Antidumping regulations: anti-competitive and anti-export

Collie, David Robert ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3132-648X and Le, Vo Phuong Mai ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3374-9694 2010. Antidumping regulations: anti-competitive and anti-export. Review of International Economics 18 (5) , pp. 796-806. 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2010.00891.x

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Abstract

In a Bertrand duopoly model, it is shown that an antidumping regulation can be strategically exploited by the home firm to reduce the degree of competition in the home market. The home firm commits not to export to the foreign market which gives the foreign firm a monopoly in its own market. As a result the foreign firm will increase its price allowing the home firm to increase its price and its profits. If the products are sufficiently close substitutes then the higher profits in the home market are large enough to compensate for the loss of profits on exports.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Publisher:	Wiley Blackwell
ISSN:	0965-7576
Last Modified:	18 Oct 2022 14:31
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/17822

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