Competition and bank payout policy

De Cesari, Amedeo, Gilder, Dudley ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7039-762X, Huang, Winifred and Onali, Enrico 2024. Competition and bank payout policy. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 56 (7) , pp. 1737-1778. 10.1111/jmcb.13028

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Abstract

Leveraging branch-level data on bank deposits, we provide evidence of a negative impact of branching restrictions on payout ratios, which occurs only for banks with a low charter value, as proxied by the market-to-book ratio. The results for the market-to-book ratio extend to the Lerner index, the return on assets, and the Z-score, suggesting that risk-shifting incentives drive our results rather than signaling incentives or agency costs. Our results are robust to different proxies for banking competition and identification strategies, and bootstrap simulations suggest that our results are not due to confounding factors.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Publisher:	Wiley
ISSN:	1538-4616
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	28 November 2022
Date of Acceptance:	31 October 2022
Last Modified:	13 Nov 2024 15:15
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/154180

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