Knowing one's own desires

Webber, Jonathan ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0529-5349 2016. Knowing one's own desires. Dahlstrom, Daniel O., Elpidorou, Andreas and Hopp, Walter, eds. Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches, Routledge Research in Phenomenology, Abingdon and New York: Routledge, pp. 165-179.

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Abstract

Do you know your own desires in some way that other people cannot know them? Richard Moran claims that his influential theory of first-person authority over beliefs and intentions can also cover desires. However, his deliberative model can apply to desire only if one already has some other way of knowing one’s own desires. Jean-Paul Sartre’s conception of pure reflection, on the other hand, portrays a direct epistemic access to one’s own desires that can ground fundamental first-person authority over desires and intentions.

Item Type:	Book Section
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Publisher:	Routledge
ISBN:	9780415705561
Related URLs:	Publisher
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	5 April 2016
Last Modified:	01 Nov 2022 09:31
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/88284

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