Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information

Ganguly, Chirantan and Ray, Indrajit ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5254-3144 2023. Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information. International Journal of Game Theory 10.1007/s00182-023-00857-0

Preview

PDF - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (495kB) | Preview

Abstract

We consider a version of the Battle of the Sexes with private information and allow cheap talk regarding the players’ types before the game. We show that a desirable type-coordination property is achieved at the unique fully revealing symmetric equilibrium (when it exists). Type-coordination is also obtained in a partially revealing equilibrium that exists when the fully revealing equilibrium does not. We further prove that truthfully revealed messages, followed by actions that depend meaningfully on these messages, are not equilibrium profiles with one-sided cheap talk. Finally, fully revealing equilibria do not exist under sequential communication either.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Published Online
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0020-7276
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	13 June 2023
Date of Acceptance:	12 April 2023
Last Modified:	04 Jul 2023 17:12
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/160332

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item