Banker directors on board and corporate tax avoidance

Song, Qian, Ding, Wenjie, Hasan, Iftekhar and Wang, Qingwei ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3695-7846 2024. Banker directors on board and corporate tax avoidance. Journal of Empirical Finance 79 , 101551. 10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101551 Item availability restricted.

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Abstract

We investigate how shareholder-debtholder conflict of interest affects the corporate tax avoidance using a unique setting of the affiliated and unaffiliated commercial bankers’ board representation. Consistent with the notion that board representation grants lenders’ access to private information that helps monitor and influence firms’ tax practice, we find that appointments of affiliated banker directors significantly reduce firms’ tax avoidance behavior, while appointing unaffiliated banker directors shows no such effect. The impact of affiliated banker directors on alleviating tax avoidance is stronger among firms with severer conflict of interest between shareholders and debtholders, specifically among firms with weaker corporate governance, higher financial leverage and higher CEO stock ownership.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0927-5398
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	13 September 2024
Date of Acceptance:	7 September 2024
Last Modified:	08 Nov 2024 07:15
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/171917

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