Bailey, Ralph W., Kozlovskaya, Maria and Ray, Indrajit ![]() ![]() |
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Abstract
We analyse the conditions for a strategy profile to be an equilibrium in a specific buy and sell strategic market game, with two goods, using best responses of a player against random bids from the opponents. The difficulty in characterising mixed Nash equilbria is that the expected utility is not quasiconcave in strategies. We still prove that any mixed strategy Nash equilibrium profile in which every player faces only two random bids is trivial, that is, is a convex combination of some pure strategy Nash equilibria; moreover, we show that the outcome (the price and the allocations) is deterministic in such an equilibrium.
Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
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Status: | Unpublished |
Schools: | Business (Including Economics) |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Publisher: | CRETA, Department of Economics, University of Warwick |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 29 January 2024 |
Last Modified: | 29 Jan 2024 15:00 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/165659 |
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