A characterisation of trading equilibria in strategic market games

Mitra, Manipushpak, Ray, Indrajit ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5254-3144 and Roy, Souvik 2024. A characterisation of trading equilibria in strategic market games. [Working Paper]. CRETA, Department of Economics, University of Warwick.

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Abstract

For a strategic market game (as introduced by Shapley and Shubik), following Dubey and Rogawski (1990), we provide a full explicit characterisation of the set of trading equilibria (in which all goods are traded at a positive price), for both the “buy and sell” and the “buy or sell” versions of this model under standard assumptions on the utility functions. We interpret and illustrate our equilibrium-characterising conditions; we also provide simple examples of trading equilibria, including those of non-interior strategy profiles (in which at least one trader is using the whole endowment in at least one good or money).

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Status:	Unpublished
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	CRETA, Department of Economics, University of Warwick
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	29 January 2024
Last Modified:	29 Jan 2024 15:00
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/165875

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