Chen, Jie, Goergen, Marc ![]() ![]() |
Preview |
PDF
- Accepted Post-Print Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives. Download (1MB) | Preview |
Abstract
This paper provides new evidence that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is symptomatic of agency problems associated with cronyism. We find that director abnormal compensation has a negative impact on the likelihood of CEO turnover and reduces the sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor stock performance. However, for firms with greater institutional ownership the adverse effects of director abnormal compensation are mitigated, and the negative impact of abnormal compensation on firm performance is reduced. These findings suggest that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is likely associated with agency problems.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | Business (Including Economics) |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
ISSN: | 0378-4266 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 17 April 2019 |
Date of Acceptance: | 27 March 2019 |
Last Modified: | 13 Nov 2024 17:00 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/121269 |
Citation Data
Cited 12 times in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data
Actions (repository staff only)
![]() |
Edit Item |