Irvine, Elizabeth ![]() |
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Abstract
It is a working assumption in much of the literature on the meta-problem that problem intuitions are (fairly) universal, and they are (fairly) universally treated as being psychological or rationally significant. I argue that variation in the universality and psychological or rational significance of problem intuitions is worth taking seriously, and that doing so places significant and challenging constraints on what an answer to the meta-problem might look like. In particular, it raises a potential challenge for (full-blown) realists on how solutions to the meta-problem link to the hard problem.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | English, Communication and Philosophy |
Publisher: | Imprint Academic |
ISSN: | 1355-8250 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 15 August 2019 |
Date of Acceptance: | 10 July 2019 |
Last Modified: | 02 Nov 2022 23:29 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/124923 |
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