Gratuitous violence and the rational offender model

Foreman-Peck, James S. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9826-5725 and Moore, Simon Christopher ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5495-4705 2010. Gratuitous violence and the rational offender model. International Review of Law and Economics 30 (2) , pp. 160-172. 10.1016/j.irle.2010.03.003

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Abstract

Rational offender models assume that individuals choose whether to offend by weighing the rewards against the chances of apprehension and the penalty if caught. While evidence indicates that rational theory is applicable to acquisitive crimes, the explanatory power for gratuitous non-fatal violent offending has not been evaluated. Lottery-type questions elicited risk attitudes and time preferences from respondents in a street survey. Admitted violent behaviour was predictable on the basis of some of these responses. Consistent with the rational model, less risk averse and more impatient individuals were more liable to violence. Such people were also more likely to be victims of violence. In line with a 'subjective' version of the rational model, respondents with lower estimates of average violence conviction chances and of fines were more prone to be violent.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics) Dentistry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Violence; Alcohol; Risk; Intertemporal choice; Rational offending
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0144-8188
Last Modified:	05 Jan 2024 02:08
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/15856

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