Intentional side-effects of action

Scaife, Robin and Webber, Jonathan ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0529-5349 2013. Intentional side-effects of action. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2) , pp. 179-203. 10.1163/17455243-4681004

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Abstract

Certain recent experiments are often taken to show that people are far more likely to classify a foreseen side-effect of an action as intentional when that side-effect has some negative normative valence. While there is some disagreement over the details, there is broad consensus among experimental philosophers that this is the finding. We challenge this consensus by presenting an alternative interpretation of the experiments, according to which they show that a side-effect is classified as intentional only if the agent considered its relative importance when deciding on the action. We present two new experiments whose results can be explained by our hypothesis but not by any version of the consensus view. In the course of doing so, we develop a methodological critique of the previous literature on this topic and draw from it lessons for future experimental philosophy research.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Experimental philosophy; Joshua Knobe; Side-effects; Intentional action; Moral psychology
Publisher:	Brill
ISSN:	1740-4681
Related URLs:	http://www.jonathanwebber.co.uk/articles...
Last Modified:	21 Oct 2022 10:09
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/39238

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