Assembling cybersecurity: the politics and materiality of technical malware reports and the case of Stuxnet

Stevens, Clare ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5685-7930 2019. Assembling cybersecurity: the politics and materiality of technical malware reports and the case of Stuxnet. Contemporary Security Policy 41 (1) , pp. 129-152. 10.1080/13523260.2019.1675258

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Abstract

This is an article about how cybersecurity gets “made,” with a focus on the role of commercial computer security firms in generating knowledge in matters of international cybersecurity. The argument is two-fold. Firstly, malware may be an intangible artefact in some ways, but its success and its interpretation as malware is deeply interwoven in social, technical, and material alliances. Secondly, a materialist-minded examination of Symantec’s Stuxnet reports will demonstrate the politically situated nature of how cybersecurity expertise emerges. The article finds that Symantec’s work was not a-political or neutrally-technical: Their experts made profoundly political choices in their analyses. By showing the processes that go into making cybersecurity, the article contributes to a widening and deepening of debates about what is at stake in cybersecurity knowledge and practices.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Published Online
Status:	Published
Schools:	Cardiff Law & Politics
Publisher:	Taylor and Francis Group
ISSN:	1352-3260
Last Modified:	04 Jan 2024 09:45
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/165171

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