Swiss land improvement syndicates: 'Impure' Coasian solutions?

Shahab, Sina ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3788-2564 and Viallon, François-Xavier 2021. Swiss land improvement syndicates: 'Impure' Coasian solutions? Planning Theory 20 (1) , pp. 44-62. 10.1177/1473095220923629

PDF - Accepted Post-Print Version Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives. Download (728kB)

Abstract

An increasing number of planners have explored the implication of Coase Theorem for planning theory and practice. As there are often a large and dispersed number of actors involved in planning issues, the application of ‘Pure’ Coasian solutions has proved to be limited. However, some studies argue that when the conditions for a ‘Pure’ Coasian solution do not exist, ‘Impure’ Coasian solutions may still be achievable. This paper examines how, when conditions of ‘Impure’ Coasian solutions are available, local authorities in Switzerland use Land Improvement Syndicates (LIS) as a policy instrument in order to achieve negotiated solutions in relation to development processes involving multiple landowners. With a syndicate in the commune of Cheseaux as an illustrative example, the paper analyses how this policy instrument has been utilised to reduce transaction costs, correct information asymmetries, and clarify property rights. The focus has been on an interpretation of the Coasian Theorem that identifies attempts to reduce transaction costs and clarify property rights as the main roles of governments or local authorities.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Geography and Planning (GEOPL)
Publisher:	SAGE Publications (UK and US)
ISSN:	1473-0952
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	21 February 2020
Date of Acceptance:	17 February 2020
Last Modified:	26 Nov 2024 23:30
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/129892

Citation Data

Cited 9 times in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item