Alharbi, Karima
2025.
Determinants of voluntary interim reporting frequency in the UK: Firm characteristics, CEO myopia, and board governance after post-deregulation.
PhD Thesis,
Cardiff University.
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Abstract
This thesis examines the determinants of voluntary interim reporting frequency (IRF) among UK listed firms following the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) 2014 deregulation that removed mandatory quarterly reporting. This regulatory change transformed interim reporting from a compliance-driven requirement into a discretionary managerial choice, creating a distinctive institutional setting in which firms’ reporting behaviour reflects strategic disclosure decisions rather than regulatory obligation. Drawing on an integrated theoretical framework combining agency theory, signalling theory, upper echelons theory, and corporate governance perspectives, the study develops a multi-level approach to analyse how firm-level economic incentives, CEO behavioural characteristics particularly CEO myopia and board-level governance mechanisms jointly shape voluntary interim reporting frequency. The framework explicitly recognises that disclosure decisions are influenced not only by firm fundamentals, but also by managerial time horizons and the effectiveness of board oversight in a voluntary reporting environment. The empirical analysis is based on an unbalanced panel of UK FTSE All-Share non financial firms over the period 2015–2022. After excluding financial firms and observations with incomplete data, the final sample comprises 311 firms and 1,989 firm-year observations. Interim reporting frequency is manually collected from firms’ disclosures and operationalised as an ordinal measure capturing the number of interim reports issued within a financial year. Ordered logistic regression is employed as the primary estimation technique, with year and industry fixed effects included to control for temporal and sectoral heterogeneity. The findings are supported by extensive robustness checks using alternative model specifications, including binary logit, ordinary least squares, and fixed-effects estimators. The results show that firm-level incentives remain central in explaining voluntary interim reporting behaviour following deregulation. Larger firms and firms with higher leverage are significantly more likely to report more frequently, consistent with stronger information demand and monitoring pressures from investors and creditors. At the i managerial level, CEO myopia is negatively associated with interim reporting frequency, indicating that short-term oriented executives are less inclined to support frequent disclosure in a voluntary reporting regime. Board governance mechanisms exhibit more nuanced effects. While several governance variables show limited direct associations with IRF, board composition plays an important moderating role. Higher board gender diversity and larger boards attenuate the negative relationship between CEO myopia and interim reporting frequency, suggesting that effective board oversight can constrain managerial short termism in disclosure decisions. Overall, this thesis contributes to the disclosure and corporate governance literature by providing comprehensive UK evidence on the determinants of voluntary interim reporting frequency in a post-deregulation setting. It demonstrates that interim reporting practices reflect the joint influence of firm-level economic incentives, managerial behavioural traits, and board-level governance mechanisms, offering important implications for regulators, investors, and corporate boards operating in voluntary disclosure environments
| Item Type: | Thesis (PhD) |
|---|---|
| Date Type: | Completion |
| Status: | Unpublished |
| Schools: | Schools > Business (Including Economics) |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | 1. Voluntary interim reporting 2. Reporting frequency 3. CEO myopia 4. Corporate governance 5. Board gender diversity 6. UK lister firms |
| Funders: | Saudi Cultural Bureau in London |
| Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 28 October 2026 |
| Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2026 11:10 |
| URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/190493 |
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