Habermasian constructivism: an alternative to the constitutivist argument

Rees, Dafydd Huw 2020. Habermasian constructivism: an alternative to the constitutivist argument. Kantian Review 25 (4) , pp. 675-698. 10.1017/S1369415420000382

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Abstract

Jürgen Habermas’ discourse theory of morality should be understood, in metaethical terms, as a constructivist theory. All constructivist theories face a Euthyphro-like dilemma arising from how they classify the constraints on their metaethical construction procedures: are they moral or non-moral? Many varieties of Kantian constructivism, such as Christine Korsgaard’s, classify the constraints as moral, albeit constitutive of human reason and agency in general. However, this constitutivist strategy is vulnerable to David Enoch’s ‘shmagency’ objection. The discourse theory of morality, by classifying the constraints on the metaethical construction procedure (principles (D) and (U)) as non-moral, can avoid this problem.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
ISSN:	1369-4154
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	7 January 2024
Date of Acceptance:	2020
Last Modified:	29 Jan 2024 17:15
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/165329

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