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An electoral calculus? Dual incentives and committee assignment in the UK's mixed-member legislatures

Poole, Ed Gareth ORCID: 2019. An electoral calculus? Dual incentives and committee assignment in the UK's mixed-member legislatures. Regional and Federal Studies 29 (4) , pp. 507-529. 10.1080/13597566.2018.1540980

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Although mixed-member electoral systems offer an apparent opportunity to observe how different rules shape politicians’ behaviour, ‘contamination’ between the SMD and PR-list tiers has frequently confounded academic work. Investigating Scotland and Wales’ mixed-member legislatures by exploiting their different chamber sizes and an unusual dual candidacy prohibition in Wales, modelling of committee assignments uncovers a split finding. Controlling for membership of the lead governing party, list members have a higher committee workload than their constituency colleagues, and members with previous employment experience in justice and health are more likely to be assigned to the corresponding subject committee once elected. Elsewhere, expectations that members might seek assignments that best suit theorized re-election interests are not found. The hypothesized influence of electoral rules is strongly conditioned by the small size of the legislature in Wales.

Item Type: Article
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: Cardiff Law & Politics
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISSN: 1359-7566
Date of First Compliant Deposit: 30 October 2018
Date of Acceptance: 23 October 2018
Last Modified: 07 Nov 2023 14:37

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