The two sterling crises of 1964 and the decision not to devalue

Newton, Scott 2009. The two sterling crises of 1964 and the decision not to devalue. Economic History Review 62 (1) , pp. 73-98. 10.1111/j.1468-0289.2007.00431.x

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Abstract

Conventional wisdom is critical of the newly elected Labour government's reaction to external financial difficulties in the autumn of 1964. Anxious about its political position, it avoided the necessary measures, involving stringent deflation and possibly devaluation. This article seeks to revise the traditional view by re-examining the response to what were actually two sterling crises. The first was handled efficiently. The second was provoked by speculation stemming from market expectations of devaluation. The decision not to devalue but seek external support was justifiable, given changes within the international economy which were to create problems for many postwar nation states.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	History, Archaeology and Religion
Subjects:	D History General and Old World > D History (General) > D839 Post-war History, 1945 on H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
Publisher:	John Wiley & Sons
ISSN:	0013-0117
Last Modified:	04 Jun 2017 02:54
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/13694

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