Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game

Dokka, Trivikram, Moulin, Hervé, Ray, Indrajit ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5254-3144 and SenGupta, Sonali 2023. Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game. Review of Economic Design 27 , pp. 419-438. 10.1007/s10058-022-00299-2

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Abstract

As in public good provisions, in a public bad situation such as abatement, the non-cooperative interplay of the participants typically results in low levels of quantities (provision or abatement). In a simple class of n-person quadratic games, we show how Coarse correlated equilibria, using simple mediation devices, can significantly outperform Nash equilibrium outcomes in terms of a stated policy objective.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Schools > Business (Including Economics)
Additional Information:	This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	1434-4742
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	5 April 2022
Date of Acceptance:	7 March 2022
Last Modified:	31 May 2023 04:45
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/149069

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