Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games

Ray, Indrajit ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5254-3144 and Snyder, Susan 2013. Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games. Journal of Mathematical Economics 49 (6) , pp. 471-477. 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.008

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Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Schools > Business (Including Economics)
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0304-4068
Last Modified:	31 Oct 2022 10:45
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/86050

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