Game theory via revealed preferences

Ray, Indrajit ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5254-3144 and Zhou, Lin 2001. Game theory via revealed preferences. Games and Economic Behavior 37 (2) , pp. 415-424. 10.1006/game.2001.0845

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Abstract

We investigate equilibrium notions in game theory from the revealed preference approach. For extensive game forms with complete information, we derive a set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for the observed outcomes to be rationalized by subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0899-8256
Last Modified:	31 Oct 2022 10:46
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/86072

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