On form, and the possibility of moral beauty

Paris, Panos ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2549-1075 2018. On form, and the possibility of moral beauty. Metaphilosophy 49 (5) , 711--729. 10.1111/meta.12332

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Abstract

There is a tendency in contemporary (analytic) aesthetics to considerably restrict the scope of things that can be beautiful or ugly. This peculiarly modern tendency is holding back progress in aesthetics and robbing it of its potential contribution to other domains of inquiry. One view that has suffered neglect as a result of this tendency is the moral beauty view, whereby the moral virtues are beautiful and the moral vices are ugly. This neglect stems from an assumption to the effect that virtues and vices simply cannot be beautiful or ugly. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it develops an account of form, under which, it argues, possession of form suffices for an object’s candidature for beauty and ugliness. Second, it argues that, under the foregoing proposal, the moral beauty view turns out to be a coherent position, and so should be taken seriously in both aesthetics and ethics.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Wiley
ISSN:	0026-1068
Last Modified:	26 Oct 2022 07:38
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/125360

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