Tanesini, Alessandra ![]() ![]() |
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Abstract
Intellectual humility, I argue in this paper, is a cluster of strong attitudes (as these are understood in social psychology) directed toward one’s cognitive make-up and its components, together with the cognitive and affective states that constitute their contents or bases, which serve knowledge and value-expressive functions. In order to defend this new account of humility I first examine two simpler traits: intellectual self-acceptance of epistemic limitations and intellectual modesty about epistemic successes. The position defended here addresses the shortcomings of both ignorance and accuracy based accounts of humility.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | English, Communication and Philosophy |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
Publisher: | Wiley |
ISSN: | 0031-8205 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 20 May 2016 |
Date of Acceptance: | 6 May 2016 |
Last Modified: | 29 Nov 2024 14:30 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/91075 |
Citation Data
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