Sartre's critique of Husserl

Webber, Jonathan ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0529-5349 2020. Sartre's critique of Husserl. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (1) , pp. 155-176. 10.1080/09608788.2019.1591339

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Abstract

This paper articulates a new understanding of Sartre’s philosophical methodology in his early publications up to and including Being and Nothingness. Through his critique of Husserl across these works, Sartre develops an original and sophisticated variety of transcendental phenomenology. He was attracted to Husserl’s philosophy for its promise to establish the foundations of empirical psychology but ultimately concluded that it could not fulfil this promise. Through the analyses that led him to this conclusion, Sartre formulated a new kind of phenomenological reduction and a distinctive kind of transcendental argument to draw conclusions about mind-independent reality from phenomenological premises. His aims were to dissolve the traditional distinction between mind and world, to establish that the mind is accessible to empirical study, and to formulate the conceptual framework required to study the mind systematically. Sartre’s philosophy of psychology, therefore, drove the philosophical development of the methodological foundation of his philosophical project.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Uncontrolled Keywords:	phenomenology, ontology, transcendental, method
Publisher:	Taylor & Francis
ISSN:	0960-8788
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	1 March 2019
Date of Acceptance:	4 March 2019
Last Modified:	07 Nov 2023 03:58
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/120097

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