Explaining variation within the meta-problem

Irvine, Elizabeth ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1861-9533 2019. Explaining variation within the meta-problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10) , pp. 115-123.

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Abstract

It is a working assumption in much of the literature on the meta-problem that problem intuitions are (fairly) universal, and they are (fairly) universally treated as being psychological or rationally significant. I argue that variation in the universality and psychological or rational significance of problem intuitions is worth taking seriously, and that doing so places significant and challenging constraints on what an answer to the meta-problem might look like. In particular, it raises a potential challenge for (full-blown) realists on how solutions to the meta-problem link to the hard problem.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Imprint Academic
ISSN:	1355-8250
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	15 August 2019
Date of Acceptance:	10 July 2019
Last Modified:	02 Nov 2022 23:29
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/124923

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