Sartre's phenomenological psychology of imagination

Webber, Jonathan ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0529-5349 2020. Sartre's phenomenological psychology of imagination. The Sartrean Mind, Routledge Philosophical Minds, Abingdon: Routledge,

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Abstract

Two interrelated puzzles about Sartre’s theory of imagination as presented in The Imaginary concern the role of affectivity in imagination and the role of imagination in perception. If we respond affectively to what we perceive but not to what we imagine, as Sartre claims, then what explains the commonplace belief that we can learn how we would feel about something by imagining it? If imagination and perception are mutually exclusive, as Sartre maintains throughout the book, then how can imagination be essential to perception, as he claims at the end? This chapter sharpens these puzzles by clarifying Sartre’s account of the characteristics and structure of imagination and his distinction between genuine and imaginary affectivity. This indicates how the puzzles are to be resolved. Ordinary perception is essentially shaped by prior acts of imagination. The need for consonance between the affective and informational components in imagination grounds and delimits our ability to learn about our feelings by imagining. The chapter concludes by identifying this theory’s implicit developmental perspective.

Item Type:	Book Section
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Publisher:	Routledge
ISBN:	9781138295698
Last Modified:	07 Nov 2022 09:58
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/130757

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