Frames, Reasons, and Rationality

Fisher, Sarah 2022. Frames, Reasons, and Rationality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (2) , pp. 162-173. 10.1080/09672559.2022.2057685

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Abstract

1. Agamemnon’s Dilemma In his recent book, Frame It Again: New Tools for Rational Decision-Making, J. L. Bermúdez argues that it can be rational to evaluate the same thing differently when it is described using alternative ‘frames’. His central example, taken from the eponymous play, sees Agamemnon leading the Greek fleet against Troy, to avenge the abduction of Helen by Paris. Agamemnon is faced with the following dilemma: While the fleet is becalmed at Aulis, the prophet Calchas interprets a portent – two eagles swooping down to kill and eat a pregnant hare. As Calchas interprets the portent, it reflects the displeasure of the goddess Artemis at the prospect of innocents being killed at Troy. The lack of wind has the same source. The only solution, says Calchas, is for Agamemnon to sacrifice to the goddess his own daughter Iphigenia. (Bermúdez Citation2020, 7) Bermúdez makes the following observation (noting his apologies to Aeschylus for the prosaic gloss!): There is a single option, bringing about the death of Iphigenia, that Agamemnon frames in two different ways – as Murdering his Daughter, on the one hand, and as Following Artemis’s Will, on the other. His alternative is Failing his Ships and People (by refusing to make the sacrifice). (Bermúdez Citation2020, 7) Crucially, Agamemnon’s preferences are sensitive to how he frames the killing of Iphigenia: He certainly prefers Following Artemis’s Will to Failing his Ships and People. At the same time, though, he prefers Failing his Ships and People to Murdering his Daughter. But he knows, of course, that Following Artemis’s Will and Murdering his Daughter are the same outcome, differently framed. (Bermúdez Citation2020, 7-8) The key question is whether Agamemnon’s preferences can be rational here. Bermúdez makes the bold claim that they can. In what follows, I will present a critique of Bermúdez’s argument, before pointing towards a potentially more promising route to the same conclusion. The structure of the paper is as follows: §2 recaps the key notions of ‘framing’, ‘frame’, and ‘framing effect’. §3 explains why framing effects are standardly held to violate rational decision-making. §4 summarises Bermúdez’s argument against that standard view. §5 presents objections to his argument. §6 introduces an alternative – pragmatic – approach. §7 sketches how this might be applied to Agamemnon’s dilemma. I conclude that, while the jury is still out on whether Agamemnon’s preferences are ultimately rationalisable, a pragmatic approach looks more promising than the one Bermúdez pursues.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Taylor and Francis Group
ISSN:	1466-4542
Last Modified:	23 Sep 2024 12:30
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/172183

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