El Diri, Malek, King, Timothy, Spokeviciute, Laima ![]() |
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110098
Abstract
We investigate earnings management (EM) behaviour at failed banks by examining the intensity and direction of EM around FDIC-insured commercial bank failures. Our empirical analysis indicates that failing banks engage in EM to a significantly greater extent than non-failing banks. Our results show that failing banks’ discretion over loan loss provisions ranges from aggressive (upwards EM) to conservative (downwards EM).
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | Business (Including Economics) |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
ISSN: | 0165-1765 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 27 January 2022 |
Date of Acceptance: | 1 October 2021 |
Last Modified: | 21 Nov 2024 14:15 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/146804 |
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