Designing Donation Incentive Contracts for Online Gig Workers

Reggiani, Tommaso ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3134-1049 and Rilke, Rainer Michael 2023. Designing Donation Incentive Contracts for Online Gig Workers. Journal of Business Ethics 10.1007/s10551-023-05428-7

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Abstract

This study examines the effects of donation incentives on labor supply in an online labor market through a field experiment (n=944). We manipulate the donation purpose of the incentive to be either unifying or polarizing and the size of the donation relative to the workers’ wage. Our experimental design allows us to observe the decision to accept a job (extensive margin) and different dimensions of productivity (intensive margin). We predict and show that a unifying donation purpose attracts more gig workers and improves their productivity compared to a polarizing donation purpose. We discuss the implications of these results in order to understand the role of donation incentives and labor supply in online labor markets.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Published Online
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Social incentives; Labor supply; Online gig working; Experiment.
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	1573-0697
Funders:	GACR (Czechia - GA20-06785S)
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	15 May 2023
Date of Acceptance:	30 April 2023
Last Modified:	05 Dec 2023 15:32
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/159479

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