The empirical case for moral beauty

Paris, Panos ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2549-1075 2018. The empirical case for moral beauty. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4) , pp. 642-656. 10.1080/00048402.2017.1411374

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Abstract

Although formative of modern value theory, the moral beauty view—which states that moral virtue is beautiful and moral vice is ugly—is now mostly neglected by (analytic) philosophers. The two contemporary defences of the view mostly capitalize on its intuitive attractiveness, but to little avail: such considerations hardly convince sceptics of what is nowadays a rather unpopular view. Historically, the view was supported by thought experiments; and although these greatly increase its plausibility, they also raise empirical questions, which they leave unanswered. Here, I offer a novel defence of the moral beauty view, capitalizing on empirical evidence and arguing via an inference to the best explanation.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Taylor & Francis
ISSN:	0004-8402
Last Modified:	26 Oct 2022 07:38
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/125358

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