Responding to (un)reasonable requests by an authority

Pelligra, Vittorio, Reggiani, Tommaso ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3134-1049 and Zizzo, Daniel John 2020. Responding to (un)reasonable requests by an authority. Theory and Decision 89 , pp. 287-311. 10.1007/s11238-020-09758-0

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Abstract

We consider the notions of static and dynamic reasonableness of requests by an authority in a trust game experiment. The authority, modeled as the experimenter, systematically varies the experimental norm of what is expected from trustees to return to trustors, both in terms of the level of each request and in terms of the sequence of the requests. Static reasonableness matters in a self-biased way, in the sense that low requests justify returning less, but high requests tend to be ignored. Dynamic reasonableness also matters, in the sense that, if requests keep increasing, trustees return less compared to the same requests presented in random or decreasing order. Requests never systematically increase trustworthiness but may decrease it.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	Springer Verlag
ISSN:	0040-5833
Related URLs:	https://link.springer.com/article/10.100...
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	15 June 2020
Date of Acceptance:	17 May 2020
Last Modified:	07 Nov 2023 07:22
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/132396

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