Sex

Webber, Jonathan ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0529-5349 2009. Sex. Philosophy 84 (2) , pp. 233-250. 10.1017/S0031819109000205

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Abstract

The sexual domain is unified only by the phenomenal quality of the occurrence of the desires, activities, and pleasures it includes. There is no conceptual restriction on the range of intentional objects those desires, activities, and pleasures can take. Neither is there good conceptual reason to privilege any class of them as paradigmatic. Since the quality unifying the sexual is not morally significant, the morality of sexuality is no different from morality in general. The view that participant consent is morally sufficient in the sexual domain therefore requires the more controversial view that it is morally sufficient in general.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Additional Information:	Pdf uploaded in accordance with publisher's policy at http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/0031-8191/ (accessed 24/02/2014).
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
ISSN:	0031-8191
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	30 March 2016
Last Modified:	03 May 2023 08:48
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/11773

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