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Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game

Dokka, Trivikram, Moulin, Hervé, Ray, Indrajit ORCID: and SenGupta, Sonali 2022. Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game. Review of Economic Design 10.1007/s10058-022-00299-2

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As in public good provisions, in a public bad situation such as abatement, the non-cooperative interplay of the participants typically results in low levels of quantities (provision or abatement). In a simple class of n-person quadratic games, we show how Coarse correlated equilibria, using simple mediation devices, can significantly outperform Nash equilibrium outcomes in terms of a stated policy objective.

Item Type: Article
Date Type: Published Online
Status: In Press
Schools: Business (Including Economics)
Additional Information: This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
Publisher: Springer
ISSN: 1434-4742
Date of First Compliant Deposit: 5 April 2022
Date of Acceptance: 7 March 2022
Last Modified: 10 Nov 2022 11:02

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