Coordination by sunspots: letter is mightier than colour.

Bone, John, Drouvelis, Michalis, Georgalos, Konstantinos and Ray, Indrajit ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5254-3144 2026. Coordination by sunspots: letter is mightier than colour. Economics Working Paper Series Lancaster University, Department of Economics, LUMS.

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Abstract

We set up an experiment to test whether players use a payoff-irrelevant public message (BLUE or RED) as a possible sunspot to coordinate in a Battle of the Sexes game in which the pure strategies are labelled as X and Y. We find that most players do not play a "sunspot equilibrium"; instead, they learn to coordinate on a particular focal point (pure strategy X) in the game, largely ignoring the presence of the public signal (colour), and stick to this focal point, even after the public signal is withdrawn. Colour-contingent play emerges in only two of the six matching groups, which adopt opposite mappings.

Item Type:	Working paper
Date Type:	Submission
Status:	Submitted
Schools:	Schools > Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	Lancaster University, Department of Economics, LUMS
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	27 October 2026
Last Modified:	27 Oct 2026 14:28
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/190393

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