Palermos, S.Orestis ![]() ![]() |
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Abstract
Within analytic philosophy, the existence of collective knowledge has been motivated by means of two apparently distinct, and in direct competition with one another, theoretical approaches: (i) the commitment model and (ii) the distributed model. This paper agues, however, that to fully account for collaborative knowledge—i.e., a special kind of collective knowledge—both models are required. In other words, there is at least one kind of collective knowledge, the account of which requires treating the two models not as competitors but as complementary to each other. If that’s correct, not only can we gain a deeper understanding of the specifics surrounding collaborative knowledge but also a clearer picture of the broader debate surrounding collective knowledge.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | English, Communication and Philosophy |
Additional Information: | This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License |
Publisher: | Springer |
ISSN: | 0039-7857 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 14 February 2022 |
Date of Acceptance: | 18 October 2021 |
Last Modified: | 04 Mar 2023 02:50 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/147427 |
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