Welfare in the Nash equilibrium in Export Taxes under Bertrand Duopoly

Clarke, Roger and Collie, David Robert ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3132-648X 2008. Welfare in the Nash equilibrium in Export Taxes under Bertrand Duopoly. Bulletin of Economic Research 60 (2) , pp. 183-189. 10.1111/j.0307-3378.2008.00273.x

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Abstract

In the Eaton and Grossman (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (1986), pp. 383–406) model of export taxes under Bertrand duopoly, it is shown that welfare in the Nash equilibrium in export taxes is always higher than welfare under free trade for both countries.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HA Statistics H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Uncontrolled Keywords:	imperfect competition ; Oligopoly ; Trade policy
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN:	0307-3378
Last Modified:	19 Oct 2022 09:49
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/22286

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