Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction

Gonçalves, Ricardo and Ray, Indrajit ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5254-3144 2024. Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction. Review of Economic Design 28 (1) , pp. 125-150. 10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7

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Abstract

We consider the set-up of a Japanese–English auction with exogenously fixed discrete bid levels for a specific game (the wallet game with two bidders, following Gonçalves and Ray in Econ Lett 159:177–179, 2017). We show that in this auction, partition equilibria exist that may be separating or pooling. We illustrate separating and pooling equilibria in games with two and three discrete bid levels and compare the revenues of the seller from these equilibria to find the optimal bid levels for these cases.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	1434-4742
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	2 August 2023
Date of Acceptance:	7 July 2023
Last Modified:	13 Feb 2024 12:02
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/161366

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