Perception and action: The taste test

Gray, Richard ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6923-6183 and Tanesini, Alessandra ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6250-471X 2010. Perception and action: The taste test. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241) , pp. 718-734. 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.651.x

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Abstract

Traditional accounts of perception endorse an input–output model: perception is the input from world to mind and action is the output from mind to world. In contrast, enactive accounts propose action to be constitutive of perception. We focus on Noë's sensorimotor version of enactivism, with the aim of clarifying the proper limits of enactivism more generally. Having explained Noë's particular version of enactivism, which accounts for the contents of perceptual experience in terms of sensorimotor knowledge, we use taste as a test for his central thesis. We conclude that taste and other similar senses do not display the central features which Noë claims apply to all perceptual experience.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Publisher:	John Wiley & Sons
ISSN:	0031-8094
Last Modified:	06 Jan 2024 03:05
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/11821

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