


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<1947/c>	otherwise better than Richard's own. But that still left Edward IV's second son, Richard duke of York, who was in sanctuary with his mother and did not emerge until 16 June. One recent solution to this apparent illogicality was an attempt to reorder the two key events, so that the removal of York from sanctuary preceded the execution of Hastings. But this, although attractively tidy, is also clearly incorrect. For all its problems, the traditional order must stand. It is this which strengthens claims that Richard's usurpation was a series of panic responses rather than a coherent scheme. But this is not the only explanation. It is possible that Richard's letter to York did mark the beginning of a planned chain of events but that something then forced his hand and he found himself having to deal with Hastings before his plans had matured. What the 'something' was can only be speculation. News of Richard's letter to York may have leaked out and alerted Hastings. Or perhaps Gloucester had simply discovered that Hastings' distaste for Woodville authority would not, after all, extend to the deposition of Edward V. Mancini, as well as later sources, has references to Gloucester sounding out the loyalty of Hastings and others, and a clumsy enquiry may have alerted Hastings to the duke's intentions as well as warning Gloucester that Hastings would not co-operate. Whatever one's interpretation of these events, however, attempts to explain away the chronological oddity of the attack on Hastings should not be allowed to obscure the fact that in practice it did not stop Richard taking control of the duke of York. It is even possible that Gloucester's claims of another plot against him were intended not only to justify Hastings' removal but to impress the council with the gravity of the situation and make them more disposed, not less, to back Gloucester's leadership as the one hope of stability in a worsening political climate. With hindsight, the Crowland chronicler goes further and sees Hastings' death as a cynical move pour encourager les autres : 'with the rest of [Edward IV's] faithful men expecting something similar these two dukes thereafter did what they wanted'. But if the death of Hastings was a sign that Gloucester had made up his mind to take the throne, this was not yet something which could be admitted. In public, the duke continued to make plans for the coronation of Edward V, still scheduled for 22 June. At some point over the weekend of 14-15 June, Gloucester persuaded the council that the presence of York was needed for the coronation. On Monday 16 June the council, including Thomas Bourghier ,
	
<p>Key:</p> <p>Footprint ConEn1 Footprint ConEn2 Footprint ConEn3</p>	
	<p>archbishop of Canterbury</p>
	<p>and John Russell of Lincoln, duly waited on the queen at Westminster and persuaded her to hand over York. Neither Gloucester nor Buckingham put in an appearance until the surrender was safely accomplished, and the inference is that the business had been left to Bourghier, a respected elder statesman, as a demonstration of Gloucester's good faith. That Elizabeth Woodville submitted is therefore perhaps not very surprising. She was probably prepared to trust the cardinal archbishop when he undertook to guarantee her son's safety and, even if she had doubts, she may have preferred an arrangement involving Bourghier to the</p>

risk of forcing Gloucester into unilateral action. It is more surprising that **Bourgchier** accepted the role of go-between. Mancini suggests that it was to prevent Gloucester breaking sanctuary, and there are other indications that the duke was prepared to resort to force if negotiation failed. The Crowland chronicler goes further and states bluntly that **Bourgchier** was compelled to play his part. Either may be true. But it is possible that both views were influenced by hindsight and that matters seemed less clear-cut at the time. Since Gloucester's arrival in London he had seemed to offer the stability which the council wanted. They may simply not yet have accepted that Gloucester now had his own ambitions beyond the preservation of his brother's polity. Even if the unwelcome possibility was beginning to dawn on them, they may not have wanted to be the first to break the consensus. **Bourgchier** may well have thought, as Mancini implies in a narrower context, that to co-operate with the duke rather than opposing him still offered the best hope of warding off disaster. If this were the case, the council must have been rapidly undeceived. Later the same day, Gloucester issued writs of supersedeas cancelling the parliament summoned for 25 June. He also postponed the coronation of Edward V until 9 November. From this point contemporaries recognized that Richard was moving to take the throne. Business began to wind down as men tacitly awaited the new regime. In the signet office, the last dated document to survive was issued on 11 June. Here business was likely to have been dislocated by the arrest of the king's secretary Oliver King on 13 June, but departments without that problem show a comparable running down of business. The last grants to pass the great seal (although others were in the pipeline) were the appointments of the chief baron of the exchequer and two serjeants at law on 14 and 15 June - a last attempt by the establishment to pretend that it was business as normal. This prompt response to political crisis reflects the fact that the progress of grants through the system relied on the initiative of