Sartre’s transcendental phenomenology

Webber, Jonathan ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0529-5349 2018. Sartre’s transcendental phenomenology. Zahavi, Dan, ed. The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology, Oxford Handbooks, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 286-301.

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Abstract

The first phase of Sartre’s philosophical publications is marked by an apparent ambivalence towards Husserl’s transcendental turn. Sartre accepts both major aspects of that turn, the phenomenological reduction and the use of transcendental argumentation. Yet his rejection of the transcendental ego that Husserl derives from this transcendental turn overlooks an obvious transcendental argument in favour of it. His books on emotion and imagination, moreover, make only very brief comments about the transcendental constitution of the world of experience. In each case, these appear at the end of the book and can seem to contradict the book’s central analysis. The problem underlying these features of his works of phenomenological psychology is clarified and resolved, however, when Sartre articulates his own transcendental phenomenology and ontology in Being and Nothingness a decade after he first encountered the work of Husserl. This resolution raises a new problem that animates the next phase of his philosophy.

Item Type:	Book Section
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
ISBN:	9780198755340
Last Modified:	24 Oct 2022 07:43
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/115739

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