Rivalry, uncertainty, and militarized compellent threats

Atkinson, Douglas B. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4628-1664, Jackson, Joshua L. and Williford, George W. 2021. Rivalry, uncertainty, and militarized compellent threats. Journal of Global Security Studies 6 (1) , ogz079. 10.1093/jogss/ogz079

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Abstract

Rivalry scholars have done much to explain how rivalries begin and how they end, but much less attention had been paid to when states will choose to engage in militarized behavior that ultimately continues the rivalry. Uncertainty concerning the ability of an opponent’s willingness to continue to pay the costs associated with the rivalry periodically surface, and states eliminate this uncertainty by issuing threats designed to compel the enemy to make concessions on the underlying issue. States issue threats to signal their commitment to continue disputing the issue, or to force their opponent to reveal their ability to bear the costs of the dispute. We test our arguments across a large-n dataset and find support for our hypotheses.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Department of Politics and International Relations (POLIR) Cardiff Law & Politics
Subjects:	J Political Science > JZ International relations
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
ISSN:	2057-3189
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	20 December 2019
Date of Acceptance:	11 November 2019
Last Modified:	24 Nov 2024 06:30
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/127484

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