Keeping up with the Joneses: competition and the evolution of collusion

Dixon, Huw David ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9875-8965 2000. Keeping up with the Joneses: competition and the evolution of collusion. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 43 (2) , pp. 223-238. 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00117-7

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

An economy consists of many markets, each of which is a duopoly. Firms must earn normal-profits in the long-run if they have to survive. Normal-profits are interpreted as the long-run limit of average profits in the whole economy. We adopt an aspiration based model of firm behaviour, linking it to the economy with the requirement that in the long-run, the profit aspiration must be at least as great as normal-profits. We assume that the joint-profits can be maximized with symmetric payoffs, and with very few other assumptions are able to show that the (almost) global attractor is the cooperative outcome.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HT Communities. Classes. Races
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Aspirations; Learning; Evolution; Average-payoff
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0167-2681
Last Modified:	21 Oct 2022 09:53
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/38232

Citation Data

Cited 40 times in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item