Paris, Panos ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2549-1075 2017. Scepticism about virtue and the five-factor model of personality. Utilitas 29 (4) , pp. 423-452. 10.1017/S0953820816000327 |
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Abstract
Considerable progress in personality and social psychology has been largely ignored by philosophers, many of whom still remain sceptical concerning whether the conception of character presupposed by virtue theory is descriptively adequate. Here, I employ the five-factor model of personality, currently the consensus view in personality psychology, to respond to a strong reading of the situationist challenge, whereby most people lack dispositions that are both cross-situationally consistent and temporally stable. I show that situationists rely on a false dichotomy between character traits and situations, and that evidence supports the empirical adequacy of the sorts of character traits presupposed by virtue ethics. Additionally, I suggest that the personality traits of the five-factor model are relevant to virtue theory, in so far as they are malleable, morally salient, and seem to structurally parallel Aristotelian virtues and vices. Thus, contra situationism, the five-factor model supports the descriptive adequacy of a virtue-theoretical framework.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | English, Communication and Philosophy |
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press (CUP) |
ISSN: | 0953-8208 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 3 October 2019 |
Last Modified: | 07 Nov 2023 05:55 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/125356 |
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