Gratuitous violence and the rational offender model

Foreman-Peck, James ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9826-5725 and Moore, Simon 2009. Gratuitous violence and the rational offender model. [Working Paper]. Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff: Cardiff University.

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Abstract

Rational offender models assume that individuals choose whether to offend by weighing the rewards against the chances of apprehension and the penalty if caught. While evidence indicates that rational theory is applicable to acquisitive crimes, the explanatory power for gratuitous non-fatal violent offending has not been evaluated. Lottery-type questions elicited risk attitudes and time preferences from respondents in a street survey. Admitted violent behaviour was predictable on the basis of some of these responses. Consistent with the rational model, less risk averse and more impatient individuals were more liable to violence. Such people were also more likely to be victims of violence. In line with a ‘subjective’ version of the rational model, respondents with lower estimates of average violence conviction chances and of fines were more prone to be violent.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	Cardiff University
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	30 March 2016
Last Modified:	28 Oct 2022 10:19
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/77824

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