێگەیی ئنجومەنی نیشتمانی سوریا لەوانیە خزمەتی بەرەو مەدەنییەکانی تورکیا بکات بۆ رێگرتن لە ئەجینداکانی پەکهەو کوردی عێراق. بەلام ئەو کات رەنگە لە جیاتیی ئەوەی یارمەتی شۆرشگێرەکان بەدات بۆ روخاندنی رژێمەکی ئێسەد، تورکیا مەجازەفی ئەو دەکات کە سوریا بەرەو مەملانێیەکی بەرفراوانی ناوخوازی ببات.

وەرگیرانی لە ئینگلیزییەو: ئاریز حسین/ ئاوانە

AKK.28

<http://www.pukonline.org/wtar-details.aspx?jimare=35>

نەمریکا پێویستی بە کورده ... جۆن هانا\*

3/25/2012

لەنێوان ئەو سالیادە عێراقیانە دەبێت یادیکرێتەو بریتییە لەوەی 21 سالی لەمەوێر و لەهەفتەییەکی وەک ئەم هەفتەییەدا، بە ملیۆنان کوردی عێراق لەترسی سوپای سەدام حسین بۆ چیاکانی نزیکی سنوورەکانی تورکیا و ئێران هەلات. دواي شکستەکی لە جەنگی یەکمەمی کەنداو، رژێمی سەدام بەخیزایی دەستیکرد بە سەرکوتکردنی ئۆپۆزیسیون ناوخوازی دەسەلاتە دیکتاتۆریەکی.

ئەمەندی پەموەندی بە کوردهکانەو هەیه، مەبەستی سەدام رۆنوو، و دیویست بۆیەکارەکی و بۆ هەتا هەتا ئەو بەرەستە نەسپاوەی کەمینەیی کوردهکان بۆ دەسەلاتە دیکتاتۆریەکی دروستیکردبو لەناو ببات. جێنوساید لەئارادابوو و بریتییوو لە تەواوکردنی ئەرکێک کە سالی 1988

دەستپېژند، کاتى ھېزەمکانى عىراق بەھىزاران گوندیان تەختکرد و خەلکەمەیان کوشت و چەکی کیمیاویان لەدژى ژن و مندال و پیاوانى بېتاوان لە شارۆچکەى ھەلەبجە بەکار ھێنا.

لەو بارودۆخدا و لە کەشو ھوايەکی ساردى شاخاويدا، شکستى کوردەکان لە رۆبەر و بونەوى ھەموو ھېزى رژىمى سەدامدا نزيك بوو.

ھەتائە کاتەى ئەمریکا وتى نەخیز، و بەھەماناھەنگى گروپىکى بچووک لە ھاو پەیمانان وىلايەتە يەكگرتووەکان بە سادەى کوردەکانى رزگار کرد. فەرمانکرا بە سوپای سەدام واز لە ھېزەمکانى بھێننى ئەگىنا رۆبەر وى گورزى نوێ دەبێتەو. ھېزە پىادەکانى ئەمریکا لە باکوورى عىراق جىگىر کران و توانيان يەكێک لە مەز نترين پرۆسەى فرياکەوتنى مرويى لەمىژ وودا تۆمار بکەن. بەسەر ئاسمانى کوردستاندا ناوچەى دژ ھەزىن دروستکرا و ھەتا سالى 2003 فرۆکەکانى ئەمریکا چاودىرى و پارىزگار ييان لە ئاسمانى ھەريمى کوردستان دەکرد، و دوا جار سالى 2003 ئەمریکا 30 ملیۆن ھاوڵاتى عىراقى، لەنۆوانيشياندا کوردەکان، لە دەسەلاتى دژەندى رژىمى سەدام رزگار کرد.

جىگای خۆيەتى ئەم چىرۆکى رزگار کردنە بىرى سەر کردايەتى ئەمرىکى بخرىتەو، بەتايەتى لەمسالدا بۆيەکەمىنجار کوردەکانى عىراق بەيى پاراستنى راستەمۆخى ئەمرىکى خۆيان دەبينەو. بىر يارەکەى سەرۆک ئۆباما بۆ کشانەوى ھېزەمکانى ئەمریکا لە عىراق جارىکى تر کوردەکانى لە نيشتمانى خۆياندا بە تەنبايى ھېشەو. لەکاتێکدا چىدى رۆبەر وى تىرۆرى سەدام ناينەو، سىپەرى مېژ ووى بەئازارى کوردەکان ماوتەو، چونکە چەندىن بارگىژى چارەسەر نەکراو لەئارادايە ئەکە لەگەڵ زۆرىنەى عەربى عىراقدا، بەلکۆ لەگەڵ دراوسى بەھېزەمکانى وەکو ئىران و سوريا و تورکيدا کە لەگەڵ کەمپەى کوردى و ئاتەمکانياندا لەکيشە و ملماننيدان.

رەنگە بەھوى ترس و رق و دەستپەردانى دەرەکیەو، رۆبەر و بونەوى مەیک يان جەنگێک لەناوخۆى عىراق و بگەرە ناوچەکەشدا بھېننە ئاروہ. ئەو ھەش بەراستى زۆر تراژىدى دەبیت بۆ کوردەکان و ناوبانگ و بىر مۆھەندىە درىژخايەنەکانى ئەمریکا.

جىبەجىکردنى پرۆژەى ئەمرىکى لە عىراق لە کوردستان سەرکەوتوودەبیت ھەر وەکو لە ئالمانيا و ژاپۆن و کۆريای باشوور دواى جەنگى جىھانى دووم روويدا.

ھەريمى کوردستان ئاسايشکى سەقامگىرى ھەيە و لەراستيدا تاکە سەربازىکى ئەمرىکى لەم ھەريمەدا گيانى لەدەستدەواو، و ھەر وەھا نابوور يەکى گەشەسەندووى ھەيە کە ئاستەمکانى وەبەر ھێنانى بىيانى گەشەدەکات. ھەر وەھا ديمۆکراسيەکى گەشەسەندووى ھەيە و لەکاتێکدا ئەم ديمۆکراسيە پىزفیکت نى، بەلام چەندىن پارتى نوپۆز سىۆنى راستەمۆخى و کۆمەلگای مەدەنى و مەيداي گەشەسەندووى بەخۆيەو بېنيوہ. بەلێ گەندەلى، و نەبوونى لىپرسىنەو و پىشکەوتنى ئارێک وەکو کيشەى جدى ماونەو، بەلام بەدلىيايەو بەگشتى لە کۆريای باشوورى سالى 1970 کان خراپتر نى لە خالىکى ھاوشوودا لە ئەزموونى ئەو و ئاتە لەژىر دەسەلاتى ئەمریکادا.

کوردستانى عىراق ھەموو پىداويستىەکانى ئەو تىدايە بېيتە ھېزىکى ستراتيژى ئەمرىکى. رەنگە عەرەبەکانى عىراق زۆر دلىنايەبووين لە رۆلىکى درىژخايەنى ھېزەمکانى ئەمریکا، بەلام کوردەکان بەو شىوہ نين، و سەرکردەکانى کورد خواستى خۆيان راگەياندوہ بۆ مانەوى ھەميشەيى ھېزەمکانى ئەمریکا و دانىشتوانى ئەم ھەريمە کە نزيکەى پىنج ملیۆن دەبیت بەگشتى دۆستى ئەمرىکان. لەبەر ئەو سەنورى ھاو بەشى لەگەڵ ئىران و سوريا ھەيە، کوردستان دەتوانىت رۆلىکى گرنگ بېينىت لە ستراتيژى ئەمرىکا بۆ جەنگان لەدژى ئەو ھەريمانەى نيشتا لەرژىمەکانى ئەو دوو و ئاتە دژ ئەمریکاوہ سەرچاوەدەگرىت. ھېزەمکانى ئاسايش و ھەوالگرى کورد بۆتوانان و ئەزموونى شەريان ھەيە و دواى چەندىن سال لەھاوکارى پەيوەندى کارکردنى زۆرباشيان لەگەڵ ھاوتا ئەمرىکەيەکانياندا دروستکردوہ لەنۆوانيشياندا شەرىکردن لەدژى رىخخراوى ئەلقاعيدە. لەبەر ئەو کوردستان 40-50 مليار بەرميل نەوتى تىدايە، ئەم ھەريمە دەتوانىت بېيتە يەكێک لەمەز نترين و ئاتە بەر ھەمپەينەرەکانى نەوت و بەشدارىکى سەرەکى لە ئاسايشى وزەى جىھانى.

بەپشتگىرى ئەمریکا، کوردستان دەتوانىت بېيت بە بزوينەرى پىشکەوتنى ديمۆکراتى بەشەکانى ترى عىراق. بەلام کشانەوى بەپەلەى ئەمریکا بۆشايەکى مەترسىدارى جىبەشووہ کە رىگاخشکەرە بۆ کردارى وىزانکەر کە بەئاسانى لەکۆنترۆل دەر دەچىت.

ئەو بۆشايە پىويستە دەستبەجى بە ستراتيژىکى بەھېزى ئەمرىکى پىرىکرتەو بۆ دانانى پەيوەندىەکى نوێ "تايەتى" لەگەڵ کوردەکانى عىراقدا. رۆنکردنەوى ئەو کە سەلامەتى کوردستان لەچارچوہى عىراقىکى فیدرالى راستەمۆخدا ئەولەويەتکى بالای ئەمریکا بەدەتوانىت دۆنمان دوربختەوہ و ھاوکات ھاندەرە بۆ ددانبەخۆداگرتن و ئارامگرتن و ھاوکارى کوردەکان لە چارەسەرکردنى بارگىژى سياستەتەکانى رۆژانەى بەغدا.

کاتى مەسعود بارزانى، سەرۆکى ھەريمى کوردستان، مانگى داھاتو سەردانى ئەمریکا دەکات، باشترە ئىدارەى ئۆباما ئەو ھەلە بقۆزىتەو بۆ دامەزراندنى لىژنەيەکى ھاو بەشى نوێ سەبارەت بە پەيوەندىەکانى نۆوان ئەمریکا و کورد بۆ سەربەشکىردنى پەيوەندىە دووقولەيەکانى نۆوان ھەردولا و ئەم لىژنەيە پىويستە لەبەر پىرسانى بالای ھەردولا پىکىت. پىويستە کونسولخانەى ئەمریکا لە کوردستان لەلایەن فەرمانبەرىکى بالای وەزارەتى دەر مە بەپەلەى بالۆز بەر ئومبىر ئيت و دەتوانىت بە ژەنەرالىکى خانەنشين پىشتگىرى لىپىکرىت. لەژىر ناو نيشانى ھارىکارى ئەمنى ئەمرىکى بۆ عىراق، پىويستە چەندىن پرۆگرام بۆ پىچەککردن و راھەنانى ھېزەمکانى ئاسايش و ھەوالگرى ھەريمى کوردستان دايمەزىنرىت لەنۆوانيشياندا چەندىن کەنالى بەھېز بۆ گۆرىنەوى زانىارى و ھەولەکانى ترى ھاوکارىکردن. پىويستە دەستپىشخەريەکى ھاو بەش بۆ فراوانکردنى وەبەر ھێنانى ئەمرىکى لە کوردستان دەستپىکرىت و جەختبکرىتەو لەسەر پەرمەيدانى ھەلکشانى ھەريمەکە وەکو ھەناردەکارىکى وزەى مەتەنەيىکراو بۆ بازارەکانى رۆژناو. پىويستە ھاوکارى تەکنىکى فەر ھەمبکرىت بۆ پىشتگىرىکردنى ھەولەکانى ھەريمى کوردستان بۆ رىشەکشکردنى گەندەلى و بەھېزکردنى حوکمى ياسا و زامەنکردنى مافەکانى مەوۇف.

دواى زياتر لە دوو دەيە لە رزگارکردنى کوردەکانى عىراق لە لەناوبردن و سىپەوہ، کاتى ئەوہيە ئەمریکا پەيوەندىەکى درىژخايەنى ستراتيژى

لەگەڵ كوردەكاندا دابەمزر ئىنئىت. كوردستانىكى ئارام و خوشگوزەران و دەولەمەند و متمانەبەخۆبوو لەپەيوەندىيەكانى لەگەڵ تاكە زەلەزى دنيا، دەتوانىت بىتە قازانچىك بۇ بەرژمەندىيەكانى ئەمەريكا و ھىزىك بۇ سەقامگىرى و مۆدىرنىزم لە سەرانسەرى عىراق و رۆژھەلاتى ناوەرەستى فراوانتردا.

\*جۆن ھانا: ئەندامىكى بالاي دامەزراوى بەرگريكرەنە لە ديمۆكراسىيەكان و زياتر لە 20 سال ئەزموونى كاركرەنى ھەيە لە وەزارەتى دەرەوى ئەمەريكا، و لەماوەى سالانى نىوان 2001 بۆ 2009 يەكئىك بوو لە يارىدەدەرە متمانەپەيكرامەكانى دىك چىنى، جىگرى سەرۆكى ئەمەريكا، بۇ مەسەلەكانى ئاسايشى نەتەوىي و چەندىن پۇستى تىرى وەرگرتوو.

سەرچاوە: foreignpolicy.com

وەرگێڕانى ئەمىنىگىزىيە: دانا تەيب مەمنى

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جوگرافىاى سياسىي كورد ... گۆكەهان بەجىك

4/25/2012

نورى مالىكى سەرۆك وەزىرائى عىراق بە شىوئەيەكى سەرنجراكش ھەلۆئىستى توركيائى بەرامبەر كوردەكان گۆرى. خواستى گەورەى مالىكى ئەمەيە كە عىراق لە روى جيوپۆلوتىكەمە بىسەتتەمە بە ئايدۆلۆژىي مۆرۆوىي شىعە لە پال ئىراندا، ئەو جۆرە ستراتيژە ھەرچەندە لەلايەن ھەندىك و لاتى وەك توركيائە رەخنەى لىدەگىزىت، بە ئەواوى بى بناغە نەيە شىعەكان زۆرىنەيەكى بەرچاوان لە عىراقدا، زياتر لەو دەستپۆردانى خۆرئاوایى بە رابەري ئەمەريكا دەولەتى عىراقى فەوتان و رىگەي كوردەو بۇ ئەو تايەفەگەرييە ئەمەرو، ستراتيژەكەى مالىكى مەترسىي زۆرە بۇ ئايندەى عىراق سەبارەت بە يەكئىتتى عىراق، بەلام پال بە توركيائە دەنئىت بەرمو بۆچوونىكى واقىعەى دەر بارەى كىشەى كورد، بۇ نمونە توركيائى ئىستاتىگەيشنوو كە بەرژمەندىيە بالاكەى لە ناوچەكەدا پىنۆيستى بە ھاوکارىي توندو بەھىزە لەگەڵ كوردەكانى عىراق، توركيائى ھىچ كارىكى ئەوتو ناكات يەكئىتى عىراق بشىوئىنئىت و تىكيدات، بەلام دوو دل نائىت لە قوولكرەنەوى ئىلتىزاماتى خۆى لەگەڵ ھەريەمە كوردىيەكە سەرمەراي بەر ھەلستىكرەن لەلايەن بەغداو، ھاوکارىيكرەنى ئەنكەرە لەگەڵ مەسعود بارزائى سەرۆكى ھەريەمە كوردىيە سەربەخۆكەى عىراق لە راستىدا گۆشارى ناوچەي لەسەر توركيائى كەمەدەكاتەو، بەلام ئابا ئەو بەسە بۇ زالىون بەسەر خۆدى كىشەى كورد دا؟

بەر لە وەلادانەو، مەروۇف بۆيىستە جوگرافىاى سياسىي كوردەكان شىكەتەو، ئەمەرو كوردەكان لە توركيائى عىراق و سورىا ئىراندا دەژىن، ھىچ كام لەم و لاتانە ستراتيژىكى تۆكمەى دەستەبەر نەكرەو كە ئەوان وەك ھاوولائى يەكسان يەكخەن، ئىدى سەبارەت بە پرسی كورد ھەموو ئەم دەولەتەنە شەكستيان ھىناو، لەگەڵ ئەمەشدا ئەو ھەستىار تەر ئەو بە چىنكرەنە سياسىيەى كوردەكانە بەگشتى، كوردەكان لە مۆرۆو وەك تەقلىدەيى يان مۆدىرن پۆلنكران، بۇ نمونە نەقشەبەندىيە كە رىيازىكى ئابىيى ئىسلامە زۆر كارىگەر بوو لەناو كوردەكانى توركيادا، بەلام ئەواو لەناو برا لەلايەن رۆژىمە كەمالىستەو بە تايەتەى دواى كودەتاكەى 1960، ئەگەر كەمالىزم تۆزىك ئەقۇل و دانايى سۆشۆلۆژىي ھەموايە مەملەتتىيەى خۆى لەگەڵ ئىسلامدا نەدەھىنايە ناوچە كوردىيەكانى توركيائە.

ئەو جياوازىيكرەنەى مۆركى (تەقلىدەيى) و (مۆدىرن) ى ھىنايە بەر ھەم سۆشۆلۆژىيتر بوو لە جۆرەكەيداو پەيوەست بوو بە ئىسلام و شارنشىيەو بەمواى يەكدا، ھەر وەك چاومرواندەكران بنگە تەقلىدەيى كوردىيەكە كە بەتوندىيە بە ئىسلامەو لكاو، لەسەر مەسەلە سياسىيەكان بىدەنگ بوون، لە ئەنجامدا گروپە كوردىيە مۆدىرنەكان و شارنشىيە كوردەكانى توركيائى كە چىتر بەشنىك نەبوون لە رىكخستە تەقلىدەيىيان، دەستەبەجى چوونە ناو ناسىۆناليزمەو، بە شىوئەيەكى ئەمگۆنجاو ئەم پەنا بۆ بۆردنە لە شىوازە چەپەرەو و عىلمانىيەكەيدا خۆى ئاشكرا كرد كە تاكە بۆاردەى بوو بە ھۆى ھەزارى سياسىيە لە توركيائى لەسەر مەسەلەى كورد لە بارەى سياسىيە موحافىزكارەكان و سياسىيەكانى بالى راست وەك بەك، بە پىچەوانەى ناو توركيائەو، ناسىۆناليزمى كوردىيە لە عىراقدا گروپە تەقلىدەيى ئابىيەكانى شىوئەى- بارزائى پىشەوايى دەكرە، لەبەرئەو جوگرافىاى سياسىيە كوردىيەى دوو مۆدىلى سەرمەيە ھەيە: ناسىۆناليزمى كوردىيە لە رىگەى نۆخبە تەقلىدەيەكان (مۆدىلى بارزائى) و ناسىۆناليزمى كوردىيە لە رىگەى نۆخبە عىلمانىيەكانەو (مۆدىلى ئۆجەلان).

تابلۆي پىشوو تر پىسارىكى جددى بۇ توركيائى دروستەكات: كى كوردەكانى توركيائى رازى دىكات لە مۆدىلى ئۆجەلان دووربەمەو؟ تائىستە مەملەتتىيە لەم مەسەلەيدا لە مەيدانى دەزگا ئەمىنىيەكانى توركيادا بوو، لەگەڵ ئەمانەدا دەولەتى توركيائى ھىچ رىكخراوئىكى كوردىيەى تىدا نەيە ھىچ ئەلەتەنەتەيى كوردىيەى تىدا نەيە، پارىزگارەن و ئەفسەرانى سەربازى و كەسايەتتەيە گشتىيەكانى تر رۆلى سنووردارىان لەم جۆرە مەسەلەندا ھەيە، وەك زۆربەى دەولەتەنى تر، لە سەعات 4ى پاشنىومەرو رادەوستتەت، بەلام ژيان لە ھەموو ئالۆزىيەكانى تردا بەرەوامدەبىت، بە واتايەكى تر، توركيائى نەمىتوانىو مۆدىللىكى ئەلەتەنەتەيى بھىنئەتە بەر ھەم بۇ دژەھاوسەنگى كوردنى مۆدىلەكەى ئۆجەلان، ئىدى سەرمەراي كىشە ناوچىيەكانى، وەك (دەسەلتاخوازي و گەندەلى و تەنەنت تىرۆرىزم)، مۆدىلى ئۆجەلان كارىگەري لەسەر كوردەكانى توركيائى بۆ خۆى قورخكردو، ھىچ مۆدىللىكى تر نەيە، بۆيە مايەى سەرمەرومان نەيە كە لە قامىشلى ئەمەرودا بىيىن كوردەكان پەرت نىن ئايا سەر بە ئەسەد بن يان دژى بن،.. كوردەكان دابەشبوون بەسەر لاينەگر يان دژەبەك دا.

كەواتە وەلامەكە چى دەنئىت؟ وەلامەكە بىرىتتە لە (نەخىز) توركيائى بە موحافىزكارو كەمالىستەكانەو تەوانى سياسىيە يان كۆمەلەيەتەيان نەيە كىشەى كورد چارەسەر بەكەن و ناشيان بىت تاشتىكى شۆرشگىزانە ئەنجامەندەن بۆ بەر ھەمەيەتەنى ئەو تەوانايە.

سەرچاوە: Todays Zaman /



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پەرتىۋونى بۇچوۋىنەكان لەناو ھۆكۈمەتى تۈركىيا سەبارەت بەستراتېژىيە كوردىيەكە ... ن/ لالە كەمال  
4/3/2012

بەيرىسە بالاكانى ھۆكۈمەت تېببىي چەۋاشە دەربارە ستراتېژىيە كوردىيەكە دەمخەنەرو، دەركەوتوۋە كە بۇچوۋى جىاواز لەناو ھۆكۈمەتدا ھەيە دەربارە سىياسەتى كوردى ئاپئەدى ۋلات.

ھۆسەين چەلىك ۋەتەنچى پارتىيە ھەمەلەت ۋە پەرىپىدان (ئە.كە.پە)، لە چاۋپىكەتتىكى تەلەپزىۋىدا نەكۈلى لە بوۋى پلانچى نوئ كەرد، لە ھەمەكاندا ھەندىك لە بىرگەكانى ئەم پلانە سەلمانە كە ئىستە لە كاردەيى شىتچى نوئ لە ئارادا نەم تەنھا ئەردوگانى سەروك ۋەزىران تەنكىدى لە پلانەكە كەرد دۋاى دوو رۆژ لە بلاۋبونەمەي لە رۆژنامەكاندا، جەگە لە ئەردوگان ھىچ كەسنىك لەناو ھۆكۈمەتدا سەرنج ۋە تېببىي دەربارە راپۇرتە رۆژنامە ئىپپەكانى ستراتېژىيە كوردىيەكە رانەگەياندوۋە تا 29 ى نازار، ئەم رۆژە (6 رۆژ دۋاى ئەمەي ئېمەي چەند رۆژنامەنوۋىنىك ستراتېژىيە مەكان باسكرد) چەلىك بە كەنالى تېقى خەبەر تۈركى رانگەياند كە ھىچ ستراتېژىيە نوئ نە!

ۋەتەنچى: "مەن دەربارە پلانە نوئەكە پەرسىيارم لە ھەمەو ۋەزىرە پەيۋەندىدارەكان كەرد، ئەتەلەي جىگەرى سەروك ۋەزىران ۋە ئىدرىس نەھىم شاھىن ۋەزىرى ناۋخۇ، ئەمەن نەكۈلىن لە پلانەكە كەرد، مەن خۆم ۋەتەنچى پارتىيە ۋە ئاگادارى ئەم پلانە نوئەي نەم."

چەلىك لە بىرى ئەمە، گەلەي ئەم رۆژنامەنوۋىسانە كەرد كە روۋمالى ھەمەلەكەيەن كەردوۋە، بەلام لەگەل ئەمەشدا بەيچەكانى قەسەكانى خۇيەمە رانگەياند كە تۈركىيا ئىستە ستراتېژىيە نوئ جىيەجىدەكەت كە چەند بىرگەيەكى ئەم پلانە نوئەي لەمخۇدەگەرت، ئەمەش بىرىتەيە لە درىژمەندى شەمە دۋى (پ.ك.ك)، بەتەيەمەي لەمەشەكانى خۇرناۋاى رۆژەلەتەي تۈركىياى كوردىشەي، لەمەشەكە كە سالى رابردوۋ بىرارى درىژمەندى شەمەكە دراۋە، تۈركىيا رەبەرۋى رەخنە بوۋەتەمە كە گەراۋەتەمە بۇ سىياسەتى ئەمەنى دۋاى شىكەتەنەنى (كرانەمە كوردىيەكە) 2009، ھەمەھا مەن بۇمەدەكەت كە تاقىمەي بچوۋك لەناو ھۆكۈمەتدا كە ئەردوگانى تەيەيە، نەخشە رەيگەيەكان ئەمەدەكەردوۋە بۇ رەبەرۋى بونەمەي كەشەي كوردو (پ.ك.ك) ۋە لەگەل نوئەمەي پارتىيە (ئە.كە.پە) يالچەن ئەكەدوگان ۋە شاھىنى ۋەزىرى ناۋخۇ، چەلىك دەلەت كە ۋەزارەتەكەي ئەم ستراتېژىيە نوئەكەي ئىستە خستوۋەتەگەل لەمەس بىنەمەي بەگۋەدچوۋەنەمەي (پ.ك.ك) ۋە لەمەكانتەشدا ئەمەدەكانى چاكەسازى بە مەودەيەكى فراۋانتر، بەلام پلانەكە داۋاكارىيە سەروكەيە كوردىيەكان بەلاۋە دەنەت، ۋەك بەمەشەنەنى مافى فېزىۋونى زەمانى كوردى ۋەك زەمانى دوۋەم لە خۇپەندەكاندا.

گروپكى تەر لەناو ھۆكۈمەتدا، بە پېشەنگە ئەتەلەي جىگەرى سەروك ۋەزىران لەسالى 2009 دەستەيپەكەرد، كاتەك ۋەزىرى ناۋخۇ بوۋ ۋە ئىستە شىكەتەنەنە، ئەم گروپە دۋى ستراتېژىيە نوئەكە بوۋ لەمەشەمەي ئەمەنى دەكەت، ھەقان فېدان جىگەرى ئەمەندارى (مەيت) لەناو تەمەكەي ئەتەلەي دابە، ئەم تەمە كە ئەردوگان پېشەنگە دەكەت مۇركى خۇيان، ۋەك باسەدەكەيت خستوۋەتەسەر ستراتېژىيە كوردىيە نوئەكە، ئەمەش لەمەش ئەمەيە كە ھۆكۈمەت ئەمەلەيەت بەسپاسەتى ئەمەنى دەدات كە تەمەكەي ئەتەلەي بەمەلەستەيەن دەكەرد.

سەسچاۋە/ رۆژنامەي تودەي زەمان

ن/ لالە كەمال و/ فازل مەلا رەھىم

## AKX.31

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رەنگە كوردەكان رابەيەتى بەھارى عەرەبى بىكەن :

لەكەتەكدا گۇرەكانى سەرتاپاى رۆژەلەتەي ناۋەراستى گەرتەتەمە ۋە شادى دەربەرىن بەشەمەيەكى ھىۋاش ۋە لەسەرخۇ ئەمە نىگەرانىيەي ئاشكەركەردوۋە كە ئازاۋە سوۋد داگەيەنەيت بە گروپە ئاپئەيە تۈندەمەكان كە ئەجەندەي دۋە رۆژاۋا ۋە دۋە مۇدەرنەيەن ھەيە.

گەشەيەنەن دەستەيەنەنى چەندەن ھىز دەكەن كە لەمەنەيە كارىگەرى ئەم جۇرە گروپانە كۇنتەروۋل بىكەت، ۋەكە سەروشتى ئەمەنى زۇرەي ئەم ھىزانەي كە رەزىمە كۇنەكانىيان رەۋخاندوۋە ۋە تۈندەمەكان ئەپانئەنەيە پەشتەگەرى جەمەمەرىيە لەخۇيان كۇبەكەنەمە.

بەلام ژمارەيەكى كەم جەختەنەكەدەتەمە لەسەر گۇرەكانىيەكى تەر كە دەتۋانەيت يارمەتەدەرىتە لەمەشەپەندەنى مەنەمەي لە ناۋچەكەدا ئەمەش بىرىتەيە لە: رۆلى گەشەسەندوۋى دانىشتۋانى كوردى ناۋچەكە.

سىياسەت دارىژمەن لە ئەمەرىكا ۋە ئەۋروپا پەيۋىستە شىۋازى تەقلىدى خۇيان بۇ تەپروانىن لە جىھان بەشەمەيەكى گەشتى ۋەكە كۇكرەۋەي دەۋلەتەنى نەتەمەكان ۋە لائەن ۋە دانەنەن بە ئەگەمەكان ۋە مەترەسەيەكانى پەشت دەسەلەت بەخەشىن بە كوردەكان،



ستر اتىزىڭ بىياتىن بۇ ھاندانى ئەم گەلە رۇژ ئاۋا دۆستە بۇئەۋى كاريگەرى زياتر لە ناۋچەكەدا بەدەستېھىنن بەبى ئەۋەى كار دانەۋە و رەخنەى لىيىكەۋىتەۋە.

مىژۋى كوردەكان لە رۇژ ھەلاتى ناۋەر استا برىتتە لە چىرۆكىكى بى كۆتايى سەركوتىردن و خواست و ويستى ناۋمىدكراو و تراژىدىا. كوردەكانى رۇژ ھەلاتى ناۋەر استا، كە زياترن لە 30 مىليۇن و بەزۆرى مۇسلمانن و لەروۋى ئىتتىپاقىيە لە عەرەبەكان و فارسەكان و تۈركەكان جياۋازن، ماۋىيەكى دورودىرە بۇ بەدەستېھىننى ئوتتۇمى لە دەسەلاتى ھۆكۈمەتە دوۋر مەنكارەكان و تەننەت بۇ سەربەخۋىي ئەۋا دىجەنگن.

مەنەتتەكانى كوردەكانى عىراق پىدەچىت بەدناۋەترييان بن و لەنۋانېشياندا جىنۇسايىدى ھىرشى چەكى كىمىيى لەلايەن سەدام ھىسنىيە لە سالانى ھەشتاكاندا. لە سورىيەى دراۋسىدا نىيەكى 2 مىليۇن كورد خەباتيان كروۋە بۇ پاراستنى ناسنامەى ئىتتىپاقى خۇيان لە دىزى ئەۋ ياسايانەى زمانى ئەۋان قەدەغە دەكات و كوردەكانى دىكەى ھۆكۈمەت تاكو زۆريان لىيىكات لە پۈتەى عەمىدا بىتۈنەۋە. زۆرىيەى كوردەكان لەمىژە لە مافى ھاۋلاتىيۋىنى سورىا بىيەشكران تاكو لە سەرمەتاي مانگى نىساندا سەركە بەشار ئەسەد لە ھەۋلىكا بۇ پىشتىگىرىكىردنى ھۆكۈمەتە لەرزۆكەكەى رەگىزنامەى بەخشى بە 300000 كورد.

نەيەكى 15 مىليۇن كوردى تۈركىيا، كەمىنەيەكى بچۈك كە ھەلمەتتەكى چەكارىيان لەدزى ھۆكۈمەت بەرپاكرودە، بانگەشەى مىژۋىيەك دەكەن لە باخىيۋون و جەنگى كراۋە و بەزۆر دەرگەن لەلايەن سوپاى تۈركىياۋە. زياتر لە 5 مىليۇن كوردى ئىران لە دەۋلەتەى دىكە زياتر مافى بەكارھىنانى زمانى خۇيان ھەيە، ھەروەھا توندوتىزانە لەگەل دەۋلەتەدا شەرىانكرودە.

لەبەر ئەۋ ھەموو كۆزانانەى بەدريژايى مىژۋو چەشتويانە، زنجىريەك لە گۆرانكارى ئىستا لەۋانەبە بەشۋىۋازى گەنگ و پىۋىست بەختى كوردەكان بگۆرىت. كوردەكانى عىراق كە لەدۋاى جەنگى كەندۋاى سالى 1991 ئوتتۇمى راستەقىيەيان بەدەستېھىناۋە لە روۋخانى رۇژىمى سەدام ھىسنى لە سالى 2003 داۋ ھەۋلەكانى دواتر بۇ دروستكردى سىستەمىكى سىياسى نۆى، سوۋدى زۆريان درۋىنە كروۋە. پارتە كوردىيەكان ئىستا لە بەغدا دەسەلاتى گەنگ بەكاردەھىنن، ھاۋىيەمانىكى گەنگن لە ھەموو ھۆكۈمەتتەدا. لە سالى 2005 ھە كوردىك، جەلال تالەبانى، سەركەى عىراقە.

پاراستنى ئوتتۇمى

كوردەكان لەژىر سابەى ھۆكۈمەتى ھەرىمى كوردستاندا لە باكۋورى عىراق ئاستىكى بەرز لە سەربەخۋىي رامبارى و رۇشنىرى خۇيان پاراستوۋە. ھەرچەندە ئەۋان پىۋىستە چەند مەسەلەيەكى فەرمانەرۋاى و سىياسەتى ھاۋىيەش بۇ پاراستنى ھىزى خۇيان بەھەند وەرگەن، نابۋورى ئەۋان گەشەدەكات و ھەر كەسنىك سەردانى ھەرىمى كوردستانى عىراق بكات ئەۋا كاريگەر دەبىت بە ۋەبەرھىنانى گەشتى و پىرۆزەكانى ژىرخانى نابۋورى و ئەۋ بىزنسە نويانەى لە ھەموو لايەكەۋە تىيىنى دەكرىت.

ھەندىكى دىكە لە دەستكەۋەكانى كورد لە سەرانسەرى ھەرىمەكەدا زياتر ئەزمۋىنن، بەلام ئەگەرى ئەۋە ھەيە كە بەشۋىيەكى يەكسان گەنگ بن. لە تۈركىيا كوردەكان رەنگە لە لىۋارى لەبارتەن سالتا بن لە ماۋەى دەيان سالتا بۇ چارەسەركردنى كىشەكانيان. ھەلىژا رەنەكانى ئەۋ ھەفتەيە سەركەۋىتتىكى بەرچاۋى بۇ پارتى داد و گەشەپىدان (ئاك پارتى) فەرمانەرۋاى دۆستى ئىسلام مەسۇگەر كەرد. تەننەت بەشۋىيەش ئاك پارتى لەداهاتوۋدا پىۋىستە بە ھاۋبەشى پەرلەمانى دەبىت بۇ ئەۋەى بىتۈنەت زۆرىنەى دوۋ لەسەر سىي پىۋىست بۇ ئەنجامدانى رىفۇرمى دەستۋورى بەدەستېھىننىت.

پارتى ئاشتى و دىمۇكراتى (بەدەپە)، كەسايەتە سەربەخۋ كوردەكان پىدەچىت ئەۋ رۆلە بگىرن و ھەل و ھىزى ئەۋە بەدەن بە كوردەكانى ۋلات زۆرىيەى كىشە سەركەبىيەكانى پەيۋەست بە جىگە و پىگەيان لە كۆمەلگادا چارەسەر بگەن. ئەۋان لەمىژە خواستى خۇيان روۋنكر دۆتەۋە بۇ كۆتايىھاتنى ئۇپەراسىۋنە سەربازىيەكان لە ناۋچە كوردىيەكانى باشۋورى رۇژ ھەلات و ئوتتۇمى سىياسى زياتر.

بە پىشتەستەن بەۋەى لە سورىا روۋدەدات، لەۋانەيە چەند ھەلىك بۇ كوردەكانى ئەۋى بىتەئارۋە. ئەگەر رۇژىمى ئەسەد بروۋخىت، رى و شۋىننىكى سىياسى لەسەر بىنەماى ھاۋبەشكىردنى دەسەلات لەنۋان پىكەتە ئىتتىپاقى و ئاينىيەكانى سورىادا. ھەروەك ئەۋەى عىراقى دۋاى سەدام - لە گەتۈگۈكاندا پىگەيەكى راستەقىيە بە كوردەكان دەبەخشىت.

ئەگەرى مەملەتنى

كاريگەرى ھەلگەشاۋى كوردەكان ئەگەرى ئالۋىزى زياتر و تەننەت كىشەمەكىش و مەملەتنى دەھىننە ئارۋە. كوردەكانى رۇژ ھەلاتى ناۋەر استا رەنگە بىرپايدەن سوۋدومەرگەن لە گۆرانكارىيەكانى ناۋچەكە بۇ ئەۋەى فشار دروستىكەن بۇ دامەزراندنى دەۋلەتى كوردستانى سەربەخۋ كە زۆر دەمىكە بابەتى سەركەى گۆرانى و شىعەرى كوردى بوۋە. ھەنگاۋىك

بەم ئاراستەيدا شتيكى چاۋەرۋاننەكر او نابيت ئەۋىش بەھۋى ئەۋ سەختى و مەينەتيانەى كوردەكان چەشتويانە و ئارەزوۋى ئەۋان بۆ رزگار بون لە دەسلەتەى بەغداد و ديمەشق و ئەنكرە.

لەلایەكى دیکەۋە پیدەچیت ئالۆزى سیاسى لەگەل ئەم ھیزە نوپیدا بئەئارۋە، ھەرۋەك ئەۋەى لەننۋان كوردەكانى عىراقدا روویدا. زۆربەى كوردەكانى عىراق ئەۋ دەستكەوتانەى كە دەتوانریت لەچوارچۆەى عىراقىكى ديمۆكراتدا دركى پيكریت بەرزەدەنخینن و جەختى لەسەر دەكەنەۋە لەبەرەمبەر ئەگەرى مەترسى وروژاندنى ھیزە ناوچەییەكان كە دژایەتى دەۋلەتتىكى كوردى سەرەخۆ دەكەن.

ستراتیژیكى گەردوونى.

لەجیاتى پشەنگیرىردنى ھاۋارى نوئ بۆ دەۋلەتتىكى كوردى، لەوانەىە زیادکردنىكى كاریگەر كوردەكانى ناوچەكە ھەلەبیت ستراتیژیكى "گەردوونى" پەیرەو بەكەن. ئەم شىۋازە گرنكى سنوورەكانى دەۋلەت لەسەرەنسىرى جیھاندا دەناسینیت و جەختەكەتەۋە لەسەر دروستکردنى بەستەرى رۆشنییری و ئابوورى. كارکردن پروو و دەۋلەتى كوردستانى "نزيك"، كوردەكانى رۆژەلەتەى ناوەرەستى گۆرا و رەنگە بەى ئەزمونکردنى تۆرەى دەۋلەتە بەھیزەكانى ناوچەكە درك بە زۆربەى ھىوا و خواستەكانیان بەكەن.

ئەمرىكا و ھاۋەپەیمانەكانى پئويستە ئەم دەرنەجامە پەسەندبەكەن، نەك بە سانایى لەبەر ئەۋەى شتيكى باش دەبیت بۆ كوردەكان، بەلكو ئەۋە شتيكى باش دەبیت بۆ بەرژەۋەندىيەكانى خۆیان. پیدەچیت كوردەكان لەبەر مژوۋى رەشى خۆیان بەدەستى توندرومەكان، حەزبەكەن ميانرەۋەن. لەكاتىكدا زۆربەى كوردەكان موسلمانى دلسۆزن، پیدەچیت ئەۋان زیاتر حكوەتى عەلمانى بەباشتر بزانن.

كوردەكان، كە بۆ زیاتر لە دە سال سوودیان بېنەۋە لە ناوچەى دژە-فرینى ئەمرىكى بەسەر باكوورى عىراقدا، يەكێن لەو گەلەنەى رۆژەلەتەى ناوەرەست كە زۆر دۆستى ئەمرىكان. ھەرۋەھا كوردەكانى عىراق حەز بە بېزنس دەكەن و پشەۋازى لە وەبەر ھینانى ئەمرىكى و رۆژناۋایى دەكەن.

ھاۋەپەيمانى ئەمرىكا

ئەگەر دەستكەوتەكانى كوردەكانى عىراق و توركيا و سوريا كوردەكانى ئيران ھان بەدات لە دژى رژیى تاران راپەرن، ئەۋا ئەۋە باشترە.

ھەموو ئەمانە وادەكات ئیدارەى باراك ئوباما گۆشەییەكى كوردى لە ستراتیژی نوپى خۆى بۆ رۆژەلەتەى ناوەرەست جیگەكەتەۋە. سەرەتا پئويستە ئەمرىكا بەردەوامییت لە ھاندانى چارەسەرکردنى كیشە ھەلپەسزیراۋەكانى نئوان بەغدا و كوردەكانى عىراق. بەتایبەت پەسەندکردنى یاساىەك بۆ ھاۋەشپىکردنى داھاتەكانى نەۋت یارمەتیدەر دەبیت لە پتەوترکردنى مانەۋەى كوردەكان لەچوارچۆەى عىراقدا ئەۋىش بە زامەنکردنى بەشيك لە سەرچاۋە و داھاتە فراوانەكانى ولات بۆ ئەۋان. دووم، ئەمرىكا دەتوانیت پشەۋاننەك بێت بۆ رۆشونىتىكى سیاسى دواى ئەسەد لە سوريا و ئەۋەش ھەندىك دەسلەتەى سیاسى دەبەخشیت بە پێكەتە زۆرەكانى ئەۋ ولاتە و ئەمەش بۆ ھەموو سوریەكان نەك تەنھا كوردەكان بەسۆد دەبیت. لەكاتىكدا ئەسەد رەنگە بېسەلمىنیت كە بۆ چەند ھەفتەىەك و تەنەت چەند مانگەك لە دەسلەتادا دەمیننیتەۋە، ئەۋا پیدەچیت ئەۋىش بخریتە ناو لیستى ئەۋ سەرکردانەى لەلایەن بەھارى عەرمیەۋە لە دەسلەت دورخراۋنەتەۋە.

كاتى ئەم رۆژە دیت، سوريا و ناوچەكە بەشپەۋەییەكى فراوان سوود وەرەگرن لەھەموو ئەۋ ھەلەنەى ئیستا دەدرین بۆ دارشتنى ریسایەكى سیاسى كاتى. بەپێچەوانەى یەمەنەۋە كە لەۋئ ئەمرىكا پەيوەندىەكى درژی ھەیە لەگەل سەرۆكێكدا، پیناچیت ئەمرىكا راۋژكارى سوريا بێت، بەلام ھاۋەپەيمانى نزیكى سوريا، توركيا وایە و پئويستیشە ھاندەرىت بەم ئاراستەىە كاربكات.

سپییەم، ئەمرىكا پئويستە بەھیمنى ھانى حكوەتى نوپى توركيا بەدات بە نەرمى لەگەل كەمىنەى كوردى ئەۋ ولاتەدا مامەلەبكات، مامەلەییەكى لەۋجۆرە بكاتە خالىكى جەۋھەرى لە پەيوەندىە دەۋلەمەند و ئالۆزەكانى نئوان ھەردوولادا. رەجەب تەیب ئەردوغان لەرابردودا دانینا بەپئويستى چارەسەرکردنى كیشەى كورد. پئويستە ئەمرىكا پشەنگیری لە ھەولە نوپكان بكات بۆ دۆزینەۋەى چارەسەرىكى گونجاو سەبارەت بە لیبووردنەك بۆ چەكدارە كوردەكان، مافى خۆیندن بە زمانى خۆیان بۆ كوردەكان فەرھەم بكريت و سەرەخۆى زیاتر بۆ ھەرىمى كوردى توركيا دەستەبەر بكريت.

دوچار، ئەمرىكا دەتوانیت پەيوەندى باشى خۆى لەگەل كوردەكانى عىراقدا بەكاربھینیت بۆ ئاراستەکردنى پراگماتیزم لەكاتىكدا كوردەكان ھیزە نوپە ھەرىماپەتییەكان ھەلدەسەنگینن. پئويستە ئەمرىكا بەردەوامییت لە پەشیمانکردنەۋەیان سەبارەت بە بانگەشەكردن و گەشتن بە دەۋلەتتىكى كوردى.

چەندین ئاستەنگ لە دارشتنى ستراتیژیكى نوئ بۆ رۆژەلەتەى ناوەرەستى خیرا گۆرا و ئاۋتەى خواستى شروڤەكارەكانە تاكو بەشپەۋەییەكى گشتى لەروۋى دەۋلەتە نەتەۋەییەكانەۋە نەك رەچاۋکردنى ھیزە نئودەۋلەتییەكان لە جیھان برونن، بەلام ئەگەر سیاسەت داریزەران بەشپەۋەییەكى كەمتر تەقلىدیانە برونن، لەوانەىە ئەۋان ھەلەك بېینن بۆ ئەۋەى دەسلەت بېەخشیت

بە يەككەك لە گەلە ميانرەو و دۆستەكانى ئەمەرىكا بەشێو مەكە كە يارمەتى كوردەكان و بەرژوهندىيەكانى رۆژ ئاوا و ئازادى و خوشگوزەرانى لە رۆژ هەلاتى ناوەر استدا بدات.

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<http://www.xendan.org/drejaWtar.aspx?NusarID=672&Jmara=3852>

## كوردستان دەتوانیت بپێتە مۆدىلێك بۆ ديموكراسى رۆبیرت هالفون

ئەگەر جەنگى يەكەمى كەنداو نەبووایە، سەدام كوردى لەسەر نەخشە دەسڕیەو. بۆچى نەتەرە يەكگرتوو مەكان توندوتیژی سەدام وەكو جینۆساید نانسینیت؟  
دواى جەنگى عیراق زۆرجار دەتوانا رۆژ هەلاتى ناوەر است "ئامادەنێیە بۆ ديموكراسى". بۆ نموونە رۆژنامەى گاردیان لە سالى 2003 دا پێیوابوو لەبارەى عیراقەو ئەو بۆچوونە راستە، بەلام ئەمە ئارگيومینتێكى بێبايەخە، لەبەر ئەوەى وا پێشنيار دەكات كە هەندێك خەلك بەهۆى باكگراو ندىانەو شایانى ديموكراسى نین و نموونەى كوردستان زۆر بەروونى دەریدەخات ئەمە چەندە هەلەیه.

پروخاندنى رژیمی سەدام حسین ئەك تەنیا كوردى لە فەوتان بەهۆى جینۆسایدەو پاراست، بەلكو ولاتێك و گەلێكى سەربەخۆ و ديموكراتى و ئازادى لە شێوەى كوردستاندا هێناپەگۆڕی.

وەكو جیگرى سەرۆكى گرووبى هەموو فراكسیۆنەكانى بەریتانیا كە سەردانى كوردستانیان كرد، دووجار سەردانى كوردستانم كردووە و بەلگەى راستەقینەى جینۆساید بێیووە. سەرەرای ناسەقامگیرى ناوچەى، كوردستانى سەربەخۆ لە سالى 2003 دا دامەزرینرا. حكومەتى هەرێمى كوردستان یاسای خۆى دەركەكات و كۆنترۆلى سوپای تایبەت بە خۆى دەكات و بریار لە هەنگاوى گەشەسەندنى ئابوورى تایبەت بە خۆى دەكات. بەپێچەوانەى زۆریەى بەشەكانى تری عیراقەو، هەرێمى كوردستان بەشێو مەكە رێژى تیرۆرىستى تیدا نییە.

دوچار بەهۆى ریزگرتنى لە مافەكانى مۆلكدارى، لیبوردەى ئایینى، حوكمى یاسا، يەكسانى سەبارەت بە ژنان، دەستراگەشتنى يەكسان بۆ خوێندن، میدیایەكى ئازاد و ئۆپۆسیۆنێكى سیاسى بەهێز هەرێمى كوردستان دەتوانرێت بە ديموكراسى لەقەلم بدرێت.

شیاو تییینیكر دەرە هەرێمى كوردستان تاجەند هەندێك لەم پەرەسپانە جێبەجێدەكات:

### مافەكانى مۆلكدارى

رەشئوسى دەستوورى كوردستان (هێشتا رەشئوسە) چەندین ماددەى لەخۆگرتووە سەبارەت بە پاراستنى كەمینەكان و مافە سیاسى و مۆلكدارى تییینیكان. لە عەنكاوا، گەرمكى سەرمكى مەسیحییەكان لە پارێزگای هەولێر، تەنەت نەریتێكى تایبەتى پاراستنى مۆلكدارى هەیه.

### لیبوردەى ئایینى

پەرلەمانى هەرێمى كوردستان ئیستا بەرەسمى دانیناوە بە مافەكانى كەمینە نەتەوايەتیەكانى تەردا وەكو توركمانەكان و ئاشوریەكان و ئەمانە لە سیستمى هەلبژاردندا نوێنەرایەتیا هەیه. لە راستیدا كوردستان يەكێكە لەتاكە پەناگەكان بۆ مەسیحییەكان و جولهكەكان لە ناوچەكەدا.

لەكاتێكدا مەسیحییەكان لەسەرانسەرى عیراق و ئێراندا دەكوژرین و دەچوسنێرنەو، ئەوان لە كوردستاندا پێشوازیان لێدەكرێت. سەرۆكى هەرێمى كوردستان تەنەت ئاوارە مەسیحییەكانى بانگهێشتكر دەرێمى كوردستان بكەنە پەناگەى ئارامى خۆیان.

### حوكمى یاسا

ناستی تاوان به بهر اوردکردن به عیراقي دراوسي زور نزمه و بهریتانیا یارمەتی دەسەڵاتدارانی پۆلیسی هەریمی کوردستانی داوه شارەزایی زانستی بنیاتنن وەک لەموی پشتبەستن بە سیاسەتی تەقلیدی "داننان بە تاواندا". سیستمی دادومری کوردی سەر بەخۆیە و لەمیانەی بەهاری عەرمییدا مافی کۆبوونەوه و خۆپیشاندانی نازادی پاراستووه.

### مافەکانی ژنان

سەبارەت بە مافەکانی ژنان بەم دواایانە پەرلەمانی کوردستان چەند یاسایەکی توندی تێپەراندووه لەدژی توندوتیژی خێزانی. ئەمەش خەتەنەکردنی مێینه و بەزور بەشوووان و کارکردنی منداڵانی بۆ یەکەمجار بە تاوان لەقەڵەمداوه.

### دەستراگەشیستی نازاد بە خۆیندن

لەکاتییدا ئابووری کوردستان لە بوژانەوهدا، زانکۆکانیش لە پیشکەوتندان و سەرەرای چەند رێگریەک فۆکیوس و جەختکردنەوهیەکێ راستەقینە هەیە بۆ باشترکردنی خۆیندن. رێژەی نەخویندەواری لە ساڵی 2003 وە لە 37% وە بۆ تەنها 16% دابەزیوه، نیستی رێژەی نەخویندەواری نزیکەی هەمان رێژەی ساڵی 2011 ی شاری لەندەنه.

کوردستان وڵاتیکیە لە رابردوو فێربووه، نەک لە رابردوودا بژی. ئەگەر سەدام لە دەسەڵاتدا بمایەتەوه و ئەگەر جەنگی یەکەمی عیراق و دروستکردنی ناوچه ئارامەکان بۆ کوردەکان لە ساڵانی 1991 و 1992 نەبوایە رەنگبوو بەشەکانی تری کوردستان بە (گازی ئەعساب) داپۆشرايه و پیاوکانی سەدام بەلێنیاندابوو بە بیلدۆزەر بیاننێژن و بیانشارنەوه.

تەنانەت باومردەکریت هەندێک لە ئەنجامدەوانی جینۆساید لە ئەوروپا بژین و رەنگە لە بهریتانیاش بن و داوای مافی پەناوەرێتیان کردبێت. بەشێوهیەکێ نامۆ جینۆسایدی کوردەکان لەلایەن کۆمەڵگای نیودەولەتیەوه و بەتایبەت لەلایەن نەتەوه یەکگرتووەکانەوه وەکو جینۆساید نەناسراوه.

بۆ ئەموی دادپەروەری جێبەجێکریت، نەتەوه یەکگرتووەکان پێویستە بە تەواوی کوشتنی کوردەکان بە جینۆساید بناسێنێت.

بەهاری عەرمی دەریدەخات رۆژەلاتی ناومراست ئامادەیه بۆ دیموکراسی. بەدڵنیاییەوه ئەمەش واناگەیهنێت کە هەمووی دەستبەجێ دێتەدی و لە داهاوودا زور ناویمیدبوون لەرێگاگەدا دەبێت، بەلام خەڵکی رۆژەلاتی ناومراست لە هیچ کەسێکی تر جیاوازتر نین. ئەوان نانیان دەوێت، بەلام نازادیشیان دەوێت.

من لە کۆنفرانسی پارتهکەمدا لەگەڵ پەرلەمانتار نیکۆلاس سوامس، پەرلەمانتار نازم زەهاوی، دەقیقید گارنەر و خاتوو بیان سامی عەبدولرحمان، نوێنەری بالای حکومەتی هەریمی کوردستان لە بهریتانیا، ئەم کەیسە دەخەمەروو. \*رۆبێرت هالفون: ئەندام پەرلەمانی بهریتانیایە لەناوچهی هەلبێاردنی هارلو، لە مألپەری [roberthalfon.blogspot.com](http://roberthalfon.blogspot.com) وتارەکانی بڵاودەکاتەوه.

لە ئینگلیزییەوه: دانا تەیب مەنمی

ئەم بابەتە 2245 جار خوینراوەتەوه

AKX.33

<http://xendan.org/drejaWtar.aspx?NusarID=696&Jmara=3983>

نەینی قەتەر  
هو نیاکین

لە کوتابی مانگی تشرینی یەکەمدا تەلەفزیۆنی رسمی سوریا فلمیکی دۆکیومینتاری (17) خولەکی پەخشکرد و ناشرایکرد میرنشینیی بچووی کەنداوی فارس، قەتەر، لە پشت راپەرین و خۆپیشاندانەکانی حەوت مانگی رابردووی سوریاوەیه. لە سەرەتای فیلمەکەدا هاتوو کە ناوی قەتەر کە جاریک وەکو کارەسات و کێشەیهک دەرهکەوت لە جیهانی عەرەب و

موسولماندا بلأوده بئیتوه. قەتەر دەستور دەداتە کێشە گەوره و بچوو کەکان و ھەول دەدات بە پشتگیریکردنی بزوتنەو ھاوێش و توندروەکان و گروپە ئیسلامیە چەکارەکان کاریگەری بۆ خۆی دروستبکات. ھاوشانی بلأوکردنەوێ "نازاوگێری" لە شونایتی تر لە میسر و تونس و سودان و یەمەن "قەتەر یارمەتی دارایی و چەکی پیشکەش بە بزوتنەو ھاوێش و توندروەکان لە رۆژھەتی لیبیا کردووە". نێستا نەو و لاتە دەولەتمەندە کەنداو وەکو بەشینک لە نەخشەییکی دۆزمنکارانە بۆ دروستکردنی "رۆژھەلاتیکی ناوەرستی نوێ" نێھانەیی سووریا دەکات. رەنگە نیدیعی لەو شێوەیە وەکو قسەیی درندانی سەرکردایەتیەکی نانومێد لە دیمەشق لێکبدریتەو. دواچار رژیمی سووریا کەنالی جەزیرە، کە تۆڕیکی ھەولە حکومەتی قەتەر پشتیوانی لێدەکات، تۆمەتبار دەکات بەوێ بە کوپیکردنی سێنەمایی شارەکانی سووریا لە بیابانی قەتەر دا شۆڕشی سووریای ھەلبەستوو. چەند شتیکی کەم ھەبە لەبارەیی قەتەرەو کە وادەکات نەو و لاتە وەکو ھاندەری شۆڕشی جەماویری و راپەرینی ئیسلامی دەرکات. بەلام لەگەڵ راگەیانندنەکی نەمدواییە جامیعیە عەرەبی بۆ سزادانی سووریا کە ھەنگاویکی گرنگە و قەتەر، کە نێستا سەرکایەتی جامیعیە دەکات، دەستی تێدا ھەبوو شتیکی سەختە بەشینک لە راستی لە رووداوەکانی سووریا دا نەبین. لە راستیدا قەتەر دوورە لەوێ تەنھا بینەریکی راپەرینەکانی سالی 2011 بوو. لەکاتێدا جەزیرە مائەکانی رۆژھەلاتی ناوەرستی بە وینەیی راپەرینەکانی تونس و میسر و لیبیا و یەمەن و سووریا بۆمبارانکرد، شێخ یوسف قەرزای، زانای نایبی میسری کە قەتەر دادەنیشیت پشتگیری بۆ پارتنە ئیسلامیەکان زیاتر کرد و نەم پارتنە ئیسلامیانە وەکو ھەلبژاردنەکانی تونس و میسر نەو تەنکێدەدەنەو. لەھەموو کەس زیاتر سوود لە نەنجامی ھەلبژاردنەکان وەرەگرت. ھاوکات قەتەر رۆحی نوێی کردووە بەبەری چەند نەنجومەنیکی ھەرمیایەتی وەکو نەنجومەنی ھاریکاری کەنداو و جامیعیە عەرەبی، و لەھەمان کاتدا سەرقالە بە دیپلوماسیەتی چەند گروپیکی وەکو ھەماس و تالیبانەو. ( بەگوێزەیی راپۆرتەکان ھەردوو گروپ بیریان کردۆتەو لە دامەزراندنی بنکەیی ھەمیشەیی لە قەتەر لە چەند مانگی رابردو دا کەنەو ھەش بێزار کەربوو بۆ حکومەتی سووریا کە ھاوکات پەيوەندیەکانی لەگەڵ سەرکردایەتی ھەماس لە دیمەشق لاوازبوو. )

ھەرەو ھا حکومەتی قەتەر لە دەستیوێردانی سەربازیی خۆی بەدوورنەگرتوو، بەئگو ھاوشانی ناتۆ لە راپەرینی لیبیا دا شەریکرد، و ھاوکات دەستبەجێ و بەنھینی بەشداریکرد لەو ھیزانەیی بە پشتیوانی سعودیە بۆ دامرکاندنەوێ راپەرینی بەھرەین نێردا. بەشداریکردنی قەتەر لە لیبیا جینگای سەرنج بوو. ھەرلەسەرەتاو قەتەر گرنگترین پشتیوانی عەرەب بوو لە ئەمریکی ناتۆ لە لیبیا نەویش بە ناردنی فرۆکە جەنگیەکان و ھیزە تاییەتەکانی بۆ مەشقیکردنی میلیشیا لیبیەکان. بەلام قەتەر گەمارۆی نەتەو یەگرتوو کانی شکاند، ھەرەو رۆژنامەیی و ستریت ژورنال بەمدواییانە بلأوکردووە نزیکە 20 ھزار تەن لە چەکی بۆ چەند سەرکردەییکی شۆڕشگریانی لیبیا ناردووە. شتیکی سەختە کاریگەریی نەم چەکانە بەکەمبەگرتن کە ھەندیک لە ھیزەکانی ناتۆ تەحەفوزیان لەسەری ھەبوو و رەنگە نەو چەکانە چارەنوسازبوو بێت لە شەری زەمینی لە دژی رژیمی قەزافی.

بۆ ولاتیک کە رووبەری لە نیووی بەلجیکا کەمترە و ھیزە چەکارەکانی خۆی، بەگوێزەیی ناماریک، دووھەمین بچووکتەری سوپایە لە رۆژھەلاتی ناوەرستدا، و تێوەگلان لە بارودۆخی سەختی و تەنانت وایکردووە پشپۆرانی کەنداو سەریان سوڕمینی. قەتەر کۆمەلە تاییەتەندییەکی ھەبە کە وادیارە لە بارگرتی سیاسی پاراستووەتی. قەتەر دەستی کارکەری نانومیدی نیە ( ھەرچەندە زۆربەیی دانیشتوانەکی لە کریکاری کۆچکردو پیکدیت کە چەند مافیکی کەمیان ھەبە ) و سەرچاوەی فراوانی غازی ھەبە و لە بازاری جیھانی غازی سروشتی شلدا دەتوانیت ھەلی کار بەدانیشتوانەکی کە 225 ھزار کەسە بەرزترین ئاستی گوزەران بەپیویری داھاتی سالتەیی تاک لە جیھاندا ببەخشیت. ھەرەو ھا قەتەر ژمارەیی دانیشتوانی شیعیە کەمە و زۆربەیی دانیشتوانەکی سوننەیی نەو ھەش رەنگە رووبەری بارگرتی مەزھەبی بکاتەو کە لەدەولەتانی دراوسێی وەکو بەھرەین و سعودیەو سەرچاوە دەگرت.

دۆحە، سەنتەری بازارگانی و پایتەختی بە ھۆتیل دەولەتمەندی قەتەر شونینیکە بە دەگمەن پیشینی بێرۆکەیی مەزنی سیاسی لێدەکەیت. ریکخراوە مەدەنیەکان بە دەگمەن بەدەیکریت و بەگوێزەیی زانیاری راپرسی نوێ گەنجانی قەتەر لەچاو ولاتانی تری عەرەبدا کەمترین نەرەزوویان ھەبە لە دیموکراسی. سەرەرای تۆری ھەوالی جەزیرەیی زۆر سەرکەوتوو، تاییەتەندیەکانی دۆحە بریتیە لە پیشبیرکی حوشت و چەند بنکەیی سەربازی فراوانی نەمریکی لە بیاباندا، ناوبانگی قەتەر بۆ ھەژاری کەم و سەقامگیری دۆستی رۆژناو (قەتەر لە سەدەیی 19 ھەمینەو ھەمان بنەمالە فەرمانرەوایی دەکات) وایکردووە شونینیک بێت کە ریکخراوی بازارگانی جیھانی ھەزدەکات کۆبونەوێ تێدا سازبکات و و فیفا بیریاردەو لە سالی 2022 دا جامی جیھانی تێدا سازبکات.

بەلام شىخ ھەمدىن خەلىفەى دووم، نەمىرى قەتەر، خوويەكى ھەيە بۇ بەرھەلستىكردى پېشىنپەكان. لەم ساتەى لەسالى 1995 دا (نەك بە رېكەوت، بەلكو بە لەسەركارلاپردى باوكى) فەرمانرەوايى گرتەدەست، شىخ ھەمدە لە ياريەكى زيرەكانەدا لە ناوچەكەدا تيوەگلاوہ كەتيايدا نەجولان بۇتە نەخۇشيەكى دريژخايەن. بەمشيوەيە پەيوەندى ناست نزمى لەگەل نيسرانيلدا بنياتناوہ، بەلام بنگەيەكى ناسمانى بە بەھاي مليارىك دولار بۇ ئەمريكا بنياتناوہ، و بەين ھيچ فشارىك ژمارەيەك ريفورمى سياسى نەنجامداوہ لەنيوانيشياندا چەندىن مافى نوئ بۇ ژنان، نوسينەوہى دەستورىكى نوئ و پلانى ھەلئىزاردنىكى پارلەمانى لە سالى 2013 دا. و ھەموو نەمانەش بەدلى واشنتون و نەوروپا بووہ، لەكاتىكدا وازى لە چەند بئەمايەكى سېستىمى ميرنشيني ھيئاوہ لەوانەش ياساي شەريە و نيسلامى وەھايى.

لەھەمانكاتدا لەگەل دەستبەكاربوونى جەزيرەدا- كە تۆرىكى ھەوالى ھەربىيە و ناترسىت لە رەخنەگرتن لە ھەكومتە ھەربىيەكان- نەمىرى قەتەر لەسەرانسەرى رۆژھەلاتى ناوہراستدا ميسداقيەتى خىراى وەرگرت و قەتەر جۆرىك لە ھىزى مەعنەوى بىردەوہ. (چاوخشانەوہيەك بە بەلگەنامەكانى ويكليكدە بۇ نەمە بەسە). ھەروەھا تۆرى جەزيرە پەيوەندىيەكانى قەتەرى لەگەل گروپە رادىكالەكاندا بەھىزكرد و كاتى پەخشى تەرخانكرد بۇ چەكدارانى نيسلامى و چەند كەسايەتيەكى سياسى تر كە دريژدەبىتەوہ لە كيشەكانى نەفغانستان تا لوبنان و پيشاندانى شىخ يوسف قەرزواى، زاناي ناپنى كەلەھەندەران دەژى، وەكو كەسايەتيەك كە زۆرتەين بىنەرى لە رۆژھەلاتى ناوہراستدا ھەيە.

لەگەل دەستكەوتى وەھا دۇستى رۆژناوا و دۇستى نيسلامدا، نەمىرى قەتەر زەمىنەى خىراى رۆچوون لە دىپلوماسىيەتى ناوچەيى دا خۆشكرد و بەوہش قەتەر بە خىرايى رەوشىكى وەرگرت وەكو نەو ولاتەى كە وتوئ لەگەل نيران و نەمريكا و تزيبي لىقتى، سەرۆكى ئۆپوزىسيونى نيسرانيل و خالد مەشعەل، سەرۆكى ھەماس، دا بكت. لەبەرئەوہى داھاتى زۆرى غاز ھەيە ھەميشە بۆاردەى تىگرتنى پارە روو كيشەكە لەنارادايە. كاتى قەتەريەكان حيزبولايان قايلكرد كوتايى بھىننىت بە 18 مانگ لە گريكوئيرە لەگەل لايەنە لوبنايەكانى ترى دۇستى رۆژناوا لە سالى 2008 دا، قەتەريەكان بەسەدان مليون دولاريان وەكو يارمەتى بە باشوورى لوبنان بەخشى.

دواتر، لەروانگەى قەتەرەوہ راپەرىنەكانى 2011 چەند ھەلىكى لەخۆگرتوہ: ھەلىك بۇ پيشاندانى نيازى ديمۇكراتى و دىپلوماسى قەتەر بۇ كۆمەلگەى نۆدەولەتى و لەھەمانكاتدا دۇنياونەوہ لەوہى بەرژەوہندىيەكانى بايەخى پىدەدرىت. نەمە لەھىچ كوتىيەك وەكو لىبىا روون نىە، كە بەشىكى زۆرى ھاوكارىيەكانى قەتەر بۇ شۆرشگيران نەرويشتوہ بۇ خودى نەنجومەنى نيشتمانى كاتى، بەلام بەشيوەيەكى راستەوخۇ بۇ نەو نيسلاميانە رۆيشتوہ كە پەيوەنديان لەگەل دۇجەدا ھەيە، بەلام نەمە لە ميسرىش روون بوو، كە چەند رۆژىك لەدواى روخانى موبارەك قەرزواى قسەيكرد بۇ سەدان ھەزار كەس لە مەيدانى تەحرير و ھەروەھا لە ھەولەكانى نەم پايژەى قەتەر بۇ بەھىزكردى پشنگىرى بۇ بزوتتەوہى ھەماس.

قەتەر بە كراوہيى تىدەكات كە برايانى موسولمان و لقەكانى رەنگە وەكو ھىزى گەورەى داھاتوو لە ناوچەكەدا دەرېكەون، نەگەر رژیى نەسەد بروخت رەنگە پارتە نايىنەكانى گریدراوى زۆرىنەى سوننى سوریا لە دیمەشق ھەرس بھىنن، ھەروەھا راستە نەم بزوتتەوانە لەمىژە لەلایەن دەولەتەكانى كەنداوہو پشنگىريان لىدەكرىت و زۆر رىيئىدەچىت كە چەند سىياسەتيك بگرنەبەر كە بەدلى قەتەر و دراوسىكانى بىت.

بۆنموونە جىگەى نامازەپىكردەنە دواى ماوہيەكى كورت لەوہى دەولەتەكانى كەنداو چوونەناو خاكى بەھرەينەوہ بۇ پاراستنى رژیى سوننى نەو ولاتە، شىخ قەرزواى رايگەياند راپەرىنى بەھرەين زياتر تايەفەگەريە وەك نەوہى جەماوہى بىت و بەوہش پشنگىرى ناپنى بۇ سەركوكتردنى دىرندانەى ھەكومت لەدژى خۆپيشاندەران پيشاندا. بەدلىايىيەوہ دەستوہردان لە بەھرەيندا مەترسىيەكانى لەنامىزگرتنى قەتەر بۇ شۆرشەكانى ھەرب دەردەخات، بەلام تەنانەت لە بەھرەين رەخنەگرتن كىكرایەوہ بە رومالى فراوانى بەشى نىنگلىزى تۆرى جەزيرە كە بۇ نوخەيەك لە بىنەرى نۆدەولەتى پەخشەكات، و بەيچەوانەى بەشى ھەربى تۆرەكە وەكو خوى لە بۆلوكردنەوہى راپورتى ھەلئىزراو پاراستوہ. نەگەر قەتەر بىتوانىت بەردەوامىت لە گىرانى رۆلى دووفاقى بەشيوەيەكى لەوجۆرە، نەوا رەنگە ناوچەى دژە ديمۇكراتى كەنداو بكتە يەككە لە ھەرە سوودمەندەكانى شۆرشە جەماوہريەكانى جىھانى ھەرب.

لەنىنگلىزىيەوہ: دانا تەيب مەنمى  
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05:57:25/07/2012

کۆبوونهوهیهکی جهماوریهی کوردهکان له شاری قامیشلو له رۆژئاوای کوردستان - فۆتۆ: کۆریبس خهندان-

نیگهرانییهکی ئاشکرا دیاره به سیاسهتی حکومهتی ئهمنهوه دهربارهی زیادبوونی کاریگهری پارتیکی کوردی رۆژئاوای که پهیمهندی ههیه به پارتی کرێکارانی کوردستان که لهگهڵ ئهمنهوه له شهربان و لهوه دهرسن که ئهم بارودۆخه بپێته هۆی زیاتر قورسکردنی چارهرسری کێشهی کورد له باکووری کوردستان.

لهماوهی 16 مانگی رابردووی خۆپیشاندان و پێکادانهکانی دژی بهشار ئهسهد، کوردانی رۆژئاوای به سهلامهتترین شیوه پێیدا تێپهریون و ئیستاش لهو باوهرمان که بوارێک ههیه بۆ بهدهستهینانی سهربهخۆیی و ئهممۆنکردنی ئهو سهربهخۆیییهی که کوردهکان له ههریمی کوردستانی عیراق ههیه، ئیستاش وینهکانی ئالای کوردستان و دانانی لهسهه دهرگا حکومهیهکان و شهکاندهوهی لهلایهن کوردانی رۆژئاوایه بووته باسێکی گهرنگی میدیا تورکیهکان و وای له چاودێرانی بارودۆخهکه کردوه که بلێن ئهگهری دروستبوونی ههریمیکی سهربهخۆ لهو ناوچهکاندا ههیه، کهسایهتییهکانی پارتیه ئۆپۆزیسیۆنه کوردهکانی سوریا دهلێن، بهشار ئهسهد هیزهکانی له ناوچهکانی حهلب و حهسهکه کهشاندووتهوه کۆنترۆلی ئهو ناوچهکانی بۆ پارتی یهکیتی دیموکراتی (پهیمهده) بهجێهێشتوه، که ئهمان به بوونی پهیمهندی لهگهڵ پارتی کرێکارانی کوردستان ناوزهند دهرکێن، ههر بهینی ههوالهکان شارهکانی کوبانی، عفرین، دێرک، عاموده، ئیستا له ژێر کۆنترۆلی پارتی یهکیتی دیموکراتیدان.

پارتیه سوریهی ئۆپۆزیسیۆنهکان، پهیمهده به هاوکاریی هیزهکانی بهشار ئهسهد و ههروهها دامرکاندهوهی خۆپیشاندانهکانی رۆژئاوای له دژی حکومهتهکهی ئهسهد تۆمهتبار دهکهن، بهتایبهتیش له کوشتنی مهشعهل تهمودا، که کهسایهتییهکی ناسراوی رۆژئاوای کوردستان بوو، بهلام پهیمهده ههموو ئهم ههوالانه به ناراست لهقهلم دهدات و رهنیدهکاتهوه ههچ پهیمهندییهکی به (پهکهکه)شهوه ههیه.

ههرچهنده تانیستا بهشیوهیهکی رهسمی بهرپرسیانی تورکیا ههلوێستی خۆیان دهربارهی پهیمهده دهرنهربیهوه، بهلام بهرپرسیکی وهزارهتی دهرمهی تورکیا رایگهیاند، که داود ئوغلۆ و مزیری دهرمهی تورکیا، ئهنجومهنی نیشتمانی سوریا له ئهگهری شهربی تایفهگهری و ههروهها شهربی ناوخوا ناگادار کردووتهوه.

ههروهها بهشیر ئهتهلای، جێگری سهروکی ئهنجومهنی وهزیرانی تورکیا له وهلامی ئهو پرسیارهی "ئایا ترستان ههیه له بهرزکردنهوهی ئالای کوردستان باخود راگیانندی سهربهخۆیی لهو ناوچهکاندا؟"، رایگهیاند: ئهوان بهههچ جۆرێک دوودل نین و ئهو ههوالانهی رهنکردمه که گوایه کوردهکان کۆنترۆلی زۆربهی ناوچهکانیان کردبیت و وتی: "له ههندیک ناوچهدا بوونیان ههیه، بهلام کۆنترۆلی تهواوتیان نییه."

عهبدولباسهت سهیدا، سهروکی ئهنجومهنی نیشتمانی سوریا، رایگهیاند، که ئهوان رێنمایی تهواویان دهرکردوه که نابیت بێجگه له ئالای سوریا ئازاد ههچ ئالایهکی دیکه ههلبکریت، چونکه کوردهکانیش بهشیکن له پێکهاتهی خهکی سوریا.

بهینی قسهکانی رۆژنامه نووسێکی تورک که له دهیلی رادیکالدا بلاوی کردبوومهوه، "ئهنقهره زۆر سهری سورماوه لهو پشنگیرییهی که خهڵکانی کوردی سوریا له (پهکهکه)ی دهکهن"، ههروهها دهسلێت، که تورکیا ئهم بارودۆخه به گهشهاندنێکی مهترسیدار تیدهگات و چهند ههنگاوێکی ناوه بۆ ئهوهی ئهو بارودۆخی ئیستای رۆژئاوای کوردستان نهپێته هۆی قۆلبوونهوهی زیاتری کێشهی کورد له تورکیا.

دەلەیت: تاكه رېگهچاره بىدەست توركيواه ئهويه كه داواى هاوکاریى له مسعود بارزانی سەرۆكى هەرمى كوردستان بکات بۆ ئهوهى زياتر فشار بخته سەر پارتە كوردییهكانى رۆژئاوا، یان ئەنقەرە داواى لابرەنى بەشار ئەسەد و هەولێ پتەوکردنى پەيوەندىيى بدات لەگەڵ پارتە كوردییهكان.

بەپێى راپۆرتەكەى رۆیتەرز، تورکیا لەم ماوەیەى داوییدا پەيوەندىيەكانى لەگەڵ بارزانی و حکومەتى هەرىمدا بەرموێش بردوو ئیستا چاویان لەسەر بەرموێشبردنى بواری بازرگانی و وزیە لەئێوانیاندا.

پارتە ئۆپۆزیسیۆنەكانى تورکیا لەدوایین پێشەهاتەكاندا قسەى خۆیان هەیه، بۆئەم مەبەستە موحەرەم ئیجە، ئەندامى سەرکردایەتى پارتى گەلى كۆمارى (جەهەپە) رای گەياندوو: دەولەتێكى نوێى كوردی بەرێوەیە، دەولەتەكەش دەولەتى كوردستانی سوریاى.

هەروەها ئیحسان داغل، لێكۆلێاریكى بواری تورکیا رایگەياند: دەبێت تورکیا لەم كاتەدا هەلوێستى خۆى لەسەر كێشەى كورد رەوونبكاتەوه، بەم پێیەى چەندین جار هەلوێستى جیاوازی دەربرێوه، رۆژێك بەنیازبوون لەگەڵ پەكەكە گفتوگۆ بكەن و رۆژێك سیاسەتێكى شێوه پۆلیسی ئەنجام داوه. هەروەها لەمیانەى ئه گۆشەیهى كه له رۆژنامەى دەلیلى زەماندا نووسیبوو "ئێوه ئامادەن بۆ هەرمێمێكى كوردی؟" دەلەیت هەرمێمێكى ئۆتۆنۆمى كوردی له ناوچەكەدا دروست دەبێت ئەگەر ئەسەد بڕووخت، هەروەها ئەگەرى رۆژئاوایەكى سەربەخۆ بۆ كوردەكان له ئارادایە.

له نووسینەكەشیدا دەلەیت: "نەخشەى سیاسى كورد له ناوچەكەدا گۆراوه، كوردستانیكى گەوره چیتەر خەونێك نییه بۆ زۆریەى كوردان"، دەشڵێت "لەوه دەجێت یەكەم هەرمێمى سەربەخۆ له شۆیئێكى چاوەروانەكراوى وەكو سوریا دا ببیستین."

له ئینگلیز بییه: هەلوێست ئەنوەر  
سەرچاوه: رۆیتەرز

AKX.35

<http://www.xendan.org/drejaWtar.aspx?NusarID=704&Jmara=5199>

لەناو بازنەى دەسەلاتى ئێرانەوه ، براوەیەكى پراگماتیک

تۆماس هینریکسن

26/06/2013

لەكاتێكدا ئێرانیهكان هەستى خۆیان بەرامبەر سەرکەوتنى حەسەن روحانى له هەلبژاردنە سەرۆكایەتیهكەى نەو وڵاتەدا دەربرى و رژانە سەر شەقامەكان و بەو بۆنەیهوه ناهەنگیان گێرا بە جۆریك كه له چەند سالى رابردودا بى وینه بووه ،لەوه دەچى كه جۆریك له شۆرشى ریفۆرمیستى له گۆرئ بى.

له سەرانسەرى وڵاتدا ،شۆفیرەكان به هۆرن لێدان وپیاوان به سەما كردن لەسەر ناوازی مۆسیقای پۆپ وژنانیش به چەپڵە ریزان ناهەنگى بەلێنەكانى بەریز روحانى یان دەگێرا بۆ هینانە دیى نازادیی زیاتر و پەيوەندىيەكى باشتەر لەگەڵ جیهانى دەرەودا.

بەلام بەریز روحانى تەمەن 64 سال ،ریفۆرمخواریكى سەرسەخت نییه ،و سەرکردەكانى ئێرانیش نەویدان زۆر بەلاوه گەنگ نیه .لەبەرامبەردا ،ژيانى سیاسى له ناوچەرگەى دامەزراوى موحافیزکارەكاندا گۆزەراندوو ،تەنەت بەرلەوهى نایەتولا روحوئلا خومەینى شۆرشە نیسلامیهكەى له سالانى هەشتادا رابەرى بکا .شیکەرەكان دەلێن نەولەویەتى له پێشینهى بەریز روحانى چاککردنەوهى پەيوەندىيى گەرزو ئالۆزى نیوان سەرکردایەتى و هاوڵاتیانى ئێران دەبى،نەك نەنجامدانى گۆرانکارییهكى مەزن.

تەنەت نازانەكەشى -شێخى دیپلۆماسى- گوزارشتە لەو رۆلەى گێراویەتى وەك پراگماتیسیتیک له بەرژەوهندیى سەرکردایەتیى نیسلامیدا.جا چ له مامەله كرنیدا لەگەڵ خۆپیشاندانى خۆیندکارانداو له كارساتى بومەلەرزە مألۆزانكەرەكەدا یاخود له



نەركەكەيدا ۈەك ۈتۈۈڭكارىڭكى نەتۈمى ،ۈەۈلەكانى بۇ سوڭ كىردى گۇشارە ئۈۈدەۈلەتپەكان ، لەكاتىڭدا ئىران بەردەۈام بوۈ لەسەر بەرنامە نەتۈمپەكەى،بەرئىز رۇحانى كارى دەكرىد بۇ دۇزىنەۈەى رىڭپەچارەپەپەكى پراكتىكى لەپىناۈ بەدپەپىنانى نامانجەكانى سەركرىدپەتپەكەيدا.

ھەرچەندە كە بە كەسپىكى رىئالىست ناسراۈە، بەلام يەكەم ھەنگاۈى بۇ ناۈ بازنەى ناۈەۈەى ئىران لە تافى لاۈيدا بوۈ، ھەنگاۈەكەشى بەسەرڭىشپەك دەست پىكرىد.

لە بىرەۈەرىپپەكانىدا، بەرئىز رۇحانى باس لە سەفەرئىكى مەترسىدارى خۇى دەكات نەۈدەمەى تەمەنى 18 سالان بوۈە خۈىندكارى خۈىندنگەپەكى ناىنى بوۈە. دەپگىرئەۈە كە چۈن دزەى كىردۈتە ناۈ سنورى عىراقەۈە بۇ دىدارى ناپەتۈۈللا خۈمەنى لە مەنفا، ۈ قاچاچپەكە داۈاى لىكرىدۈۈە عەمامەكەى سەرى داكەنئىت، تا لەناۈ نۈتۈمپپەلەكەدا بەپاشى نەپىنرئىت.

تەننات دۇگماتىرپىاۈانى ناىنى شىعەش داۈاپەكى لەۈچۈرەپان رەت دەكرىدەۈە ، بەلام رۇحانى لاۈ دۈۈ دل نەبوۈ لەۈەى دەستبەجى عەمامە سىپەكەى لە سەرى بكاۈەۈ.

رۇحانى لەۈ بارەپەۈە نوسىۈىتى : (بەسەلامەتى گەپشئىنە چى، نەۈەش گىرنگ بوۈ) ھەر لە بىرەۈەرىپپەكانىدا، نامازە بەۈە دەكات كە ناپىت ھەرگىز نايدۇلۇزى بىتتە بەرپەست لەرئى ى بەرەۈ پىشچۈۈندا.

لەسالى 1979دا، لە دۈاپىن مانگەكانى ناپەتۈۈللا خۈمەنى لە مەنفا، بەرئىز رۇحانى لە فەرەنسا لەگەلپدا بوۈ.

لەۈبارەپەۈە دەنۈۈسپت: ( ھەندىڭ كەس درۈشمى نەۈەپان بەرز كىردۈۈە كە ناپىت ئىران چەك لە نەمىركا بىكرىت، تا پىشتىۈانى لە پىشەسازى چەكى نەۈ ۈۈلاتە نەكەپن، بەلام مەن پىم ۈۈتن كە ناپى خۇمان مەحروم بىكەپن لە تەكەنەلۇجىپاى چەكى مۇدپىر ھەرلەپەرئەۈەى كە لە نەمىركا بەرھەم ھىنراۈە).

لە كاتىڭدا سەركرىدەكانى ئىران نىسلامپان كىردۈتە بىنەماى سىياسەتى خۇپان، بەرئىز رۇحانى سەر بەۈ بالەى دامەزراۈە ناىنپەكەپە كە پىنى ۈاپە پىۈىستە نىسلام داىنامىكى تر بىت.

لە تىزى دىكتۇراكەپدا لە قانونى دەستۈۈرىدا كە سالى 1997 لە زانكۈى گلاسكۈى سىكۈلەندا بەدەستى ھىناۈە، بەگۈىرەى نەۈەى كە لە سى قى يەكەپدا لە ۈىسپاىتەكەى خۇپدا نۈۈسراۈە، باپەتەكەى بەناۈنىشانى ( مرونەتى شەرىعەت ) بوۈە. نەۈ مرونەتە پراگماتىپەشى لە بەرەمبەر نايدۇلۇزىدا لە سالى 2003دا زۇر بە پاشى بەرچەستە بوۈ كاتىڭ بەرئىز رۇحانى سەردانى ناۈچەى كارەساتپارى بۈمەلەرزە لىدراۈى (بەم)ى كىرد، نەۈ دەمەى سىكرتپرى نەنجۈمەنى بالاى ناساىشى نەتەۈەپى بوۈ. سەرەراى نەۈ گىزى ۈ نالۇزىپەى لەگەل نەمىركادا ھەبوۈ، ئىران رىگەى بە نەمىركەپكاندا نەخۇشخانەپەكى فرىاكەۈتن داىنپن، تەننات بەرئىز رۇحانى سەردانىشى كىردن ۈ چەند ۈنەپەكەشى لەگەل پىشكە نەمىركەپكاندا گىرت. بەرئىز رۇحانى باس لە گەشتىكى خۇى دەكات بە سۈارى شەمەندەفەر لە سالى 1967دا. بە درىزىپى نەۈ گەشتەى، پىۈاپىكى ناىنى دۈستى خۇى ھۈرپى سەفەرى بوۈە كە نىستا سەرۈكى نۇفسى دەست رۈىشتۈۈى ناپەتۈۈللا عەلى خامەنەپە.

كەسپىكى تىرپش ھەرلەناۈ نەۈ شەمەندەفەرەدا بوۈە كە نىستا داۈاكارى گشتى ۈلاتە. ھۈرپىپەكى خاۈەن نفۈزى تىرى لەسالانى بەر لە شۇرشدا عەلى نەكپەر ھاشمى رەفسەنجانى سەرۈكى پىشۈۈى ئىرانە كە پىشتىۈانىكرىدى لىپى لەم ھەلپىزاردنەدا رى ى لەپەردەمدا ھەمۈاركرىد بۇ سەرۈكاپەتى.

نەمە كۈرتەپەك بوۈ لە ژىاننامەى نەۈ پىۈاۈەى كە كەسپىكى ناۈ بازنە بچۈكەكەى دەسەلاتى پىۈاۈنى ناىنى ئىران بوۈە. لەپەر دلۇزى بۇ نىسلامى سىاسى ۈ پەپۈەندىپە بەتپەكانى، نەستپىرەى بەختى بەرئىز رۇحانى بەخپراپى بەرز بۈتەۈە. لە سالانى ھەشتادا جىگىرى سەرۈكى بۈنىادى جەنگى ئىران- عىراق بوۈە، ماۈەى 20 سال لە پارلەمانى ئىران كارى كىردۈۈە، ماۈەى 16 سالىش لە نەنجۈمەنى ناساىشى ئىراندا، كە ھەمۈۈپان لە دامەزراۈە دەست رۈىشتۈۈەكانى نەۈ ۈلاتەن.

نىستا سەرۈكى ناۈەندى لىكۈلپنەۈەى سىتراتىپە لە تاران، كە ھەرىپەك لە بەرئىز رەفسەنجانى ۈ ناپەتۈۈللا خامەنەپش تپايدا راۈىزپان پىن دەكرى . بە ۈتەى عەلى شاخۈرى راد كە سىياسەتمەدارىكى رىفۇرمخۈازە ژىاننامەكەى نەۈە دەرەخا كە رۇحانى لە ناۈەندى دەسەلاتى سىياسى ئىراندا بوۈە ۈنامانچىشى خزمەتكىردن بوۈە بە كۇمارى نىسلامى ئىران. ھەرۈەھا دەلئىت راستىپى نەۈەى كە ھەلپىزىرداۈە دەپسەلمپنئىت كە لەلاپەن نپەۈە پىشتىۈانى تەۈاۈى لى دەكرى.

رۈزى يەكشەمە، لە يەكەم لپدۈانىدا داۈى ھەلپىزاردنى بەسەرۈك بەرئىز رۇحانى دۈۈپاتىكرىدۈتەۈە كە كىشەكانى ۈلات لە شەۈۈ رۈزىڭدا چارەسەر ناكىپن، ۈنامازەى بەۈە كىردۈۈە كە لەگەل دام ۈ دەرگا كۈمپەكان ۈ پىۈاۈنى ناىنى ۈ فەرماندەكاندا كۈدەپنئەۈەۈ راۈىزپان پىن دەكات.

سروش فەرھادیانی تەمەن 31 سالاڭ كە لە رۆژنامەى ریفۆرمخوآزى (بەھار) دا كار دەكا دەلى: ئەو پىلوىكى ناىيىنى مۆدىرنە، دىپلوماتكارەو بەسوودە بۆ سىياسەتى ناوخۆو دەرەو.

شىخى دىپلوماتكار رۆلىكى بىنەرەتتى گىراو لەمەسەلەى ھەلپەساردنى خۆبەخشانەى يۆرائيۆم لە سالى 2004 دا، بەلام ولاتانى خۇراوا داواى زىياتيان لە نىران كرد. لەناو نىرندا ئەو ھەنگاو بە شكست لەقەلەم درا، و لەو كاتەو سەركردايەتتى نىران ھەلويستىكى توندترى لە وتوويزەكاندا گرتۆتە بەر.

لە كتيبەكەيدا: (ناسايشى نەتەوہى دىپلوماسىيەتى نەتۆمى) كە دەربارەى ھەلويستى وەك دانوستكارىكى نەتۆمى نوسىويەتى بەريز روحانى داكۆكى لەخۆى دەكاودەلى ھەموو ئەو بەرەو پىشچوونە دراماتيكيانەى لەو بەرنامە نەتۆميەدا بەدى ھاتووہ لە كاتى ئەو ھەلپەساردنەدا بەدى ھاتوون. لەو بارەيەوہ دەنوسى: توانيمان مامەلەى دروست لەگەل گوشارە نيودەولەتيەكاندا بەگەين كە تا دەھات زياتر دەبوو و لەھەمان كاتدا يەكرىزى ناوخوييشمان پاراست.

نوسىنى : تۆماس نىردبرىك  
وەرگىزائى : ناوات عەبدوللا  
The New York Times  
تاران-

AKX.36

<http://www.xendan.org/drejaWtar.aspx?NusarID=643&Jmara=3690>

ھۆيەك نىيە بۆ داواى لىبوردين لە توركيا  
ئىلى ئەفيدار

2011/09/08

ماوہەكى زۆر پيش بلاو بوونەوہى راپۆرتەكەى بالمەر، لەگەل سەرەتاي دزەكردى بەشىكى ناوەرۆكى راپۆرتەكە، ھۆكارى راستەقىنەى داواى توركيا لە ئيسرائيل بۆ داواى لىبوردين ئاشكرا، لەگەل داواى بلاونەكردنەوہى ئەنجامەكانى راپۆرتەكە، ئەوكات پرونبووہو كە راپۆرتەكەى بالمەر بەشيوہەكى يەكلاكەرەوہ رازىيە لەسەر داواكەى ئيسرائيل پەيوەست بە ياسايبوونى ئابلقە دەرپايەكەى لەسەر كەرتى غەرزە، نەك ھەر ئەوئەندە بەلكو ئەوہشى تيدا ھاتووہ توركيا كارى پيوستى نەكردووہ بۆ رىگرتن لە دەرچوونى چالاكانە توندروەكان بە كەشتى مەرمرە بەرەو ئيسرائيل، توركەكان دركيان بەوشكرد ھىچ گریمانەيەك نىيە كە داواى بلاو بوونەوہى راپۆرتەكە بتوانن داواى لىبوردينىك لە ئيسرائيل و دەستينن، بۆيە ھىرشىكى سىاسيان دەستينكر، بەلام ئيسرائيل خۆى راگرت بەرامبەر بەو فشارە ئەمەش شتىكى ھەم باش و ھەم خراپوو، چونكە ھىچ ھۆيەك نەبوو كە ئيسرائيل داواى لىبوردين بكات.

توركەكان دەبىت مەمنون بن بەو فەزلەى لىزنەى بالمەر كردى بۆيان كاتىك پەيوەندى حكومەتى توركى بەرىكخراوى HH پىشتگوخت، لەوہ زياتر ئەو يارمەتيانەى ئەو رىكخراو پىشكەش بە ئەردوغانى كردبوو لەكاتى ھەلزاردنەكاندا پىشتگوخت خست، لەگەل ئەوہشدا ئەنجامى كوتايى راپۆرتەكە روونە، چونكە ھەر رەخنەيەك راپۆرتەكە ھەبىت لەسەر كارى سوپاى ئيسرائيل، بەلام رازىيە بەھەلويستى ئيسرائيل لەو مەسەلەيدا. ئاستى ئەو سووكايەتيەش زۆر قورس و گەورەيە كە لە راپۆرتەكەدا سەبارەت بە توركيا ھاتووہ، چونكە توركيا لەماوہى چەند مانگى رابردودا لە ھەموو ئەو مونتەدايانەى بەشدارىي تيدا كردووہ ئىدىعائى ئەوہى كردووہ ئيسرائيل پىشئىلى ياساى نيودەولەتى كردووہ، بۆيە جىي سەرسورمان نىيە بەھۆى ئەو گورزوہ ئەردوغان رايىگەيەننىت كە باليوزى ئيسرائيل لەئەنقەرە كەسايەتيەكى ويستراو نىيە.

دواتر چەند كەسنىڭ ئىدىيەسى ئۇمەيان كىرد لەگەل ھەلۋىستى عادىلانە ئىسرائىل ۋاى پىن باشە بۇ نەھىشتى قەيرانەكە ئىسرائىل داۋاى لىيوردن بىكات لەپىناۋى بەرژ مەندىيە جۇگرافى و سىياسىيەكە، باسكىردى ھەلەمەكى زۆر خراب. داۋاى لىيوردن قەيرانەكە كۆتايى پىناھىيىت، چۈنكە تۇركىيا داۋاى لىيوردى ئابلۇقەسى سىر كەرتى غەزە دەكات ئۇمەش ھەنگاۋىكە رىگە بۇ نەردۇغان خۇش دەكات پىنگەسى سىر كەردە جىھانى عەربى بىگرىت لەسەر حسابى ھولائىيانى ئىسرائىل كە خۇيان لەژىر ھەرشەى موشەك و پىرۋسەى گەورەتۇر دا دەپىننەھ. دواتر ئۇمانەى شەى و رۆژ ئىدىيەسى ئۇمەيان دەكرد كە دەپىت ئىسرائىل تەنازول بۇ تۇركەكان بىكات ھەر ئۇمان بوون يارمەتى ئەنقىرەمىندا بۇ سىر كەرتىن بەسەر درمختىكى بەرژدا كە نىستا بوارى دابەزىنى نىيە. لە گوتارى رۆژ ھەلەلەتى ناۋەر استىدا، شىۋازى باشكىردى پەيوەندىيەكان لەگەل تۇركىيادا بە باجىكى قورسى دىپلۇماسىيە دەستىدەكات لەسەر ئۇ كاردەى تۇركىيا، لەسەر ئىسرائىل ھەزىش بىكاتە سىر راپۇرتەكەى بالەسەر، چۈنكە بەرپىسارىتى تۇركىياى سووك كىردوۋە لە قەيرانى كارۋانە دەريايەكە، دەپىت بۇ ھەموو جىھانىشى ئاشكرا بىكات رۆلى سلبى حكومەتى نەردۇغان لەناۋچەى خۇرەلەتى ناۋەر استىدا دىگىزىت. دەپىت نىمە ئۇمە بىخەينە بەرچاۋ كە تۇركىيا فاكىترى سەقامگىرى و بەشىكى چارەسەرى كىشەكان نىيە لە ناۋچەكە، بەلكو فاكىترى دىلەراۋكى و دروستكەرى ئازاۋمە. گىرانەھى بالىۋزى ئىسرائىل لە ئەنقىرەمە بۇ ۋلەتەكەى بەتايىبەت زىيان بەخودى تۇركىيا دەگەپىنىت، بۇيە لەسەر نەردۇغانە لە ئەز مەۋنەكانى پىشۋوتى ھەرىكە لە عەممان و مەغرىب سوودەمە بىگرىت كە پىش چەندىن كۆنگرەى نىۋەدەلەتى و سىر كەردەى جىھان كەرتىن لە نەۋەدەكانى سەدەى راپىردوۋا، بەلام بىچرانى پەيوەندىيەكانىيان بە ئىسرائىل لە سالى 2000 بوۋەھۋى و نىۋونىيان لەسەر نەخشەى دىپلۇماسى نىۋەدەلەتى، ھەروەھا تۇركىيا كە لە راپىردوۋا دەۋلەتتىكى مەركەزى بوو، لەئىستادا مەزھەپتىكى تۇندىرەمى ناپەرسىيار كۆنتىرۆلى كىردوۋە. تۇركىيا كە لەپال شىكستى لەھەۋلەكانى بۇ چوۋنە ناۋ يەكتى ئۇمەروپا بەھەنگاۋەكانى ئەم دواپىيەى لە ۋلەتە موسولمانە ميانە مەكانىش دووركەوتە، نىستا لەھەمان كۆمەلەى تۇندىرەمى ئىران و سورىا و حزبۇللا و ھەماسادىيە، چۈنكە تىكچوۋنى پەيوەندىيەكانى بەئىسراىلەھە ھاۋشۋەى ئۇمە داپىداناننىكى عەلەنى بىت بەم مەسەلەيە، لەئىستادا بۇ چوۋنەكانى ئەنقىرە ھىچ بەھايەكى لە مەسەر و تۇندىرەمى نىيە بەھەمان شىۋەش ۋلەتەنى كەنداۋ. جىھانى عەربى نوئ نەردۇغان بەسەر كەردەك دەپىت كە ھەلسۈكەتى ھاۋشۋەى قەزافى ھەپە، لەدەستدانى ھاۋپەيمانىيەش لەگەل سورىا و لاۋازى ئەو ۋلەتە رەنگە ۋا لە كوردە پەراۋىز خراۋەكان بىكات بەنگاۋىنەھە و تۇركىيا ناچار بىكەن رۋوبەروۋى كىشە ناۋخۇيەكانى بىتەھە پىش ئەۋەى ئاگرى ئازاۋمەگىرى بەردەۋامى پىندىت. دەپىت ئىسرائىل لە سىياسەتى بەر كەرتىن و لىدانەھە بىگازىتەھە بۇ سىياسەتى ھەزىشكىردە بە بەكار ھىنانى قشارى دىپلۇماسىيە لەسەر تۇركىيا، لەكاتىكدا بۇ نىمەى ئىسرائىلى زۆر سىروشتىيە چاۋەرۋان بىكەن تا تۇرەپىيەكە كۆتايى بىت و تا ئەۋەى تۇركىيا خۇى تىبىكات ئەۋا خىتابى ھەرىمەتى بەشۋەپەكى تىر دەچىت بەرپە. باشۋونى پەيوەندىيەكان لەگەل تۇركىيادا تەنھا لەو كاتەھە دەستىدەكات كە تۇركىيا در بەمە بىكات كە قەيرانى نىستا باجىكى گەورەى لىدەكەۋىنەھە لەناستى نىۋەدەلەتى و ۋادەكات پەراۋىز بىخىرت و بە ۋلەتەك ھەزمار بىگرىت كە ھىچ پىنگەمەكى نەبىت لەسەر گۆرپانى ھەرىمەتى. بەكورتى راپۇرتەكەى بالەسەر تىشىكى خستە سەر ئەو شۋىنە تۇندىرەھە پەراۋىز خراۋە كە نەردۇغان تۇركىياى بەرەم ئەۋى پەلكىش كىرد، بەردەۋامى قشارى دىپلۇماسى بەتەنھا تۇركىيا ناچار دەكات سىياسەتى خۇى بىگورىت بە چاككىردى پەيوەندىيەكان لەگەل ئىسرائىل بىرواۋ لەناپىندەدا. لە (اسرائىل الیوم) ھە و. گۆران فەتھى

ئەم بابەتە 2228 جار خۇيىنراۋەتەھە

AKX.37

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## دەولەتی کوردستانی مەزن لەناسۆدا یە؟

پێپ ئیسکۆبار \*

لەکاتی کەدا نەخشەیی رۆژ هەلاتی ناو مەراسەت دادەریژرێتەوه، ڕەنگە ئەمە کۆتا هەل بێت بۆ کوردەکان بۆ ئەوەی دەولەتی سەربەخۆی خۆیان ھەبێت.

بەمەلێوان کورد کە ھەفتەیی ڕابردوو چاودێری کۆبونەوهی لوتکەیی بزوتنەوهی دەولەتانی بێلایەن لە تاران یان کردوو ڕەنگە پرسیبێتێان: "ئەو ئیمە؟ ئەو چارەنووسی گەلەکەیی ئیمە چی دەبێت؟ پێویستە ئیمە لەوێ بێن، ڕەنگە کۆبونەوهی داھاتوو..."

ڕەنگە کوردەکان، کە خۆیان ددان دەنێن بە ناوبانگی خراپیان لە شەری ناوخوا، دواجار پێکەوه کار دەکەن و مێژووش ڕەنگە وای بێت دواي سەدەییە کە لە جەنگی جیهانی یەکەم و پاش ئەوەش کە گۆرزیکی کوشندەیی لە کوردەکاندا، ڕەنگە ئەمە دوا هەل بێت بۆ دروستبوونی دەولەتی کوردستانی گەورە.

دواي ئەوەی ھەردوو پارتی کوردی سوریا بە پشتگیری مەسعود بارزانی، سەرۆکی ھەریمی کوردستان، ڕێکەوتنیان واژۆ کرد بۆ ئەوەی بە ھاوبەشی باکوری سوریا (کوردستانی رۆژناوا) بەریوەبەن، پارتە کوردییەکانی ئێرانیش واکەریکە ھەمناھەنگی دەکەن و ڕێکەمەون.

ھاوکات ئەنکەرە وەکو گروپێک لە مەریشکی بیسەر ھەلسۆکەوت دەکات.

کوردەکان بە وریاییەوه بایەخ دەدەن بەوەی چۆن ئەنکەرە کۆنگرەیی بزوتنەوهی دەولەتانی بێلایەنی بایکۆت کرد، ھەرچەندە تەنانت عەبدولڵا گویل، سەرۆکی تورکیا، لەلایەن مەحمود ئەحمەدی ئەژاد، سەرۆکی ئێرانەوه بەشێوەیەکی تاییەتی بانگەێشتکرا بوو. ھەروەھا لە پێشیارەکەیی مەحمەد مۆرسی، سەرۆکی میسر، دەرکۆڵنەوه کەمپێشیاڕی کرد گروپی پەیمۆندی سوریا لە وڵاتانی تورکیا و میسر و سعودیە و ئێران دروستبکریت بۆ ئەوەی ھەولێدەن تاراژیدیای سوریا چارەسەر بکەن.

ئەمەش ئەوە دەگەییەتی کە میسر لەژێر فەرمانرەوايەتی سەرۆکی ئیخوان مۆسڵمەندا بێر لە ناوێژیوانی دەکاتەوه لەشەری ناوخوا دەولەتیکی عەرمییدا، ھاوکات تورکیا کۆیژانە جەخت لە ستراتیژی گۆڕینی ڕژیمی سوریا دەکاتەوه و ئەوەش تەنها بە دروستکردنی ناوچەییکی دژە فرین لەلایەن ناتۆوە دەبێت، بەلام بە بروای من ئەوە روونادات.

بۆیە پرسیاڕی جدی بۆ کوردەکان بریتی دەبێت لەوەی چۆن سوود لە ھەموو ھەنگاوەکانی ئەنکەرە وەر بگرن.

براو ھە ئیسرائیلە

تەنانت جەماویری تورکیا نازانن چارەچۆی سیاسەتی ئەنکەرە لەبارەیی سوریاوە، بێجگە لە گۆڕینی ڕژیمی ئەو وڵاتە، بە دیاریکراوی چیه. سەرۆک عەبدولڵا گویل ئیدیعی ئەو دەکات دیمەشق گەریلاکانی پارتی کریکارانی کوردستان (پەکەکە) پڕچەکەکات (بەرەھایی ھیچ بەلگەییەک بۆ ئەو نیە) و ئەو تەنها پاساویکە بۆ ھەلگیرساندنی شەر.

دیمەشق لەلایەن خۆیەوه شەری لەگەڵ تورکیادا ناوێت.

ئەحمەد داود ئوغلو، وەزیری دەرەوهی تورکیا، کە خاوەنی سیاسەتی "سەر کێشەیی لەگەڵ دراوسێکاندا" ھیشتا پشتگیری ئەو ڕایە دەکات کە وڵاتەکەیی ناتوانێت زیاتر لە 100 ھزار پەنابەری سوری وەر بگریت.

لەمێژە 70 ھزار پەنابەری سوری لە تورکیادا یە و بەرەو ھەلکشان دەچێت و لەم حالەتەدا "ناوچەییکی ئارام" ی ناوون پێویستە لە خاکی سوریا دروستبکریت. ئەم پێنجشەممەییە، ئەنکەرە جەختەدەکاتەوه لە ئالۆزییەکانی قەیرانی پەنابەران لە کۆبونەوهیی نەتەوه یەکگرتووەکاندا.

ئەنكەرە بە بەردەوامى تاران و دیمەشق تۆمەتبار دەمات بەردى پشتگیری له گەریلاكانى پەكەكە دەمەن كه له ناو خاكى تورکیا و ناوچه سنورییه فراوانهكاندا چالاكى دەمەن، بەلام هاوكان ئەنكەرە پەرمیداوه بە چیرۆكىكى نامۆ، و نامۆ جارىكى تر هاوپەیمانی ستراتیژی ئیسرائیلە و پرووداوى ماڤى مەرمەرە ئیستا وەلانراوه.

تەل ئەبیب بەپەروشییهو گەرمو لەسەر ئەوەدەمات ئەنكەرە بێتە هێزىكى ناوچهیى خاوەن هەژموون له مەسەلەى سوریای دواى ئەسەددا ...

لههەمانكاتدا له سوریا ئالای سور و سەوز و زەردى كوردی ئیستا بەسەر چەند ناوچهیهكى وەكو گرەكە لیگ، كه تەنها 35 كیلۆمەتر له سنورى عیراق و تەنها 15 كیلۆمەتر له سنورى تورکیاوه دووره، دێشهكێتەوه. ئیستا نزیکەى سێ ملیۆن كوردی سوریا کرانهویهكى بێئینه دەبینن بۆ رەتکردنەوهى سیاسەتى بەعەرەبکردنى فەرمى پارتى بەعسى سوریا.

سەلاح موسلیم، سەرۆكى پارتى بەكێتى دیموکراتى (PYD) كوردی بەتوندی رەتیدەكاتهوه رێكەوتنێكى تاکتیکى لەگەڵ رژیى بەشار ئەسەددا هەبووبێت. بەلام لە راستیدا رێكەوتنێك هەبوو، هەتا ئەو كاتەى كوردەكانى سوریا هێرش نەكەنەسەر هێزەكانى دیمەشق، دەتوانن هەرچیهك بیانەویت ئەنجامیبدەن له كوردستانی سوریا كه ئیستا بەرمو هەریمێكى سەربەخۆ دەروات .

لهلایهكى ترموه، هیلارى كلنتون، وەزیری دەرەوهى ئەمریکا، بێشتەر پەیامەكەى به ئەنكەرە گەیاندووه و تەنانهت له سوریای دواى ئەسەدیشدا دەبیست ئەمه وەكو راستیهكى سەر زەوى رەچاوبكریت .

بۆیه ئەنكەرە دەتوانیست چی بكات؟ پاشەكشەى كوردەكان وێرانكەر دەبیست.

سەرەرای چەندین هەرا و كێشەى فەرمى، بزار دەكانى تورکیا بۆ داگیرکردنى كوردستانی رۆژئاوا ئاسان نیه. وەهێ سوپای تورکیا نزمە ئەویش دواى دورخستنهوهى چەندین ئەفسەرى پەلەدارى كەمالى. ئیستا زیاتر له 60 ژەنرال له زیندانان و تۆمەتبار كراون به ئەنجامدانى كودەتا و ئەفسەرە پەله نزمەكان رەنگە دووبارە هەولێ كودەتا بدەنەوه. عەلهویهكان و سەربازە كوردەكان رەتیدەكەنەوه لەشەرێكدا بچەنگەن كه پارتى داد و گەشەپێدان هەلێ بگیرسینیت. هەروەها ئابووری تورکیا — بێجگە له گەشتوگوزار — بەدڵناییهوه بەرمو دارمان دەروات .

### نایا سەرکردەیهك له مالهوهیه؟

كەسێك دەتوانیست وێناى ئەوه بكات نایا نەخشەى سیاسى مەسعود بارزانی، سەرۆكى هەریمى كوردستان، بۆ ئەو بەسە گۆشەى مێژوو لەئامیز بگریت و بەره و ئەو بۆنەیه هەلبكشینت.

بارزانی بەدڵناییهوه لەگەڵ كوردستانیكى گەرمەدایه كه سەربەخۆ بێت له عەرەبەكان و فارسەكان و توركەكان. بەلام بۆ ئەوهى ئەوه رەویدات، لەسەر ئاستێكى فراوان پێویستە خۆى وەكو یەكخەر و كۆكەرەوهى هەمووان رەفتار بكات و ئەك تەنها له هەریمى كوردستان دەسەلات هاوبەشى پێيكات بەلكو هیوا و ئامانجە ناكۆكەكانى كوردەكان له سوریا و ئێران و تورکیا بەرپۆهیبات. ئەمەش پێویستی به چەند توانایهكى دیپلۆماسى مەزن هەیه.

ئەوهى روون و ئاشكرایه ئەوهیه و ئاشنتۆن و تەل ئەبیب لەمەسەلەكه تێوگەلاون و ئەمەش وادەگەیهینیت زوو تر یان درەنگتر برۆكسل له مەسەلەكهوه تێو دەگەیت. روسیا و چین به دیاریكراوى لەدژى نین. لێرەدا دوو پێشەات هەیه. یەكەم بریتیه له دەوڵەتى كوردستانی مەزن وەكو مۆدێلێك بۆ رۆژەهەلاتى ناوێرەست كه ئەم دەوڵەتە قەوارمیهكى عەلمانى و چالاك بێت و رێز له كەمینه نابێهەكان بگریت. یان كۆمیدیاپهكى تری رۆژئاوا دەبینین.

گەركانێكى جوگرافی سەرەكى تر له تەقینەوه دایه. تورکیا به دڵناییهوه له كاریگەرى پێچهوانەى پێچەكەردنى هێزه سوریه سونیهكانى نەكۆلیۆتەوه و هەر ئیستا دەبینین ئەم چەكانە لهلایین پەكەكهوه لەدژى خودى تورکیا بەكار دەهێنرین .

ئەم شیکاریه دژه ئیمپریالیستیه رەنگه زۆر بەسوود بیت بۆ تێگەشتن له چالاكى كورد.

جێرمی سالت، پروفیسۆری میژوو و سیاسەتی رۆژھەڵاتی ناوەراست لە زانکۆی بیلکەنت لە ئەنکەرە و نووسەری کتێبی "پێکەستەوهی رۆژھەڵاتی ناوەراست" لە وتوێژیکدا لەگەڵ کلودیۆ گالو، رۆژنامەنووس لە رۆژنامەی (لا ستامپا) بەمجۆرە مەسەلەکە پوختەکاتەوه:

"لەسالی 1918 دا هیزە ئیمپریالیستەکان رۆژھەڵاتی ناوەراستی بەشێوەیەکی دیاریکراو داڕێژکرد کە بگۆنچیت لەگەڵ بەرژەوەندیەکانی خۆیاندا لەو کاتەدا. ئەوان ئێستا دووبارە نەخشەی ئەم ناوچەیە دەکشێنەوه و دووبارە ھەڵدەدەن لەگەڵ بەرژەوەندیەکانی خۆیاندا بگۆنچیت. بەرێکەوت نێه کە ئەم پرۆگرامە لەگەڵ نەخشە سترااتیژییە درێژخایەنەکانی خودی ئێسرائیلدا یەکدەگرێتەوه. روسیا و چین بە تەواوی ناگاداری ئەوەن چی دەگوزەرنیت، و لەبەر ئەوەش ئەم ڕەوشەی ئێستا دەتوانرێت وەک درێژکراوەی "یاری گەورە" ی نیوان روسیا و بەریتانیای مەزن لە سەدەی 21 دا لێکبدرێتەوه."

ھەڵە نێه رۆژ بەدوای رۆژ دەرئەنجامەکانی کۆپی نوێی ئەم "یاری گەورە" یە بریتیدەبێت لە دەرکەوتنی دەوڵەتی کوردستانی مەزن.

\*پێپ ئێسکۆبار: پەیامنیی رۆژنامەی ناسیا تایمز و ستوونە بەردەوامەکە "The Roving Eye" خۆنەریکی زۆری ھەیە، و شڕۆفەکاری تۆری ھەوایی Real News و سنی کتێبی جوگرافی بڵاوکردۆتەوه و دواين کتێبی بریتیه له "Obama Does Globalistan".

و مرگێرانی لە نینگلیزبێهوه: دانا تەیب مەنمی

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نۆباما و مەکین و مالیکی..ھەلەئە ھەمووانە

15/06/2014 نیکیۆلاس کریستوف

شکستخواردن لەعیراق ھەلەئە سەرۆک نۆباما و کۆماربەکان بوو، بەلام پێش ئەوان ھەلەئە نوری مالیکییە.

ھەندێک لە چەپەکان لۆمەئە جۆرج دەبلیو بوش دەکەن بەپێیئە یەکەم کەس بوو کە چووە ناو خاکی عێراقەوه و یەکەم ھەنگاو ئەو نای، لای خوشیەوه سیناتۆر جۆن مەکیین کۆشکی سپی بە پەرپرسیاری ئەو شکستە دەزاننیت و بەپێویستی دەزاننیت کە سەرۆک نۆباما دەستەئە ئاسایشی نەتەوایی بگۆرێت.

ئەبێ ئەوەمان لەیادبێت کە عیراق ھەرگیز پێکھاتەئە سەرەکی سیاسی نەبوو، بەپێیئە گەلەکەئە (کە 33 ملیۆن کەس) لە ھەلەئەدا ژبان دەگوزەرنن. بەداخەوه ئەم وولاتە کێشەئە زۆری ھەبە لە پەیمۆندیەکانیدا بە دەرەوه. وە گەر بپرسین "کێ عیراقی لەدەستدا؟" ئەوا دلێابن کە پرسیاریکێ گەمزانە دەبێت، ھەمان ئەو پرسیارە دەبێت کە لەنیوہە سەدەئە بیستەمدا دەرکرا: "کێ چینی لەدەستدا؟". جا خو چین مۆلکی ئێمە نەبوو تا لەدەستەئە بدەین، ئەمڕۆش عیراق مۆلکی ئێمە نییە تا لەدەستەئە بدەین.

چیرۆکەکە لەئۆیە سەرپەلدا کاتێک جۆرج بوش دەستەئە بە پارێکێ دۆمێنە کرد، کێشەکەش لەمەدا بوو کە چۆن بەرپرسیاری ئیدارەئە حکومەتەئە نۆباما پێش دوو سال شاناژیبیان دەرکرد و دیانوت کە عیراق بووتە وولاتیکێ پر لە ناشتی و تەبایی و ھەموو ئەوانەش گواہ بە ماندووبونی ئەوان ھاتنیئە کایەوه. بەلام ئەم ھەلەئەکاندنەئە کارمەسات بوو.

بۆچوونی کۆماربەکان ئەوەبوو کە سەرۆک نۆباما گشت ئەو ھیوا و ناوات و دەستکەوتەئە سەرپەو کاتێک سوپای ئەمریکای لەسالی 2011 دا لە عیراق کشانەوه. وادیارە ئەو بۆچوونە لەکاتی خۆیدا زۆر شیاو بوو بەپێیئە مالیکی رێکەوتنی (جیگیرکردنی ھیز) ی لا پەسەند نەبوو کە رێگەئە بە سوپای ئەمریکا دەدا تاوەکو دواي سالی 2011 ش لە عیراقدا بمێنێتەوه. گەر بەرپرسیاریئەئە ھەبێت

كە بخريته ئىستوى ئوباما ئىمى سوريالىيە- كە ھۆكۈرى وئرانكارىيەكانى ئىمىرۈى عىراقە- لەماوۋى رابردودا ئوباما ھەلى كى كاتىك رىگرى لە پىشنىارمەكى ھىلارى كلىنتونى و مەزىرى دەرەو و جەنەرال دىفد بىرايۈس كى كە پىشنىارى پىچەككىردى ئۆپوزسىۋى سوريالىان كى.

كەس نەيدەزانى كە ئىمە سەردەگرىت يان نا، بەلام ئوباما لەم لايەندە شكىستى ھىنا. چالاكوانە مەدەنىيەكان دىلەن كە 1760 ھىزار كەس لە سوريادا كۆرۈرون و ھەرەو ھەشار ئىسەد خۋى بەھىز كىردەتەو.

بەھۋى نەبوونى پالپىستى دەرەكىمە، سوپاى نازادى سوريالىيەتە ھەنا ھىوا ماونەتەو، تەنەت ھەندىك لە سەركىدەكان و يەكەكانىان چوونەتە پال چەكدارە گىرەشۋىنەكان لەبەرئەوۋى چەكى باشتىر و پىشكەوتوتورىان پىيە و ھەرەك بەتواناترىش. ئىنجامەكەش ئىمەيە كە دىيىن- گروپە چەكدارە گىرەشۋىنەكان لەنۋىشياندا داعش خۋى بەھىز كىردەو و دالەدى ھەمووان دەدات بەتايىيەتى لە باكورى سوريالى و لەۋىشەو لەم چەند رۆزە دوايىدا ھىرشىكەدە سەر باشورى عىراق.

ئەوۋى دواتر روویدا ماىەى سەرسورمان بوو، كاتىك داعش بە چار ھىزار چەكدارەو تەوانى چۆك بە سوپاى عىراق دابدات كە خاۋمنى 200 ھىزار سەربازە و چەند فەيلەتقىكى بەتەۋاۋى تىكشكاندن.

لەشەدا رۆلى نورى مالىكى سەروك و مەزىران دەرەكەۋىت لەبەرئەوۋى ئىمە كەيسىكى سىياسىيە نەك سەربازى. لەماوۋى چەند سالى رابردودا بەشۋىيەكى پلان بۆ دارىزارا، مالىكى سونەكانى پىشكەۋىدەست، ھەرەك دەرەو ھۆكۈرى لاۋازبوونى چەكدارانى بزووتتەوۋى سەھو كە پىگەيەكى گىرەك بوو لە روۋبەرۋىنەوۋى چەكدارە گىرەشۋىنەكاندا، ھەرەو ھەنگاۋ بەھەنگاۋ لە بە كارامەيى و گىرەكى ھىزە چەكدارىيەكانى كەم دەرەو.

تەنەت ھەندىك لە سونەكان ئەۋەندە لە ھۆكەتەكەيان دەرەسان كە داعشيان لەلا پەسەندىر بوو لەبەرئەوۋى ھىندە ئىمە ھۆكەتە توند و رەق نىيە. بۆيە دەرەسان بلىن مالىكى بەدەستى خۋى نەيارى بۆخۋى دروستكرد ھىماكانى ئىمە مەترىسيە گەۋرەيە پىشكەۋىدەست، بى ئىمە بىيەۋىت گۈيى لە دەرەكى راسىيەكان بىت. لە ھەموو ئىماندا كىردەكانى سەدامى دوۋبارە دەرەو.

لەسالى 2002دا و لەكاتى ھۆكى سەدامدا، وتارىكى ئاگرىنم لەدزى ھۆكەتەكەى سەدام بۆلۈكەدە كاتىك لە بەغدا بووم. ئىكەت بەرپىسىكى ھۆكى بانكى كىرە ئۆفيسەكەى خۋى لە بەغدا- ئىمە بەرپىسە وىنەى سەدامى بە دىۋارەكەيە ھەلۋاسىۋو وە سەرى ناۋ چاۋى ئەكەردىن، پاشان بەدەنگىكى بەرز دەستى كىرە بە سەرزەشت كىردىن، وادىاربو ئىمە بەرپىسە ھەموو ووتارەكەى نەخۋىدەوۋە، بۆيە مەنىش داۋام لە ۋەرگىرەكە كىرە ھەموو ووتارەكەى بە زامانى عەربى بۆ بۆيىنەتەو. پارەيەكى زۆرم بە ۋەرگىرە دەدا بۆيە ئىمە ۋەرگىرە نەيدەۋىست لەم ۋەلاتە دەرەكەىم يان زىندانى بىرەم بۆيە لە كاتى ۋەرگىرە اندا ھەندىك بەشى ووتارەكەى دەرەند. بۆيە ئىمە بەرپىسە بىرارى دا بەرەلام بىكات بەلام بە ئاگدار كىردەمىكى توندەو. ئىمە كاتە بۆم دەرەكەت كە ئىمە سىستەمانى كە ئوۋشى شىنى بوون چۆن بەدەستى خۋىان خۋىان سەركەردان دەرەند.

بەھەمان شىۋە وادىارە مالىكى ئاگدار نىيە كە سوپاكەى بە چى جۆرىك پەرتەۋە بوو. لەم كاتەدا گەتوگۇ لەگەل ئەمىركادا دەرەكەت كە پىۋىستە چى بىكات، با لەرەدا رۆلى سەركەى نورى مالىكى بىر خۇمان بىيىنەو.

ئەندامانى كۆنگرىچس راسدەكەن كە بۆى ھەيە بىيە كارمەسات، ئىمە لەئىستادا بەچاۋى خۇمان پىكەتان و دروستىۋونى دەرەلەتقى خەلافەتى توندەو دەرەين، ھەرەك كۆشتارىك دەرەين كە ۋەسف ناكىت، ئىمە جگە لە بەرزبوۋەوۋى نەرخى نەوت و تەشەنەكەردى تىرۈر لە جىھاندا.

لەم مياندا، ئەندامانى كۆنگرىس پىيان باشە كە ئەمىركا بۆردومانى ئاسمانى بەكاربىنەت، بەلام ئىمە بۆردومانە رەنگ ناكەى مەترىسدارى لىكەۋىتەو بەۋىيەى بەتايىيەت گەز زانىارىيە ھەلۋاگىرەكانمان راست نەين. ھەرەك رەنگە ئىمە بەكارھىنانى ھىزى ئاسمانى زۆر گىرەك بىت بۆ دامركاندەوۋى داعش، بەلام ھەر ئىمە بەس نىيە. بەلكو پىۋىستە پاش ئىمە ھەنگاۋى فشارى دىلۋامسى بىگىرەتە بەر تا بە ئامانچ بگەين، ئىمەش بىرەيىيە لە پەشيمان بوۋەوۋى مالىكى و بەشدار بىيىكەردى سونە لە دەسەلاتدا ھەرەك جىيەجىكەردى لامەركەزىيەت لە ھۆكەردەند.

گەز مالىكى ئىمە بىكات، ئىمە دەرەنەرتى عىراق رەزگار بىرەت. بەلام بەيى ئىمە ھەنگاۋە، بەكارھىنانى ھىزى ئاسمانى بەتەنە، جگە لە خۇ ھىلاكلەلەن ھىچى دىكە نىيە لە ۋەلاتىكدا كە زۆر شىمان تىيىدا لەدەستدا.

AKX.39

<http://www.xendan.org/drejaWtar.aspx?NusarID=282&Jmara=528>

بۆچی داعش له نازادکردنی بارمته تورکهکان رهزامهاند بوو

نیمری نوسلو 23/09/2014

قهیرانی بارمتهکانی نیوان تورکیاو داعش یهکێکه له گوماناویتیترین و سهیرترین قهیران که ههر نهتهوهیهک تووشی بووبیت . کاتی کونسولگری گشتی تورکی له موسل دهست به سهیریداگیراو 49 کهس به دیپلوماته تورکهکان و پاسهوانه تاییهتیان بارمته کران ، زور کهس نهم پرسپارهی نهکرد - بۆچی نهم کهسانه نهگوازانهوه و شۆینهکه چۆلنهکرا؟

لیدوان و بهیاننامه دهکردن دهستی پیکرد و له یهکێک لهو لیدوانه ( نهردوغان ) به زور باوه بهخۆبونهوه وتی" تورکیا زور به ناسانی بارمتهکان نهگیریتهوه ، وهک نهوهی نهمانه له دهستی توندروترین تیروریستی جیهان نهبن".

ههندێ کهس نهمه به داستانی سیاسی نهبینن که پارتی ( دادو گهشهپیدان (AKP) و داعش رهزامهاند بوون لهسهه نازادکردنی بارمتهکان.

راسته بارمتهکان له ژێردهستی داعشدابوون بهلام ههرگیز وهک بارمته مامهلهیان لهگهڵ نهکراوه. به نمونه کونسولی تورکیا بهردوام به مۆبایلهکهی خۆی لهسهه خهت بووه به درێژایی نهو ماوهیه که له 100 رۆژ زیاتر بوو. داعش نهوهنه گهمزه نییه که بهینی هیماکاری (سیگنال) ی له شۆینی مانهوهی نهمانه درچن چ کارهساتیکی لی نهکهوێتهوه که وهک زانیاری ههوالگری بۆی نهگهرێن. نهمهش خرایه قالبی نهوهی که تورکیا دلتیایی کردوون که ئۆپراسیۆنی سهربازیان دژ نهنجام نهداث بۆ نازادکردنی بارمتهکان.

وهک چۆن لهسههه تادا به بارمته گرتهیان جیگای گومان بوو، گهراوههشیان مایهی گومان بوو.. داعش بارمتهکانی نازاد کرد بهلام چهندین پرسپاری بی وهلامی دواي خۆی جیههشت؟

هاوریهکی دیپلوماتی نهمریکیم نهم پرسپارهی وورژاند " ههوالیکێ باش بوو که بارمتهکان نازادکران ، بهلام بارودۆخهکان وهک له ناو میدیای تورکیاوه نهگهیهنریت ، راستیهکان ناخهه روو . هیچ فیشهکی نهتهقینرا ، هیچ گوشاریکی سهربازی جیههجن نهکرا ، هیچ رانسۆمی نهکرا ، کهواته داعش نهمانه ی بۆ گرت و بۆ نازادیانی کرد بی هیچ بهرامبهری؟

نهبنی جۆره سهودایهک بووبی لهم کارهه!

بۆچوونی زور له بلگهههکان بۆ نهوه نهچن که تورکیا دلتیایی کردووه که ئۆپراسیۆنی سهربازیان له دژ نهنجام نهداث بۆ نازادکردنی بارمتهکان.

لهم کاتهه نهم گهله پرسپارانه به نارۆشنی و بی وهلام نهمیننهوه و ، نهم قوناغهش جگه له سهوداکههرا لهگهڵ داعش زیاتر کهسی تر وهلامهکانیان له لایه.

له ههمووشی گرنگتر ، برواناکهه که میدیای تورکی و به تاییهیی نهوانه ی لایهنگری حکومهتن بتوانن راستیهکان وهک خویان بگهیهنه دهستمان سهبهههت به باکگراوندی پرۆسهی سهوداکه.

وهک ناشکرایه و نهريتیکه که له نهمرۆوه میدیای تورکی دهست کات به دروستکردنی شاکاری پالانهوانیهتی و درۆو دهلهسهی ههلهپهستراو سهبهههت بهم پرۆسهیه ، بۆیه نهبن به ووریایی مامله لهگهڵ نهم بابهته بهکم به لایهنی کهم تا سالیکی تر تا نهو کاتهی میدیای تورکی بهسهههاته راستهقینهکانی نهم رووداوه نهگیرنهوه>



نەمە دياردەيەكە تازە و نامۇ نىيە لە ناو مېدياي توركى . لە كەيسى ئۇجالان ھەموومان لە بېرمانە چۈن باسى ھېنانەوھى ئۇچەلان ئەكرا لە مېدياي توركى و مەتەل و باسى گېرانەوھى پالەوان ناساكان دەكرا . بەھامان شىوھ لە دەستگىرکردنى (شەمەددين ساكك) لە ناو پەكەكە .

بۇ نەوھى بە راست و دروستى بزانى چى روويداوه لە نىوان توركيوا داعش ، سەرچاوەكانى ھەوائى نزيك بە حكومت بىن متمانتري سەرچاوە ھەوائى، بۇيە باشتر وايە ھەوائەكان لە سەرچاوەكانى نۆپۆزسيون و ئەو مالىپەرانەى كە لايەنگرى داعشن وەرپگرم.

وېبسايتى [Tevhidhaber.net](http://Tevhidhaber.net) كە لايەنگرى داعشە و بە ناشكرا و بە نازادى لە ناو توركيوا كارنەكات ، كە نەمەش يەككە لە پاپەتە گومانايەكانى تر ، دەسلەتدارانى توركيوا تويتەر و يوتيوب دانەخەن و ئەككاوتەكانى تويتەرى ئەو كەسانەى رەخنە لە سىياسەتى حكومت ئەگرن دانەخا يەلام رېگە ئەدا داعش بە ناشكرا پروپاگەندە بكات تەجنىدى تىرورىستان بكات لە ناو توركيوا – ئەو توركيايەى كە رازى نەبوو بچىتە پال ھاپەيمانى نيونەتەوھى دژ بە داعش.

وەك شارەزايەكى ناسايش ھەندى ئەو بۇچوونانەى خۇم ئەخەمە بەرچا و بەرامبەر بە ئەگەرەكانى نەوھى توركيوا بەللىنى چى داوھ بە داعش بۇ نەوھى نەم بارماتە نازاد بكات:

يەكەم : وەك سايتەكەى داعش نامازەيەكى پېكردووه ، وەك جۇرېك لە جۇرەكانى دلتيا كەردنەوھى داعش بەشداری لە ھاوپەيمانيەكە ناكات و ئەگەريكى تريشى نەوھى كە نۆپيراسيۆنەكە دوا بخت بۇ نەوھى داعش بتوانى زەوى زياتر و كاتى زياتر لە ناو قوولايى سوريا بە دەست بېنى و ئەگەر نەمەش سەرى ئەگرت نەوھى توركيوا خۇى وەك ناوبژيوانىك دەر نەخا بۇ كوتايى ھېنان بە توندوتىرى.

دووم : لەوانەيە توركيوا زانيارى ستراتىژى بە داعش بدات بۇ نەوھى شكست بە دوژمنانى داعش بېنى لە سورياو عىراق. لە راستيدا دووبارە پالنانى داعش بۇ ناو سوريا و بۇ نەوھى ھېرش بكاتە سەر بىكەو بارەگا تۆكەكانى پىك و پەيەدە لە كۆيانى و دەست بەسەرگرتنى چەندىن شوينى ستراتىژى بەبى زانيارى ھەوائى مەتمانى پىكراو سەبارەت بە جموجولى پەكەكە و پەيەدە مەحالە بەتايەتەى پەكەكە كە ھېزىكە شارەزاو راھىنراون.

سېيەم : لە برى پىدانى ھاوکارى و يارمەتى راستەوخو بە داعش ، توركيوا لەوانەيە يارمەتى دارايى ، سەربازى ، زانيارى ، داوھتە ئەو خىل و سەرۆك عەشیرەتالەى كە لايەنگرى داعشن و نەمانەش دانوستاندنەكانيان رىكخستووھ.

وەرگىرانى: فايزە فوناد

AKX.40

<http://www.xendan.org/drejaWtar.aspx?NusarID=324&Jmara=643>

13/10/2014

شەرمە بۇ توركيوا لە جياتى كوردان داعشى ھەلېزاردوھ  
بېرنارد-ھينرى لىفى

لە ماوھى چەند سەعاتىكى دىكە يان چەند رۆژىكى دىكە كۆيانى دەگىرئيت . بەگىرانى نەم شارەى سوريا كە قوربانيەكى لىكدانەوھ گالتەجاريەكانى سەرۆكى توركيوا، رەجەب تەيب نۆردوگانە، كە بە جۆلە لىبىرىن و دانانى سوپا بەھىزەكەى لەسەر سنورەكانى سوريا وەك تەماشاكەرىك، تەنيا چەند كىلومەترىك لە شارە شەھىدبووھە، واپىدەچىت لە جياتى كوردان، ئەو داعشى ھەلېزاردبىت .

كۆيانى دەبىتە قورباني گەمە دووسەريەكەى توركيوا . لەكاتىكدا توركيوا رىگەى بە ھەرچى جىھادى ناوچەكە ھەيە دا بۇ چوونە ناو سورياو چاوپۆشيشىكرد لە ناردنى چەكى قورس بۇ داعش لەملاونەولاوھ بۇ سەر شارە گەمارۆدراوھە، ئەو چەكانەى كەوا نىستا بەكاردىن بۇ بۆردومانکردنى كۆيانى، لە ھەمانكاتدا، توركيوا ھەموو دەرگاو كون و قوژبىنىكى داخستووھ رىگەى لە ھەموو



ئەو دەپنە تېپىلغانىدىكى ئەگەر رۇنەمە تارىخىگە، كە رۇنەمە رۇنەمە مەيلى ئۆتۈرۈپتەنەمە ئە زىيادىيەت، ئەو رۇنەمە كە نىستە ئە ھەمۇ كاتىك زىاتەر ئە ھەمە ئەمەلىيەتتە كەمەلىيەتتەمە، ئەگەر بىيەت شانسى ئەو بۇ بىيەتتەمە كە بىيەت بە شەرىكىگە ناپورى ئەگەر ئەورۇپا (دواترىش، شەراكتى سىياسى دوستىكەت)، ئەو نۇخىيە سىياسى تۈركى خەونى پۈتۈرۈپتەمە ئەگەر بە جدى پۈتۈرۈپتەمە، ئەو دەپنە بىيەتتە كە ئەو شانسى بە كۆپەنە بەرگى ئەو شەرە ئە خۇ تېپەر دەپنە. ئەو شانسى تۈركى دەستەمە سەر ئەو يارمەتەمە كۆمەكەنە پۈتۈرۈپتەمە بە شەرە قارمەنە ئەكەنە پۈتۈرۈپتەمە شەرە ناپۇقەدراو كە دەكەن.

بەلەم دەپنە ئەو شەرە زىاتەر بۈيۈن بە نۆردۈگەن بىيەن، جا بە فەرمى يان بە نافەرمى، كە شەرە ئە دۇرە داغش ساتەمەختى دەركەوتەنە راستىيەكەنە، نىستە ئەپنە قەت دەركەوتەنە. مەپەست لىرە دەركەوتەنە راستىيەكەنە بۇ ئەو ھاپەيمەنە ئەو سىستەمە ناسايشە دەستەمەمەمە كە ئە سەرۈپەندى كۆتەنە شەرى دووئەمە جىيەنە ئە ناوچەكە دامەزرا، سىستەمە كە تۈركى تېپە ئەندامەمە ئە ناسايى زىاتەر، بەو ئە كە تۈركى بۈو بە كۆلەگە رۇنەمە ئەتە ناپۇ ئە ۱۹۵۲ ۋەو.

ئە ۱۹۹۱، تۈركى زۆر بە ناپەندى بەشدارى ئەو ناپەراسىيەنەمە كە بۇ پاراستى مەدەنىيەكەنە باكورى عىراق رىكەن. ئە ۱ نازارى ۲۰۰۳، پەرەمە تۈركى، ئە دەنگەنەمە كە تارمەمەمە دىرەخەنە خستە سەر پەيۈندەمەمە نىوان ئەو ئەو ھاپەيمەنەكەنە ئە رۇنەمە، دەنگە ئە دۇرە رىگەنە بە ۶۲ ھەزار ئە سۈپە ئەمەرىكە بە تېپەرۈپتەمە بە ناو خاكى تۈركى ئە رىگەنەمە بۇ ھەشكەنە سەر عىراق، رىگەنە بە دانەنە بىكەش بۇ ھەزەكەنە ئەمەرىكە ئەنە تۈركى ئە. ئەگەر تۈركى بۇ جارى سىيەم رىگە بىكە، ئەگەر كۆپەنە بىيەت بە ناوچە بۇ فەلەمەمەمە دىكە تۈركى، ئە ئەوئەن جىگە لىيۈرەن نىيە – دۈرۈرە ئە ناپۇ دەكەنەمەمە رىر گومان.

نۆردۈرە تەپەتەمەمە سەرۈك باراك نۇبەمە كە لەم رۇنەمە گەشكەنەمە ئەنقەرە دەپنە ئەمەنە بە رۈونى بە تۈركى بەگەنە. سەرۈكى فەرمەنە، فرانسۇ ھۆلەنە، كە چەندەن نىشانەمە دۈستەمەمە بە تۈركى نىشانەمە، دەپنە رۇنە قەسەمە ھاپەيمەنەكەنە فەرمەنە بىيەتتە بە نۆردۈگەن بىيەت كە كۆپەنە شۈرە ئەورۇپە. ئە لىرە، ۋەك ناپۇقەكەمە مەدەمە، ھەمۇ دىنە دەپنە رابەگەنەمە: "نابىت لىرە تېپەرەن."

نوسىنى: گەرە فەلەمەسوفى فەرمەنە بىرنەدە-ھەنرى لىقى ۋەرگىرانى ئە نىنگىلەمەمە: د. شىركە كرمەنچ

AKX.41

<http://www.xendan.org/drejaWtar.aspx?NusarID=251&Jmara=461>

بەھارى عەرەبى بۈو بە بەھارى كوردى

تانگ چى چاۋ

2014/09/13

بەمەدۈبە رىكەزۈر داغش ھەشە تۈندى كەدەسەر ھەرىمە كوردەستان، كۆمەلى نۆدەلەمەش ھەكەرىيەن پۈشكەش بە ھەرىمە كە، ئەمە ھەمە، بەلەك ئە ھەشەنەمە داغش، سۆزى چىنەمەكەنەش بەلەي خۇدە راکىشا.

ئەمەندەمە نەبەرد مەيدانە ھەوالى رەندەنە سى ئەندەزەمە چىنە ئە ناوچە كوردەكەنە باشۈرۈر خۇرەلەتە تۈركىيەن بۆلۈكەدەمە، ئەمەش ۋە ئە چىنەمەكەنە كەدە پەرسىيە بىكەنە بىيەن: بۇچى پارتى كرىكارەنە كوردەستان چىنەمەكەنە كەدەمە نامەنچ؟ ۋە ئەمەكە ھەشەنەمە بىيەت، ئەمە مەسەلەمە كوردە كە ھەمەشە ئە بەرەبۈنەمەدە، تەمەدەمەمە نۆپە ئە خۇرەلەتە ناۋەرەستە كە پۈتۈرۈپتەمە چىن رۈبەرۈر بىيەمە.

پرسی کورد یەکیکە لەو کێشە نەتەوییەکانەی کە بەهۆی ئالۆزی خۆرەلاتی ناوەراستەو سەریهەڵداوە، ئەم کێشە نزیکی نیو سەدە لە کێشە فەلەستین کۆنترە و پێی دەوترێت مەسەلەی کورد، ئەمەش خۆی لەمەدا دەبینێتەوە کە کورد داوا لە حکومەتەکانی دەکات دان بە ناسنامەکیاندا بنێن و پانتایی مافە نەتەوییەکانیان زیاد بکەن و رێگەی ئۆتۆنۆمی یان سەربەخۆییان پێ بدەن.

کورد لەنێوان هەرچوار دەولەتی تورکیا و سوریا و عێراق و ئێران دا بەش بوون و چوارم گەورەترین نەتەوێ خۆرەلاتی ناوەراستە کە ژمارەیان بە 30 ملیۆن کەس مەزەندە دەکرێت.

کێشە کورد لە دواى جەنگی یەکەمی جیهانی دەستی پێکرد، کاتێک ولاتانی ھاوپییمان بەلێنی دەولەتێان بە کورد دا، بەلام ھاوپییمان بەهۆی نازەزایی تورکەو لەو بەلێنە پاشگەزبوونەو، ئەکە هەر ئێوە، بەلکو کوردستانیشان کرد بە چوار پارشەو، ئەمەش وایکرد بۆ ماوەیەکى زۆر دان بە ناسنامە کورد دا نەتریت، کورد روبەر ووی جیاوازیی رەگەزی و چەندین جۆری دواکەوتووی نابووری و کۆمەلایەتی بوونەو تانیستە مەسەلە کورد بەی چارەسەر ماوەتەو و بووتە فاکتەرێکی سەرەکی بۆ ناسەقامگیری لە ولاتاندا کە پەيوەندیدارن بە کێشە کوردەو.

لە مێژوودا، کورد چەند ھەلیکی زیرینی بۆ سەربەخۆیی ھەبوو، باشترین ئەو ھەلەنەش، قونای دواى جەنگی جیهانی یەکەم بوو، بەلام بەدەخەو کورد ئەو ھەلە لەدەستچوو. پاشان لە سالانی 1991 و 2003 ھەردوو جەنگی ئەمریکا لە عێراق بوونە دووڕیانێک بۆ یەکلاى بوونەو چارەنووسی کورد، لەگەڵ ئەم بێسەر و بەرەییی ئیستا کە خۆرەلاتی ناوەراستی نەروێژ و دوو شانبەشانی کێشەو نەخشە جیوسایسی و جوغرافی لە ناوچەکەدا، کورد ھەلیکی ستراتیژی دیکە کەوتووتە دەست، بۆیە دەکرێت بوترێت ئەو بەھارە عەرمییە سالی 2011 بەرپابوو، گۆردرا بۆ "بەھاری کوردی".

کورد لە سوریا ھەلی ئەو بێسەر و بەرەییی قۆستەو بۆ دامەزراندنی ھیزی چەکدارى خۆی و دەستگرتن بەسەر ناوچە کوردییەکاندا، ھەر بەمەشەو نەوێستان و حکومەتێکی خۆجێی سەربەخۆی دامەزراند، ئیستا ئەوان ھاوشیوە کوردی عێراق، خۆیان بەرپەمەین، لە تورکیاش کورد سەركەوتوو بوو لە شکاندن ئەو گەمارۆیە ماوی 100 سالە بەسەریاندا سەپێناو یەکەم حزبی کوردی بەناوی (پارتی دیموکراتی کورد) بە یاسایی دامەزرا کە یەکەمجار لە ناوچەیدا وشە کوردی ھەلگرێت. لەگەڵ قۆلبوونەو مەملەتێکەنی ناو عێراق، کورد ھەلی سەربەخۆیی ھاتووتەبەردەم، تەنەت ئەو چەکانەش کە ئەمریکا و ئەوروپا راستەوخۆ دەیان بە کورد، وەک ئامازمەکی گرنگ لێکەدرێتەو بۆ گۆرینی سیاسەتی خۆراوا بەرامبەر کورد، زۆرێک دەلێن چێژ جیاوونەو کورد خەو نییە بەتایبەت لە سایەتی ئەو بێسەر و بەرەییی عێراق پیایدا دەگۆزەرێت.

مەمەلەکردن لەگەڵ پرسی کورد، یەکیک لەو تەحەدانەو کە دیپلۆماسیەتی چین روبەر ووی بووتەو، کە خۆی لە چوار جۆر تەحە و ئاستەنگی بەردەم سیاسەتی چین دەبینێتەو: یەکەم، رەنگە جیاوونەو کورد لەگەڵ ئەو بنەمایە چین یەکنەگرتەو کە باس لەو دەکات چین دەست لە کاروباری ناوخوا ئەو ولاتانە و مەنەدات کە پەيوەندیان بە چینەو ھەیە. دوو، لەگەڵ گەشەسەندنی بەرژموندییەکانی چین لە ناوچە کوردییەکاندا، بەتایبەت لە عێراق، چین لەبەردەم ئاستەنگی پاراستنی بەرژموندییە دەرەکیەکانیدا و دەییوێت ھاوسەنگی ھەستیارى نێوان کورد و حکومەتی ناوێدی عێراق بپارێزێت. سێیەم، بەوییە چین ئەندامی ھەمیشیی ئەنجومەنی ئاسایشی نێوولەتی و ولاتانی گەورە تازەییگەشتووە، پێوستە بەرپرسیاریتی خۆی لە ئاست پرسی مەروییەکانی و مافی کەمینیەکان بگرتەنەستو، ئەمە جگەلەو کە ناسیت لە ئاست کێشە ئەمینیە گەورەکانی خۆرەلاتی ناوەراست دەستەوێستان بێت. چوارەم، بە لەبەر چاوەگرتنی ھەلوێستی ھەندێک لە ولاتانی خۆرەلاتی ناوەراست بەرامبەر ئەو کێشەو کە روبەر ووی چین بووتەو، زۆرێک لە چینیەکان لەسەر ئینتەرنێت خاوەنارێنەرێکی پەکیک پشێوانی لە کورد بکات، ئەمەش تارا دەیکە وەک گوشاری رای گشتیی ئەو ولاتەو لێ دێت کە بخرێتەسەر دیپلۆماسیەتی چین.

بەکوێتی، پرسی کورد زۆر ئالۆزە و پەيوەندیی بە بەرژموندییە ئەمەو و نەتەوییەکانی چین و ئاسایش و سەقامگیری و نەریتە نێوولەتی و مەروییەکانی ناوچەکەشەو ھەیە، چینی ش جگەلە روبەر و بوونەو راستەوخۆ، ئەوێندە بژاردەو لەبەر دەستدا نییە.

تانگ چی چاو — پسپور له سەنتەری توژیڤنەوهی ئەفریقا و خۆرئاوای ئاسیا — ئەکادیمیای چین بۆ زانستە کۆمەڵایەتیەکان

ئەم بابەتە 1536 جار خوینراوە

AKX.42

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بۆ دەبێ ئەمەریکا یارمەتی کوردان بدا؟  
فەزید زەکەریا

بارودوخەکه له عێراق زۆر مەترسیداره، لهگەڵ ئەوەشدا شلەژاو و سەرلێشێوینەرە. نایا پێویستە وڵاتە یەكگرتووەكان لەوە زیاتر بکەن بۆ یارمەتیدانی ئەو کۆمەڵگایانەی لە ژێر ھەرشەیی داروخاندان. ئەگەر ئەمەریکا لەبەر لایەنی مەرویی دەسوەردەدات، دەی بۆ لە سوریا نایکا؟ کە زۆر ترسناکتر و خراپتر دەرئەنجامە و ھەروەھا کۆمەڵکوژی تیداھ؟ لەمرووەوە ئەبێ بیرمان بۆچی بپروا؟

من بە وریایەوه نەروانمە ئەو جەختکردنەوێی ئەمەریکا سەبارەت بە گەڕانەوێ بۆ عێراق، لەگەڵ ئەوەشدا پێمانیە لەم بارودوخە نیستادا، دەبێ نیدارێ نوباما زۆر بەهێزتر و بەنومێدەو دەسوەردەدات، ھیزی ناسمانی بەکاربینی، راھێنان پێشکەش بکات و چەك بپەخشێ ئەگەر پێویستی کرد. بۆ؟

دەرکەوتنی ئەو قەیرانە مەرویی عێراق زۆر مەترسیدار و سامناکە، لە ھەمان کاتدا، ھاوشێوەی سوریا، نایا دەسوەردانی سەربازی لە راستیدا یارمەتیدەرە، نایا پلانێکی روون ھەیە کە بە کاربێر؟ نیست لە عێراق پێوەی ھەیە، کە وادەکات پاساوی ستراتیجی بپەخشێ بە کردەي ئەمەریکا. ئەو نیست لە عێراق نەگوزەرێ مەترسی ھەیە بۆ بەرژەوێندیەکانی ئەمەریکا. کە ھەرمی کوردستانە لەو وڵاتەدا.

لە سالی ۱۹۹۱ ھە، بۆ ۲۳ سال نەروا، ئەمەریکا کوردەکانی لە عێراقدا پاراستوو ئەوێ ھێرشیان بکێتە سەر و کۆمەڵگاکەیان داروخیت. لە ماوێ ئەو ۲۳ سالەدا، کوردەکان توانیان میرگێکی مۆدێرنی لیبرالی ھاوپەیمانی ئەمەریکا و رۆژناو لە بیباانی رۆژھەڵاتدا، بپنابکەن.

ھەرمی تارادەییکی زۆر خودمۆختاری کوردستانی عێراق لەوێدایە بپێتە شوێنێکی کراوێ، جیھانی، چاو لە نایندە. ئەمەو پەرەسەندنی نابۆرییەکی باش، کەرەستە گەورە بپناسازی، پێشانگا زەبەلاحەکانی ئۆتۆمبیل ھەروەھا کۆشکی خواردنی خێرا (ماکدۆنالدی ئەمەریکی)، رۆژانە لە گەشەدایە.

زانکۆی ئەمەریکی لە سلیمانی بەو دەستپێشان ئەکرێ کە شوێنێکە بۆ پەرەدەي مۆدێرن و جیگایەکە بۆ گفتوگۆی کراو. سەرکردە کوردەکان ئەرکی ئەوێان گرتوووە نەستۆ کە گەرنێتی دواوێ خۆیان بکەن، سەربەخۆی رانەگەین، کاربکەن بۆ کۆتایی ھینانی تیرۆری کوردی لە تورکیا، ھاوکاری مەرویی ناوارەکانی سوریا بکەن. کوردەکان ھێزێک بوونە بو سەپاندنی سەقامگیری لە ناوچەییکی بێ سەرویدار.

یەکنێک لە وانەکانی سیاسەتی دەرەوێ ئەمەریکا لە ماوێ ۶۰ سالی رابردوو ئەو بوو دەستیوەردان کاتیکی سوودی ئەبێ کە خەلکی ئەو ناوچانە دەسیان تێوەردەدات لە لایەن سەرکردەییکی میلی و پشت نەستۆر بە یاساو رێبەرایەتی بکێن ھەروەھا بپانەوێ بۆ مەبەستێک و ئامانجێک بچەنگن. بێر لە کوریای باشوور بکەرەو و بەراوردی بکە بە باشووری قێتنام دەستیوەردان سوودی نەبوو کاتی خەلکانی دەقەرەو خۆیان شەریان نەنکرد.

کوردەکان ئەیانەوێ بۆ نازادی بچەنگن، بۆ سەربەخۆیی. ئەوان سوپایەکی بەھێز و مەشقپێکراویان ھەیە. سەرکردەکانیان جەماویری و یاسایی، ئەوان ھاوپەیمانیکی نزیکی ئەمەریکابوون و نیست زۆریان پێویست بە یارمەتی ئەمەریکایە. نیدارێ نوباما ئەبێ بە دەنگیانەو بچیت. ----- \*

فەزید زەکەریا، رۆژنامەنوسیکی ئەمەریکی بە رەجەلەک ھندییە، پێشکەشکاری بەرنامەي (global public square GPS) ە لە کەنالی CNN.

24/06/2014

کوردستانی عێراق لەبەردەم بوون بە دەوڵەتیکی نەوتی سەر بەخۆدا  
کریستۆفەر هیلمان

پنج شهمه رابردو پاش نهو د داعش شاری موسلیان گرت و هیزه کانی پیشمرگهش له کهرکوکدا جیگیر بوون، ووتاریکم نووسی سهارهت بهو د که حکومتی ههریمی کوردستان لهوه ناچیت دؤراوه بن لهو کیشانهی نهم دواپیهدا. هیزه کانی پیشمرگه توانای شهرکردنی نه بیت. ههرهک دوو کهشتیه نهوتیه کهیان هیچ کریری نه بیت. بیگومان پنج شهمه پشوو لهوه نهده چوو سهروک نوباما ریگه بدات که به غذا (بهتابیهتی ناوچهی سهوز) بهکوینه ژیر هیرشی داعشهوه. بهلام نابا نهمریکا مالیک، لاناتا تا دنلیلیت له سهلامهت و سهقامگیری و فیدرالیته عیراق؟

نەخىر، نەۋ وتارەي پېشۋوم ھەلە بوو. ھەرۈەك چەندىن خوينەر ھەمان بۆچۈننىان لەسەر نەۋ وتارە ھەبوو. واديارە كوردەكان زۆر بەباشى ناۋچەكانى خۇيان گرتوۋە. دەنگۇي نەۋە ھەيە كە فرۆكەخانەى بەغدا لەژىر ھېرشدا بېت. داعش زۆر بى رەھمانە سەمان نەفسەرى حۇمەتەتيان گوللەبارانكرد. حۇمەتى نەمەريكاش دىبلۇماتەكانى لە ناۋچەى سەۋزدا دەكشېننېتەۋە. دەۋترىت كە نىزان پاسداريان ناردوۋتە بەغدا. سەرۆك نۇباماش داۋاي لە نۇرى مالىكى كرد كە قەبرانەكە بەشېۋەيەكى دىبلۇماتى جارەسەر بكات.

عیراق لهسه سه ده تاوه وهك پارویهکی ناسان ده ده كهوت، سنووره كانی له ابر دودا له لایهن داگیر كهری بهریتانی هوه بهی گویدانه جیاو ازیه چینایه تیه كان كیشراوه. نهو راستیهی كه نیستا ههموان دهیزان، بهتایبته كورده كان، نهوهیه كه نهه عیراقه بۆ ماوهیهکی زۆر خۆی بهیه كهوه ناگرت.

کوردستان له نیستادا خاوهنی 45 ملیار بهرمیله نهوته، نهمهش له بریژدهی نهوتی لیبیا زیاتره. ههریهك له كۆمپانیاكانی نیکسۆن و شیفرۆن و تۆتال ملیاران دۆلاریان له کوردستان سهرفکردوو ه تاوهكو بیر نهوتی تازه بدۆزنهوه و نهم پروسهیهش له لایهن حکومهتی ههریمی کوردستانهوه پهسهند دهکړیت.

حکومەتی هەریمی کوردستان تا نییست دەستی نەگرتوو بەسەر بیرە نەوتە زەبەلاحەکانی کەرکوکدا، کە دەسڵ لەمەوبەر و لەوی پەڕی توانایدا 650 هەزار بەرمیلە نەوتی لەرۆژێکدا بەرھەم دەھێنا. وەک هەر بیرە نەوتیکی دیکە ی باشوور، بیرەکانی کەرکوک لەژێر دەسەلاتی وەزارەتی نەوتی بەغدادا بوون کە سالی پێشوو گرێبەستی لەگەڵ دا، بە کەرکوکەو یان BP مۆرکرد بۆ بوژاندنەوێ بیرەکان. کوردەکان دژی نەم گرێبەستە بوون لەگەڵ BP کۆمپانیای بەیەک کەرکوک، هەریمی کوردستان لەتوانایدا بە کە رۆژانە 400 هەزار بەرمیل بەرھەم بێنێت.

ره‌نگه کۆنترۆل کردنی کەرکوک له‌لایهن به‌خداوه نیستا بێته میژوو، به‌وپێیه‌ی نیستا هیزی پێشمرگه به‌نیاز نییه ده‌ستبهرداری نه‌و شاره بێیت و به‌جێبه‌هێنیت. فه‌نار چه‌داده‌ له‌ زانکۆی نیشتمانی سه‌نگافوره تابه‌یت به‌ دامه‌زراوه‌ی خۆره‌لاتی ناوه‌راست له‌سه‌ر پێگه‌ی کۆمه‌لایه‌تی تۆبته‌ر نووسیویه‌تی: "نایا ته‌نها منم که‌ و اه‌سته‌ده‌که‌م نه‌و کەرکوک‌ه‌ی که‌ کێشه‌یه‌کی گه‌وره‌بوو هه‌روه‌ک وادیار بوو که‌ شه‌ریکی گه‌وره‌ی له‌ داهاتوودا له‌سه‌ر ده‌کریت به‌لام له‌م دوایه‌دا له‌ماوه‌ی شه‌وو رۆژێکدا کێشه‌که‌ به‌کلارابه‌وه‌!"

دواى رووداودەكانى نەم چەند رشوژەى رابردوو، واديارە كەركوك دواچار دەتوانىت خۆى ياسا بۆ خۆى دابنىت. كەواتە چى لەو كەشتىيە نەوتىيە كەوردیانە دىت كە پر كراون؟ ئەوانەى كە لە توركيا پركراون، ئەوانەى كە بەخدا ئىدانەى كردن و ھەرەشەى ئەودەى كرد كە دواى ياساى لەسەر ھەر كەسێك تۆمار بكات كە بيانگرىت؟ رەنگە نىستاش لە كەنارەكانى مەغرىب و مالتا بسورنەئەو. بەلام لە نىستادا كە مەسەلەى سەر بەخۆبى كوردستان رووى لە گەشەكردنە، رەنگە نەم ھەفتەيە ئەوە بىت كە تىبدا كريان، نەوت گشت دوودلەكانيان وەلا دەنن و نىگەران نابن ئەودەى بەخدا



حکومەتی عێراق و هاوێپەیمانان دڵیان بۆ خۆشە کە توانیویانە لە ناوەراست و باکووری ئەو وڵاتەدا پاشەکشە بە داعش بکەن، بەلام ئەو سەرکەوتنەکانی کە لە باکوور و باکووری ڕۆژھەڵاتی وڵاتەکاندا بەدەست ھاتوون لە لایەن سوپای عێراقەوە نەبوو، بەڵکو لە لایەن میلیشیا شیعەکانەوە بوو، ئەو میلیشیایانەی کە هیچ جیاوازیەک ناکەن لە نێوان داعش و دانیشوانی سوننەیی عێراقدا.

میلیشیا شیعەکان زۆر بە ئاشکرا باس لە لەناوبردنی سوننەکان دەکەن لەو پارێزگایانەی کە سوننە و شیعەیی تێدا یەک دیالە، ئەمەش ئەو دەرئەنجامەکانی لێدەکەوێتەوە کە سوننەکانی عێراق هیچ چارەبەستێکیان لێیان نەدەستدایە، گەر بیانەوێت لە ژبەدا بمانێت ئەو دەبێت یان پەڕێکی بکەن بە چەندێکی داعشەو یان بە ڕۆژ و سەری خۆیان ھەڵبگرن.

گەڕ بێت و ئەمریکا شکستێنێت لە پاراستنی کۆبانی دا، ئەو کارساتێکی سیاسی و سەربازی بەدواي خۆیدا دەھێنێت. لە راستیدا، ئەو ھەموو سەرجەمی بۆ ئەو ھۆی لە دەستدانی کۆبانی زۆر لەو گەورەترە بدرێتە پال ھێرشە ئاسمانییەکان.

لەسەرئەنجام ھێرشە ئاسمانییەکان بۆ سەر سوریا، باراک ئۆباما باسی لە بەدەستھێنانی پشتیوانی وڵاتە سوننەکانی وەک تورکیا، عەرەبستانی سعودی، قەتەر، ئێران، ئیمارات و بەحرەین دەکرد.

بەلام ھەریەک لە وڵاتەکان ئەجیندای تێبەستی خۆیان ھەیە و هیچ کامیان لەناوبردنی داعش ئامانجی پێشێنەیان نییە، ھەرچەندە پێدەچێت دەستەڵاتدارانی عەرەبی سوننی حەزبان لە داعش نەبێت، بەلام وەک چاودێری عێراقی ئامازەیی پێداوێ " ئەو وڵاتە خۆشیان لەو راستیەکانی کە داعش ھێندە کێشە بۆ شیعەکان دروست دەکات ھێندە مەترسی نییە بۆ سوننەکان."

لە ناو ئەو وڵاتەکانی کە بەشداری ھاوێپەیمانێتیەکیان کردووە، تورکیا گرنگترینیانە، بەھۆی ئەوەی تورکیا سنووریکی بە درێژایی 510 میل لەگەڵ وڵاتی سوریا ھەیە کە پێشتر لەوێ چەندێکی داعش و جەبھەتوڵئوسرە بەناسانی لێیان دەڕۆشتە ناو خاکی سوریا.

ھەر چەندە لەم سەڵدای تورکیا ئاسایشی سنوورەکانی زیاتر کرد، بەلام دواي سەرکەوتنەکانی ئەم چەند مانگەیی رابردووی داعش، چێژ چەندێکی وەک جاران پێویستیان بە یارمەتی دەرەکی نەبێت.

لە ھەفتەی رابردووشدا ئەو ڕووبۆوە کە تورکیا ھێزە سیاسییەکانی سوریا و ھێزە سەربازیەکانی (پەیدە و یەپەگە) بە مەترسیەکی گەورە دەزانێت بۆ سەر وڵاتەکانی و پێی وایە مەترسی ئەو ھێزە بۆ سەر تورکیا زیاترە لە مەترسیەکانیان بۆ سەر داعش.

زیاد لەو، (پەیدە) بەشێکن لە پارتی کرێکاری کوردستان (پەکەکە)، ئەو پارتی کە لە سالی 1984 مە داواي خۆ بەرپۆوە بردنی کوردان دەکات لەناو تورکیادا.

دواي کەشانی ھۆی حکومەتی سوریا لە کانتۆنە کوردەکان لە سنووری تورکیادا لە سالی 2012 دا، حکومەتەکانی ئەنقەرە ترسی لێنشت کە خۆبەرپۆوە بردنی کوردانی سوریا کار بکاتە سەر کوردانی تورکیا کە ژمارەیان 15 ملیۆن دەبێت.

بەجەب تەب ئێرەو، پێی وایە داعش کۆنترۆلی کۆبانی بکات باشترە وەک لە پەیدە.

کاتێکیش پێنج شەرفانی پەیدا، ئەو شەرفانەکانی ماوەکی زۆر ڕووبەرۆی ھێرشەکانی داعش وەستانەو، وێستیان لە ڕێی سنووری تورکیاوە بپەرنەو، سوپای تورکیا ئەوانی وەک تیرۆریست ناساند.

لە بارەي بەشداریکردنی بەشێوەکی کاربەر لەناو ھاوێپەیمانێتیەکاندا، تورکیا داواي نرخیکی زۆر دەکات لە ئەمریکا، تورکیا دەبێت ناوچەکی دژە فرین لە ناو خاکی سوریا دروست بکەیت، بە مەبەستی نیشتهجێکردنی ئاوارە سوریکان و ھاوکات مەشق پێکردنی ئۆپۆزیسیونی سوریا تێیدا.

ئێرەو، ناوچەکی دەبێت ئەو ناوچە دژە فرینە لە داھاتوودا لە دژی حکومەتەکانی دیمەشق بەکار بھێنێت، چونکە ڕوون و ئاشکرایە دروستکردنی ناوچەکی دژە فرین تەبیا بۆ ڕێگری دەبێت لە ڕۆکەکانی دیمەشق، ئەگەر ناو خۆ داعش خاوەنی هیچ ھێزێکی ئاسمانی نییە.

گەر ئەمەشی بۆ بچێتە سەر، ئەو تورکیا بە پالێستی ئەمریکا، دەچێتە ناو شەری تافی سوریاوە و ھاوشانی ئۆپۆزیسیونی سوریا دژی حکومەتەکانی دیمەشق دەجەنگێت.



هەر لاسەرمەتای قەیرانەکانی سوریاو لە ساڵی 2011، تورکیا خۆی ئێستەوێکی باشی بۆ پێشەهاتە سیاسەتەکان نەکردووە، لەسەرمەتای شۆرشەکاندا، تورکیا لەجیاتی ئەوەی نیوەندگیزی بکات و بالانسی پەیموئەندەییەکانی لەگەڵ حکومەتی بەشار ئەسەد و ئۆپوزسیونی ئەو ولاتەدا رابگرێت، تورکیا پشتگیری لەو ئەزمە سەربازییەکردوو ھاوکارو پشتیوانی ھێزە جیھادییەکانی کرد و پێی وابوو کە ئەسەد زوو لەناو دەچێت.

ئەردوغان پێی وایە کە دەتوانێت رقی و تورەیی کوردانی تورکیا پشتگۆی بخت، ئەو کوردانەیی کە پێیان وایە کە ئەردوغان سیاسەتیکی ناپۆشنی ھەبە لەبەر امبە بە داعش لە دژی کوردانی سوریا.

ئەو گۆمە قولتربوو کاتیگ کە 33 خۆپیشاندەری کوردی لە ناڕەزاییەکانی بەرامبەر دۆخی کۆبانی کوژران و لە ئەگەری کەوتنی کۆبانیشدا، قورمە خەستەر دەبیتمە.

بۆچی تورکیا نیگەرانی نی یە لە ئەگەری شکستپێنانی پرۆسەی ئاشتیی لەگەڵ پارێزگاری کوردستاندا؟ لەوانەیە تورکیا پێی وایێت بەھۆی ئەوەی پەکەم بە قورسی بەشداری لە شەری دژی داعشدا، چتر ئەو ھێز و تواناییە جارانیان نەماپێت و نەتوانن جاریکی دیکە بچنەو شەڕ لە گەڵ حکومەتی تورکیادا.

لەلایەکی دیکەشەو حکومەتی ئێران رابگەیانداوە گەر تورکیا بچێتە شەڕمەو لەگەڵ سوریا و بەشداری شەری ناوخوازی ئەو ولاتە بکات ئەو "باجەکی دەمات."

لەوانەیی ئەم وتەییە بەرپرسیانی ئێران ئەو مانایە ھەلبەرگرت کە لەئەگەری دەستپێکردنە توریکا لە ناو خاکی سوریا ئەو حکومەتی تاران یارمەتی ھێزە کوردییەکانی ناو توریکا بدات لە دژی ئەنقەرە.

لە رابردووشدا سەدام حەسین سەرۆکی رژیمی بەعس، ھەمان ھەڵە رەجەب تەیب ئەردوغانی دووبارەکردووە و کاتیگ ھێرشی بردە سەر ئێران لە ساڵی 1980 دا، حکومەتەکی تارانیش وەک بەرپەرچدانەویەکی و بەمەبەستی لاوازکردنی رژیمیگە سەدام حەسین یارمەتی ھێزە کوردەکانی عێراقی دا.

دەستپێکردنە سەربازی تورکیاش لە ناو سوریا ئەو ھەڵە نیە بێتە ھۆی کوتایی پێ ھێنایی جەنگی ناوخوازی سوریا، بەڵکو لەوانەیی شەڕمە بگوازیتمەو بۆ تورکیا.

سەرچاوە: Independent

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PM:02:44:15/06/2014

رۆیتەر: کوردەکان خەوێکیان بەدیدیەھێن

— خەندان

دوای کشانەوێ ھێزە سەربازییەکانی عێراق، ھێزە کوردییەکان توانییان خەونی چەند سالیان بەدیدیەھێن و لە ماوەی چەند سەعاتێکدا و بەجێ ئەقە دەستبەگر بەسەر شاری کەرکوکدا.

ناژانسی رۆیتەر بڵاویکردووە کە "دوای ھێرشی چەندارە توندڕەوێکان، حکومەتی عێراق دەسەلاتی بەسەر ناوچەکانی باکووری عێراقدا نەما، بەمەش ھەل بۆ کوردەکان رەخسا دەست بگرن بەسەر ئەو شارە مێژووییە کە بە قودسی خۆیانی دەزانن و لەھەموو کات زیاتر نزیکتربوون لە بەدیدیەھێنانی ئامانجی سەرمەکیان کە دامەزراندنی دولەتی سەربەخۆی تایبەت بە خۆیانە."

دوای دەستبەسەر داگرتنی شاری موصل کە گەورترین شاری باکووری عێراقە لەلایەن چەکدارانی ریکخراوی دەولەتی ئیسلامی لە عێراق و شام "داعش" و چوونیان بەرەو بەغدا، کوردەکان کاتیان بەغیرۆ ئەدا بۆ کوژدەوێ ھێزەکانیان و بەتەواوی شاری کەرکوک و ناوچەکانی دەوروبەریان کۆنترۆل کرد و بەجێ شەڕ کردن بەرێژە سەدا 40، ناوچەکانی ژێردەستیان فراوان کرد.

ئەو زوویە نوێیانە کوردەکان کۆنترۆلێان کرد چەندین کیلگەمی نوێیان تێدا بە کوردەکان بە بنەمای دامەزراندنی ھەر دەولەتیکی سەربەخۆی لە ناپەندە دەزانن.

ھاوکات کوردەکان ئەو بێکە سەربازییانە سوپای عێراقیان کۆنترۆل کرد کە لە شاری کەرکوک چۆلکران کرد و دەستیان بەسەر چەک و کەلوپەکانی ئەو بێکەدا گرت.

لە ئێستادا کوردەکان بۆاردەکانی بەردەستیان بۆ قوناغی داھاتو و تاووتوێ دەکەن، راشیانگەیان بە بنەمای پەکیارچەیی عێراق نەماوە.

فؤاد حسين سەرۆكى دىۋانى سەرۆكايەتى ھەريىمى كوردستان وتى: "عيراق چوۋەتە قوناغىكى نوپوھ و كوردەكان تاۋوتوئى چۆنئىتى مامەلەكردن لەگەل ئى عىراقە نوپىيەدا دەكەن."

لەكاتەمەى لەسەدەى رابردودا نەخشەى رۆژ ھەلاتى ناۋەرەست دارىژ رايەوھ و كوردەكان كە ژمارەيان 30 ملوئەن كەسە و بەسەر عىراق و ئىران و سوريە و توركيدا دابەشكران، ھەولەى دامەزراندنى دەولەتى تاييەت بەخۆيان دەدەن.

لەوای رووخانى رژیىمى سەدام حەسینەوھ، كوردەكانى عىراق كە ژمارەيان چارە ملوئەن كەس دەبىت نزیكترەن لە بەدیھنەيانى خەنەكەيان، چونكە دەسەلاتىكى نیمیچە سەر بەخۆيان ھەيە لە ناوچەكانى خۆيان كە ناسايش تیايدا بەرقەرارە و رژیەى سەدا 17 ی بودجەى گشتى عىراقیان ھەيە.

ئەم گۆرانكارىيەش بوونەھۆى ئەوھى ھەولیزى پائىنەختى ھەرنەم گەشەى كەرد لەكاتىكدا كە بەغداى پائىنەختى عىراق وەك گۆرپەنى شەر مایەوھ.

لەوای رووخانى سەدام حەسینەوھ، كوردەكان پۆستى سەرۆك كۆمار و ھەزىرى دەروھى عىراقیان بەرپۆھەردوھ و حەزبە سەياسیەكانیان رۆلەيان لە ديارىكردنى دەسەلاتدارانى ھەكۆمەتى عىراقدا ھەبوھ و ھاۋكارىبون لە پەيدانى سەماى گشتىگىرى بە ھەكۆمەتەى شەبە بەرپۆھەى دەبات، بەلام ناكۆكەيان سەبارەت بە دەسەلاتى بەرپۆھەردنى نەوت و سنوورى ھەريىمى كوردستان لەنۆوان ھەردوولادا بەردوامە.

كوردەكان دەلەين زۆرەيەى ناوچە دابراۋەكانى دەروھى ھەريىم لەنۆياندا شارى كەركوك بەشپۆھەيەكى ناساىيەى لەلەين دەسەلاتى سەدام حەسینەوھ "تەعەرب" كراون كە كوردەكانى لە ناوچانە كۆچىنكەرد و ھەرمەكانى تیدا نىشتەجەكەرد، بەئامانجى سەپاندنى دەسەلاتى بەسەر ئى ناوچانە و نەوتەكەيدا.

لە ئىستاندا ھەكۆمەتى عىراق لە ناوچانەدا نەماوھ و ھەيزە كوردەيەكان كە بە پىشەمەرگە ناسراون ناكۆكەيان لەبەرژوھەندى كورد يەكلايەكردوۋەتەوھ.

جەبار ياوھەر ئەمەندارى گشتى و ھەزارەتى پىشەمەرگە رايگەيان كە سەرچەم ئى ناوچانە دەخەرنەسەر ھەريىم، ئامارەشى بەوھدا كە لە ئىستاندا سنوورى ھەريىم لەگەل رىخراۋى دەولەتى ئىسلامى لە عىراق و شام "داعش" دايە و ھىچ سنوورىكى لەگەل ھەكۆمەتى عىراق نەماوھ.

بەپرەسانى كورد رايانگەيان لە ئىستاندا ئەولەيەتيان پاراستنى ھەريىمى كوردستانە لە كارىگەرى رووداۋەكانى ناوچەكانى ترى عىراق.

ئامارەشيان بەوھداوھ كە نەزىكەى سالىك لەمەوېر پىشەبىنى ھەرشە سەربازىيەكەى ھەفتەى رابردوۋى چەكدارانى دەولەتى ئىسلامى لە عىراق و شاميان كەردوھ و ھۆشدارىيان داۋەتە بەغدا، بەلام بى نەجەم بوھ.

كوردەكان پىشەبەيەكى ئەمەنيان لە سەر سنوورى ئىران و سوريە و موسل دروستكەردوھ كە زياتر لە ھەزار كىلۆمەتر دەبىت و واديارە نيازبان نىيە لەسەر موسل شەر بەكەن.

بەپرەسكى پىشەوى ئەمەريكى رايگەيان كە "موسل جى بايەخى كوردەكان نىيە.. بەردوام دەين لە فروانكردنى سنوورى ژىر دەسەلاتيان."

دواى چەند رۆژىك لە دەستبەسەر داگرتنى موسل لەلەين چەكدارانى داعشەو، تىببىنى كرا كە پىشەمەرگە نامادەكارى كەرد بۆ ھاۋكارىكردنى ھەكۆمەتى عىراق و دەستگرتەوھ بەسەر شارى موسلدا كە سەعاتىك بە ئۆتۆمبىل لە ھەولیزوھە دورە كەرد، بەلام كوردەكان رايانگەيان كە بەغدا بەرەسمى داۋاى ھاۋكارى لىنەكەردوون، ئەگەر بەغداش داۋاى ھاۋكارى بكات، ھىچ شەتەكى نىيە پىشەكەشى كوردەكانى بكات لەبەرەمبەر ئى خەمەتگوزارىيەدا بەتاييەت كە كوردەكان بە كەردەيى چەندىن دەستگەوتيان وەك كەركوك دەستگەوت.

ئەمەى سكاى كە رايژكارى سەياسى پىشەوى سوپاى ئەمەريكا بوھ لە عىراق رايگەيان كە رەنگە چەند سەركەردەيەكى سەياسى كورد بەدرىژاىيەى ماوھى رابردوۋ چاۋەرنى ھەرسەپنەنى رژیىمى فەرمانرەۋاى عىراقیان كەردبىت، چونكە ھاۋكارى نورى مالىكى سەرۆك ھەزىرانىان دەكەرد و گەرمويان لەسەر ھەرسەپنەنى عىراق لەسايەى دەسەلاتيدا دەكەرد.

ئەمەى سكاى وتى: "ھەندىك سەركەردەى كورد پىنوايە كە لەگەل ھەرسەپنەنى عىراقدا سەربەخۆيى كوردەكان دىتەدى و مالىكى ئى كەسەيە كە عىراق وئىران دەكات. سەربەخۆيى كوردەكان نەزىكە."

ئەم كارەش مەترەسەدارە بۆ كوردەكان كە خۆيان لە بەرەى شەر لەگەل چەكدارانى داعش بىيەنەوھ و بچەنە گىژاۋى ئى توندوتىژىيەى بەدرىژاىيەى ماوھى دەيەكە خۆيان لى پاراستوھ.

ژمارەيەكى زۆر ھەرمەي سوننە لە ناوچە دابەرنەراۋەكان و شارى كەركوكدا دەژىن، رەنگە ھەندىكەيان ھەكۆمەرانى كوردەكان قىۋل بەكەن كە ئارامى و ناسايشيان بۆ دابەين بكات، بەلام رەنگە ھەندىكى تريان ھەولەى بەدەستەپنەنى پىشەتوانى دەولەتى ئىسلامى لە عىراق و شام بەدەن، كە لەلەلەين سوپاى عىراقەوھ بەدەستەپنەنە ھەيەنواھ.

سكاى دەلەيت: "مەترەسەيەكە لەمەدەيە كە دەولەتى ئىسلامى لە عىراق و شام خۆى وەك بەرپەريكارىكى سوننە لە ناوچە جى ناكۆكەكان دەريخات و

شهر دژی کوردەکان دەستپێکات کە رەنگە سەرەتای شەری نیوان عەرەب و کوردەکان بێت."

بەلام بۆ بەرپرە کوردەکان مەترسی سەرەلانی مەلانییەکی نوێ لەگەڵ چەکارە توندڕەوکاندا شایستەیی سەرکێشییە.

سەرچاوەیەک لە حکومەتی هەرێمی کوردستان کە نەبویست ناوی ئاشکرا بکەیت، وتی: "هەمووان هەست بە نێگەرائی دەکەین، بەلام ئەمە هەڵیکێ گەرمیە بۆ ئێمە، دەوڵەتی ئێسلامی لە عێراق و شام لەماوەی دوو هەفتەدا ئەوەی پێداین کە مالیکی بەماوەی هەشت سالی پێی نەداین."

سەرچاوە: رۆیتەرز

AKR.46

<http://rudaw.net/sorani/opinion/08122013>

## مەترسیی قاعیدە بۆ سەر کوردستان

لەلایەن ولادیمیر ڤان ویلخنبیرگ 2013/12/8

تێچیرڤان بارزانی، سەرۆک وەزیرانی کوردستان، داوای لە حکومەتی کوردستان کردووە کە کۆمیتەیەک پێکبهێنن بۆ لێکۆڵینەوە لەبارەی ئەو گەنجە کوردانەی دەگوترێت بۆ جیهاد دەچنە سووریا. حکومەتی هەرێمی کوردستان هەمان ئەو کێشەیە هەیە کە وڵاتانی ئەوروپاش هەیە. شەری جیهاد لە سووریا قاعیدە هەر لە سنوورەکانی ئەوروپا نزیکتر نەکردووە، بەڵکو لە سنوورەکانی کوردستانیش نزیک کردووە. ئەوەش لە دوایین ھێرشێاندا (واتە تەقینەمەکە) لە ھولێر دەرکەوت.

چەندین راپۆرت ئاماژە بەوە دەکەن کە زۆر گەنجی جیهادی لە مزگەوتەکانی پارێزگای سلێمانییەو ئامادەکران و بردارون بۆ سووریا. یەکنەکانی پاراستنی گەل چەندین کوردی خەڵکی کوردستانی عێراقیان دەستگیرکردووە لە سووریا، ھەروەھا زۆر ھەمالیش ھەبوون دەربارەی ئەو جیهادییە کوردانەی سەفەری سووریا دەکەن. زۆربەی ئەوانە خەڵکی ناوچە زۆر ئێسلامییەکانی ژێر دەسەلاتی یەكێتی نیشتمانی کوردستان و ھێزە ئەمنییەکانی یەكێتی ئەو ناوچانە کۆنترۆڵ دەکەن.

ھەرچەندە بەرپرسان ئاگایان لەو ھەرشانە ھەبوو، بەلام ھێزە ئەمنییە کوردییەکان پێدەچێت سەرکەوتوو نەبووبن لە رێگەگرتن لە گەشەکردنی جێبوواری جیهادییەکان لە کوردستان. گرووپە جیهادییە کوردییەکان زۆربەیان داوای سالی 2003، کە ئەمریکا ھاتە عێراق، چوونە دەرەوەی کوردستان. ھەروەھا بەشداربێکردنی ھێزە ئێسلامییەکان لە سیستەمی سیاسیی کوردستاندا وایکرد کە ئەو ھێزە جیهادییانە بەھێز نەبن. ئێستا شەری سووریا ھەلی زۆرتەری داووتە جیهادییەکان بۆ ئەوەی سەرلەنەوێ دەستبەخەن بە ھێرشەکانیان و توندوتیژی بەکاربهێنن.

روژی 2013/11/18، بۆ یەکەمجار ھێزە ئەمنییەکانی کوردستان جیهادییەکیان دەستگیرکرد کە لە فڕۆکەخانەی سلێمانییەو لە سەفەری تورکیا دەگەڕایەو.

ھەرچەندە پارتی کرێکاری کوردستان PKK و پارتی دیموکراتی کوردستان ئێستا کەوتونەتە نێو شەریکی راگەیاندنەو لەدژی یەكێ و کێبڕکێ ئەوەیانە کە کامیان رێبەرایەتی کورد بکات لە روژەلاتی نێوڕاستدا، بەلام بۆ قاعیدە ھێچیک لەو پارتانە جیاوازییان نییە و ھەموویان دوژمنن.

لە پەیمانیکێ قیدییدا کە لەلایەن دەوڵەتی ئێسلامیی عێراق و شام بە زاراوەی سۆرائی (کوردی) بلۆکراوەتەو، کەسێک بەناوی ئەبوو حارس ئەلکوردی دەلێت: "بەم چەکانەو دەگەڕێنەو کوردستان و ھەموو ئەندامانی پارتی و یەكێتی و ھێزە ئەمنییەکان دەکوژن."

پێدەچێت بەھاری عەرەبی تەنیا کوردەکانی سووریای بەھێز نەکردبێت، بەڵکو قاعیدەشی بەھێز کردبێت و وایکردبێت ھەرشە لە ئاسایشی هەرێمی کوردستان بکات. ھەمان شتیش لەگەڵ کوردەکانی سووریا بکات. لە ماوەی رابردوودا قاعیدە ھێرشێ کردووتە سەر ئامانجی جیاوازی ھەموو پارتە کوردییەکان لە قامشلۆ، کوبانی، تەل مەعروف و ھولێر، ھەروەھا ھێرشیکیش لە ناكۆی پووجەلکراو بوو.

ھەندێک دەنگۆ لەسەر ئەوە ھەن کە لە ھێرشەکەو ھولێردا ھەندێک کوردیشی تێدا بوون. ھەرچەندە ھێزە ئەمنییەکان گوتیان گومانلێکراوێکی مووسڵن.

ئەمە ئەو راستییە پێشاندەت کە پارتە کوردییەکان پێوستیان بە کارکردنە لەسەر ئەو مەسەلەیە. چونکە ئەگەر ئێشی لەسەر نەکەن، تەنیا ناوچە کوردییەکانی سووریا (روژناوا) نا، بەڵکو کوردستانی عێراقیش دەرھاوێشتە خراپەکانی دەبینێت.

بیرورا

لێنێی چەكە كیمیاییەكان

له‌لایەن ده‌یفید رۆمانۆ 2013/9/6

وێنه و فیدوی هێرشه كیمیاییه‌كه‌ی 21 ی ئابی ناوچه‌ی باشووری دیمه‌شق نیگایه‌کی دلبزوینه‌ری دیکه‌ی سووریا یه‌مرو ئه‌مه‌رو پێشكه‌شی جیهان ده‌کات. به‌یوه‌ نه‌ قوربانی 600 هاوولاتی مه‌دنه‌ی، هه‌ر واته‌یه‌رینی مه‌حال دینه‌ به‌رچاو. به‌ له‌به‌رچاوگرته‌ی لێدوانه‌که‌ی سالی رابردووی ئوباما له‌باره‌ی "هێلی سوور"، رێکه‌وتنه‌نامه‌ نیوده‌مه‌لته‌یه‌ پێرۆمه‌کانی دوا‌ی جه‌نگی یه‌که‌می جیهانی دژ به‌ به‌کاره‌ینانی چه‌کی کیمیایی هه‌روه‌ها "به‌رپرسیاریتی پاراستن" که‌ سالی 2005 دا نه‌مه‌وه‌ یه‌که‌گرتووه‌کان دا‌پرشته‌وه‌، پێده‌چیت مه‌تانه‌ی ئه‌مه‌ریکا و کۆمه‌لگای نیوده‌مه‌لته‌ی له‌ مه‌ترسیدا بێت.

هه‌ستکردن به‌وه‌ی پێوسته‌ شتێک به‌کین و زانیینی ده‌بی چ به‌کین دوو شتی زۆر جیاوازن. به‌ر له‌ هه‌ر شتێک، به‌ته‌واوی روون نییه‌ کێ به‌رپرسیاری هێرشه‌که‌ بوو- گرنگ نییه‌ چۆن به‌رپرسیاری ئه‌مه‌ریکی، به‌ریتانی و فهره‌نسی هه‌له‌ده‌ن خۆیان دڵنیایی نیشانده‌ن له‌سه‌ر ته‌له‌فۆنه‌کان. ئه‌وانه‌ش که‌ گومانیان هه‌یه‌، هاوڕێ له‌گه‌ڵ رژیمی ئه‌سه‌د، روسیا و ئێران، ده‌پرسن بۆچی رژیمی ئه‌سه‌د له‌م کاته‌دا په‌ناده‌باته‌ به‌ر چه‌کی کیمیایی، له‌کاته‌یدا له‌ کۆتاییدا جه‌نگه‌که‌ خه‌ریکه‌ به‌ به‌رژمه‌ندی ئه‌و ده‌شکێته‌وه‌؟ بۆچی مه‌ترسی ده‌ستنیوهردانی خۆراوا زیاده‌مه‌کی له‌ جه‌نگێکدا که‌ خه‌ریکه‌ ده‌یه‌یه‌وه‌؟ بۆچی ئه‌و چه‌که‌ به‌کاردینی له‌کاته‌یدا پشکنه‌رانی نه‌مه‌وه‌یه‌که‌گرتووه‌کان له‌ ولاتدان، هه‌روه‌ها بۆچی له‌ نزیک دیمه‌شق به‌کاریدینی ته‌نیا 5 کیلومه‌تر له‌ شوێنی مه‌نه‌وه‌ی پشکنه‌ران؟

ئه‌گه‌ر رژییم به‌رپرس نییه‌ له‌ هێرشه‌که‌، ئه‌وکاته‌ ده‌بی یه‌که‌ک له‌ گروپه‌ یه‌خیه‌یه‌کان بن که‌ له‌ دژی رژییم ده‌جه‌نگن، هه‌یچ گومانم له‌وه‌ نییه‌ هه‌ندی له‌ گروپه‌ ئۆپۆزیسیۆنه‌کانی سووریا هه‌نده‌ درنده‌ و بی مۆرالن که‌ بتوانن شتی له‌و شێوه‌یه‌ به‌سه‌ر خه‌لکی خۆیان بێنن. به‌ له‌به‌رچاوگرته‌ی دۆرانه‌کانی ئه‌مه‌دواییه‌ مه‌یدانه‌کانی جه‌نگ و زیاده‌بونی په‌رته‌وازی، یه‌خپووانی سووریا به‌ روونی خواسته‌ی به‌هه‌زیان هه‌یه‌ بۆ راکێشانی ده‌ستنیوهردانی خۆراوا جا به‌ هه‌ر رێگایه‌ک بێت. مانگی مایسی 2013 کارلا دیل پونتی لێکۆله‌ریکی نه‌مه‌وه‌یه‌که‌گرتووه‌کان له‌ سووریا، رایگهیاند پێده‌چیت یه‌خپووان رژییمه‌کی سنوورداری گازی سارینیان به‌کاره‌ینا‌یت له‌ هه‌ندێک له‌ هێرشه‌کانیاندا.

بۆ ئه‌م هێرشه‌ی دوا‌یی، ده‌بی چه‌کدارانی ئۆپۆزیسیۆن ده‌ستیان به‌ رژییمه‌کی زۆر زیاتری گازی کوشنده‌ راگه‌یشتنی، ده‌بی ئۆپه‌راسیۆنه‌که‌یان به‌هه‌زی ئه‌مه‌دواییه‌ ئه‌نجامدا‌یت. به‌ساده‌ی ئه‌مه‌ رێی تێناچیت، به‌تایه‌ت هه‌یچ راپۆرتێک نییه‌ له‌باره‌ی ده‌سته‌به‌سه‌رداگیرانی چه‌کی ئه‌تمۆمی رژیمی ئه‌سه‌د له‌لایه‌ن یه‌خپووانه‌وه‌ به‌ درێژایی ماوه‌ی جه‌نگه‌که‌- هه‌روه‌ها ژماره‌یه‌ک ئازانسێ هه‌والگری زۆر به‌ وردی چاودیری کۆگای چه‌که‌ کیمیاییه‌کانی رژییم ده‌کەن ته‌نیا بۆ ئه‌گه‌ریکی له‌سجۆره‌.

هه‌موو ئه‌مه‌ ده‌مانگێرتیه‌وه‌ لای رژیمی ئه‌سه‌د. بێگومان رژیمی ئه‌سه‌د له‌لایه‌ن ویلایه‌ته‌یه‌که‌گرتووه‌کان و ولاتانی دیکه‌ی خۆراوا‌یه‌یه‌وه‌ بۆمباران نا‌ک‌ریت، هێرشێکی کیمیایی له‌سجۆره‌، که‌ زیانی گیانی زۆری لێکه‌وته‌وه‌، ده‌ستی واشتنن کێش ده‌کات. هه‌رچه‌نده‌ نا‌یت ئه‌مه‌ هه‌موو رووداوێک بۆ مه‌هه‌ستێک هه‌له‌سه‌نگێنین.

رووداو ده‌قه‌مه‌ین، به‌تایه‌ت له‌نیو غوباری جه‌نگدا. فهرمانده‌یه‌کی سه‌رکێشی یه‌که‌ی چه‌که‌ کیمیاییه‌کان، به‌ ماهیری برا گچکه‌ی به‌شار ئه‌سه‌دیه‌یه‌وه‌، یه‌که‌که‌ له‌ ئه‌گه‌ره‌کان. من واینا‌بینم ئه‌مه‌ش رێنیتیچیت، به‌له‌به‌رچاوگرته‌ی ئه‌وه‌ی نا‌بی ماهیر به‌ که‌م ناوهر‌تر له‌ براگه‌وره‌که‌ی بزانی. ئه‌م جۆره‌ یه‌کانه‌ له‌لایه‌ن رژییمه‌یه‌وه‌ به‌ وردی کۆنترۆله‌کرین.

تاوه‌کو نووسینی ئه‌مه‌ش، ئه‌و به‌لگه‌یه‌ی که‌ به‌ریاره‌ جۆن کیری وه‌زیری ده‌ره‌وه‌ی ئه‌مه‌ریکا نیشانی جیهانی بدات په‌یوه‌ندییه‌کی ته‌له‌فۆنی له‌خۆده‌گریت له‌لایه‌ن به‌رپرسیکی بالای سووریاوه‌ بۆ یه‌که‌یه‌کی چه‌که‌ کیمیاییه‌کانی دیمه‌شق ژێر ده‌ستی ماهیر. له‌ په‌یوه‌ندییه‌که‌دا، ئه‌و به‌رپرسی سهر به‌ رژییم واده‌مه‌وت زیاتر به‌دوا‌ی ورده‌کاریه‌یه‌کانی هێرشه‌ کیمیاییه‌کی ئه‌و یه‌که‌وه‌ بێت.

به‌پێی لێکدانه‌وه‌کان ئه‌و هێرشه‌ کیمیاییه‌که‌ی حکومه‌تی سووریا ده‌ره‌جانه‌یه‌کی گه‌وره‌تر بوون له‌وه‌ی چاودیری ده‌کرد. له‌ حوزمیرانی 2013وه‌، ده‌زگا هه‌والگری به‌ خۆراوا‌یه‌یه‌کان به‌ ئاشکرا باوهری خۆیان راگه‌یانده‌وه‌ له‌باره‌ی به‌کاره‌ینانی چه‌کی کیمیایی به‌ رژییمه‌کی



جاران سیاسەتی دەرەوی تورکیا کلیلکی زۆر لەمە نزمتر بوو، بە لێدان و ھۆشدارى دیپلوماتیانە پراکابوومە، خۆپارێز بوو لە تێوەگلانی لە ھەر شتێک لەدەرەوی ئەندامی نائۆ. ئیستا وای بۆ دەچم دیپلوماتکارەکانی نێو و مزارەتی دەرەوی ھەمەکانێک ئەردوغان دەستبەداتە مایکرو فۆنێک دەچەمێنەو .

لە ناوچەیکدا کە ئەزمونی گۆرانکاری و پێشەقچوونی ناوا خێرا بەخۆیەو دەبینیت، زیرەکتەری یاریزانەکان کارتەکانیان لە نزیک سنگیان دەھێنەو. لەو کاتەو سۆیا و گرووپە نەیارەکانی دەستەمۆ کردووە، ئەردوغانی سەرۆک و مزیارن زیاتر و زیاتر لە قومانچییەکی ھەلەشە و زۆر باوەر بەخۆ دەردەکەوێت .

ھەموو کارتەکانی فرێدا و نیوەی مائەمەکی خستە گرومەو لەسەر مۆرسی لە میسر، ئۆپۆزیسیۆنی سووریا، ھەماسی فەلەستینی و لایەنە سونیەکانی عێراق. لەگەڵ کەڵەمەبوونی دۆراندەکانی، کۆمەڵگای بازارگانی و دیپلۆماسی تورکیا لەو راماون کە بۆ زۆریان لێبکریت بۆ داپۆشی گرومەکانی ئەردوغان.

تاوەکو ئەم ساتە، تاکە گرومە سەرکەوتوووەکانی ئەردوغان پێدەچیت ئەوانە بووبن کە لەسەر کورد کردوونی. حکومەتی ھەریە کوردستان وەک یەکێک لە دراوسێ کەمانە دەرکەوتوووە کە تورکیا ھیچ کێشەیکە لەگەڵدا نییە، لانیكەم لەم ساتەدا .

پارتی کرێکاری کوردستان PKK رازی بوو لەسەر نەخشەری گای ئاشتی لەگەڵ ئەقەرە، ھەرچەندە ھێشتا ئەگەری شکستەنانی ھەیە ئەگەر حکومەتی تورکیا شکستەنێت لە بەپەرەوچوونی کشانەوێ PKK بە چاکسازی دیموکراسیانە. تەنانت کوردی سووریا رەتیارکردووە تووشی ھیچ دڵگەرییەک بن بە پشەگیری تورکیا لە ئیسلامییە توندرومەکان کە ھێرشیان دەکەنە سەر، بە جەختکردنەو لەسەر ئەوێ جگە لە پەموەندی دۆستانە ھێچیان لە دراوسێ باکووریا نەویستووە.

ئەردوغان و حکومەتەیکە لە داھاتوودا چ کارێک دەکەن لەگەڵ کەڵەمەبوونی تیکشکانی سیاسەتی دەرەویان و پتربوونی ئالۆزییە ئیخویەکان؟ باشتەین شت کە ھەوڵی بۆ دەن، چینیەوێ بەری ئەو گرومانیە کە لەسەر کورد کردبوویان و دەستپێوەگرتنێانە.

شتە ھەلەشەکەش ئەو دەبێت کە چالاکنەتر لەسەر قومانکردن و لەسەر فرێدانی پارە زیاتر لەسەر گرومە دۆراوەکان بەردەوام بێت. پێدەچیت ئەم ستراتیژیەتە دۆراندنی گرومەکانی سەر کوردیش لەخۆبکریت، پاشان لۆمە خۆرناو و ئیسرائیل بکات کاتێک ھەموو شتێک لە نیوخو و دەرەوی ھەرسدینی.

لەنێو ھەندێک لە لێدانەکانی ئەم دواییە، بەکێکیان لەبارەو تۆمەتبارکردنی ئیسرائیل بوو بە ئەنجامدانی کودەتای دژ بە مۆرسی لە میسر، ئەو گومانم زیاتر دەکات لە چەمانەوێ ئەردوغان بەرەو ئەم ستراتیژیەو ئامارەم پیکرد. بۆ ولاتی کە جارن بە کۆلەمەو سەقامگیری و وریایی ناسرابو لە ناوچەیکدا، گۆرانکارییەیکە ناکرێ لەو ھەژنەتر بێت.

AKR.49

<http://rudaw.net/sorani/opinion/041020131?keyword=&isArchive=True>

بیرورا

"توتیلی راکردن لە "دیموکراسی

لەلایەن دەیفید رۆمانو 2013/10/4

دەیفید رۆمانو

دەیفید رۆمانو

بەنەيازبوم گۆشەى ئەم ھەفتەيەم لە بارەى ھەلئەزاردنەكەى كوردستانەو بنووسم. ھەك زۆر كەسى دىكە، خۇشالابوم بە بىنىنى ھەلئەزاردنەكەى لە كوردستان بە كىشەى كەم، بەشداری بەرز و ھەندىك سەرسامىيەو .

لەبرى ئەو، ھەزەكەم باسى رووداويكى ئەمدوايە بەكەم لە توركيە، كە لەوى ھەلئەزاردن و ھوكمى ياسا ميژوويەكى دريژتري ھەيە. رۆژى 25ى ئەيلول ميدياكاني توركيە بڵاويانكردەو كە 18 بەندكرانى سەر بە پەكەكە لە ربي ليدانى تونيلەو لە زىندانى ھەريەى بينگول رايانكردەو. زۆربەى خوينەرانى تورك بە تاموچىزەو ھەوالى چۆنيتى ليدانى تونيلەكەيان دەخويندەو كە دريژبيەكەى 80 مەتر بوو و بەرەو دەرەوى ديوارمكاني زىندان دريژبووئەو بەرەو كەئالى ئاومرۆ. بەرپەرساني زىندانەكە ھىچ بەشنيك لە خۆلى تونيلەكەيان پاچ و پىمەرە و نامرازمكاني ھەلەكەندنيان نەمۆزيوئەو، بە زوويش دواى دەرچوونى بەندكرانەكان بيسەر و شوين بوونە. رەنگە ھەلاتنەكە پىكەتەى باش لەخو بگريت بۆ دروستكردى درامايەكى ناكشن.

ئەو كە پتويستە خەلك سەرنجى بخاتە سەر، ليدوانەكەى سەعدوللا ئەرگين، وەزىرى دادە لەبارەى رووداومەو: "زانيمانە كە 18 بەندكران رايانكردەو، 14 راگيراو و چوار ھوكمدراو." واديارە مەبەستى وەزىرى داد ئەو يە كە لەكوى 18 ھەلاتوومە، تەنيا چارايان تاوانباركران بە ئەنجامدانى تاوان. 10 كەسيان لە رابردودا دەستگيركران، بەلام ھىشتا ھوكمنەراون. چواركەسى دىكەيان ھەرگىز لەربى تومەتباركردى فەرميەو دەستگيرنەراون. بۆماوەى لانىكەم سالىك، ئەوان خزينراونەتە نيو زىندانەكە بەبى گرتە بەرى ھىچ ريشوئيەكى ياسايى .

رەنگە من بە ھەلە لە ليدوانەكەى وەزىرى داد تتيگەم. بەلام پيشموانىيە. مۆدەلەكە لە توركيە ھەر بە سادەى دەمىننەو (بەبى زۆربەى ليدوانەمەكانىش لەژىر ھوكمرانى ئەردوغاندا بەرەو خراپتر چووە). خەلك بەبى تۆمەت دەستگيركران، يان بۆماوەى چەندىن سالى بەندكران و چاومرەى دادگايەك دەكەن بۆئەو بەرگري لە خزيان بەكەن. ئەو كەسانەى كە تووشى ئەو بارودوخە بوونە لە بەرھەستەى ھوكمەتەكەى ئەردوغان، زۆرەشيان كوردن. ھوكمەتيك كە بتوانيت ئەمە بەسەر ھەندى كەس بىنيت، دەتوانيت بەسەر ھەر كەسيكى بىنيت.

بەدريژايى چەند سالىك، چاوم بە زۆر لە بەرپەرساني توركيە كەوتووە كە واديارن زۆر شەيدان بۆ دووبارەكرنەو "توركيە ولاتى سەرومىرى ياسايە." ئەگەر ياسا ريگە بە شتى لەمچۆرە بەت، نوينەرايەتيەكى پوچى ياساسەرومىرى دەكەن.

ئەردوغانى سەرۆك وەزيران بەليني دا تاومكو كۆتايى ئەيلول پاكيجيكى چاكسازى ديموكراتى بخاتە روو. ئىستا بۆ چەندىن مانگە دارودەستەكەى بە شيوەيەكى نەينى و لە پشت دەرگاي داخراووە خەريكى دروستكردى پاكيجەكەن، بەبى بەشداری ئەوانى دىكە. بەلام كات خەريكە لە دەست دەچيت بۆ چاكسازى ديموكراتى، بەتايەت كە پەكەكە گومانى لا دروستبوو لەبارەى "نەخشەريگاي ناشتى" ھوكمەت. ھەرچەند سەركردەكاني كورد بە ئاشكرا سەرنجيان لەسەر "خويندن بە زمانى دايك" و مافى ھاوشيوە بۆ كەمە نەتمەكان لەم پاكيجەدا، من زياتر سەرنج لەسەر ئەو دەبيت ناخو دەستگيركردى بەبى تۆمەت و بەندكردى بەبى دادگايى بەردەوام ريكارى ياسايان بۆ دادەنريت لە توركيەى "ياسا سەرومەدا".

لەھەمانكاتدا، ھىواخووزم ئەو زىندانىيانەى ھەرگىز دادگايان نەبىنى ھەلاتنەكە مایەى خۆشى بىت بۆيان.

AKR.50

علمانییەت و ئیسلامیزم

له‌لایەن دمیقید رۆمانۆ 2013/7/20

دوینی گۆم له رادیۆی نەشنال پەلێکی ئەمریکی بوو له زاری تارق رەمەزان، پروفیسۆری تۆزینەوێ نیسلامی له زانکۆی ئۆکسفۆرد و نەوێ دامەزرێنەری ئیخوان موسلیمینی میسر. دکتۆر رەمەزان باسی رووداوێکی ئەم دواییە میسری دەکرد، بە چەند قسەیەکە لەم جۆرە دەستیپێکرد “پنۆیستە نیسلامی و ئەلمانییەکان فیزی پێکەوه ژیان و قبولکردنی یەکتەر بن.” (وشەکانیم رێک وەک خۆی لەبەر ئەمان، بەلام ئەمە ناوەڕۆکی قسەکانی بوو، ئەگەر یادەمەرم لەگەڵدا راستگۆ بێت). ئەمە رەنگە دیدگایەکێ زۆر عەقڵانی بێت بەلای خەڵکەوه. هاوشێوەی “نێمە پنۆیستە فیزی ناستەوایی بین، ئەک شەر.”

کێ دەیهوێت لەسەر دیدگای ویستی خوایی دانوستاندن بکات

پێکەوه ژێانی نیسلامی و ئەلمانی، وا دیارە، هەر لە دەربریندا لێکدژییە. نیسلامیەکان، لە پێناسدا، بەشدارێ سیاسەت دەکەن بەمەبەستی تێنەخەنی ناین لە سیاسەتی گشتی. ئەگەر ئەمە نیازێ ئێوان نەبوا، بەسەدەیی دەبوون بە سیاسەتمەدارێ پابەند بەئاین لەنێو لایەنی سیاسی دیکەدا. بەهەمان شێوە، بە پێناس، ئەلمانییەکانیش برۆایان وایە ناکرێ رێگە بەئاین بدرێت سیاسەتی گشتی نارااستە بکات. رەنگە نێمەش ئاواتەخواز بین مەسیحییە توندڕەوێ مەکان لەگەڵ ئەمریکییە بەرچەڵەک ئەفریقییەکان پێکەوه بسازین.

رەنگە هەندێک لە خۆنەران، لەم خەڵدە بلێن “چاوەرێکە! چەندین جۆر نیسلامی جیاواز هەن، بەهەمان شێوە جۆری جیاوازی ئەلمانییەکان!” تەوێک ئێو راددەیهی بێتوان بێم بەراستی تەغیا دوو جۆر نیسلامی هەن. جۆری دان بەخۆدا گرەکان، “پەڕەوێ یاساکان دەکەن”، هەروەها جۆری دانەبەخۆدا نەگەرەکان، “بەهەر ئامرازێک بێت، دەسەلات دەگەرنە دەست”. بێگومان تەفسیری زۆر زۆر جیاواز هەن بۆ نیسلا، یاساکانی نیسلا و ئاستی جیاوازی حەمسەختیش هەن بۆ سەپاندنی رێسا ئاینییەکان لە کۆمەڵگادا. لە هەردوو جۆری ئێو نیسلامییاندا، هەمان بنەمای لۆجیکی پێدایە دەبێت: فەرمانکردن بە چاکە و رێگەگرتن لە خراپە، ئەمانەش دەبێ وەرگیردرێن بۆ سیاسەتی گشتی جا بە هەر رێگایەک بێت.

له نیسلا، کحول، بێزێی بە پێڕۆزییەکان، زینا و ریبە، لەگەڵ هەندێ شتی دیکە تەوانن. لەبەر ئەوە هەندێ لە نیسلامیەکان رێوشوونی توند دادەنێن بۆ یاساگرەکانی ئەم کردارە، وەک لە ئێران و سعودییە عەرەبی، لەکاتیگەدا هەندێ نیسلامی دیکە شێوازی زۆر تر نا راستەوخۆ دەگەرنە بەر، وەک تۆرکیا. بەپێی دەستووری تۆرکیا فەرمانەروایی ئەلمانییە، پارتی داد و گەشەپێدان (AKP) هەوێ کەمکردنەوێ بەکارهێنرانی کحول دەدات، وەک بەشێک لە هەڵمەتێکی تەندروستی، هەروەها لە قەڵەمدانی بێزێی بەرامبەر پێڕۆزییەکان و زینا بە دەرچوون لە یاسا، وەک بەشێک لە کەمپەینێکی ئەخلاقیاتی گشتی تاوێک ئەهەوێ سنووردانەکان بۆ زینا، هەروەها مۆنامەرە و هەرشەهێ بەرفراوان لە دژی زیادکردنی رێژە سود لە بانگی ناوێ. تۆرکیا بە فەرمانەروایی (AKP) نارااستەکی بەرەو هەمان وێستگە گشتییە “ژیان لەلایەن ناین و شەریعەتەو نارااستە بکەیت.” بە هەمان شێوە ئێران و سعودییە عەرەبی، بەلام بە شەمەندەفەرێکی هێواشتر و بە پێچاوێچی زیاتر دا. نیسلامیەکان، لە پێناسدا، بەشدارێ سیاسەت دەکەن بەمەبەستی تێنەخەنی ناین لە سیاسەتی گشتی

ئێو وێنەیهی کە لەم دیمەنەو رەنگ دەداتەوه لێکچوونی هەیه لەگەڵ شێوازی ریبازی فەرەنسییەکان بۆ ئەلمانییەت. لەم تێگەشتنەو، ناین شتیکی لاوەکییە لە دەوڵەت و حوکمرانی، سیاسەت تەنەت رێوشوێن و سنووریش بۆ ناین دادەنێت. کەمالیزم لە تۆرکیا هەمان ریبازی پەڕەو دەکرد، بۆ نمونە کاتێک رەهێنان و مۆلەتی بەخشێ بە ئێمامەکانی سەرئاسەری ولات، بەپێی دۆکترینی سنووردارکراوی دەوڵەت، پۆشیینی پەچەمی یاساگرە لە دامودەزگا حکومییەکاندا، رێگە گرت لە بەرپرسە حکومییەکان ریش پێلێنەوه. ئەم جۆرە ئەلمانییەتەیه کە تۆرەیهی زۆری لەنێو نیسلامیەکاندا چاندووه و ئەردۆغانیش بەم دواییە ئامازەهێ پێکرد، کاتێک گوتی “بۆ چەندین سال بەهەکانی ئێمەیان پێشێل کرد. برۆاکانی ئێمەیان پەرۆزخست. بۆاردەکان، خولیاکان، داواکاری و چاوەروانییەکانی ئێمەیان لەبەر کرد.” نیسلامیزم، بە جۆرە دانەبەخۆداگرەکی ئەردۆغانیشەو، هاوشێوەیهی بەرچاوی هەیه لەگەڵ ئەم جۆرە ئەلمانییەتە، کە هەردووکیان بەهەکانی گرۆپێک بەسەر ئێوانی دیکەدا دەسپێنن. ناتوانن پێکەوه بژین.

ئەوێ لەبارە شێوازی ئەلمانییەتی ئەمریکی؟ لە تێگەشتنی ئەمریکییەو، ئەلمانییەت واتا لێکەڵبێرینی کەنێسە (یان مەزگەوت) و فەرمانەروایی، بەپێی ئەوەی هێچکامیان ئەویدی پێشێل بکات. وەک چۆن نایبێت دەوڵەت ئاینێک یان جۆرە تەفسیری زالبکات لە دۆکترینی نایبیدا، ئاینیش نای، وەک دیاریکەری سیاسەتی گشتی سوودی لێ بێنرێت. لەگەڵ ئەوەی ئەم لێکەڵبێرێ ئەرووبەرۆی تەحەدی بەردوام دەبێتەوه لە ئەمریکا، ئەم پەڕەنسییە ئەواو روونە: سیاسەت ناین پێس دەکات، ناینیش سیاسەت تێکەشکێنێت. بە دلناییهو ئەو لایەنە سیاسییانە بێکە جەماوەرییان مسوولمانانی پارێزکارن، بەپێچەوانە نیسلامیەکان، دەرێ لەگەڵ ئەم جۆرە ئەلمانییەتە هەلکەن؟

کاتێک سالانی 2008 و 2009 لەگەڵ بەرپرسیانی AKP قسەمکرد، پێیانگوتم زۆر پشێوانی ئەلمانییەت دەکەن، بە رووه ئەمریکییەکید. خۆزگە دەموانی باوەریان پێیکەم. رەنگە ئەگەر حیزبە سیاسییەکیان لەسەر پاشماوەکانی پارتی رەفای نیسلامی یاساگرەو بنیات نەنابا، ئەگەر مەزەهێ سوننی نیسلامییان نەکردبا سەرۆشتی ناوێندی پارتەکیان، دەموانی باوەر بکەم. پێدەچێت ملیۆنان خۆنیشاندەریش لە تۆرکیا چیدی باوەریان پێنەکەن، وەک چۆن ملیۆنان خۆبێشاندەری میسر چیدی برۆایان بە ئیخوان موسلیمین ئەما. ئەلمانییەکانیش برۆایان وایە ناکرێ رێگە بەئاین بدرێت سیاسەتی گشتی نارااستە بکات

تەنەت شێوازی ئەلمانییەتی ئەمریکی و ئیسلامیزمی میانرویش هاوتا و پێکەوه هەلکەن نین، بە داخەوه. لایەنێک بەئاین دەدات خەڵک وێل بکات، کاتێک دێتە سەرپاسی باوەر و شێوازی ژێانی خەڵک (هەرچەند تەنەت ئەم بەلێنانەش هەندێجار رووبەرۆی کێشە دەبێو، وەکچۆن پارێزکارە



به لایم نهی چی نهگمر نیسلامیهیکان ناین بهکار بهنین بۆ بهدهستههینانی پآپهستی سیاسی؟ نهی نهگمر ههر له بنهوه باوهریان به دهستووریکی ناسمانی نهیت، نامادش بن بۆ نهجامدانی دانوستاندن لهسر ههمو مهسلهیهک؟ لهم باردا، پارتهیکی سیاسی بنهمانیانین پتکهینهوا، بهشیهویهکی سههرکی لههر هۆکاری ستراتیجی نهک لههر ههر جۆره رهسپههکی چهپیو. لهوه دهجته هیوای زۆرتر ههیهت بۆ هههکردن لهگهل عملانییهیکان له سیناریویهکی لهم چهندها، ههرچهنده خههکزهکی زۆر که دهنگایدا بهم جۆره سههر کرده “نیسلامیهانه”، رهنگه زۆر له تهنازولهکانهیان قبول نهیت بهر لهوهی دهنگ بهدن به سههر کردهیهکی جیاواز، کهمهتر مایهرو، به نواندن نیسلامی. ئههههه سههر کرده نیسلامیهانهش، تهناهت بهر لهوهی بهچه نهیو سیاسهتهوه، بهیسته گومانوای و درۆزن بن، ئهههش به زحمهت نهلهامهههشی تهناهی...

<http://rudaw.net/sorani/opinion/07052013?keyword=&isArchive=True>

بەگەوتەي ئىمى "جۆرى ئىمى ئۆتۈنۈمبەيەي كورد لە سووربە و مەيدەگەرن دەستىنەشەنى دەمکات كە تاو مەكو چەند كوردانى سووربەي توانای بېرەردانىان ھەيە لەسەر نەوہەي كە كوردانى عەزاق بۆتوان خۇيان رەزگار بەگەن لەمى گوشارنامى ھەر يەكە لە ئەنقەرە و بەغدا دەمخەنە سەريان. ئەمە رەگەمەكى ئەنەش دابەين دەمکات بۆ گو استەمەي نەوت و غاز لەر پەگەي ئىمى ناوچانەي لەمەندەستەي كوردانى سووربادان."

ئەوانە زۆرىيە جار لەبىريان دىجىتەمە ئە كورد (بەتايبەنیش كوردانى سووربا) چواردەمورىان گىراو و ناگنە سەر دەريا، بۆيش بەردەوام بۆ  
 ھەناردەردنى ئەوتەكەيان پىشت بە دەوربەريان دەبەستن. ھەروەھا ھەستەمەرييە زۆرەكانى ئەم داويەيە نۆيان پارتى ديموكراتى كوردستان و  
 پارتى كركىرانى كوردستان PKK وادەكات كە ھاوكارى نۆيان كوردانى عىراق و سووربا زەحمەت بێت. كۆمپانيا گەورەكانى ئەوتيش ناگدارن  
 كە ئەوتى كوردانى سووربا لەدەست پارتى يەكيتى ديموكراتى PYD داپە و ئەو پارتىش كۆنترۆلى ناوچەكەى كردوو، ئەك پارتى ديموكراتى  
 كوردستان.

هەر چه‌نده ئه‌وه به‌ته‌ماوێ روونه که کوردستان چوار دهموری گیراوه، به‌لام هه‌هنه‌نگ کوردی ناسیۆنالیست پێیان ناساییه که په‌کسه‌ر داوای سه‌ربه‌خوایی بکه‌ن، به‌بێ نه‌مه‌ی رهنه‌مندی تورکیا یان ئیزران یان سووریا له‌سه‌ره‌یه‌ت. ئه‌وه لاتانه‌ش ماوه بو‌ ماوه روژێان هه‌مووه له‌بوژاندنه‌وه یان لاواز کردنی نابوویری کوردستان. هه‌ر بۆیه‌شه سه‌روکی حکومه‌تی هه‌ریمی کوردستان به‌م دواییانه گوته‌ی بۆ کوردانی عێراق هیچ ده‌رگایه‌کی ئومید نییه‌ی تورکیا نه‌یت.

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ماوەیک لەمەوبەر وەزارەتی دەرەوی ئەمریکا رێخراوی موjahیدی خەلقێ ئێرانی لەنێو لیستی رێخراوە ئێرۆریستەکان دەرھێنا. ئەو رێخراوە بەرپرسبەرە لە کوشتی ئەک هەزاران بەلگە دێیان هەزار کەس لە ئەجماعی چەندین ھێرش بۆ سەر ئێرانییەکان. یەکێک لە نوێدارترین ھێرشەکانی ئەو رێخراوە ئەوێبوو کە لە 6/28 تاوەکو 1981/8/30 ئەجماعیدا، کاتیکی ھێزەکانی موjahیدین چەندین کاری تەقینەویان ئەجماعدا بەھۆیە نزیکەی 70 گەھرە بەرپرسی ئێرانی کوژران، لەنێویشیاندا سەرۆک وەزیران و سەرۆکی پەرلەمان و چەندین پەرلەمانتاری ئەوکاتی ئێران. لە سەر و مەختی جەنگی نیوان عێراق و ئێران، موjahیدی خەلق شانبەشانی ھێزەکانی سەدام حوسین خاکی ئێرانیان داگیرکرد و بە سوود وەرگرتن لە چەکی و کەلوپەلی سەربازی سوپای عێراق شەریان لەدژی ئێران دەکرد. لەسالی 1991یشتا موjahیدی خەلق ھاوکاری سەدامیان کرد بۆ سەرکوژدنی راپەڕینی کورد و شیعە.

رهنګه لمو کاتمه و مجاهیدینی خلق ګورابن. دمیئ نهوش بلیم که چالاکیه کانی نم دواپپانهی نوانم نعیبونه، جګه لمو دفنګوبانهی که گواپه نندامه کانیان بهشداربون له کاری نهیئنی نیسرا نیلی و نمیریکی لغتو تیران و نمو رموشه زمحمتهی نندامه کانیان دوچار ی هاتون له کامپی نئسرف لمدوای سالی 2003ه. لمدالی 2011 لمداری جینف بو ماویمهکی دریز قسم لگمل چمند نندامیکی مجاهیدین کرد که نموکات خمریکی خویشاندان بوون، به لام نهوش پیوهر نییه بوئمهوی بیروکیمهکی باش و مربرګری لمداره ی نموهی ناخو نمو ګرووپه هیشتا ریکخراویکی تیروربستین یان نا.

راستییه‌کهی نهمیه که همیشه کاریکی ز محمته ز انیاری وردت له‌بار هی چالاکی گروویه چه‌کدار مکان دهم‌تک‌موی، بانیش دهر بار هی نهم تاکتیکانه‌ی دی‌گر نه‌بر، مه‌گر گروویه‌که زور توندرو بیت و به نا‌شکرا بلئی که نامانجه‌کائی نهم خملکی سقیله همره‌ک گروویه‌کائی (قاعیده، نه‌ساری سونه و گروویی هاوشویه‌ی نه‌وان). کسانئی نه‌کادیمی وه‌ک من همیشه به‌دای راپۆرت‌ه‌کاندان ده‌گر‌یین تاره‌کو بزانی کئ به‌رپر ساری خوی راگه‌باندوه له هیز شه‌کان، به‌لام نه‌نانت نهم هیز‌شانه‌ی سالی 1981 که زور به‌رپرس و خملکی سقیلی نژیانی تیدا کوژران، تانیستا موجه‌یدینی خعلق به‌رپر ساری بیتی خوی له نه‌جام‌دانیان رانه‌گه‌باندوه.

[illegible]

نیازی سیاسی، سهمگی نمو لیستانه لازام دکات که ئەمریکا یان یەكێتی نەروپا و هەر وڵاتیکی دیکە بۆ ریکخواز تیرۆریستانەکانی دروستدەکەن. سەرۆک وەزیریانی تورکیا بەردوام دەلی PKK ی تیرۆریست، ئەمە پیش ئەوەی بچێتە فرۆکەخانە بۆ پیشوازیکردن لە بەرپرسیکی ھەماس کە بۆ خۆانێکی نیووز دیتە تورکیا. سەرکردەکانی ئێران باس لە کارە قێزەونەکانی موحاھیدی نی خەلق دەکەن، لەو کاتەی کە خۆیان پارەیان ھەڵبژێتووە بۆ گرووپی جیھادییەکانی فەلەستین و عێراق و ئەفغانستان.

ئەگەر دەرھىنانى ناۋى رېڭخراۋڭ لە لىستى تېرۇر لەسەر ئۇ بىنەمايە بولايە كە ئۇ رېڭخراۋە پىشتى كر دوولتە تاكتىكى تېرۇرىستانە، ئۇ دەبىۋايە PKK ھەر لەسالى ۱۹۹۹ ۋە چەند جارڭ ناۋى دەرھاتبايە سەر كر دىمكالى PKK تىنانت چەند جارڭ ناۋى رېڭخراۋە مەشيان گۇرۇ و كر دىيانە كۇنگرەي گەل لە سالانى ۲۰۰۲ و ۲۰۰۳، بۇ دوور كەوتتەۋە لە بىكار ھىنانى چەك و دوور كەوتتەۋە لە تاكتىكى سەر بازى و نزيكوۋەنەۋە لە پىرۇسى دانوستاندن، بەلام ئۇە گىرنگ نەبوۋ ئەگەر PKK بىۋايە چەند كچ و كورنكى كوزى بى دەسلەۋاتىش، لەمىر ئۇەي ھەتا ھاورى نزيكەي نەمىرىكا كە تۇركايە بىھوى ناۋى PKK لەنىۋ ئۇ لىستە بىمىنىتەۋە، نەمىرىكا دەستكارى لىستەكە ناكات، بىگۇيدانە ئۇەي ئۇ رېڭخراۋە چى دەكات و چى ناكات.

بۇيە ئىمى گروپپە چەكدارانە ھېچ ھانداننڭ نابېنين وايان ئىنيكات تاكتىكە گەمىلايىپەكەنى خۇيان بگۇرن، چۈنكە چۈنە نئو ئىمى لىستە و دەرھاتن ئىمى لىستە پىمەندى بە جالاكىيەكەنى ئىمى انمە نىيە، ھەر لىمىر ئىمە فاكىتر شە تانىستا كىم رىخزاور ھىمىوۋە بئوانى خۇى رىفورم بىكات .

\*دیفەر رومانو، پروفیسوری سیاسەتەکانی روژھەلاتی نیو دەرستە لە زانکۆی ولایەتی مزووری لە ئەمریکا و نووسەری کتێبی (بزوو نەوی نەتەوی کورد) لە ساڵی . نەم گۆشەبە تاییەت بۆ (رووداو) دهنوو سێ.

لە میسر و تونس و لیبیا رووخانی دیکتاتۆرەکان خوشی و چاوەروانی زۆری لەگەڵ خۆیدا هێنا، بەلام نەبوو هۆی دروستکردنی لیبیوردەیی لەو وڵاتەدا. پەرستگەکانی جوولەکە لە تونس کەوتنە بەر هێرش، پیاوێکەدارەکان لە لیبیا رێگەیان لە جولەکەییەکە لە تاراوگە گەراوە گرت بچیت پەرستگەییەکە کۆنی جوولەکە لە تەرابلوس خاوەن بکاتەو. لە میسریش، قبتییەکان رووبەرۆی تووندوتیژی زیاتر دەبنەو لەلایەن شەقامەکانی سەر شەقام و سوپا.

مرۆف لەوانەییە بیهێت خەتای هەموو ئەمانە بداتە پال چەندین دەیه دەسلەلاتی تاکروانە، چونکە کاتێک خەڵک سالاڤانێکی دووردریژ لەژێر چەپۆکی دەسلەلاتیکی داپلۆسینەرەدا دەژین، ئەمانی دیکتاتۆرەکان لەسەرەتادا دەبیته هۆی سەرەلەدانی هەندێک مەیل و ئارەزووی ناشرین و سەرکوتکارانە. کەس ناتوانی لە یەکەم رۆژی پاش رووخانی دیکتاتۆرەکان یەکسەر چاوەرێی لیبیرالیزم و لیبیوردەیی بکات. لەهەوای شۆرشێ فەرمەنسی یەکمەجار سەردەمیکی ترس و تۆقاندن ھاتە کایەو، ئینجا بڕایەتی، ئازادی و یەکسانی سەریهەلدا.

ئەگەر ئەمە سەرەوێ شیکردنەوێکی بەجێی رووداوێ ناشرینەکانی هەفتە رابردووی بیت لە قاھیرە و شۆینەکانی دیکە، ئەوا دەبی چۆن شۆرقە ئێزمونی کورد بکریت لە پاش رزگار بوونیان لە دەسلەلاتی ئاسنێی سەدام حوسێن لە سالی 1991؟ تەنانت لەکاتی شەری ناوخی نیوان پارتی دیموکراتی کوردستان و یەگێتی نیشتمانی کوردستان لە نەوئەکان، مەسیحی و ئیزدی و کاکەیی و عەرەبەکانی کوردستان لە ئۆفرمییدا بوون و وەک بەشێک لە کۆمەلگە قبۆلەر ابوون. قەد رووینەدا خەلکی توورە هێرشبەکنە سەر پەرستگەیان قوتابخانە و مەڵەکانیان.

کاتێک پاش سیانزە سال ناوچەکانی دیکە عێراق لە چنگی دەسلەلاتی سەدام حوسێن رزگار بوون، مەسیحی و ئیزدیەکان لەنێو یەکمەمین ئەو گرووپانە بوون کە یەکسەر کەوتنە بەر هێرش. دەنگۆی وا لە شەقامەکانی بەغدا بڵاوبوووە کە جولەکە عێراقییەکان گەراونەتەو بۆ ئەوێ بەشێوێکی پیلانگیرانە زەوی و زار بکرن. لە دۆخێکی وادا کە حکومەت و کۆمەلگە عێراقی هەرسێکی بەرچاویان هینا، بەتایبەت لە پاراستنی مەسیحییەکان، نیسلامیە تووندروەکان هێرشیان دەکردە سەر مەسیحییەکان و گەرک لە دواي گەرک وەدەریان دەفان.

کاتێک بەسەرکە دێتە سەر لیبیوردەیی و قبۆلکردنی کەمینەکان لەلایەن جەماوەرەو، نیسلامیە سیاسییەکان کارنامەییکی زۆر ھەزاریان ھەبە. کەمینە نایینیەکان لە ئەوروپاش ژبانیکی خوشیان نەبوو، تاوەکو جاکردنەوێ کۆنە و دەولەت نەهاتە ئارەو (پشکنی بیروراتان لە نیسپانیا بەبیر دێت بۆ نمونە؟) لەگەڵ بەهێزتریونی پێگەیی جولەکە ئایندارەکان لە سیاسەتی ئیسرائیل، دەبینن کە تارانێ رەقەمێز دەرھەق بە خەڵکانی ناچولەکە سەریهەلداوە وەک سووتاندنی مەزگەتێک لە ناوچە ئەلجەلێل. ھەڵکشانی ھیندویزیسیسیسی دياردەبەکی ھاوشیوێ لە چەندین شۆینی ھیندستان خولقاند. تەنانت لە تورکیاش، سەرەلەدانی پارتی داد و گەشەپێدان ھاوکات بوو لە گەڵ بەرزبوونەوێ ھێرشەکان بۆ سەر ئەو ژانەیی باش خۆیان دانابۆش و مەسیحییەکان (وەک ھارانت دینک نووسەری ئەرەبی ناسراو) و ئەوانیدیکەش کە بە "بێئەخلاق" دادەنرێن لەو ھێرشانە پارێزراو نەبوون. وادیارە سیاسەت و ئایین باش پێکەو تێکەڵ نابن. ھۆکاریکی سەرەکی ئەوێ کە کوردستانی ئەمرۆ زیاتر لیبیوردەیی بەرامبەر کەمینەکان، لە عەلمانیوونی پارتە سیاسییە سەرکەبەکانییەو سەرچاوە دەگرت. ھەرچەندە زۆربەیی سیاسییەکانی کورد کەسانی باوەردارن و پەیرۆی ئایین دەکەن، بەلام بەو رادەیی ئایین تێکەڵ بە سیاسەت ناکەن. ئەمەش پێچەوانەیی زۆربەیی جیھانی عەرەبییە کە تێیدا پارتە ئۆپۆزیسیۆنە گەورەکان نیسلامین و ئەنجامدا حکومەتەکانیان لە پشێرکێدان لەگەڵ ئۆپۆزیسیۆن لەسەر ئەوێ کامەیان دەتوانی زیاتر نیسلامی بیت.

بەلام بۆچی دەبی مرۆف پیرۆزی ئایین پشێل بکات بە پەلکێشکردنی بۆ ئۆزەلکۆی سیاسەت. زۆر زانایانی لاھوتیش بە ئەواي دژی ئەو بیروکەیی دەوستان کە نیسلام لەناخەو ئایینیکی سیاسییە. ئەوان دەلێن ئەگەر نیسلام ھێندە سیاسییە بۆچی گرنگترین پرسی سیاسی، واتە جیگرتەوێ پێغەمبەر لە پاش کۆچی دواي، بەبێ وەلام ھێلەر اوتمەو؟ ھەر ئەم پرسە سیاسییە بەرئەتییە بوو ھۆی دروستبوونی شیعی و سوننە و ئەو تووندوتیژییە زۆرە کە بەدوایدا ھات.

ئەوروپا تەنھا کاتێک توانی شەری خۆیناوییەکانی نیوان کاتۆلیک و پڕۆتێستانتەکان کۆتایی پێ بێتی کە ئایینی لە کایەیی سیاسەت وەدەنا. بە سەرئەدیان لە رووداوەکانی ئەم دوايیە میسر و ھەندێک شۆینی دیکە، دەبینن ئەم پەندە لەلایەن عەرەبەو بەھەند وەرنەگیراوە. لەکاتێکدا زۆربەیی جیھان بە ئەواي بنەما لیبەرالییە بەرئەتییەکانی وەک یەکسانی مەدەنی لەنێوان ھەموو گرووپە نایینییەکان و ئازادی نایینی قبۆلەدەکات، دەبینن کە کۆنترین و گەورەترین گرووپ نیسلامی، واتە ئیخوان مۆسڵمینی میسر، تەنانت توانای سەرکۆنەردنێکی سادە کوشتاری خۆپشانەدەر قبتییە مەسیحییەکانی نییە.

\* دەیفێد رۆمانۆ، پڕۆفیسۆری سیاسەتەکانی رۆژھەلاتی نیوئەرستە لە زانکۆی ولایەتی مزووری لە ئەمریکا و نووسەری کتییی (بزووتنەوێ ئەتەوێ کورد) لە سالی 2006. ئەم وتارەیی بە تاییبەت بۆ (رووداو) نووسبوو

پۆتین پشێگێری دەولەتی یەگرتووی کورد دەکات

لەلایەن دەیفێد رۆمانۆ 2014/4/4

نیستا سەرئەم راکشێش بۆ بابەتەکە، لەر استیدا فەلادیمیر پۆتین ھێچ پشێگێرییەکی بۆ دەولەتی یەگرتووی کورد رانەگەیاندووە. ئەو جیھانەیی تێیدا

دەژین پرە لە نادادپەرەری بەرامبەر گرووپ و نەتەوێی جیاواز. لە راستیدا ئەوێ پوتین گوتی لە دواى رووخانى یەكێتیی سۆڤیەتیی جارانەو ئەمە بوو: "نەتەوێی روسیا بوو گەورەترین نەتەوێ لە جیهاندا كە سنوورەكان جیای كردهبوونە".

بوونی 27 ملیۆن روسی لە دەروەوێ روسیا، بەوانەشەو كە لە ئەمریکا و رۆژئاوای ئەوروپا دەژین، وادەكات كە قسەكەى پوتین راست بێت كاتێك دەڵێت لەدواى ساڵى 1991 ئەو نەتەوێ روسی بوو بە گەورەترین نەتەوێ كە سنوورەكان جیای كردهبوونە. بەلام ئەگەر باس لە ژمارەى ئەو خەلكە بكەین كە لە ولاتى خۆیان دابڕێندراون بەهۆى گۆرانكارى لە سنوورەكاندا، ئەوا نەتەوێ روسی گەورەترین نەتەوێ نین لە جیهاندا. بوونی 30 تا 40 ملیۆن كورد لە جیهاندا بەبێ بوونی دەولەتێكى سەر بەخۆ لە هیچ شوێنێكى جیهاندا، ئەو شەرفە نەخوازراوە بە كورد دەدات. پاش ئەوێ ئۆكرائینا لەساڵى 1991 سەر بەخۆی وەرگرت، كورد بوونە گەورەترین نەتەوێ بێ دەولەت لە جیهاندا.

لە پاش ریفاراندۆمەكەى ھەریەمى كریمیا و لكاندنێ ئەو ھەریەمە بە ولاتەكەى، وادەركەوێ كە پوتین بڕیارەكی بەھیزی ھەبێت بە مافى بڕیاردانى چارمنوس بۆ نەتەوێكان. زۆرینەى بە رەگەز روسیەكانى ھەریەمى كریمیا خاوەنارێكەى بێتەوێ بەشێك لە دەولەتێ روسیا، وەك دەبین، پوتین خۆى ناچار ببوێ بۆ بەدیهێنانى خەونى روسەكانى ئەو ھەریەمە. بەبێ وتەى روسەكان، لكاندنێ كریمیا بە ئۆكرائیناوە لەساڵى 1954 ھەڵەكەى مێژووییى بوو، بۆیە وا دەركەوێ ئەو ھەڵەكە پێویستى بە راستكردنەو ھەبێت.

دەزانم كە زۆرینەى كورد ھەزەركەن ئەم جۆرە شتەنە لە جیهاندا رووبەت. ھۆكارەكەش ئەوێ ھەتا سنوورە دیاریكراوەكانى جیهان بایەخیان كەمتر بێتەوێ باشترە. باوەریان وایە، ھەتا زیاتر خەلك باس لە مافى بڕیاردانى چارمنوسى نەتەوێكان بكەن، چانسى ئەو زیاترە كە كۆمەڵگەى نێودەولەتێ لە كۆتاییدا دان بەو مافەدا بنێ بۆ كوردیش. ھەروەھا بەھیوان كە ناعەدالەتیەكان لە كیشانى سنوورە سیاسییەكانى پاش جەنگى یەكەمى جیهانى راستبەركرێتەو. كریمیا، باشوورى سوودان، رۆژھەلاتى تەیموور و كۆسۆڤو، ئەمە ھەموو مۆسیقان بۆ گوتی كورد.

بەلام ناتەواوێك لە ئوازی ئەو مۆسیقایدا ھەبێ: ئەوێش دوورەوێ جیهان و دەنگى زولالێ ئەو ناعەدالەتیەن كە بەرامبەر گرووپ و نەتەوێكەى دیاریكراو دەكێ. بۆ نموونە كاتێك دێتە سەر مەسەلەى سووریا، پوتین باس لە سەروەری خاك و دەستبەردەدان لە كاروبارى ناوخۆى ولاتەن دەكات. گرنگ نییە كوردی سووریا چەندە ریفاراندۆم دەكەن و چەند ھەلبژاردن سازدەكەن، ھێچكام لە ولاتە زەلھێزەكانى جیهان بە روسیای داكوێكە لە مافى بڕیاردانى چارمنوسیشەو دان بەماف و كۆششى كوردی سووریدا ناھێن. ئەمریکا و ھاوێپەمانەكانى لە رۆژئاوای ئەوروپا بەھەموو شێوێك پشەنگیاریان لە مافى بڕیاردانى چارمنوس بۆ كۆسۆڤو، یەكەن و دروستكردنێ كۆمارى كۆسۆڤو دەكرد، ھێچ بەلایەنەو گرنگ نەبوو ئەگەر دروستكردنێ ئەو قەوارە پشەنگارى مافى سربەكان بووایە. تەنەت كەوتە بۆردومانى سربیا لە كاتێكدا كە روسیای ھاوێپەمانى سربیا لاوازتر بوو لەوێ ھێچ كاردانەوێك ھەبێت. ئێستا كە یەكێك لە ھاوێپەمان و ھاوێپەمانى ھەریەمى لەدەست دەدات، لە پڕێكدا بابەتێ وەك "ئەمە پشەنگارى تەواوێ سەروەری ئۆكرائیناوە" دەبێتە جێى گرنگى بۆیان.

بۆیە ھەر بەشێك لە بەشەكانى كوردستان ئەگەر بڕیارى راگەیاندنێ دەولەتێ سەر بەخۆى دا، باشترە زۆر پشت نەبەستێ بە یاساو پرنسپ و رووداوە ھاوشێوەكانى پێشوو. تەنھا ئەو نەتەوانەى كە ولاتە زەلھێزەكانیان لە پشە سوود لەم دوو رووبەوێ وەردەگرن.

## AKR.55

<http://old.rudaw.net/kurdish/index.php/opinion/5023.html>

گۆران و ھەلبژێرانەوێ تەختەى یاریەكە لە كوردستان

15:48:00 2011/02/17

دەیفد رۆمانو\*

پەنابەردن بۆ توندوتیژی تەنھا لەكاتێكدا روایە كە سیستەمى سیاسى بەرووى ھەموو ھەلبژێرانەوێ داخراوێ. تەنەت ئەوكاتیش خۆپیشاندانى ھێمانە و نازەرای دەربڕینی مەدەنیانە پەسەندترە لە رووبەرووبوونەو چەكدارى. كەم كەس گومانى ئەو ھەبێ كە سیستەمى سیاسى لە تونس و میسر لەھەموو رووبەوێ داخراو بوون، ئەمە بوو ھۆى ئەوێ كە ئەو ولاتەنە خۆپیشاندانى گەورە بەخۆو ببوون و سۆزى نێودەولەتیش بەدەستبێن.

بەلام ھەلبژێرانەوێ ئەم دواییە بزووتەوێ گۆران بۆ دووبارەكردنەوێ نمونەى تونس لە كوردستان وەك گریانى گورگە. ھەروەك گۆشەنووسەكانى دیکەى ئەم رۆژنامەى ئاماژەیان پێداوە، گۆران بەشداری لە ھەلبژێرانەكانى رابردودا كرد كە لەلایەن چاودێرانى نێودەولەتیەو بە ھەلبژێرانەكانى ئازاد و پاك وەسفكرا و ئەنجامەكیان قبوڵكرد. بەمانایەكى دیکە، سیستەمى سیاسى لە كوردستانى عێراق، سەرمەرای زۆرى كەموورتییەكانى، ھێشتا رێگە بە ھەلبژێرانەكانى یاسایی و گۆرانكارى دەدات. ئەگەر تونسى و میسر یەكەن ئەوێ بەختیان ھەبووایە، ئەوا ناچار نەدەبوون بە ملیۆنانیان بڕژێنە سەر شەقامەكان.

دواوەكی چاوەروانەكراو بۆ ھەلبژێرانەوێ ھەریەمى كوردستان و پەرلەمان بەلای زۆرینەى خەلكەو ھێچە. گۆران وەك ئەو مەندالە ھەلبژێرانەوێ كە تەختەى یاریەكە ھەلبژێرانەوێ، كاتێك دەزانێ یاریەكەى دۆرانووە.

گۆران نازەرای دەردەبڕێ ئەوێ كە كەسانى نێو پارتمەكەى ھێچ پۆستێكیان لێو داوودەزگا ھۆمەییەكانى ھەریەمى كوردستاندا وەرنەگرتووە. لەكاتێكدا ھۆمەتى ئێستای ھەریەمى كوردستان ھۆمەتى ئێتێلاڤى كەمبێنە نییە، باشە بۆچى گۆران چاوەرێ پۆست دەكات؟ دواى ئەوێ گۆران پشەتێ لە ئامانجە نەتەوێیەكانى كورد لەبەغدا كرد، بەوێ لە ئێتێلاڤى كوردستانى جیاووەو، دەبێ خۆیان زۆر بەبەختەو بزانن كە ھێشتا خەلك قسەیان لەگەڵ دەكات. لەكاتێكدا كە كوردستانى عێراق ھێشتا رووبەرووى مەترسێ گەورە دەبێتەو ھەروەھا زۆر بەوێ كوردستانییەكانیش پێیانوایە ئەمە سیاسەتێكى گەمژانەى كە بەشێوازی نا دەزگایی بەتەو ھۆمەتى ھەلبژێرانەوێ.

ئەوێ ئەم رووداوە زۆر خراپتر دەكات ئەوێ كە بەھۆى كردووە گەورەكراوەكەى گۆرانەو، زۆر نازەرای شەرى دژى ھۆمەتى ھەریەمى

کوردستان ونبوون. نەوشیروان مستەفا راستەمەکات کاتێک دەلێت کە زۆر لە داوودەزگا گەرنەکانی حکومەتی هەریمی کوردستان لە پێشمەرگەو بەرگەر هەتا ئاسایش یان زۆربەیی رێکخراوە ناحکومییەکان کە بە NGO ی ساخته "ناسراون یان نەو رێکخراوە ناحکومیانەیی کە حکومین، هێشتا لەژێر کۆنترۆلی پارێزگاری و یەکنێتێدان. هێشتا گەندەلی و پوانخوازی بەربلایە. زۆربەیی، بەلام خۆشەخاتە نەک سەرچەم میدیاکان، لەلایەن پارێزگەرە کۆنترۆلکاران (بێگومان نەمە کۆمپانیای وشەش دەگرتەو کە میدیای بزوتنەوێ گۆرانە). خزمەتگوزارییەکان بەتایبەتی بواری پەرەدە و تەندروستی هێشتا پێویستیان بە کارکردنە، نەم پێشکەوتنەش زەحمەتە رووبەدەن لەکاتێک گەندەلی رێگە نادات کۆمەڵگە بەشێوەیەکی گونجاو بەرەو پێشەو بەروات.

زۆربەیی ولاتانی جیهان رووبەرۆی کێشەیی وەک ئەوانەیی کوردستان بوونەتەو، نەک ئەوانەیی لە توونس و میسر هەن. لە زۆربەیی نەو ولاتانەیی کە نێمچە کراوەن و سیستەمی سیاسی نێمچە لێرە، پارێزگەرە دەسەلاتدار کۆمەڵێک قازانجی نادادپەرەوانەیی دەستدەکەوێ. لەو جۆرە سیستەمانە، داخراوی نێبە یاخود دەسەلاتێکی دیکتاتۆرە نێبە کە دەبێتە هۆی دروستکردنی نەو خۆپێشاندانەیی وەک توونس و میسر. وەلامدانەوێکی گونجاییش بۆ نەم شێوازە نەوێیە کە مافی ئازادی رادەربەرین پەڕو بکڕێ (لەم کەسەشدا کۆمپانیای وشە و کەنالی KNN زۆر بەسوودن بۆ گۆران) و هەرەها هەمووێکی زۆریش بەرێ تەوێکە لە هەلبێژاردنی داهاوتودا بەشاری بەکی، لەجیاتی نەوێ داوا بەکی یارییەکی نێستە هەلبێژیتەو. نێمە هەموومان بەپەرۆشەو چاوەڕێی بزوتنەوێ گۆران دەکەین کە لەرووی سیاسییەو کەمێت، تەوێکە لەو راستییە تێبگات.

\* دەبێت رۆمانۆ، پڕۆفیسۆری سیاسەتەکانی رۆژەلانی نێوێرەستە لە زانکۆی ولایتی مزووری لە ئەمریکا و نووسەری کتێبی (بزوتنەوێ نەتەوێ کورد) لە سالێ 2006. نەم وتارەیی بە تاییبەت بۆ (رووداو) نووسێو

AKR.56

<http://old.rudaw.net/kurdish/index.php/opinion/10536.html>

مالە شووشەکەیی ئەنقەرە و پڕۆژە یاساکەیی فەرەنسای  
16:00:00 2012/01/08 رووداو

دەبێت رۆمانۆ \*

هەفتەیی رابردو (22 دێسەمبەر) پەرەمانی فەرەنسای بە زۆرینەیی دەنگ بەریاریدا کە لەمەوپاش نەوێکەردنی ئاشکرا لەو جێنۆسایدانەیی یاسای ولاتەکە دانێ پێدانان بە پێشێلکردنی یاسا دادەنرێن و نەوێکەردنی سزادەدرێت. نەو جێنۆسایدانەش، یەکنێکیان هەلوکۆستە کە رۆژێکی نازی لە دژی جوولەمەکان ئەنجامیدا و یاسای فەرەنسی پێشتر دانێ پێدانانە و نەوێ تازەش قەتڵو عامکردنی نەرمەنەکان (و مسیحییەکانە) لەلایەن نێمپراتۆری عوسمانی لە سالێ 1915.

دوای نەو پەرسەندنە، ئەنقەرە دەستبەجێ پڕۆژە یاساکەیی بە "هێرشێک بۆ سەر ئازادی رادەربەرین و لێکۆڵینەوێ مێژوویی" دانا و پارێزگەرە دەسەلاتدار و ئۆپوزیسیۆنەکان پێکەو سەرکۆنەیان کرد و وەک "هەلبەسەکی مەزن، پەسەندنەکراو و مێژوویی" دایانە ناسین. سەرۆکەزبیران رەجەب تەیب ئەردۆغانیش گوتی کە پڕۆژە یاساکە دەرەخەری "سیاسەتێکە لە سەر بنەمای نەزادپەرستی، جیاکاری و ترس لە بێگەنە". خۆپێشاندەرێکی تورکیش لە پارێس بە ئازانی (رۆیتەرز)ی گوت "من تێناگەم بۆچی فەرەنسای دەبێت ئازادی رادەربەرینی من سانسۆر بکات". رای نەم خۆپێشاندەرە دەرەیری بۆچوونی زۆر لە خەڵکە.

هەلبەت خودی نەوێ کە لە ئەنقەرە نەم جۆرە قسانە لە سەر نەم بابەتە دەگوترێن، شتێکی سەیرە. بەپێی زانیارییەکانی پەیمانگەیی رۆژنامەوانی نێودەوڵەتی IPI، تورکیا زیاتر لە هەموو ولاتێکی دیکەیی جیهان رۆژنامەنووسان زیندانێ دەکات، تەنەت زیاتر لە ولاتانی وەک ئێران و چین. لە تورکیا کۆمەڵە یاساییەکان هەن دەرەبارەیی "سووکایەتیکردن بە تورکیوون"، "سووکایەتیکردن بە سوپا"، سەرۆکەزبیران و "داوودەزگاکانی دەوڵەت" و "یادی ئەتاتۆرک" و شتە پێرۆزەکانی دیکە، کە زۆرجار بەکارەدەهێنرێن بۆ حوکمان لەسەر خەڵک. نەو کەسانەیی کە بۆینر بایس لە روودانی جێنۆسایدی نەرمەنەکان یان کۆمەڵکۆژییە جۆراوجۆرەکانی دژ بە کورد بەکەن بەپێی نەم یاسایانە زیندانێ دەکەرن. تەنەت گوتتی نەوێ کە ئەتاتۆرک سەرکەردەیی دەسەلاتخواز و پوانخواز بوو، دەتوانی خەڵک بەخاتە گۆشەیی بەندێخانەو.

یاساکانی دیکە وەک (یاسای دژە تیرۆر) هێندە بەربلای و لاسیتیکێن کە دەسەلاتدارانی تورکیا دەتوانن هەر کەسێک لە هەر کاتێکدا کە بیانەوێ بێگەرن و زۆر جاریش وادەکەن. کۆمیسێۆنی مافەکانی مرۆفی ئەوروپا بەم دواییانە گەلی لە زۆر لەو جۆرە یاسا و رێسا نارووانە کردووە کە لە واقیعدا ئازادی رادەربەرینیان لە تورکیا کۆشتووە. یەکنێک لەو یاسایانە بایس لە "زیندانیکردن دەکات لەئێوان یەک تەوێکەو سێ سالی بۆ هەر کەسێک کە پڕۆپاگەندە بۆ رێکخراویکی ئاوانکار یان ئامانجەکانی بڵاودەکاتەو. نەمەش واتە ئەگەر تەوێکەو شارێکی دێرینی وەک حەسەنکێف بەکەمە ناوچەییکی مێژوویی، سەروشتی و کۆلتۆری (نەک بەندواییکی بۆ دروستبەکی بۆ نەوێ ژێر ناو بەکەوێت وەک نەوێ نێستە حکومەتی تورکیا دەیکات)، هاوکات پارێزگەرێکی کوردستانیش ئامانجێکی هاوشێوە هەبێت، نەوای بەپێی یاساکە دەکڕێ لەبەر هۆکاری تیرۆریزم دەستبەجێبکەری.

پێناسەیی تیرۆریزم لە یاسای "دژە تیرۆری" تورکیادا تەنەت لە پاش هەموارکردنیشی لەسالێ 2006، هێندە بەرفراوانە کە بۆی هەیه خەڵک لەبەر گوتنی نەوێ کە کەمەنەیی کورد لە تورکیا هەیه تووشی دادگاییکردن بین. بەپێی پێناسەیی نێو یاساکە: "تیرۆریزم هەموو نەو کردووانە دەگرتەو کە لەلایەن یەک کەس یان زیاترەو ئەنجامیدرێن کە سەر بە رێکخراویک بن کە ئامانجەکی گۆرینی تاییبەتەنەییەکانی کۆمارە بەوشتوویە کە لە دەستوور بایسکراوە و سیستەمی سیاسی، یاسایی، کۆمەلایەتی، عەلمانی و ئابووری ولات بەکەنە ئامانج یان زیان بە یەکگرتوویی دەوڵەتی تورکیا، بە گەل و خاوەن، بەگەینن، یان بوونی دەوڵەت و کۆماری تورکیا بەخەنە مەترسییەو و دەسەلاتی دەوڵەت لاوازیکەن یان لەناوایی بیەن و دەستی بەسەردا بگەرن و ماف و ئازادییە بەنەرەتییەکان لەئێو بەرن، یان زیان لە ئاسایشی ناوخوا و دەرەوێ دەوڵەت، خەڵک و تەندروستی گشتی بەدەن، ئەمەش لە رێی گۆشار، هێز، تووندوتیژی، تیرۆر، تۆقاندن و هەرشە لێکردن". ئەگەر داواکاریکی گشتی لە تورکیا بیەوێ وای پێشاندات کە من نیازم و ابووێ زیان لە خەباتی دژە تیرۆری تورکیا بەدەم، گۆشەنووسی وەک من لەوانەیی تووشی کێشە بی، تەنەا لەبەر نەوێ دەلێم نەم جۆرە پێناسەیی بۆ تیرۆریزم پیرە لە گرتی ئاشکرا. مرۆف لەوانەیی بەرپرسیار بکەیت بە "تاوانی" و تەنەت ئەگەر مەبەستی پشت قەس و کردووەکانیشی بەوشتوویە

نەبووئیت. زۆر رۆشنپەر و کەسایەتی گشتی لە تورکیا خراوەتە زیندان یان دادگاییکراون تەنها لەبەر ئەوەی گوتووایە کەمەنە کورد لە تورکیادا دەژیت .

سەرەرای هەموو ئەمانە، تورک مافی ئەرمەیان هەیە کە بەرد بگرنە یاسای جینۆسایدی فەرنسی و ئەو ماله شووشەیی خۆبەهەقزانی کە فەرنسییەکان بۆ خۆیان دروستیانکردووە. شەری جەزائیرتان بەبیر دیت؟ یان پێویستدەمکات حکومەتی فەرنسای سەردەمی هیتلەر تان بەبیر بێنەمە کە چۆن کار بەدەستانی ئەوکاتی فەرنسا بە تەمەرزۆییە و یارمەتی نازییەکانیان دەدا بۆ کۆکردنەوەی جوولەکەکان و قەتڵکردن؟ یان دەشی هەولەکەکانی (چارلز دوگول) تان بە بیر بێنەمە کە دمیگوت فەرنسییەکان لەژێر داگیرکاری ئەلمانیدا سەرقاتی بەرخۆدانی چەکارانەیی بێوچان بوون (نەک هاوکارکردنی نازییەکان)؟ ئەوەی کە راستی مەسەلەکیە و لای کەس شاروا نییە ئەوەیە کە پڕۆژە یاسای جینۆسایدەکە رێک لە سەر و بەندی هەڵبژاردنەکاندا پەسەندکرا و مەبەست لەوەش رازیکردنی ئەو ژمارە زۆری تاراوگە نشینی ئەرمەنییە کە لە فەرنسا دەژین. ئەو کارە پەر لەمانی فەرنسا زیان بە هەموو هەلیکی گەتوگۆی کراوە، راستگۆیانە و پێویست دەگەییێن دەربارەیی ئەو کردوانەیی کە عوسمانییەکان لە ساتەمۆختی رووخانی ئیمپراتۆرییەکیان بەرامبەر بە کەمینە مسیحییەکان نواندیان. هەر لەبەر ئەم هۆکارە، زۆر لە هاوولاتییە لیبرالەکانی تورکیا (بە کەسایەتیە ناسراوە ئەرمەنیەکانی ئەو ولاتەشمە) رەخنە لە یاساکەیی فەرنسا دەگرن. لەم نوێواندا، تورکیش مافی ئەرمەیان هەیە باسی ئەو ژمارە زۆری موسلمانان بکەن کە لەلایەن هیزەکانی روسیا و هەندێک لە ئەرمەنیەکان لە سەردەمدا قەتلەم کران. لەئەنجامدا، دەبی ئەو رۆلە بەرچاو وەبیر کورد بەهێزیتەمە کە هەندێک هۆزی کورد گێرایان و کاریان بۆ عوسمانییەکان دەکرد، لە کۆمەڵگۆزی مسیحییەکانی ئەناتۆلیای رۆژ هەلات .

دەبی حکومەتەکان مێژوو و لێکەڵێن بۆ کۆمەڵگە و مێژوونووسان، ئەوان لەبارەو رۆلی خۆیان سنووردار بکەن بە سەکۆنەکردن نەک قەدەخەکردنی هەر دیدگایەک کە بە دلایان نەبێت. ئەگەر کەسێک دەبێت نۆلی لە هۆلۆکۆست بکات یان بۆ کۆمەڵگۆزی سرتیبیچا لە بۆسنیا رووینەدا یان هەولی کەمکردنەوەی قەبارەیی جینۆسایدی ئەرمەنیەکان بەدات یان بۆ کوردە باخییوومەکانی عێراق شایانی پڕۆسەی پاکتووی رەگەزی ئەنفال بوون، ئەوا من پێم باشترە گۆیم لەو بۆچوونەکانی بێت نەک قەدەخەبکەین. چونکە لەو حالەتەدا بە خێرای بۆت دەردەکەوێت کە ئەو جۆرە کەسانە دژسەمین یان ترسیان لە ئیسلامە یان رەگەز پەرست و فاشیست .

تورک دەبی هەندێک لە بەردەکانیان هەڵگرن بۆ خانووە شووشەکی خۆیان و سەیری ئەو کۆتوبەندە تووندانە بکەن کە لە سەر نازادی رادەبرین لە ولاتەکیاندا هەیە. لە فەرنسا هەر هێچ نەبێت مەرفۆف دەتوانێت بەبێ ترس پێاسە بکات و باس لە کردووە نابەجێکانی حکومەتی فەرنسی لە جەزائیر، قیتنام یان ناوچەیی زەربای هینن و کۆمەڵگۆزییەکانی (قیندیی) لەسالی 1974 دا بکات. هەر کاتێک خەڵک توانیان بەبێ ترس لە تورکیادا هەمان شت بکەن، ئەوا بێگومان سەرۆکە زەربان نەردوغان و حکومەتەکی دەتوانن گەلی لە "هێرش بۆ سەر نازادی رادەبرین و لیکۆلینەوی مێژوویی بکەن".

\* دەفید رۆمانو، پڕۆفیسۆری سیاسەتەکانی رۆژ هەلاتی نیو دەرستە لە زانکۆی ولایتی مزووری لە ئەمریکا و نووسەری کتیی (بزووتنەوی ئەتەوی کورد) لە سالی 2006. ئەم گۆشەیی بە تاییەت بۆ (رووداو) دەنووسێ

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تورکیا.. کۆبانی و باکووری قوبرس

لەلایەن دەفید رۆمانو 2014/10/24

هەر لە دامەزراندنی کۆماری تورکیاوە لە سالی 1923، ئەکەمە بەردەوام داوای لە کوردی نیو سنوورەکی کردووە دڵسۆز و گۆنراپەل بن. نۆلی لە شوناسیان کرد و هەلمەتیی گەورەیی تواندەنەوی لەدژی کورد بەرێوەبەرد، بۆ ئەوەی وایان لێبکەن بەو زمانە قسە بکەن کە ئەوان دەیانویست و کەلتوور و مێژوویان بگۆرن.

نایدۆلۆژیای دەولەت جەختی لەوە دەکردووە کە هەر کەس لە تورکیا بژی، تورکە. تورکیبون شوناسە نەک ولاتینامە. زمان و مێژوو و کەلتووری "هاوولاتی تورکیا" بەسترا بوو بە رەگەزی تورک. چەندین شۆرشیان کپ کردووە و دەشیانگوت ئەوانە شۆرش نین، بەلکو چەتەگەرای کۆمەلە کەسێک کە "شارستانیەتیان قبوڵ نییە و نامادە نین ئەو سوودانە و مەبەگرن کە دەولەت بۆی دا بین کردوون".

کەچی کۆماری تورکیا و کۆمەڵگەیی تورکی لەلایەکی دیکەو چارەنووسی ئەو تورکەکانیان بەدڵ و بەمەیان گرتبوو کە هاوولاتی نەبوون، تورکەکانی بولگاریا و یۆنان و قوبرس و ئەلمانیا و شۆنەکانی دیکە. لە کاتێکدا تورکیا هێچ گەنگی بە مافەکانی ئەو هاوولاتیانەیی نەدەدا کە بە زمانی جگە لە تورکی قسەیان دەکرد، سەرکردەکانی تورکیا بێوچان داگوکیان لە کەمینە تورکەکانی ولاتانی دیکە دەکرد. کاتێک لە سالەکانی 1960-1970 دا میلیشیاکانی قوبرس هەرشەیان لە کەمینەیی تورک دەکرد لەو دورگەیی، کۆمەڵگە و بەرپرسیانی تورکیا داوایان لە جیهان دەکرد کە بێدەنگ نەبن. دواجار لەسالی 1974 دا هیزێکی زۆریان ناردە قوبرس بۆ ئەوەی هاوکاریی تورکە قوبرسیەکان بکەن و یەک لەسەر سێی قوبرسیان داگیرکرد و تا ئێستاش سوپای تورکیا لەوێ ماوتەمە .

پارتی کرێکارانی کوردستان کە لە سالی 1984 دەستی بە خەبات کرد، دواجار بە زۆر گۆرانکاری لە سیاسەتی فەرمیی تورکیا لەبەرەمبەر کورد دروستکرد. کار گەیشتە ئەوەی کە ئیتر ئێستەم بێت بۆ تورکیا نۆلی لە بوونی کورد بکات. ئەگەر کورد بوونی نەبوو، ئیتر کەوابێ پێویستی نەدەکرد وشەیی "کوردستان" لە ناوی پەکەمدا ئەمۆندە ترس و دڵەراوکی لای ئەکەمە دروست بکات. سالی 1991 تورکیا دواجار دانی بەمەدانا کە کورد لە ولاتەکییدا هەیە. ئەو لەکاتێکدا کورد 20%ی دانیشتووانی تورکیا پێکدین .

دەستگیرکردن و زیندانیکردنی سەرۆکی پەکەمە لە کۆتایی ئەمۆتەکان، پەکەمەیی تووشی مەتبوون کرد، بەلام لە دەوروبەری 2005 دا پەکەمە جاریکی دیکە گەراوە گۆرپان. لەبەر ئەوە بوو کە ئیتر لە ژێر چاودێریی سەرۆک و مەزیران رەجەب تەیب ئەردوغان و پارتە سوننیه ئیسلامیەکی، پارتی داد و گەشەپێدان، ئەکەمە دەستگیر بە گەران لەوای رێگەچارەیی دیکە بۆ ئەوەی کۆتایی بە توندوتیژی بھێنن. ئەردوغان رێگەیی بە هەندێک مافی زمانەوانی دا و کۆمەڵێک چاکسازی راگەیاند، لەوانە رێگەمان بە پەختی سنووردار بە زمانی کوردی. بە ئاشکرا دانی بە بوونی "برا کوردەکان"ی



چەند سائىڭ دواتر ، ئەرۇغان ھىنگاۋىكى نوۋى بۇ ئاشتى راگىيانەد و لە نادارى 2013 يەكەمە رازى بوو چالاىكەكانى خۇى راگرىت و چەكدار مەكانى لە خاكى توركيawe بەر مو ھىرمى كوردستان گشاندەمو . نەوان كشانەو لەبەر امبەر بەلئنى ناروونى حكومت بۇ بەر موپشېردنى پروسەى ئاشتى ، بەلام بەداخەمو ، حكومتەكەى ئەرۇغان زياتر خەمى پروسەىكى ئاشتى بوو كە ئاشتى بەئىتت . ھېچەك لە داواكارىيەكانى كورد جىيەجى نەكران . لەبرى ئەو ھەزاران رۇژنامەنوسى ئاشتىخاۋى كورد ، چالاكوانى مەدەنى ، خوئندكار و سىياسەتمەدار دەستگىر كران و رەوانەى زىندان كران و تا ئىستاش ھەندىك چاومروانى بەسرەردنى سزاكانيانن .

به‌لام هېشتا، هېمان نېو دولتمې دې داوای دلسنوزی له کورد دمکات و دلنپایان دمکاتوه که کورد هاوولاتی په‌سانن، گهمارو دمخاته سهر کولای له‌کاتیکدا که دانیشتونانمکې هېرشپان لاسمرو بهرگریکاران له شارمکه تهمفهمینپان بو چهکه سووکه‌کانپان پې نساوه و له‌ژیر فشاری خوینرئترین تېرورپستی پر چه‌کراودا که جېهان تا نیستا به‌خویمو له‌پینویه، پشپان نووسیننراوه به سنورومو. له‌گمل نمانه‌شدا کورد (هاوولاتی په‌کسانه‌کانی تورکیا) هېشتا داوای نېوه ناگمن سوپای تورکیا دستپوهدان بکات و مکو نېوی له باکووری قوبرس کردپان. نېوان تمنپا داوا دمکن ریگیان پېندریت خوېان هاوکاری بو براکانی خوېان بنیزن. به‌لام نېکمه ریگه نادات و لمبری نېوه، په‌که‌که که بوخوی له سالی 2013دا گفتوگوی ناشتی له‌گمل کردوه، به داعش دمچوینی. جیگری سمرۆک و مزیرانی تورکیاش لم هفتپیدا هوالی کمکردنموی به‌های بهرگری قارمانانموی کورده‌کانی کولایندی دا له دزی هیزه جیهادیپه‌کانی داعش، هیزیک که له ماوهی چمند روژیکدا له مانگی حوزمیرانی رابردووی نېوی سوپای عیراقی بهر مو به‌غداراونا

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هەرچەنده گورد و شیعە و زۆریکی دیکەى عێراقیەکان ھەرگیز پەشیمان نین لە جەنگی داگیرکردنی ساڵی 2003ی عێراق، بەلام زۆرینهی نەمر بکێبەکان بەنجەوانەو لەم جەنگە پەشیمانان.

نەمىرىكىيەكان بېزار و ماندوو بوون له شەهر، بۇيە سالى 2008 ئۆلمايان وەك سەروكى نوئى و لاتەكەيان ھەلبۇزارد. ھەلبۇزاردنى ئۆلما لەسەر نەمەي پەلئەكەكانى بۇ تەركىز خەستە سەركار و بارى ناوخۇ لەمرى كەشەكانى سەسەستى دەر وە، ناپەت مایە سەرسورمان بېت. دروشمەكەيان "پەلئەكەكانى" بە دلنایەو بۇ جەيەجەكر دىنى رەسكى نوئ نەمو لە دەر وەى نەمرىكا. ھەر وەھا دەپەت جەنى سەرسورمان نەمەت كە ئۆلما پەيچەمانەى سەروكەكەى پەش خۇى دەرناكوئ و رەسك ناكات لە سەسەستى دەر وەھا. چ كەشەى نەئومى ئۆران بېت، يان پەشەر مەيەكانى رووسپا لە ئۆكرائنا تا شەرى نەسرائىل و فەلەستەننەكان و شەرى ناوخۇى سوورپا و ھەرشەتكى دىكە، ئەم سەروكە نوئەى و دەرەكەوئ و رەپاى بەلاوہ پەسەند بېت و ھىچ پەلئەكەكان نەدات دەر بارەى تۆمەكلان لەكارى سەربازى .

[illegible]

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دەگمىر ئىتەمە بۆ سەردەمى پېش مەسجىيەت و ئىسلام، ئىستا بى مأل و حال بوون و لە پرۆسەى راگواستندان بۆ دوورخستەمىيان لە ھەر مەشەى داعش. لەكاتىدا سەرقالى ئەم نووسىنەم، ھېشتا ھەزاران ھاوولائى ئىزدى بە گەنج و پېرمو لەسەر چىايەكە كە پلەى گەرمە لەوئ 45 پلەيە، گىرپان خواردوو داعش گەمارۆى چىاكەى داوہ .

بەكورتى دىرندەمى داعش واىكردووہ ئەلقاعىدە وەك كۆمەلەىك مندال دەرگەم، رەنگە لەبەرئەوہ بىت كە قاعىدە خۆى لى بىيەرى كردوون. قاعىدە زياتر ئايدىولۇژيا و كۆمەلەىكى پەرتەوازە بوون، بەلام داعش زۆر لەوہ زياترە. چەكدارانى داعش زياتر خۆيان لە سوپايەكى نىزامى دەولەتدا رىكخستووہ لەسەر بەشكى زۆرى خاكى سووريا و عىراق. پارەيەكى كاشى زۆريان لەدەستە لەگەل ئەو چەكە ئەمرىكايەنى كە سوپا ھەلاتووہەكى عىراق بۆى جىيەشتوون. پېشروپيە سەربازىيەكانى ئەم دوپيەى گرووپەكە واىكردووہ عەرمبە سوننەكان داعش و رۆليان بە گەرنە تەمەشا بەكەن. لەلەيەكى دىكەوہ، كەسبىش لەم ناوچەيە ناىوئەت لايەنگرى لاوازەكان بەكات. ئەو توئىژمەرائەى چاودىرىي ئەم شتەنە دەكەن، پېشروپيەكانى داعش بە "رووداويكى چاودرواننەكراو" ناودەبەن. رەنگە ئەمەرو ئەو جەدبەترىن ھەمەشە بىت بۆ تەواى ناوچەكە .

ھەموو ئەو توئىژمە و رۆژنامەنووس و ئەكادىميەنى چاودىرىي ئەم بارودۆخە دەكەن، گەيشتوونەتە ئەو باوەرەى كە دەبىت: ھىزە عەلمانىيەكانى كوردستان دەبى پرچەك بەكرىن كە ئىستا رووبەرووى داعش دەبەنەوہ. بەھوى بىرىنى بودجەكەيان لەلەيەن بەغدا و نەبوونى ھىچ يارمەتییەكى سەربازى، كوردى عىراق تووشى شەكست بوون لەبەرامبەر ئەو ھەموو چەك و تەقەمەنيە پېشكەوتووہى ئەمرىكا كە لە دەستى داعشدايە. كوردى سووريا پېشروپيەكانى كردووہ بۆ يارمەتيدانى كوردى عىراق لە دژى داعش، بەلام ئەوانىش ھىچ يارمەتییەكانى پېنەگەيشتووہ سەرمەراى ئەوہى بۆماوہى دوو سالا لە سووريا لە دژى داعش شەردەكەن .

ھەموو ئەمانە بەرھەمى سىياسەتەكانى ئۆبامان، نەيارە كۆمارىيەكانى كەمەك لەو باشتر دەرگەم، رەنگە ئەوانىش يان بەباشى تەنەگەن لەوہى چى دەگوزمەئى حالى حازر، يان نايانەوئ جەنگەكەى سالى 2003 وەبىرى خەلگ بەيئەنەوہ. خۆبەدوورگرتنى ئۆباما و پەشتگويخستنى كېشەكانى عىراق، سەرتەشەيەك كە ھەرگىز نەبووشتووہ مامەلەى لەگەل بەكات، واى كرد سىياسەتەكان بۆ بىرۆكراتەكانى وەزارەتى دەرەوہ جىيەنلەيت. ئەولەياتى ئەمانىش سەلماندى ئەمەيە كە ھەلە نەبوون لە پەشتگىريە بى مەرجەكانيان بۆ ماليكى لەماوہى ئەو ھەموو سالا. لەبەرى راوستانەوہ لەدژى كۆمەلەكوژى و ئەو ھەمەشە گەرمەيەى لەسەر ھەموو كەسەكە، زياتر جەخت دەكەنە سەر پاراستنى "يەكپارچەيى خاك"ى ولەتيك كە ئىستا ھەر بەناو بوونى ھەيە.

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راستىيەكە دەربارەى كۆبانى

لەلەيەن دەپقيد رۆمانو 2014/10/15

لەم ھەفتەيدا كۆلۆمنىوسى گاردیان، دەپقيد گەرمەيەر لە وتارىكدا دۆخى كوردى سووريا و گەمارۆدانى كۆبانى بە شەرى ناوخۆى نىسپانىا بەراورد دەكات: "لە شەرى سووريا دا ئەزموننىكى ديموكراتيك لەلەيەن داعشەوہ دەخريئە ژىر پى. ئەوہش كە جىهان بى ناگايە بۆخۆى سەكەندالەكە ."

ھەروەكو چۆن شۆرشگىرانى نىسپانى ھىزى ژنانيان دروست كرد و سەربازى ژنيان ناردە بەرەكانى جەنگ، يەكەنەكانى پاراستنى گەل (پەپەگە)ش ھەمان كار دەكەن .

ئىستا شەرقانى يەپەگە بە چەكە سووگەمەكانيانەوہ مأل بە مأل شەرى فاشىستەكانى دەولەتى ئىسلامى لە عىراق و شام دەكەن. شەرقانى يەپەگە شەردەكەن بۆ ئەوہى خاكى خۆيان بپارىزن و ھۆكۆمەتەكى ديموكراتيك بپارىزن- ھۆكۆمەتەك كە نەك ھەر تەنيا كوردى پاراستووہ و بەھىزى كردوون، بەلكو بووئە پەناگە بۆ تورەكان، كرەستيان، عەرمب و كەمەنەكانى دىكەش. پارتى يەكەتتى ديموكراتى كە ھىزەكانى يەپەگە بەرئەدەبات، ھەروەكو شۆرشگىرە نىسپانىيەكان و زۆر شۆرشى دىكەى دنيا فرىشتە نين. ئەوان تۆمەتى ئەمەيان دەدريئە پال كە رىگە لە پارتى سىياسى دىكە دەگەرن، واتە ئەو پارتانەى كە لەلەيەن تورەكيا و ئەمرىكا و كوردى عىراقەوہ پەشتگىرى دەكرىن. ئەوان ھەروەھا پەيوەندى تۆرگەيى بەھىزيان لەگەل پارتى كرەكرانى كوردستان (پەكەكە) ھەيە .

بەلام كوردى سووريا ھەرشيان نەكردووئە سەر ھىچ لايەنەك، جگە لەو ئىسلاميانەى كە دەيانەوئەت خاكەكەيان داگىر بەكەن. ئەوان تەنەت داواى دەولەتى كوردى و جىابوونەوہ لە سوورياش ناكەن. لەبەرى ئەو ھۆكۆمەتەكى لۆكالىان لە ھەرسى كەنتونى كۆبانى و جىزىرە و عفرىن دروستكردووہ. ئەو سى كەنتونە وەكو ھەرمەتەكى ديموكراتيك و لىبەروردە لەناو گەردەملولى شەرى ناوخۆى

سوورپادا دەرکەوتتووه. بەیئى یاساكانى پەیمەدە خوڤان، ھەموو بەرئوبەر ایهتیهکان پنیویستە بەرپرسی پیاو و ژنیان ھەبیت و ھەموو کەمینە ناینیپەکانى ناوچەکە لە بریار داندە بەشدار بکەن .

بەئێ ھەر لەم کاتەمە کە لە سالى 2012 دەسەلاتى لۆکالییان دامەزراند، ئەمریکا و ئەوروپا و نزیکەى ھەموو دەولەتە "پیشکەوتوو" مکائى جیھان کوردی سووریان پشنگوئى خستوو. گرەبەر دەپرسیت: "ئەگەر لە جیھانى ئەمڕۆدا ھاوشیو ھەیکى فرانکو ھەبیت، فرانکو ھەیکى بە ساختە ناینپەرور و بکوژ جگە لە داعش دەبێ کێ بێت؟ ئەگەر ھاوشیو ھەیکى موھیریس لیبریس (ژنانى نازاد) ی ئیسپانیا ھەبیت، دەبیت کێ بێت جگە لەم ژنە نازیانەى کە لە سەنگەر مکائى بەرگریان لە کۆبانى؟ ئایا جیھان و لە ھەموو خراپتر رەوتى چەپی نیودەولەتى، بێدەنگ دەبن و رینگە دەدەن میژوو خۆی دووبارە بکاتەو؟"

پێدەچیت زۆر کەس دووبارەبونەوى میژوویان بویت، بەیئى ئەم ھەلخەلەتاندنە بێت کە کاربەدەستانى واشنتن و ئەنکەرە دەیانەویت دەر خواردى ئیمەى بدن، ئەوان دەلێن چەک بە "چەکدارە میانرەمەکانى سووریا" دەدەن. بەلام زۆرەى ئەم میانرەوانەى کە ئەوان چەکیان پێدەدەن شتیکى زۆر کەم لە داعش توندرووترن. بەلام ئەگەر کوردە ھەلمانیپەکانى سووریا چەکیان بویت، ئەو واشنتن و ئەنکەرە پێیان دەلێن دەبیت واز لە داواکاریى ئوتۆتۆمى و ھۆکمی خۆجیئى و مافى کورد و کەمینەکانى دیکە بێنن. واز ھێنان لەم داواکاریانە ئینجا دەیانکات بە میانرەمە بۆئەوى بەشدارى شەڕێک بن کە تێیدا دیکتاتۆریەتى ھەلەوى ھەربى بگۆرن بۆ دیکتاتۆریەكى سوننى ھەربى .

کاتێک کە ئەمریکا دەستیکرد بە ھێرشە ئاسمانیپەکانى لە سووریا، ھەموو ئەم ناوچانەى کە داعشى تێدا بوو بۆردومانى دەکرد تەنیا لەم شونانەدا نەبیت کە گەمارۆى کوردی سووریان داو. داعش بەجێ دوودلێ تانک و چەکەکانى کە لە عێراق دەستى بەسەر دا گرتبوون لە دەورووبەرى کۆبانى دەسووراندەو، ھەر چەندە ئەم تانک و ھەمەرانە بە ئاسانى لەلاین فرۆکە رۆژناواییپەکانەو دەکرێنە ئامانج. رۆژنامەنووسان لەدیوى سنوورەو ھەموو دیمەنەکیان بە قیدیۆ گرتوو، تا ئەوکاتەى کە سەربازە تورکەکان بە گازی فرمیسکرێز بلاقەیان پێدەکەن. دواچار کە لەم ھەفتەیدا فرۆکە ئەمریکیەکان لە دەورووبەرى کۆبانى ھێرشیان کردە سەر مۆلگەکانى داعش، لە کاتێکدا کە نیتەر شارەکە وردە وردە دەکوتە دەستى جیھادیپەکان، بە خەلکى دەکوئرا کە تورکیا داواى لە ئەمریکیپەکان کردوو شتێک بکات بۆ ئەوى ھاوکارى ئەم شارە گەمارۆ دراوہ بکات .

بەلام زۆر پێدەچیت کە ئەمریکیپەکان دواچار بریاریان دا بێت شتێک بکەن پێچەوانەى ھەزى تورکیا بێت. لە کۆبانى داعش خەریکە سەرکەوتنێکى گەورە تۆمار بکات، ئەمەش بۆ ھەلمەتەکەى ئۆباما باش نییە. رەنگە بە تورکیایان گوتبێت وا خۆمان دەرەمخەین کە پرسیمان پێکەردن. چونکە ئەگەر تورکیا بەراستى ویستبێت لە داعش بدرێت لە دەورووبەرى کۆبانى، ئەمە خۆی دەیتوانى لە داعش بدات، خۆ داعش تەنیا چەند سەد مەترێک لە سنوورەکانیپە دوورە. ھەر چەند گوشت تۆپێک کارىگەریپەکی بێ وێنەى دەبوو. یان ھیچ نەبیت ئەنکەرە دەیتوانى رینگە بە ھێزەکانى پێشمەرگە بدات بە خاکی تورکیادا بچنە ھاوکارى کۆبانى، ھەروەکو چۆن پەیمەدە ھاوکارى کرد لە عێراق. بزارەى زۆر باشتر لەبەردەستدا ھەن بۆ ھاوکارىکردنى کۆبانى، وەکو لەوى کە شارەکە بە گەمارۆ دراوى بێنیتەو یان ھیزی زەمینى تورکیا بچیت بۆ دروستکردنى ناوچەى ئارام. ئەم ناوچە ئارامەى کە بۆ تێکدانى ئوتۆتۆمى کوردی سووریا دەبیت زیاتر لە ھەر شتیکى دیکە .

ئەنکەرە ھێشتا ھەر دەلێت کە ئەم دژی داعشە، تەنەت لە کاتێکدا کە داعش چەکدار لە تورکیاوە دەھینیت و نەوتە قاچاخەکەى بە خاکی تورکیادا رەوانە دەکات، ھەموو سالیێک سەدان کورد دەخزێنە زیندانەو لەبەر بە قاچاخ بردنى جگەرە لە سنوورە شاخاویپەکانى ئێران و عێراقەو، بەلام نابینن قاچاخچەیکى داعش لە سنوورى تەختى ئێوان سووریا و تورکیادا بگێریت. لەبەرى ئەوہ تورکیا رینگە لە ناردنى خواردن و خواردنەو بۆ بەرگریکاران لە کۆبانى دەگریت. لەھەمان کاتیشدا وا خۆی پێشان دەدات کە نایەویت کۆبانى بکەوێتە دەست داعش .

مانگی ئادارى 2013 پەکەکە شەرى خۆی لە دژی ئەنکەرە راگرت و دەستى بە گفتوگۆى ناشتى کرد لەگەڵ تورکیا. کەچى ھەفتەى رابردوو سەرۆک ئەردوگان گوتى بۆ تورکیا ئیرووریستەکانى داعش و پەکەکە ھەمان شتن. ئەگەر ئەوہ راست بێت، کەوايە باشتر وایە ھاوکارى چەکدارە کوردەکان بکړیت نەک رینگەیان لێ بگێریت، تا لە سنوورى تورکیا بچنە دەرەو بۆ سووریا و پارێزگارى لە کۆبانى بکەن.

## **Appendix-B-**

The Excel sheets which are used for the analysis of the corpus are all put on a CD and are available with this thesis.