Silencing and assertion

Tanesini, Alessandra ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6250-471X 2019. Silencing and assertion. Goldberg, Sanford, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, (10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.31)

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Abstract

Theories of assertion must explain how silencing is possible. This chapter defends an account of assertion in terms of normative commitments on the grounds that it provides the most plausible analysis of how individuals might be silenced when attempting to make assertions. The chapter first offers an account of the nature of silencing and defends the view that it can occur even in contexts where speakers’ communicative intentions are understood by their audience. Second, it outlines some of the normative commitments characteristic of assertion when used in the speech act of telling;. This commitment view of assertion is then used to explain silencing as a matter of being deprived of the ability to make some of the commitments one is trying to acquire. Finally, the main rivals of the commitment view of assertion endorsed here are shown to be unable to account for silencing, at least when they are considered in their purest form.

Item Type:	Book Section
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Uncontrolled Keywords:	silencing, assertion, discursive injustice, normative commitment, communicative intention
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	18 September 2018
Last Modified:	24 Oct 2022 07:12
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/114339

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