Possibilistic Boolean games: strategic reasoning under incomplete information

De Clercq, Sofie, Schockaert, Steven ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9256-2881, De Cock, Martine and Nowé, Ann 2014. Possibilistic Boolean games: strategic reasoning under incomplete information. Presented at: JELIA 2014: 14th European Conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence, Funchal, Madeira, Portugal, 24-26 September 2014. Published in: Fermé, Eduardo and Leite, Joao eds. Logics in Artificial Intelligence: 14th European Conference, JELIA 2014, Funchal, Madeira, Portugal, September 24-26, 2014. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Lecture Notes in Computer Science , vol.8761 Springer, pp. 196-209. 10.1007/978-3-319-11558-0_14

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Abstract

Boolean games offer a compact alternative to normal-form games, by encoding the goal of each agent as a propositional formula. In this paper, we show how this framework can be naturally extended to model situations in which agents are uncertain about other agents’ goals. We first use uncertainty measures from possibility theory to semantically define (solution concepts to) Boolean games with incomplete information. Then we present a syntactic characterization of these semantics, which can readily be implemented, and we characterize the computational complexity.

Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Computer Science & Informatics
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Publisher:	Springer
ISBN:	9783319115573
ISSN:	0302-9743
Last Modified:	27 Oct 2022 10:01
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/68590

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