“Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots

Forges, Françoise and Ray, Indrajit ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5254-3144 2024. “Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots. Journal of Mathematical Economics 114 , 103044. 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103044

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Abstract

The very first paper published in the Journal of Mathematical Economics, “Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”, by Aumann, proposes a new approach to strategic form games by taking account of an extraneous space of states of the world, on which every player has a subjective probability distribution and private information. We review some of Aumann’s results as well as some properties and extensions of the best known by-product of his seminal paper, the “correlated equilibrium”.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Additional Information:	License information from Publisher: LICENSE 1: URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, Start Date: 2024-08-03
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0304-4068
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	12 August 2024
Date of Acceptance:	25 July 2024
Last Modified:	03 Sep 2024 13:45
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/171316

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