Auctioning immigration visas

Collie, David Robert ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3132-648X 2009. Auctioning immigration visas. Review of Development Economics 13 (4) , pp. 687-694. 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2009.00521.x

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Abstract

Freeman (2006) suggested that auctioning immigration visas and redistributing the revenue to native residents in the host country would increase migration from low-income to high-income countries. The effect of the auctioning of immigration visas, in the Ricardian model from Findlay (1982), on the optimal level of immigration for the host country is considered. It is shown that auctioning immigration visas will lead to a positive level of immigration only if the initial wage difference between the host country and the source country is substantial. The cost of the immigration visa is more than half the earnings of the immigrant worker.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HT Communities. Classes. Races
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Auctioning immigration visas; redistributing revenue; Ricardian model; immigrant worker
Publisher:	Blackwell Publishing
ISSN:	1363-6669
Last Modified:	19 Oct 2022 09:02
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/19810

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